[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 20 (Thursday, February 16, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H337-H351]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
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RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION REGARDING IRAN
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, pursuant to the previous order of
the House, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 341)
condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, and ask for its
immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:
H. Con. Res. 341
Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly
referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''),
under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the
Treaty, ``not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'';
Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19,
1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''),
which requires Iran to report the importation and use of
nuclear material, to declare nuclear facilities, and to
accept safeguards on nuclear materials and activities to
ensure that such materials and activities are not diverted to
any military purpose and are used for peaceful purposes and
activities;
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an
undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had
covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out
over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal,
separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its
nuclear facilities and activities;
Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director
General of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision to
suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and
stated that the suspension would cover all activities at the
Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed
material for enrichment, and the importation of any
enrichment-related items;
Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the
Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of its
enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the IAEA was
invited to verify, including the suspension of the operation
or testing or any centrifuges, either with or without nuclear
material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, the
suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into
any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new
centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the
installation of centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Natanz, and, to the extent practicable, the withdrawal of
nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment facility;
Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran
informed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and
clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the furthest
extent possible the assembly and testing of centrifuges and
the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including
those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that
any components that are manufactured under existing contracts
that cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA
seal, invited the IAEA to verify these measures, and
confirmed that the suspension of enrichment activities
applied to all facilities in Iran;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003
did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's
past and present nuclear programme considered essential by
the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that
the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced
centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing
activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser
enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle
highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the
development of its enrichment technology to its current
extent, and that a number of other questions remain
unresolved'';
Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with
Iran on Iran's nuclear program (commonly referred to as the
``Paris Agreement''), securing a formal commitment from the
Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment
operations in exchange for discussions on economic,
technological, political, and security issues;
Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran's Atomic Energy
Organization announced it has mastered the technique of using
biotechnology to extract purer uranium, adding that this
method ``substantially decreases the cost . . . in the
process that leads to the production of yellowcake'', which
is a part of the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;
Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires
the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of
any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safeguards obligations
to all members and to the Security Council and General
Assembly of the United Nations;
Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA
specifies that ``if in connection with the activities of the
Agency there should arise questions that are within the
competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify
the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security'';
Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors
adopted a resolution finding that Iran's many failures and
breaches of its obligations to comply with the Safeguards
Agreement constitute noncompliance in the context of Article
XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters concerning
Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are
within the competence of the Security Council as the organ
bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security;
Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in
an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for ``a world without
America'' and his desire ``to wipe Israel off the map'' and
has subsequently denied the existence of the Holocaust;
Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran
announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research
efforts;
Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence
of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from the
enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ``[i]t
is obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its
international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would
indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N.
Security Council'';
Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ``The Iranian
government and nation has no
[[Page H338]]
fear of the Western ballyhoo and will continue its nuclear
programs with decisiveness and wisdom.'';
Whereas the United States joined with the Governments of
Britain, France, and Germany in calling for a meeting of the
IAEA Board of Governors to discuss Iran's noncompliance with
its IAEA safeguards obligations;
Whereas on February 4, 2006, Resolution GOV/2006/14 of the
IAEA Board of Governors relayed an ``absence of confidence
that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful
purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's
nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other
issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations
made by Iran since September 2002'';
Whereas Resolution GOV/2006/14 further expressed ``serious
concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify
some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme,
including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document
on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as
reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the
fabrication of nuclear weapon components'';
Whereas on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors
reported Iran's noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards
obligations to the Security Council;
Whereas Iran has, since February 4, 2006, taken additional
steps confirming its unwillingness to comply with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations; and
Whereas Iran has been designated a state sponsor of
terrorism for over two decades and the Department of State
has declared in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism
that Iran ``remained the most active state sponsor of
terrorism'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms the many
breaches and failures of the Government of Iran to comply
faithfully with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations,
including its obligations under the Agreement Between Iran
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on
the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna
June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards
Agreement''), as reported by the Director General of the IAEA
to the IAEA Board of Governors since 2003;
(2) commends the efforts of the Governments of France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek a meaningful and
credible suspension of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-
related activities and to find a diplomatic means to address
the non-compliance of the Government of Iran with its
obligations, requirements, and commitments related to nuclear
nonproliferation;
(3) calls on all members of the United Nations Security
Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the
People's Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and
take action in response to the report of Iran's noncompliance
in fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to
respond to and deal with situations bearing on the
maintenance of international peace and security;
(4) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for
almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards
Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a
nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment,
and facilities;
(5) calls on all responsible members of the international
community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran
the ability to develop nuclear weapons; and
(6) urges the President to keep Congress fully and
currently informed concerning Iran's violation of its
international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). Pursuant to the
order of the House of Wednesday, February 15, 2006, the gentlewoman
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.
Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in
opposition.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Ohio?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Reserving the right to object, we understand that
the ranking member is on his way, and he seeks time on the bill.
Therefore, accordingly, I would object to that request.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
General Leave
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 341, a
resolution that I had the pleasure of drafting with my good friends,
the distinguished chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, Henry Hyde, and our ranking member, Congressman Tom Lantos.
I want to express my appreciation to our leadership for recognizing
the importance for the House to be heard on this important issue and
for moving this resolution expeditiously to the floor today.
Madam Speaker, for at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been
pursuing a covert nuclear program using multiple approaches and
technology to achieve a nuclear status. It has undertaken a number of
efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuges, including at
facilities owned by military industrial organizations.
It has sought completion of a heavy water reactor that would be well
suited for plutonium production, while seeking uranium enrichment
through the use of lasers.
The Iran saga within the context of the International Atomic Energy
Agency began almost 4 years ago. Every step along the way, Iran has
demonstrated contempt for the request of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and has mocked the EU 3 nations composed of France, Great
Britain and Germany, as they provided incentives to convince Iran to
suspend its enrichment activities.
It is important to quickly summarize the sequence of events of the
last few years, Madam Speaker, in order to fully comprehend the need
for this resolution as a basis for stronger legislative action
regarding Iran.
In November of 2003, for example, the IAEA reported that Iran had
been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for close to
two decades and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment,
had carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium
metal, it had separated plutonium, and it had concealed many other
aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities.
That same month, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency
of its decision to temporarily suspend enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities. It stated that the suspension would cover all
activities in the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all
feed material for enrichment and the importation of any enrichment-
related items.
But that was not to be, Madam Speaker. Iran continuously
reinterpreted its commitment. By September of 2004, Iran announced that
it had resumed large-scale uranium conversion. The International Atomic
Energy Agency called on Iran to stop. Then Secretary of State Colin
Powell called for the Iran case to be referred to the United Nations
Security Council for sanctions to be imposed.
Faced with this possibility, Iran temporarily halts these activities
in those nuclear facilities known to the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the EU 3.
By April of 2005, Iran announces that it will resume uranium
conversion in the Isfahan facility. This was met with a warning from
the EU 3 that their negotiations on trade and economic incentives with
Iran would end if Iran acted on this threat.
In August of 2005, the new radical leader is installed as Iran's new
president. Immediately following, Iran proceeded to remove the
International Atomic Energy Agency seals on the uranium conversion
plant at Isfahan, announced that it could successfully use
biotechnology for its nuclear program, decreasing the cost for the
production of the feed material for nuclear weapons. It announced that
it would provide nuclear technology to other Islamic states. Iran's
defense minister said that it is Iran's absolute right to have access
to nuclear arms, and Iran's leader publicly stated his willingness to
share nuclear expertise with other Islamic nations.
The IAEA inspectors were finally allowed into the Parchin military
site. However, after all the time Iran was
[[Page H339]]
given to sanitize this site, that is to hide, to remove all signs of
their nuclear activities, even IAEA inspectors and foreign diplomats
acknowledged in news reports that they did not expect the inspections
to yield any firm results.
Experts further noted that there may be no nuclear material present
at Parchin if the Iranians did dry testing of nuclear bomb simulations.
Fast forward to Tuesday of this very week. Madam Speaker, on
Valentine's Day, 2006, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization announced
it has restarted uranium enrichment efforts which could also be
developed for use in nuclear weapons.
In sum, referral of the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council has
been a long time coming. We are gratified that the International Atomic
Energy Agency Board of Governors earlier this month voted to report the
Iran case to the Security Council, but it should not stop there, Madam
Speaker.
H. Con. Res. 341 therefore calls on all members of the U.N. Security
Council to immediately consider the report and take the necessary steps
to address Iran's behavior. The resolution frames the debate by
condemning in the strongest possible terms the Iranian regime's
repeated violations of its international obligations.
More importantly, it underscores that, as a result of these
violations, Iran no longer has the right to develop any aspect of a
nuclear fuel cycle.
As President Bush stated on February 11, 2004, proliferators must not
be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and
the infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.
H. Con. Res. 341 reiterates previous U.S. calls to responsible
members of the international community to impose economic sanctions to
deny Iran the resources and the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
But the grave threat posed by Iran is not limited to its nuclear
pursuit. H. Con. Res. 341 therefore refers to Iran's support for
Islamic jihadist activities worldwide.
Madam Speaker, it includes language highlighting that Iran has been
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for over two decades and,
according to our own State Department reports on global terrorism, it
remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism worldwide.
Madam Speaker, too much time has already passed. Let us not waste
anymore. Let us begin by adopting this resolution and send a strong
message to the Iranian regime and other potential proliferators that
this behavior will not be tolerated.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in strong support of this resolution. Madam Speaker, unless
the international community acts quickly and decisively, the world's
chief terrorist state may soon possess the greatest weapon of terror
ever created.
A critical first step was taken on February 2 at an emergency session
of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board
of Governors. By a vote of 27-3 they reported Iran's history of
deception, lies and noncompliance to the United Nations Security
Council.
The ayatollahs of terror in Tehran were sent a bold and unambiguous
message that their clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons and
their transparent lies of peaceful intent will no longer be tolerated
by the civilized world.
Madam Speaker, Tehran sponsors terrorism as an official state policy.
I wish to repeat this. Tehran sponsors terrorism as official state
policy.
I ask my colleagues to imagine this terrorist state armed with
nuclear weapons and in possession of large amounts of nuclear weapons
material. Even if it did not put these destructive materials up for
sale, a nuclear armed Iran would terrorize and destabilize the entire
Middle East. Terrorist-in-chief Ahmadinejad himself advocates wiping
Israel from the map.
Madam Speaker, Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and
reneged on every single commitment it has made. The International
Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs,
equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and
plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply Libya.
Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear bomb. There is
every reason to believe that Tehran has acquired actual bomb
blueprints, as Libya used to do.
Iran has also reneged on its remaining empty assurances to negotiate
in good faith with Britain, France and Germany by breaking the
international seals on its uranium enrichment facility.
Ahmadinejad, in a rare moment of lucidity, revealed Tehran's view of
the relative balance of power in these negotiations; and I quote, ``the
West needs us more than we need them.''
With billions of dollars of existing western investment in Iran's oil
and gas fields, Tehran's ruling elite has shrewdly calculated that the
West will not impose far-reaching and meaningful sanctions against Iran
over the nuclear issue.
Madam Speaker, we must change Tehran's calculations, hopefully by
diplomacy and pressure but with international sanctions if necessary.
The United Nations Security Council should require all members of the
U.N. to reject any and all investment and nonhumanitarian trade with
Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear fuel and weapon
material production capabilities.
{time} 1030
But, Madam Speaker, we cannot wait for the Security Council to act.
Responsible European and Asian governments must immediately ensure that
their companies, banks, and other financial organizations will suspend
and terminate their existing investments in Iraq.
Some banks and oil companies are already leaving Iran over just the
possibility of sanctions. Those that remain must be given immediate
incentives by the international community to stop business as usual
with a developing nuclear weapon terrorist state. As part of this, the
United States must finally use the sanctions authority in U.S. law to
punish and deter those who continue to invest in and thereby aid and
abet a state bent on adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal of terror.
Madam Speaker, this is the first resolution of the year regarding
Iran. I guarantee you it will not be the last one. We must reauthorize
the Iran Sanctions Act, which will be accomplished through the Iran
Freedom Support Act, a bill offered by my good friend, the gentlewoman
from Florida, and myself.
Madam Speaker, our allies in Europe have learned a hard lesson:
playing nice with a terrorist regime gets you nothing. Now that the
Europeans are with us in demanding Security Council action, it is
imperative that they take the next step by imposing a comprehensive
sanctions regime against Tehran.
Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this
resolution.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).
Mr. GINGREY. Madam Speaker, first of all, let me thank the
gentlewoman from Florida for allowing me to speak on this resolution,
and also let me thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and
completely associate myself with the remarks that he just made. I think
he is right on target.
Madam Speaker, the passage of yesterday's resolution on the
Palestinian Authority once again expressed our position against funding
an ideology of terror in hope of maintaining the peace process in the
Middle East. Today's resolution has a more direct message with the
prospect, hopefully, of addressing the entire world.
In our current struggle against terrorism, no country is more
uncertain and dangerous than Iran. With an uncompromising foreign
policy and repressed trade, it often feels like the only commodity that
Iran exports involves disdain for Western culture. It is indeed
disheartening to see a nation of good people commandeered by an
individual with nuclear aspirations. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran must
not be allowed to carry out threats against Israel, the United States,
or any other peaceful nation. Nuclear weapons and the ideology of
Wahabism are a dangerous combination, and they must be prevented.
[[Page H340]]
So, Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution. I
commend the gentlewoman from Florida and the gentleman from California
for bringing it forward. I believe it is time for the United Nations
Security Council to take action against nuclear proliferation in Iran,
and I ask the leaders of Iran to reconsider the path that they have
chosen.
Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the distinguished ranking member
of our Armed Services Committee.
Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for
allowing me to make comments on this, and I compliment the gentlewoman
from Florida for her leadership in this regard as well.
I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This condemns Iran for
violating its nonproliferation agreements and expresses support for
efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
Thank you, Mr. Lantos, for the opportunity to briefly address House
Concurrent Resolution 341 on the Iranian nuclear situation. I think it
is deadly serious.
Madam Speaker, the situation in Iran is a critical matter that
demands serious attention and serious action from this administration
as well as from Congress. It threatens the security of our Nation, the
future of the nonproliferation regime and stability in the Middle East.
International support for referring Iran to the United Nations
Security Council is very encouraging, but it is not enough to address
the complexity of the nuclear situation or broader longer-term problems
posed by Iran, including its involvement in Iraq, which evidently is
quite substantial.
Direct American leadership is long overdue. There must be a
comprehensive interagency effort to develop and implement the necessary
plan, and Congress must do its part. This must be a top bipartisan
priority. And yet while the U.S. must act expeditiously, it must also
act effectively. We must sufficiently consider all tools at our
disposal, and we must take care not to inadvertently make matters worse
by our rhetoric or by our actions.
For example, we should consider ``smart sanctions'' that would target
Iran's leadership, avoid harming the Iranian population and have strong
international support.
There are no easy answers or simple solutions; but as I have
emphasized numerous times now, there are many tools at our disposal,
many more than this administration has used to date. I am committed to
doing whatever I can to effectively address the problems posed by Iran,
and I ask my colleagues to join me in this effort.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Paul), a member of the International Relations
Committee.
(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time.
I rise to express a note of caution regarding this resolution. I see
this resolution somewhat like some of the resolutions that we debated
and passed prior to our commitment to go into Iraq. As a matter of
fact, some of the language is very similar. If you substitute the word
``Iraq'' for ``Iran,'' you would find out that these concerns are very
similar.
I do not quite have the concern that others have expressed that Iran
is on the verge of having a nuclear weapon. They have never been found
in violation. There has been a lot of talk and a lot of accusation, but
technically they have never been found in any violation.
My concern for this type of language and these plans is that nothing
ever changes. This is the type of thing that occurred before. Of
course, we went into Iraq, and yet today the success in Iraq is very
questionable. Fifty-five percent of the American people say it was a
mistake to have gone into Iraq. Only forty percent of the people
support staying in Iraq. Attitudes have shifted now since the success
in Iraq has been so poor.
We went into Afghanistan to look for Osama bin Laden, and we sort of
got distracted. We have forgotten about him just about completely.
Instead we went into Iraq. Though the Iraq war is not going well, all
of a sudden we are looking to take on another burden, another military
mission. I find some things in the resolution that are very
confrontational because it invokes sanctions. People say, well,
sanctions are not that bad. That is no shooting or killing. But
sanctions and boycotts and embargoes, these are acts of war. And, of
course, many times our administration has expressed the sentiment that
if necessary we are going to use force against Iran; we are going to
start bombing. And why do we follow this policy? Especially since it
literally helps the radicals in Iran. This mobilizes them. There is an
undercurrent in Iran that is sympathetic to America, and yet this
brings the radicals together by this type of language and threats.
There is no doubt that our policy helps the hard-liners.
There has been no talk, it has been implied, but there has been no
serious talk that Iran is a threat to our national security. There is
no way. Even if they had nuclear weapons, they are not going to be a
threat to our national security. Pakistan, that is not a democratic
nation. It happens to be a military dictatorship. They have nuclear
weapons. India has nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, the nuclear
weapons serve as a balance of power between two countries. The Soviets,
had 30,000 nuclear weapons, and we followed a policy of containment. We
did not say we have to go into the Soviet Union and bomb their
establishment. No. Finally that problem dissipated. And yet we create
unnecessary problems for ourselves. We go looking for trouble, and I
see this as very detrimental for what we are doing with this
resolution.
There is one portion of the resolution that concerns me about our
urging the Russians and China to take a firm stand, and that has to do
with the resolved clause No. 3; it says to the people of Russia and
China to ``expeditiously consider and take action in response to any
report of Iran's noncompliance'' in fulfillment of the mandate of the
Security Council to respond and deal with situations . . .
Any report? I mean, some report in the newspaper? Is it an IAEA
report? Or whatever. That is so open-ended that this is a risky, risky
resolution.
I urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution.
Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, let me just indicate to my friend from
Texas that he has now discovered the ultimate oxymoron, a benign
Islamic fanaticism hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction.
This takes the concept of oxymoron to a new height.
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.
Mr. HOYER. Madam Speaker, the international community, not just
America, is being challenged again by a dangerous, deceptive lawbreaker
whose defiant pursuit of nuclear weapons threaten America's national
security interests as well as international peace and security. Now,
this is an obligation that the Iranians undertook freely and
voluntarily. It was not imposed upon them.
I believe that this grave and gathering danger commands the
collective attention, effort, and action of the entire international
community. This time the nations of the world which are committed to
peace, security, and the rule of law must embrace their
responsibilities, not flinch from them, as, unfortunately, has been too
often the case.
Through this resolution today, the House speaks with one voice in
condemning in the strongest possible terms the many breaches and
failures of the government of Iran to comply with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations. In this resolution, we call on all
responsible members of the international community to impose economic
sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons
and to encourage its people to get the government to change its
dangerous and reckless policies.
{time} 1045
We urge the members of the United Nations Security Council to take
action in response to Iran's noncompliance with its international
obligations.
Let no one harbor any illusions: The government of Iran, which is
recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism,
[[Page H341]]
believes it can exploit international irresolution, and it will prey on
vacillation. The international community must stand as one against this
lawbreaker, whose record leaves no doubt of its motivations.
Iran failed to properly disclose the existence of a fuel enrichment
plant and facility at Natanz until both were revealed by opposition
groups. It has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguard
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to report all
nuclear material it has imported. It confirmed that it had conducted
research on uranium conversion processes, but only after it denied
doing so. On February 4, in response to a 27-3 vote by the
International Atomic Energy Agency board to report Iran to the Security
Council, Iran ended voluntary cooperation with the agency and announced
it would start large-scale enrichment activities.
I suggest to us and to our international allies that standing silent,
standing back, standing without action, is not an option. It goes
without saying that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons constitutes a
threat to the national security interests of the United States of
America. Let me remind all of us, the gentleman from Texas indicated
that they were not a threat to us. There are 250,000 Americans as we
debate this resolution right now in range of Iranian weapons, so it is
not just those who live in the Middle East who are put at risk, it is
those of us who are there, and the security of the international
community is put at risk.
Our concerns are only heightened by the inflammatory, irresponsible
statements of the Iranian president, who has stated his hope for ``a
world without America.'' That is the nation that stands on the doorstep
of becoming a nuclear power. He has further stated his desire to ``wipe
Israel off the map.'' The United States will not stand still for that.
A regime that has the objective to have nuclear weapons will make the
Middle East more dangerous in an extraordinary geometric way.
Madam Speaker, when the Security Council considers Iran's flagrant
and deceptive abuse in March, I urge it to act as one. Today, I urge us
to act as one in sending a very clear, very clear, unmistakable
message: This will not stand.
Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good
friend from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank my friend and indicate that I rise in
opposition.
This rhetoric that we are hearing on the House floor from people who
I have to say I do respect greatly is eerily reminiscent of the debate
in this House prior to the United States authorizing an attack on Iraq.
I think we can look back today and say that the U.S. rushed into war
against Iraq, only to find that there were no weapons of mass
destruction.
Madam Speaker, I will include for the Record an article from the
Washington Post dated August 2, 2005, which says, ``A major U.S.
intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from
manufacturing the key ingredients for nuclear weapons, roughly doubling
the previous estimate of 5 years.'' It goes on to say that ``this
carefully hedged assessment, which represents consensus among U.S.
intelligence agencies, contrasts with forceful public statements by the
White House. Administration officials have asserted but have not
offered proof that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear
arsenal.''
I also include for the record the remarks of Angela Merkel, who is
the leader of Germany, who says that we have not used all of our
available windows of opportunity. She saw an opportunity for a
negotiated settlement. As a matter of fact, in this news dispatch out
of Berlin from yesterday, the German chancellor says there are real
chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing crisis over Iran's
nuclear program.
Madam Speaker, I include for the record a news report out of Moscow
and Tehran of yesterday which says that Iran and Russia will hold talks
on Monday on a Russian offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran in
the Russian territory. This would avert what is a building crisis.
Madam Speaker, I include for the record an analysis that was done of
the joint resolution on Iraq, this was done by myself, that pointed out
the flaws in a resolution that was presented to this House. This is an
analysis from October 2, 2002, that relates to analyzing the Iraq
resolution. I think this would be very valuable when you compare it
side by side with the resolution that we have now.
Madam Speaker, I want to call to the Members' attention the same
article that Mr. Paul called to Members' attention, section 3 of the
enactment clause, which calls on members of the United Nations Security
Council, particularly the Russian Federation and the People's Republic
of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in response to the
report of Iran's noncompliance. This is in response to a report of
Iran's noncompliance and fulfillment of the mandate of the Security
Council to respond and deal with situations bearing on the maintenance
of international peace and security.
The importance of this point and this amendment is that this point
undermines and sets aside the only possibility for a peaceful
resolution of this crisis, namely the offer by Russia to enrich uranium
for Iran to use in its nuclear power plants. Iran would not operate any
enrichment processing facilities of its own, so we have an opportunity
to put aside this crisis if we see what is developing now. This
resolution, unfortunately, would scuttle the Russian-led negotiated
settlement. I ask Members to consider that this resolution would put us
on the threshold of war.
Now, I stand with Mr. Lantos in defense of the right of Israel to
survive. I voted for legislation yesterday that challenges any nation
that would call for the destruction of Israel, and we should do that.
But we don't have to go to war against Iran or to set the stage for a
war against Iran when we have diplomatic means of resolving this. We
should continue to pursue diplomacy.
Madam Speaker, I include the articles referred to earlier for the
Record.
[From washingtonpost.com, Aug. 2, 2005]
Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb
(By Dafna Linzer)
A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is
about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for
a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of
five years, according to government sources with firsthand
knowledge of the new analysis.
The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus
among US. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful
public statements by the White House. Administration
officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that
Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The
new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran
over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he
wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that ``all
options are on the table.''
The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the
intelligence community views as credible indicators that
Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the
sources said there is no information linking those projects
directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that
Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and
mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking.
The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's
ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear
arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior
intelligence official familiar with the findings said that
``it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left
to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear
weapons.''
At no time in the past three years has the White House
attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as
it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion.
Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and
questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would
require a large-scale nuclear energy program.
The NIE addresses those assertions and offers alternative
views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are
based on. Those familiar with the new judgments, which have
not been previously detailed, would discuss only limited
elements of the estimate and only on the condition of
anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of
the evidence on which it is based.
Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review, several
administration officials said, as the White House formulates
the next steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and
competing strategies. For three years, the administration has
tried, with limited success, to increase pressure on Iran by
focusing attention on its nuclear program. Those efforts have
been driven as much by international diplomacy as by the
intelligence.
The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in
January, is the first major
[[Page H342]]
review since 2001 of what is known and what is unknown about
Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first
term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by
advocates of policies that were inconsistent with the
intelligence judgments.
One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current
officials said was commissioned by national security adviser
Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the
possibility for ``regime change'' in Iran. Those findings
described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward
democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that
process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's
classified findings only on the condition of anonymity.
The new estimate takes a broader approach to the question
of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer
whether the country's ruling clerics will still be in control
by the time the country is capable of producing fissile
material. The administration keeps ``hoping the mullahs will
leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability,'' said
an official familiar with policy discussions.
Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the president
of national security developments and help guide policy. The
new Iran findings were described as well documented and well
written, covering such topics as military capabilities,
expected population growth and the oil industry. The
assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate
annex to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders.
``It's a full look at what we know, what we don't know and
what assumptions we have,'' a U.S. source said.
Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February
testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the
capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S.
officials have continually estimated Iran to be ``within five
years'' from reaching that same capability. So far, it has
not.
The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran
will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly
enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon,
before ``early to mid-next decade,'' according to four
sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the
shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical
limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line
with recently revised British and Israeli figures.
The estimate is for acquisition of fissile material, but
there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be
ready by then with an implosion device, sources said.
The time line is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect
a program moving full speed ahead without major technical
obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has
suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a
tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced
yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the
European talks fall short of expectations.
Sources said the new timeline also reflects a fading of
suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own
separate and covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence
of clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge
research and development that could be linked to a nuclear
program, four sources said.
Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on the missile
program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings
obtained last November. The documents include design
modifications for Iran's Shahab-3 missile to make the room
required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign officials
said.
``If someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he
has really good connections, he'll get that program
through,'' said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's
nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the
presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction. ``But
that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear
weapon.''
The commission found earlier this year that U.S.
intelligence knows ``disturbingly little'' about Iran, and
about North Korea.
Much of what is known about Tehran has been learned through
analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the
work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for
more than two years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for
uranium conversion and enrichment, results of plutonium
tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan--all of
which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an
energy program. Inspectors have found no proof that Iran
possesses a nuclear warhead design or is conducting a nuclear
weapons program.
The NIE comes more than two years after the intelligence
community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that
then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program. The
judgments were declassified and made public by the Bush
administration as it sought to build support for invading
Iraq five months later.
At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen. Michael V.
Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that
new rules recently were imposed for crafting NIBs and that
there would be ``a higher tolerance for ambiguity,'' even if
it meant producing estimates with less definitive
conclusions.
The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative analysis and
alternative theories that could explain some of the
suspicious activities discovered in Iran in the past three
years. Iran has said its nuclear infrastructure was built for
energy production, not weapons.
Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is Iran's public
explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18
years, because it feared attack by the United States or
Israel if the work was exposed.
In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney
suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that
Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23
years earlier in Iraq.
In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton--then the
administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and
now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador--said: ``If
we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be
too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons.''
But the level of certainty, influenced by diplomacy and
intelligence, appears to have shifted.
Asked in June, after the NIE was done, whether Iran had a
nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, Robert G.
Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: ``I
don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have
perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian
records what the Iranian leaders have said . . . lead us to
conclude that we have to be highly skeptical.''
____
[From expatica.com, Feb. 15, 2006]
Iranian Nuclear Deal Is Still Possible: Merkel
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Wednesday she still
saw real chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing
crisis over Iran's nuclear programme.
``We still have not used all our available window of
opportunity,'' Merkel said in a Stern magazine interview,
adding that she saw ``real chances for a negotiated
solution.''
Merkel said Iran had to recognize that its decision to
resume uranium enrichment and to cut inspection rights for
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had left
Tehran isolated.
Germany, France and Britain--the EU-3--led talks over the
past few years aimed at reaching a deal exchanging aid and
trade for cut-backs in Iran's nuclear research which the US
and many European countries believe is aimed at nuclear
weapons.
But last month the EU-3 declared negotiations had reached a
``dead end'' and referred Iran to the IAEA which voted to
send Tehran to the UN Security Council.
Tehran insists its nuclear programme is for peaceful
purposes.
____
[The Indian Express, Feb. 16, 2006]
Uranium Enrichment: Iran, Russia Talks on Monday
Iran and Russia will hold talks on Monday on a Russian
offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran on Russian
territory. ``The Iran side has provided official notification
on their arrival . . ,'' Interfax reported.
The confirmation from Iran comes a day after Iranian
parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel had called for
Venezuela to join his country in forming an alliance to
counter threats from the world's nuclear powers during his
visit to that country. He had accused the US of attacking
Iran's nuclear programme in order to undermine Iran's
independence.
Haddad Adel, part of the Iranian delegation, had thanked
President Hugo Chavez's government for its ``favorable
position'' towards Iran, especially its support on the
International Atomic Energy Agency board earlier this month,
when Venezuela voted against referring Iran to the UN
Security Council.
Asked by reporters if Iran would accept Moscow's proposal
to enrich uranium on Russian soil, Haddad Adel had said: ``If
that means we are deprived from peaceful use of nuclear
energy . . . we could study the Russian proposal.''
Haddad Adel had also denied his country had flouted
international rules by resuming small-scale uranium
enrichment activities at Natanz, the country's main
enrichment plant. ``All we've done is reinitiate nuclear
energy research at the laboratory level. We have not said
anything new or committed any crime.''
Iran's economy minister, meanwhile, warned that oil prices
could rise to unexpected levels if the Islamic republic was
subjected to sanctions over its disputed nuclear programme.
``Any sanctions in the current situation would be more
detrimental for the West than for Iran,'' Davoud Danesh-
Jaafari was quoted as saying by the state TV. ``Iran is in a
very important regional situation, and any disturbance of the
economic and political situation of the country could turn
the regional situation into a crisis and increase price of
oil higher than what the West expects,'' he said.
``Iran has a high economic capacity, and by relying on its
experience during the war (with Iraq from 1980-88) is ready
to face any problem,'' he added.
____
Analysis of Joint Resolution on Iraq by Dennis J. Kucinich
Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression
against an illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States
forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its
people in order to defend the national security of the United
States and enforce United Nations Security Council
resolutions relating to Iraq;
[[Page H343]]
Key issue: In the Persian Gulf war there was an
international coalition. World support was for protecting
Kuwait. There is no world support for invading Iraq.
Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq
entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement
pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other
things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them,
and to end its support for international terrorism;
Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors,
United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led
to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical
weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and
that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program
that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than
intelligence reporting had previously indicated;
Key issue: UN inspection teams identified and destroyed
nearly all such weapons. A lead inspector, Scott Ritter, said
that he believes that nearly all other weapons not found were
destroyed in the Gulf War. Furthermore, according to a
published report in the Washington Post, the Central
Intelligence Agency has no up to date accurate report on
Iraq's WMD capabilities.
Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the
cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons
inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which
finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on
October 31, 1998;
Key issues: Iraqi deceptions always failed. The inspectors
always figured out what Iraq was doing. It was the United
States that withdrew from the inspections in 1998. And the
United States then launched a cruise missile attack against
Iraq 48 hours after the inspectors left. In advance of a
military strike, the U.S. continues to thwart (the
Administration's word) weapons inspections.
Whereas in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing
weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United
States interests and international peace and security,
declared Iraq to be in ``material and unacceptable breach of
its international obligations'' and urged the President ``to
take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution
and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into
compliance with its international obligations'' (Public Law
105-235);
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national
security of the United States and international peace and
security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material
and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by,
among other things, continuing to possess and develop a
significant chemical and biological weapons capability,
actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting
and harboring terrorist organizations;
Key issues: There is no proof that Iraq represents an
imminent or immediate threat to the United States. A
``continuing'' threat does not constitute a sufficient cause
for war. The Administration has refused to provide the
Congress with credible intelligence that proves that Iraq is
a serious threat to the United States and is continuing to
possess and develop chemical and biological and nuclear
weapons. Furthermore there is no credible intelligence
connecting Iraq to Al Qaida and 9/11.
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in
brutal repression of its civilian population thereby
threatening international peace and security in the region,
by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi
citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American
serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully
seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
Key issue: This language is so broad that it would allow
the President to order an attack against Iraq even when there
is no material threat to the United States. Since this
resolution authorizes the use of force for all Iraq related
violations of the UN Security Council directives, and since
the resolution cites Iraq's imprisonment of non-Iraqi
prisoners, this resolution would authorize the President to
attack Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait citizens who may or
may not be in Iraqi prisons, even if Iraq met compliance with
all requests to destroy any weapons of mass destruction.
Though in 2002 at the Arab Summit, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to
bilateral negotiations to work out all claims relating to
stolen property and prisoners of war. This use-of-force
resolution enables the President to commit U.S. troops to
recover Kuwaiti property.
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its
capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction
against other nations and its own people;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its
continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the
United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate
former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of
occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged
in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council;
Key Issue: The Iraqi regime has never attacked nor does it
have the capability to attack the United States. The ``no
fly'' zone was not the result of a UN Security Council
directive. It was illegally imposed by the United States,
Great Britain and France and is not specifically sanctioned
by any Security Council resolution.
Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing
responsibility for attacks on the United States, its
citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
Key Issue: There is no credible intelligence that connects
Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to participation in those
events by assisting Al Qaida.
Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other
international terrorist organizations, including
organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American
citizens;
Key Issue: Any connection between Iraq support of terrorist
groups in Middle East, is an argument for focusing great
resources on resolving the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. It is not sufficient reason for the U.S. to
launch a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq.
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11,
2001 underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international
terrorist organizations;
Key Issue: There is no connection between Iraq and the
events of 9/11.
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to
use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current
Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a
surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces
or provide them to international terrorists who would do so,
and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the
United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine
to justify action by the United States to defend itself;
Key Issue: There is no credible evidence that Iraq
possesses weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq has
successfully concealed the production of such weapons since
1998, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has the
capability to reach the United States with such weapons. In
the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had a demonstrated capability of
biological and chemical weapons, but did not have the
willingness to use them against the United States Armed
Forces. Congress has not been provided with any credible
information, which proves that Iraq has provided
international terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United
Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent
relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain
activities that threaten international peace and security,
including the development of weapons of mass destruction and
refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections
in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution
687, repression of its civilian population in violation of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and
threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in
Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 949;
Key Issue: The UN Charter forbids all member nations,
including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN
resolutions.
Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has
authorized the President ``to use United States Armed Forces
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
(1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council
Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674,
and 677'';
Key Issue: The UN Charter forbids all member nations,
including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN
resolutions with military force.
Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that
it ``supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the
goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as
being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),'' that
Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United
Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and ``constitutes a
continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of
the Persian Gulf region,'' and that Congress, ``supports the
use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 688'';
Key Issue: This clause demonstrates the proper chronology
of the international process, and contrasts the current march
to war. In 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution
asking for enforcement of its resolution. Member countries
authorized their troops to participate in a UN-led coalition
to enforce the UN resolutions. Now the President is asking
Congress to authorize a unilateral first strike before the UN
Security Council has asked its member states to enforce UN
resolutions.
Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338)
expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy
of the United States to support efforts to remove from power
the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a
democratic government to replace that regime;
Key Issue: This ``Sense of Congress'' resolution was not
binding. Furthermore, while Congress supported democratic
means of removing Saddam Hussein it clearly did not endorse
the use of force contemplated in this resolution, nor did it
endorse assassination as a policy.
Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the
United States to ``work
[[Page H344]]
with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common
challenge'' posed by Iraq and to ``work for the necessary
resolutions,'' while also making clear that ``the Security
Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of
peace and security will be met, or action will be
unavoidable'';
Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the
war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international
terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of
mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under
the 1991 ceasefire and other United Nations Security Council
resolutions make clear that it is in the national security
interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war
on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of
force if necessary;
Key Issue: Unilateral action against Iraq will cost the
United States the support of the world community, adversely
affecting the war on terrorism. No credible intelligence
exists which connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to those
terrorists who perpetrated 9/11. Under international law, the
United States does not have the authority to unilaterally
order military action to enforce UN Security Council
resolutions.
Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the
war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and
funding requested by the President to take the necessary
actions against international terrorists and terrorist
organizations, including those nations, organizations or
persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or
harbored such persons or organizations;
Key Issue: The Administration has not provided Congress
with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the
events of 9/11.
Whereas the President and Congress are determined to
continue to take all appropriate actions against
international terrorists and terrorist organizations,
including those nations, organizations or persons who
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons
or organizations;
Key Issue: The Administration has not provided Congress
with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the
events of 9/11. Furthermore, there is no credible evidence
that Iraq has harbored those who were responsible for
planning, authorizing or committing the attacks of 9/11.
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution
to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of
international terrorism against the United States, as
Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization
for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and
Key Issue: This resolution was specific to 9/11. It was
limited to a response to 9/11.
Whereas it is in the national security interests of the
United States to restore international peace and security to
the Persian Gulf region;
Key Issue: If by the ``national security interests'' of the
United States, the Administration means oil, it ought to
communicate such to the Congress. A unilateral attack on Iraq
by the United States will cause instability and chaos in the
region and sow the seeds of future conflicts all over the
world.
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Authorization
for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq''.
SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by
the President to--
(a) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security
Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable
to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and
(b) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security
Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay,
evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies
with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
Key Issue: Congress can and should support this clause.
However Section 3 (which follows) undermines the
effectiveness of this section. Any peaceful settlement
requires Iraq compliance. The totality of this resolution
indicates the Administration will wage war against Iraq no
matter what. This undermines negotiations.
Sec. 3. Authorization for Use of United States Armed
Forces.
Authorization. The President is authorized to use the Armed
Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate in order to--
(1) defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
Resolutions regarding Iraq.
Key Issue: This clause is substantially similar to the
authorization that the President originally sought.
It gives authority to the President to act prior to and
even without a UN resolution, and it authorizes the President
to use U.S. troops to enforce UN resolutions even without UN
request for it. This is a violation of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, which reserves the ability to authorize force for
that purpose to the Security Council, alone.
Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
``The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace . . . and shall make recommendations to
maintain or restore international peace and security.''
(Article 39). Only the Security Council can decide that
military force would be necessary, ``The Security Council may
decide what measures . . . are to be employed to give effect
to its decisions (Article 41) . . . [and] it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.''
(Article 43). Furthermore, the resolution authorizes use of
force illegally, since the UN Security Council has not
requested it. According to the UN Charter, members of the UN,
such as the U.S., are required to ``make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces. . .'' (Article
43, emphasis added). The UN Security Council has not called
upon its members to use military force against Iraq at the
current time.
Furthermore, changes to the language of the previous use-
of-force resolution, drafted by the White House and objected
to by many members of Congress, are cosmetic:
In section (1), the word ``continuing'' was added to ``the
threat posed by Iraq''.
In section (2), the word ``relevant'' is added to ``United
Nations Security Council Resolutions'' and the words
``regarding Iraq'' were added to the end.
While these changes are represented as a compromise or a
new material development, the effects of this resolution are
largely the same as the previous White House proposal.
The UN resolutions, which could be cited by the President
to justify sending U.S. troops to Iraq, go far beyond
addressing weapons of mass destruction. These could include,
at the President's discretion, such ``relevant'' resolutions
``regarding Iraq'' including resolutions to enforce human
rights and the recovery of Kuwaiti property.
Presidential Determination.--
In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in
subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to
such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but
no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make
available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination
that--
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or
other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately
protect the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to
lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and
(2) acting pursuant to this resolution is consistent with
the United States and other countries continuing to take the
necessary actions against international terrorists and
terrorist organizations, including those nations,
organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed
or aided the terrorists attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001.
(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.--
(1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with
section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress
declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of
the War Powers Resolution.
(2) Applicability of other requirements.--Nothing in this
resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers
Resolution.
Sec. 4. Reports to Congress.
(a) The President shall, at least once every 60 days,
submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this
joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the
exercise of authority granted in section 2 and the status of
planning for efforts that are expected to be required after
such actions are completed, including those actions described
in section 7 of Public Law 105-338 (the Iraq Liberation Act
of 1998).
(b) To the extent that the submission of any report
described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of
any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution
otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to
the reporting requirements of Public Law 93-148 (the War
Powers Resolution), all such reports may be submitted as a
single consolidated report to the Congress.
(c) To the extent that the information required by section
3 of Public Law 102-1 is included in the report required by
this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the
requirements of section 3 of Public Law 102-1.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume to refute some of the statements that have been made against
the resolution.
Madam Speaker, H. Con. Res. 341 clearly outlines the Iran threat, not
just as assessed by the United States, not just as assessed by the
Europeans, but by the International Atomic Energy Agency. After dealing
with the Iran case for over 3 years, it reaffirms the position of the
United States, of the U.S. Congress, as articulated through the passage
of previous measures, that Iran has forfeited any right
[[Page H345]]
for any access to nuclear technology or materials.
In response to previous statements regarding this resolution and
sanctions, stating that it would isolate the Iranian people, on the
contrary, Madam Speaker, sanctions would empower the Iranian people
because it would weaken this regime.
More importantly, due to the Iran economy's vulnerabilities, the
sanctions and the denial of billions of dollars of oil investments
would deny the regime in Tehran the funds that they need to carry out
this nuclear program and to continue with its extremist terrorist
activities.
In closing, I would like to remind my colleagues that in the summer
of 2001 Iran's ayatollah expressed Iran's commitment to bring America
to its knees. Those were his statements. He added that ``the giant will
fall,'' the giant being the United States of America.
Combine this with what the director of the National Intelligence
Agency, John Negroponte, said in his recent testimony. He said, while
the assessment of when Iran would go nuclear is about 5 to 10 years
from now, he also expressed grave concerns that we did not really know
the extent of Iran's nuclear activities. He said that Iran's 20-year
pursuit of a covert program means that we cannot truly confirm any
specific timeframe.
Mr. Negroponte also said that Iran's missile program, with a nuclear
capability, posed a serious concern for our U.S. security interests.
Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce).
Mr. ROYCE. I thank the chairwoman for yielding.
Madam Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. This resolution
rightfully condemns Iranian noncompliance with its nonproliferation
obligations and calls upon the U.N. Security Council to expeditiously
consider this matter.
Madam Speaker, this is a grave matter, one deserving of this House's
full and careful consideration. Iran, the most active state sponsor of
terrorism, is seeking nuclear weapons. Its regime denies it, but the
U.S. and many other nations know otherwise. Iran has a long record of
deceiving international inspectors and has a history of dealing with
the A.Q. Khan network. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Nonproliferation, nothing worries me more than this deadly combination
of terrorism and WMD.
For a closed country such as Iran, we actually know a great deal
about the Iranian nuclear program. IAEA inspectors have played a key
role in spotlighting Iranian behavior. In its most recent update to the
35 member IAEA Board of Governors, inspectors reported that Iran has in
its possession a document on the production of uranium metal
hemispheres. This is of great significance, as the IAEA identified this
document as being related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon
components, the first time the international body has attributed a
nuclear weapons purpose to activities by Iran.
Madam Speaker, if Iran were to go nuclear, many other countries in
this combustible region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and
Turkey, to name a few, might follow. This proliferation would pose a
grave threat to our security and certainly the security of our allies.
Some criticize our European partners for failing in their
negotiations with Iran. I agree that it has taken us too long to get to
this point, but, frankly, when you think about it, our hand is
strengthened at this point because of the European involvement.
At the IAEA vote the other week, we had the permanent five members of
the Security Council united. I am under no illusions that this united
front will last, but it is an important first step.
We will also hear from some that the administration has outsourced
its diplomacy to the Europeans and has stood by as Iran moves toward a
nuclear weapon. I will remind those that we alone cannot meet all
security threats. We need partners. It is time to start challenging the
norms that have developed over time.
The Iranians skillfully talk about their inalienable rights under the
nonproliferation treaty to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle,
including its most sensitive aspects. Indeed, in the eyes of the IAEA,
Iran's crime has been its failure to report its nuclear materials and
the technology, not the nuclear activities themselves, including
uranium enrichment.
{time} 1100
Under the guise of the NPT, Iran is walking right up to the edge of
developing nuclear weapons. This is a violation of the spirit if not
the letter of the NPT.
My subcommittee will soon take a close look at this issue. This
notion of rights has to be challenged, because if we don't, the world
will be a very, very dangerous place.
Mr. Speaker, there are no easy answers. We need to think long and
hard about what types of sanctions are constructive in reaching the
goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. This challenge
will require careful and marked consideration by the administration,
Congress, and our partners as we move forward. It is too serious for
anything else.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the statement of
the American representative to the IAEA Special Board of Governors
meeting on February 4.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to join other colleagues in expressing
condolences to the Egyptian delegation, and through them to
the Egyptian people, for yesterday's tragedy on the Red Sea.
My government is pleased to have joined an overwhelming
majority of Board members in signaling to Iran through
adoption of this resolution the Board's firm determination
that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations.
The Board's September 24, 2005 resolution found Iran in
noncompliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to
Article XII.C.
That resolution also found that pursuant to Article
III.B.4, Iran's nuclear program raises questions that fall
within the competence of the UNSC.
At that time and again in November, we deferred reporting
Iran to the Council to give Iran yet another opportunity to
choose diplomacy over confrontation.
Unfortunately, Iran did not take that opportunity. As a
result, the Board today carried forward the statutory process
begun in September, by voting to report this Board's past
findings and concerns regarding Iran's noncompliance.
I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that
today's report to the Security Council will not divest the
IAEA of the challenge posed by Iran.
We continue to expect the Agency's investigation of Iran's
nuclear program to proceed actively and urgently and we look
forward to the Director General's implementation report in
March. We note that the DG's report will also be conveyed to
the UNSC immediately after our next meeting.
By reporting Iran to the Security Council now, we seek to
add the Council's weight to reinforce the Agency's role,
reinforce its investigation, and add an imperative for Iran
to choose a course of cooperation and negotiation over a
course of confrontation.
The Agency has a specific mandate to deal with nuclear
safeguards issues. This mandate is without prejudice to the
rights and responsibilities of the Security Council to
address matters that raise questions of international peace
and security, as we have found is the case with Iran.
That is why the IAEA Statute expressly contemplates the
Security Council's involvement in such instances of
noncompliance. And that is why the Board made clear in
September that such a report is mandatory.
In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush
emphasized that, ``the Iranian government is defying the
world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the
world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear
weapons.''
We believe that this Board decision sends a strong and
clear message to Iran's leaders to abandon their pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability.
We continue to seek a diplomatic solution and we do not
envision diplomacy ending as a result of this report.
Quite the contrary, we see this as part of a new phase of
diplomacy, one aimed at strengthening the ongoing efforts of
the Agency to investigate Iran's deeply troubling nuclear
activities, and underscoring the calls on Iran to resolve our
concerns through peaceful diplomacy rather than threats and
confrontation.
Through this path, and only through this path, can Iran
persuasively demonstrate that it has now chosen to confine
its nuclear program to exclusively peaceful purposes.
And through this path Iran can also start to restore its
standing in the international community to the benefit of the
Iranian people.
[[Page H346]]
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the resolution
adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic
of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006
the board of governors
(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on
Iran's nuclear programme,
(b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,
(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in
the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and
II of the Treaty,
(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for
their professional and impartial efforts to implement the
Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding
safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by
Iran of the suspension,
(e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as
a special verification case,
(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the
Director General noted that after nearly three years of
intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a
position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's
nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
(g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its
obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and
the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history
of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of
those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's
verification of declarations made by Iran since September
2002,
(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that
Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the
Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/
67),
(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's
cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment,
materials and activities which have applications in the
conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well
as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director
General in GOV/2005/67),
(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General
reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related
to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to
metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining
of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into
hemispherical forms,
(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear
programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of
confidence-building is required from Iran,
(1) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for
a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and
(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would
contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to
realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of
mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be
resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to
the calls for confidence building measures which the Board
has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for
Iran to:
re-establish full and sustained suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated
by heavy water;
ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional
Protocol;
pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with
the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed
on 18 December 2003;
implement transparency measures, as requested by the
Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend
beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement
and Additional Protocol, and include such access to
individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use
equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and
development as the Agency may request in support of its
ongoing investigations;
2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security
Council of the United Nations that these steps are required
of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council
all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to
this issue;
3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in
a position to clarify some important issues relating to
Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in
its possession a document on the production of uranium metal
hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this
process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon
components; and, noting that the decision to put this
document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran
to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a
full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeplv regrets that, despite repeated calls from the
Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment
related and reprocessing activities which the Board has
declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran
resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility
on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment
activities on 10 January 2006;
5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of
confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a
fissile material production capability against the background
of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous
Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its
position in relation to confidence-building measures, which
are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a
constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can
result in increased confidence;
6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to
the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable
and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify
possible activities which could have a military nuclear
dimension;
7. Underlines that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's
declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to
continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's
Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional
Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with
a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence
of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to
pursue additional transparency measures required for the
Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and
reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's
past nuclear activities;
8. Requests the Director General to report on the
implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next
regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and
immediately thereafter to convey, together with any
Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security
Council; and
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a brief by the
Deputy Director General For Safeguards on Iran's development of nuclear
weapons.
Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's
Suspension of Enrichment-Related and Reprocessing Activities
The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the
developments that have taken place since November 2005 in
connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the
Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of
enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief
provides factual information concerning those developments;
it does not include any assessments thereof.
Iran has continued to facilitate access under its
Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act
as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by
providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and
access to locations.
1. Enrichment Programme
As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November
2005, during meetings that took place in October and November
2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional
information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme.
Responses to some of these requests were provided during
discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between
Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy
Director General for Safeguards. This information is
currently being assessed.
1.A. Contamination
As part of its assessment of the correctness and
completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment
activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the
source(s) of low enriched uranium, LEU, particles, and some
high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at
locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components
had been manufactured, used and/or stored.
1.B. The 1987 offer
As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency
in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document
reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by
a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a
disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and
specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings,
specifications and calculations for a ``complete plant''; and
materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also
made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive
equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and
purification plant; a complete set of workshop equipment for
mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium
re-conversion and casting capabilities.
On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page
document was the only remaking documentary evidence relevant
to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this
to the secret nature of the programme and the management
style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at
that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists,
such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports,
personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its
statements concerning that offer.
[[Page H347]]
1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer
According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network
between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key
members of the network about the events leading to the mid-
1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this
context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification
of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI
staff members in the mid-1990s.
P-1 centrifuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s: Iran
has been unable to supply any documentation or other
information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of
500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The
Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and
contents of these shipments.
P-2 centrifuge programme: Iran still maintains that, as a
result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the
mid-1990s, the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2
centrifuge components (which contained no supporting
specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered
along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to
assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during
the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this
period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2
centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge
components. In light of information available to the Agency
indicating the possible deliveries of such components, which
information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November
2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made
after 1995.
In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2 design
said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting
company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that
the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased,
magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is
still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to
acquire such magnets. 2.
2. Uranium Metal
Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to
have been the drawings, specifications and supporting
documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of
which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these
was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the
reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and
the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into
hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon
components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other
specifications for machined pieces for such components.
According to Iran, this document had been provided on the
initiative of the network, and not at the request of the
AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the
Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency
during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document
again and to place it under Agency seal.
3. Transparency Visits and Discussions
On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a
military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances
regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities at that site, where several environmental samples
were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of
the analysis of those samples.
Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional
information and clarifications related to efforts made by the
Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at
Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment
that could be used in uranium enrichment and
conversion activities. The Agency has also requested
interviews with the individuals involved in the
acquisition of those items.
On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency
documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts
by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a
number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment,
power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye
laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation
suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had
actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical
university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor.
However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency
for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request
to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential
for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use
of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass
spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment
(equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium
enrichment).
On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list
of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to
see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in
situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on
the Agency's list was presented at a technical university,
and environmental samples were taken from it.
On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification
about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use
material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium
and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005.
High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and
environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that
the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing,
but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran
agreed to provide additional information on inquiries
concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and
special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's
acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and
filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31
January 2006 for environmental sampling.
On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a
meeting to discuss information that had been made available
to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the
Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium
dioxide into UF4 (``green salt''), as well as
tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile
re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear
dimension and which appear to have administrative
interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the
``issues related to baseless allegations.'' Iran agreed on 23
January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the
clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to
address the other topics during that meeting. In the course
of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the
Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow
diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications
related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national
nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the
allegations were baseless and that it would provide further
clarifications later.
4. Suspension
The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements
of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and
reprocessing activities.
In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency
that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006,
``those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which
ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and
non-legally binding suspension'' (GOV/INF/2006/1). On 7
January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran
requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz,
Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of
suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOV/INF/
2006/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January
2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.
Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it
refers to as ``small scale R&D''. As of 30 January 2006,
Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or
assembly of centrifuges, or the feeding of UF 6
material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of
the gas handling system is underway at the Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, and quality control of
components and some rotor testing is being conducted at
Farayand Technique and Natanz. Due to the fact that all
centrifuge-related raw materials and components are without
IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D activities
being carried out by Iran cannot be effective except at PFEP,
where containment and surveillance measures are being applied
for the enrichment process. The two cylinders at Natanz
containing UF6, from which seals had been removed
on 10 January 2006, were again placed under Agency
containment and surveillance on 29 January 2006.
The uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the
Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November
2005 is continuing and is expected to end in March 2006. All
UF6 produced at UCF thus far has remained under
Agency containment and surveillance.
Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to
monitor the ongoing civil engineering construction of the
Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding back our time, may I just
say fanaticism in the field of international affairs is always
dangerous. But fanaticism armed with nuclear weapons is not just
dangerous; it is unacceptable. Iran is determined to move in the
direction of developing nuclear weapons. The civilized world cannot
stand by.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume in closing.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my good friend, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Lantos), for his wise words. It is always a
pleasure to work with him as well as with our chairman, Henry Hyde.
Mr. Speaker the International Atomic Energy Agency in its February 4,
2006 resolution said that after nearly 3 years the agency is not yet in
a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials
or activities in Iran.
Iran needs to hear our message loud and clear. The United Nations
Security Council now has the Iran case after 20 years of Iran's covert
activities and after 3 years of mocking the international community.
Let us send a message loud and clear today. Let us pass this
resolution.
[[Page H348]]
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support H. Con. Res. 341,
condemning Iran for violating its international nuclear
nonproliferation obligations. Mr. Speaker, the United Nations Security
Council must quickly consider Iran's repeated violations of
international nuclear norms, impose a comprehensive sanctions regime
and send an unequivocal message that the world rejects its nuclear
ambitions.
In addition to its refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic
Energy Agency, IAEA, Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has drawn
considerable attention for his heinous calls for the United States'
greatest ally, Israel, to be ``wiped off the map'' and his bold denial
of the Holocaust. When offered a number of reasonable solutions to
avert an international standoff, the Ahmadinejad regime has unwisely
refused.
It is a positive sign that Russia and Iran are continuing discussions
on a proposal the U.S. and others have endorsed. This plan would have
Russia enrich Iran's uranium and remove it once it's spent, thereby
maintaining safeguards on the nuclear fuel. I am hopeful an agreement
will be reached, but have no qualms about this body sending a resolute
message to Iran that its breaches and failures to comply with its
nuclear nonproliferation obligations will be met with strong
resistance.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition of House
Concurrent Resolution 341, which calls on the UN Security Council to
expeditiously take action in response to reports of Iran's
noncompliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
I am gravely concerned about nuclear proliferation in Iran and in any
other nation. But, this resolution is the wrong resolution at the wrong
time.
Right now, Russia is negotiating with Iran to avert their domestic
production of enriched uranium. Russia and China also supported the
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, decision to refer Iran to the
Security Council, but requested that any action against Iran be delayed
to March so these negotiations can continue.
Yet, here we are on February 16th trying to supersede those
negotiations by calling on the UN Security Council to act now. This
strikes me as a step toward more unilateralism.
In addition to my concern about interfering with ongoing
negotiations, the latest U.S. National Intelligence Council analysis
projects that Iran is a decade away from manufacturing the key
ingredient for a nuclear weapon. This expert analysis gives me further
reason to question this rush to unilateral action.
I urge my colleagues to give peaceful negotiations the opportunity to
succeed and vote against this resolution.
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, some time yesterday, a Member introduced
House Concurrent Resolution 341. Earlier today, without benefit of
hearings or markup by any committee or subcommittee of the House, it
was brought to the floor and the vast majority of members voted for it.
They voted, I believe, for it for the best of reasons: to strengthen
efforts by the international community to convince Iran to meet its
obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The resolution makes a number of important and factual points about
Iran's lack of cooperation with IAEA and then sets out six statements
of Congressional policy. The first two condemn Iran's breaches of its
obligations and commend the efforts of several nations to find a
diplomatic means to return Iran to compliance. The final clause urges
the President to keep Congress informed on this issue. All well and
good.
But, for some reason, the fourth declaration goes beyond what
international treaties require and beyond anything that Congress has
carefully studied. It reads as follows:
[Congress] declares that Iran, through its many breaches
for almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards
Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a
nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment
and facilities.
Now, let's be clear on what ``nuclear fuel cycle'' means. It means
any use of nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy for
the provision of civilian electrical power.
I think there is some level of agreement that our problem with Iran
is not about nuclear power plants. And it is abundantly clear that Iran
intends to insist on its right to nuclear energy. If Iran's leaders
want to insist that they only seek to produce electricity, we should
work with the IAEA to make sure there are so many inspectors assigned
to Iran that they can't produce anything except electricity. A
Congressional declaration that a country cannot use nuclear power for
peaceful, minutely inspected, civilian purposes is neither practical
nor helpful.
Had there been hearings, I believe that the difficulties with this
approach would have been identified. But once again, the Republican
House leadership hasn't bothered with regular process, hasn't bothered
with hearings and witnesses or even markups and amendments. The
Republican leadership doesn't want to hear dissent, doesn't want to
hear concerns, doesn't want to hear anything but ``yes, sir!''
In addition, the convoluted language of the third declaration seems
to call upon the Russian Federation to cease its unilateral efforts to
bring Iran into compliance with its treaty obligations. Whether an
arrangement can be designed that allows Iran access to nuclear power
without creating its own enrichment facilities remains to be seen, but
the attempt should not be scorned.
So now the House is on record that the Iranian people should never be
allowed to use nuclear power and that Russia should stop talking to
Iran about solving this problem. If the resolution had not been brought
to the floor today, just one day following its introduction, these
problems might have been avoided.
Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of
this resolution.
Iran must be condemned for following the path of nuclear
proliferation. This past Tuesday, February 14, 2006, Iran announced
that it has resumed uranium enrichment efforts, sending a signal to the
world that it is taking steps to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Iran
said it will no longer allow international inspectors to access its
nuclear facilities. Therefore we must work to ensure that Iran is
unsuccessful in the path that it has chosen.
Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous and most horrible weapons man
has ever invented. These weapons pose a threat to human kind; and an
even graver threat when in the hands of a nation that supports
terrorism. We need to work to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in
our world.
Iran must join the community of nations and lay down the instruments
for the development of nuclear weapons. We must encourage all nations
to lay down the burden and instruments of the most destructive weaponry
known to human kind. There is enough madness on this little planet that
we do not need to add more. There is not any room in our society for
more nations to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution. We must unite the
community of nations and use all diplomatic means to rid our world of
rogue nuclear threats.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Con. Res.
341, which condemns the Government of Iran for violating its
international nuclear nonproliferation obligations, and expressing
support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security
Council.
Iran is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, which poses a
threat to the national security of the United States and to the world.
Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations to the international
community, specifically the 1973 Safeguards Agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. In 2002 the world learned
that Iran was illegally continuing to develop a secret nuclear program,
which has led to years of negotiations with the international
community. Last August, however, the Iranian government resumed its
conversion of uranium. Earlier this month the IAEA voted 27 to 3 to
report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for further action.
I urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to
pressure Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA.
The House should additionally take up and pass legislation to
strengthen the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA. The House should pass
H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act, which I have co-sponsored. The
bill would strengthen ILSA, provide assistance to pro-democracy groups
in Iran, and require that ILSA remain in effect until the President
certifies to Congress that Iran has permanently and verifiably
dismantled its weapons on mass destruction programs and has committed
to combating their proliferation.
I am pleased that the United States has continued to work closely
with the international community--including the European Union, Russia,
and China--on this urgent matter. I urge the President to keep Congress
fully and current informed on this matter, as called for in this
resolution. I urge the international community to impose economic
sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
We cannot allow a rogue nation such as Iran to obtain nuclear
weapons. Iran has actively supported terrorist groups, such as
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran has funded
suicide bombers in Israel and militant organizations elsewhere. Many of
these terrorist groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction, WMD, so
that they can kill or injure thousands or even millions of people. The
Iranian President has publicly expressed his hope for ``a world without
America,'' his desire to ``wipe Israel off the map,'' and has denied
the existence of the Holocaust.
I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
[[Page H349]]
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I support House Concurrent Resolution 341
condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council. As co-chairman
of the Iran Working Group, I am increasingly concerned about Iran's
movement towards the brink of a nuclear showdown. In response to the
historic International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, referral of Iran to
the United Nations Security Council, UNSC, Iran retaliated by halting
snap inspections by IAEA inspectors. There are even reports that Iran
resumed uranium-enrichment at its Natanz nuclear plant, a process that
had been suspended for two years following the disclosure of Iran's
covert program. Iranian President Ahmadinejad warned that Iran could
withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if international
pressure increased over its nuclear program.
President Ahmadinejad repeatedly states that his nation will develop
nuclear capabilities, and continually rebuffs efforts of nations such
as Russia and the EU-3 in providing a way out of a conflict. Given the
Iranian President's genocidal intentions of ``wiping Israel off the
map,'' we cannot allow Iran to advance on its path towards a nuclear
future.
The Congress must consider many options to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. That is why I introduced House Concurrent
Resolution 177, which calls on our allies and the U.S. to consider
quarantining gasoline sales to Iran should the Iranians reject the
international effort to end the nuclear impasse.
Despite being one of the world's top oil producing nations, Iran is
highly dependent on foreign gasoline due to severe mismanagement of its
domestic energy supply. The need is so great that the Iranian
government regularly debates rationing gasoline to manage its short
supply. An oil embargo on exports from Iran could hurt Western
economies, but a gasoline quarantine on imports to Iran would fall
heavily on Iran alone.
Now is the time for the Security Council to take strong action
against Iran. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of House
Concurrent Resolution 341.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this
resolution to condemn the Iranian government for violating its
international nonproliferation obligations and to support efforts to
report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
Last week, the 35-nation International Atomic Energy Agency's, IAEA,
Board of Governors overwhelmingly voted to report Iran to the U.N.
Security Council, an important step in the international effort to
prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons.
Iran has made clear its plans to enrich uranium by building its
centrifuge program and constructing a heavy-water reactor which could
provide plutonium for nuclear weapons. Additionally, the IAEA revealed
that Iran was in possession of a document describing the procedure for
fabricating uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres, which form
the core of a nuclear weapon.
Following the vote on the resolution, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad ordered Iran's nuclear commission to end its cooperation
with the IAEA and begin full-scale production of enriched uranium,
which can be used to build nuclear weapons.
The thought of Iran with a nuclear weapon is a frightening one, and
if this issue is not addressed promptly Iran will soon have the ability
and materials to produce such weapons. Nuclear proliferation alone is a
threat to American interests and security; nuclear proliferation to a
country with a radical Islamic leader who has supported terrorism is an
even more immediate threat.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this
resolution to condemn Iran's decision to advance its nuclear program
and to urge the U.N. Security Council to address this issue at once.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. Iran
has obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT, to not
carry out a nuclear weapons program. Iran has ignored its obligations
by carrying out a covert uranium enrichment program. It is becoming
increasingly clear that this enrichment program is not merely aimed at
producing nuclear fuel for a civilian energy program. According the
IAEA, Iran has documents in their possession for casting of enriched
and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres--something which has no
legitimate civilian purpose and which appears clearly to be related to
the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. Possession of these
documents is a violation of the NPT.
I support the work of the IAEA to monitor Iran's nuclear program, to
press for Iran to agree to the Additional Protocol for enhanced
monitoring and inspection of that program. The British, the French, and
the Germans have tried for years to convince Iran to move away from
nuclear weapons capability and to agree to increased international
monitoring of its nuclear activities. Iran has rejected their efforts
and made it clear that it is not willing to accept the type of
negotiated solution proposed by the Europeans.
Right now we face a crisis that challenges the future of the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime. If the international
community cannot address the issue of Iran, then we risk the collapse
of the NPT.
I hope the U.N. Security Council can resolve this issue. Now that
this matter has been referred to the Security Council, the
international community needs to begin a dialogue about how best to
respond to Iran's action. We need to start thinking about tough and
enforceable sanctions that can send a clear signal to Tehran that
ignoring the will of the international community on this issue has
consequences.
As we call upon Iran to stop their clandestine program, however, we
must remember the United States also has obligations to the NPT. We can
not ask the world to enforce regulation on Iran while we shirk our
obligations to the NPT by opening up nuclear trade with India, a
country which has not signed the Treaty. If we seek special exemptions
from international and domestic nonproliferation law for India while
simultaneously seeking strict enforcement of such laws for Iran, an NPT
signatory, we will undermine our credibility as a leader on
nonproliferation. Iran will accuse us of hypocrisy, and other nations
may seek similar special exemptions.
For example, we know that China has long had a close relationship
with Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan has already asked the U.S. to
make special exemptions for them from international and domestic
nonproliferation law. China has called for that as well. Are we going
to also exempt Pakistan from the international system of controls and
safeguards established by the NPT and by U.S. law? Are we going to
stand by and do nothing if China goes ahead and sends the same type of
nuclear technology and materials that we are talking about sending to
India?
We also know that Russia has historically had a close relationship
with the Iranian nuclear program. They've been trying to get the
Iranians to agree to a nuclear fuel supply arrangement in return for
foregoing a domestic Iranian enrichment program. But what if Moscow
decides now to go far beyond that and afford Iran broader access to
controlled nuclear technology, citing what we're proposing to do with
India?
I think that if we want to send a strong signal to Iran that its
flouting of international nuclear nonproliferation norms is
unacceptable and will have adverse consequences, then now is not the
time to be thinking of granting selective exemptions from
nonproliferation laws and treaties for other nations, even if they are
our friends. We need to be principled leaders on the most important of
all issues facing our country. We do not want Iran, with a regime that
has made it clear that it desires the destruction of Israel, a regime
that is known to have provided material support to terrorist groups, to
obtain its own nuclear arsenal.
The time for us to act as an international community is now. There
are forces within Iran that want to move away from extremism. We need
to send a strong signal that the international community does not
accept the current Iranian government's nuclear aspirations, and that
there will be consequences, there will be sanctions, if Tehran persists
in its current course of action.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a cosponsor of this
resolution. Iran's resumption of nuclear activities and its non-
compliance with international commitments must be met by a united
Congress and a united international community.
For almost 3 years, the United States, the European Union, Russia,
the IAEA and other parties have been working to negotiate an end to
those parts of Iran's nuclear program that could allow it to produce
nuclear weapons. Iran has continued to mislead the international
community about its efforts. It has alternated diplomatic overtures
with clandestine activity on its nuclear program.
In June 2004, just a few months after making assurances to the
international community, Iran was criticized by the IAEA for failing to
cooperate with an inquiry of its nuclear activities. In November 2004,
Iran agreed to suspend much of its uranium enrichment in a deal with
the EU. However, in August 2005, Iran resumed its uranium conversion at
its Isfahan plant and in January 2006, broke IAEA seals at its Natanz
facility. It has since resumed enriching uranium at that facility.
Experts indicate that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in as
little as 3 to 5 years. According to a report issued by the IAEA to
member governments on January 31, 2006, Iran has a clandestine effort,
dubbed Green Salt, which has been working on uranium processing, high
explosives and a missile warhead design. The report clearly
demonstrates a nexus between Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear fuel
cycle and Tehran's military, thus
[[Page H350]]
undercutting the Iranian government's repeated denials that it seeks to
develop nuclear weapons.
Iran's growing nuclear capability is compounded by a series of recent
statements by Iran's president, in which he declared that a fellow
member of the United Nations must be wiped off the map. These remarks
demonstrate a disregard for human life and undermine the central
principle of the United Nations. The world community cannot stand by
while an outlaw regime announces its desire to annihilate millions of
people and attempts to develop the nuclear weapons to do so. The
community of nations has properly condemned these threats; now we must
ensure that Iran will never develop the capability to act on them.
I am hopeful that all members of the United Nations Security Council
will take a strong stand for international peace and security when this
issue is considered by the Security Council in March. I can think of no
greater priority for the Council and believe that concerted action by
the Council's Permanent Members represents the best opportunity to
defuse this crisis.
As a gesture of appreciation from the Congress, I, along with Mr.
Kirk of Illinois and Mr. Andrews of New Jersey, am circulating a letter
to the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. The letter
thanks them for their support in reporting Iran to the Security Council
and urges them to establish consequences to continued non-compliance. I
encourage my colleagues to sign the letter.
I am hopeful that with a united Congress and a united international
community, we can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons which
could destabilize the entire region and which could be used to carry
out Iran's professed desire to wipe millions of its neighbors off the
map.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, several years ago, we learned that Iran was
operating a secret program to enrich uranium and carry out other
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Iran's failure to report these activities to the International Atomic
Energy Agency was a blatant violation of its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
The more we learn about Iran's program, the more obvious it's become
that Iran's true intention is not peaceful power generation, but the
development of a nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States,
our allies in the Middle East, and even Europe.
Any seeds of doubt on this issue have been dispelled once and for all
by Iran's rejection of a sensible proposal put forward by Great
Britain, France and Germany, and more recently, its move to resume
uranium enrichment.
The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made the urgency of
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that much greater.
With his comments about the Holocaust being a ``myth,'' endorsement
for ``wiping Israel off the map,'' and enthusiastic support of
Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations, this vile anti-
Semite has made his true intentions crystal clear.
The IAEA's decision to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council is a
long-overdue step in the right direction.
But tough words must be backed by tough action. We must continue to
push the other members of the Security Council--especially China and
Russia--to meet their international obligations.
Congress should also pass H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act.
This important legislation will close a loophole in the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act that has allowed successive administrations to avoid
penalizing foreign firms that continue to invest in Iran's oil and gas
sector.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This
resolution is closely modeled on a resolution, Senate Concurrent
Resolution 78, introduced in the Senate by the majority leader, Senator
Frist, csponsored by Senator Reid, the minority leader, Senators Lugar
and Biden, and a bipartisan group totaling 32 Senators, and adopted
unanimously on January 27. Our colleague, Representative Ros-Lehtinen
of Florida, has worked with me and other members of the House Committee
on International Relations, including our distinguished ranking
Democrat, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, on this
resolution. She has updated the text of the Senate resolution in the
light of recent events and in the light of the understanding that we in
the House have about Iran's actions and intentions.
This House may be divided on precisely how to respond to every aspect
of the Iranian challenge, but we are certainly united, as our vote will
show, in our support for the current efforts to bring the weight of the
Security Council of the United Nations to bear against Iran's
continuing violations of its formal and informal obligations concerning
its nuclear activities.
These efforts are not only American efforts, but ones which involve
many responsible members of the international community. The
administration deserves credit for coaxing some of the reluctant states
to this point: the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, has indeed
reported to the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear program.
Although the IAEA may make additional reports during the next month,
the die is cast: the Security Council is in a position to take action,
and it should do so. It should respond to what is clearly a threat to
international peace and security--and making such responses in a
collective way is precisely the purpose it is meant to serve.
The administration deserves credit for having brought along the IAEA
Board of Governors and, in particular, all of the permanent members of
the Security Council, to this stage in the process. The signal to Iran
could not have been more stark.
Critical to arriving at this point was the support extended by the
Bush administration for the so-called ``ED-3'' process, in which
Britain, France, and Germany conducted negotiations with Iran--
negotiations that ultimately failed to contain Iran's efforts, to be
sure, but which succeeded in keeping the international community moving
forward in unison.
At this point, we need to continue to keep the pressure on, but let
us keep the pressure on the recalcitrant party--the Iranians--and not
begin internecine warfare among the Western powers. It is only with the
cooperation of other States that we can truly pressure Iran.
As we consider other legislation in the next months--and the
consideration of this resolution does not, in my mind, prejudice the
ability of the House to consider other legislation--we should bear in
mind that we need allies in this struggle. Sticking our finger in the
eye of other states which are, in general terms, ``on our side'' will
do nothing to bring Iran to heel.
Another reason to work with our friends is that if the Security
Council does not achieve consensus on how to deal with Iran, we will
need to work with them to arrive at a ``Plan B,'' as an alternative.
That plan should consist, in all likelihood, of a series of
comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions.
Those sanctions should be designed to serve several purposes. First,
they should make it clear to the Iranian people that their leaders'
course of action needs to change. Second, they should serve to inflict
some pain on the Iranian leadership in an effort to coerce those
leaders to behave in a responsible way. Finally, they should reduce the
resources available to the Iranian state to continue their nuclear
weapons program.
In summary, Mr. Speaker, this is an important resolution; it
indicates quite clearly that we are behind the administration's
approach. I hope that we will continue to support it in the days ahead.
Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my support of the
resolution condemning Iran for violating its nonproliferation
obligations and expressing support for efforts to report them to the
United Nations Security Council.
Early last month, the Iranian regime announced that it planned to
restart its nuclear research program. This was in clear violation of a
2004 agreement that had been reached with Britain, France and Germany
to suspend uranium enrichment operations.
Iran claims that the program is aimed at generating electricity, but
I think the United States and the world know better. In fact, the
International Atomic Energy Agency has already voted to report Iran to
the U.N. Security Council.
The president of the Iranian regime, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has also
caused concern in the United States and Europe with his confrontational
statements denying the Holocaust happened and stating his desire to
annihilate Israel.
The United States fully expects the Security Council to add its
weight to the IAEA's calls for Iran to return to the 2004 agreement,
suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activity, cooperate fully with
the IAEA and return to negotiations with Great Britain, France and
Germany.
Only then will the Iranian regime restore any confidence that it is
in fact, not seeking nuclear weapons under the guise of an
``electricity program.''
Mr. Speaker, with their continued defiance it's imperative that the
United Nations act quickly. We must send a clear message to the Iranian
regime that he world will not permit them to obtain nuclear weapons.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). All time for
debate has expired.
Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, February 15, 2006,
the concurrent resolution is considered read and the previous question
is ordered on the concurrent resolution and on the preamble.
The question is on the concurrent resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
[[Page H351]]
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 404,
nays 4, answered ``present'' 4, not voting 20, as follows:
[Roll No. 12]
YEAS--404
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Becerra
Berkley
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boustany
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Higgins
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCaul (TX)
McCollum (MN)
McCotter
McCrery
McGovern
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz (PA)
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--4
Kucinich
McDermott
Paul
Stark
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--4
Abercrombie
Capuano
Kaptur
Lee
NOT VOTING--20
Berman
Bishop (UT)
Blumenauer
Campbell (CA)
Carson
Cummings
Davis (IL)
Evans
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hunter
McKinney
Miller, Gary
Osborne
Rangel
Simpson
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Westmoreland
Woolsey
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington) (during the
vote). Members are advised that there are 2 minutes remaining in this
vote.
{time} 1131
Mr. MOORE of Kansas changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
Ms. LEE changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``present.''
So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to vote today on H. Con. Res.
341 because I was traveling on official business to a Middle East
regional security conference in Athens, Greece, and then on to Egypt
and Israel for meetings with top government officials. Had I been
present, I would have voted ``yea.''
____________________