[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 151 (Tuesday, November 15, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12840-S12844]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mrs. MURRAY (for herself, Ms. Collins, Mr. Lieberman, and Mr. 
        Coleman):
  S. 2008. A bill to improve cargo security, and for other purposes; 
read the first time.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, today I'm pleased to introduce the 
bipartisan GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act with the chair of the 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, Senator Susan 
Collins.
  We've worked together to create an innovative bill that will protect 
the American people and protect our economy from terrorist threats.
  Our bill will help close one of the most dangerous vulnerabilities 
facing our nation--a terrorist organization using cargo containers to 
bring weapons and terrorists into the United States.
  For decades, industry leaders in my home state of Washington and 
around the world have worked hard to create an open, efficient trading 
system. That system relies on cargo containers to move the vast 
majority of the world's commerce from factory to market.
  The cargo container has reduced the cost of trade--helping American 
businesses and creating American jobs. We can be proud of the 
efficiency and speed of our container trading system.
  But that system was designed for a different time--before terrorist 
attacks on American soil and before fanatics took jetliners and turned 
them into missiles.
  Our bill addresses those concerns. Our bill increases scrutiny of 
shipments. It provides benefits to shippers but only after we have 
verified that they have improved security. And it ensures we keep 
testing the system to make sure it stays secure.
  Let me quickly summarize the benefits of the GreenLane Act. It gives 
U.S. officials in foreign ports the authority to inspect suspicious 
containers before they are loaded for departure into the United States. 
The GreenLane Act makes the haystack of containers smaller so that the 
search is smaller. It allows the Government to focus on suspicious 
cargo. It ensures that we are inspecting and stopping cargo that poses 
a threat. And it cuts down smuggling of weapons, people, drugs or other 
illegal cargo.
  A smaller haystack and strict overseas security measures will allow 
the United States and foreign officials to better stop criminal actions 
and threats to our national security. The GreenLane Act protects 
America's economy in the event of a terror attack, and it provides a 
secure, organized way to quickly resume cargo operations after any 
emergency shutdown. Because any shutdown of ports has the potential to 
cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars a day, the GreenLane Act will 
minimize the economic impact of a terrorist attack. And the GreenLane 
Act creates market incentives for everyone in the supply chain to 
improve security and take responsibility for the cargo they handle.
  Today we have a choice in how we deal with the cargo security 
challenges that face us. But if we wait for a disaster, we will not 
have a choice. If we all agree on a system now, we will have a role in 
shaping what it looks like and making sure it is sensitive to the need 
for free-flowing commerce. I am here to say, along with Senator 
Collins, that we need to make these changes on our terms now before 
there is an incident. If we wait until after there is an incident, we 
risk drastic actions that will hurt everyone. With the GreenLane Act we 
introduce today, we have the opportunity to create effective, efficient 
systems and put them in place now.
  I invite anyone who cares about our security and our economy to join 
Senator Collins and me in this effort. If anybody would like more 
information, visit my Web page at Murray.Senate.Gov/GreenLane.
  I thank Senator Collins for her tremendous leadership and partnership 
in developing this legislation. She brings tremendous experience and 
expertise to one of America's biggest threats. It has been a pleasure 
to work with her in developing this critically important bill. I look 
forward to working with her, and anyone else here, to help turn the 
ideas of this bill into laws that will protect the American people.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, 
Senator Murray, in introducing today the GreenLane Maritime Cargo 
Security

[[Page S12841]]

Act. It has been a great pleasure to work with my colleague on this 
important issue. Senator Murray has been an early leader in the call 
for greater port security. I am pleased we were able to join our 
efforts in a bipartisan bill to provide long overdue improvements in 
maritime security.
  Our comprehensive legislation would help build a coordinated approach 
to maritime and port security across all levels of government and with 
our overseas trading partners. It would improve our Nation's security 
as it expedites trade with those governments and businesses that join 
us in this goal. It would encourage innovation, and it would provide 
financial assistance to our ports as they strive to strengthen their 
terrorism prevention and response efforts.
  This legislation would provide the structure and resources needed to 
better protect the American people from attack through these vital yet 
extremely vulnerable points of entry and centers of economic activity.
  Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, including 
the largest port by tonnage in New England, I am keenly aware of the 
importance of our seaports to our national economy and to the 
communities in which they are located. In addition to our ports' 
obvious economic significance, the link between maritime security and 
our national security has been underscored time and again by terrorism 
experts, including the 9/11 Commission. It is easy to see why, if you 
look at the statistics.
  In 2003, more than 6,000 ships made nearly 57,000 calls on American 
ports. They carried the bulk of approximately 800 million tons of goods 
that came into our country, including more than 9 million containers. 
We know that al-Qaida has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to 
the American people and maximum disruption to our economy. Therefore, 
when you look at what could achieve those goals, you are instantly 
drawn to our cargo ports.
  We already have a glimpse of the staggering damage a terrorist attack 
on a cargo port could produce. In the fall of 2002, the west coast dock 
strike cost our economy an estimated $1 billion a day for each of the 
10 days that the work stoppage lasted. It not only brought those 
western coast ports to a halt but also harmed businesses throughout the 
country. That astonishing amount of harm, $10 billion worth, was the 
result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. Think of 
what the impact of a terrorist attack would be.
  More recently, Hurricane Katrina brought the port of New Orleans and 
several other gulf coast ports to a standstill. Fortunately, much of 
this cargo was able to be diverted to other ports undamaged by the 
storm. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, however, it is likely 
that an attack on one port would result in the closure, at least 
temporarily, of all ports. All of us remember in the wake of 9/11 that 
commercial aircraft were grounded across this country for a number of 
days. It is logical to assume that all of the ports would be closed in 
this country if there were a terrorist attack on one port.
  In addition to the threat of a direct attack on one of our ports, any 
one of the more than 9 million containers that enter the United States 
each year has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st century. 
When we look at these huge cargo ships unloading thousands of 
containers every day, we think: Oh, that contains consumer goods, maybe 
television sets or toys or clothing or sneakers. Fortunately, in the 
vast majority of cases, that is exactly what is in those containers. 
But a container could include terrorists themselves, biological or 
chemical agents, or even a small nuclear weapon.
  For years, criminals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, 
firearms, and people into the United States. These containers may come 
from anyone of 1,000 ports overseas, ports that have varying degrees 
and levels of security. They could also be intercepted or tampered with 
along the way.
  Earlier year this year, I toured the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. The sheer size of these facilities and the activities that are 
going on every day are startling. So, too, are the risks and the 
vulnerabilities that they offer for terrorists to exploit. By 
coincidence, my visit came days before 32 Chinese nationals were 
smuggled into the port of Los Angeles in two cargo containers. 
Fortunately, that Trojan horse held people who were simply seeking a 
better way of life, albeit illegally, and they were not terrorists 
seeking to destroy our way of life. They were caught. But what is 
particularly disturbing to me, and speaks to the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of the current system, is they weren't caught through 
any security measure. It wasn't the container security initiative or 
the C-TPAT Program or any other new initiative that resulted in these 
32 Chinese nationals being caught. Instead it was an alert crane 
operator who happened to see them crawling out of the containers.
  We cannot continue to rely on luck or even alert crane operators to 
provide for the security of our seaports, our Nation, and our people.
  In August, the President issued the National Security Strategy for 
Maritime Security. It warns of the probability of a hostile state using 
a weapon of mass destruction sometime in the next decade, and it 
identifies the maritime sector as most likely to be used to bring a 
weapon of mass destruction into the United States. In addition, the use 
of ``just in time'' inventories, which are now used by most industries, 
means that a disruption of our ports would have catastrophic 
repercussions for our entire economy.
  A fundamental goal of port security is to head off trouble before it 
reaches our shores. Current supply-chain security programs within the 
Federal Government, however, were separately conceived and managed by 
different agencies, rather than woven together into a layered, 
consistent approach. The result of that, the Government Accountability 
Office tells us, is that only 17.5 percent of high-risk cargo 
identified by our own Customs agents was inspected overseas. I am 
talking about cargo that has been identified as high risk, and yet we 
are inspecting less than 20 percent of high-risk cargo. We found that 
the current programs lack standards, lack staffing, and lack the 
validation of security measures that are necessary for their success.
  We cannot remove the risk of a terrorist attack, but the better 
security measures outlined by the Murray-Collins bill can build a 
stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade.
  This legislation provides the tools to construct a more effective 
security system. It was developed in close consultation with key 
stakeholders including port authorities, major retailers and importers, 
carriers, supply chain managers, security and transportation experts, 
and Federal and State agencies.
  First, it addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain 
security efforts by directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop a strategic plan to strengthen international security for all 
modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from or 
move through seaports of the United States. This plan will clarify the 
roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies at all 
levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear, 
measurable goals for furthering the security of commercial operations 
from point of origin to point of destination. It will outline 
mandatory, baseline security measures and standards and provide 
incentives for additional voluntary measures.
  The new Office of Cargo Security Policy, established in our 
legislation, would ensure implementation of the strategic plan. This 
important office will report to the Department's Assistant Secretary 
for Policy in order to better coordinate maritime security efforts 
within the Department of Homeland Security and among our international 
and private-sector partners.
  This legislation also gives the Secretary 6 months to establish 
minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to 
the U.S., based on the Department's experience with current cargo 
security programs. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry must 
meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established. 
Currently, DHS has been too slow to implement certain vital security 
measures. For example, the Department has been working on a regulation 
setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for

[[Page S12842]]

more than 2 years. Such delays are unacceptable. This legislation would 
set clear timelines to ensure steady progress.
  The Department has also pledged to deploy radiation detection 
equipment at all ports of entry in the U.S. to examine 100 percent of 
cargo. The zero tolerance policy for radiation has been discussed since 
2002, though less than a quarter of the detection equipment deemed 
necessary for domestic coverage had been deployed as of last month. 
Even more frustrating is that the Department has changed the target for 
system deployment multiple times. The Department's new Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office is beginning to take hold of this critical issue, yet 
the need for a comprehensive plan for the deployment of radiation 
detection equipment is evident. Our legislation requires this plan be 
developed and that 100 percent incoming containers to the U.S. be 
examined for radiation no later than 1 year after enactment.
  I want to thank Senator Coleman for his efforts in this area. These 
provisions address concerns that have been identified through our joint 
investigative work on programs protecting our nation against weapons of 
mass destruction.
  For the first time, this legislation would authorize the Container 
Security Initiative. Ongoing, predictable funding--$175 million a year 
for the five years beginning in 2007--is essential for this crucial 
program to succeed. In addition to providing funding, the bill lays out 
requirements for CSI ports and a process for designating new ports 
under CSI. The Secretary must undertake a full assessment of the 
potential risk of smuggling or cargo tampering related to terrorism, 
before designating a port under CSI. This authorization also will 
enable our CSI partners to strengthen anti-terrorism measures and to 
improve training of personnel.
  We would authorize C-TPAT at $75 million per year for that same 5-
year period, and we clearly outline the certification and validation 
requirements and the benefits associated with meeting those 
requirements. Our legislation directs the Secretary to correct the 
deficiencies of the program, and, within one year, to issue guidelines 
that will be used to certify a participant's security measures and 
supply chain practices.
  In addition, we would create a new, third tier of C-TPAT, called the 
GreenLane, which offers additional benefits to C-TPAT participants that 
meet the highest level of security standards. Cargo in transit to the 
U.S. through the GreenLane would be more secure through the use of 
container security devices and stronger supply chain security practices 
in all areas, such as physical, procedural and personnel security. The 
legislation directs the Secretary to develop benefits that may include 
further reduced inspections, priority processing for inspections, and, 
most significantly, preference in entering U.S. ports in the aftermath 
of a terrorist attack. Senator Murray, who developed this concept, will 
describe GreenLane in greater detail.
  The bill also places a greater emphasis on communications among 
government and industry players in responding to an incident and 
settles the critical question of ``who's in charge.''
  Technology plays an important role in maritime and cargo security. 
The Department of Homeland Security has scattered efforts to deploy 
existing technologies, to enhance those tools and to develop new ones. 
It is critical that these efforts be undertaken in a more coordinated 
fashion. In addition, the Government must work closely with and 
encourage the ingenuity of the private sector in developing the 
technologies that will improve both security and trade.
  Let me close by saying that this legislation recognizes that 
America's ports, large and small, are our partners in keeping our 
Nation safe and our economy moving. Our Port Security Grant Program 
will help our ports make the investments needed to meet the threat of 
terrorism. The global maritime industry is crucial to our Nation's 
economy, and our ports are undoubtedly on the front lines of the war 
against terrorism. This legislation would set clear goals for improving 
the security of this vital sector, and it would provide the resources 
to meet and achieve those goals.
  I again thank my colleague, Senator Murray, for her hard work and 
initiative on this legislation. We are pleased to be joined as original 
cosponsors by Senators Norm Coleman and Joe Lieberman. That is 
indicative of the kind of bipartisan support this legislation enjoys, 
and it is my hope that many more of our colleagues will join us in 
bringing this legislation to enactment early next year. Our container 
trading system was designed for a world before September 11.
  Now, here we are, 4 years later, and we still have not made our 
maritime cargo system as secure as it needs to be. Six months after the 
September 11 attacks, I held a hearing to exam the vulnerability of 
cargo security. Many of the concerns that were raised at that hearing 
are still dogging us today.
  One of the challenges we face is how we can make trade more secure 
without slowing it to a crawl. If we have absolute security, we will 
curtail trade. If we have completely open trade, we will not have 
enough security.
  For the past few years, I have been meeting with leaders in 
Government and industry to figure out how we can strike the right 
balance. One thing I know for sure is, it is better for us to work 
together now to design a security system on our own terms than to wait 
for an attack and force a security system in a crisis atmosphere.
  I have spent several years exploring this challenge and meeting with 
stakeholders to get their ideas. Senator Collins, as chair of the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, has held 
hearings on this issue and has introduced legislation.
  As a result of our work, Senator Collins and I have developed the 
GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It provides, for the first time, 
a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve security while keeping 
trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the good 
things about trade--speed and efficiency--without being vulnerable to 
the bad things about trade--the potential for terrorists to use our 
engines of commerce.
  There is an incident that occurred a few years ago that shows just 
how serious a threat we are facing. Four years ago, in Italy, 
dockworkers noticed something strange about one of the cargo 
containers. They opened it up and found an Egyptian man inside. But 
this was not your average stowaway. This man was a suspected al-Qaida 
terrorist, and he had all of the tools of the trade with him. His cargo 
container had been outfitted for a long voyage with a bed, a heater, 
and water. He had a satellite phone and a laptop computer. He also had 
security passes and mechanic certificates for four U.S. airports.
  Now, that happened in 2001. It can still happen today. But don't take 
my word for it. The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection said:

       [T]he container is the potential Trojan Horse of the 21st 
     century.

  The 9/11 Commission said terrorists may turn from targeting aviation 
to targeting seaports because ``opportunities to do harm are as great, 
or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.''
  As we all know, our Government has uncovered al-Qaida training 
manuals, and some of these books suggest that terrorists try to recruit 
workers at borders, airports, and seaports.
  There are two main scenarios we need to think about.
  First, a group like al-Qaida could use cargo containers to smuggle 
weapons and personnel into the United States. They could split up a 
weapon and ship it to the U.S. in separate containers. And those pieces 
could be reassembled anywhere in the United States. So the first danger 
is that terrorists could use these cargo containers to get dangerous 
weapons into the United States.
  Secondly, terrorists could use a cargo container as a weapon itself. 
A terrorist could place a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon 
inside a container and then detonate it once it reaches a U.S. port or 
another destination inside the United States.
  This week, the 9/11 Commission said we have not done enough to 
prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. One 
study said if a nuclear device was detonated at a major seaport, it 
could kill up to a million people.

[[Page S12843]]

  Now, many of our ports are located near major cities. Others are 
located near key transportation hubs. For example, if a chemical weapon 
were detonated in Seattle, the chemical plume could contaminate the 
rail system, Interstate 5, and SeaTac Airport, not to mention the 
entire downtown business and residential areas.
  Terrorists could also detonate a dirty bomb or launch a bioterror 
attack. Any of those scenarios would impose a devastating cost in human 
lives, but that is not all.
  We also know that al-Qaida wants to cripple our economy. Cargo 
containers could offer them a powerful way to do just that, and the 
damage goes beyond lives. An attack launched through our ports would 
also have a devastating economic impact. That is because after an 
attack the Federal Government is likely to shut down our ports to make 
sure that additional hazards weren't being brought into the country--
similar to what we did with airplanes after 9/11.
  When we stopped air travel then, it took us a couple of days to get 
back up to speed. And as we all remember, it cost our economy a great 
deal. But if you stopped cargo containers without a resumption system 
in place, it could take as long as 4 months to get them inspected and 
moving again. That would cripple our economy, and it could even spark a 
global recession.
  Today, our cargo containers are part of the assembly line of American 
business. We have just-in-time delivery and rolling warehouses. If you 
shut down the flow of cargo, you are shutting down the economy. If our 
ports were locked down, we would feel the impact at every level of our 
economy.
  Factories would not be able to get the raw materials they need. Many 
keep small inventories on hand. Once those inventories run out, 
factories would be shut down and workers laid off. We would also see 
the impact in stores. Merchants would not be able to get their products 
from overseas. Store shelves would go bear, and workers, again, would 
be laid off.
  One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for 
12 days, it could cost our economy $58 billion. In 2002, we saw what 
closing down a few ports on the west coast would do. When west coast 
dockworkers were locked out, it cost our economy about $1 billion a 
day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports, not just those on the west 
coast.
  Dr. Stephen Flynn, who is a national security expert, has said that a 
3-week shutdown could spawn a global recession. It is clear that we are 
vulnerable and that an attack could do tremendous damage.
  If our ports were shut down today, we do not have a system in place 
for getting them started again. There is no protocol for what would be 
searched, what would be allowed in, and even who would be in charge.

  Now, I want to acknowledge that we have made some progress since 9/
11. We have provided some funding to make our ports more secure. I have 
fought for port security grants to make sure we are controlling access 
to our ports, and our local ports are on the cutting edge of security. 
We have implemented the 24-hour rule so we know what is supposed to be 
in a container before it reaches the United States. We are adding some 
more detection equipment to American ports, but, remember, once a 
nuclear device is sitting on a U.S. dock, it is too late. Customs 
created a program that works with foreign ports to speed some cargo 
into the United States. It is a good idea, but to date it has not been 
implemented well.
  In May, the Government Accountability Office issued a very troubling 
report. It found that if companies applied for C-TPAT status, we gave 
them less scrutiny simply for submitting paperwork. We never checked to 
see if they actually did what they said they were going to do. We just 
inspected them less. One expert called that approach ``trust, but don't 
verify.''
  Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a 
foreign port, they cannot force a container to be inspected today. They 
can ask the local government, but those requests are frequently 
rejected.
  So because we cannot enforce those agreements through our State 
Department, our Customs officials do not have the power they need, and 
potentially dangerous cargo can arrive at U.S. ports without being 
inspected overseas.
  I am deeply concerned about this issue because I know that maritime 
cargo, especially container cargo, is a critical part of our economy. 
My interest in trade goes back to my childhood. My dad ran a small dime 
store. He relied on imports to stock the shelves in his store. 
International trade put food on our table, and I have never forgotten 
that. So I want to make sure we close the loopholes that threaten our 
ability to trade, while we protect our lives and our economy.
  I have worked on this challenge for several years. I have held 
hearings. I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce. And I have been 
meeting with various stakeholders.
  I know this proposal has to work for everyone in the supply chain: 
importers, freight forwarders, shippers, terminal operators, and 
workers such as longshoremen, truckdrivers, and port employees--all the 
people who are on the frontlines as our eyes and our ears. They need to 
be part of the solution because they would be among the first to be 
hurt if an incident occurred.
  Senator Collins and I have worked together to get input from 
stakeholders, and with that we have crafted a bill that I believe 
strikes the right balance. Our proposal is built around five 
commonsense ideas.
  It has been over 4 years since the tragedy of September 11, and some 
of our most vulnerable assets--our ports and our maritime cargo 
system--still do not have a coordinated security regime. So the 
GreenLane Act will take that first step and ensure minimum security 
standards are in place for all container cargo entering our ports.
  Secondly, because there are so many cargo containers coming into our 
country, we need to make that haystack smaller. We need to do a better 
job in front-loading our inspections overseas before the cargo ever 
gets loaded on a ship that is headed for the United States. Then, 
instead of focusing on a small percent of all containers, we can 
separate the most secure containers from the ones that need more 
security.
  Third, we need to give businesses incentives to adopt better 
security. Companies are going to do what is in their financial 
interest, and we can use market incentives to make the entire industry 
more secure.
  Fourth, we need to minimize the impact of any incident. Right now, if 
there were a terrorist attack through one of our ports, there would be 
an awful lot of confusion. So we need to put one office in charge of 
cargo security policy. We need to create protocols for resuming trade 
after an incident occurs. And we need to establish joint operations 
centers to help make local decisions that will get our trade moving 
again.
  We cannot afford to leave cargo on the docks for weeks. We need a 
plan that tells us in advance what cargo will be unloaded first, and 
how we will get this system back on its feet.
  Finally, we need to monitor and secure cargo from the factory floor 
overseas until it reaches our own shores. There are vulnerabilities at 
every step of the supply chain. A secure system is going to start at 
the factory overseas and continue until that cargo reaches its final 
destination.
  I want to detail how our bill will make the American people safer. 
First of all, it raises the security standards for everyone across the 
board and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take all of 
the best practices and lessons learned and create new standards that 
will establish a new baseline of security for everyone.
  Secondly, it creates the GreenLane. If shippers agree to follow the 
higher security standards of the GreenLane, they get a series of 
benefits.
  To be designated as GreenLane cargo, importers have to ensure that 
all entities within their supply chain are validated C-TPAT 
participants; access to the cargo and containers is restricted to those 
employees who need access and we are assured of their identification; a 
logistics system is in place that provides the ability to track 
everything loaded into a GreenLane container back to the factory; and, 
a container security device, such as an e-seal, is used to secure the 
container.
  Remember, GreenLane is optional. No one has to participate. I believe 
companies will want to participate because they will get benefits in 
return.
  What are those benefits? Their bonding requirements could be reduced 
or

[[Page S12844]]

eliminated. Instead of paying customs duties on every shipment, they 
could be billed monthly or quarterly. Their cargo will be subject to 
fewer searches and will be released faster upon entering the United 
States. They will lose less cargo to theft, and they will have the 
stability that comes from having one uniform standard to plan around.
  Finally, the GreenLane Act sets up a plan so that trade can be 
resumed quickly and safely if an attack occurs. Today, there are no 
protocols. There is no guide on how to get the system going again. Our 
bill will create one, and it will let the most secure cargo--the 
GreenLane cargo--be released first.
  Our bill creates joint operations centers to ensure a coordinated, 
measured response and the resumption and flow of commerce in the event 
of an incident or heightened national security threat level.
  Our bill takes other steps. It expands port security grants. It makes 
sure we continue to monitor our security system to make sure it is 
working. It makes sure that a company's cargo data is not available to 
competitors. It sets a uniform standard for security so shippers and 
others have some certainty, rather than a hodgepodge of different 
standards.
  There have been a lot of commissions and studies on port security, 
and we have worked to address their recommendations in our bill.
  The 9/11 Commission said we need ``layered'' security, that we need 
to centralize authority so we can have more accountability, and that 
Federal agencies need to share information better. Our bill implements 
all of those recommendations.
  The Government Accountability Office looked at current Customs 
programs and identified some troubling shortcomings.
                                 ______