[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 154 (Friday, November 18, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13331-S13333]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             DEFENSE BUDGET

  Mr. TALENT. Mr. President, I decided to come to the Senate for a few 
minutes this evening to speak to the Senate because of growing concern 
over the defense budget and, in particular, the growing likelihood that 
we are going to see cuts in the defense budget so that next year's 
budget is lower than what the President had proposed for fiscal year 
2007.
  I am moved especially by a recent ``Inside Defense'' column which 
reports that because of pressure from the Office of Management and 
Budget, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may well require that the 
service chiefs take $7.5 billion out of next year's budget and $32 
billion in cuts over the next 5 years--this at the end of the budget 
cycle, not as a result of an assessment of military need or necessity. 
As I will show in a minute, one could hardly in any dispassionate view 
of our military needs believe we could absorb $7.5 billion in cuts next 
year because of procedure that is budget driven. When I see that, it 
reminds me of other things I have been hearing lately. I felt it was 
deja vu all over again, as Yogi Berra might have said.
  I remember the days in the 1990s when military needs were determined 
by the budget rather than the budget being determined by military 
needs. When the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended, our country 
was justifiably pleased. We believed there was a peace dividend 
available. The Clinton Administration took a lot of money out of the 
defense budget. I will go into that in a minute. They took too much out 
of the defense budget, and left a force that by the end of the 1990s 
was hollowing out. Our military was not as prepared as it should have 
been. We have been doing the best we can in the last few years to 
reconstitute that force, but now we may be headed in the wrong 
direction.
  I emphasize, this pressure is not from within the Department of 
Defense. It is not what the Department wants to do. It is what the 
Department may be forced into as a matter of false economy. There is no 
economy more false than depriving our military and our men and women of 
what they need to defend us.
  Let me go over a little bit more of a history lesson in some depth. 
Defense spending actually decreased in real terms every year from 1990 
through 1999. In fact, during 3 years in that period, it decreased in 
nominal terms by almost $50 billion.
  Actual dollars, or nominal dollars, went down in the defense budget 
over 3 years during that period by $50 billion, and in every year 
during that period military spending decreased in real terms.
  The reason was, some people thought with the fall of the Soviet Union 
we would need the military less. That was true for the nuclear arsenal, 
but not true for the people in the military. It turned out we needed 
conventional forces actually more than we needed them before the fall 
of the Soviet Union because deployments went up. We found, in the post-
Cold War era, that regional conflicts around the world, the ethnic and 
religious and regional conflicts that had been suppressed by the 
bipolar nature of world competition, rose to the surface.
  I remember reading what former CIA Director Gates said about it. He 
said: History had not ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. It had 
just been frozen before that. And he said: ``Now it is thawing out with 
a vengeance.''
  Well, when you spend less and less overall, at least as against 
inflation, and you have to spend more and more on operations and 
maintenance, on readiness, because you are actually using the troops 
more and more, something has to give. You cannot take more and more of 
a percentage for operations and maintenance out of a budget which is 
less and less, at least as adjusted against inflation, without 
something giving. And what gave was procurement.
  We took basically a decade-long ``procurement holiday.'' By the last 
few years of the 1990s most people realized what was happening and we 
were able to push more money back into the defense budget, but it was 
not enough to make up for what had happened before.
  From 1975 through 1990, we purchased, on average every year, 78 scout 
and attack helicopters. From 1991 through the year 2000, we purchased 7 
per year on average. For battle force ships from 1975 through 1990, it 
was 19 a year; 7 a year from 1991 to the year 2000. For fighter 
aircraft for the Navy, we purchased 111 per year from 1975 through 
1990. We purchased 42 per year on average in the decade of the 1990s. I 
could go on and on.
  For tankers, we purchased 5 per year on average during the 15-year 
period from the mid-1970s to 1990. In the mid 1990s, we purchased one 
per year. For tanks, artillery, and other armored vehicles listen to 
this, the basic platforms the Army uses; tanks, artillery and other 
armored vehicles--we purchased 2,083 on average every year from 1975 to 
1990. But we purchased 145 on average every year from 1991 through the 
year 2000.
  What happened is what you would have expected. The average age of the 
force and the equipment in the force

[[Page S13332]]

grew. Look at legacy aircraft, the A-10, the ``Warthog,'' 24 year old; 
the B-52 bomber, 44 years old; the C-130 transport, 33 years old; the 
KC-135 tanker, 43 years old. The procurement holiday left us with 
equipment that was too old.
  Well, what happened? Beginning at the end of the 1990s, Congress and 
the President at the end of the Clinton administration, and especially 
with the beginning of the Bush administration--began to respond. The 
Chiefs complained to the point where people who didn't get it earlier 
finally saw what we were talking about. The decision was made to 
increase spending enough to sustain the volunteer force, to 
recapitalize the basic equipment that we had not bought in the 1990s, 
and to begin designing and producing the new generation of systems that 
the men and women in our military would use for decades to come.
  The plan was to increase defense spending by a modest amount above 
inflation, beginning around the year 2001, so that these needs could be 
met. There were many of us who were concerned that was not enough 
money. The Department of Defense has traditionally been rather 
optimistic in its estimation of costs. The CBO traditionally has 
claimed we needed between $20 billion and $30 billion more than even 
was estimated at that time. But at least we had a plan. It was a 
beginning. It was based on an actual if perhaps optimistic estimate of 
need.
  Unfortunately, the plan has not been as effective as we hoped in 
achieving its goals, and particularly in recapitalizing the force. 
There are a lot of reasons for that. One is that op tempo, operational 
tempo, has been even higher than we expected after what we experienced 
in the 1990s. It is what the military calls ``mission creep,'' a 
significantly expanded number and variety of missions that drive up 
defense costs because they stress the force. Operations and maintenance 
costs go up, readiness costs go up. Just staying in place, just keeping 
the force you have and the equipment you have maintained and ready 
becomes more difficult.
  But what was the mission creep? The September 11th attacks had 
something to do with that, and then Afghanistan and Iraq. Our Armed 
Forces have become global first responders. We have homeland security 
missions now that we never anticipated. Contingency peace enforcement 
missions around the world, special ops, and ongoing training 
operations. Operational tempo is at a historic high. It is likely to 
remain so.
  This means not only that we are sucking up more money in operations 
and maintenance, it means the equipment we have is being used up even 
faster. Even if you maintain it properly, if you are using it at a 
greater rate than you anticipated, it is not going to last as long. We 
face a situation where we are going to have to reset or reconstitute 
the basic equipment in the force.
  In addition, personnel costs have been higher than we anticipated 
because we wanted to do right by the men and women in America's 
military. We voted for pay raises. And we should have. We have 
increased housing allotments. We have met the obligations we promised 
our retirees regarding health care. Those were good things. I supported 
them. But adjusted for inflation, personnel costs have increased from 
1999 to 2006 from $92 billion to $109 billion annually. That alone 
would eat up any of the real increases we had planned and have been 
able to give the military in the last 5 years.

  In addition, we are facing a threat, at least sooner, and certainly 
more seriously--or a potential threat--than we thought we would have to 
face; and that is, the rising military power of China. China is engaged 
in a comprehensive effort to profoundly improve its ability to project 
naval power and to develop a comprehensive anti-access capability in 
order to prevent the American military from having access into the 
western Pacific.
  I am not saying that China is going to become, or need become, an 
enemy of the United States. I am saying that China is rising as a world 
power. It is very deliberately, according to plan, increasing in 
particular its naval strength. If we are to deter some kind of 
aggression or conflict, we need to be strong--not provocative, but we 
need to be strong in response. We did not anticipate, 5 or 6 years ago, 
that they would grow so strong so quickly.
  Their most significant advances are in submarines. China will take 
delivery of 11 submarines in 2005. We are going to buy one. Its fleet 
includes an increasing number of the following vessels: the Type 93 
nuclear-powered attack submarine; Type 94 nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarine, which carries an ICBM with a range of more than 
5,000 miles; and Russian-built ``Kilo"-class diesel electric attack 
submarines.
  By the year 2010, they may be able to deploy a fleet of up to 50 
modern submarines to confront us, should they choose to do so. 
Remember, they can concentrate that power in the Western Pacific.
  Among China's surface combat vessels, the most notable is the growing 
number of Russian-built missile destroyers which carry the SS-22 
``Sunburn'' anti-ship missile, and the Type 72 large amphibious assault 
ship. In addition, China is developing and producing its own advanced 
fighter aircraft. It is procuring hundreds of advanced Russian-built 
Sukhoi fighters. China has deployed over 700 land-attack ballistic 
missiles opposite Taiwan. It is adding over 100 new missiles each year.
  I could go on for a considerable period of time. The upshot of that 
is, by the end of the decade, China may be able to field, as I said 
before, 50 submarines, all concentrated in the Western Pacific. They 
are closing the technology gap and working steadily to develop an area 
denial capability which is aimed directly at American strength.
  I am not saying they are going to use it. I do believe strongly that 
the more they believe we are going to be prepared and ready, the more 
likely they will be to seek peaceful redress of whatever concerns they 
may have, the more likely it is we are going to be able to avoid 
developing a confrontational relationship with them.
  For all these reasons, we have not completed the task of redressing 
procurement shortfalls from the 1990s. We need 160 aircraft per year to 
keep the average age in the inventory stable. Instead, we are 
purchasing 80 aircraft. The current plan is to purchase less than one-
half the number of new F/A-22s the Air Force says it needs. This is the 
superior air-to-air fighter. The Navy is at 283 ships, and that number 
is going down. We purchased an average of 5.6 ships per year over the 
past 10 years. You assume a 30-year service life. At that rate, it is 
eventually going to give us a fleet of 170 ships.
  The last time the Department of Defense estimated the number of ships 
we needed to be secure, it was 375. I expect that a reasonable 
Quadrennial Defense Review, looking at this, will produce a number no 
lower than 300. We are not purchasing ships at anywhere near the rate 
we have to in order to sustain the Navy at that level. At that rate, 
our submarine force will drop below 40 in the next decade. Every recent 
study identifies the need for 55 to 76 submarines at a minimum. We need 
to get the shipbuilding budget up, and estimates range from $14 billion 
to $18 billion a year to maintain a Navy at approximately 300 ships. We 
are not there yet.
  Now, additional reductions are being proposed. Those reductions, if 
implemented, will mean the defense budget again will not grow, at least 
in real terms. Most of the Department's budget is basically committed. 
You cannot short operations and maintenance. You cannot short 
readiness. You must pay your people. You must provide the benefits you 
have committed to provide. That means any budget cuts must come almost 
entirely out of exactly the platforms, the ships and planes and tanks 
and vehicles that we have been designing and developing to provide the 
new generation of capabilities that our men and women need to be able 
to defend us.
  So proposals are afoot and rumors are out that the Army is going to 
cancel the Future Combat System. That is the Army's system to replace 
the older tanks, the Bradley fighting vehicles, to make sure the 
technology is adequate, the information technology is networked 
together. FCS is the system designed to give us the most modern ground 
combat capabilities. All of this

[[Page S13333]]

is potentially on the chopping block. The next generation destroyer, 
the DD(X), may not get built. That is the ship that is going to provide 
naval surface fire to support troops going ashore. The Joint Strike 
Fighter, our stealthy air-to-ground strike fighter, which we have been 
developing for years, is on the chopping block. The new tanker is 
imperiled. The need for additional airlift is imperiled. This situation 
is serious.

       What do we need to do? The Department is engaged right now 
     in a Quadrennial Defense Review. Every 4 years the Department 
     looks at its needs and is supposed to analyze what it needs 
     to defend us and analyze that in terms of military needs, not 
     fiscal constraints. In other words, the way the law reads, 
     they look at what structure of forces, what package of 
     capabilities they need to defend the United States, and then 
     we try to come up with the money to pay for that.

  Well, I am concerned that the analysis may be the other way around. 
They may be given a figure, a budget number, and told to come up with a 
force structure and a package of capabilities that meet that budget 
number. They must be allowed to assume reasonable inflation-adjusted 
increases in the defense budget for the future and then be allowed to 
build the package of capabilities and force structure needed to defend 
the United States.
  That Quadrennial Defense Review needs to be military driven, not 
budget driven. Then, in the meantime, while we wait for that review, we 
should stick with the planned figure for fiscal 2007. Every year, the 
Department sends its budget here. And, of course, the key number is the 
number for the upcoming fiscal year, but it is always a 5-year defense 
plan. In the first few years of the Bush administration, to the credit 
of the Department and the administration, they have basically stuck to 
their projections year by year, with fairly minor deviations.
  The figure for fiscal 2007 that we were given last year is $443 
billion, and that is the figure that should come over. We should not 
sacrifice our defense requirements for deficit concerns. Whatever your 
feelings about the deficit and about how we ought to resolve the 
deficit, it is not caused by the defense budget.
  The defense budget is 48 percent of discretionary spending. It was 
just about the same in the Carter era. The defense budget as a 
percentage of the total budget is 17 percent, which is 6 percent less 
than it was in the Carter era. As a percentage of gross domestic 
product, it is 3.6 percent which, again, is less than it was in the 
Carter era. The military budget has not caused the deficit that we are 
dealing with today. In fact, if we could just sustain defense spending 
at 4 percent of the gross domestic product, which would be an historic 
low, that would be more than adequate for us to build the kind of force 
structure that we need to defend our country. That is not too big a 
sacrifice to pay for this Nation's security.
  I said at the beginning of my remarks that reducing the defense 
budget in the name of reducing the deficit is a false economy. I ask 
Senators to consider the world situation today. The stability of the 
international order in the world depends on the reality and the 
perception of American military power. The more stable the world is, 
the more hospitable it is to freedom and to our interests, the faster 
our economy will grow, and the more money we will have available, not 
just for defense spending but, indeed, for all other obligations of the 
Government. That is something President Reagan understood. When he 
became President in 1981, he began building up America's defenses. He 
had double-digit spending increases in the military budget. He knew 
that was a key aspect of winning the Cold War. He got the attention of 
the Soviets. After a few years, they decided it was not worth it to try 
to compete with the United States in that arena. That was one of the 
key factors that led to the fall of the Soviet Union. And the freedom 
that resulted from that, the end of the isolation of Eastern Europe, 
the opportunities that were unleashed on the world are one of the 
reasons that we had unparalleled economic growth all throughout the 
1990s, which then enabled us to balance the budget and eventually get 
to a surplus.
  If, as a result of budget-driven decisions, we reduce the defense 
budget beneath what is minimally adequate, we create a sense of 
instability in the world, a doubt about our resolution to maintain our 
obligations and to protect our freedom. If that even minimally 
increases the possibility of a confrontation somewhere in the world, it 
will affect our economic opportunities and our economic growth far more 
than anything we could possibly save by reducing the defense budget, to 
put it on just as low and cold a level as possible. A strong defense, 
the perception of American will and resolution is good for the economy. 
It is necessary if we are going to grow as a country, create jobs, and 
generate the kind of revenue that will allow us to address the deficit.
  I offer a personal note on behalf of this issue. The men and women 
who defend us in our military are the finest people who have ever 
served in any military service at any time in the Nation's history. 
They know the obligation that they are undertaking. They undertake it 
willingly. Over Veterans Day, I attended a few rallies around Missouri. 
I like to do that in commemoration of the men and women who have 
served. I was in Lebanon, MO, and met a number of our service personnel 
who were there. One of them was a recent enlistee in the National 
Guard, a young man who was proud to wear his country's uniform, proud 
at the prospect that he might be actively involved, as I am sure he 
will be, in helping our Nation win the war against terror.
  We had an opportunity to visit. He understood that in doing that, he 
was doing something very important, very large. He was sacrificing, and 
his sacrifice was a measure of the value he placed on the freedom of 
his country and the security of his family.
  Those young men and women in America's military will keep faith with 
us. They are going to do what we ask and expect them to do to protect 
us. We owe it to them, particularly in the Congress. We owe it to them, 
to keep faith with them. They protect us. They count on us to protect 
them, to do what we know is necessary to provide them with what they 
need to do their jobs.
  Let's live up to that. Let's have confidence that doing the right 
thing, meeting our obligations with regard to the national defense, is 
the best way to approach the future, both economically and as a matter 
of foreign policy and as a matter of the Nation's security.
  I yield the floor.

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