[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 160 (Wednesday, December 14, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H11644-H11649]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CONDEMNING ACTIONS BY SYRIA REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER PRIME
MINISTER OF LEBANON
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree
to the resolution (H. Res. 598) condemning actions by the Government of
Syria that have hindered the investigation of the assassination of
former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri conducted by the United
Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC),
expressing support for extending the UNIIIC's investigative mandate,
and stating concern about similar assassination attempts apparently
aimed at destabilizing Lebanon's security and undermining Lebanon's
sovereignty, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
H. Res. 598
Whereas on September 2, 2004, United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1559 was adopted by the Security Council
to address Syria's continued interference in Lebanese
politics, reaffirming strict respect for Lebanon's
sovereignty, and stipulating the withdrawal of all non-
Lebanese forces from Lebanon and the disbanding and
disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
Whereas on February 14, 2005, former Prime Minister of
Lebanon Rafik Hariri and 22 others were killed in a terrorist
bombing orchestrated by unidentified assailants;
Whereas on April 7, 2005, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 1595, under which the Security
Council decided to ``establish an international independent
investigation Commission [the UNIIIC] based in Lebanon to
assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all
aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its
perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices'';
Whereas on October 19, 2005, the first report of the United
Nations International Independent Investigation Commission
(UNIIIC), headed by former German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis,
found ``there is converging evidence pointing at both
Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act'';
Whereas the October 19, 2005, report also asserted that
``[g]iven the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and
society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services
working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a
scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have
been carried out without their knowledge'';
Whereas on October 31, 2005, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 1636, which expressed extreme
concern that ``Syrian authorities have cooperated in form but
not in substance'' with the UNIIIC, that ``several Syrian
officials tried to mislead the investigation by giving false
or inaccurate statements'' and that ``Syria's continued lack
of cooperation with the inquiry would constitute a serious
violation of its obligations'';
Whereas on December 12, 2005, the second report of the
UNIIIC noted that ``steady progress'' has been made in the
Lebanese portion of the investigation that ``remains to be
matched'' in the Syrian portion of the investigation and
recommended an extension of the UNIIIC's investigative
mandate by a ``minimum period of six months'' since
substantive lines of enquiry are far from being completed and
``given the slow pace with which the Syrian authorities are
beginning to discharge their commitments to the [Security]
Council'';
Whereas Syria's actions to hinder the UNIIIC's
investigative efforts include credible reports of the arrest
and threatening of close relatives of at least one crucial
witness, delay caused by procedural maneuvering, and the
report of two witnesses that all Syrian intelligence
documents concerning Lebanon have been burned;
Whereas since the assassination of Rafik Hariri,
intimidation of the press in Lebanon has increased and a
series of attacks and explosions in Lebanon have occurred,
targeting political leaders and journalists who have
advocated Lebanese sovereignty, including Samir Qassir, May
Chidiac, and most recently on December 12, 2005, the
assassination of Gebran Tueni, a Member of the Lebanese
Parliament and the general manager of the Lebanese daily an-
Nahar, which has been a vital editorial voice opposing Syrian
political control and influence in Lebanon; and
Whereas Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on December 12,
2005, expressed outrage at the assassination of Gebran Tueni
and stated: ``Syrian interference in Lebanon continues, and
it must end completely. The United States will work with its
partners on the Security Council and in the region to see
that Security Council Resolutions 1595 and 1636 are fully
implemented.'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
(1) condemns the Government of Syria for hindering and
failing to cooperate fully in a timely and substantive manner
with the investigation of the assassination of former Prime
Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri conducted by the United
Nations International Independent Investigation Commission
(UNIIIC);
(2) expresses support for extending the investigative
mandate of the UNIIIC for at a
[[Page H11645]]
minimum an additional six-month period as recommended by the
UNIIIC in order to fully ascertain the responsibility for the
assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik
Hariri;
(3) states its concern that insecurity in Lebanon could
have a destabilizing effect on the region and harm the
ability of the people of Lebanon to strengthen democracy and
economic prosperity in their country;
(4) expresses its gratitude to--
(A) chief investigator Detlev Mehlis and the UNIIIC for
their continuing efforts to uncover evidence related to the
assassination of Rafik Hariri; and
(B) those who have freely assisted the UNIIIC in its
investigation;
(5) demands that Syria commit itself to expeditiously
fulfill all obligations to cooperate with the UNIIIC and to
meet all obligations of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1559, 1595, and 1636;
(6) encourages the United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence
of the United States in the United Nations Security Council
to advocate for the application of punitive measures against
Syria that target its leadership--including the enactment of
punitive sanctions against Syria under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations--if Syria further fails to
cooperate fully with the ongoing UNIIIC investigation and
continues to violate Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1595,
and 1636;
(7) urges the Government of the United States to support
the extension of the jurisdiction of the UNIIIC to cover
assassinations and assassination attempts in Lebanon since
October 1, 2004; and
(8) urges the President to implement further measures
against the Syrian leadership in accordance with the
requirements in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-175),
particularly if Syria further fails to cooperate fully with
the ongoing UNIIIC investigation and continues to violate
Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1595, and 1636.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
General Leave
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of House Resolution 598, which
seeks to condemn the actions by the government of Syria that have
hindered the investigation into the assassination of former Prime
Minister Hariri, investigations led by Mr. Mehlis.
Since the attempted assassination of Marwan Hamadeh in October 2004,
Lebanon has suffered a series of attacks and assassinations that have
targeted political leaders and journalists who have been critical of
Syria. The assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri on February
14, 2005, prompted the passage of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1595, which established an international independent
investigation commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese
Government in finding those responsible for that terrorist attack.
The first report of that commission was delivered on October 19,
2005, and its findings point to Lebanese and Syrian involvement in the
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. The report states: ``Given the
infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and
Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult
to see a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have
been carried out without their knowledge.''
Furthermore, the commission reported on difficulties it was
encountering with regard to the cooperation being extended by the
Syrian authorities. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1636
extended the mandate of the commission and addressed the urgency of
Syria to cooperate with the investigation.
On December 12, 2005, the second report of the commission was
delivered. It presented the progress of the investigation, reinforced
preliminary findings of Lebanese and Syrian cooperation in the
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, and outlined progress with
regard to the form and content of Syrian cooperation with the
commission.
That same day, a member of parliament, who was also the publisher of
a leading Lebanese newspaper known for its opposition to Syria's
political control and influence in Lebanon, was savagely murdered in a
car bomb.
After the assassination of his colleague on June 2, 2005, the
parliamentarian and the publisher said the following: ``The Lebanese
security authorities and the remnants of the Syrian system in Lebanon,
and directly the Syrian regime from top to bottom, is responsible for
every crime and every drop of blood spilled.''
As this resolution notes, Mr. Speaker, there has been a concerted
effort to undermine Lebanon's security and sovereignty by targeting
opinion leaders. The perpetrators of these evil attacks are attempting
to silence Lebanon's most profound thinkers and voices of public
opinion. The assassination of these two leaders and the attempted
assassination of another one earlier this year indicate that Lebanon's
press and freedom of expression are themselves targeted through the
elimination of their leading figures.
However, the people of Lebanon see through these cowardly and
unjustified acts, and they will not be intimidated. The people of the
United States of America stand with the people of Lebanon in their time
of sorrow and support their demands to see international investigations
into all the unjustified attacks since October 1, 2004.
{time} 2345
The United States Government should do all that we can to win the
support of the international community and to ensure that the
international investigation into the assassination of Prime Minister
Hariri is extended so that justice can be served.
I support this resolution and its passage.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution,
and yield myself such time as I might consume.
Mr. Speaker, at the outset, I want to commend my friend and fellow
Californian, Mr. Issa, for preparing a significant, important and well-
crafted piece of legislation.
Mr. Speaker, Syrian brazenness knows no bounds. With his press
conference and report to the U.N. Security Council this week, Detlev
Mehlis has made clear that Syrian interference with his investigation
into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
has only increased.
We now know for certain what we previously only suspected, that Syria
has ignored Security Council warnings and persisted in obstructing
Mehlis's investigation, using delaying tactics, destroying documents,
withholding witnesses and pressuring key individuals involved in these
matters by threatening their families, all quite sickening, Mr.
Speaker.
But on Monday, Syria appears to have reached a new height of cynicism
and treachery. The murder of Gebran Tueni, a parliamentarian and the
publisher of the most respected Lebanese daily, an-Nahar, was a
devastating response to Mehlis's report on the eve of its release. Of
course, Mr. Speaker, Syria denies involvement in the assassination,
but, like so many hit jobs before it, including the one on Hariri, it
has all the hallmarks of a product ``made in Damascus.''
Tueni is the latest of several courageous leaders to be the object of
a murderous Syrian attack. All of these victims have had one thing in
common: A strong commitment to Lebanese independence and sovereignty
and the powerful opposition to Syria's control of Lebanon.
Tueni is a special case. His newspaper emerged in recent years as the
leading journalistic opponent to the Syrian occupation, and he is the
second journalist of that newspaper to be killed in the past 6 months.
The former occupiers bided their time, but they got their revenge just
a few short months after Tueni prophetically and tragically told the
world in August that he was on the top of Syria's list of those marked
for assassination.
I would ask, Mr. Speaker, for a moment of silence from this body for
Mr. Tueni and all the others, including Prime Minister Hariri, who have
lost their lives this year in Syria's murderous and shadowy war on
Lebanese
[[Page H11646]]
patriots. If my colleagues would join me in a moment of silence for
these Lebanese heroes who gave their lives for their country's
independence.
Thank you.
On October 31, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1636 which
warned that ``Syria's continued lack of cooperation with the U.N.
inquiry would constitute a serious violation of its obligations.''
Mr. Speaker, in my view, the clock has now run out on Syria. With its
arrogant disregard for human life and all international norms, Damascus
has now put the ball squarely in our court. I suggest that we respond,
and do so forcefully.
I fully support this resolution's call for the administration to use
its influence in the Security Council to seek punitive measures against
the Syrian leadership and to utilize all the tools made available in
the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act to
convince the Assad regime in Damascus that its behavior carries a heavy
price. We cannot let the cruel regime in Damascus escape unscathed. Its
crimes in Lebanon are but one dimension of Syrian transgressions
against all standards of decency.
We could go on at length citing Syria's support for terrorists,
including the Iraqi terrorists, and its internal repression of all
peaceful dissent and its more than 2,000 political prisoners, including
most recently the arrest last month of Dr. Kamal al-Labwani following
his visit here as a guest of our Department of State's International
Visitors Program.
Mr. Speaker, I would be remiss were I not to make one additional
observation: International pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon
began in a serious way in September 2004 with the passage of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1559, but that resolution not only called
for Syrian withdrawal, it also called for the disarming and disbanding
of Hezbollah and all other Lebanese militias. That latter point has
been woefully neglected by the international community, as well as by
the Lebanese government, which has even seen fit to include a Hezbollah
representative in its cabinet. Now I fear international, and Lebanese,
neglect is coming home to roost.
The shadowy figures who are carrying out Syria's instructions to
murder Lebanese patriots may or may not be Hezbollah operatives. But I
do know that as long as Hezbollah remains armed, there will be
thousands of killers available to carry out the Syrian regime's evil
whims, thousands of jihadist killers who are loyal to Syria and care
not a whit for Lebanese unity or Lebanese independence.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution, which sends a
powerful message to the Assad regime. I urge all of my colleagues to do
likewise.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), the author of this resolution.
(Mr. ISSA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Madam Chairman for the
time, but also as the subcommittee chairwoman, you were instrumental in
our ability to be able to bring this legislation to the floor quickly.
Mr. Lantos particularly not only aided in bringing this to the floor,
but, Mr. Speaker, this was a piece of legislation that was drafted and
then aid was given on a bipartisan basis to make it a better, more
comprehensive piece of legislation, and I am grateful for that.
Mr. Speaker, it is a difficult task to keep coming to the well and
asking for Congress to help in a war of words, a war of diplomacy that
now wages in Lebanon and in Syria, but it is a better war to fight than
a war with tanks and blood. What we are doing here with this resolution
is we are saying to Syria that we want to avoid war; we are saying to
Lebanon that we want to avoid war; but with the help of the French, the
Germans, the United Nations, the entire world, we will in fact see that
the murderers of Rafiq Hariri are brought to justice. But, more
importantly, I think we send the message that diplomacy is in fact an
alternative to war, but it is not an alternative to war forever.
President Bush should be commended for the years of work that first
Secretary Powell and now Secretary Rice have done in order to try to
convince and cajole Syria to come in to the world of nations, to
abandon its occupation of Lebanon, which it did not do without global
pressure, and further to come clean about its support for Hezbollah, to
certainly come clean for its support of various groups that have
committed at least 12 separate bombings in Lebanon.
I do not believe that Syria will hear this. I believe I am here
tonight speaking, Mr. Speaker, to the American people and to the rest
of the world in saying that, yes, we are using diplomacy to anyone who
would possibly hear it. We are doing it with the United Nations, we are
doing it in concert with every nation, every nation that rejects
terrorism we are doing it with. But I think it is very clear that on a
bipartisan basis, the House of Representatives in voting for this
resolution is making it clear that we stand together against the kinds
of activities that it is clear Syria has been implicated with.
I have met with Bashar Assad. I met with him in 2001 and 2002 and
2003 and 2004. My hope was that he would embrace the West. He had been
educated in the West, he had all that it would take to understand the
benefits that would come from that, and he said he wanted them.
But at the same time I met with Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, both
here in the United States on his many trips and in Lebanon, and you
could see how he was unable to enjoy the fruits of a democracy and a
people that were able to bring an economy, even under adverse
conditions, to more than twice the GDP of the region, and certainly far
greater than Syria has ever had. In fact, Prime Minister Hariri had a
model for Syria, but Syria would not follow it, and ultimately that
schism between the two cultures led to people who were adverse to what
Prime Minister Hariri stood for killing him.
Today we do want to bring them to justice, but today, Mr. Speaker, it
is very clear that we are using diplomacy. The Bush administration and
this Congress is using diplomacy as an alternative to war, but as
someone who recognizes that today, in President Bush's speech at about
11 o'clock today, he talked about there being one democracy in the Arab
world.
Mr. Speaker, I do not normally correct the President, but there are
two democracies in the Arab world. Clearly Lebanon is a democracy, with
a long history of being a democracy. Mr. Speaker, it will not be a
functional democracy, it will not be a democracy that people like our
President will speak of in those terms, until the outside forces that
have dominated their very ability to exercise that democracy are pushed
out, by diplomacy, if possible, by greater measures of the UN and the
rest of the world if necessary.
Mr. Speaker, I call for all of my fellow Members to vote for this
resolution and to stand tall in support of Lebanon's attempt to be a
real democracy in the Arab world.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to my friend
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
{time} 0000
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
time.
Mr. Speaker, I would just like to say briefly that I think that our
Nation would be much more persuasive in our attempts to try to change
the behavior within Syria if we also acknowledged that there are the
news reports about a covert war in Iraq that has expanded in recent
months to Syria, and that bombing has been taking place along the
Syrian border.
I think it is going to be kind of difficult for us to engage Syria in
discussions when they may be getting indications that we are attacking
their country.
[From the New Yorker, Dec. 12, 2005]
Annals of National Security, Up in the Air
Where is the Iraq war headed next?
(By Seymour M. Hersh)
In recent weeks, there has been widespread speculation that
President George W. Bush,
[[Page H11647]]
confronted by diminishing approval ratings and dissent within
his own party, will begin pulling American troops out of Iraq
next year. The Administration's best-case scenario is that
the parliamentary election scheduled for December 15th will
produce a coalition government that will join the
Administration in calling for a withdrawal to begin in the
spring. By then, the White House hopes, the new government
will be capable of handling the insurgency. In a speech on
November 19th, Bush repeated the latest Administration
catchphrase: ``As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.'' He
added, ``When our commanders on the ground tell me that Iraqi
forces can defend their freedom, our troops will come home
with the honor they have earned.'' One sign of the political
pressure on the Administration to prepare for a withdrawal
came last week, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told
Fox News that the current level of American troops would not
have to be maintained ``for very much longer,'' because the
Iraqis were getting better at fighting the insurgency.
A high-level Pentagon war planner told me, however, that he
has seen scant indication that the President would authorize
a significant pullout of American troops if he believed that
it would impede the war against the insurgency. There are
several proposals currently under review by the White House
and the Pentagon; the most ambitious calls for American
combat forces to be reduced from a hundred and fifty-five
thousand troops to fewer than eighty thousand by next fall,
with all American forces officially designated ``combat'' to
be pulled out of the area by the summer of 2008. In terms of
implementation, the planner said, ``the drawdown plans that
I'm familiar with are condition-based, event-driven, and not
in a specific time frame''--that is, they depend on the
ability of a new Iraqi government to defeat the insurgency.
(A Pentagon spokesman said that the Administration had not
made any decisions and had ``no plan to leave, only a plan to
complete the mission.'')
A key element of the drawdown plans, not mentioned in the
President's public statements, is that the departing American
troops will be replaced by American airpower. Quick, deadly
strikes by U.S. warplanes are seen as a way to improve
dramatically the combat capability of even the weakest Iraqi
combat units. The danger, military experts have told me, is
that, while the number of American casualties would decrease
as ground troops are withdrawn, the over-all level of
violence and the number of Iraqi fatalities would increase
unless there are stringent controls over who bombs what.
``We're not planning to diminish the war,'' Patrick
Clawson, the deputy director of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, told me. Clawson's views often mirror the
thinking of the men and women around Vice-President Dick
Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. ``We just want
to change the mix of the forces doing the fighting--Iraqi
infantry with American support and greater use of airpower.
The rule now is to commit Iraqi forces into combat only in
places where they are sure to win. The pace of commitment,
and withdrawal, depends on their success in the
battlefield.''
He continued, ``We want to draw down our forces, but the
President is prepared to tough this one out. There is a very
deep feeling on his part that the issue of Iraq was settled
by the American people at the polling places in 2004.'' The
war against the insurgency ``may end up being a nasty and
murderous civil war in Iraq, but we and our allies would
still win,'' he said. ``As long as the Kurds and the Shiites
stay on our side, we're set to go. There's no sense that the
world is caving in. We're in the middle of a seven-year slog
in Iraq, and eighty percent of the Iraqis are receptive to
our message.''
One Pentagon adviser told me, ``There are always
contingency plans, but why withdraw and take a chance? I
don't think the President will go for it''--until the
insurgency is broken. ``He's not going to back off. This is
bigger than domestic politics.''
Current and former military and intelligence officials have
told me that the President remains convinced that it is his
personal mission to bring democracy to Iraq, and that he is
impervious to political pressure, even from fellow
Republicans. They also say that he disparages any information
that conflicts with his view of how the war is proceeding.
Bush's closest advisers have long been aware of the
religious nature of his policy commitments. In recent
interviews, one former senior official, who served in Bush's
first term, spoke extensively about the connection between
the President's religious faith and his view of the war in
Iraq. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
former official said, he was told that Bush felt that ``God
put me here'' to deal with the war on terror. The President's
belief was fortified by the Republican sweep in the 2002
congressional elections; Bush saw the victory as a purposeful
message from God that ``he's the man,'' the former official
said. Publicly, Bush depicted his reelection as a referendum
on the war; privately, he spoke of it as another
manifestation of divine purpose.
The former senior official said that after the election he
made a lengthy inspection visit to Iraq and reported his
findings to Bush in the White House: ``I said to the
President, `We're not winning the war.' And he asked, `Are we
losing?' I said, `Not yet.'' The President, he said,
``appeared displeased'' with that answer.
``I tried to tell him,'' the former senior official said.
``And he couldn't hear it.''
There are grave concerns within the military about the
capability of the U.S. Army to sustain two or three more
years of combat in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon, a specialist on
military issues at the Brookings Institution, told me, ``The
people in the institutional Army feel they don't have the
luxury of deciding troop levels, or even participating in the
debate. They're planning on staying the course until 2009. I
can't believe the Army thinks that it will happen, because
there's no sustained drive to increase the size of the
regular Army.'' O'Hanlon noted that ``if the President
decides to stay the present course in Iraq some troops would
be compelled to serve fourth and fifth tours of combat by
2007 and 2008, which could have serious consequences for
morale and competency levels.''
Many of the military's most senior generals are deeply
frustrated, but they say nothing in public, because they
don't want to jeopardize their careers. The Administration
has ``so terrified the generals that they know they won't go
public,'' a former defense official said. A retired senior
C.I.A. officer with knowledge of Iraq told me that one of his
colleagues recently participated in a congressional tour
there. The legislators were repeatedly told, in meetings with
enlisted men, junior officers, and generals that ``things
were fucked up.'' But in a subsequent teleconference with
Rumsfeld, he said, the generals kept those criticisms to
themselves.
One person with whom the Pentagon's top commanders have
shared their private views for decades is Representative John
Murtha, of Pennsylvania, the senior Democrat on the House
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. The President and his
key aides were enraged when, on November 17th, Murtha gave a
speech in the House calling for a withdrawal of troops within
six months. The speech was filled with devastating
information. For example, Murtha reported that the number of
attacks in Iraq has increased from a hundred and fifty a
week to more than seven hundred a week in the past year.
He said that an estimated fifty thousand American soldiers
will suffer ``from what I call battle fatigue'' in the
war, and he said that the Americans were seen as ``the
common enemy'' in Iraq. He also took issue with one of the
White House's claims--that foreign fighters were playing
the major role in the insurgency. Murtha said that
American soldiers ``haven't captured any in this latest
activity''--the continuing battle in western Anbar
province, near the border with Syria. ``So this idea that
they're coming in from outside, we still think there's
only seven per cent.''
Murtha's call for a speedy American pullout only seemed to
strengthen the White House's resolve. Administration
officials ``are beyond angry at him, because he is a serious
threat to their policy--both on substance and politically,''
the former defense official said. Speaking at the Osan Air
Force base, in South Korea, two days after Murtha's speech,
Bush said, ``The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front
in their war against humanity. . . . If they're not stopped,
the terrorists will be able to advance their agenda to
develop weapons of mass destruction, to destroy Israel, to
intimidate Europe, and to break our will and blackmail our
government into isolation. I'm going to make you this
commitment: this is not going to happen on my watch.''
``The President is more determined than ever to stay the
course,'' the former defense official said. ``He doesn't feel
any pain. Bush is a believer in the adage `People may suffer
and die, but the Church advances.' ``He said that the
President had become more detached, leaving more issues to
Karl Rove and Vice President Cheney. ``They keep him in the
gray world of religious idealism, where he wants to be
anyway,'' the former defense official said. Bush's public
appearances, for example, are generally scheduled in front of
friendly audiences, most often at military bases. Four
decades ago, President Lyndon Johnson, who was also
confronted with an increasingly unpopular war, was limited to
similar public forums. ``Johnson knew he was a prisoner in
the White House,'' the former official said, ``but Bush has
no idea.''
Within the military, the prospect of using airpower as a
substitute for American troops on the ground has caused great
unease. For one thing, Air Force commanders, in particular,
have deep-seated objections to the possibility that Iraqis
eventually will be responsible for target selection. ``Will
the Iraqis call in air strikes in order to snuff rivals, or
other warlords, or to snuff members of your own sect and
blame someone else?'' another senior military planner now on
assignment in the Pentagon asked. ``Will some Iraqis be
targeting on behalf of Al Qaeda, or the insurgency, or the
Iranians?''
``It's a serious business,'' retired Air Force General
Charles Homer, who was in charge of allied bombing during the
1991 Gulf War, said. ``The Air Force has always had concerns
about people ordering air strikes who are not Air Force
forward air controllers. We need people on active duty to
think it out, and they will. There has to be training to be
sure that somebody is not trying to get even with somebody
else.'' (Asked for a comment, the Pentagon spokesman said
there were plans in place for such training. He also noted
that Iraq had no offensive airpower of its own, and thus
would have to rely on the United States for some time.)
[[Page H11648]]
The American air war inside Iraq today is perhaps the most
significant--and underreported--aspect of the fight against
the insurgency. The military authorities in Baghdad and
Washington do not provide the press with a daily accounting
of missions that Air Force, Navy, and Marine units fly or of
the tonnage they drop, as was routinely done during the
Vietnam War. One insight into the scope of the bombing in
Iraq was supplied by the Marine Corps during the height of
the siege of Falluja in the fall of 2004. ``With a massive
Marine air and ground offensive under way,'' a Marine press
release said, ``Marine close air support continues to put
high-tech steel on target. . . . Flying missions day and
night for weeks, the fixed wing aircraft of the 3rd Marine
Aircraft Wing are ensuring battlefield success on the front
line.'' Since the beginning of the war, the press release
said, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing alone had dropped more
than five hundred thousand tons of ordnance. ``This number is
likely to be much higher by the end of operations,'' Major
Mike Sexton said. In the battle for the city, more than seven
hundred Americans were killed or wounded; U.S. officials did
not release estimates of civilian dead, but press reports at
the time told of women and children killed in the
bombardments.
In recent months, the tempo of American bombing seems to
have increased. Most of the targets appear to be in the
hostile, predominantly Sunni provinces that surround Baghdad
and along the Syrian border. As yet, neither Congress nor the
public has engaged in a significant discussion or debate
about the air war.
The insurgency operates mainly in crowded urban areas, and
Air Force warplanes rely on sophisticated, laser-guided bombs
to avoid civilian casualties. These bombs home in on targets
that must be ``painted,'' or illuminated, by laser beams
directed by ground units. ``The pilot doesn't identify the
target as seen in the pre-brief''--the instructions provided
before takeoff--a former high-level intelligence official
told me. ``The guy with the laser is the targeteer. Not the
pilot. Often you get a `hotread' ''--from a military unit on
the ground--``and you drop your bombs with no communication
with the guys on the ground. You don't want to break radio
silence. The people on the ground are calling in targets that
the pilots can't verify.'' He added, ``And we're going to
turn this process over to the Iraqis?''
The second senior military planner told me that there are
essentially two types of targeting now being used in Iraq: a
deliberate siteselection process that works out of
airoperations centers in the region, and ``adaptive
targeting''--supportive bombing by prepositioned or loitering
warplanes that are suddenly alerted to firefights or targets
of opportunity by military units on the ground. ``The bulk of
what we do today is adaptive,'' the officer said, ``and it's
divorced from any operational air planning. Airpower can be
used as a tool of internal political coercion, and my
attitude is that I can't imagine that we will give that power
to the Iraqis.''
This military planner added that even today, with Americans
doing the targeting, ``there is no sense of an air campaign,
or a strategic vision. We are just whacking targets--it's a
reversion to the Stone Age. There's no operational art.
That's what happens when you give targeting to the Army--they
hit what the local commander wants to hit.''
One senior Pentagon consultant I spoke to said he was
optimistic that ``American air will immediately make the
Iraqi Army that much better.'' But he acknowledged that he,
too, had concerns about Iraqi targeting. ``We have the most
expensive eyes in the sky right now,'' the consultant said.
``But a lot of Iraqis want to settle old scores. Who is going
to have authority to call in air strikes? There's got to be a
behavior-based rule.''
General John Jumper, who retired last month after serving
four years as the Air Force chief of staff, was ``in favor of
certification of those Iraqis who will be allowed to call in
strikes,'' the Pentagon consultant told me. ``I don't know if
it will be approved. The regular Army generals were resisting
it to the last breath, despite the fact that they would
benefit the most from it.''
A Pentagon consultant with close ties to the officials in
the Vice-President's office and the Pentagon who advocated
the war said that the Iraqi penchant for targeting tribal and
personal enemies with artillery and mortar fire had created
``impatience and resentment'' inside the military. He
believed that the Air Force's problems with Iraqi targeting
might be addressed by the formation of U.S.-Iraqi transition
teams, whose American members would be drawn largely from
Special Forces troops. This consultant said that there were
plans to integrate between two hundred and three hundred
Special Forces members into Iraqi units, which was seen as a
compromise aimed at meeting the Air Force's demand to vet
Iraqis who were involved in targeting. But in practice,
the consultant added, it meant that ``the Special Ops
people will soon allow Iraqis to begin calling in the
targets.''
Robert Pape, a political-science professor at the
University of Chicago, who has written widely on American
airpower, and who taught for three years at the Air Force's
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, in Alabama, predicted
that the air war ``will get very ugly'' if targeting is
turned over to the Iraqis. This would be especially true, he
said, if the Iraqis continued to operate as the U.S. Army and
Marines have done--plowing through Sunni strongholds on
search-and-destroy missions. ``If we encourage the Iraqis to
clear and hold their own areas, and use airpower to stop the
insurgents from penetrating the cleared areas, it could be
useful,'' Pape said. ``The risk is that we will encourage the
Iraqis to do search-and-destroy, and they would be less
judicious about using airpower--and the violence would go up.
More civilians will be killed, which means more insurgents
will be created.''
Even American bombing on behalf of an improved, well-
trained Iraqi Army would not necessarily be any more
successful against the insurgency. ``It's not going to
work,'' said Andrew Brookes, the former director of airpower
studies at the Royal Air Force's advanced staff college, who
is now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
in London. ``Can you put a lid on the insurgency with
bombing?'' Brookes said. ``No. You can concentrate in one
area, but the guys will spring up in another town.'' The
inevitable reliance on Iraqi ground troops' targeting would
also create conflicts. ``I don't see your guys dancing to the
tune of someone else,'' Brookes said. He added that he and
many other experts ``don't believe that airpower is a
solution to the problems inside Iraq at all. Replacing boots
on the ground with airpower didn't work in Vietnam, did it?''
The Air Force's worries have been subordinated, so far, to
the political needs of the White House. The Administration's
immediate political goal after the December elections is to
show that the day-to-day conduct of the war can be turned
over to the newly trained and equipped Iraqi military. It has
already planned heavily scripted change-of-command
ceremonies, complete with the lowering of American flags at
bases and the raising of Iraqi ones.
Some officials in the State Department, the C.I.A., and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair's government have settled
on their candidate of choice for the December elections--Iyad
Allawi, the secular Shiite who served until this spring as
Iraq's interim Prime Minister. They believe that Allawi can
gather enough votes in the election to emerge, after a round
of political bargaining, as Prime Minister. A former senior
British adviser told me that Blair was convinced that Allawi
``is the best hope.'' The fear is that a government dominated
by religious Shiites, many of whom are close to Iran, would
give Iran greater political and military influence inside
Iraq. Allawi could counter Iran's influence; also, he would
be far more supportive and cooperative if the Bush
Administration began a drawdown of American combat forces in
the coming year.
Blair has assigned a small team of operatives to provide
political help to Allawi, the former adviser told me. He also
said that there was talk late this fall, with American
concurrence, of urging Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shiite, to
join forces in a coalition with Allawi during the post-
election negotiations to form a government. Chalabi, who is
notorious for his role in promoting flawed intelligence on
weapons of mass destruction before the war, is now a deputy
Prime Minister. He and Allawi were bitter rivals while in
exile.
A senior United Nations diplomat told me that he was
puzzled by the high American and British hopes for Allawi.
``I know a lot of people want Allawi, but I think he's been a
terrific disappointment,'' the diplomat said. ``He doesn't
seem to be building a strong alliance, and at the moment it
doesn't look like he will do very well in the election.''
The second Pentagon consultant told me, ``If Allawi becomes
Prime Minister, we can say, 'There's a moderate, urban,
educated leader now in power who does not want to deprive
women of their rights.' He would ask us to leave, but he
would allow us to keep Special Forces operations inside
Iraq--to keep an American presence the right way. Mission
accomplished. A coup for Bush.''
A former high-level intelligence official cautioned that it
was probably ``too late'' for any American withdrawal plan to
work without further bloodshed. The constitution approved by
Iraqi voters in October ``will be interpreted by the Kurds
and the Shiites to proceed with their plans for autonomy,''
he said. ``The Sunnis will continue to believe that if they
can get rid of the Americans they can still win. And there
still is no credible way to establish security for American
troops.''
The fear is that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would
inevitably trigger a Sunni-Shiite civil war. In many areas,
that war has, in a sense, already begun, and the United
States military is being drawn into the sectarian violence.
An American Army officer who took part in the assault on Tal
Afar, in the north of Iraq, earlier this fall, said that an
American infantry brigade was placed in the position of
providing a cordon of security around the besieged city for
Iraqi forces, most of them Shiites, who were ``rounding up
any Sunnis on the basis of whatever a Shiite said to them.''
The officer went on, ``They were killing Sunnis on behalf of
the Shiites,'' with the active participation of a militia
unit led by a retired American Special Forces soldier.
``People like me have gotten so downhearted,'' the officer
added.
Meanwhile, as the debate over troop reductions continues,
the covert war in Iraq has expanded in recent months to
Syria. A composite American Special Forces team, known as an
S.M.U., for ``special-mission unit,'' has been ordered, under
stringent cover, to target suspected supporters of the Iraqi
insurgency across the border. (The Pentagon had
[[Page H11649]]
no comment.) ``It's a powder keg,'' the Pentagon consultant
said of the tactic. ``But, if we hit an insurgent network in
Iraq without hitting the guys in Syria who are part of it,
the guys in Syria would get away. When you're fighting an
insurgency, you have to strike everywhere-and at once.''
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, we have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Reichert). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the
House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 598, as
amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of
those present have voted in the affirmative.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
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