[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 146 (Monday, November 7, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12420-S12422]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I commend Senator Levin and others
for their leadership in proposing this amendment. I am proud to be an
original cosponsor of the amendment based on the belief that a
comprehensive, objective, and independent investigation into the
collection of intelligence through the detention, interrogation, and
rendition of prisoners is long overdue. While I am a strong supporter
of the amendment, I regret greatly the fact that we have been forced to
seek the creation of a national commission on such a critically
important matter that falls squarely within the oversight
responsibility of the Congress. Unfortunately, Congress's unwillingness
to carry out these oversight duties in the past year has left us with
no remaining alternative but to seek the creation of a national
commission.
Why do I say this? The collection of intelligence through
interrogation and rendition is an extremely important part of our
counterterrorism effort. The interrogation of captured terrorists and
insurgents is, in fact, one of the most important of intelligence
tools. We must ensure that those interrogations are carried out in a
proper and effective manner. This tool, as with all others, must be
applied within the bounds of our laws and our own national moral
framework, and it must be subject to the same scrutiny and
congressional oversight as every other aspect of intelligence. This,
unfortunately, has not been the case.
Despite the critical importance of interrogation-derived intelligence
and the growing controversy surrounding retention, interrogation, and
rendition policies and practices, the Congress has largely ignored the
issue, holding a limited number of hearings that have provided limited
insight.
More disturbing, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Senate
committee charged with overseeing U.S. intelligence programs and the
only one with jurisdiction to investigate all aspects of this issue, is
sitting on the sidelines and effectively abdicating its oversight
responsibility to media investigative reporters.
As the Intelligence Committee's vice chairman, I have been pushing
for the past 10 months for a formal investigation into the legal and
operational
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questions at the heart of the detention interrogation controversy, as
has my colleague from the State of Michigan, Senator Levin.
My proposal that the Intelligence Committee conduct an investigation
into this matter was rejected. A decision was made that the
Intelligence Committee, as it is charged to do, would not formally
examine the legal and operational aspects of our detention and
interrogation program despite compelling and disturbing evidence that
serious, possibly criminal, abuses had occurred.
Now, this decision is particularly curious given the litany of
investigations carried out by the Intelligence Committee in the past.
In recent years, our committee has produced detailed investigative
reports into prewar intelligence on Iraq, technology transfer to China,
the bombing of the USS Cole, and the shooting down of the missionary
plane in Peru, and on and on. In fact, on July 30, 1999, a few years
before he became our current chairman, Senator Pat Roberts wrote to
then-Chairman Richard Shelby and Vice Chairman Bob Kerrey requesting an
investigation into the intelligence related to the downing of CDR
Michael Scott Speicher's F-18 plane in the early stages of the Persian
Gulf war.
The committee responded favorably to Senator Roberts' request,
conducted the investigation, and produced a report. Each of the
committee reports was produced as a result of formally authorized
investigations, and each was a constructive contribution to
understanding not just how and why intelligence failures occur but what
action should be taken to avoid them in the future. Our unanimously
approved first phase of our Iraq report last July, which was the
weapons of mass destruction aspect, was a rather thorough and
devastating critique of the collection and analytical failings of our
intelligence community prior to the war that has provided, frankly, a
very critical momentum to an intelligence reform movement that was
already gathering steam and ended up in the passage of landmark
legislation in December, which most people would have said a couple of
months earlier was not possible. Yet when presented with a similar set
of compelling reports on how the United States detains and interrogates
prisoners, the majority on the committee has prevented us from pursuing
an investigation.
Why? Well over a year has passed since the appearance of photographs
graphically portraying the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib
prison. As my colleagues know, these images and other reports of abuse
provided a powerful propaganda tool to our terrorist enemies. Since
then we have seen a steady stream of accusations relating to the way
the U.S. military and intelligence agencies treat individuals in their
custody. Allegations of mistreatment have surfaced wherever the United
States holds prisoners overseas--across Iraq, Afghanistan, and at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Troubling new revelations have become an almost daily occurrence,
with a disturbing number of these instances resulting in prisoner
deaths. At least 26 prisoners have died in American custody, and the
unsettling charge has been leveled against the United States that we
are exporting torture through rendition practices that lack
accountability.
Who can honestly say that these events and allegations are not
serious enough to warrant an Intelligence Committee investigation? My
good friend and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator John Warner, believed such an investigation was needed back in
February of this year, and at the February 18 open Intelligence
Committee hearing on worldwide threats, which we do once a year,
Senator Warner remarked:
And there's an issue out here, I say to my distinguished
chairman and ranking member and colleagues on the committee,
which I think we've got to address both in my committee and
in this committee, and that is the manner in which we gain
intelligence from those that are captured, either on the
battlefield or in other areas.
My hope was that sort of congressional inquiry referenced by Senator
Warner back in February would have become a reality.
The Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee with
their respective oversight of the military and intelligence communities
could have provided the sort of complementary reviews into troubling
allegations swirling around our interrogation of prisoners in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and, as I said, Guantanamo Bay. Regrettably, our
efforts and those of Senator Levin to authorize and conduct such an
investigation have not succeeded. We are now, therefore, left by
default with the remaining option of turning over this responsibility
to a national commission to carry it out.
If the Senate oversight committees are either unwilling or unable to
tackle the tough but necessary questions associated with detention,
interrogation, and rendition of prisoners, then we should step aside,
if we have to, regrettably, and let the work be done by those
unfettered by other considerations.
I am confident that this new national commission, like the 9/11
Commission, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission before it,
will provide the sort of comprehensive review of U.S. policy and
practices relating to the treatment of detainees that has been absent
so far.
Our amendment calls for a 12-month investigation in which all aspects
of all of this must be looked at. More specifically, the 10-person
commission will examine and report upon the policies and practices of
the United States relating to the treatment of individuals detained
since September 11, 2001. The commission will also be tasked to
evaluate causes and factors that have contributed to the alleged
mistreatment of detainees, including an assessment of either those
directly or indirectly responsible for the mistreatment.
I am worried about the legal aspects of our underpinning, and I will
more or less close with this: On May 18, 2005, the Central Intelligence
Agency issued a statement that ``CIA policies on interrogation have
always followed legal guidance from the Department of Justice.'' That
may or may not be so, but was that legal guidance supportable? That is
what you have to ask. Was it supportable? Was it factual?
A lengthy legal opinion on the Department of Justice interrogation
practices, which had been issued in secret, in August, 2002, was
quickly repudiated by the White House when it became public in June of
2004 and was then superseded by a public Justice Department legal
opinion in December of 2004.
As that episode shows, secret interpretations of the law beyond the
oversight of the Congress are an invitation to potentially great error.
What supporting roles do the CIA and FBI play in the interrogation of
suspects of military-run prisons and how are their activities
coordinated? It has been publicly reported that the CIA requested that
a number of prisoners held in Iraq not be registered and be kept from
international inspection; therefore, the so-called ghost detainees.
More recently, it has come to light that FBI officials lodged
strenuous complaints about what they considered to be the mistreatment
of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay. These reports and others strongly
suggest that different agencies are operating under different sets of
rules, or they are not coordinated. This is a recipe for disaster which
will come back to haunt us one of these days.
The commission will also review policies regarding the controversial
practice of the United States of rendering detainees to foreign
governments for interrogation.
Our practice of contracting out to foreign governments the
interrogation of detainees is, to this Senator, particularly troubling.
There have been numerous reports of individuals turned over by the
United States to a foreign government for interrogation allegedly being
tortured.
In addition to the ethical and legal considerations associated with
this practice, the veracity of the information gained from these and
other detainees is called into question if these statements were made
under physical coercion. Therefore, it is important that we have a
thorough evaluation of the current policy guidelines and field
directives for when it is appropriate to render a detainee to another
country and what intelligence is gained from such a practice.
More specifically, we must examine the validity of assurances that
the
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United States is given when detainees are rendered to other countries
that they will not be tortured.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coburn). The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I hope my colleagues will support the amendment. I
thank the Presiding Officer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do have the privilege of being an ex
officio member of the Intelligence Committee. I served 8 years on that
committee, and my concluding years was as ranking member. I have a very
high respect for that committee and find, from my participation,
together with others on it, under the leadership of Chairman Roberts
and Senator Rockefeller, that the committee does a very good job.
Mr. President, I wish to speak in opposition about this question of
the need for this country to establish an independent commission to
investigate the detention and interrogation operations conducted by the
Department of Defense and other elements of the Government in
conjunction with the war on terrorism.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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