[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 131 (Monday, October 17, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11433-S11436]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN:
  S. 1874. A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify 
jurisdiction of Federal Courts over a tort action brought by an alien, 
and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation 
that clarifies the meaning and scope of the Alien Tort Statute.
  This 200-year-old law has spawned dozens of legal cases involving 
U.S. multinational companies, human rights groups, foreign plaintiffs, 
the State Department, and millions of dollars in litigation costs. 
Numerous companies in California are in the midst of these lawsuits as 
defendants and it is my view that legislation can help refine and 
improve the law.
  Judges have grappled in interpreting and applying the statute for 
years now without a consensus view emerging. I think it would be fair 
to say that confusion reigns supreme when it comes to alien tort suits.
  Given this opaque legal picture, last summer the Supreme Court ruled 
on a case, Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, in an attempt to reconcile 
conflicting decisions from judges across the country.
  The Court's June 2004 ruling was notable, for embracing certain 
principles that will help guide the Judiciary branch on alien tort 
claim issues but for leaving many questions unanswered as well.
  It held that a substantive, legal basis exists for foreigners to sue 
U.S. individuals and corporations over alleged human rights violations 
occurring in overseas locations. The Court essentially affirmed that a 
limited, implicit sanction for courts exists to decide certain alien 
tort claims.
  At the same time, the opinion provided a wide berth for what the 
claims might actually be. The Court hedged on key issues, without 
clearly demarcating what suits ought to go forward under the statute 
and which ones should be summarily dismissed.
  In particular the ruling did not address: which international law 
claims by foreigners should be heard in a U.S. district court, and the 
standard of liability for U.S. companies facing these human rights 
charges.
  To clarify these areas, the Justices wrote that they would welcome 
``any congressional guidance'' on the breadth of the statute. During 
oral arguments a number of the Justices appeared to concur that a 
legislative approach would make sense. One Justice even commented that 
``I just wonder if it isn't wise to . . . let Congress have a look at 
this thing.''
  Those views were echoed by a Washington Post editorial that followed 
soon after. The paper stated that the alien tort law has ``formed the 
basis for litigation against U.S. companies involved with nefarious 
regimes abroad. And while horrid conduct by an American company ought 
to be, where proven, grounds for action in American courts, the 
parameters of such litigation are surely a legislative question, not 
one for the freewheeling discretion of judges. . . . But the court left 
open the possibility that at least some of these suits can proceed in 
the absence of further congressional action.''
  The Court's perspective, along with the Post commentary, indicates, 
at least to me, a sense of caution about imposing by judicial fiat 
action that is better left to consideration and refinement by the 
Congress.
  The Court's hesitation to legislate from the bench shifts the 
responsibility to this body, I believe, to pass legislation that 
settles on a reasonable legal means that plaintiffs and defendants 
alike can rely on to litigate their differences.
  I believe the measure we are introducing today accomplishes this 
basic and important goal.
  Right now, courts are essentially adrift in terms of being able to 
pinpoint the underlying meaning, scope and intent of this 200-year-old 
statute. In its entirety, it reads: ``The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.''
  The economy of words makes the law abstruse and subject to varying 
interpretation. And complex, lengthy and unnecessary litigation has 
burdened the courts as a result.
  This new bill will establish a fair, legal basis for filing suit 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). And it will have the added benefit 
of explicating the law's dual jurisdictional and substantive nature.
  The measure: specifies a legal standard convicting defendants of 
wrongdoing if they directly participate with specific intent to commit 
the alleged tort; codifies international claims under the Alien Tort 
law to include genocide, torture, slavery and slave trade, 
extrajudicial killing, and piracy; expands on existing statutory law, 
the Torture Victim Protection Act; states that Federal courts shall not 
proceed with tort claims when the President adequately certifies that 
such exercise of jurisdiction will have a negative impact on the 
foreign policy interests of the U.S.; maintains that every effort 
should be made to try these cases in the country of origin before 
granting jurisdiction in U.S. courts; invokes a 10-year statute of 
limitations on ATS charges filed against U.S. multinational companies; 
and disallows contingency fee arrangements for legal representatives of 
plaintiffs or defendants.
  The Supreme Court's delineation that the Alien Tort law is 
jurisdictional in one sense, but recognizes a restricted category of 
substantive claims encompassed by the law of nations, leaves many 
unresolved questions.
  The historical origins of the ATS, passed by the First Congress as 
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, suggest that certain offenses 
relevant to that period in American history--piracy, infringing the 
rights of ambassadors, and prevention of safe travel abroad--were meant 
to be prosecutable. But Justice Souter's Alvarez-Machain opinion notes 
that a slim legislative history of the statute makes it difficult to 
surmise the law's true intent.
  At the same time, Justice Souter opined: ``Still, the history does 
tend to support two propositions. First, there is every reason to 
suppose that the First Congress did not pass the ATS as a 
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a 
future Congress or state legislature that might, some day, authorize 
the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element 
of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners. The 
anxieties of the preconstitutional period cannot be ignored easily 
enough to think that the statute was not meant to have a practical 
effect. . . . The second inference to be drawn from the history is that 
Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively 
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.''
  The opinion ranges further, that, such a ``modest set of actions'' 
indeed applies to current times, not merely offenses grounded in law 
two hundred

[[Page S11434]]

years ago. The critical portion reads: ``Accordingly, we think courts 
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to 
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th century paradigms we have recognized.''
  I am uncomfortable with such a nebulous, open-ended legal approach 
permitting courts to entertain suits based on a ``norm of international 
character'' and ``specificity'' consistent with crimes of early 
American history. Adjudicating cases based on these broad historical 
and legal precepts is admirable. In practical terms it remains very 
difficult.
  The Congress ought to weigh in and play a constructive role. Without 
legislation, judges will continue to reach markedly different 
conclusions under the law, based on arbitrary interpretations of case-
specific facts and other considerations.
  Let's take the legal mystery out of the statute and what qualifies as 
an alien tort and replace it with something that is concrete and 
appropriate for the times.
  At the heart of this legislation is codifying a class of violations 
of international law that will discourage defendant companies from 
consorting with human rights violators in any respect. They will be 
held liable if they do so by a specific standard that judges whether 
they intentionally and directly caused certain violations of human 
rights.
  A plaintiff victim will be able to vindicate their rights by filing 
an express statutory cause of action based on a half dozen egregious 
wrongs. Regardless of the foreign policy and trade implications, 
defendant U.S. companies will be held fully accountable under the bill 
for bad corporate behavior in their overseas business operations.
  That is as it should be. Certain alien torts in violation of the law 
of nations ought to be cognizable and this legislation ensures that 
result. Moreover, the fact that specific crimes are made actionable and 
enforceable will aid human rights organizations in their fight to 
strengthen the deterrent effect of the law for potential violators.
  Regarding the defendant perspective, in one friend of the court brief 
submitted in the Alvarez Machain case, the argument was made that ``. . 
. companies face enormous uncertainty regarding the scope of potential 
claims under the statute. . . . Because ATS cases are based upon an 
implied cause of action without any clear standards of liability, there 
may be little companies can do to protect themselves against potential 
claims, short of simply ceasing to do business in the many nations 
whose human rights practices come up short against evolving Western 
ideals.''
  The business community ought to embrace this legislation precisely 
because it wipes away this uncertainty. The best way to encourage U.S. 
multinationals to invest abroad is: 1. by specifying a universe of the 
most egregious human rights violations that they may be held liable for 
and 2. offering a clear, understandable legal standard that judges 
their actions accordingly. This legislative measure tackles both issues 
head on.

  There are estimates that dozens of existing alien tort suits claim 
damages--collectively--in excess of $200 billion dollars. That's an 
extraordinary sum that rightly concerns the U.S. business community, 
particularly given numerous inconsistent federal courts verdicts handed 
down in the past two decades.
  This legislation deters private plaintiffs from filing sweeping and 
specious claims simply because a corporation has a U.S. legal nexus and 
deep pockets. Yet, it expands the basis for foreign plaintiffs pursuing 
certain international law causes of action in federal court by 
codifying their rights in a judicious way.
  While some in the U.S. business community would prefer that the Alien 
Tort statute be deleted from the U.S. Code altogether, I would 
respectfully disagree. A fair compromise that balances the interests of 
U.S. companies and human rights organizations is what this legislation 
seeks to accomplish.
  The Congress has waded into this debate before, passing the Torture 
Victim Protection Act in 1991, and this new legislation contains many 
similar elements: a statute of limitations, a statutory exhaustion 
provision, and specifying torture and extrajudicial killing as within 
the adjudicatory discretion of a district court.
  There is precedent, then, for the Legislative branch acting to 
provide civil redress for victims of torture. Asserting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS, for torture and other jus 
cogen violations, has a firm footing in American jurisprudence.
  The legislative history of the TVPA is important because it spells 
out the constitutional grounds justifying that statutory law and this 
new legislation as well.
  The Senate Judiciary Committee report on the TVPA states as follows: 
``Under article III of the Constitution, the Federal judiciary has the 
power to adjudicate cases `arising under' the `law of the United 
States.' The Supreme Court has held that the law of the United States 
includes international law. . . . Congress's ability to enact this 
legislation also derives from article I, section 8 of the Constitution 
which authorizes Congress `to define and punish . . . Offenses against 
the Law of Nations.' ''
  Existing case law confirms the point that Congress has given the 
federal courts the power to interpret and apply international human 
rights law. The notable Paquete Habana decision states, in part, that 
``international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as 
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
their determination. . .  Congress, however, has not only expressed no 
disagreement with our view of the proper exercise of the judicial 
power, but has responded to its most notable instance by enacting 
legislation [the Torture Victim Protection Act] supplementing the 
judicial determination in some detail.''
  The view expressed in the Alvarez Machain case last year was much the 
same, that no development in the last two centuries has ``categorically 
precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of 
nations as an element of common law.''
  Different precedent, Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, also posits 
that civil liability should ensue from certain violations of 
international law, suggesting that the ``limits of section 1350's [the 
ATS] reach'' be defined by ``a handful of heinous actions--each of 
which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms.''
  This legislation fills that legal vessel with the most egregious 
crimes: genocide, torture, slavery and slave trading, extrajudicial 
killing, and piracy. These jus cogen offenses are singled out through 
1. stare decisis, 2. the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 
3. academic writings, 4. official annual human rights assessments from 
the State Department and 5. among the writings and publications of many 
human rights and international law advocacy groups.
  Congress is in the best position to make the determination of what 
falls within the ambit of the statute, not judges across America who 
lack expertise, time, and resources to assess what constitutes 
definable, specific, universal, and obligatory norms of international 
law. The bill, I would submit, represents a good faith effort in 
permitting these tortious acts, all firmly established and well defined 
in international law norms, to be prosecuted in U.S. district courts.
  I was interested to read the views last year of the head of the 
National Foreign Trade Council, William Reinsch, that ``these cases are 
going to end up in the Supreme Court . . . and the Court will over time 
end up defining what in its judgment constitutes the law of nations and 
what does not. But that seems to us a fairly circuitous way of doing 
things.'' I would concur, particularly since the Supreme Court's 
decision last year in the Alvarez Machain case did not clear up the 
inherent vagaries in the law.
  A significant provision in this legislation creates a standard of 
liability that requires plaintiffs to show that a defendant directly 
participated with specific intent in carrying out the alleged tort. In 
my view, we need to deter legal fishing expeditions, whereby plaintiffs 
come to the bar with flinty facts backing weak charges.

[[Page S11435]]

Their real intent, it seems, is to rely on an extensive legal discovery 
process to uncover matters that embarrass companies and delay their 
business plans.

  In the groundbreaking 1980 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala case, for example, 
the threshold requirement laid out was that the offense needed to be 
``clear and unambiguous'' to be viable under the statute. Succeeding 
cases have affirmed a standard essentially requiring proof of a 
defendant aiding and abetting the worst human rights violations. This 
bill replaces the current aiding and liability standard for good 
reason: these foreign-based claims demand a particularity of facts that 
is both strong and specific.
  I would submit that the existing ambiguous grant of jurisdiction 
needs more refinement to provide judges legal bright lines for deciding 
these cases. My bill offers precise, and fair, treatment for which 
cases get standing in a U.S. court.
  A common theme in dozens of cases alien tort cases is whether the 
facts and law combine to present a nonjusticiable political question. 
Each cause of action is obviously different, and whether the matter 
ought to be under the province of a different branch of government 
requires careful analysis.
  I would certainly agree that certain prudential doctrines, act of 
state, political question, foreign sovereign immunity, forum non 
conveniens, and considerations of comity among nations, at times can be 
appropriately invoked to limit jurisdiction.
  Part of that consideration can usefully come from statements of 
interest and certifications submitted by the Executive branch; for that 
reason, the legislation I'm offering preserves a suitable role for the 
Executive branch to weigh in. If a judge determines that a 
certification offered by the State Department adequately justifies that 
harm will come to U.S. foreign policy interests if an alien tort suit 
proceeds, then dismissal is warranted.
  In regards to restricting the statute of limitations to ten years, 
equitable tolling considerations should be explicitly considered in 
interpreting provisions in the legislation. There are numerous factors 
that give rise to equitable tolling and long-established judge-made 
doctrine in this area is not inconsistent with the goals of my bill.
  Complementary legislation which I raised earlier, the Torture Victim 
Protection Act, upholds the principle of equitable tolling. The 
Judiciary Committee report on that measure notes some common examples:
  ``The statute of limitation should be tolled during the time the 
defendant was absent from the United States or from any jurisdiction in 
which the same or a similar action arising from the same facts may be 
maintained by the plaintiff, provided that the remedy in that 
jurisdiction is adequate and available. Excluded also from calculation 
of the statute of limitations would be the period when a defendant has 
immunity from suit. The statute of limitations should also be tolled 
for the period of time in which the plaintiff is imprisoned or 
otherwise incapacitated.''
  I would submit that all of these listed circumstances, and others, 
are sufficient to suspend the running of the time under my legislation.
  Let me conclude by referring back to one of the Supreme Court's 
foundational points in the Alvarez-Machain case that ``despite 
considerable scholarly attention, it is fair to say that a consensus 
understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive.''
  The 33 words contained in the law remain a ``legal Lohengrin'' since 
``no one seems to know whence it came'' added a judge hearing a 
different case some years ago. As a result, costly, complex litigation 
proceeds forward across the country.
  Courts deserve guidance from Congress about how to treat and 
interpret the statute, particularly in light of the growing importance 
of international trade and commerce. In a major address Supreme Court 
Justice O'Connor recently observed that ``international law has emerged 
in ways that affect all courts, both here and abroad. The reason is 
globalization. Its importance should not be underestimated. Thirty 
percent or more of our gross domestic product is internationally 
derived.'' Yet these particular suits, brought by foreigners for 
massive monetary damages, threaten the international economic 
activities that are important to sustaining the American economy.
  The suits should be able to go forward, but judges need better legal 
tools to make heads or tails of the cases that come before them hence 
the motivation for introducing the Alien Tort Statute Reform Act.
  With full understanding of the Supreme Court's admonition to act with 
judicial caution in framing the alien tort statute, I believe it is 
time for Congress to bring clarity to the law and this proposed 
legislation does so.
  I look forward to working with colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, 
through the hearing process and other means, to give this matter 
serious consideration by the Legislative branch.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1874

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Alien Tort Statute Reform 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. SUITS BY ALIENS.

       Section 1350 of title 28, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 1350. Alien's action for tort

       ``(a) Jurisdiction of District Courts.--The district courts 
     shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of any civil 
     action brought by an alien asserting a claim of torture, 
     extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or slave 
     trading if a defendant is a direct participant acting with 
     specific intent to commit the alleged tort. The district 
     courts shall not have jurisdiction over such civil suits 
     brought by an alien if a foreign state is responsible for 
     committing the tort in question within its sovereign 
     territory.
       ``(b) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
       ``(1) Defendant.--The term `defendant' means any person 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the 
     United States, including--
       ``(A) a United States citizen;
       ``(B) a natural person who is a permanent resident of the 
     United States;
       ``(C) a natural person who resides in the United States; or
       ``(D) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
     organized under the laws of the United States or of a foreign 
     state.
       ``(2) Foreign state.--The term `foreign state' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 1603 of title 28, United 
     States Code.
       ``(3) Extrajudicial killing.--The term `extrajudicial 
     killing'--
       ``(A) means a deliberated killing, which--
       ``(i) notwithstanding the jurisdictional limitations 
     referred to in subsection (a), is carried out by an 
     individual under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
     law, of any foreign state;
       ``(ii) is directed against another individual in the 
     offender's custody or physical control; and
       ``(iii) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced 
     by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
     guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
     peoples; and
       ``(B) does not include any such killing that, under 
     international law, is lawfully carried out under the 
     authority of a foreign state.
       ``(4) Genocide.--The term `genocide' means, whether in time 
     of peace or in time of war, an act carried out, or an attempt 
     to carry out an act, with the specific intent to destroy, in 
     whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or 
     religious group as such, which--
       ``(A) kills members of that group;
       ``(B) causes serious bodily injury to members of that 
     group;
       ``(C) causes the permanent impairment of the mental 
     faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or 
     similar techniques;
       ``(D) subjects the group to conditions of life that are 
     intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in 
     whole or in part;
       ``(E) imposes measures intended to prevent births within 
     the group; or
       ``(F) transfers by force children of the group to another 
     group.
       ``(5) Piracy.--The term `piracy' means--
       ``(A) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
     of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
     passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
     directed--
       ``(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 
     or against persons or property on board such ship or 
     aircraft; or
       ``(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a 
     place outside the jurisdiction of any country;
       ``(B) any act of voluntary participation in the operations 
     of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it 
     a pirate ship or aircraft; or
       ``(C) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating 
     an act described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

[[Page S11436]]

       ``(6) Slave trading.--The term `slave trading' includes--
       ``(A) all acts involved in the capture, acquisition, or 
     disposal of a person with intent to reduce such person to 
     slavery;
       ``(B) all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with 
     a view to selling or exchanging such slave;
       ``(C) all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave 
     acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and
       ``(D) in general, every act of trade or transport of 
     slaves.
       ``(7) Slavery.--The term `slavery' means the status or 
     condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
     attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.
       ``(8) Torture.--
       ``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding the jurisdictional 
     limitations referred to in subsection (a), the term `torture' 
     means any act, carried out by an individual under actual or 
     apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign state, 
     directed against another individual in the offender's custody 
     or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other 
     than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or 
     incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, 
     is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such 
     purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person 
     information or a confession, punishing that individual for an 
     act that individual or a third person has committed or is 
     suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that 
     individual or a third person, or for any reason based on 
     discrimination of any kind.
       ``(B) Mental pain or suffering.--In subparagraph (A), 
     mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm 
     caused by or resulting from--
       ``(i) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction 
     of severe physical pain or suffering;
       ``(ii) the administration or application, or threatened 
     administration or application, of mind altering substances, 
     or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the 
     senses or the personality;
       ``(iii) the threat of imminent death; or
       ``(iv) the threat that another individual will imminently 
     be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or 
     the administration or application of mind altering substances 
     or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the 
     senses or personality.
       ``(c) Liability for Damages.--Any defendant who is a direct 
     participant acting with specific intent to commit a tort 
     referred to in subsection (a) against an alien shall be 
     liable for damages to that alien or to any person who may be 
     a claimant in an action for the wrongful death of that alien.
       ``(d) Exhaustion of Remedies.--A district court shall 
     abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction over a civil action 
     described in subsection (a) if the claimant has not exhausted 
     adequate and available remedies in the place in which the 
     injury occurred. Adequate and available remedies include 
     those available through local courts, claims tribunals, and 
     similar legal processes.
       ``(e) Foreign Policy Interests of the United States.--No 
     court in the United States shall proceed in considering the 
     merits of a claim under subsection (a) if the President, or a 
     designee of the President, adequately certifies to the court 
     in writing that such exercise of jurisdiction will have a 
     negative impact on the foreign policy interests of the United 
     States.
       ``(f) Procedural Requirements.--
       ``(1) Specificity.--In any action brought under this 
     section, the complaint shall state with particularity 
     specific facts that--
       ``(A) describe each tort alleged to have been committed and 
     demonstrate the reason or reasons why the tort action may be 
     brought under this section, provided that if an allegation is 
     made on information and belief, the complaint shall state 
     with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed; 
     and
       ``(B) demonstrate that the defendant had the specific 
     intent to commit the tort alleged to have been committed.
       ``(2) Motion to dismiss.--In any action brought under this 
     section, the court shall, on the motion of any defendant, 
     dismiss the complaint if the requirements of subparagraphs 
     (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) are not met.
       ``(3) Stay of discovery.--In any action brought under this 
     section, all discovery related to the merits of the claim and 
     other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any 
     motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of 
     any party that particularized discovery is necessary to 
     preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that 
     party.
       ``(4) Plaintiff identity.--
       ``(A) Requirement.--Subject to subparagraph (B), in any 
     action brought under this section, the first and last names 
     of all plaintiffs shall be disclosed in the complaint filed 
     with the court.
       ``(B) Exception.--A court may permit an anonymous filing of 
     a complaint if a plaintiff's life or safety would be 
     endangered by publicly disclosing the plaintiff's identity.
       ``(g) Fees.--Contingency fee arrangements are prohibited in 
     any action brought under the jurisdiction provided in this 
     section.
       ``(h) Statute of Limitations.--No action shall be 
     maintained under this section unless it is commenced not 
     later than 10 years from the date the injury occurred.
       ``(i) Application of Other Laws.--Nothing in this section 
     may be construed to waive or modify the application of any 
     provision of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Public 
     Law 109-2; 119 Stat. 4) and any amendment made by that Act, 
     or of title 28, United States Code, to any class action law 
     suit brought under this section.''.
                                 ______