[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 142 (Tuesday, November 1, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12130-S12132]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. Obama):
  S. 1949. A bill to provide for coordination of proliferation 
interdiction activities and conventional arms disarmament, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today I rise on behalf of myself and 
Senator Obama to introduce the Cooperative Proliferation Detection, 
Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act of 2005.
  This legislation aims to support the priority the Administration has 
placed on the detection and interdiction of weapons of mass 
destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, as well as 
dual-use items of proliferation concern. The legislation also contains 
important conventional weapons threat reduction measures that have 
previously been approved by the Foreign Relations Committee.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the remarks Senator Obama 
and I made this morning at the Council on Foreign Relations regarding 
this legislation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Statement of Senator Obama on the Introduction of the Cooperative 
  Proliferation Detection, Interdiction, Assistance, and Conventional 
                          Threat Reduction Act

       Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Lugar in 
     introducing the Cooperative Proliferation Detection, 
     Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction 
     Act.
       Earlier today, Senator Lugar and I appeared at the Council 
     on Foreign Relations to discuss our recent trip to Russia, 
     Ukraine, and Azerbaijan and talk about this new piece of 
     legislation.
       Now, few people understand these challenges better than the 
     co-founder of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 
     Senator Lugar, and this is something that became particularly 
     clear to me during one incident on the trip.
       We were in Ukraine, visiting a pathogen laboratory in Kiev. 
     This is a city of two and a half million, and in a non-
     descript building right in the middle of town stood this 
     facility that once operated on the fringes of the Soviet 
     biological weapons program.
       We entered through no fences or discernible security, and 
     once we did, we found ourselves in a building with open 
     first-floor windows and padlocks that many of us would not 
     use to secure our own luggage.
       Our guide then brought us right up to what looked like a 
     mini-refrigerator. Inside, staring right at us, were rows 
     upon rows of test tubes. She picked them up, clanked them 
     around, and we listened to the translator explain what she 
     was saying. Some of the tubes, he said, were filled with 
     anthrax. Others, the plague.
       At this point I turned around and said ``Hey, where's 
     Lugar? Doesn't he want to see this?'' I found him standing 
     about fifteen feet away, all the way in the back of the room. 
     He looked at me and said, ``Been there, done that.''
       Of course, Senator Lugar has been there and he has done 
     that, and thanks to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs 
     he co-founded with Senator Sam Nunn, we've made amazing 
     progress in finding, securing, and guarding some of the 
     deadliest weapons that were left scattered throughout the 
     former Soviet Union after the Cold War.
       As we discussed with the Council on Foreign Relations, this 
     is one story that shows our job is far from finished at a 
     time when demand for these weapons has never been greater.
       Right now, rogue states and despotic regimes are looking to 
     begin or accelerate their own nuclear programs. And as we 
     speak, members of Al Qaeda and other terrorists organizations 
     are aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, which 
     they would use without hesitation.
       We've heard the horror stories--attempts by rogue states to 
     recruit former Soviet weapons scientists; terrorists shopping 
     for weapons grade materials on the black market. Some weapons 
     experts believe that terrorists are likely to find enough 
     fissile material to build a bomb in the next ten years--and 
     we can imagine with horror what the world will be like if 
     they succeed.
       Today, experts tell us that we're in a race against time to 
     prevent this scenario from unfolding. And that is why the 
     nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons within the borders 
     of the former Soviet Union represent the greatest threat to 
     the security of the United States--a threat we need to think 
     seriously and intelligently about in the months to come.
       Fortunately, the success of Cooperative Threat Reduction--
     especially in securing nuclear weapons--serves as a model of 
     how we can do this. And so the question we need to be asking 
     ourselves today is, what is the future of this program? With 
     the situation in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet 
     Union so drastically different than it was in 1991, or even 
     in 1996 or 2001, what must we do to effectively confront this 
     threat in the days and years to come?
       The answers to these questions will require sustained 
     involvement by the Executive Branch, Congress, non-
     governmental organizations, and the international community. 
     Everyone has a role to play, and everyone must accelerate 
     this involvement.
       For my part, I would suggest three important elements that 
     should be included in such a discussion.
       First, the Nunn-Lugar program should be more engaged in 
     containing proliferation threats from Soviet-supplied, 
     civilian research reactors throughout Russia and the 
     Independent States.
       The Department of Energy and others have certainly made 
     progress in converting civilian reactors to low-enriched 
     uranium, taking back spent fuel, and closing unnecessary 
     facilities.
       Yet, a serious threat still remains. Many of these aging 
     research facilities have the largest, least secure quantities 
     of highly enriched uranium in the world--the quickest way to 
     a nuclear weapon. For a scientist or other employee to simply 
     walk out of the lab with enough material to construct a 
     weapon of mass destruction is far too easy, and the 
     consequences would be far too devastating. Not to mention the 
     environmental and public health and safety catastrophe that 
     could come from a failure to store and transport these 
     materials safely and securely.
       In a way that balances the needs of science and security, 
     more needs to be done to bring these materials--as well as 
     other sources that can be used to construct 
     improvised nuclear weapons and radiological devices--under 
     control and dramatically reduce the proliferation threat 
     they pose.
       In the years ahead, this should become an increasing 
     priority for the Nunn-Lugar program, the Congress, and the 
     Russians, who are already taking important steps to help 
     implement these programs.
       I want to turn to a second critical area: biological 
     weapons threat reduction programs.
       Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was engaged in a 
     massive undertaking in the field of germ warfare.
       At its height in the late 1980' s, this program stockpiled 
     of some of the most dangerous agents known to man--plague, 
     smallpox, and anthrax--to name just a few. As one book says, 
     ``disease by the ton was its industry.''
       Besides the devastation they can cause to a civilian 
     population, biological agents can also be effective in 
     asymmetrical warfare against U.S. troops. While they are 
     often difficult to use, they are easy to transport, hard to 
     detect, and, as we saw in Kiev, not always well secured.
       Here in Washington, we saw what happened when just two 
     letters filled with just a few grams of Anthrax were sent to 
     the U.S. Senate. Five postal employees were killed and the 
     Senate office buildings were closed for months.
       This was two letters.
       Fortunately, however, we've made some good progress on this 
     front. For years, Nunn-Lugar programs have been effectively 
     upgrading security at sites in six countries

[[Page S12131]]

     across the former Soviet Union. And the Kiev story is heading 
     in the right direction--while we were in Ukraine, Senator 
     Lugar, through his tireless and personal intervention, was 
     able to achieve a breakthrough with that government, bringing 
     that facility and others under the Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction program.
       But because of the size, secrecy, and scope of the Soviet 
     biological weapons program, we are still dangerously behind 
     in dealing with this proliferation threat. We need to be sure 
     that Nunn-Lugar is increasingly focused on these very real 
     nonproliferation and bioterrorism threats.
       One of the most important steps is for Russia to permit the 
     access and transparency necessary to deal with the threat.
       Additional steps should also be taken to consolidate and 
     secure dangerous pathogen collections, strengthen bio-
     reconnaissance networks to provide early warning of bio-
     attack and natural disease outbreaks, and have our experts 
     work together to develop improved medical countermeasures. As 
     the Avian Influenza outbreak demonstrates, even the zealous 
     Russian border guard is helpless against the global sweep of 
     biological threats.
       My third recommendation--which I'll just touch briefly on 
     and let Senator Lugar talk about in more detail--is that we 
     need to start thinking creatively about some of the next-
     generation efforts on nuclear, biological, and chemical 
     weapons.
       On our trip, we saw two areas where this is possible: 
     elimination of heavy conventional weapons, and interdiction 
     efforts to help stop the flow of dangerous materials across 
     borders.
       In Donetsk, I stood among piles of conventional weapons 
     that were slowly being dismantled. While the government of 
     Ukraine is making progress here, the limited funding they 
     have means that at the current pace, it will take sixty years 
     to dismantle these weapons. But we've all seen how it could 
     take far less time for these weapons to leak out and travel 
     around the world, fueling insurgencies and violent conflicts 
     from Africa to Afghanistan. By destroying these inventories, 
     this is one place we could be making more of a difference.
       One final point. For any of these efforts that I've 
     mentioned to work as we move forward, we must also think 
     critically and strategically about Washington's relationship 
     with Moscow.
       Right now, there are forces within the former Soviet Union 
     and elsewhere that want these non-proliferation programs to 
     stop. Our detention for three hours in Perm is a testament to 
     these forces. Additionally, in the last few years, we've seen 
     some disturbing trends from Russia itself--the deterioration 
     of democracy and the rule of law, the abuses that have taken 
     place in Chechnya, Russian meddling in the former Soviet 
     Union--that raise serious questions about our relationship.
       But when we think about the threat that these weapons pose 
     to our global security, we cannot allow the U.S.-Russian 
     relationship to deteriorate to the point where Russia does 
     not think it's in their best interest to help us finish the 
     job we started. We must safeguard these dangerous weapons, 
     material, and expertise.
       One way we could strengthen this relationship is by 
     thinking about the Russians as more of a partner and less of 
     a subordinate in the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort.
       This does not mean that we should ease up one bit on issues 
     affecting our national security. Outstanding career officials 
     who run the Nunn-Lugar program--people like Col. Jim Reid and 
     Andy Weber who were with us at the Council this morning--will 
     be there every step of the way to ensure that U.S. interests 
     are protected.
       Time and time again on the trip, I saw their skill and 
     experience when negotiating with the Russians. I also saw 
     their ability to ensure that shortcomings were addressed and 
     programs were implemented correctly.
       But thinking of the Russians more as partners does mean 
     being more thoughtful, respectful, and consistent about what 
     we say and what we do. It means that the Russians can and 
     should do more to support these programs. And it means more 
     sustained engagement, including more senior-level visits to 
     Nunn-Lugar program sites.
       It's important for senior officials to go and visit these 
     sites, to check their progress and shortcomings; to see 
     what's working and what's not. But lately we haven't seen 
     many of these visits. We need to see more.
       We also need to ensure that the Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction umbrella agreement, due to expire in 2006, is 
     renewed in a timely manner.
       And we need to work together to obtain a bilateral 
     agreement on biological threat reduction.
       The Russians, however, must also realize that with greater 
     partnership comes greater responsibility.
       There is no doubt that there is a tough road ahead. It will 
     be difficult. And it will be dangerous.
       But, when I think about what is at stake I am reminded by a 
     quote from the late President Kennedy given in a speech at 
     American University in 1963 about threats posed by the Soviet 
     Union.
       ``Let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also 
     direct attention to our common interests and to the means by 
     which those differences can be resolved . . . For in the 
     final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all 
     inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We 
     all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.''
       Much of what President Kennedy described in 1963 remains 
     true to this day--and we owe it to ourselves and our children 
     to get it right.
       I look forward to working with Senator Lugar on this 
     legislation and, more broadly, on this issue for years to 
     come.
                                  ____


 Council on Foreign Relations, ``New Directions for Cooperative Threat 
        Reduction,'' Senator Richard G. Lugar, November 1, 2005

       It is a pleasure to appear before the Council on Foreign 
     Relations with my good friend Senator Barack Obama. As you 
     have heard, we had an extremely successful trip in August. I 
     appreciate his strong support for the Nunn-Lugar Program. In 
     his first year in the Senate, he has committed himself to 
     improving the U.S. response to the threat posed by weapons of 
     mass destruction. We discussed existing programs and new 
     opportunities extensively during our trip, and we are eager 
     to share with you the first public mention of the joint 
     legislative initiative that developed from our findings.
       I was particularly pleased that Barack chose Nunn-Lugar as 
     the subject of his first foreign travel as a Senator. This 
     choice was not an accident or the result of a last-minute 
     whim. During his Senate campaign, well over a year ago, he 
     identified the threat posed by unsecured weapons of mass 
     destruction as the greatest national security threat facing 
     the United States. On the Foreign Relations Committee, he has 
     followed these issues intensely, and he has been a steadfast 
     voice of support for non-proliferation efforts.
       Our trip in August was spent hiking through nuclear weapons 
     storage sites, picking through piles of mortar rounds and 
     landmines, touring missile elimination facilities, examining 
     laboratories containing deadly pathogens, and--for three 
     hours--being detained in the visitors lounge at a remote 
     Russian airfield, near Perm.
       Barack, I want to make sure you understand that your future 
     congressional travels are unlikely to include so many 
     glamorous tourist hotspots.
       It's safe to assume that none of the reporters who have 
     joined us today are from Frommer's or Lonely Planet.
       I have had the opportunity to visit the former Soviet Union 
     to tour Nunn- Lugar sites and facilities once or twice a year 
     for the last 14 years. As Barack witnessed, these trips serve 
     a greater purpose than our personal edification. They are 
     designed to invigorate and endorse the work of a program that 
     both of us see as vital to our national security. On many 
     previous trips, weapons facilities were opened to Americans 
     for the first time, including such notable facilities as the 
     SevMash submarine base, birthplace of the Typhoon nuclear 
     missile submarine. Political support for Nunn-Lugar 
     activities can never be taken for granted. Not everyone in 
     the former Soviet Union, and indeed, not everyone in our own 
     country believes that these programs should be a priority. 
     The Nunn-Lugar program and associated non-proliferation 
     efforts have required constant stewardship and support from 
     the Congress. In this context, I am enthused and encouraged 
     by Senator Obama's commitment to adding his strong voice and 
     creativity to the proliferation challenge.
       Since its founding, Sam Nunn and I always have regarded 
     Nunn-Lugar as more than a government program. We have seen it 
     as a disarmament concept and non-proliferation tool worthy of 
     adaptation and expansion. The Nunn-Lugar program and people 
     like Jim Reid and Andy Weber, who manage its day to day 
     operations, represent a tremendous national security asset 
     that can be applied to situations well beyond the scope of 
     the original Nunn-Lugar legislation. Indeed, the program's 
     aims have been expanded from the focus on safeguarding and 
     destroying strategic nuclear weapons to a much broader array 
     of goals involving safely disposing of all types of nuclear, 
     chemical, and biological weapons and materials, as well as 
     employing former weapons scientists. In 2003, I offered the 
     Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which was signed into law by 
     President Bush. It allowed, for the first time, Nunn-Lugar 
     funds to be used anywhere in the world, not just within the 
     boundaries of the former Soviet Union. As I have advocated 
     frequently, U.S. officials should be prepared to extend the 
     Nunn-Lugar concept whenever opportunities present themselves. 
     Some potential applications for the program North Korea, for 
     example--seem remote today. But the same could have been said 
     for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
       In this spirit, Senator Obama and I are introducing 
     legislation, today, that will again extend the Nunn-Lugar 
     concept to new areas of endeavor. Our bill is entitled the 
     ``Cooperative Proliferation Detection, and Interdiction 
     Assistance and Conventional Threat Reduction Act.''
       As Barack described, our trip included an examination of 
     conventional weapons stockpiles near Donetsk, Ukraine. We 
     also visited Baku, Azerbaijan, where we observed the mock 
     interdiction of a naval vessel playing the role of nuclear 
     smuggler.
       These visits and our subsequent joint research have 
     convinced us that the United States can and should do more to 
     eliminate conventional weapons stockpiles and assist other 
     nations in detecting and interdicting weapons of mass 
     destruction. We believe that

[[Page S12132]]

     these functions are underfunded, fragmented, and in need of 
     high-level support.
       The U.S. government's current response to threats from 
     vulnerable conventional weapons stockpiles is dispersed 
     between several programs at the Department of State. We 
     believe that the planning, coordination, and implementation 
     of this function should be consolidated into one office at 
     the State Department with a budget that is commensurate with 
     the threat posed by these weapons.
       We are particularly concerned that our government has the 
     capacity to deal quickly with vulnerable stockpiles of 
     shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, known as MANPADS. In 
     recent years, concerns have grown that such weapons could be 
     used by terrorists to attack commercial airliners, military 
     installations, and government facilities here at home and 
     abroad. Al Qaeda reportedly has attempted to acquire MANPADS 
     on a number of occasions.
       The Lugar-Obama bill recognizes that the proliferation of 
     conventional weapons is a major obstacle to peace, 
     reconstruction, and economic development in regions suffering 
     from conflict and instability. It calls upon the State 
     Department to implement a global effort to seek out and 
     destroy surplus and unguarded stocks of conventional 
     armaments and to cooperate with allies and international 
     organizations when possible.
       In Ukraine, we saw stacks of thousands of mortars, anti-
     personnel landmines, and other weapons, left over from the 
     Soviet era. The scene there is similar to situations in other 
     states of the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, and 
     Asia. I have also witnessed these threats firsthand in 
     Albania and Georgia, where those governments have requested 
     assistance in eliminating MANPADS, tactical missile systems, 
     and millions of tons of ammunition and weapons.
       In many cases, the security around these weapons is 
     minimal--particularly when the weapons are no longer being 
     used by a nation's military. But as we have seen in Iraq, 
     even obsolete weaponry and explosives can be reconfigured 
     with deadly results. If foreign governments know that the 
     United States is poised to help them eliminate such 
     weapons, they will be more likely to come forward with 
     requests for help, as Albania and Georgia did.
       Inevitably, some countries will decline our assistance, and 
     their stockpiles will remain unsecured. But this is not a 
     reason to fail to secure the stockpiles that are opened to 
     us. Every stockpile represents a theft opportunity for 
     terrorists and a temptation for security personnel who might 
     seek to profit by selling weapons on the black market. The 
     more stockpiles that can be safeguarded or eliminated, the 
     safer we will be. We do not want the question posed the day 
     after an attack on an American military base, embassy 
     compound, or commercial plane why we didn't take these 
     threats seriously.
       Two years ago the Department of Energy combined several 
     nonproliferation programs into the Global Threat Reduction 
     Initiative (GTRI) charged with identifying, securing, and 
     disposing of vulnerable nuclear materials and equipment 
     around the world. We used GTRI as a blueprint for the 
     organizational and programmatic structure needed in the 
     conventional arms elimination arena. By merging activities in 
     a single office at the State Department and making it the 
     lead Federal agency in efforts to eliminate non-strategic 
     missile systems, MANPADS, and all small arms, we will raise 
     the profile and value of this important work.
       The second part of the Lugar-Obama legislation is focused 
     on U.S. efforts to assist allies in detecting and 
     interdicting weapons of mass destruction. The Nunn-Lugar 
     Program is our country's first line of defense against the 
     threat posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction. It 
     attempts to secure weapons of mass destruction at their 
     source. The Department of Homeland Security is our last line 
     of defense, focused on detecting these threats inside U.S. 
     borders and responding to attacks, if they occur. Our bill 
     would bolster the second line of defense, namely, our ability 
     to stop weapons of mass destruction that have been taken from 
     the source, but have not yet reached the United States.
       To strengthen the second line of defense, we believe that 
     we must improve the capabilities of other nations. The United 
     States military and intelligence services cannot be 
     everywhere. We need the cooperation and vigilance of like-
     minded nations to detect and interdict WMD threats. The 
     United States has constructed the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative, which enlisted the participation of other nations 
     in the interdiction of WMD. PSI is an excellent step forward 
     in our communications with foreign governments on WMD 
     interdiction. But what is lacking is a coordinated effort to 
     improve the capabilities of our foreign partners so that they 
     can playa larger detection and interdiction role.
       The Lugar-Obama bill creates a single office dedicated to 
     supporting the detection and interdiction of WMD. The State 
     Department engages in several related anti-terrorism and 
     export control assistance programs to foreign countries. But 
     these programs are focused on other stages of the threat, 
     not on the detection and interdiction of WMD cargo. Thus, 
     we believe there is a gap in our defenses that needs to be 
     filled.
       The Lugar-Obama bill earmarks 25 percent of the 
     Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related 
     Programs account to address the shortcomings in the State 
     Department's response. This would have amounted to $110 
     million this year. Our bill goes one step further by calling 
     on the State Department to also commit 25 percent of annual 
     foreign military financing amounts to nations for the 
     purchase of equipment to improve their ability to detect and 
     interdict WMD. This would represent a potent but flexible 
     tool that could help build a network of WMD detection and 
     interdiction capabilities world wide.
       Senator Obama and I give the State Department the 
     flexibility to determine how these funds should be used. This 
     is because a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach does not work 
     with FMF funds. Some recipients of U.S. security assistance, 
     such as Israel, already are capable of detecting and 
     interdicting WMD. Other potential recipients are unable to 
     utilize effectively such detection and interdiction 
     assistance because they lack the basic military structures to 
     employ it. We require the Administration to outline for 
     Congress the rationale behind the decision not to invoke the 
     25 percent requirement clause. Through this reporting 
     requirement, we are seeking to ensure that Congress remains 
     an active participant in important decisions on foreign 
     military financing.
       I am confident that the ongoing reorganization of the arms 
     control and non-proliferation bureaus, under the direction of 
     Under Secretary Bob Joseph, provides us with an excellent 
     opportunity to reshape, refocus and reinvigorate the State 
     Department's non-proliferation mission. The Lugar-Obama 
     legislation is intended to assist in the transformation of 
     the Department's efforts.
       The U.S. response to conventional weapons threats and the 
     lack of focus on WMD detection and interdiction assistance 
     must be rectified if we are to provide a full and complete 
     defense for the American people. We look forward to working 
     closely with the Administration on these proposals and will 
     benefit from their recommendations on ways to perfect our 
     legislation. The Lugar-Obama bill is a critical step forward 
     in improving our ability to protect the United States and its 
     citizens.

                          ____________________