

never shied away from firsts. She was the first woman to serve on the advisory board of what is now known as Texas Utilities and was later the first woman from East Texas to be named to the Texas Utilities governing board.

The reason she deserves the honor itself does not lie in the fact that she is a woman, but in the beauty and generosity of her heart and soul. Through all of her many endeavors and accomplishments, she remains a wonderful wife to her husband, Archie, and a magnificent mother to their two sons, Tucker and Christopher.

I am proud to say she is not only a great friend of East Texas, but she is a friend of mine. Madam Speaker, with this one piece of advice to anyone encountering Judy, if she is pushing a project, you have two options: number one, get on board; or, number two, get run over.

SOCIAL SECURITY

(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, in the President's budget he asks for a few hundred million dollars over the next few years for the cost of privatizing Social Security. When he was here at the State of the Union address, he commented that Congress rejected his proposals to privatize Social Security. All the Democrats to his surprise got up and cheered, because we think it is a terrible idea to privatize Social Security.

To do to Social Security what they are doing to the pension system, eliminating private pensions and making people depend only on 401(k)s, we think is a terrible idea. What the President telegraphed, by putting in his budget the money to pay for the cost of privatizing Social Security, is that if the Republicans retain control of Congress in this election, they are going to try it again.

They will privatize Social Security if the Republicans control Congress again next year. If anybody thinks that privatizing Social Security is a bad idea, that we should not destroy Social Security, you better vote Democratic this year.

□ 1015

RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION REGARDING IRAN

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, pursuant to the previous order of the House, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 341) condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 341

Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the Treaty, "not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices";

Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the "Safeguards Agreement"), which requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear materials and activities to ensure that such materials and activities are not diverted to any military purpose and are used for peaceful purposes and activities;

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities;

Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and stated that the suspension would cover all activities at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed material for enrichment, and the importation of any enrichment-related items;

Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the IAEA was invited to verify, including the suspension of the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with or without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, the suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent practicable, the withdrawal of nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment facility;

Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited the IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the suspension of enrichment activities applied to all facilities in Iran;

Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with "serious concern

that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution", and also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;

Whereas the same resolution also noted "with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved";

Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran's nuclear program (commonly referred to as the "Paris Agreement"), securing a formal commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic, technological, political, and security issues;

Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization announced it has mastered the technique of using biotechnology to extract purer uranium, adding that this method "substantially decreases the cost . . . in the process that leads to the production of yellowcake", which is a part of the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;

Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that "if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security";

Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the Safeguards Agreement constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters concerning Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for "a world without America" and his desire "to wipe Israel off the map" and has subsequently denied the existence of the Holocaust;

Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research efforts;

Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;

Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, "[i]t is obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N. Security Council";

Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, "The Iranian government and nation has no

fear of the Western ballyhoo and will continue its nuclear programs with decisiveness and wisdom.”;

Whereas the United States joined with the Governments of Britain, France, and Germany in calling for a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss Iran's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations;

Whereas on February 4, 2006, Resolution GOV/2006/14 of the IAEA Board of Governors relayed an “absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002”;

Whereas Resolution GOV/2006/14 further expressed “serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components”;

Whereas on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations to the Security Council;

Whereas Iran has, since February 4, 2006, taken additional steps confirming its unwillingness to comply with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations; and

Whereas Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism for over two decades and the Department of State has declared in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism that Iran “remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism”: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress—

(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms the many breaches and failures of the Government of Iran to comply faithfully with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations, including its obligations under the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the “Safeguards Agreement”), as reported by the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors since 2003;

(2) commends the efforts of the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek a meaningful and credible suspension of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities and to find a diplomatic means to address the non-compliance of the Government of Iran with its obligations, requirements, and commitments related to nuclear nonproliferation;

(3) calls on all members of the United Nations Security Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in response to the report of Iran's noncompliance in fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to respond to and deal with situations bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security;

(4) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;

(5) calls on all responsible members of the international community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons; and

(6) urges the President to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning Iran's violation of its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan). Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, February 15, 2006, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) each will control 30 minutes.

Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in opposition.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Reserving the right to object, we understand that the ranking member is on his way, and he seeks time on the bill. Therefore, accordingly, I would object to that request.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 341, a resolution that I had the pleasure of drafting with my good friends, the distinguished chairman of the House International Relations Committee, HENRY HYDE, and our ranking member, Congressman TOM LANTOS.

I want to express my appreciation to our leadership for recognizing the importance for the House to be heard on this important issue and for moving this resolution expeditiously to the floor today.

Madam Speaker, for at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert nuclear program using multiple approaches and technology to achieve a nuclear status. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuges, including at facilities owned by military industrial organizations.

It has sought completion of a heavy water reactor that would be well suited for plutonium production, while seeking uranium enrichment through the use of lasers.

The Iran saga within the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency began almost 4 years ago. Every step along the way, Iran has dem-

onstrated contempt for the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has mocked the EU 3 nations composed of France, Great Britain and Germany, as they provided incentives to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activities.

It is important to quickly summarize the sequence of events of the last few years, Madam Speaker, in order to fully comprehend the need for this resolution as a basis for stronger legislative action regarding Iran.

In November of 2003, for example, the IAEA reported that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for close to two decades and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, had carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, it had separated plutonium, and it had concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities.

That same month, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency of its decision to temporarily suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. It stated that the suspension would cover all activities in the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed material for enrichment and the importation of any enrichment-related items.

But that was not to be, Madam Speaker. Iran continuously reinterpreted its commitment. By September of 2004, Iran announced that it had resumed large-scale uranium conversion. The International Atomic Energy Agency called on Iran to stop. Then Secretary of State Colin Powell called for the Iran case to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions to be imposed.

Faced with this possibility, Iran temporarily halts these activities in those nuclear facilities known to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the EU 3.

By April of 2005, Iran announces that it will resume uranium conversion in the Isfahan facility. This was met with a warning from the EU 3 that their negotiations on trade and economic incentives with Iran would end if Iran acted on this threat.

In August of 2005, the new radical leader is installed as Iran's new president. Immediately following, Iran proceeded to remove the International Atomic Energy Agency seals on the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, announced that it could successfully use biotechnology for its nuclear program, decreasing the cost for the production of the feed material for nuclear weapons. It announced that it would provide nuclear technology to other Islamic states. Iran's defense minister said that it is Iran's absolute right to have access to nuclear arms, and Iran's leader publicly stated his willingness to share nuclear expertise with other Islamic nations.

The IAEA inspectors were finally allowed into the Parchin military site. However, after all the time Iran was

given to sanitize this site, that is to hide, to remove all signs of their nuclear activities, even IAEA inspectors and foreign diplomats acknowledged in news reports that they did not expect the inspections to yield any firm results.

Experts further noted that there may be no nuclear material present at Parchin if the Iranians did dry testing of nuclear bomb simulations.

Fast forward to Tuesday of this very week. Madam Speaker, on Valentine's Day, 2006, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization announced it has restarted uranium enrichment efforts which could also be developed for use in nuclear weapons.

In sum, referral of the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council has been a long time coming. We are gratified that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors earlier this month voted to report the Iran case to the Security Council, but it should not stop there, Madam Speaker.

H. Con. Res. 341 therefore calls on all members of the U.N. Security Council to immediately consider the report and take the necessary steps to address Iran's behavior. The resolution frames the debate by condemning in the strongest possible terms the Iranian regime's repeated violations of its international obligations.

More importantly, it underscores that, as a result of these violations, Iran no longer has the right to develop any aspect of a nuclear fuel cycle.

As President Bush stated on February 11, 2004, proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and the infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.

H. Con. Res. 341 reiterates previous U.S. calls to responsible members of the international community to impose economic sanctions to deny Iran the resources and the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

But the grave threat posed by Iran is not limited to its nuclear pursuit. H. Con. Res. 341 therefore refers to Iran's support for Islamic jihadist activities worldwide.

Madam Speaker, it includes language highlighting that Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for over two decades and, according to our own State Department reports on global terrorism, it remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism worldwide.

Madam Speaker, too much time has already passed. Let us not waste anymore. Let us begin by adopting this resolution and send a strong message to the Iranian regime and other potential proliferators that this behavior will not be tolerated.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support of this resolution. Madam Speaker, unless the inter-

national community acts quickly and decisively, the world's chief terrorist state may soon possess the greatest weapon of terror ever created.

A critical first step was taken on February 2 at an emergency session of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors. By a vote of 27-3 they reported Iran's history of deception, lies and noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council.

The ayatollahs of terror in Tehran were sent a bold and unambiguous message that their clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons and their transparent lies of peaceful intent will no longer be tolerated by the civilized world.

Madam Speaker, Tehran sponsors terrorism as an official state policy. I wish to repeat this. Tehran sponsors terrorism as official state policy.

I ask my colleagues to imagine this terrorist state armed with nuclear weapons and in possession of large amounts of nuclear weapons material. Even if it did not put these destructive materials up for sale, a nuclear armed Iran would terrorize and destabilize the entire Middle East. Terrorist-in-chief Ahmadinejad himself advocates wiping Israel from the map.

Madam Speaker, Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and reneged on every single commitment it has made. The International Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs, equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply Libya. Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear bomb. There is every reason to believe that Tehran has acquired actual bomb blueprints, as Libya used to do.

Iran has also reneged on its remaining empty assurances to negotiate in good faith with Britain, France and Germany by breaking the international seals on its uranium enrichment facility.

Ahmadinejad, in a rare moment of lucidity, revealed Tehran's view of the relative balance of power in these negotiations; and I quote, "the West needs us more than we need them."

With billions of dollars of existing western investment in Iran's oil and gas fields, Tehran's ruling elite has shrewdly calculated that the West will not impose far-reaching and meaningful sanctions against Iran over the nuclear issue.

Madam Speaker, we must change Tehran's calculations, hopefully by diplomacy and pressure but with international sanctions if necessary. The United Nations Security Council should require all members of the U.N. to reject any and all investment and nonhumanitarian trade with Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear fuel and weapon material production capabilities.

□ 1030

But, Madam Speaker, we cannot wait for the Security Council to act. Re-

sponsible European and Asian governments must immediately ensure that their companies, banks, and other financial organizations will suspend and terminate their existing investments in Iraq.

Some banks and oil companies are already leaving Iran over just the possibility of sanctions. Those that remain must be given immediate incentives by the international community to stop business as usual with a developing nuclear weapon terrorist state. As part of this, the United States must finally use the sanctions authority in U.S. law to punish and deter those who continue to invest in and thereby aid and abet a state bent on adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal of terror.

Madam Speaker, this is the first resolution of the year regarding Iran. I guarantee you it will not be the last one. We must reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act, which will be accomplished through the Iran Freedom Support Act, a bill offered by my good friend, the gentlewoman from Florida, and myself.

Madam Speaker, our allies in Europe have learned a hard lesson: playing nice with a terrorist regime gets you nothing. Now that the Europeans are with us in demanding Security Council action, it is imperative that they take the next step by imposing a comprehensive sanctions regime against Tehran.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. GINGREY).

Mr. GINGREY. Madam Speaker, first of all, let me thank the gentlewoman from Florida for allowing me to speak on this resolution, and also let me thank the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) and completely associate myself with the remarks that he just made. I think he is right on target.

Madam Speaker, the passage of yesterday's resolution on the Palestinian Authority once again expressed our position against funding an ideology of terror in hope of maintaining the peace process in the Middle East. Today's resolution has a more direct message with the prospect, hopefully, of addressing the entire world.

In our current struggle against terrorism, no country is more uncertain and dangerous than Iran. With an uncompromising foreign policy and repressed trade, it often feels like the only commodity that Iran exports involves disdain for Western culture. It is indeed disheartening to see a nation of good people commandeered by an individual with nuclear aspirations. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran must not be allowed to carry out threats against Israel, the United States, or any other peaceful nation. Nuclear weapons and the ideology of Wahabism are a dangerous combination, and they must be prevented.

So, Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution. I commend the gentlewoman from Florida and the gentleman from California for bringing it forward. I believe it is time for the United Nations Security Council to take action against nuclear proliferation in Iran, and I ask the leaders of Iran to reconsider the path that they have chosen.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), the distinguished ranking member of our Armed Services Committee.

Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for allowing me to make comments on this, and I compliment the gentlewoman from Florida for her leadership in this regard as well.

I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This condemns Iran for violating its nonproliferation agreements and expresses support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

Thank you, Mr. LANTOS, for the opportunity to briefly address House Concurrent Resolution 341 on the Iranian nuclear situation. I think it is deadly serious.

Madam Speaker, the situation in Iran is a critical matter that demands serious attention and serious action from this administration as well as from Congress. It threatens the security of our Nation, the future of the nonproliferation regime and stability in the Middle East.

International support for referring Iran to the United Nations Security Council is very encouraging, but it is not enough to address the complexity of the nuclear situation or broader longer-term problems posed by Iran, including its involvement in Iraq, which evidently is quite substantial.

Direct American leadership is long overdue. There must be a comprehensive interagency effort to develop and implement the necessary plan, and Congress must do its part. This must be a top bipartisan priority. And yet while the U.S. must act expeditiously, it must also act effectively. We must sufficiently consider all tools at our disposal, and we must take care not to inadvertently make matters worse by our rhetoric or by our actions.

For example, we should consider "smart sanctions" that would target Iran's leadership, avoid harming the Iranian population and have strong international support.

There are no easy answers or simple solutions; but as I have emphasized numerous times now, there are many tools at our disposal, many more than this administration has used to date. I am committed to doing whatever I can to effectively address the problems posed by Iran, and I ask my colleagues to join me in this effort.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PAUL), a member of the International Relations Committee.

(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time.

I rise to express a note of caution regarding this resolution. I see this resolution somewhat like some of the resolutions that we debated and passed prior to our commitment to go into Iraq. As a matter of fact, some of the language is very similar. If you substitute the word "Iraq" for "Iran," you would find out that these concerns are very similar.

I do not quite have the concern that others have expressed that Iran is on the verge of having a nuclear weapon. They have never been found in violation. There has been a lot of talk and a lot of accusation, but technically they have never been found in any violation.

My concern for this type of language and these plans is that nothing ever changes. This is the type of thing that occurred before. Of course, we went into Iraq, and yet today the success in Iraq is very questionable. Fifty-five percent of the American people say it was a mistake to have gone into Iraq. Only forty percent of the people support staying in Iraq. Attitudes have shifted now since the success in Iraq has been so poor.

We went into Afghanistan to look for Osama bin Laden, and we sort of got distracted. We have forgotten about him just about completely. Instead we went into Iraq. Though the Iraq war is not going well, all of a sudden we are looking to take on another burden, another military mission. I find some things in the resolution that are very confrontational because it invokes sanctions. People say, well, sanctions are not that bad. That is no shooting or killing. But sanctions and boycotts and embargoes, these are acts of war. And, of course, many times our administration has expressed the sentiment that if necessary we are going to use force against Iran; we are going to start bombing. And why do we follow this policy? Especially since it literally helps the radicals in Iran. This mobilizes them. There is an undercurrent in Iran that is sympathetic to America, and yet this brings the radicals together by this type of language and threats. There is no doubt that our policy helps the hard-liners.

There has been no talk, it has been implied, but there has been no serious talk that Iran is a threat to our national security. There is no way. Even if they had nuclear weapons, they are not going to be a threat to our national security. Pakistan, that is not a democratic nation. It happens to be a military dictatorship. They have nuclear weapons. India has nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, the nuclear weapons serve as a balance of power between two countries. The Soviets, had 30,000 nuclear weapons, and we followed a policy of containment. We did not say

we have to go into the Soviet Union and bomb their establishment. No. Finally that problem dissipated. And yet we create unnecessary problems for ourselves. We go looking for trouble, and I see this as very detrimental for what we are doing with this resolution.

There is one portion of the resolution that concerns me about our urging the Russians and China to take a firm stand, and that has to do with the resolved clause No. 3; it says to the people of Russia and China to "expeditiously consider and take action in response to any report of Iran's non-compliance" in fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to respond and deal with situations . . .

Any report? I mean, some report in the newspaper? Is it an IAEA report? Or whatever. That is so open-ended that this is a risky, risky resolution.

I urge a "no" vote on this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, let me just indicate to my friend from Texas that he has now discovered the ultimate oxymoron, a benign Islamic fanaticism hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. This takes the concept of oxymoron to a new height.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4½ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), the distinguished Democratic whip.

Mr. HOYER. Madam Speaker, the international community, not just America, is being challenged again by a dangerous, deceptive lawbreaker whose defiant pursuit of nuclear weapons threaten America's national security interests as well as international peace and security. Now, this is an obligation that the Iranians undertook freely and voluntarily. It was not imposed upon them.

I believe that this grave and gathering danger commands the collective attention, effort, and action of the entire international community. This time the nations of the world which are committed to peace, security, and the rule of law must embrace their responsibilities, not flinch from them, as, unfortunately, has been too often the case.

Through this resolution today, the House speaks with one voice in condemning in the strongest possible terms the many breaches and failures of the government of Iran to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. In this resolution, we call on all responsible members of the international community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons and to encourage its people to get the government to change its dangerous and reckless policies.

□ 1045

We urge the members of the United Nations Security Council to take action in response to Iran's noncompliance with its international obligations.

Let no one harbor any illusions: The government of Iran, which is recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism,

believes it can exploit international irresolution, and it will prey on vacillation. The international community must stand as one against this lawbreaker, whose record leaves no doubt of its motivations.

Iran failed to properly disclose the existence of a fuel enrichment plant and facility at Natanz until both were revealed by opposition groups. It has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to report all nuclear material it has imported. It confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes, but only after it denied doing so. On February 4, in response to a 27-3 vote by the International Atomic Energy Agency board to report Iran to the Security Council, Iran ended voluntary cooperation with the agency and announced it would start large-scale enrichment activities.

I suggest to us and to our international allies that standing silent, standing back, standing without action, is not an option. It goes without saying that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the national security interests of the United States of America. Let me remind all of us, the gentleman from Texas indicated that they were not a threat to us. There are 250,000 Americans as we debate this resolution right now in range of Iranian weapons, so it is not just those who live in the Middle East who are put at risk, it is those of us who are there, and the security of the international community is put at risk.

Our concerns are only heightened by the inflammatory, irresponsible statements of the Iranian president, who has stated his hope for "a world without America." That is the nation that stands on the doorstep of becoming a nuclear power. He has further stated his desire to "wipe Israel off the map." The United States will not stand still for that. A regime that has the objective to have nuclear weapons will make the Middle East more dangerous in an extraordinary geometric way.

Madam Speaker, when the Security Council considers Iran's flagrant and deceptive abuse in March, I urge it to act as one. Today, I urge us to act as one in sending a very clear, very clear, unmistakable message: This will not stand.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH).

(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank my friend and indicate that I rise in opposition.

This rhetoric that we are hearing on the House floor from people who I have to say I do respect greatly is eerily reminiscent of the debate in this House prior to the United States authorizing an attack on Iraq. I think we can look back today and say that the U.S. rushed into war against Iraq, only to

find that there were no weapons of mass destruction.

Madam Speaker, I will include for the RECORD an article from the Washington Post dated August 2, 2005, which says, "A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredients for nuclear weapons, roughly doubling the previous estimate of 5 years." It goes on to say that "this carefully hedged assessment, which represents consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrasts with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted but have not offered proof that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal."

I also include for the record the remarks of Angela Merkel, who is the leader of Germany, who says that we have not used all of our available windows of opportunity. She saw an opportunity for a negotiated settlement. As a matter of fact, in this news dispatch out of Berlin from yesterday, the German chancellor says there are real chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing crisis over Iran's nuclear program.

Madam Speaker, I include for the record a news report out of Moscow and Tehran of yesterday which says that Iran and Russia will hold talks on Monday on a Russian offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran in the Russian territory. This would avert what is a building crisis.

Madam Speaker, I include for the record an analysis that was done of the joint resolution on Iraq, this was done by myself, that pointed out the flaws in a resolution that was presented to this House. This is an analysis from October 2, 2002, that relates to analyzing the Iraq resolution. I think this would be very valuable when you compare it side by side with the resolution that we have now.

Madam Speaker, I want to call to the Members' attention the same article that Mr. PAUL called to Members' attention, section 3 of the enactment clause, which calls on members of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in response to the report of Iran's non-compliance. This is in response to a report of Iran's non-compliance and fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to respond and deal with situations bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security.

The importance of this point and this amendment is that this point undermines and sets aside the only possibility for a peaceful resolution of this crisis, namely the offer by Russia to enrich uranium for Iran to use in its nuclear power plants. Iran would not operate any enrichment processing facilities of its own, so we have an opportunity to put aside this crisis if we see what is developing now. This resolution, unfortunately, would scuttle the

Russian-led negotiated settlement. I ask Members to consider that this resolution would put us on the threshold of war.

Now, I stand with Mr. LANTOS in defense of the right of Israel to survive. I voted for legislation yesterday that challenges any nation that would call for the destruction of Israel, and we should do that. But we don't have to go to war against Iran or to set the stage for a war against Iran when we have diplomatic means of resolving this. We should continue to pursue diplomacy.

Madam Speaker, I include the articles referred to earlier for the RECORD.

[From washingtonpost.com, Aug. 2, 2005]

IRAN IS JUDGED 10 YEARS FROM NUCLEAR BOMB

(By Dafna Linzer)

A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis.

The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that "all options are on the table."

The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the intelligence community views as credible indicators that Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the sources said there is no information linking those projects directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking.

The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior intelligence official familiar with the findings said that "it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons."

At no time in the past three years has the White House attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion. Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would require a large-scale nuclear energy program.

The NIE addresses those assertions and offers alternative views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are based on. Those familiar with the new judgments, which have not been previously detailed, would discuss only limited elements of the estimate and only on the condition of anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of the evidence on which it is based.

Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review, several administration officials said, as the White House formulates the next steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and competing strategies. For three years, the administration has tried, with limited success, to increase pressure on Iran by focusing attention on its nuclear program. Those efforts have been driven as much by international diplomacy as by the intelligence.

The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in January, is the first major

review since 2001 of what is known and what is unknown about Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by advocates of policies that were inconsistent with the intelligence judgments.

One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current officials said was commissioned by national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the possibility for "regime change" in Iran. Those findings described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's classified findings only on the condition of anonymity.

The new estimate takes a broader approach to the question of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer whether the country's ruling clerics will still be in control by the time the country is capable of producing fissile material. The administration keeps "hoping the mullahs will leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability," said an official familiar with policy discussions.

Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the president of national security developments and help guide policy. The new Iran findings were described as well documented and well written, covering such topics as military capabilities, expected population growth and the oil industry. The assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate annex to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders.

"It's a full look at what we know, what we don't know and what assumptions we have," a U.S. source said.

Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S. officials have continually estimated Iran to be "within five years" from reaching that same capability. So far, it has not.

The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, before "early to mid-next decade," according to four sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line with recently revised British and Israeli figures.

The estimate is for acquisition of fissile material, but there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be ready by then with an implosion device, sources said.

The time line is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect a program moving full speed ahead without major technical obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the European talks fall short of expectations.

Sources said the new timeline also reflects a fading of suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own separate and covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence of clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge research and development that could be linked to a nuclear program, four sources said.

Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on the missile program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings obtained last November. The documents include design modifications for Iran's Shahab-3 missile to make the room required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign officials said.

"If someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he has really good connections, he'll get that program through," said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction. "But that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear weapon."

The commission found earlier this year that U.S. intelligence knows "disturbingly little" about Iran, and about North Korea.

Much of what is known about Tehran has been learned through analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for more than two years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment, results of plutonium tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan—all of which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an energy program. Inspectors have found no proof that Iran possesses a nuclear warhead design or is conducting a nuclear weapons program.

The NIE comes more than two years after the intelligence community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program. The judgments were declassified and made public by the Bush administration as it sought to build support for invading Iraq five months later.

At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that new rules recently were imposed for crafting NIBs and that there would be "a higher tolerance for ambiguity," even if it meant producing estimates with less definitive conclusions.

The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative analysis and alternative theories that could explain some of the suspicious activities discovered in Iran in the past three years. Iran has said its nuclear infrastructure was built for energy production, not weapons.

Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is Iran's public explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18 years, because it feared attack by the United States or Israel if the work was exposed.

In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23 years earlier in Iraq.

In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton—then the administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador—said: "If we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons."

But the level of certainty, influenced by diplomacy and intelligence, appears to have shifted.

Asked in June, after the NIE was done, whether Iran had a nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, Robert G. Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: "I don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian records what the Iranian leaders have said . . . lead us to conclude that we have to be highly skeptical."

[From expatica.com, Feb. 15, 2006]

IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEAL IS STILL POSSIBLE: MERKEL

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Wednesday she still saw real chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing crisis over Iran's nuclear programme.

"We still have not used all our available window of opportunity," Merkel said in a

Stern magazine interview, adding that she saw "real chances for a negotiated solution."

Merkel said Iran had to recognize that its decision to resume uranium enrichment and to cut inspection rights for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had left Tehran isolated.

Germany, France and Britain—the EU-3—led talks over the past few years aimed at reaching a deal exchanging aid and trade for cut-backs in Iran's nuclear research which the US and many European countries believe is aimed at nuclear weapons.

But last month the EU-3 declared negotiations had reached a "dead end" and referred Iran to the IAEA which voted to send Tehran to the UN Security Council.

Tehran insists its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes.

[The Indian Express, Feb. 16, 2006]

URANIUM ENRICHMENT: IRAN, RUSSIA TALKS ON MONDAY

Iran and Russia will hold talks on Monday on a Russian offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran on Russian territory. "The Iran side has provided official notification on their arrival . . ." Interfax reported.

The confirmation from Iran comes a day after Iranian parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel had called for Venezuela to join his country in forming an alliance to counter threats from the world's nuclear powers during his visit to that country. He had accused the US of attacking Iran's nuclear programme in order to undermine Iran's independence.

Haddad Adel, part of the Iranian delegation, had thanked President Hugo Chavez's government for its "favorable position" towards Iran, especially its support on the International Atomic Energy Agency board earlier this month, when Venezuela voted against referring Iran to the UN Security Council.

Asked by reporters if Iran would accept Moscow's proposal to enrich uranium on Russian soil, Haddad Adel had said: "If that means we are deprived from peaceful use of nuclear energy . . . we could study the Russian proposal."

Haddad Adel had also denied his country had flouted international rules by resuming small-scale uranium enrichment activities at Natanz, the country's main enrichment plant. "All we've done is reinstate nuclear energy research at the laboratory level. We have not said anything new or committed any crime."

Iran's economy minister, meanwhile, warned that oil prices could rise to unexpected levels if the Islamic republic was subjected to sanctions over its disputed nuclear programme.

"Any sanctions in the current situation would be more detrimental for the West than for Iran," Davoud Danesh-Jaafari was quoted as saying by the state TV. "Iran is in a very important regional situation, and any disturbance of the economic and political situation of the country could turn the regional situation into a crisis and increase price of oil higher than what the West expects," he said.

"Iran has a high economic capacity, and by relying on its experience during the war (with Iraq from 1980-88) is ready to face any problem," he added.

ANALYSIS OF JOINT RESOLUTION ON IRAQ BY DENNIS J. KUCINICH

Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against an illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;

Key issue: In the Persian Gulf war there was an international coalition. World support was for protecting Kuwait. There is no world support for invading Iraq.

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;

Key issue: UN inspection teams identified and destroyed nearly all such weapons. A lead inspector, Scott Ritter, said that he believes that nearly all other weapons not found were destroyed in the Gulf War. Furthermore, according to a published report in the Washington Post, the Central Intelligence Agency has no up to date accurate report on Iraq's WMD capabilities.

Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;

Key issues: Iraqi deceptions always failed. The inspectors always figured out what Iraq was doing. It was the United States that withdrew from the inspections in 1998. And the United States then launched a cruise missile attack against Iraq 48 hours after the inspectors left. In advance of a military strike, the U.S. continues to thwart (the Administration's word) weapons inspections.

Whereas in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in "material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations" and urged the President "to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235);

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;

Key issues: There is no proof that Iraq represents an imminent or immediate threat to the United States. A "continuing" threat does not constitute a sufficient cause for war. The Administration has refused to provide the Congress with credible intelligence that proves that Iraq is a serious threat to the United States and is continuing to possess and develop chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. Furthermore there is no credible intelligence connecting Iraq to Al Qaida and 9/11.

Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the

region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;

Key issue: This language is so broad that it would allow the President to order an attack against Iraq even when there is no material threat to the United States. Since this resolution authorizes the use of force for all Iraq related violations of the UN Security Council directives, and since the resolution cites Iraq's imprisonment of non-Iraqi prisoners, this resolution would authorize the President to attack Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait citizens who may or may not be in Iraqi prisons, even if Iraq met compliance with all requests to destroy any weapons of mass destruction. Though in 2002 at the Arab Summit, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to bilateral negotiations to work out all claims relating to stolen property and prisoners of war. This use-of-force resolution enables the President to commit U.S. troops to recover Kuwaiti property.

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Key Issue: The Iraqi regime has never attacked nor does it have the capability to attack the United States. The "no fly" zone was not the result of a UN Security Council directive. It was illegally imposed by the United States, Great Britain and France and is not specifically sanctioned by any Security Council resolution.

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Key Issue: There is no credible intelligence that connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to participation in those events by assisting Al Qaida.

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens;

Key Issue: Any connection between Iraq support of terrorist groups in Middle East, is an argument for focusing great resources on resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It is not sufficient reason for the U.S. to launch a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq.

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Key Issue: There is no connection between Iraq and the events of 9/11.

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

Key Issue: There is no credible evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq has successfully concealed the

production of such weapons since 1998, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has the capability to reach the United States with such weapons. In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had a demonstrated capability of biological and chemical weapons, but did not have the willingness to use them against the United States Armed Forces. Congress has not been provided with any credible information, which proves that Iraq has provided international terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949;

Key Issue: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN resolutions.

Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President "to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677";

Key Issue: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN resolutions with military force.

Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1)," that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and "constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region," and that Congress, "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688";

Key Issue: This clause demonstrates the proper chronology of the international process, and contrasts the current march to war. In 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution asking for enforcement of its resolution. Member countries authorized their troops to participate in a UN-led coalition to enforce the UN resolutions. Now the President is asking Congress to authorize a unilateral first strike before the UN Security Council has asked its member states to enforce UN resolutions.

Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Key Issue: This "Sense of Congress" resolution was not binding. Furthermore, while Congress supported democratic means of removing Saddam Hussein it clearly did not endorse the use of force contemplated in this resolution, nor did it endorse assassination as a policy.

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to "work

with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge" posed by Iraq and to "work for the necessary resolutions," while also making clear that "the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable";

Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 ceasefire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;

Key Issue: Unilateral action against Iraq will cost the United States the support of the world community, adversely affecting the war on terrorism. No credible intelligence exists which connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to those terrorists who perpetrated 9/11. Under international law, the United States does not have the authority to unilaterally order military action to enforce UN Security Council resolutions.

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such persons or organizations;

Key Issue: The Administration has not provided Congress with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the events of 9/11.

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Key Issue: The Administration has not provided Congress with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the events of 9/11. Furthermore, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has harbored those who were responsible for planning, authorizing or committing the attacks of 9/11.

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Key Issue: This resolution was specific to 9/11. It was limited to a response to 9/11.

Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region;

Key Issue: If by the "national security interests" of the United States, the Administration means oil, it ought to communicate such to the Congress. A unilateral attack on Iraq by the United States will cause instability and chaos in the region and sow the seeds of future conflicts all over the world.

Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq".

SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to—

(a) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and

(b) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

Key Issue: Congress can and should support this clause. However Section 3 (which follows) undermines the effectiveness of this section. Any peaceful settlement requires Iraq compliance. The totality of this resolution indicates the Administration will wage war against Iraq no matter what. This undermines negotiations.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

AUTHORIZATION. The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to—

(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and

(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.

Key Issue: This clause is substantially similar to the authorization that the President originally sought.

It gives authority to the President to act prior to and even without a UN resolution, and it authorizes the President to use U.S. troops to enforce UN resolutions even without UN request for it. This is a violation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which reserves the ability to authorize force for that purpose to the Security Council, alone.

Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace . . . and shall make recommendations to maintain or restore international peace and security." (Article 39). Only the Security Council can decide that military force would be necessary. "The Security Council may decide what measures . . . are to be employed to give effect to its decisions (Article 41) . . . [and] it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." (Article 43). Furthermore, the resolution authorizes use of force illegally, since the UN Security Council has not requested it. According to the UN Charter, members of the UN, such as the U.S., are required to "make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces. . ." (Article 43, emphasis added). The UN Security Council has not called upon its members to use military force against Iraq at the current time.

Furthermore, changes to the language of the previous use-of-force resolution, drafted by the White House and objected to by many members of Congress, are cosmetic:

In section (1), the word "continuing" was added to "the threat posed by Iraq".

In section (2), the word "relevant" is added to "United Nations Security Council Resolutions" and the words "regarding Iraq" were added to the end.

While these changes are represented as a compromise or a new material development, the effects of this resolution are largely the same as the previous White House proposal.

The UN resolutions, which could be cited by the President to justify sending U.S. troops to Iraq, go far beyond addressing weapons of mass destruction. These could include, at the President's discretion, such "relevant" resolutions "regarding Iraq" in-

cluding resolutions to enforce human rights and the recovery of Kuwaiti property.

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.—

In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that—

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and

(2) acting pursuant to this resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorists attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.— Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 2 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of Public Law 105-338 (the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998).

(b) To the extent that the submission of any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of Public Law 93-148 (the War Powers Resolution), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated report to the Congress.

(c) To the extent that the information required by section 3 of Public Law 102-1 is included in the report required by this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of Public Law 102-1.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to refute some of the statements that have been made against the resolution.

Madam Speaker, H. Con. Res. 341 clearly outlines the Iran threat, not just as assessed by the United States, not just as assessed by the Europeans, but by the International Atomic Energy Agency. After dealing with the Iran case for over 3 years, it reaffirms the position of the United States, of the U.S. Congress, as articulated through the passage of previous measures, that Iran has forfeited any right

for any access to nuclear technology or materials.

In response to previous statements regarding this resolution and sanctions, stating that it would isolate the Iranian people, on the contrary, Madam Speaker, sanctions would empower the Iranian people because it would weaken this regime.

More importantly, due to the Iran economy's vulnerabilities, the sanctions and the denial of billions of dollars of oil investments would deny the regime in Tehran the funds that they need to carry out this nuclear program and to continue with its extremist terrorist activities.

In closing, I would like to remind my colleagues that in the summer of 2001 Iran's ayatollah expressed Iran's commitment to bring America to its knees. Those were his statements. He added that "the giant will fall," the giant being the United States of America.

Combine this with what the director of the National Intelligence Agency, John Negroponte, said in his recent testimony. He said, while the assessment of when Iran would go nuclear is about 5 to 10 years from now, he also expressed grave concerns that we did not really know the extent of Iran's nuclear activities. He said that Iran's 20-year pursuit of a covert program means that we cannot truly confirm any specific timeframe.

Mr. Negroponte also said that Iran's missile program, with a nuclear capability, posed a serious concern for our U.S. security interests.

Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE).

Mr. ROYCE. I thank the chairwoman for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. This resolution rightfully condemns Iranian noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations and calls upon the U.N. Security Council to expeditiously consider this matter.

Madam Speaker, this is a grave matter, one deserving of this House's full and careful consideration. Iran, the most active state sponsor of terrorism, is seeking nuclear weapons. Its regime denies it, but the U.S. and many other nations know otherwise. Iran has a long record of deceiving international inspectors and has a history of dealing with the A.Q. Khan network. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation, nothing worries me more than this deadly combination of terrorism and WMD.

For a closed country such as Iran, we actually know a great deal about the Iranian nuclear program. IAEA inspectors have played a key role in spotlighting Iranian behavior. In its most recent update to the 35 member IAEA Board of Governors, inspectors reported that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres. This is of

great significance, as the IAEA identified this document as being related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, the first time the international body has attributed a nuclear weapons purpose to activities by Iran.

Madam Speaker, if Iran were to go nuclear, many other countries in this combustible region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, to name a few, might follow. This proliferation would pose a grave threat to our security and certainly the security of our allies.

Some criticize our European partners for failing in their negotiations with Iran. I agree that it has taken us too long to get to this point, but, frankly, when you think about it, our hand is strengthened at this point because of the European involvement.

At the IAEA vote the other week, we had the permanent five members of the Security Council united. I am under no illusions that this united front will last, but it is an important first step.

We will also hear from some that the administration has outsourced its diplomacy to the Europeans and has stood by as Iran moves toward a nuclear weapon. I will remind those that we alone cannot meet all security threats. We need partners. It is time to start challenging the norms that have developed over time.

The Iranians skillfully talk about their inalienable rights under the nonproliferation treaty to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, including its most sensitive aspects. Indeed, in the eyes of the IAEA, Iran's crime has been its failure to report its nuclear materials and the technology, not the nuclear activities themselves, including uranium enrichment.

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Under the guise of the NPT, Iran is walking right up to the edge of developing nuclear weapons. This is a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the NPT.

My subcommittee will soon take a close look at this issue. This notion of rights has to be challenged, because if we don't, the world will be a very, very dangerous place.

Mr. Speaker, there are no easy answers. We need to think long and hard about what types of sanctions are constructive in reaching the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. This challenge will require careful and marked consideration by the administration, Congress, and our partners as we move forward. It is too serious for anything else.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the statement of the American representative to the IAEA Special Board of Governors meeting on February 4.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to join other colleagues in expressing condolences to the Egyptian delegation, and through them to the Egyptian people, for yesterday's tragedy on the Red Sea.

My government is pleased to have joined an overwhelming majority of Board members in signaling to Iran through adoption of this resolution the Board's firm determination that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations.

The Board's September 24, 2005 resolution found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to Article XII.C.

That resolution also found that pursuant to Article III.B.4, Iran's nuclear program raises questions that fall within the competence of the UNSC.

At that time and again in November, we deferred reporting Iran to the Council to give Iran yet another opportunity to choose diplomacy over confrontation.

Unfortunately, Iran did not take that opportunity. As a result, the Board today carried forward the statutory process begun in September, by voting to report this Board's past findings and concerns regarding Iran's noncompliance.

I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that today's report to the Security Council will not divest the IAEA of the challenge posed by Iran.

We continue to expect the Agency's investigation of Iran's nuclear program to proceed actively and urgently and we look forward to the Director General's implementation report in March. We note that the DG's report will also be conveyed to the UNSC immediately after our next meeting.

By reporting Iran to the Security Council now, we seek to add the Council's weight to reinforce the Agency's role, reinforce its investigation, and add an imperative for Iran to choose a course of cooperation and negotiation over a course of confrontation.

The Agency has a specific mandate to deal with nuclear safeguards issues. This mandate is without prejudice to the rights and responsibilities of the Security Council to address matters that raise questions of international peace and security, as we have found is the case with Iran.

That is why the IAEA Statute expressly contemplates the Security Council's involvement in such instances of noncompliance. And that is why the Board made clear in September that such a report is mandatory.

In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush emphasized that, "the Iranian government is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons."

We believe that this Board decision sends a strong and clear message to Iran's leaders to abandon their pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.

We continue to seek a diplomatic solution and we do not envision diplomacy ending as a result of this report.

Quite the contrary, we see this as part of a new phase of diplomacy, one aimed at strengthening the ongoing efforts of the Agency to investigate Iran's deeply troubling nuclear activities, and underscoring the calls on Iran to resolve our concerns through peaceful diplomacy rather than threats and confrontation.

Through this path, and only through this path, can Iran persuasively demonstrate that it has now chosen to confine its nuclear program to exclusively peaceful purposes.

And through this path Iran can also start to restore its standing in the international community to the benefit of the Iranian people.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON 4 FEBRUARY 2006

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

(a) *Recalling* all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,

(b) *Recalling* also the Director General's reports,

(c) *Recalling* that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,

(d) *Commending* the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,

(e) *Recalling* the Director General's description of this as a special verification case,

(f) *Recalling* that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

(g) *Recalling* Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,

(h) *Recalling* that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67),

(i) *Recalling* the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director General in GOV/2005/67),

(j) *Recalling* that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF₆ to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms,

(k) *Expressing* serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,

(l) *Reaffirming* the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and

(m) *Recognising* that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

1. *Underlines* that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's pro-

gramme by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context *deems* it necessary for Iran to:

re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;

reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;

ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;

pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;

implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;

2. *Requests* the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;

3. *Expresses* serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put this document under Agency seal is a positive step, *requests* Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;

4. *Deeply regrets* that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;

5. *Calls on* Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its position in relation to confidence-building measures, which are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence;

6. *Requests* Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension;

7. *Underlines* that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's declarations is ongoing and *requests* the Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;

8. *Requests* the Director General to report on the implementation of this and previous

resolutions to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey, together with any Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security Council; and

9. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD a brief by the Deputy Director General For Safeguards on Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND AGENCY VERIFICATION OF IRAN'S SUSPENSION OF ENRICHMENT-RELATED AND REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the developments that have taken place since November 2005 in connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief provides factual information concerning those developments; it does not include any assessments thereof.

Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations.

1. ENRICHMENT PROGRAMME

As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November 2005, during meetings that took place in October and November 2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme. Responses to some of these requests were provided during discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards. This information is currently being assessed.

1.A. Contamination

As part of its assessment of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the source(s) of low enriched uranium, LEU, particles, and some high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored.

1.B. The 1987 offer

As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings, specifications and calculations for a "complete plant"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and purification plant; a complete set of workshop equipment for mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities.

On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page document was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this to the secret nature of the programme and the management style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists, such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports, personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its statements concerning that offer.

1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer

According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key members of the network about the events leading to the mid-1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI staff members in the mid-1990s.

P-1 centrifuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s: Iran has been unable to supply any documentation or other information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of 500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and contents of these shipments.

P-2 centrifuge programme: Iran still maintains that, as a result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the mid-1990s, the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2 centrifuge components (which contained no supporting specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2 centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge components. In light of information available to the Agency indicating the possible deliveries of such components, which information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November 2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made after 1995.

In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2 design said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased, magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to acquire such magnets. 2.

2. URANIUM METAL

Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been the drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF₆ to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal.

3. TRANSPARENCY VISITS AND DISCUSSIONS

On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at that site, where several environmental samples were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of the analysis of those samples.

Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional information and clarifications related to efforts made by the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion ac-

tivities. The Agency has also requested interviews with the individuals involved in the acquisition of those items.

On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment, power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor. However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment (equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium enrichment).

On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on the Agency's list was presented at a technical university, and environmental samples were taken from it.

On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005. High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing, but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran agreed to provide additional information on inquiries concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31 January 2006 for environmental sampling.

On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a meeting to discuss information that had been made available to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF₄ ("green salt"), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the "issues related to baseless allegations." Iran agreed on 23 January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to address the other topics during that meeting. In the course of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless and that it would provide further clarifications later.

4. SUSPENSION

The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to re-

sume, as from 9 January 2006, "those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension" (GOV/INF/2006/1). On 7 January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz, Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOV/INF/2006/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January 2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.

Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it refers to as "small scale R&D". As of 30 January 2006, Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or assembly of centrifuges, or the feeding of UF₆ material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of the gas handling system is underway at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, and quality control of components and some rotor testing is being conducted at Farayand Technique and Natanz. Due to the fact that all centrifuge-related raw materials and components are without IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D activities being carried out by Iran cannot be effective except at PFEP, where containment and surveillance measures are being applied for the enrichment process. The two cylinders at Natanz containing UF₆, from which seals had been removed on 10 January 2006, were again placed under Agency containment and surveillance on 29 January 2006.

The uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November 2005 is continuing and is expected to end in March 2006. All UF₆ produced at UCF thus far has remained under Agency containment and surveillance.

Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to monitor the ongoing civil engineering construction of the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding back our time, may I just say fanaticism in the field of international affairs is always dangerous. But fanaticism armed with nuclear weapons is not just dangerous; it is unacceptable. Iran is determined to move in the direction of developing nuclear weapons. The civilized world cannot stand by.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume in closing.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), for his wise words. It is always a pleasure to work with him as well as with our chairman, HENRY HYDE.

Mr. Speaker the International Atomic Energy Agency in its February 4, 2006 resolution said that after nearly 3 years the agency is not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.

Iran needs to hear our message loud and clear. The United Nations Security Council now has the Iran case after 20 years of Iran's covert activities and after 3 years of mocking the international community. Let us send a message loud and clear today. Let us pass this resolution.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support H. Con. Res. 341, condemning Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Mr. Speaker, the United Nations Security Council must quickly consider Iran's repeated violations of international nuclear norms, impose a comprehensive sanctions regime and send an unequivocal message that the world rejects its nuclear ambitions.

In addition to its refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has drawn considerable attention for his heinous calls for the United States' greatest ally, Israel, to be "wiped off the map" and his bold denial of the Holocaust. When offered a number of reasonable solutions to avert an international standoff, the Ahmadinejad regime has unwisely refused.

It is a positive sign that Russia and Iran are continuing discussions on a proposal the U.S. and others have endorsed. This plan would have Russia enrich Iran's uranium and remove it once it's spent, thereby maintaining safeguards on the nuclear fuel. I am hopeful an agreement will be reached, but have no qualms about this body sending a resolute message to Iran that its breaches and failures to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations will be met with strong resistance.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition of House Concurrent Resolution 341, which calls on the UN Security Council to expeditiously take action in response to reports of Iran's noncompliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

I am gravely concerned about nuclear proliferation in Iran and in any other nation. But, this resolution is the wrong resolution at the wrong time.

Right now, Russia is negotiating with Iran to avert their domestic production of enriched uranium. Russia and China also supported the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, decision to refer Iran to the Security Council, but requested that any action against Iran be delayed to March so these negotiations can continue.

Yet, here we are on February 16th trying to supersede those negotiations by calling on the UN Security Council to act now. This strikes me as a step toward more unilateralism.

In addition to my concern about interfering with ongoing negotiations, the latest U.S. National Intelligence Council analysis projects that Iran is a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon. This expert analysis gives me further reason to question this rush to unilateral action.

I urge my colleagues to give peaceful negotiations the opportunity to succeed and vote against this resolution.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, some time yesterday, a Member introduced House Concurrent Resolution 341. Earlier today, without benefit of hearings or markup by any committee or subcommittee of the House, it was brought to the floor and the vast majority of members voted for it.

They voted, I believe, for it for the best of reasons: to strengthen efforts by the international community to convince Iran to meet its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The resolution makes a number of important and factual points about Iran's lack of cooperation with IAEA and then sets out six statements of Congressional policy. The first

two condemn Iran's breaches of its obligations and commend the efforts of several nations to find a diplomatic means to return Iran to compliance. The final clause urges the President to keep Congress informed on this issue. All well and good.

But, for some reason, the fourth declaration goes beyond what international treaties require and beyond anything that Congress has carefully studied. It reads as follows:

[Congress] declares that Iran, through its many breaches for almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment and facilities.

Now, let's be clear on what "nuclear fuel cycle" means. It means any use of nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy for the provision of civilian electrical power.

I think there is some level of agreement that our problem with Iran is not about nuclear power plants. And it is abundantly clear that Iran intends to insist on its right to nuclear energy. If Iran's leaders want to insist that they only seek to produce electricity, we should work with the IAEA to make sure there are so many inspectors assigned to Iran that they can't produce anything except electricity. A Congressional declaration that a country cannot use nuclear power for peaceful, minutely inspected, civilian purposes is neither practical nor helpful.

Had there been hearings, I believe that the difficulties with this approach would have been identified. But once again, the Republican House leadership hasn't bothered with regular process, hasn't bothered with hearings and witnesses or even markups and amendments. The Republican leadership doesn't want to hear dissent, doesn't want to hear concerns, doesn't want to hear anything but "yes, sir!"

In addition, the convoluted language of the third declaration seems to call upon the Russian Federation to cease its unilateral efforts to bring Iran into compliance with its treaty obligations. Whether an arrangement can be designed that allows Iran access to nuclear power without creating its own enrichment facilities remains to be seen, but the attempt should not be scorned.

So now the House is on record that the Iranian people should never be allowed to use nuclear power and that Russia should stop talking to Iran about solving this problem. If the resolution had not been brought to the floor today, just one day following its introduction, these problems might have been avoided.

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this resolution.

Iran must be condemned for following the path of nuclear proliferation. This past Tuesday, February 14, 2006, Iran announced that it has resumed uranium enrichment efforts, sending a signal to the world that it is taking steps to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Iran said it will no longer allow international inspectors to access its nuclear facilities. Therefore we must work to ensure that Iran is unsuccessful in the path that it has chosen.

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous and most horrible weapons man has ever invented. These weapons pose a threat to human kind; and an even graver threat when

in the hands of a nation that supports terrorism. We need to work to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in our world.

Iran must join the community of nations and lay down the instruments for the development of nuclear weapons. We must encourage all nations to lay down the burden and instruments of the most destructive weaponry known to human kind. There is enough madness on this little planet that we do not need to add more. There is not any room in our society for more nations to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution. We must unite the community of nations and use all diplomatic means to rid our world of rogue nuclear threats.

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Con. Res. 341, which condemns the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations, and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

Iran is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, which poses a threat to the national security of the United States and to the world. Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations to the international community, specifically the 1973 Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. In 2002 the world learned that Iran was illegally continuing to develop a secret nuclear program, which has led to years of negotiations with the international community. Last August, however, the Iranian government resumed its conversion of uranium. Earlier this month the IAEA voted 27 to 3 to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for further action. I urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to pressure Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA.

The House should additionally take up and pass legislation to strengthen the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA. The House should pass H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act, which I have co-sponsored. The bill would strengthen ILSA, provide assistance to pro-democracy groups in Iran, and require that ILSA remain in effect until the President certifies to Congress that Iran has permanently and verifiably dismantled its weapons on mass destruction programs and has committed to combating their proliferation.

I am pleased that the United States has continued to work closely with the international community—including the European Union, Russia, and China—on this urgent matter. I urge the President to keep Congress fully and current informed on this matter, as called for in this resolution. I urge the international community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

We cannot allow a rogue nation such as Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran has actively supported terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran has funded suicide bombers in Israel and militant organizations elsewhere. Many of these terrorist groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction, WMD, so that they can kill or injure thousands or even millions of people. The Iranian President has publicly expressed his hope for "a world without America," his desire to "wipe Israel off the map," and has denied the existence of the Holocaust.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I support House Concurrent Resolution 341 condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council. As co-chairman of the Iran Working Group, I am increasingly concerned about Iran's movement towards the brink of a nuclear showdown. In response to the historic International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, referral of Iran to the United Nations Security Council, UNSC, Iran retaliated by halting snap inspections by IAEA inspectors. There are even reports that Iran resumed uranium-enrichment at its Natanz nuclear plant, a process that had been suspended for two years following the disclosure of Iran's covert program. Iranian President Ahmadinejad warned that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if international pressure increased over its nuclear program.

President Ahmadinejad repeatedly states that his nation will develop nuclear capabilities, and continually rebuffs efforts of nations such as Russia and the EU-3 in providing a way out of a conflict. Given the Iranian President's genocidal intentions of "wiping Israel off the map," we cannot allow Iran to advance on its path towards a nuclear future.

The Congress must consider many options to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. That is why I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 177, which calls on our allies and the U.S. to consider quarantining gasoline sales to Iran should the Iranians reject the international effort to end the nuclear impasse.

Despite being one of the world's top oil producing nations, Iran is highly dependent on foreign gasoline due to severe mismanagement of its domestic energy supply. The need is so great that the Iranian government regularly debates rationing gasoline to manage its short supply. An oil embargo on exports from Iran could hurt Western economies, but a gasoline quarantine on imports to Iran would fall heavily on Iran alone.

Now is the time for the Security Council to take strong action against Iran. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of House Concurrent Resolution 341.

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this resolution to condemn the Iranian government for violating its international nonproliferation obligations and to support efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

Last week, the 35-nation International Atomic Energy Agency's, IAEA, Board of Governors overwhelmingly voted to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council, an important step in the international effort to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons.

Iran has made clear its plans to enrich uranium by building its centrifuge program and constructing a heavy-water reactor which could provide plutonium for nuclear weapons. Additionally, the IAEA revealed that Iran was in possession of a document describing the procedure for fabricating uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres, which form the core of a nuclear weapon.

Following the vote on the resolution, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ordered Iran's nuclear commission to end its cooperation with the IAEA and begin full-scale production of enriched uranium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons.

The thought of Iran with a nuclear weapon is a frightening one, and if this issue is not addressed promptly Iran will soon have the ability and materials to produce such weapons. Nuclear proliferation alone is a threat to American interests and security; nuclear proliferation to a country with a radical Islamic leader who has supported terrorism is an even more immediate threat.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this resolution to condemn Iran's decision to advance its nuclear program and to urge the U.N. Security Council to address this issue at once.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. Iran has obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT, to not carry out a nuclear weapons program. Iran has ignored its obligations by carrying out a covert uranium enrichment program. It is becoming increasingly clear that this enrichment program is not merely aimed at producing nuclear fuel for a civilian energy program. According to the IAEA, Iran has documents in their possession for casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres—something which has no legitimate civilian purpose and which appears clearly to be related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. Possession of these documents is a violation of the NPT.

I support the work of the IAEA to monitor Iran's nuclear program, to press for Iran to agree to the Additional Protocol for enhanced monitoring and inspection of that program. The British, the French, and the Germans have tried for years to convince Iran to move away from nuclear weapons capability and to agree to increased international monitoring of its nuclear activities. Iran has rejected their efforts and made it clear that it is not willing to accept the type of negotiated solution proposed by the Europeans.

Right now we face a crisis that challenges the future of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. If the international community cannot address the issue of Iran, then we risk the collapse of the NPT.

I hope the U.N. Security Council can resolve this issue. Now that this matter has been referred to the Security Council, the international community needs to begin a dialogue about how best to respond to Iran's action. We need to start thinking about tough and enforceable sanctions that can send a clear signal to Tehran that ignoring the will of the international community on this issue has consequences.

As we call upon Iran to stop their clandestine program, however, we must remember the United States also has obligations to the NPT. We can not ask the world to enforce regulation on Iran while we shirk our obligations to the NPT by opening up nuclear trade with India, a country which has not signed the Treaty. If we seek special exemptions from international and domestic nonproliferation law for India while simultaneously seeking strict enforcement of such laws for Iran, an NPT signatory, we will undermine our credibility as a leader on nonproliferation. Iran will accuse us of hypocrisy, and other nations may seek similar special exemptions.

For example, we know that China has long had a close relationship with Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan has already asked the U.S. to make special exemptions for them from international and domestic nonproliferation

law. China has called for that as well. Are we going to also exempt Pakistan from the international system of controls and safeguards established by the NPT and by U.S. law? Are we going to stand by and do nothing if China goes ahead and sends the same type of nuclear technology and materials that we are talking about sending to India?

We also know that Russia has historically had a close relationship with the Iranian nuclear program. They've been trying to get the Iranians to agree to a nuclear fuel supply arrangement in return for foregoing a domestic Iranian enrichment program. But what if Moscow decides now to go far beyond that and afford Iran broader access to controlled nuclear technology, citing what we're proposing to do with India?

I think that if we want to send a strong signal to Iran that its flouting of international nuclear nonproliferation norms is unacceptable and will have adverse consequences, then now is not the time to be thinking of granting selective exemptions from nonproliferation laws and treaties for other nations, even if they are our friends. We need to be principled leaders on the most important of all issues facing our country. We do not want Iran, with a regime that has made it clear that it desires the destruction of Israel, a regime that is known to have provided material support to terrorist groups, to obtain its own nuclear arsenal.

The time for us to act as an international community is now. There are forces within Iran that want to move away from extremism. We need to send a strong signal that the international community does not accept the current Iranian government's nuclear aspirations, and that there will be consequences, there will be sanctions, if Tehran persists in its current course of action.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a cosponsor of this resolution. Iran's resumption of nuclear activities and its non-compliance with international commitments must be met by a united Congress and a united international community.

For almost 3 years, the United States, the European Union, Russia, the IAEA and other parties have been working to negotiate an end to those parts of Iran's nuclear program that could allow it to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has continued to mislead the international community about its efforts. It has alternated diplomatic overtures with clandestine activity on its nuclear program.

In June 2004, just a few months after making assurances to the international community, Iran was criticized by the IAEA for failing to cooperate with an inquiry of its nuclear activities. In November 2004, Iran agreed to suspend much of its uranium enrichment in a deal with the EU. However, in August 2005, Iran resumed its uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant and in January 2006, broke IAEA seals at its Natanz facility. It has since resumed enriching uranium at that facility.

Experts indicate that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in as little as 3 to 5 years. According to a report issued by the IAEA to member governments on January 31, 2006, Iran has a clandestine effort, dubbed Green Salt, which has been working on uranium processing, high explosives and a missile warhead design. The report clearly demonstrates a nexus between Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear fuel cycle and Tehran's military, thus

undercutting the Iranian government's repeated denials that it seeks to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran's growing nuclear capability is compounded by a series of recent statements by Iran's president, in which he declared that a fellow member of the United Nations must be wiped off the map. These remarks demonstrate a disregard for human life and undermine the central principle of the United Nations. The world community cannot stand by while an outlaw regime announces its desire to annihilate millions of people and attempts to develop the nuclear weapons to do so. The community of nations has properly condemned these threats; now we must ensure that Iran will never develop the capability to act on them.

I am hopeful that all members of the United Nations Security Council will take a strong stand for international peace and security when this issue is considered by the Security Council in March. I can think of no greater priority for the Council and believe that concerted action by the Council's Permanent Members represents the best opportunity to defuse this crisis.

As a gesture of appreciation from the Congress, I, along with Mr. KIRK of Illinois and Mr. ANDREWS of New Jersey, am circulating a letter to the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. The letter thanks them for their support in reporting Iran to the Security Council and urges them to establish consequences to continued non-compliance. I encourage my colleagues to sign the letter.

I am hopeful that with a united Congress and a united international community, we can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons which could destabilize the entire region and which could be used to carry out Iran's professed desire to wipe millions of its neighbors off the map.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, several years ago, we learned that Iran was operating a secret program to enrich uranium and carry out other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.

Iran's failure to report these activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency was a blatant violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

The more we learn about Iran's program, the more obvious it's become that Iran's true intention is not peaceful power generation, but the development of a nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States, our allies in the Middle East, and even Europe.

Any seeds of doubt on this issue have been dispelled once and for all by Iran's rejection of a sensible proposal put forward by Great Britain, France and Germany, and more recently, its move to resume uranium enrichment.

The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made the urgency of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that much greater.

With his comments about the Holocaust being a "myth," endorsement for "wiping Israel off the map," and enthusiastic support of Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations, this vile anti-Semite has made his true intentions crystal clear.

The IAEA's decision to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council is a long-overdue step in the right direction.

But tough words must be backed by tough action. We must continue to push the other members of the Security Council—especially

China and Russia—to meet their international obligations.

Congress should also pass H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. This important legislation will close a loophole in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act that has allowed successive administrations to avoid penalizing foreign firms that continue to invest in Iran's oil and gas sector.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This resolution is closely modeled on a resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, introduced in the Senate by the majority leader, Senator FRIST, cosponsored by Senator REID, the minority leader, Senators LUGAR and BIDEN, and a bipartisan group totaling 32 Senators, and adopted unanimously on January 27. Our colleague, Representative ROS-LEHTINEN of Florida, has worked with me and other members of the House Committee on International Relations, including our distinguished ranking Democrat, the gentleman from California, Mr. LANTOS, on this resolution. She has updated the text of the Senate resolution in the light of recent events and in the light of the understanding that we in the House have about Iran's actions and intentions.

This House may be divided on precisely how to respond to every aspect of the Iranian challenge, but we are certainly united, as our vote will show, in our support for the current efforts to bring the weight of the Security Council of the United Nations to bear against Iran's continuing violations of its formal and informal obligations concerning its nuclear activities.

These efforts are not only American efforts, but ones which involve many responsible members of the international community. The administration deserves credit for coaxing some of the reluctant states to this point: the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, has indeed reported to the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear program. Although the IAEA may make additional reports during the next month, the die is cast: the Security Council is in a position to take action, and it should do so. It should respond to what is clearly a threat to international peace and security—and making such responses in a collective way is precisely the purpose it is meant to serve.

The administration deserves credit for having brought along the IAEA Board of Governors and, in particular, all of the permanent members of the Security Council, to this stage in the process. The signal to Iran could not have been more stark.

Critical to arriving at this point was the support extended by the Bush administration for the so-called "ED-3" process, in which Britain, France, and Germany conducted negotiations with Iran—negotiations that ultimately failed to contain Iran's efforts, to be sure, but which succeeded in keeping the international community moving forward in unison.

At this point, we need to continue to keep the pressure on, but let us keep the pressure on the recalcitrant party—the Iranians—and not begin internecine warfare among the Western powers. It is only with the cooperation of other States that we can truly pressure Iran.

As we consider other legislation in the next months—and the consideration of this resolution does not, in my mind, prejudice the ability of the House to consider other legislation—we should bear in mind that we need allies in this

struggle. Sticking our finger in the eye of other states which are, in general terms, "on our side" will do nothing to bring Iran to heel.

Another reason to work with our friends is that if the Security Council does not achieve consensus on how to deal with Iran, we will need to work with them to arrive at a "Plan B," as an alternative. That plan should consist, in all likelihood, of a series of comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions.

Those sanctions should be designed to serve several purposes. First, they should make it clear to the Iranian people that their leaders' course of action needs to change. Second, they should serve to inflict some pain on the Iranian leadership in an effort to coerce those leaders to behave in a responsible way. Finally, they should reduce the resources available to the Iranian state to continue their nuclear weapons program.

In summary, Mr. Speaker, this is an important resolution; it indicates quite clearly that we are behind the administration's approach. I hope that we will continue to support it in the days ahead.

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my support of the resolution condemning Iran for violating its nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report them to the United Nations Security Council.

Early last month, the Iranian regime announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research program. This was in clear violation of a 2004 agreement that had been reached with Britain, France and Germany to suspend uranium enrichment operations.

Iran claims that the program is aimed at generating electricity, but I think the United States and the world know better. In fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency has already voted to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

The president of the Iranian regime, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has also caused concern in the United States and Europe with his confrontational statements denying the Holocaust happened and stating his desire to annihilate Israel.

The United States fully expects the Security Council to add its weight to the IAEA's calls for Iran to return to the 2004 agreement, suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activity, cooperate fully with the IAEA and return to negotiations with Great Britain, France and Germany.

Only then will the Iranian regime restore any confidence that it is in fact, not seeking nuclear weapons under the guise of an "electricity program."

Mr. Speaker, with their continued defiance it's imperative that the United Nations act quickly. We must send a clear message to the Iranian regime that the world will not permit them to obtain nuclear weapons.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, February 15, 2006, the concurrent resolution is considered read and the previous question is ordered on the concurrent resolution and on the preamble.

The question is on the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 404, nays 4, answered “present” 4, not voting 20, as follows:

	[Roll No. 12]	
	YEAS—404	
Ackerman	Davis, Tom	Inslee
Aderholt	Deal (GA)	Israel
Akin	DeFazio	Issa
Alexander	DeGette	Istook
Allen	Delahunt	Jackson (IL)
Andrews	DeLauro	Jackson-Lee
Baca	DeLay	(TX)
Bachus	Dent	Jefferson
Baird	Diaz-Balart, L.	Jenkins
Baker	Diaz-Balart, M.	Jindal
Baldwin	Dicks	Johnson (CT)
Barrett (SC)	Dingell	Johnson (IL)
Barrow	Doggett	Johnson, E. B.
Bartlett (MD)	Doolittle	Johnson, Sam
Barton (TX)	Doyle	Jones (NC)
Bass	Drake	Jones (OH)
Bean	Dreier	Kanjorski
Beauprez	Duncan	Keller
Becerra	Edwards	Kelly
Berkley	Ehlers	Kennedy (MN)
Berry	Emanuel	Kennedy (RI)
Biggart	Emerson	Kildee
Bilirakis	Engel	Kilpatrick (MI)
Bishop (GA)	English (PA)	Kind
Bishop (NY)	Eshoo	King (IA)
Blackburn	Etheridge	King (NY)
Blunt	Everett	Kingston
Boehlert	Farr	Kirk
Boehner	Fattah	Kline
Bonilla	Feeney	Knollenberg
Bonner	Ferguson	Kolbe
Bono	Filner	Kuhl (NY)
Boozman	Fitzpatrick (PA)	LaHood
Boren	Flake	Langevin
Boswell	Foley	Lantos
Boucher	Forbes	Larsen (WA)
Boustany	Ford	Larson (CT)
Boyd	Fortenberry	Latham
Bradley (NH)	Fossella	LaTourette
Brady (PA)	Fox	Leach
Brady (TX)	Frank (MA)	Levin
Brown (OH)	Franks (AZ)	Lewis (CA)
Brown (SC)	Frelinghuysen	Lewis (GA)
Brown, Corrine	Gallely	Lewis (KY)
Brown-Waite,	Garrett (NJ)	Linder
Ginny	Gerlach	Lipinski
Burgess	Gibbons	LoBiondo
Burton (IN)	Gilchrest	Lofgren, Zoe
Butterfield	Gillmor	Lowe
Buyer	Gingrey	Lucas
Calvert	Gohmert	Lungren, Daniel
Camp (MI)	Gonzalez	E.
Cannon	Goode	Lynch
Cantor	Goodlatte	Mack
Capito	Gordon	Maloney
Capps	Granger	Manzullo
Cardin	Graves	Marchant
Cardoza	Green (WI)	Markey
Carnahan	Green, Al	Marshall
Carter	Green, Gene	Matheson
Case	Grijalva	Matsui
Castle	Gutierrez	McCarthy
Chabot	Gutknecht	McCaul (TX)
Chandler	Hall	McCollum (MN)
Chocoma	Harman	McCotter
Clay	Harris	McCrery
Cleaver	Hart	McGovern
Clyburn	Hastings (FL)	McHenry
Coble	Hastings (WA)	McHugh
Cole (OK)	Hayes	McIntyre
Conaway	Hayworth	McKeon
Conyers	Hefley	McMorris
Cooper	Hensarling	McNulty
Costa	Herger	Meehan
Costello	Herseth	Meek (FL)
Cramer	Higgins	Meeks (NY)
Crenshaw	Hobson	Melancon
Crowley	Hoekstra	Mica
Cubin	Holden	Michaud
Cuellar	Holt	Millender-
Culberson	Honda	McDonald
Davis (AL)	Hooley	Miller (FL)
Davis (CA)	Hostettler	Miller (MI)
Davis (FL)	Hoyer	Miller (NC)
Davis (KY)	Hulshof	Miller, George
Davis (TN)	Hyde	Mollohan
Davis, Jo Ann	Inglis (SC)	Moore (KS)

Moore (WI)	Renzi
Moran (KS)	Reyes
Moran (VA)	Reynolds
Murphy	Rogers (AL)
Murtha	Rogers (KY)
Musgrave	Rogers (MI)
Myrick	Rohrabacher
Nadler	Ros-Lehtinen
Napolitano	Ross
Neal (MA)	Rothman
Neugebauer	Roybal-Allard
Ney	Royce
Northup	Ruppersberger
Norwood	Rush
Nunes	Ryan (OH)
Nussle	Ryan (WI)
Oberstar	Ryun (KS)
Obey	Sabo
Olver	Salazar
Ortiz	Sánchez, Linda
Otter	T.
Owens	Sanchez, Loretta
Oxley	Sanders
Pallone	Saxton
Pascarella	Schakowsky
Pastor	Schiff
Payne	Schmidt
Pearce	Schwartz (PA)
Pelosi	Schwarz (MI)
Pence	Scott (GA)
Peterson (MN)	Scott (VA)
Peterson (PA)	Sensenbrenner
Petri	Serrano
Pickering	Sessions
Pitts	Shadegg
Platts	Shaw
Poe	Shays
Pombo	Sherman
Pomeroy	Sherwood
Porter	Shimkus
Price (GA)	Shuster
Price (NC)	Simmons
Price (OH)	Skelton
Putnam	Slaughter
Radanovich	Smith (NJ)
Rahall	Smith (TX)
Ramstad	Smith (WA)
Regula	Snyder
Rehberg	Sodrel
Reichert	Solis

Souder	PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Spratt	
Stearns	Ms. CARSON. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoid-
Strickland	ably detained and unable to record my vote
Stupak	for rollcall vote 12. Had I been present I would
Sullivan	have voted “yea.”
Sweeney	
Tancredo	
Tanner	PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Tauscher	
Taylor (MS)	Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, I was pre-
Taylor (NC)	pared today to vote for this resolution but a
Terry	late language change has made that impos-
Thomas	sible.
Thompson (CA)	The phrase “and take action” was added to
Thompson (MS)	paragraph three which now reads: “calls on all
Thornberry	members of the United Nations Security Council
Tiahrt	. . . to expeditiously consider <i>and take ac-</i>
Tiberi	<i>tion</i> . . . to respond to and <i>deal with</i> situa-
Tierney	tions bearing on the maintenance of inter-
Towns	national peace and security” (emphasis
Turner	added). Because of that change, I cannot sup-
Udall (CO)	port this resolution. However, since I do be-
Udall (NM)	lieve that Iran poses a serious threat to the
Upton	world and demands the attention of the world,
Van Hollen	I could not vote against the proposal. There-
Velázquez	fore, I voted “present.”
Visclosky	I strongly agree that Iran poses a real secu-
Walden (OR)	rity threat to the world and I encourage contin-
Walsh	ued vigilance. However, I have real concerns
Waters	that the wording of this resolution might be in-
Watson	terpreted by the Bush administration as all that
Watt	is necessary to take military action. Although
Waxman	the day may come when I do support such ac-
Weiner	tion, today is not that day. I do not trust the
Weldon (FL)	Bush administration to come back to Congress
Weldon (PA)	if they wish to pursue military action. My lack
Weller	of trust is, unfortunately, based on past ac-
Wexler	tions. I voted to support military action against
Whitfield	Afghanistan but the President is insisting
Wicker	today that Congress in so voting also granted
Wilson (NM)	him the legal authority to intercept telephone
Wilson (SC)	calls and other forms of communication with-
Wolf	out a warrant. I completely reject that asser-
Wu	tion and I am concerned with future interpreta-
Wynn	tions of H. Con. Res. 341. I regret that I can-
Young (AK)	not trust the President of the United States to
Young (FL)	use military force prudently and when all non-
	violent means have been exhausted. I regret
	that I cannot support this resolution.

	NAYS—4
Kucinich	Paul
McDermott	Stark

	ANSWERED “PRESENT”—4
Abercrombie	Kaptur
Capuano	Lee

	NOT VOTING—20	
Berman	Evans	Rangel
Bishop (UT)	Hinchee	Simpson
Blumenauer	Hinojosa	Wamp
Campbell (CA)	Hunter	Wasserman
Carson	McKinney	Schultz
Cummings	Miller, Gary	Westmoreland
Davis (IL)	Osborne	Woolsey

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE
 The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington) (during the vote). Members are advised that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

□ 1131

Mr. MOORE of Kansas changed his vote from “nay” to “yea.”

Ms. LEE changed her vote from “yea” to “present.”

So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to vote today on H. Con. Res. 341 because I was traveling on official business to a Middle East regional security conference in Athens, Greece, and then on to Egypt and Israel for meetings with top government officials. Had I been present, I would have voted “yea.”

PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE—PRIVILEGED RESOLUTION REGARDING CULTURE OF CORRUPTION SURROUNDING BUDGET RECONCILIATION

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to rule IX, I rise in regard to a question of the privileges of the House, and I offer a privileged resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the resolution.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 687

Whereas the Republican Leadership has engaged in a continuing pattern of withholding accurate information vital for Members of the House of Representatives to have before voting on legislation, and has inserted numerous controversial provisions into completed conference reports in the dead of night without notifying Democratic Members of the House, the press, or the public;

Whereas on February 1, 2006 the Republican Leadership permitted a vote on House Resolution 653 to concur in a Senate amendment to the conference agreement on Budget Reconciliation, despite the inclusion of inaccurate numbers in provisions that cost the