[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 30 (Thursday, March 9, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1934-S1935]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             PORT SECURITY

  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak a little bit about Iran 
and about the outrageous comments by the Iranians threatening the 
United States of America and continuing their perilous path to try to 
obtain nuclear weapons. But before I do that, I have to respond as I 
listened to the discussion about port security.
  I am chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation. For 2 
years we have been looking at the issue of port security. We have 
looked at the possibility of someone bringing a nuclear bomb into this 
country, or weapons in one of the over 11 million cargo containers that 
come in from the seas.
  We have before us a situation and the prospect of UAE Dubai Ports 
World taking over a number of American ports on the east coast. It has 
raised a lot of concern, as it should. But some of the rhetoric is a 
little aboveboard.
  When I say that, we need to do everything in our power to make sure 
that we are safe and secure. Ports are points of entry, and there are 
areas of vulnerability. This deal has raised very legitimate concerns.
  First and foremost was the process. The process, while we look at 
foreign investment in the United States, as I would describe it, a pre-
9/11 process and a post-9/11 world, about 1,500 of these have been done 
on a 30-day expedited basis.
  When folks at the sub-Cabinet level looked at this--folks in 
Treasury, Homeland Security, other agencies of the administration 
looked at this--they saw that we were talking about taking control of 
ports, and, yes, by the UAE. It raises security issues. Under the law 
that calls for a 45-day review. It didn't happen. That was a mistake. 
That was the wrong thing. It was a violation of the law. It was a bad 
process and the process needs to be changed. But we have to tone down 
the rhetoric a little bit.
  It is interesting. I have been, again, a major critic of the process. 
I signed a bipartisan letter with my colleague from New York, Senator 
Schumer, with Senator Clinton from New York, and with both Senators 
from New Jersey. We signed a bipartisan letter that said we demand that 
this go back to the 45-day process; we demand that we take a close and 
serious look at it and we make sure we have looked at all the security 
concerns. Then, at the end of that 45-day process, we demanded that 
Congress have the right to review the conclusion. If the conclusion 
from our perspective did not appear to be in the best interests of our 
national security, we would then note our disapproval and the deal 
wouldn't go through. We had a bipartisan agreement to do that.
  Today, clearly the American public is deeply concerned, as they 
should be. But instead of going through the process--by the way, we 
pride ourselves as being the greatest deliberative body in the world--
instead of allowing the process to go through with Congress then being 
briefed, having the hearings--we have had to some degree, and we need 
more. We heard from the folks who made the decision in front of the 
Homeland Security Committee. They explained what happened. Then we went 
into private session. We went into the secure room in this building and 
had classified material. We had a review. We listened. We understand 
the review is ongoing. Nothing is going to change. There is no change 
in the status quo. Dubai is not going to be taking over any American 
port until the CFIUS process is done, not until the President has 
exercised his authority under law and until we in Congress have a 
review.

  My colleagues are talking about this is our only chance to stop this 
deal, and we have to act now. This is policymaking by poll taking. 
Clearly, the American public has been concerned, as they should be.
  We have put in place a process by which there is a 45-day time to 
review. We have called for and demanded congressional oversight of that 
and the opportunity to be heard, and we will get that. We need to be 
assured that we are going to get that.
  But to somehow communicate to the American public that this is our 
only chance and terrible things are going to happen if we do not stand 
up and stop this today is really more about pandering to the fears of 
the moment than doing what we are supposed to do in this bill; that is, 
be deliberative and thoughtful.
  I have some deep concerns about the history regarding UAE--deep 
concerns about the trafficking of nuclear materials by Dr. Kahn from 
Pakistan. I have concerns about the UAE when they recognized the 
Taliban, as they did, by the way, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
  One of our strongest allies today in the war on terror is Pakistan. 
Are my colleagues presuming that somehow we

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should be cutting off relations with Pakistan? I don't think so. They 
say there were concerns about what they did, but now they work with us.
  I believe we have about 500 to 700 naval ships that are docked in the 
UAE on a regular basis. Our ability to fight the war on terror is 
dependent in part on the partnership we have with the UAE. They support 
us in the war in Afghanistan. We have a changed situation in the post-
9/11 world. We have an ally whose policy I don't like when it comes to 
boycotting Israel. That is something that deeply troubles me, and it 
should be a factor that we look into. But the bottom line is you can't 
pick out all the negatives and not recognize in this post-9/11 world 
that we have a country that has been an ally, that does billions in 
trade with us. We put the safety of our sailors in their hands at their 
ports.
  I think we have to look at the whole picture and allow the review to 
go forward with an understanding that nothing is going to happen within 
45-days--no change of ownership and no increase in security problems.
  Let me briefly try to address the overall issue of port security and 
container security. Some of us have been working on that before the 
issue became the issue de jour, the issue of the day. I have been to 
Hong Kong and looked at the operation. I have been at the Port of L.A. 
I have looked at the radiation portals, the radiation portal monitors 
that we have in various places throughout this country.
  The reality is that today there are 11 million cargo containers 
coming into this country, and we actually closely look at perhaps 1 in 
20--5 percent. That is what we look at. We have a system. It is not a 
random system. It is a targeted system. These are things that are based 
on the manufacturer, where the cargo came from, and a range of things--
who the shipper is and who the receiving company is. We are looking at 
1 in 20. We need to do better.
  One of the things we should be doing--and I had a chance to review 
this when I was in Hong Kong. They have part of their operation in 
which they have put in place American technology. They are actually 
able to literally, almost like a moving CAT scan--as the trucks come 
from mainland China with the goods being sent to the United States, 
they don't stop. They just keep coming in. They go through two portals. 
You get a screening. You can see what is inside the vehicle. At the 
same time, right at the very end, there is a radiation portal monitor 
which gives us an indication of whether there is any nuclear material 
in that cargo.
  At the same time, the operators--the folks who are watching this--
have a manifest of what is in it. If the manifest says X-thousand DVDs 
and all of a sudden you see a big, solid kind of cylindrical object, 
you have a problem. You stop it and do further inspection. You take a 
look at it. They have an opportunity to screen 100 percent of that. 
That should be the standard we set.
  I am introducing this morning a bill that will require the Department 
of Homeland Security to put in place a system to screen each and every 
one of the cargo containers that come into this country. That is the 
kind of security we need. In addition to that--and I believe the UAE 
deal represents a concern, even though security is being done, 
certainly, at home by the Coast Guard and Homeland Security, even 
though the reality is that cargo security starts at overseas ports, it 
is not when it comes into our waters--we have, I believe, 41 agreements 
called the ``Container Security Initiative.'' We have the Department of 
Homeland Security sitting side by side in foreign countries with 
personnel who run their ports looking at every manifest that comes in, 
making some judgments about what is inspected and not inspected. At the 
same time, we have an agreement with private security, CT-PAT, 
Partnership Against Terrorism. We work, then, on the private side to 
have measures in place that will increase the measure of safety and 
security that we have regarding these containers coming in.

  The bottom line is, I am concerned if we have a foreign entity that 
is owning or operating an American port, that they would have access, 
then, to our security procedures. That raises concerns.
  The other reality is that 80 percent of the terminals in the United 
States are foreign owned--either foreign companies, or in some cases--
by the way, I say to my colleague from California, there are four port 
operations on the west coast that are foreign owned by foreign 
countries--three by Singapore and one by China.
  Do we feel any safer that China owns a major American port operation? 
The reality is there hasn't been a problem, by the way, until this 
deal. Now we hear there is a crisis. Now we have to hear we have to act 
today.
  What is happening today is it is about politics. That is what is 
happening today. We had an understanding that we should have a 45-day 
review, that we should have access to then participate in that and look 
at the information as it comes in. And we should have a clear 
opportunity to make a judgment about that 45-day review.
  We have something else today. But the bottom line, again, is that 
part of the bill that I will introduce today will require a separation 
of ownership, and we can't unravel 80 percent of the terminals that are 
foreign owned, foreign operations. Each of these operations should have 
an American company, folks who are operating these ports who understand 
the security procedures. They should be vetted. They should be cleared. 
We should know who they are.
  If we can separate operations from ownership, if we can make sure we 
have in place a system whereby each and every piece of cargo in a 
container that is coming into this country--the 11 million that come in 
by ship, and then if we can reform the CFIUS process so it is more 
transparent, so Congress has a chance to review these things before 
they happen, we will be much better served. That is the way this 
deliberative body should act rather than playing with the politics, to 
demand that we have to do something today when, in fact, we have a 
process, a review process. We should let it go forward and not allow 
anything to change until our will has been heard, then do the things 
that we have to do to check out each and every piece of material coming 
into this country, require Homeland Security do that, and, as I said 
before, separate the operation of ports, where we have folks we can 
vet, who we can check out, those who own it.
  By the way, we have, I believe, about $100 billion of foreign 
investment in this country. That is a good thing. It is called jobs for 
Americans, economic security, national security. Let us strengthen our 
national security when it comes to cargo container security, but let us 
not act on politics at the moment.

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