[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 124 (Thursday, September 29, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10760-S10761]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 55--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS 
REGARDING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BECOME A SIGNATORY TO 
  ANY MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE RESULTING FROM THE WORLD TRADE 
              ORGANIZATION'S DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA ROUND

  Mr. CRAIG (for himself, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Baucus, Ms. 
Snowe, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Crapo, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Reed, Mr. 
Allen, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Specter, Mr. Levin, Mr. Voinovich, Mr. Byrd, Mrs. 
Dole, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Shelby, Ms.

[[Page S10761]]

Collins, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Graham, Mr. Reid, Mr. Coleman, Ms. Stabenow, 
Mr. Santorum, and Mr. Durbin) submitted the following concurrent 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Finance:

                            S. Con. Res. 55

       Whereas members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are 
     currently engaged in a round of trade negotiations known as 
     the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round);
       Whereas the Doha Round includes negotiations aimed at 
     clarifying and improving disciplines under the Agreement on 
     Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
     Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) and the 
     Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies 
     Agreement);
       Whereas the WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 
     14, 2001 (WTO Paper No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) specifically 
     provides that the Doha Round negotiations are to preserve the 
     ``basic concepts, principles and effectiveness'' of the 
     Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement;
       Whereas in section 2102(b)(14)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2002, the Congress mandated that 
     the principal negotiating objective of the United States with 
     respect to trade remedy laws was to ``preserve the ability of 
     the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws . . . 
     and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of 
     domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, 
     especially dumping and subsidies'';
       Whereas the countries that have been the most persistent 
     and egregious violators of international fair trade rules are 
     engaged in an aggressive effort to significantly weaken the 
     disciplines provided in the Antidumping Agreement and the 
     Subsidies Agreement and undermine the ability of the United 
     States to effectively enforce its trade remedy laws;
       Whereas chronic violators of fair trade disciplines have 
     put forward proposals that would substantially weaken United 
     States trade remedy laws and practices, including mandating 
     that unfair trade orders terminate after a set number of 
     years even if unfair trade and injury are likely to recur, 
     mandating that trade remedy duties reflect less than the full 
     margin of dumping or subsidization, mandating higher de 
     minimis levels of unfair trade, making cumulation of the 
     effects of imports from multiple countries more difficult in 
     unfair trade investigations, outlawing the critical practice 
     of ``zeroing'' in antidumping investigations, mandating the 
     weighing of causes, and mandating other provisions that make 
     it more difficult to prove injury;
       Whereas United States trade remedy laws have already been 
     significantly weakened by numerous unjust and activist WTO 
     dispute settlement decisions which have created new 
     obligations to which the United States never agreed;
       Whereas trade remedy laws remain a critical resource for 
     American manufacturers, agricultural producers, and 
     aquacultural producers in responding to closed foreign 
     markets, subsidized imports, and other forms of unfair trade, 
     particularly in the context of the challenges currently faced 
     by these vital sectors of the United States economy;
       Whereas the United States had a current account trade 
     deficit of approximately $668,000,000,000 in 2004, including 
     a trade deficit of almost $162,000,000,000 with China alone, 
     as well as a trade deficit of $40,000,000,000 in advanced 
     technology;
       Whereas United States manufacturers have lost over 
     3,000,000 jobs since June 2000, and United States 
     manufacturing employment is currently at its lowest level 
     since 1950;
       Whereas many industries critical to United States national 
     security are at severe risk from unfair foreign competition; 
     and
       Whereas the Congress strongly believes that the proposals 
     put forward by countries seeking to undermine trade remedy 
     disciplines in the Doha Round would result in serious harm to 
     the United States economy, including significant job losses 
     and trade disadvantages: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any 
     agreement or protocol with respect to the Doha Development 
     Round of the World Trade Organization negotiations, or any 
     other bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, that--
       (A) adopts any proposal to lessen the effectiveness of 
     domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade or 
     safeguard provisions, including proposals--
       (i) mandating that unfair trade orders terminate after a 
     set number of years even if unfair trade and injury are 
     likely to recur;
       (ii) mandating that trade remedy duties reflect less than 
     the full margin of dumping or subsidization;
       (iii) mandating higher de minimis levels of unfair trade;
       (iv) making cumulation of the effects of imports from 
     multiple countries more difficult in unfair trade 
     investigations;
       (v) outlawing the critical practice of ``zeroing'' in 
     antidumping investigations; or
       (vi) mandating the weighing of causes or other provisions 
     making it more difficult to prove injury in unfair trade 
     cases; and
       (B) would lessen in any manner the ability of the United 
     States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the 
     antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws;
       (2) the United States trade laws and international rules 
     appropriately serve the public interest by offsetting 
     injurious unfair trade, and that further ``balancing 
     modifications'' or other similar provisions are unnecessary 
     and would add to the complexity and difficulty of achieving 
     relief against injurious unfair trade practices; and
       (3) the United States should ensure that any new agreement 
     relating to international disciplines on unfair trade or 
     safeguard provisions fully rectifies and corrects decisions 
     by WTO dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body that 
     have unjustifiably and negatively impacted, or threaten to 
     negatively impact, United States law or practice, including a 
     law or practice with respect to foreign dumping or 
     subsidization.

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