[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 22 (Monday, February 27, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1508-S1509]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. COLLINS:
  S.J. Res. 32. A joint resolution disapproving the results of the 
review conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) into the purchase of Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation (P&O) by Dubai Ports World (DP World); to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a joint resolution 
disapproving the conclusion of the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States, CFIUS, to allow Dubai Ports World, DP World, to take 
over certain port operations in the United States. My colleague and 
good friend, Congresswoman Jane Harman, will be introducing this 
resolution in the House of Representatives.
  This resolution would do the following: 1. Disapprove the CFIUS 
review of the transaction; 2. direct the CFIUS to conduct a 45-day 
investigation in order to ensure that the sale will not have an adverse 
effect on national security; and 3. direct CFIUS to brief Members of 
Congress on the findings of its investigation before the transaction is 
allowed to proceed if the Committee maintains that it should go forth.
  The pending sale raises potential maritime security concerns. The 
sale would transfer control of Peninsular & Oriental, P&O, Ports North 
America to DP World, a foreign government-owned entity. P&O Ports has 
extensive terminal and stevedoring operations along the eastern 
seaboard and on the gulf coast. It encompasses not only terminal 
facility leases in six major U.S. ports, as has been reported widely in 
the media, but also stevedoring and terminal operations in a total of 
21 U.S. ports, including my home State in Portland, ME.
  We have long acknowledged the vulnerability of our ports--both as a 
potential target and as a conduit through which terrorists, their 
weapons or other contraband may enter the U.S. coming from a State with 
three international cargo ports, I am keenly aware of the importance of 
our seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which 
they are located. In addition to our ports' economic significance, the 
link between maritime security and our national security is evident.
  The attacks of 9/11 have forced us to reassess and rebuild our entire 
approach to security. Against an enemy determined to cause maximum harm 
to both the American people and the American economy, we are building a 
structure that, in great part, relies upon private-public partnerships. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in our ports--where terminal 
operators, longshoremen, port authorities, importers, carriers, and 
others have worked with the United States Coast Guard, Customs and 
Border Protection, and state and local law enforcement to put security 
plans in place.
  The foreign government in question, that owns DP World, is the 
government of Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates, UAE. While UAE 
is an ally in the war on terrorism, it also has been used as a base of 
terrorist operations and financing. In fact, the 9/11 Commission 
reported that UAE was ``both a valued counterterrorism ally of the 
United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem.'' The attacks 
of 9/11 were planned in part in the UAE, and much of the financing for 
those operations was funneled through the UAE banking system. The facts 
warrant a thorough 45-day investigation by CFIUS, not a cursory review.
  This incident has revealed significant shortcomings in the CFIUS 
process. It is not adequately transparent and does not provide for 
sufficient oversight reporting to appropriate committees and the 
leadership of Congress. The Exon-Florio provision of the Defense 
Production Act gives the President the authority to suspend or prohibit 
any foreign acquisition, merger or takeover of a U.S. corporation that 
is determined to threaten the national security of the U.S. Through 
Executive order, the President established the CFIUS to review 
transactions pursuant to Exon-Florio and make a recommendation 
regarding the exercise of his authority. It may be appropriate for the 
reviews, which may involve proprietary data and classified information, 
to be held confidential. However, once a decision has been reached by 
the CFIUS, it is wholly appropriate, and even necessary, that Members 
of Congress be briefed on the findings of the review and the basis for 
the decision.
  I am truly troubled by the review process that was followed with 
respect to this purchase. The more I learn, the more questions are 
raised. The law requires a 45-day investigation in cases where an 
acquirer is controlled by a foreign government, as in the case of DP 
World, and the acquisition could affect the national security of the 
U.S.

[[Page S1509]]

However, the CFIUS did not conduct an investigation, as the plain 
language of the statute would demand.
  I am pleased that, in a recent development, the administration has 
agreed to undertake a 45-day investigation as a result of discussions 
with DP World and congressional leadership. Perhaps its recommendation, 
once briefed to Congress, will allay concerns that have been raised. 
Perhaps the national security implications, apparent on the face of the 
deal, will be adequately addressed through a more rigorous process. 
Given the remaining uncertainties, however, I felt it was important to 
proceed with the introduction of this resolution, in conjunction with 
my colleague in the House, Congresswoman Harman.
  The silver lining of recent events is that they have served to 
highlight the critical importance of port security to our Nation. Last 
November, Senator Murray and I introduced the GreenLane Maritime Cargo 
Security Act of 2005. This comprehensive legislation authorizes $835 
million annually for programs and initiatives to better secure our 
Nation's ports.
  It would help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port 
security across all levels of government and with our overseas trading 
partners, improving our Nation's security as it expedites trade with 
those governments and businesses that join in this goal.
  The bill addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain security 
efforts, directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a 
strategic plan to enhance security for all modes of transportation by 
which containers arrive in, depart from, or move through seaports of 
the United States. The strategic plan also must include protocols for 
the resumption of trade in the case of an incident.
  This legislation recognizes that America's ports, large and small, 
are our partners in keeping our Nation safe and our economy strong.
  I seek my colleagues support both for this resolution and for the 
GreenLane bill.

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