[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 138 (Wednesday, October 26, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H9240-H9246]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2005
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass
the Senate bill (S. 1713) to make amendments to the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 related to International Space Station
payments, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
S. 1713
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nonproliferation
Amendments Act of 2005''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence's most recent
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December
2003, states ``Russian entities during the reporting period
continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related
goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran,
India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining
technology and materials from Russian entities helped
accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and
continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian
efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-
sufficiency in missile production.''
(2) Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in testimony before the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on February
16, 2005, that ``Tehran probably will have the ability to
produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade''.
(3) Iran has--
(A) failed to act in accordance with the Agreement Between
Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June
19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards
Agreement'');
(B) acted in a manner inconsistent with the Protocol
Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards, signed at Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly
referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'');
(C) acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and
entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the
``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''); and
(D) resumed uranium conversion activities, thus ending the
confidence building measures it adopted in its November 2003
agreement with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany.
(4) On September 24, 2005, the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally declared
that Iranian actions constituted noncompliance with its
nuclear safeguards obligations, and that Iran's history of
concealment of its nuclear activities has given rise to
questions that are within the purview of the United Nations
Security Council.
(5) The executive branch has on multiple occasions used the
authority provided under section 3 of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) to impose sanctions on entities that have engaged
in activities in violation of restrictions in the Act
relating to--
(A) the export of equipment and technology controlled under
multilateral export control lists, including under the
Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile
Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement or otherwise having the potential to
make a material contribution to the development of weapons of
mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missile systems to
Iran; and
(B) the export of other items to Iran with the potential of
making a material contribution to Iran's weapons of mass
destruction programs or on United States national control
lists for reasons related to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or missiles.
(6) The executive branch has never made a determination
pursuant to section 6(b) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000 that--
(A) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian
Federation to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of
mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering
such weapons;
(B) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the
law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and
intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated
and continues to demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek
out and prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and
technology that could make a material contribution to the
development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or
of ballistic or cruise missile systems; and
(C) no entity under the jurisdiction or control of the
Government of the Russian Federation, has, during the 1-year
period prior to the date of the determination pursuant to
section 6(b) of such Act, made transfers to Iran reportable
under section 2(a) of the Act.
(7) On June 29, 2005, President George W. Bush issued
Executive Order 13382 blocking property of weapons of mass
destruction proliferators and their supporters, and used the
authority of such order against 4 Iranian entities, Aerospace
Industries Organization, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group,
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, and the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, that have engaged, or attempted to
engage, in activities or transactions that have materially
contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their
means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering
such weapons), including efforts to manufacture, acquire,
possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items.
SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000
RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
PAYMENTS.
(a) Treatment of Certain Payments.--Section 7(1)(B) of the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by striking the period at the end and inserting a
comma; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``except that such term does not mean payments in cash or in
kind made or to be made by the United States Government prior
to January 1, 2012, for work to be performed or services to
be rendered prior to that date necessary to meet United
States obligations under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation
on the Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed
at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March
[[Page H9241]]
27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of
understanding, or contract related thereto.''.
(b) Exception.--Section 6(h) of the Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended by inserting after ``extraordinary payments in
connection with the International Space Station'' the
following: ``, or any other payments in connection with the
International Space Station,''.
(c) Reporting Requirements.--Section 6 of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(i) Report on Certain Payments Related to International
Space Station.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall, together with each
report submitted under section 2(a), submit to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives a
report that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom
the United States Government has, since the date of the
enactment of the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of
2005, made a payment in cash or in kind for work to be
performed or services to be rendered under the Agreement
Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998,
and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol,
agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related
thereto.
``(2) Content.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include--
``(A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each
entity or person identified in the report; and
``(B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of
the President that the payment was not prejudicial to the
achievement of the objectives of the United States Government
to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise missile
systems in Iran and other countries that have repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism, as
determined by the Secretary of State under section 620A(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)),
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''.
SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000
TO MAKE SUCH ACT APPLICABLE TO IRAN AND SYRIA.
(a) Reports on Proliferation Relating to Iran or Syria.--
Section 2 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public
Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``TO IRAN'' and inserting
``RELATING TO IRAN AND SYRIA''; and
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(i) by inserting ``or acquired from'' after ``transferred
to''; and
(ii) by inserting after ``Iran'' the following: ``, or on
or after January 1, 2005, transferred to or acquired from
Syria''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``Iran'' the
following: ``or Syria, as the case may be,''.
(b) Determination Exempting Foreign Persons From Certain
Measures.--Section 5(a) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``transfer to Iran'' and
inserting ``transfer to or acquire from Iran or Syria, as the
case may be,''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Iran's efforts'' and
inserting ``the efforts of Iran or Syria, as the case may
be,''.
(c) Restriction on Extraordinary Payments in Connection
With the International Space Station.--Section 6(b) of the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``to Iran'' and inserting
``Relating to Iran and Syria'';
(2) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``to Iran'' each
place it appears and inserting ``to or from Iran and Syria'';
and
(3) in paragraph (3), by striking ``to Iran'' and inserting
``to or from Iran or Syria''.
(d) Definitions.--Section 7(2) of the Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C) to read as follows:
``(C) any foreign government, including any foreign
governmental entity; and''; and
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``subparagraph (B) or
(C)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),
including any entity in which any entity described in any
such subparagraph owns a controlling interest''.
(e) Short Title.--
(1) Amendment.--Section 1 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act
of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
by striking ``Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000'' and
inserting ``Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act''.
(2) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation,
document, or other record of the United States to the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 shall be deemed to be a
reference to the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos) each will control 20 minutes.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I request the time in opposition if neither
gentleman is opposed to the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos) opposed to the bill?
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, no, I am not. I am supporting the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 1 of rule XV, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul) will control 20 minutes in opposition.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
General Leave
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material on S. 1713, the bill
under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Lantos) and ask unanimous consent that he control
that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and, of
course, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for the leadership that
has been demonstrated in getting this legislation to the floor.
One of America's challenges as we seek global security and stability
is stopping the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies.
Several years ago, we enacted the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000
to give the United States several tools in our fight against
proliferation to Iran, one of which was a restriction on U.S.-Russian
space cooperation. As a member of both the Committee on International
Relations and the Committee on Science, I was deeply involved in that
aspect of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
While many of the INA's tools have helped and should be continued,
the limitation on space cooperation has not been effective and is now
counterproductive. So, today, we have an opportunity to both correct
and strengthen that legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the amended version of
Senate bill 1713. First and foremost, the bill strengthens the tools
available to fight proliferation to, and from, Iran. This bill also
provides urgently needed relief for NASA so that the United States can
maintain a continued presence on the International Space Station and
enables cost-effective commercial partnerships to support the Space
Station. This latter benefit also strengthens non-proliferation,
because over the past decade we have learned that commercial ties
between the United States and Russian aerospace companies have been an
effective tool against proliferation. We need to employ such carrots
along with our non-proliferation sticks.
The changes put in place by S. 1713 will prevent a major setback for
America's space program, and that is one of the most important things
we are talking about today. It will prevent this setback by ensuring a
continued and uninterrupted presence, an American presence, on the
International Space Station.
Cooperation with Russia, just as similar cooperation with Russia by
the State of Israel in terms of space policy, will help us achieve
America's space goals while maintaining our commitment to non-
proliferation.
This bill needs to be passed. There is a time element here, and I
would like to thank all those who have been involved in trying to get
this legislation to the floor.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in opposition to the bill, but I want to make it very clear
that the portion of the bill that the gentleman from California was
speaking about I strongly endorsed. Matter of fact, I had a similar
bill that would have made the same corrections, but I would like to
make two points about this portion of the bill.
[[Page H9242]]
The one is that the corrections were necessary because we had placed
sanctions on Iran, and there was an unintended consequence. It actually
harmed NASA and harmed our relationships with Russia. This is making a
correction and I think that is good, and I strongly support that part
of the bill.
{time} 1845
But it goes to show that sanctions per se are not necessarily good.
We might just use as an example not having sanctions on a country like
China. We do better talking with and getting along with China as we
become trading partners rather than adversaries. So even countries that
seem to be adversarial, there are some downsides to putting on
sanctions.
Actually, the portion of the bill that I rise in objection to is the
portion that was amended dealing with Syria. I consider this a
significant change in our law. There has been very little discussion on
this. This makes the bill quite different from the Senate bill. But
once again, I think it is doing things that could come back to haunt
us, and that is expanding our authority and the President's authority
to place sanctions on Syria, of course always with good intentions; but
too often bad things can happen.
In 1998, a bill came up on the suspension calendar. It was considered
noncontroversial and was called the Iraq Liberation Act. It passed
overwhelmingly, but at that particular time, I took the time in
opposition to point out that there could be some unintended, or maybe
some intended, consequences that at that time the Congress was not
admitting to, and that it could lead to war. And, of course, that was
the first stepping stone to the current war that we are in.
Although this particular bill is not nearly as strong as what the
Iraq Liberation Act was, this nevertheless is a step as far as I am
concerned in the wrong direction.
The basic thing that happens here is we are expanding tremendously
the power to place sanctions on Syria, and this comes in light of the
publication of the U.N. investigation on Hariri's murder, and there is
a tremendous move right now to move on to the next regime change in the
Middle East. To me, I believe we are overstepping our bounds and
looking for more trouble.
We have essentially zero right to decide who should head foreign
states. Once we decide that we know what is best for foreign countries
and we can actually pick a head of state, I think it leads to trouble.
I could give Members every bit of reason why we ought to change the
King of Saudi Arabia, as we should change the King of Syria; and yet
Saudi Arabia gets a lot of support from us.
There was a recent report in a newspaper today, whether it is factual
or not it is still frightening, it said that the administration was
actually putting feelers out and asking Israel and Italy to nominate a
replacement for Assad. This means we are moving in that direction.
One of the reasons we are supposed to be doing this and looking
closely to Syria is they present a destabilizing element in the Middle
East. That in itself is stretching it. They are struggling to stabilize
and survive with the pounding they are getting internationally. We
forget that Syria actually sent troops into the first Persian Gulf war
dealing with Kuwait. But those kinds of things are easily forgotten.
The truth is the Mehlis Report is rather vague. There is no way it
ties it to Assad. There is no proof of that whatsoever. As a matter of
fact, Der Spiegel, a German magazine, reported today that the most
important information that the Mehlis Report cites comes from an
informer who was a convicted swindler and felon. That is one of the
sources of the information they are using to try to tie this into
Syria.
If you want to talk about destabilization of a region, all we have to
do is look at 150,000 troops in a country 6,000 miles from our borders.
If we talk about the responsibility of somebody being assassinated, we
might ask the question how many dozens of Iraqi administrators have
been assassinated in Iraq since we have been in charge. So there are
two different ways we can look at that. My deep concern is that we are
moving in the direction of expanding our presence and expanding the war
in that region.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. Five years ago,
Congress approved far-reaching legislation to stop the flow of nuclear
missiles and other sensitive technology to the ayatollahs of terror in
Tehran. By a unanimous vote, Congress commanded that those who aid in
the development of Iran's destabilizing nuclear and missile programs be
exposed and sanctioned.
The need for the Iran Nonproliferation Act is stronger today than it
was 5 years ago. The Iranian regime continues to seek aggressively a
nuclear weapons capability by exploiting allegedly peaceful nuclear
facilities to produce nuclear weapons materials. Iran is also
developing long-range missile systems capable of destabilizing the
entire Middle East and beyond. The Iranians are accomplishing this task
with the active assistance of Russia and other irresponsible actors on
the international scene.
Fortunately, Mr. Speaker, in large part due to the farsighted
initiatives such as the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the world no longer
trusts Tehran. Just this past month, the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna voted to find Iran in
violation of its nuclear safeguards obligations. And absent any
dramatic turnaround by Iran, the United States must and will demand
that Iran's violations be reported to the U.N. Security Council at the
next meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency this coming
November.
The legislation before us today is designed to preserve the core of
the Iran Nonproliferation Act while allowing for continued cooperation
with the Russians in support of our national space program.
It is unfortunate, Mr. Speaker, that this legislation is necessary. I
wish that the Russians had ceased their missile-related cooperation
with the Iranians so Congress would not be forced to carve out this new
exception. Moscow's deliberate decision to flaunt international norms
on weapons of mass destruction just shows how far away the Russian
regime is from being a responsible international actor.
But we are compelled to pass this legislation because the United
States needs to continue paying Russia for rides for American
astronauts to the International Space Station and for other space
services. Because the President cannot certify that Russia has ended it
missile cooperation with Iran, and with the space shuttle still
experiencing difficulties in its return to service, this exemption has
proved necessary.
But, Mr. Speaker, at the end of the day, the Iran Nonproliferation
Act is emerging even stronger than before. My good friend, the chairman
of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and I made changes to the bill which will focus
even greater attention on Russia's destabilizing cooperation with Iran.
The Hyde-Lantos provisions will make governments, not just individuals
and business entities, newly vulnerable to sanctions for trade in
weapons of mass destruction with the Iranian regime. It will also help
ensure that Iran does not spread dangerous technology in the future.
Our bill also applies the provision of the Iran Nonproliferation Act
for the first time to the authoritarian regime in Damascus. This action
will help ensure that whatever happens to the regime of Bashir Assad in
the near term as it faces international condemnation richly deserved
for its direct complicity in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the
Prime Minister of neighboring Lebanon, it cannot develop weapons of
mass destruction.
Mr. Speaker, the leadership cabals in both Tehran and Damascus are
aggressively seeking to develop such weapons that would threaten the
entire Middle East and the region beyond. Our legislation marks an
important step in focusing greater attention on these emerging threats
while preserving key aspects of our own space program. I urge all of my
colleagues to support this most important and urgent piece of
legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
[[Page H9243]]
Texas (Mr. DeLay), a Member whose leadership has been a major factor in
the passage of so much historic legislative reform that has gone
through this body.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California, and I
appreciate the work that you all have done. I rise in strong support of
this legislation and also to commend everyone on both sides of the
aisle and both sides of the Capitol who helped develop this legislation
in the recent months.
The legislation before us will correct an unintended consequence of
the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Under that 2000 act passed by a
Republican Congress and signed into law by President Clinton, the
United States will soon find itself unable to manage many of its
investments in space and unable to continue to develop and conduct
vital scientific experiments aboard the International Space Station.
Under that 2000 act, by next April, NASA would be severely limited in
its ability to maintain an American scientific crew on the ISS, let
alone monitor the billions of dollars in investments that the American
people have made in the program.
The bill before us will carve out an exemption in the 2000 act for
NASA's relationships with Russian companies that build and maintain the
vehicles and machinery that provide the services that help us in our
partnership with them on the International Space Station. Among the
most critical of these relationships are those that allow American
astronauts access to the Russian Soyuz, a crew rescue vehicle, docking
components for our own spacecraft, and other critical equipment and
services.
The United States' permanent presence in space today depends on our
ongoing partnership with the Russian Federal Space Agency and other
international partners. The President's new vision for space
exploration depends on America's investment and involvement in the ISS
so that we can develop the science necessary to prepare our astronauts
for long-term exposure to microgravity and radiation.
The experiments planned in coming years aboard the ISS can only be
conducted in space, and NASA's future missions to the Moon and Mars
depend on those experiments. Meanwhile, the potential gap between the
retirement of the space shuttle and the deployment of NASA's new crew
exploration vehicle would, without this legislation, leave the United
States without continual access to space at a time at the end of this
decade when we need it the most.
This bill ensures NASA has the flexibility it needs to meet America's
challenges in space. I urge all Members to support it.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to reiterate that the portion of the bill that deals with our
ability to pursue our space program I strongly endorse. It is the
portion that deals with Syria that was added on at the last minute that
I am concerned about.
I want to say that portion of the bill, I believe, further
destabilizes the Middle East and we should move with great caution. We
have been warned. We should be prepared for a broader war in the Middle
East as plans are being laid for the next U.S.-led regime change in
Syria.
A U.N. report of the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri elicited
this comment from a senior U.S. policy maker: ``Out of a tragedy comes
an extraordinary strategic opportunity.'' This statement reflects the
continued neoconservative, Machiavellian influence on our foreign
policy.
{time} 1900
The ``opportunity'' refers to the long-held neoconservative plan for
regime change in Syria, similar to what was carried out in Iraq.
This plan for remaking the Middle East has been around for a long
time. Just as 9/11 served the interests of those who longed for changes
in Iraq, the sensationalism surrounding Hariri's death is being used to
advance plans to remove Assad.
Congress already has assisted these plans by authorizing the
sanctions placed on Syria last year. Harmful sanctions, as applied to
Iraq in the 1990s, inevitably represent a major step toward war since
they bring havoc to so many innocent people. Syria already has been
charged with developing weapons of mass destruction based on no more
evidence than was available when Iraq was similarly charged.
Syria has been condemned for not securing its borders by the same
U.S. leaders who cannot secure our own borders. Syria was castigated
for placing its troops in Lebanon, a neighboring country, although such
action was invited by an elected government and encouraged by the
United States. The Syrian occupation of Lebanon elicited no suicide
terrorist attacks, as was suffered by Western occupiers.
Condemning Syria for having troops in Lebanon seems strange
considering most of the world sees our 150,000 troops in Iraq as
unwarranted foreign intervention. Syrian troops were far more welcome
in Lebanon.
Secretary Rice likewise sees the problem in Syria that we helped to
create as an opportunity to advance our Middle Eastern agenda. In
recent testimony she stated that it was always the administration's
intent to redesign the greater Middle East, and Iraq was only part of
that plan. And once again we have been told that all options are still
on the table for dealing with Syria, including war.
The statement that should scare all Americans and the world is the
assurance by Secretary Rice that the President needs no additional
authority from Congress to attack Syria. She argues that authority
already has been granted by the resolutions on 9/11 and Iraq. This is
not true, but if Congress remains passive to the powers assumed by the
executive branch, it will not matter. As the war spreads, the only role
for the Congress will be to provide funding lest they be criticized for
not supporting the troops. In the meantime, the Constitution and our
liberties here at home will be further eroded as more Americans die.
This escalation of conflict with Syria comes as a result of the U.N.
report concerning Hariri's death. When we need an excuse for our
actions, it is always nice to rely on the organization our
administration routinely condemns, one that brought us the multi-
million-dollar oil-for-food scandal and the sexual crimes by U.N.
representatives.
It is easy to ignore the fact that the report did not implicate
Assad, who is targeted for the next regime change. The U.N. once
limited itself to disputes between nations; yet now it assumes the
U.N., like the United States, has a legal and moral right to inject
itself into the internal policies of sovereign nations. Yet what is the
source of this presumed wisdom? Where is the moral imperative that
allows us to become the judge and jury of a domestic murder in a
country 6,000 miles from our shores?
Moral, constitutional, and legal arguments for a less aggressive
foreign policy receives little attention in Washington, but the law of
unintended consequences serves as a thorough teacher for the slow
learners and the morally impaired.
Is Iraq not yet a headache for the proponents of the shock and awe
policy? Are 2,000 lives lost not enough to get their attention? How
many hundreds of billions of dollars must be drained from our economy
before it is noticed? Is it still plausible that deficits do not
matter? Is the apparent victory for Iran in the Shiite theocracy we
have created in Iraq not yet seen as a disturbing consequence of the
ill-fated Iraq regime change effort? When we have our way with the next
election in Lebanon and Hezbollah becomes a governing party, what do we
do then?
If our effort to destabilize Syria is no more successful than our
efforts in Iraq, then what? If destabilizing Syria leads to the same in
Iran, what are our options? If we cannot leave now, we will surely not
leave then. We will be told we must stay to honor the fallen to prove
the cause was just.
We should remember Ronald Reagan's admonition regarding this area of
the world. Ronald Reagan reflected on Lebanon in his memoirs,
describing the Middle East as a ``jungle'' and Middle Eastern politics
as ``irrational.'' It forced him to rethink his policy in the region.
It is time we do some rethinking as well.
This bill today does not help.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to be equally divided
between the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and the gentleman
from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), and I ask
[[Page H9244]]
unanimous consent that they be allowed to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Poe). Is there objection to the request
of the gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Sherman), a distinguished member of the Committee on
International Relations.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on
International Relations, and a member of the Committee on Science, and
as a member of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, and, in fact,
the ranking member of International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
Subcommittee, I am well aware of the conflict of two goals of the
Federal Government. One of those is to meet our obligations to the
international space station. The other is to use every device possible
to try to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to try to
prevent Russia from assisting in that process.
For me, these goals are not of equal weight. The supreme goal and
objective and obligation of the Federal Government is to protect our
people. Iranian nuclear weapons could be smuggled into our cities, and
I would say that we should adopt no legislation and leave on the books
current law that puts one objective, and that is limiting Iranian
nuclear weapons, as the sole objective that is embodied in our
statutes.
But, in fact, some balance is going to be struck, and it is not going
to be the overwhelming balance that I would strike, a balance in favor
of doing everything possible to limit Iranian nuclear weapons
development and giving far less weight to meeting our international
space station obligations.
I want to take this opportunity to commend the ranking member and the
chairman of the Committee on International Relations and of the
Committee on Science and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Rohrabacher) for doing a very good job of trying to narrowly tailor
this legislation, to try to balance those two goals in not the way I
would, but in a way that I have to concede is reasonable. And for that
reason I will not ask for a recorded vote on this bill. I recognize
that if this bill does not pass in this form, it is as likely to get
worse as it is to get better because, in fact, my colleagues have
labored very effectively and have taken some input from me to create a
bill which is tailored to the twin objectives.
Now, I would hope the day would come when the President of the United
States could certify to this Nation that Russia is doing everything
possible to help us prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and in
any case was not helping Iran to develop those terrible weapons. But
until that day comes, present law says that we cannot contract with
agencies of the Russian Government space program no matter what for
various space-related activities.
As I understand this bill in its final revised form, and I see most
of the principal authors of the amendment to it here on the floor, and
I know the rest will correct the record tomorrow if I misstate
anything, but I would yield to anyone here to correct me if I am wrong,
the bill in its present form creates a very limited exception to
present law. It allows NASA to contract with Russian Government space
agencies only when those agencies are the only available seller of
goods and services necessary to meet our obligations to the
international space station.
There are two important aspects of that understanding. One is the
language that I said, the only available seller of essential goods and
services. That is to say this bill does not authorize us to turn a
blind eye to Russian space agency cooperation with the nuclear plans of
Tehran just because the Russian space agency is the cheapest or the
most convenient or a few days faster. It allows us to ignore those
important Iran nonproliferation goals only when it is absolutely
necessary and only when necessary to meet our own obligations to the
space station, not obligations of other countries.
To reiterate, not only is this bill limited to situations where it is
necessary, not merely convenient, for us to contract with the Russian
space agency, but it is also a requirement that we are meeting our
obligations to the international space station, not a circumstance when
we are paying the Russians to meet their own obligations or the
obligations of some other country.
So I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. And to put it in
context, I think this bill does a good job of striking what is the best
balance we are likely to see in this legislative process between our
goals.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Boehlert), a Member who was both the senior member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as serving as
chairman of the Committee on Science.
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this amended
version of S. 1713.
Let me start by thanking the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) for working so cooperatively
with us for so long on this issue, which is of great concern to both of
our committees over which both of our committees have jurisdiction. I
also want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert), the
chairman of our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, who, as always, has
helped to keep our eye on the ball and has pressed to make sure we got
this done. The gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the
gentleman from California's (Mr. Calvert) predecessor, who serves on
both committees, played a similarly dogged role. And if one has been
exposed to the Rohrabacher machine, they know he is persistent. All of
us have cosponsored the bill before us today.
Finally, I want to thank the administration, including NASA and the
State Department and the National Security Council, for being willing
to consider a variety of approaches, and I want to thank the gentleman
from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon), my ranking Democrat on the Committee on
Science, for being a thoughtful participant as we examined different
ways to deal with this issue.
The puzzle we had to solve with dealing with the Iran
Nonproliferation Act was how to enable the U.S. to continue to man the
international space station without reducing our vigilance with regard
to nonproliferation. I have been clear all along that, for me,
maintaining nonproliferation is a far more important goal than is
continuing to have Americans aboard the space station.
But from the point of view of space policy, we had another goal here,
too. We wanted to make sure that Russia, or any other foreign nation,
could not bring our space program to a screeching halt or whatever the
equivalent would be in the vacuum of space. Therefore, we wanted to try
to write this bill in a way that would create an incentive for NASA to
contract with new suppliers that would not be dependent on foreign
technology to get U.S. personnel or supplies to and from the Space
Station.
{time} 1915
These are all tough goals, goals that have had their critics, goals
that create winners and losers, goals that seek to balance competing
national needs. And I think with this version of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, we have come as close as anyone possibly could to
accomplishing our goals.
The bill enables the U.S. to continue to use the International Space
Station unimpeded. The bill, in effect, allows the status quo to
continue until 2012, when presumably the U.S. will have access to a new
crew exploration vehicle to carry astronauts and commercial firms to
move cargo. We will see if the budget enables that to actually happen
on that schedule, but it is a plausible position.
The bill encourages NASA to find commercial firms that are not
dependent on the Russians to carry cargo in the future by setting a
specific end date for our current relationship with the Russians. And
the bill minimizes the harm to the nonproliferation regime by requiring
the act to be reviewed again in 2012, by making it clear that no
individual entity that violates the act can receive U.S. money and by
adding Syria to the countries listed in the act, and, finally, by
requiring clear reporting of payments under the act.
[[Page H9245]]
The Senate deserves credit for moving all parties toward compromise;
and our version, I would say, perfects that compromise by adding Syria
and by making it clear that we have a true deadline. Under our bill, no
funds can be used in violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act after
2012, even if the funds are made available before 2012 and even if they
are made available pursuant to an agreement that existed before that
date.
So I think we are where we have to be on this bill in order that we
are going to protect the space program while protecting the world from
nuclear weapons. These issues are never easy and nonproliferation
necessarily involves a lot of guesswork about what is and what is not
working; but this is a responsible, thoughtful compromise.
In closing, let me again thank the Members of the Committee on
International Relations and their staff, particularly Walker Roberts,
for working so cooperatively with us and for continuing to push for
tighter, but reasonable, language.
I want to thank our staff on the Committee on Science, particularly
Bill Adkins, for ensuring that we always took into account all the
implications of the proposed language.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, which
incorporates a truly thoughtful and effective compromise.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding back my time, I want to pay
public tribute to two outstanding members of our staff, David
Abramowitz and David Fite, who did extraordinary work on this very
complex piece of legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I have no additional requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
First of all, thank you very much to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Lantos) and all those on the other side of the aisle and the
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), who has done such great work
in our committee and on issues dealing with Iran and trying to secure
the safety of our country as well as the Middle East. The gentleman has
my respect; and as he knows, he has had my cooperation in the past, and
we appreciate his cooperation on this effort as well.
This legislation needed to come to the floor, and we needed that type
of bipartisan cooperation as well as cooperation with the Members on
this side of the aisle and the hard work of the staff of both the
Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Science to
ensure that we were able to get this legislation passed in time to
prevent what would have been an embarrassment, a major embarrassment,
to the United States of America, which would have done irreparable
damage to our credibility.
Our space program would have been humiliated by the elimination of
America's presence on the International Space Station, having an
International Space Station, which we paid for, then to be occupied and
controlled by Russians. We have, by this effort today, and by this
cooperation, prevented that shortcoming, that humiliation from
happening.
But let me note, it was never the intent of the authors of this part
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act that we should ever come to a crisis
like this. I can say that with certainty, because I was the one who was
involved with writing this portion of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. I
felt at that time we should have taken care of this issue a long time
ago with carrots rather than sticks.
I went to both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration
years ago to ask them to offer Russia an alternative to being involved
with Iran in terms of building nuclear facilities. The Clinton
administration did not act and the Bush administration did not act to
prevent this crisis that we are averting right now at the last minute
from happening.
Thus, for the record, let us note that, yes, we have averted a
crisis; but a long time ago, positive and responsible actions by either
the Clinton administration or the Bush administration could have
prevented this from happening in a most important way.
Let me note, cooperation with Russia in the space program is not
inherently bad. It is something that is inherently good. It places the
Russian scientists working on positive programs such as cooperation
with America's space program. Israel itself is very involved with the
Russians in their space program. Russian rockets launch Israeli
satellites. Thus, we know that it is not inherently tied to Iran, the
cooperation with Russia in space matters.
But let us make sure that by passing this today we in no way are
belittling the argument about the importance of dealing with Iran's
development of nuclear weapons. This should be of concern to each and
every one of us, and passage of this bill does not lessen that concern
whatsoever.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hyde-Lantos
amendments to S. 1713, a bill passed by the Senate on September 21,
2005 amending the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to authorize new
payments to Russia in support of the international space station. The
Hyde-Lantos amendments, which have been authored on a bipartisan basis,
would provide a substitute text for the Senate bill.
The Senate bill is defective in significant respects. Chief among
these would be a reduction in United States leverage over Russian
technology transfers to Iran's weapons programs. The Hyde-Lantos
substitute text would remedy this and other deficiencies in the Senate
bill by more carefully balancing space cooperation interests with our
nonproliferation interests.
In particular, the substitute text would permit NASA to make payments
to Russia for the next six years, up to January 1, 2012, as provided in
the Senate version. But, it would eliminate the ambiguity in the Senate
version, whereby payments and services might be rendered well beyond
January 1, 2012. Instead, the substitute text would clearly establish
that no payments or services may take place after that date unless
Congress provides additional authority through new legislation or the
Executive Branch makes the determination required under existing law
concerning an end to Russia's support for Iran's weapons programs.
During my discussion of the substitute text with NASA Administrator
Griffin, he expressed support for our version of the bill provided one
small concern could be resolved. His concern centered on a
parenthetical expression, which he felt might constrain negotiation of
arrangements with Russia before new payments could commence. I agreed
to strike the relevant language on the express understanding, which Mr.
Griffin accepted, that, while the substitute text as revised would
permit any necessary arrangement for payments in order to fulfill
existing United States obligations under the space station agreement,
it would not permit payments for new obligations. During consideration
of the bill a question arose concerning whether this limitation would
restrict NASA's ability to purchase international space station re-
supply services from U.S. companies using Russian content, should NASA
conclude that this is necessary to meet U.S. obligations under the
space station agreement. In my opinion, this would not be the case,
assuming the bona fides of the Russian suppliers.
In addition, the substitute text makes three changes to the
underlying law, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. First, the Act
would henceforth be applicable to Syria, as well as to Iran. Second,
the Act would cover weapons technology exported to other countries by
Iran and Syria (as well as weapons technology imported by them). Third,
``foreign persons'' would hereafter be defined to include foreign
governmental entities, in addition to individuals and business
organizations.
I consider these changes to the underlying law to be both necessary
and timely in light of two recent developments. The first concerns
charges by the United Kingdom that either Iran, or Iranian-backed
Hezbollah, is supplying explosives technology used by insurgents
against coalition forces in Iraq. The second is the very troubling UN
report implicating Syria in the February 14th massive bombing
assassination in Beirut of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-
Hariri.
In light of NASA's support and the enhancements to United States
nonproliferation interests we have made to the bill, I am optimistic
that the Senate will have little difficulty agreeing to this substitute
text.
Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1713, as amended,
which strengthens the Nation's nonproliferation principles and
objectives while allowing NASA to meet its operational and programmatic
needs with regard to the International Space Station (ISS), as called
for in the President's Vision for Space Exploration. I am pleased to be
a cosponsor of such important legislation with my colleagues and
friends, Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos, Chairman Boehlert, and
Congressman Rohrabacher. This amendment is timely. NASA must revise its
agreement and contractual arrangements with the Russian Federal Space
Agency quickly in order to ensure uninterrupted training beyond October
2005. The next ISS crew is scheduled
[[Page H9246]]
to fly on the Russian Soyuz in April 2006. If this amendment is not
enacted, INA restrictions will prevent a continued presence of U.S.
crew onboard the ISS and limit U.S. presence onboard the ISS to Space
Shuttle visits. We could lose our leadership role on the International
Space Station.
I know this amendment has been negotiated and discussed by many of my
colleagues, who recognize the extreme importance of passing a measure
which allows NASA to continue with its current role on the Space
Station. I am a sponsor of this legislation and, at the same time, I
have been concerned that we not be so restrictive on NASA to prevent
them from doing their mission. S. 1713 as amended grants NASA the
authority to procure urgent required goods and services from Russia,
including crew rescue, to allow continuing ISS operations in the most
safe and effective way possible. Some of these goods and services will
be required from 2012 to the end of the program's operation. Moreover,
ISS is an operational program that continues to evolve, requiring
enough flexibility to deal with emerging issues over time.
Consequently, Congress may need to address this issue again at a later
date. We should be watchful as we move forward that we are able to
maintain the ISS and to retain our leadership role.
As the Chairman of the House Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I am
mindful of the importance of a continued American presence in space.
This amendment moves in the right direction by supporting those Russian
entities which are compliant, while helping to solve near-term problems
for NASA and its international partners.
Without legislative action, NASA will have limited access to the ISS
until the U.S. Crew Exploration Vehicle is ready to be deployed. I urge
my colleagues to pass S. 1713 as amended as expeditiously as possible.
I also salute my colleagues for bringing this important legislation to
the floor in such a timely manner and plan to offer my support as we
pass this legislation today in the House of Representatives.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in strong support of
the amendment offered by Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos.
Iran and Syria remain threats to the security and stability of the
Middle East and the world whether it is from their continued support of
terrorists to their desire to obtain unconventional weapons.
Iran continues to thumb its nose to the IAEA and the international
community on its desire to obtain nuclear weapons.
According to the British, Iran is providing weapons to terrorists
attacking coalition troops and working hard to destabilize Iraq even
though it is not in the region's interests.
Syria keeps its border with Iraq open thus allowing foreign fighters
to illegally enter Iraq and carry out terrorists plots.
These terrorists are working against the Iraqi people's quest for
freedom and democracy.
Iran is not the only neighbor Syria has been working hard to
destabilize.
Last week, the UN released the findings of its investigation into the
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and I
don't think any of us in this House were surprised to see that they
pointed a finger at the regime of Syria's President Bashar Assad.
Before his death the former prime minister had become one of the most
vocal opponents of the Syrian occupation.
This report names high level Syrian and Lebanese government officials
who plotted to assassinate this outspoken leader.
I hope that our actions today will show President Assad that our
resolve is strong.
Mr. Speaker, Syria must change its ways and begin to contribute to
international peace and security rather than undermine it.
I urge all my colleagues to support this important amendment.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Poe). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) that the
House suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill, S. 1713, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate bill, as amended, was
passed.
The title of the Senate bill was amended so as to read: ``An Act to
make amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 related to
International Space Station payments, and for other purposes.''.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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