S. RES. 349—CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, IN NOVEMBER 2004, FOR VIOLATING THE TERMS OF THE 2004 PARIS AGREEMENT, AND EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO REFER IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, FOR ITS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY OBLIGATIONS

Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. KYL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. Res. 349

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities;

Whereas the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program (commonly known as the “Paris Agreement”), which successfully secured a commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic, technological, political, and security issues;

Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA obligations to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

Whereas Article III.B–4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that “if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;”;

Whereas, in September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution declaring that Iran’s many failures and breaches constitute noncompliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA;

Whereas, on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research efforts in direct violation of the Paris Agreement;

Whereas, in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the person of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stated that Iran now had the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”;

WHEREAS the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities;

WHEREAS the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program (commonly known as the “Paris Agreement”), which successfully secured a commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic, technological, political, and security issues;

WHEREAS Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA obligations to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

WHEREAS Article III.B–4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that “if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;”;

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WHEREAS, on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research efforts in direct violation of the Paris Agreement;

WHEREAS, in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the person of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stated that Iran now had the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”;

WHEREAS the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities;
Whereas the Fourth Amendment provides that courts shall issue "warrants" to authorize searches and seizures, based upon probable cause;

Whereas the United States Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40 years that the monitoring and recording of private conversations constitutes a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment;

Whereas Congress was concerned about the United States Government unconstitutionally spying on Americans in the 1960s and 1970s;

Whereas Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and specified provisions of the Federal criminal code (including those governing wiretaps for criminal investigations), as the "exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance may be conducted pursuant to law (18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f))

Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 establishes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (commonly referred to as the "FISA court"), and the procedures by which the United States Government may obtain a court order authorizing electronic surveillance (commonly referred to as a "FISA warrant") for foreign intelligence collection in the United States;

Whereas Congress created the FISA court to review wiretapping applications for domestic electronic surveillance to be conducted by any Federal agency;

Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 provides specific exceptions that allow the President to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes (1) in emergency situations, provided an application for judicial approval from a FISA court is made within 72 hours; and (2) within 15 calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress;

Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 makes criminal any electronic surveillance not authorized by statute;

Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 has been amended over time by Congress since September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States;

Whereas President George W. Bush has confirmed that his administration engages in warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans inside the United States and that he has authorized such warrantless surveillance more than 30 times since September 11, 2001; and

Whereas Senate Joint Resolution 23 (107th Congress), as adopted by the Senate on September 14, 2001, and House Joint Resolution 64 (107th Congress, as adopted by the House of Representatives on September 14, 2001), together enacted as the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), to authorize the use of military force against those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001, do not contain legal authorization nor approval of domestic electronic surveillance, including electronic surveillance of United States citizens, without a judicially approved warrant: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, that the Senate jointly resolves that the President, today, is amending this resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which Congress passed to authorize military action against those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001, did not authorize warrantless eavesdropping on American citizens.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, today I am submitting this resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which Congress passed to authorize military action against those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001, did not authorize warrantless eavesdropping on American citizens.

As Justice O'Connor underscored recently, even war "is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."

Now that the illegal spying of Americans has become public and the President has acknowledged the 4-year-old warrantless surveillance program, many lawyers are contending that Congress authorized it. The September 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force did no such thing. Republican Senators also know it and a few have said so publicly. We all know it. The liberties and rights that define us as Americans and the system of checks and balances that serve to preserve them should not be sacrificed to threats of terrorism or to the expanding power of the government.

In the days immediately following September 11, and I continue to believe, that the terrorists win if they frighten us into sacrificing our freedoms and what defines us as Americans.

I well remember the days immediately after the 9/11 attacks. I helped open the Senate to business the next day. I said then, on September 12, 2001: "If we abandon our democracy to battle them, they win. . . . We will maintain our democracy, and with justice, we will use our strength. We will not lose our commitment to the rule of law, no matter how much the provocation, because that rule of law has anchored us through all the tumult of our history. We are a just and good Nation."

I joined with others, Republican and Democrat, and we engaged in round-the-clock efforts over the next months in connection with what came to be the USA PATRIOT Act. During those days the Bush administration never asked us for this surveillance authority or to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to accommodate such a program.

Just as we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of false comfort when it comes to our national security, we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a blind trust regarding our freedoms and rights. The Framers built checks and balances into our system specifically to counter such abuses and undue assertions of power. We must remain vigilant against those who would use that authority to investigate not only groups with suspected ties to foreign terrorists, but also protest groups suspected of having links to violent or disruptive activities."

When I learned of such efforts and that they reportedly included monitoring Quakers in Florida and possibly Vermont, I wrote to the Secretary of Defense demanding an answer. That was a month ago. So far he has refused to provide that answer.

Now we have learned that President Bush has, for more than four years, secretly allowed the warrantless wiretapping of Americans inside the United States. And we read in the press that sources at the FBI say that much of what was forwarded to them to investigate was worthless and led to dead ends. That is a dangerous diversion of our investigative resources away from those who pose real threats, while precious time and effort is devoted to looking into the lives of law-abiding Americans.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40 years, since its landmark decision in Katz v. United States, that the monitoring and recording of private conversations constitutes a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, FISA, to provide a legal mechanism for the government to engage in electronic surveillance of Americans in connection with intelligence gathering. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, along with

We have also seen this type of overreaching in that same Justice Department office's twisted interpretation of the torture statute, an analysis that had to be withdrawn; with the detention of suspects without charges and denial of access to counsel; and with the misapplication of the material witness statute as a sort of general preventive detention law. Such abuses serve to harm our national security as well as our civil liberties.

Now we have learned that the Pentagon maintains secret databases containing information on a wide cross-section of ordinary Americans, and that the FBI is monitoring law-abiding citizens in the exercise of their First Amendment freedoms. When I worked with Senator Wyden and others in 2003 to stop Admiral Poindexter's Total Information Awareness program, an effort designed to datamine information on Americans—and we meant it. And when I added a reporting requirement on government's e-mail monitoring program, to the Department of Justice Authorization law in 2002, we meant it. We demanded that Congress be kept informed and that any such program not proceed without congressional authorization.

The New York Times reported that after September 11, 2001, when former Attorney General John Ashcroft loosened restrictions on the FBI to permit it to monitor Web sites, mosques, and other public entities, "the FBI has used that authority to investigate not only groups with suspected ties to foreign terrorists, but also protest groups suspected of having links to violent or disruptive activities." When I learned of such efforts and that they reportedly included monitoring Quakers in Florida and possibly Vermont, I wrote to the Secretary of Defense demanding an answer. That was a month ago. So far he has refused to provide that answer.

Now we have learned that President Bush has, for more than four years, secretly allowed the warrantless wiretapping of Americans inside the United States. And we read in the press that sources at the FBI say that much of what was forwarded to them to investigate was worthless and led to dead ends. That is a dangerous diversion of our investigative resources away from those who pose real threats, while precious time and effort is devoted to looking into the lives of law-abiding Americans.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40 years, since its landmark decision in Katz v. United States, that the monitoring and recording of private conversations constitutes a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, FISA, to provide a legal mechanism for the government to engage in electronic surveillance of Americans in connection with intelligence gathering. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, along with
the criminal wiretap authority in title 18 of the United States Code, together provide the exclusive means by which the Government may intercept domestic electronic communications pursuant to the rule of law.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been amended over time, and it has been adjusted several times since the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, much of the PATRIOT Act was devoted to modifying FISA to make it easier to obtain FISA warrants. But the PATRIOT Act did not amend FISA to give the Government the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of American citizens.

If the Bush administration believed that the law was inadequate to deal with the threat of terrorism within our boundaries, it should have come to Congress and sought to change the law. It did not. Indeed, Attorney General Gonzales admitted at a press conference on December 19, 2005, that the Administration still has not sought to amend FISA to authorize the NSA spying program because it was advised that “it was not something we could likely get.”

I chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2001 and 2002, when the President’s secret eavesdropping program apparently began. I was not informed of the program. I learned about it for the first time in the press last month. I thank heaven and the Constitution that we still have a Free press.

The Bush administration is now arguing that when Congress authorized the use of force in September 2001 to attack al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it authorized warrantless searches and eavesdropping on American citizens. I voted for that authorization, and I know that Congress did not sign a blank check. The notion that Congress authorized warrantless surveillance in the AUMF is utterly inconsistent with the Administration’s admission that Congress was not asked for such authorization because it was assumed that Congress would say no.

Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, who helped negotiate the use of force resolution with the White House, has confirmed that the subject of warrantless wiretaps of American citizens never came up, that he did not and never would have supported giving authority to the President for such wiretaps, and that he is “confident that the 98 senators who voted in favor of authorization of force against al Qaeda did not believe that they were also voting for warrantless domestic surveillance.

Senator Daschle also noted that the Bush administration sought to add language to the resolution that would have explicitly authorized the use of force “in the United States,” but Congress refused to grant the President such “wiping power.” Maybe that was the Administration’s covert way to seek the authority to spy on Americans, but Congress did not grant any such authority.

Spying on Americans without first obtaining the requisite warrants is illegal, unnecessary and wrong. No President can simply declare when he wishes to follow the law and when he chooses not to, especially when it comes to the hard-won rights of the American people.

The resolution I submit today is intended to help set the record straight. It is an important first step toward restoring checks and balances between the co-equal branches of government. I urge all Senators to support it.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, what is past is prologue. Today, we see history repeating itself. In 1978, President Carter signed into law the “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,” successfully concluding years of debate on the power of the President to conduct national security wiretapping.

As a result of lengthy hearings and consultation, Congress enacted that law with broad bipartisan support. Its purpose was clear—to put a check on the power of the President to use wiretaps in the name of national security. One of the clear purposes of that law was to require the government to obtain a judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance of the United States in which communications of U.S. citizens might be intercepted. The Act established a secret court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to review wiretapping applications and guarantee that any such electronic surveillance followed the rule of law. Since 1979, the special court has approved nearly 19,000 applications and denied only 4. Last year, the Administration reached an all-time-high with the number of applications granted.

In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress established the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance could be conducted in the United States for national security purposes. The purpose of the legislation was to ensure that information obtained from illegal wiretaps could not be used to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. We even made sure that there would be criminal penalties for anyone who failed to comply with these rules.

The PATRIOT Act did not give the President the authority to spy on anyone without impartial judicial review—and neither did the Joint Resolution enacted in 2001, authorizing the use of force against those responsible for the attacks of September 11th.

The President seemed to agree. In 2004, in Buffalo he stated categorically that “any time that you hear the United States talking about a wiretap, it requires a court order.” He said that “Nothing had changed—when we’re talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking about getting a court order before we do so.”

Now it appears that the President and the administration claim they do not have to comply with the law. Just yesterday, the administration again asserted its constitutional authority to eavesdrop on any person within the United States—not without judicial or legislative oversight and it claims that the Congress implicitly granted such power in the Joint Resolution of 2001.

But that Joint Resolution says nothing about domestic surveillance. As Justice O’Connor has said, “A state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens.”

The bipartisan 9/11 Commission made clear that the Executive Branch has the burden of proving why a particular governmental power should be retained—and Congress has the responsibility to see that adequate guidelines and oversight are made available.

The Executive Branch has failed to meet the 9/11 Commissioners’ burden of proof. The American people are not convinced that these surveillance methods achieve the right balance between our national security and protection of our civil liberties.

These issues go to the heart of what it means to have a free society. If President Bush can make his own rules for domestic surveillance, Big Brother has run amok. If the President believes that winning the war on terror requires new surveillance capabilities, he has a responsibility to work with Congress to make appropriate changes in existing law. He is not above the law.

Congress and the American people deserve full and honest answers about the Administration’s domestic electronic surveillance activities. On December 22, 2005, I asked the President to provide us with answers before the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on Judge Alito’s nomination to the Supreme Court. We got no response. The Senate Judiciary Committee is scheduled to begin separate hearings on President Bush’s actions in 2006. Instead of providing us with the documents the Administration relied upon, the Justice Department continues to circulate summaries and white papers on the legal authorities it purports to have on the President and the law. It now appears that the President did so on at least thirty occasions after September 11. There is no legitimate purpose in denying access by Members of Congress to all of the legal thought and analysis that the President relied upon when he authorized these activities.

Every 45 days, the President ordered the PATRIOT Act’s provisions to lapse. The Administration has sought to ram an emergency amendment through Congress that would rush the resolutions of oversight and judicial oversight were made available.

The Administration has not made available the documents that the White House Counsel and the Inspector General of the National Security Agency have already said that’s not good enough. These are all executive branch appointees who report directly to the President.

Congress spent seven years considering and enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It was not a hastily conceived idea. We had broad agreement that both Congressional oversight and judicial oversight were fundamental—even during emergencies
SENATE RESOLUTION 351—RESPONDING TO THE THREAT POSED BY IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Mr. BAYH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 351

Whereas Iran is precipitating a grave nuclear crisis with the international community that directly impacts the national security of the United States and the efficacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, D.C., on July 1, 1968, and entered into force May 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the “Treaty on Non-Proliferation Treaty”);

Whereas the United States welcomes a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis, but the Government of Iran continues to reject a peaceful resolution to the matter;

Whereas the United States and the Government of Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment activities and to sign and ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol on expansive, intrusive no-notice inspections in 2003, it has repeatedly failed to live up to its obligations under this agreement;

Whereas the Government of Iran broke IAEA seals on uranium centrifuges in September 2004, converted uranium to a gas needed for enrichment in May 2005, limited IAEA inspectors to a few sites, and said it would suspend centrifuge conversion activities;

Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA declared in September 2005 that Iran was in non-compliance of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments;

Whereas Iran announced on January 3, 2006, that it would resume uranium “research” activities at Natanz and invited IAEA inspectors to witness the breaking of IAEA seals at the facility;

Whereas the Government of Iran has acknowledged deceiving the IAEA for the past 18 years for not disclosing an uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water production plant in Arak;

Whereas the Government of Iran’s human rights record and its strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by United Nations reports;

Whereas the Department of State stated in its most recent Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that Iran’s already poor human rights record “worsened” during the previous year and deemed Iran a country “of particular concern” in its most recent International Religious Freedom Report;

Whereas the Government of Iran funds terror and rejectionist groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan and is providing material support to groups directly involved in the killing of United States citizens;

Whereas Iran has been designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, and the Department of State said in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism that Iran “remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2004”;

Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad issued anti-American and anti-Semitic statements, including denying the occurrence of the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist, and called on people to imagine “liquidating the United States”;

Whereas Iran’s recent acquisition of new anti-ship capabilities to block the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf and the decision by the Government of Saudi Arabia to sell the Government of Iran $1,000,000,000 in weapons, mostly for 29 anti-aircraft missile systems, is most regrettable and should dampen United States-Russian relations;

Whereas the behavior of the Government of Iran does not reflect that country’s rich history and the democratic aspirations of most people in Iran;

Whereas the people of the United States stand with the people of Iran in support of democracy, the rule of law, religious freedom, and regional and global stability;

Whereas, although Iran is subject to a range of unilateral sanctions and some third country and Government of Iran practices, these sanctions have not been fully implemented;

Whereas Iran remains vulnerable to international sanctions, especially with respect to its financial sector, in its petrochemical export investment, in its petroleum sector and oil sales, few foreign nations have joined the United States in attempting to isolate the regime in Iran and compel compliance with Iran’s international obligations;

Whereas, although Iran may be one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, it does not have the requisite infrastructure and the gasoline necessary to make its economy run and currently imports 40 percent of its refined gasoline from abroad;

Whereas moratorium on the implementation of United States sanctions laws and the adoption of additional statutes would improve the chances of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis with Iran;

Whereas President George W. Bush has for 4 years given too little attention to the growing nuclear problem in Iran beyond rhetoric and actions that have carried out an Iran policy consisting of loud denunciations of the country and foreign investment in its nuclear program, including its violation of the October 2003 agreement with the United States signed in 2002 and not respected by Iran, including its refusal to answer outstanding questions related to its nuclear program;

(5) the United Nations Security Council should adopt reductions in diplomatic exchanges with Iran, limit travel by some Iranian officials, and limit or ban sports or cultural exchanges with Iran;

(6) the President should more faithfully implement the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) (commonly known as “ILSA”), and Congress should—

(A) increase the requirements on the President to justify waiving ILSA-related sanctions;

(B) repeal the sunset provision of ILSA;

(C) set a 90-day time limit for the President to determine whether an investment constitutes a violation of ILSA; and

(D) make exports to Iran for the purpose of military cooperation related to weapons of mass destruction sanctioned under ILSA;

(7) the United States should withdraw its support for Iran’s accession to the WTO until Iran ceases weapons of mass destruction, human rights, terrorism, and regional stability sanctions;

(8) the United States must make the Government of Iran understand that if its nuclear activity continues it will be treated as a pariah state.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 76—CONDEMN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN FOR ITS FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND CALLING FOR CERTAIN ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO SUCH VIOLATIONS

Mr. COLEMAN (for himself, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. LUTENBERG, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Mr. NELSON of Florida, and Ms. FEINSTEIN) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 76

Whereas Iran—

Whereas the Government of Iran concealed a nuclear program from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community for nearly two decades until it was revealed in 2002;

Whereas Iran has repeatedly failed to live up to its obligations under a variety of nuclear-related activities, including uranium enrichment and laboratory-scale separation of plutonium;

Whereas the Government of Iran recently removed IAEA seals from a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and announced the resumption of “research” on nuclear fuel in a brazen affront to the international community;

Whereas members of the international community have agreed that the pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran-—whether full-scale enrichment or any other means—poses a “red line” for United Nations Security Council referral that has now unequivocally crossed by Iran;

Whereas this provocation represents only the latest action by the Government of Iran in a long pattern of intransigence related to its nuclear program, including its violation in October 2003 of the EU-3 agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (the “EU-3”) only months after the agreement was signed, its unilateral violation of the last round of the EU-3 to suspend its enrichment program (commonly known as the “Paris Agreement”), its failure to provide IAEA inspectors access to various nuclear sites, and its refusal to answer outstanding questions related to its nuclear program;