[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 144 (Thursday, November 3, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2259-E2260]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              IRAN NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2005

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                         HON. DANA ROHRABACHER

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, October 26, 2005

  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to clarify a confusing or 
mistaken impression that may have been left by one of my colleagues 
during the House floor debate on S. 1713, the Iran Nonproliferation 
Amendments Act of 2005, for which I served as the majority floor 
manager.
  The purpose of enacting S. 1713, as amended by the House, is twofold: 
to strengthen our nonproliferation tools in dealing with Iran and also 
Syria, and at the same time enable necessary cooperation between NASA 
and U.S. businesses with their Russian counterparts on the 
International Space Station. Just to be clear, in no way does S. 1713 
favor our space goals at the expense of effectiveness in 
nonproliferation. In fact, the time-limited authority we give NASA to 
purchase, either directly or through U.S. companies, Russian space 
goods and services, is in my view a net plus for nonproliferation, not 
a minus.
  That said, I want to stress that the legislation the House adopted, 
and the intent of that legislation, allows NASA significant flexibility 
in using Russian space goods and services to support the assembly and 
operation of the International Space Station between now and January 1, 
2012. NASA is free to make payments pursuant to the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on ISS ``or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of 
understanding, or contract related thereto.'' As Chairman Hyde pointed 
out in his floor statement, this means that after enactment of this 
legislation, NASA can enter into new arrangements to meet our needs 
regarding ISS, but that NASA will not enter into new obligations beyond 
or unrelated to the ISS.
  The primary limitations with respect to ISS payments are the sunset 
date of January 1, 2012, and the existing statutory requirement that 
the specific Russian entities to be paid have not been sanctioned as 
proliferators under the earlier sections of the Iran Nonproliferation 
Act.
  I point all of this out because my friend and colleague, Mr. Sherman, 
mistakenly suggested during the floor debate that the phrase 
``necessary to meet United States obligations'' added to the Hyde-
Lantos substitute to S. 1713 implies that NASA could not purchase 
Russian goods or services if any other alternative was available. That 
is certainly not the plain meaning of the phrase, nor the intent behind 
it. However, because Mr. Sherman explicitly invited correction, I am 
doing so here in some detail.
  Here are three examples of arrangements that are wholly consistent 
with the legislative text, the Senate and House floor statements by the 
architects of this legislation, and the Administration's request for 
relief, but which would not be allowed under Mr. Sherman's 
interpretation.
  First, NASA has stated it wants to use the Russian Soyuz crew capsule 
to exchange long-term ISS research crews, even during the time the 
Space Shuttle is flying, because this will allow the Shuttle astronauts 
to focus on the job of assembling the Space Station to meet our 
international partner commitments during the Shuttle's limited 
remaining lifetime. Under the previously negotiated agreements between 
our countries, Russia is no longer obligated to provide NASA with Soyuz 
crew transport seats. Therefore, in this example, NASA would not be 
paying Russia for an obligation they have promised to us. However, 
because NASA could theoretically use the Space Shuttle as an 
alternative to carry out crew transfer, albeit at some risk and a cost 
to our other ISS commitments, Mr. Sherman's inference would suggest 
NASA cannot do this. Given that the primary exigency for adopting this 
legislation is enabling continued U.S. occupation of ISS beyond April 
of next year, which requires payment for training and launch to ISS of 
a NASA astronaut on the next Soyuz launch, Mr. Sherman's interpretation 
is incorrect.
  Second, Chairman Hyde's statement explicitly makes clear that cargo 
resupply services to ISS using technology developed by Russian 
companies would be legal under the amended Act, again within the 
limitations I stated above. This would be the case regardless of 
whether the Space Shuttle might technically be available to deliver 
cargo to ISS, namely through the middle of 2010.
  Third, some bidders may wish to use a very reliable and capable U.S. 
launch vehicle, one which the Defense Department uses right now to 
launch critical military satellites, and which happens to incorporate 
Russian rocket engines. Nothing in this bill was meant to preclude such 
activities, even though there might be similar launch vehicles which do 
not use Russian rocket engines. Mr. Hyde's statement makes this clear.
  Beyond those examples, I would offer the words of House Science 
Committee Chairman Boehlert as further disputation of Mr. Sherman's 
reading. In his floor statement, Chairman Boehlert declares that ``by 
setting a specific end date for our current relationship with the 
Russians'' the bill ``encourages NASA to find commercial firms that are 
not dependent on the Russians to carry cargo in the future.'' While I 
may disagree with that goal or a sunset date's effectiveness as a 
management tool, if Mr. Sherman's reading were true, the sunset date 
would be superfluous, because once a U.S. provider whose service had no 
Russian content emerged, NASA would be barred from any further 
payments, let alone purchases, from companies which do use

[[Page E2260]]

some Russian content. Clearly Chairman Boehlert's interpretation is the 
same as Chairman Hyde's and my own: Russian content is allowed up until 
the January 1, 2012 date.
  Finally, I would just echo the comments made by Chairman Calvert 
during the floor debate: the ISS program requires long-term flexibility 
for NASA to safely and cost-effectively execute both for our taxpayers 
and to meet our international commitments. We are partners with Russia 
in the Space Station. Both NASA and its commercial providers need to be 
able to exchange goods and services at ISS with nonproliferation 
compliant Russian entities for the lifetime of the station, 
particularly as we seek to engage the U.S. private sector in ISS 
operations. Last week the House made clear that even in a time of great 
concern over the manifest threat from Iran, we want NASA and industry 
to have this ability at least through January 1, 2012.

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