[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 160 (Wednesday, December 14, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H11644-H11649]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




CONDEMNING ACTIONS BY SYRIA REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER PRIME 
                          MINISTER OF LEBANON

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree 
to the resolution (H. Res. 598) condemning actions by the Government of 
Syria that have hindered the investigation of the assassination of 
former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri conducted by the United 
Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), 
expressing support for extending the UNIIIC's investigative mandate, 
and stating concern about similar assassination attempts apparently 
aimed at destabilizing Lebanon's security and undermining Lebanon's 
sovereignty, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                              H. Res. 598

       Whereas on September 2, 2004, United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 1559 was adopted by the Security Council 
     to address Syria's continued interference in Lebanese 
     politics, reaffirming strict respect for Lebanon's 
     sovereignty, and stipulating the withdrawal of all non-
     Lebanese forces from Lebanon and the disbanding and 
     disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
       Whereas on February 14, 2005, former Prime Minister of 
     Lebanon Rafik Hariri and 22 others were killed in a terrorist 
     bombing orchestrated by unidentified assailants;
       Whereas on April 7, 2005, the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted Resolution 1595, under which the Security 
     Council decided to ``establish an international independent 
     investigation Commission [the UNIIIC] based in Lebanon to 
     assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all 
     aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its 
     perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices'';
       Whereas on October 19, 2005, the first report of the United 
     Nations International Independent Investigation Commission 
     (UNIIIC), headed by former German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, 
     found ``there is converging evidence pointing at both 
     Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act'';
       Whereas the October 19, 2005, report also asserted that 
     ``[g]iven the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and 
     society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services 
     working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a 
     scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have 
     been carried out without their knowledge'';
       Whereas on October 31, 2005, the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted Resolution 1636, which expressed extreme 
     concern that ``Syrian authorities have cooperated in form but 
     not in substance'' with the UNIIIC, that ``several Syrian 
     officials tried to mislead the investigation by giving false 
     or inaccurate statements'' and that ``Syria's continued lack 
     of cooperation with the inquiry would constitute a serious 
     violation of its obligations'';
       Whereas on December 12, 2005, the second report of the 
     UNIIIC noted that ``steady progress'' has been made in the 
     Lebanese portion of the investigation that ``remains to be 
     matched'' in the Syrian portion of the investigation and 
     recommended an extension of the UNIIIC's investigative 
     mandate by a ``minimum period of six months'' since 
     substantive lines of enquiry are far from being completed and 
     ``given the slow pace with which the Syrian authorities are 
     beginning to discharge their commitments to the [Security] 
     Council'';
       Whereas Syria's actions to hinder the UNIIIC's 
     investigative efforts include credible reports of the arrest 
     and threatening of close relatives of at least one crucial 
     witness, delay caused by procedural maneuvering, and the 
     report of two witnesses that all Syrian intelligence 
     documents concerning Lebanon have been burned;
       Whereas since the assassination of Rafik Hariri, 
     intimidation of the press in Lebanon has increased and a 
     series of attacks and explosions in Lebanon have occurred, 
     targeting political leaders and journalists who have 
     advocated Lebanese sovereignty, including Samir Qassir, May 
     Chidiac, and most recently on December 12, 2005, the 
     assassination of Gebran Tueni, a Member of the Lebanese 
     Parliament and the general manager of the Lebanese daily an-
     Nahar, which has been a vital editorial voice opposing Syrian 
     political control and influence in Lebanon; and
       Whereas Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on December 12, 
     2005, expressed outrage at the assassination of Gebran Tueni 
     and stated: ``Syrian interference in Lebanon continues, and 
     it must end completely. The United States will work with its 
     partners on the Security Council and in the region to see 
     that Security Council Resolutions 1595 and 1636 are fully 
     implemented.'': Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved,  That the House of Representatives--
       (1) condemns the Government of Syria for hindering and 
     failing to cooperate fully in a timely and substantive manner 
     with the investigation of the assassination of former Prime 
     Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri conducted by the United 
     Nations International Independent Investigation Commission 
     (UNIIIC);
       (2) expresses support for extending the investigative 
     mandate of the UNIIIC for at a

[[Page H11645]]

     minimum an additional six-month period as recommended by the 
     UNIIIC in order to fully ascertain the responsibility for the 
     assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik 
     Hariri;
       (3) states its concern that insecurity in Lebanon could 
     have a destabilizing effect on the region and harm the 
     ability of the people of Lebanon to strengthen democracy and 
     economic prosperity in their country;
       (4) expresses its gratitude to--
       (A) chief investigator Detlev Mehlis and the UNIIIC for 
     their continuing efforts to uncover evidence related to the 
     assassination of Rafik Hariri; and
       (B) those who have freely assisted the UNIIIC in its 
     investigation;
       (5) demands that Syria commit itself to expeditiously 
     fulfill all obligations to cooperate with the UNIIIC and to 
     meet all obligations of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions 1559, 1595, and 1636;
       (6) encourages the United States Permanent Representative 
     to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence 
     of the United States in the United Nations Security Council 
     to advocate for the application of punitive measures against 
     Syria that target its leadership--including the enactment of 
     punitive sanctions against Syria under Chapter VII of the 
     Charter of the United Nations--if Syria further fails to 
     cooperate fully with the ongoing UNIIIC investigation and 
     continues to violate Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1595, 
     and 1636;
       (7) urges the Government of the United States to support 
     the extension of the jurisdiction of the UNIIIC to cover 
     assassinations and assassination attempts in Lebanon since 
     October 1, 2004; and
       (8) urges the President to implement further measures 
     against the Syrian leadership in accordance with the 
     requirements in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
     Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-175), 
     particularly if Syria further fails to cooperate fully with 
     the ongoing UNIIIC investigation and continues to violate 
     Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1595, and 1636.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of House Resolution 598, which 
seeks to condemn the actions by the government of Syria that have 
hindered the investigation into the assassination of former Prime 
Minister Hariri, investigations led by Mr. Mehlis.
  Since the attempted assassination of Marwan Hamadeh in October 2004, 
Lebanon has suffered a series of attacks and assassinations that have 
targeted political leaders and journalists who have been critical of 
Syria. The assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri on February 
14, 2005, prompted the passage of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1595, which established an international independent 
investigation commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese 
Government in finding those responsible for that terrorist attack.
  The first report of that commission was delivered on October 19, 
2005, and its findings point to Lebanese and Syrian involvement in the 
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. The report states: ``Given the 
infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and 
Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult 
to see a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have 
been carried out without their knowledge.''
  Furthermore, the commission reported on difficulties it was 
encountering with regard to the cooperation being extended by the 
Syrian authorities. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1636 
extended the mandate of the commission and addressed the urgency of 
Syria to cooperate with the investigation.
  On December 12, 2005, the second report of the commission was 
delivered. It presented the progress of the investigation, reinforced 
preliminary findings of Lebanese and Syrian cooperation in the 
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, and outlined progress with 
regard to the form and content of Syrian cooperation with the 
commission.
  That same day, a member of parliament, who was also the publisher of 
a leading Lebanese newspaper known for its opposition to Syria's 
political control and influence in Lebanon, was savagely murdered in a 
car bomb.
  After the assassination of his colleague on June 2, 2005, the 
parliamentarian and the publisher said the following: ``The Lebanese 
security authorities and the remnants of the Syrian system in Lebanon, 
and directly the Syrian regime from top to bottom, is responsible for 
every crime and every drop of blood spilled.''
  As this resolution notes, Mr. Speaker, there has been a concerted 
effort to undermine Lebanon's security and sovereignty by targeting 
opinion leaders. The perpetrators of these evil attacks are attempting 
to silence Lebanon's most profound thinkers and voices of public 
opinion. The assassination of these two leaders and the attempted 
assassination of another one earlier this year indicate that Lebanon's 
press and freedom of expression are themselves targeted through the 
elimination of their leading figures.
  However, the people of Lebanon see through these cowardly and 
unjustified acts, and they will not be intimidated. The people of the 
United States of America stand with the people of Lebanon in their time 
of sorrow and support their demands to see international investigations 
into all the unjustified attacks since October 1, 2004.

                              {time}  2345

  The United States Government should do all that we can to win the 
support of the international community and to ensure that the 
international investigation into the assassination of Prime Minister 
Hariri is extended so that justice can be served.
  I support this resolution and its passage.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution, 
and yield myself such time as I might consume.
  Mr. Speaker, at the outset, I want to commend my friend and fellow 
Californian, Mr. Issa, for preparing a significant, important and well-
crafted piece of legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, Syrian brazenness knows no bounds. With his press 
conference and report to the U.N. Security Council this week, Detlev 
Mehlis has made clear that Syrian interference with his investigation 
into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
has only increased.
  We now know for certain what we previously only suspected, that Syria 
has ignored Security Council warnings and persisted in obstructing 
Mehlis's investigation, using delaying tactics, destroying documents, 
withholding witnesses and pressuring key individuals involved in these 
matters by threatening their families, all quite sickening, Mr. 
Speaker.
  But on Monday, Syria appears to have reached a new height of cynicism 
and treachery. The murder of Gebran Tueni, a parliamentarian and the 
publisher of the most respected Lebanese daily, an-Nahar, was a 
devastating response to Mehlis's report on the eve of its release. Of 
course, Mr. Speaker, Syria denies involvement in the assassination, 
but, like so many hit jobs before it, including the one on Hariri, it 
has all the hallmarks of a product ``made in Damascus.''
  Tueni is the latest of several courageous leaders to be the object of 
a murderous Syrian attack. All of these victims have had one thing in 
common: A strong commitment to Lebanese independence and sovereignty 
and the powerful opposition to Syria's control of Lebanon.
  Tueni is a special case. His newspaper emerged in recent years as the 
leading journalistic opponent to the Syrian occupation, and he is the 
second journalist of that newspaper to be killed in the past 6 months. 
The former occupiers bided their time, but they got their revenge just 
a few short months after Tueni prophetically and tragically told the 
world in August that he was on the top of Syria's list of those marked 
for assassination.
  I would ask, Mr. Speaker, for a moment of silence from this body for 
Mr. Tueni and all the others, including Prime Minister Hariri, who have 
lost their lives this year in Syria's murderous and shadowy war on 
Lebanese

[[Page H11646]]

patriots. If my colleagues would join me in a moment of silence for 
these Lebanese heroes who gave their lives for their country's 
independence.
  Thank you.
  On October 31, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1636 which 
warned that ``Syria's continued lack of cooperation with the U.N. 
inquiry would constitute a serious violation of its obligations.''
  Mr. Speaker, in my view, the clock has now run out on Syria. With its 
arrogant disregard for human life and all international norms, Damascus 
has now put the ball squarely in our court. I suggest that we respond, 
and do so forcefully.
  I fully support this resolution's call for the administration to use 
its influence in the Security Council to seek punitive measures against 
the Syrian leadership and to utilize all the tools made available in 
the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act to 
convince the Assad regime in Damascus that its behavior carries a heavy 
price. We cannot let the cruel regime in Damascus escape unscathed. Its 
crimes in Lebanon are but one dimension of Syrian transgressions 
against all standards of decency.
  We could go on at length citing Syria's support for terrorists, 
including the Iraqi terrorists, and its internal repression of all 
peaceful dissent and its more than 2,000 political prisoners, including 
most recently the arrest last month of Dr. Kamal al-Labwani following 
his visit here as a guest of our Department of State's International 
Visitors Program.
  Mr. Speaker, I would be remiss were I not to make one additional 
observation: International pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon 
began in a serious way in September 2004 with the passage of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1559, but that resolution not only called 
for Syrian withdrawal, it also called for the disarming and disbanding 
of Hezbollah and all other Lebanese militias. That latter point has 
been woefully neglected by the international community, as well as by 
the Lebanese government, which has even seen fit to include a Hezbollah 
representative in its cabinet. Now I fear international, and Lebanese, 
neglect is coming home to roost.
  The shadowy figures who are carrying out Syria's instructions to 
murder Lebanese patriots may or may not be Hezbollah operatives. But I 
do know that as long as Hezbollah remains armed, there will be 
thousands of killers available to carry out the Syrian regime's evil 
whims, thousands of jihadist killers who are loyal to Syria and care 
not a whit for Lebanese unity or Lebanese independence.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution, which sends a 
powerful message to the Assad regime. I urge all of my colleagues to do 
likewise.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), the author of this resolution.
  (Mr. ISSA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Madam Chairman for the 
time, but also as the subcommittee chairwoman, you were instrumental in 
our ability to be able to bring this legislation to the floor quickly.
  Mr. Lantos particularly not only aided in bringing this to the floor, 
but, Mr. Speaker, this was a piece of legislation that was drafted and 
then aid was given on a bipartisan basis to make it a better, more 
comprehensive piece of legislation, and I am grateful for that.
  Mr. Speaker, it is a difficult task to keep coming to the well and 
asking for Congress to help in a war of words, a war of diplomacy that 
now wages in Lebanon and in Syria, but it is a better war to fight than 
a war with tanks and blood. What we are doing here with this resolution 
is we are saying to Syria that we want to avoid war; we are saying to 
Lebanon that we want to avoid war; but with the help of the French, the 
Germans, the United Nations, the entire world, we will in fact see that 
the murderers of Rafiq Hariri are brought to justice. But, more 
importantly, I think we send the message that diplomacy is in fact an 
alternative to war, but it is not an alternative to war forever.
  President Bush should be commended for the years of work that first 
Secretary Powell and now Secretary Rice have done in order to try to 
convince and cajole Syria to come in to the world of nations, to 
abandon its occupation of Lebanon, which it did not do without global 
pressure, and further to come clean about its support for Hezbollah, to 
certainly come clean for its support of various groups that have 
committed at least 12 separate bombings in Lebanon.
  I do not believe that Syria will hear this. I believe I am here 
tonight speaking, Mr. Speaker, to the American people and to the rest 
of the world in saying that, yes, we are using diplomacy to anyone who 
would possibly hear it. We are doing it with the United Nations, we are 
doing it in concert with every nation, every nation that rejects 
terrorism we are doing it with. But I think it is very clear that on a 
bipartisan basis, the House of Representatives in voting for this 
resolution is making it clear that we stand together against the kinds 
of activities that it is clear Syria has been implicated with.
  I have met with Bashar Assad. I met with him in 2001 and 2002 and 
2003 and 2004. My hope was that he would embrace the West. He had been 
educated in the West, he had all that it would take to understand the 
benefits that would come from that, and he said he wanted them.
  But at the same time I met with Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, both 
here in the United States on his many trips and in Lebanon, and you 
could see how he was unable to enjoy the fruits of a democracy and a 
people that were able to bring an economy, even under adverse 
conditions, to more than twice the GDP of the region, and certainly far 
greater than Syria has ever had. In fact, Prime Minister Hariri had a 
model for Syria, but Syria would not follow it, and ultimately that 
schism between the two cultures led to people who were adverse to what 
Prime Minister Hariri stood for killing him.
  Today we do want to bring them to justice, but today, Mr. Speaker, it 
is very clear that we are using diplomacy. The Bush administration and 
this Congress is using diplomacy as an alternative to war, but as 
someone who recognizes that today, in President Bush's speech at about 
11 o'clock today, he talked about there being one democracy in the Arab 
world.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not normally correct the President, but there are 
two democracies in the Arab world. Clearly Lebanon is a democracy, with 
a long history of being a democracy. Mr. Speaker, it will not be a 
functional democracy, it will not be a democracy that people like our 
President will speak of in those terms, until the outside forces that 
have dominated their very ability to exercise that democracy are pushed 
out, by diplomacy, if possible, by greater measures of the UN and the 
rest of the world if necessary.
  Mr. Speaker, I call for all of my fellow Members to vote for this 
resolution and to stand tall in support of Lebanon's attempt to be a 
real democracy in the Arab world.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to my friend 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  (Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  0000

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I would just like to say briefly that I think that our 
Nation would be much more persuasive in our attempts to try to change 
the behavior within Syria if we also acknowledged that there are the 
news reports about a covert war in Iraq that has expanded in recent 
months to Syria, and that bombing has been taking place along the 
Syrian border.
  I think it is going to be kind of difficult for us to engage Syria in 
discussions when they may be getting indications that we are attacking 
their country.

                  [From the New Yorker, Dec. 12, 2005]

               Annals of National Security, Up in the Air


                   Where is the Iraq war headed next?

                         (By Seymour M. Hersh)

       In recent weeks, there has been widespread speculation that 
     President George W. Bush,

[[Page H11647]]

     confronted by diminishing approval ratings and dissent within 
     his own party, will begin pulling American troops out of Iraq 
     next year. The Administration's best-case scenario is that 
     the parliamentary election scheduled for December 15th will 
     produce a coalition government that will join the 
     Administration in calling for a withdrawal to begin in the 
     spring. By then, the White House hopes, the new government 
     will be capable of handling the insurgency. In a speech on 
     November 19th, Bush repeated the latest Administration 
     catchphrase: ``As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.'' He 
     added, ``When our commanders on the ground tell me that Iraqi 
     forces can defend their freedom, our troops will come home 
     with the honor they have earned.'' One sign of the political 
     pressure on the Administration to prepare for a withdrawal 
     came last week, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told 
     Fox News that the current level of American troops would not 
     have to be maintained ``for very much longer,'' because the 
     Iraqis were getting better at fighting the insurgency.
       A high-level Pentagon war planner told me, however, that he 
     has seen scant indication that the President would authorize 
     a significant pullout of American troops if he believed that 
     it would impede the war against the insurgency. There are 
     several proposals currently under review by the White House 
     and the Pentagon; the most ambitious calls for American 
     combat forces to be reduced from a hundred and fifty-five 
     thousand troops to fewer than eighty thousand by next fall, 
     with all American forces officially designated ``combat'' to 
     be pulled out of the area by the summer of 2008. In terms of 
     implementation, the planner said, ``the drawdown plans that 
     I'm familiar with are condition-based, event-driven, and not 
     in a specific time frame''--that is, they depend on the 
     ability of a new Iraqi government to defeat the insurgency. 
     (A Pentagon spokesman said that the Administration had not 
     made any decisions and had ``no plan to leave, only a plan to 
     complete the mission.'')
       A key element of the drawdown plans, not mentioned in the 
     President's public statements, is that the departing American 
     troops will be replaced by American airpower. Quick, deadly 
     strikes by U.S. warplanes are seen as a way to improve 
     dramatically the combat capability of even the weakest Iraqi 
     combat units. The danger, military experts have told me, is 
     that, while the number of American casualties would decrease 
     as ground troops are withdrawn, the over-all level of 
     violence and the number of Iraqi fatalities would increase 
     unless there are stringent controls over who bombs what.
       ``We're not planning to diminish the war,'' Patrick 
     Clawson, the deputy director of the Washington Institute for 
     Near East Policy, told me. Clawson's views often mirror the 
     thinking of the men and women around Vice-President Dick 
     Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. ``We just want 
     to change the mix of the forces doing the fighting--Iraqi 
     infantry with American support and greater use of airpower. 
     The rule now is to commit Iraqi forces into combat only in 
     places where they are sure to win. The pace of commitment, 
     and withdrawal, depends on their success in the 
     battlefield.''
       He continued, ``We want to draw down our forces, but the 
     President is prepared to tough this one out. There is a very 
     deep feeling on his part that the issue of Iraq was settled 
     by the American people at the polling places in 2004.'' The 
     war against the insurgency ``may end up being a nasty and 
     murderous civil war in Iraq, but we and our allies would 
     still win,'' he said. ``As long as the Kurds and the Shiites 
     stay on our side, we're set to go. There's no sense that the 
     world is caving in. We're in the middle of a seven-year slog 
     in Iraq, and eighty percent of the Iraqis are receptive to 
     our message.''
       One Pentagon adviser told me, ``There are always 
     contingency plans, but why withdraw and take a chance? I 
     don't think the President will go for it''--until the 
     insurgency is broken. ``He's not going to back off. This is 
     bigger than domestic politics.''
       Current and former military and intelligence officials have 
     told me that the President remains convinced that it is his 
     personal mission to bring democracy to Iraq, and that he is 
     impervious to political pressure, even from fellow 
     Republicans. They also say that he disparages any information 
     that conflicts with his view of how the war is proceeding.
       Bush's closest advisers have long been aware of the 
     religious nature of his policy commitments. In recent 
     interviews, one former senior official, who served in Bush's 
     first term, spoke extensively about the connection between 
     the President's religious faith and his view of the war in 
     Iraq. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
     former official said, he was told that Bush felt that ``God 
     put me here'' to deal with the war on terror. The President's 
     belief was fortified by the Republican sweep in the 2002 
     congressional elections; Bush saw the victory as a purposeful 
     message from God that ``he's the man,'' the former official 
     said. Publicly, Bush depicted his reelection as a referendum 
     on the war; privately, he spoke of it as another 
     manifestation of divine purpose.
       The former senior official said that after the election he 
     made a lengthy inspection visit to Iraq and reported his 
     findings to Bush in the White House: ``I said to the 
     President, `We're not winning the war.' And he asked, `Are we 
     losing?' I said, `Not yet.'' The President, he said, 
     ``appeared displeased'' with that answer.
       ``I tried to tell him,'' the former senior official said. 
     ``And he couldn't hear it.''
       There are grave concerns within the military about the 
     capability of the U.S. Army to sustain two or three more 
     years of combat in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon, a specialist on 
     military issues at the Brookings Institution, told me, ``The 
     people in the institutional Army feel they don't have the 
     luxury of deciding troop levels, or even participating in the 
     debate. They're planning on staying the course until 2009. I 
     can't believe the Army thinks that it will happen, because 
     there's no sustained drive to increase the size of the 
     regular Army.'' O'Hanlon noted that ``if the President 
     decides to stay the present course in Iraq some troops would 
     be compelled to serve fourth and fifth tours of combat by 
     2007 and 2008, which could have serious consequences for 
     morale and competency levels.''
       Many of the military's most senior generals are deeply 
     frustrated, but they say nothing in public, because they 
     don't want to jeopardize their careers. The Administration 
     has ``so terrified the generals that they know they won't go 
     public,'' a former defense official said. A retired senior 
     C.I.A. officer with knowledge of Iraq told me that one of his 
     colleagues recently participated in a congressional tour 
     there. The legislators were repeatedly told, in meetings with 
     enlisted men, junior officers, and generals that ``things 
     were fucked up.'' But in a subsequent teleconference with 
     Rumsfeld, he said, the generals kept those criticisms to 
     themselves.
       One person with whom the Pentagon's top commanders have 
     shared their private views for decades is Representative John 
     Murtha, of Pennsylvania, the senior Democrat on the House 
     Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. The President and his 
     key aides were enraged when, on November 17th, Murtha gave a 
     speech in the House calling for a withdrawal of troops within 
     six months. The speech was filled with devastating 
     information. For example, Murtha reported that the number of 
     attacks in Iraq has increased from a hundred and fifty a 
     week to more than seven hundred a week in the past year. 
     He said that an estimated fifty thousand American soldiers 
     will suffer ``from what I call battle fatigue'' in the 
     war, and he said that the Americans were seen as ``the 
     common enemy'' in Iraq. He also took issue with one of the 
     White House's claims--that foreign fighters were playing 
     the major role in the insurgency. Murtha said that 
     American soldiers ``haven't captured any in this latest 
     activity''--the continuing battle in western Anbar 
     province, near the border with Syria. ``So this idea that 
     they're coming in from outside, we still think there's 
     only seven per cent.''
       Murtha's call for a speedy American pullout only seemed to 
     strengthen the White House's resolve. Administration 
     officials ``are beyond angry at him, because he is a serious 
     threat to their policy--both on substance and politically,'' 
     the former defense official said. Speaking at the Osan Air 
     Force base, in South Korea, two days after Murtha's speech, 
     Bush said, ``The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front 
     in their war against humanity. . . . If they're not stopped, 
     the terrorists will be able to advance their agenda to 
     develop weapons of mass destruction, to destroy Israel, to 
     intimidate Europe, and to break our will and blackmail our 
     government into isolation. I'm going to make you this 
     commitment: this is not going to happen on my watch.''
       ``The President is more determined than ever to stay the 
     course,'' the former defense official said. ``He doesn't feel 
     any pain. Bush is a believer in the adage `People may suffer 
     and die, but the Church advances.' ``He said that the 
     President had become more detached, leaving more issues to 
     Karl Rove and Vice President Cheney. ``They keep him in the 
     gray world of religious idealism, where he wants to be 
     anyway,'' the former defense official said. Bush's public 
     appearances, for example, are generally scheduled in front of 
     friendly audiences, most often at military bases. Four 
     decades ago, President Lyndon Johnson, who was also 
     confronted with an increasingly unpopular war, was limited to 
     similar public forums. ``Johnson knew he was a prisoner in 
     the White House,'' the former official said, ``but Bush has 
     no idea.''
       Within the military, the prospect of using airpower as a 
     substitute for American troops on the ground has caused great 
     unease. For one thing, Air Force commanders, in particular, 
     have deep-seated objections to the possibility that Iraqis 
     eventually will be responsible for target selection. ``Will 
     the Iraqis call in air strikes in order to snuff rivals, or 
     other warlords, or to snuff members of your own sect and 
     blame someone else?'' another senior military planner now on 
     assignment in the Pentagon asked. ``Will some Iraqis be 
     targeting on behalf of Al Qaeda, or the insurgency, or the 
     Iranians?''
       ``It's a serious business,'' retired Air Force General 
     Charles Homer, who was in charge of allied bombing during the 
     1991 Gulf War, said. ``The Air Force has always had concerns 
     about people ordering air strikes who are not Air Force 
     forward air controllers. We need people on active duty to 
     think it out, and they will. There has to be training to be 
     sure that somebody is not trying to get even with somebody 
     else.'' (Asked for a comment, the Pentagon spokesman said 
     there were plans in place for such training. He also noted 
     that Iraq had no offensive airpower of its own, and thus 
     would have to rely on the United States for some time.)

[[Page H11648]]

       The American air war inside Iraq today is perhaps the most 
     significant--and underreported--aspect of the fight against 
     the insurgency. The military authorities in Baghdad and 
     Washington do not provide the press with a daily accounting 
     of missions that Air Force, Navy, and Marine units fly or of 
     the tonnage they drop, as was routinely done during the 
     Vietnam War. One insight into the scope of the bombing in 
     Iraq was supplied by the Marine Corps during the height of 
     the siege of Falluja in the fall of 2004. ``With a massive 
     Marine air and ground offensive under way,'' a Marine press 
     release said, ``Marine close air support continues to put 
     high-tech steel on target. . . . Flying missions day and 
     night for weeks, the fixed wing aircraft of the 3rd Marine 
     Aircraft Wing are ensuring battlefield success on the front 
     line.'' Since the beginning of the war, the press release 
     said, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing alone had dropped more 
     than five hundred thousand tons of ordnance. ``This number is 
     likely to be much higher by the end of operations,'' Major 
     Mike Sexton said. In the battle for the city, more than seven 
     hundred Americans were killed or wounded; U.S. officials did 
     not release estimates of civilian dead, but press reports at 
     the time told of women and children killed in the 
     bombardments.
       In recent months, the tempo of American bombing seems to 
     have increased. Most of the targets appear to be in the 
     hostile, predominantly Sunni provinces that surround Baghdad 
     and along the Syrian border. As yet, neither Congress nor the 
     public has engaged in a significant discussion or debate 
     about the air war.
       The insurgency operates mainly in crowded urban areas, and 
     Air Force warplanes rely on sophisticated, laser-guided bombs 
     to avoid civilian casualties. These bombs home in on targets 
     that must be ``painted,'' or illuminated, by laser beams 
     directed by ground units. ``The pilot doesn't identify the 
     target as seen in the pre-brief''--the instructions provided 
     before takeoff--a former high-level intelligence official 
     told me. ``The guy with the laser is the targeteer. Not the 
     pilot. Often you get a `hotread' ''--from a military unit on 
     the ground--``and you drop your bombs with no communication 
     with the guys on the ground. You don't want to break radio 
     silence. The people on the ground are calling in targets that 
     the pilots can't verify.'' He added, ``And we're going to 
     turn this process over to the Iraqis?''
       The second senior military planner told me that there are 
     essentially two types of targeting now being used in Iraq: a 
     deliberate siteselection process that works out of 
     airoperations centers in the region, and ``adaptive 
     targeting''--supportive bombing by prepositioned or loitering 
     warplanes that are suddenly alerted to firefights or targets 
     of opportunity by military units on the ground. ``The bulk of 
     what we do today is adaptive,'' the officer said, ``and it's 
     divorced from any operational air planning. Airpower can be 
     used as a tool of internal political coercion, and my 
     attitude is that I can't imagine that we will give that power 
     to the Iraqis.''
       This military planner added that even today, with Americans 
     doing the targeting, ``there is no sense of an air campaign, 
     or a strategic vision. We are just whacking targets--it's a 
     reversion to the Stone Age. There's no operational art. 
     That's what happens when you give targeting to the Army--they 
     hit what the local commander wants to hit.''
       One senior Pentagon consultant I spoke to said he was 
     optimistic that ``American air will immediately make the 
     Iraqi Army that much better.'' But he acknowledged that he, 
     too, had concerns about Iraqi targeting. ``We have the most 
     expensive eyes in the sky right now,'' the consultant said. 
     ``But a lot of Iraqis want to settle old scores. Who is going 
     to have authority to call in air strikes? There's got to be a 
     behavior-based rule.''
       General John Jumper, who retired last month after serving 
     four years as the Air Force chief of staff, was ``in favor of 
     certification of those Iraqis who will be allowed to call in 
     strikes,'' the Pentagon consultant told me. ``I don't know if 
     it will be approved. The regular Army generals were resisting 
     it to the last breath, despite the fact that they would 
     benefit the most from it.''
       A Pentagon consultant with close ties to the officials in 
     the Vice-President's office and the Pentagon who advocated 
     the war said that the Iraqi penchant for targeting tribal and 
     personal enemies with artillery and mortar fire had created 
     ``impatience and resentment'' inside the military. He 
     believed that the Air Force's problems with Iraqi targeting 
     might be addressed by the formation of U.S.-Iraqi transition 
     teams, whose American members would be drawn largely from 
     Special Forces troops. This consultant said that there were 
     plans to integrate between two hundred and three hundred 
     Special Forces members into Iraqi units, which was seen as a 
     compromise aimed at meeting the Air Force's demand to vet 
     Iraqis who were involved in targeting. But in practice, 
     the consultant added, it meant that ``the Special Ops 
     people will soon allow Iraqis to begin calling in the 
     targets.''
       Robert Pape, a political-science professor at the 
     University of Chicago, who has written widely on American 
     airpower, and who taught for three years at the Air Force's 
     School of Advanced Airpower Studies, in Alabama, predicted 
     that the air war ``will get very ugly'' if targeting is 
     turned over to the Iraqis. This would be especially true, he 
     said, if the Iraqis continued to operate as the U.S. Army and 
     Marines have done--plowing through Sunni strongholds on 
     search-and-destroy missions. ``If we encourage the Iraqis to 
     clear and hold their own areas, and use airpower to stop the 
     insurgents from penetrating the cleared areas, it could be 
     useful,'' Pape said. ``The risk is that we will encourage the 
     Iraqis to do search-and-destroy, and they would be less 
     judicious about using airpower--and the violence would go up. 
     More civilians will be killed, which means more insurgents 
     will be created.''
       Even American bombing on behalf of an improved, well-
     trained Iraqi Army would not necessarily be any more 
     successful against the insurgency. ``It's not going to 
     work,'' said Andrew Brookes, the former director of airpower 
     studies at the Royal Air Force's advanced staff college, who 
     is now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
     in London. ``Can you put a lid on the insurgency with 
     bombing?'' Brookes said. ``No. You can concentrate in one 
     area, but the guys will spring up in another town.'' The 
     inevitable reliance on Iraqi ground troops' targeting would 
     also create conflicts. ``I don't see your guys dancing to the 
     tune of someone else,'' Brookes said. He added that he and 
     many other experts ``don't believe that airpower is a 
     solution to the problems inside Iraq at all. Replacing boots 
     on the ground with airpower didn't work in Vietnam, did it?''
       The Air Force's worries have been subordinated, so far, to 
     the political needs of the White House. The Administration's 
     immediate political goal after the December elections is to 
     show that the day-to-day conduct of the war can be turned 
     over to the newly trained and equipped Iraqi military. It has 
     already planned heavily scripted change-of-command 
     ceremonies, complete with the lowering of American flags at 
     bases and the raising of Iraqi ones.
       Some officials in the State Department, the C.I.A., and 
     British Prime Minister Tony Blair's government have settled 
     on their candidate of choice for the December elections--Iyad 
     Allawi, the secular Shiite who served until this spring as 
     Iraq's interim Prime Minister. They believe that Allawi can 
     gather enough votes in the election to emerge, after a round 
     of political bargaining, as Prime Minister. A former senior 
     British adviser told me that Blair was convinced that Allawi 
     ``is the best hope.'' The fear is that a government dominated 
     by religious Shiites, many of whom are close to Iran, would 
     give Iran greater political and military influence inside 
     Iraq. Allawi could counter Iran's influence; also, he would 
     be far more supportive and cooperative if the Bush 
     Administration began a drawdown of American combat forces in 
     the coming year.
       Blair has assigned a small team of operatives to provide 
     political help to Allawi, the former adviser told me. He also 
     said that there was talk late this fall, with American 
     concurrence, of urging Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shiite, to 
     join forces in a coalition with Allawi during the post-
     election negotiations to form a government. Chalabi, who is 
     notorious for his role in promoting flawed intelligence on 
     weapons of mass destruction before the war, is now a deputy 
     Prime Minister. He and Allawi were bitter rivals while in 
     exile.
       A senior United Nations diplomat told me that he was 
     puzzled by the high American and British hopes for Allawi. 
     ``I know a lot of people want Allawi, but I think he's been a 
     terrific disappointment,'' the diplomat said. ``He doesn't 
     seem to be building a strong alliance, and at the moment it 
     doesn't look like he will do very well in the election.''
       The second Pentagon consultant told me, ``If Allawi becomes 
     Prime Minister, we can say, 'There's a moderate, urban, 
     educated leader now in power who does not want to deprive 
     women of their rights.' He would ask us to leave, but he 
     would allow us to keep Special Forces operations inside 
     Iraq--to keep an American presence the right way. Mission 
     accomplished. A coup for Bush.''
       A former high-level intelligence official cautioned that it 
     was probably ``too late'' for any American withdrawal plan to 
     work without further bloodshed. The constitution approved by 
     Iraqi voters in October ``will be interpreted by the Kurds 
     and the Shiites to proceed with their plans for autonomy,'' 
     he said. ``The Sunnis will continue to believe that if they 
     can get rid of the Americans they can still win. And there 
     still is no credible way to establish security for American 
     troops.''
       The fear is that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would 
     inevitably trigger a Sunni-Shiite civil war. In many areas, 
     that war has, in a sense, already begun, and the United 
     States military is being drawn into the sectarian violence. 
     An American Army officer who took part in the assault on Tal 
     Afar, in the north of Iraq, earlier this fall, said that an 
     American infantry brigade was placed in the position of 
     providing a cordon of security around the besieged city for 
     Iraqi forces, most of them Shiites, who were ``rounding up 
     any Sunnis on the basis of whatever a Shiite said to them.'' 
     The officer went on, ``They were killing Sunnis on behalf of 
     the Shiites,'' with the active participation of a militia 
     unit led by a retired American Special Forces soldier. 
     ``People like me have gotten so downhearted,'' the officer 
     added.
       Meanwhile, as the debate over troop reductions continues, 
     the covert war in Iraq has expanded in recent months to 
     Syria. A composite American Special Forces team, known as an 
     S.M.U., for ``special-mission unit,'' has been ordered, under 
     stringent cover, to target suspected supporters of the Iraqi 
     insurgency across the border. (The Pentagon had

[[Page H11649]]

     no comment.) ``It's a powder keg,'' the Pentagon consultant 
     said of the tactic. ``But, if we hit an insurgent network in 
     Iraq without hitting the guys in Syria who are part of it, 
     the guys in Syria would get away. When you're fighting an 
     insurgency, you have to strike everywhere-and at once.''
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, we have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Reichert). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the 
House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 598, as 
amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of 
those present have voted in the affirmative.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

                          ____________________