[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 123 (Wednesday, September 28, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H8395-H8401]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MOTION TO GO TO CONFERENCE ON H.R. 2360, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2006
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1 of rule
XXII, and by direction of the Committee on Appropriations, I move to
take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2360) making
appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2006, and for other purposes, with a Senate
amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the
conference asked by the Senate.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shaw). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers).
The motion was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Motion to Instruct Offered by Mr. Sabo
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
The Clerk read as follows:
Motion To Instruct House Conferees H.R. 2360, FY2006 Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill Offered by Mr. Sabo
Mr. Sabo moves that the managers on the part of the House
at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
on the bill, H.R. 2360, be instructed to insist on the
headings and appropriation accounts in Title III of the
House-passed bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under rule XXII, the gentleman from
Minnesota (Mr. Sabo) and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) each
will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo).
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, Hurricane Katrina shined a bright spotlight on troubling
gaps in our Nation's homeland security. We all saw what it means to be
unprepared: people die and suffer needlessly.
Americans are patiently waiting for competence and accountability
from the Congress and the President. Our capacity to deal with
catastrophe may actually have gotten worse since the Department of
Homeland Security was created in 2003. The people demand that we fix
what is broken.
Last week, Secretary Chertoff told me about his vision for improving
national preparedness and response. What he said scares the living
daylights out of me. In the Department's sixth reorganization plan in
2\1/2\ years, the Secretary proposes to sever the last ties between
Federal disaster preparedness and response. He unveiled this proposal
in July, before Katrina; and he is still determined to implement it on
October 1.
With all due respect, the Secretary is dead wrong about what is most
needed at the Federal level to coordinate and lead local, State, and
Federal agencies in preparing for and responding to a major disaster,
whether it is natural or man-made. If we have learned one thing in the
past month, it should be that disaster preparedness and response must
go hand in hand. Not long ago, FEMA did that well. The agency was
robust, proactive and proved how good planning and coordination are
critical to effective response. Congress should demand a pause before
Secretary Chertoff implements more organizational changes that will
further
[[Page H8396]]
weaken FEMA. It is the first step toward fixing our broken emergency
management system.
This motion to instruct would do just that. It directs conferees to
insist that the preparedness title of the conference agreement be in
the same form as the House bill. The effect is to put a hold on the
Secretary's reorganization plan for preparedness. Let me add that it
lets other parts of his reorganization proceed. If he wants to take the
air marshals from ICE and put them back in TSA where they were
originally, fine. But this puts a hold on his preparedness plans.
The House should take this stand. Otherwise, DHS will simply shuffle
organizational boxes again instead of tackling head-on the problems
that Hurricane Katrina laid bare. At the very least, we should take
time to think through the Department's preparedness plans in light of
Katrina. We need to analyze what went wrong so we know how to fix
things before the next catastrophe. It should be clear to everyone that
we have not yet learned those hard lessons.
I see two keys to addressing the problems that Hurricane Katrina
exposed: first, we need a unified, Federal ``all-hazards'' emergency
management agency. It must have the stature, the resources and the
clout to lead, coordinate, and demand the very best of local and State
governments and other Federal agencies in planning for and responding
to major disasters. Equally important, the President needs to appoint
and empower well-qualified and respected emergency management
professionals to lead this agency. There is no substitute for competent
and accountable leadership.
Mr. Speaker, before FEMA was merged with DHS, it was a robust and
experienced FEMA. We can rebuild it. We still have the blueprints. If
you want to take us another step in weakening FEMA, vote ``no'' on this
motion to instruct. If you think we should maybe take some time to
think, then vote ``yes,'' because it is the right thing to do.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I think the real question here is, if you are happy with
the way the planning went to prepare for Katrina, vote for this motion
to instruct conferees. But if you think that we can plan better for
disasters in this country, including hurricanes like Katrina, then
reject this motion and allow the Department, the government to bring
together all of the agencies that might be involved in planning for a
disaster into the same room. Not just FEMA. Bring the Coast Guard,
bring the military, bring the border patrol, bring the Secret Service.
Bring all of the agencies that deal with disasters or have a part of
that into the same place, the same directorate, if you will, in the
Department of Homeland Security so that we can properly plan and bring
the resources to bear of the government in a timely way, at the outset,
by properly preparing. FEMA is a FEMA-centric organization. It stays
within its boundary and does a good job basically in responding, but
not planning, not preparedness.
The gentleman from Minnesota says early on in his statement, Katrina
shined a bright spotlight on troubling gaps in our ability to deal with
catastrophes. I could not agree more. That is why I think we need to
allow the government to create a directorate for preparedness that is
the broadest in its scope it can be, encompassing all of the agencies
of the government, not just FEMA.
The gentleman from Minnesota also said in his opening remarks, people
demand that we fix what is broken. I agree with that as well.
Ironically, however, his motion to instruct conferees would prevent our
capability of being able to fix what is broken. To fix what is broken,
which is preparedness, we need to be able to build a much broader-
scoped organization, looking just at preparedness for these disasters.
A single preparedness directorate will be able to work not just with
the Federal agencies but State and local governments as well to build a
comprehensive preparedness strategy, focused not just on terrorist
activities but certainly an all-hazards strategy.
Consolidating all preparedness functions will assist the Department
in successfully deploying this strategy throughout all levels of
government where it is needed the most.
The responsibility for preparedness exists in various agencies and
levels of the government outside of FEMA. For example, the Coast Guard
is not a part of FEMA. Do you want to prevent the Coast Guard from
being able to help plan for rescuing people in case of a flood or
disaster like Katrina?
{time} 1045
I do not want to exclude the Coast Guard from that process. Do
Members want to exclude the military and the National Guard from that
process? This motion would keep things just as it is. I am not happy
with things just as they are. Hurricane Katrina proved that it is not
getting the job done.
Do Members want to exclude the Corps of Engineers? They are not a
part of the FEMA, they are part of the Army. Do Members want to prevent
the Coast Guard, the National Guard, the military and all other
agencies from helping plan to prepare for these disasters? I want them
included, not excluded. Creating a directorate in the Department whose
sole focus is preparedness will bring together all of these agencies
and build a preparedness capability in DHS that does not currently
exist.
Also, keep in mind that FEMA will continue to be responsible for
their portion of preparedness planning within this much-larger
construct. They will continue to administer the Emergency Management
Institute, which serves as the national focal point for the development
and delivery of emergency management training and enhances the
capabilities of Federal, State and local governments in order to
minimize the impact of disasters. They will still be involved, deeply,
in preparedness planning. But I think we need to add these other
agencies into the mix so we know from the outset, from the git-go who
is going to do what, when, where and why. What is wrong with that?
The bottom line is that this reorganization will allow for better
coordination among the various preparedness components within the much
larger Department of Homeland Security and encourage learning and
building off of each other. If FEMA were to be solely responsible for
preparedness, the result will be a FEMA-centric approach, just within
the small world of FEMA. DHS must develop a broader, all-hazards focus
when it comes to preparedness, one that includes natural disasters and
terrorist incidents.
We know that somewhere in response to Hurricane Katrina, the system
broke. To vote for this motion will perpetuate the status quo. If
Members like things just as they are, then vote for the Sabo motion.
But if Members want a much broader context of preparing for these
disasters with all of the agencies of the government that could be
involved in disaster relief and planning, if Members want all of them
involved, then reject this motion and let the Department reorganize the
preparedness part of getting ready for these terrible storms using all
of the assets of the government, not just a small part.
I urge Members to reject this motion and to allow the conferees to go
about the business of conferring with the other body and bringing back
a bill responsibly to this body.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I would hope that Congress would not repeat
the mistakes that it has already made with respect to the Department of
Homeland Security and FEMA. We all remember what happened after 9/11.
The Congress, in knee-jerk fashion, passed the proposal to create a new
Department of Homeland Security, a gargantuan agency. Up until that
time there were 133 agencies that had something to do with homeland
security.
So what happened is that the Congress and the White House, in its
infinite wisdom, took 22 of those 133 agencies, lumped them together in
a huge bureaucracy. They did not include the FBI, they did not include
the CIA, the two agencies most connected with dealing with terrorism.
They took 22 agencies, lumped them together in a huge
[[Page H8397]]
bureaucracy, set up many layers of bureaucracy within that
organization, and dumped FEMA into that organization.
Up until that time, FEMA had been one of the stars of the previous
administration under James Lee Witt when, for a change, that agency had
been professionalized and depoliticized. But now what has happened is
that since FEMA has been buried in homeland security, we have seen six
separate reorganization plans for the Department of Homeland Security.
We have had a number of directors, and now we have Mr. Chertoff sending
us a letter raising two points that I find almost laughable.
In his letter opposing this motion, Mr. Chertoff says that his
proposal was formed after intensive consultations with preparedness
professionals. The problem is we do not know who those professionals
were and what they recommended because it all happened behind closed
doors. It was an inside job. People who thought they knew better than
anybody else got together with a proposed plan. I think that plan needs
to have some critiquing from the outside, from professional people,
before it goes into effect.
Secondly, Mr. Chertoff says in his letter, ``No structural changes
were made to FEMA prior to Hurricane Katrina.'' Does he not consider
dumping FEMA into a huge bureaucracy where there are many layers that
you have to go through before you can reach the President's phone, does
he not think that is a major reorganization? Does he not think that
taking away the grant program from FEMA is a major reorganization? He
may not think so; I think they are.
What I would simply suggest is that instead of, in a knee-jerk
fashion, approving the reorganization plans of the gang that has
demonstrated they cannot shoot straight, instead what we ought to do is
get Chertoff down here in hearings before the committee. We ought to
have Chertoff testify about his view about what happened, why we had
the failures, what happened within FEMA, what are the faults within the
agency, and let us have a detailed discussion of the problem. I would
submit while I am sure this subcommittee can do a reasonable job of
that, I think the country would feel far better off if we had an
independent commission looking at the entire problem.
The distinguished subcommittee chairman says if Members like the
status quo, then vote for the Sabo motion. Quite the contrary. The
purpose of the Sabo motion is to make certain that the people who are
the status quo on this issue have somebody else looking over their
shoulders before they make yet another unaccountable decision. This is
too important to leave to the people who screwed it up the first time.
Before we buy any more reorganizations on this level, we ought to
bring those people down here, talk to them nose to nose. Mr. Brown was
the President's appointment to FEMA. Mr. Brown testified yesterday that
he inherited a robust organization when he was appointed FEMA director
and that the Department of Homeland Security had stripped the agency of
authority, positions, and dollars.
We ought to bring them both down here, facing each other face to
face, so they can have it out on the outside--not behind closed doors,
but on the outside so we can get to the bottom of what the problem is.
For Congress to just, in a knee-jerk fashion, pass whatever
reorganization program the Homeland Security director sends down to us
is patently irresponsible. It is once again neglecting our oversight
duties. The problem is we do not pay the price when a mistake is made,
the public does, and the best way to avoid that is to pass the Sabo
motion.
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Latham), a very hard-working member of the
subcommittee.
Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, let me just say, if Members like the response to
Hurricane Katrina and Rita, they are going to love this motion to
instruct.
The plan that is being proposed was thought of long before the
hurricanes struck. It is a plan that recognizes exactly the problems
that we have seen in our response to the hurricanes: The fact that
there is not a coordinated plan, a preparation in place to respond to
these types of disasters, whether they be man-made or natural
disasters. This plan was thought out, and again, I want to emphasize
before this disaster struck, and it recognizes the problems that we
have in the bureaucracy.
I think we should also remember that this is a motion to instruct
conferees on the Committee on Appropriations, and Members are totally
avoiding the authorizing committee of jurisdiction. There will be
hearings. The Secretary will be brought before the committee to discuss
this plan, to finally air out the differences.
The gentleman is quite right in that sometimes we move in haste
around here, such as to respond to 9/11. There is a big debate about
FEMA being in Homeland Security. That was one of the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission, to basically dilute FEMA by putting it in an
agency like that. That is why we have a committee of jurisdiction, the
authorizers. This is not the way to do business around here. To just
have a somewhat knee-jerk reaction to make a political point is not
what we should be doing in this Congress.
We need to represent the people. We need to represent the idea that
we have to be prepared. We have seen by these disasters that what the
Secretary is proposing is exactly right, that we need to have
coordination between different agencies in this government to prepare.
FEMA is an agency to respond to disasters. To have an agency to prepare
that can actually talk to everyone involved in the preparation or
should be involved is right.
I also want to make a point that currently the Secretary has
jurisdiction to make these changes, or has the authority under current
law. So no matter what this motion to instruct says, the Secretary can
go forward. But this idea of trying to make some kind of a political
point and beating up on someone who is trying to put forth a plan to
prepare this Nation for man-made or natural disasters is simply wrong.
Mr. Speaker, I would again simply say if Members liked the response
we had to these natural disasters, they will love this motion to
instruct.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me quickly respond to my friend from Iowa. FEMA, we
have spent the last year dismantling FEMA. What was FEMA? FEMA was not
an operational agency, it was a coordinating agency. I do not
understand all of this talk I am hearing today.
It was working with State and local communities and making plans. It
was to work with a wide variety of Federal agencies that go way beyond
those that are included in the Department of Homeland Security. It
existed with cabinet-level status. If the director of FEMA called a
department head and they knew that the director of FEMA had the
President's ear, they listened.
Today I do not know that. Somebody that is three levels down in a new
department that is floundering, is not working, calls some other agency
and there is a slow response, surprise.
Mr. Speaker, we had a system, we should have built on it. Instead, we
destroyed it. We are saying okay, let us have Congress look at it a
little bit. Mr. Chertoff is going to implement this on October 1.
{time} 1100
There have been hearings in Congress, three. Four questions on FEMA;
one on preparedness. And that was it. That is Congress' involvement in
looking at the major restructuring of this program. Any outside
witnesses? No.
It is about time we do our work. Before we let somebody who has not
done anything in his new office except draw a plan for restructuring
have unbridled authority to do it, let us have Congress do some work.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar).
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time and for a very impassioned statement. Rarely have I seen my
colleague so intense on something as he has been here, which shows the
depth of his conviction and the seriousness of this issue.
Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago there was another reorganization plan for
FEMA proposed by the Reagan administration. It would have drastically
altered
[[Page H8398]]
the way FEMA conducts its business. It would have dramatically reduced
the Federal share of covering the cost of disaster assistance. It
elicited an outpouring of anger and animosity from local preparedness
agencies and from Members of Congress.
I chaired the investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of our
Committee on Public Works and Transportation at the time. My colleague
from Pennsylvania, Bill Clinger, the ranking Republican, and I launched
a series of hearings on those proposals. Principal among the opponents
of the plan was another Republican Member from Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge,
who vigorously opposed the administration's plan. Together, we
developed legislation to correct the administration's proposal, reshape
FEMA, and insert in its mission preparedness.
That has been a constant. That has been a fundamental role of FEMA.
And as the gentleman from Minnesota said, to coordinate, we envisioned
that 20 years ago.
This is the national response plan developed in December of 2004. In
its mission statement by then-Congressman Tom Ridge, the mission
states: ``The approach is unique and far reaching. It eliminates
critical seams, ties together a complete spectrum of incident
management activities to include the prevention of, preparedness for,
response to, and recovery from terrorism, natural disasters, and other
major emergencies.'' This is the Secretary, who, as a Member of
Congress, understood the important role of FEMA in coordinating, in
preparing for, responding to disasters.
The motion of the gentleman from Minnesota would require FEMA and the
Department to link disaster preparedness and response. The Chertoff
plan would sever what is a vital link between disaster preparedness and
response. It would move disaster preparedness out of FEMA. It would
strip FEMA of that responsibility and leave it only with the ability to
respond.
That is not what local agencies want. That is not what they need in
the gulf States, out on the west coast when there is an earthquake, in
the Midwest when there are tornadoes. I will not say blizzards because
we do pretty well handling blizzards in the upper Midwest. But to cut
this critical linkage between preparedness and response is madness, in
my view, from having had a very long experience, well over 20 years,
looking over this critical agency, which I said, when we created the
Department of Homeland Security, do not put FEMA in it.
All they need is a link to Homeland Security to be a part of the team
in response to whatever, weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist
actions; but leave FEMA in its role to provide funding for predisaster
mitigation, for preparedness, for coordination, and for response to
disasters. That is its role, and that is the role that would be
restored, protected, enhanced by the motion of the gentleman from
Minnesota.
We saw that tragedy of failure to coordinate, failure to prepare. The
lessons of September 11 simply were not learned and applied in advance
of Hurricane Katrina. On September 11 we knew that there were failures
of communication between fire and police, among police units, among
fire departments; and it was a recommendation of the September 11
Commission that FEMA reorganize itself and fix those problems of
communication so that we have an interoperability of communication
systems among all the responders. We take this plan that Secretary
Chertoff is going to go forward with and we will disintegrate that
recommendation for interoperability, coordination, and preparedness and
effective response.
When I opposed the inclusion of FEMA in the Department of Homeland
Security, I said imagine the situation the Department of Homeland
Security has created. The floodwaters are rising up to the eaves of our
house, we are sitting on the rooftop with a cell phone and a white
handkerchief calling for FEMA's help, and we get an answer that they
are out looking for terrorists. How many people have the Members seen
sitting on the rooftops of their homes in the tragedy of Katrina?
I said that in July, 2002. I said it on this floor on July 25, 2002.
Do not put FEMA in this Department. Do not emasculate this agency. Five
hundred people have been transferred out of this agency, $250 million
cut from its budget; and the result was evident on our screens,
television screens, all across America. Do not make that mistake again.
Support the motion of the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to instruct conferees to
H.R. 2360, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill, to
stop DHS from implementing one element of its pending reorganization
plan because it will further weaken Federal Emergency Management Agency
preparedness programs.
The Administration's proposal is the sixth reorganization of DHS in
two and a half years. This summer, as part of his new reorganization
plan of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Secretary Chertoff
proposed a new Preparedness Directorate--further stripping FEMA of
duties and resources and severing the critical linkage between disaster
preparedness and response.
This plan was proposed by Secretary Chertoff before Hurricane Katrina
struck and yet, in light of all of the problems, questions, and
concerns with FEMA's and DHS' preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina, the Administration seems determined to go forward with the
plan, disregarding any lesson that can be learned from the Katrina
response.
In his request, Secretary Chertoff ignores FEMA's critical ``all-
hazards'' approach to preparedness and response. He states: ``. . .
Federal preparedness efforts need to be targeted toward addressing gaps
in our terrorism and homeland security capabilities.''
I have long believed that Federal preparedness must also address the
critical gaps in our natural disaster preparedness capabilities.
Hurricane Katrina tragically illustrated those critical gaps.
Since the creation of the DHS, FEMA has been systematically weakened,
programs and personnel transferred from one Directorate to another.
This new plan would take away two more preparedness programs from
FEMA--shifting them to the new Preparedness Directorate.
It is critical that disaster preparedness and response be linked.
Secretary Chertoff's plan calls for severing the vital link between
disaster preparedness and response--moving disaster preparedness out of
FEMA and leaving FEMA with only disaster response.
This would be a mistake. The first responder community has told us
that disaster preparedness and response go hand-in-hand. By joint
planning and training, we best learn how to respond in a real crisis.
Our response in a disaster is based on all of the preparedness that has
been done in advance.
Finally, this is not the time to be further weakening FEMA--we must
take the time to learn from the mistakes of the response to Katrina.
I urge my colleagues to support the motion to instruct conferees.
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 10 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, the proposal to create within the Department a
directorate dealing just with preparedness and bringing into that
agency all of the other agencies of the government, Federal, State, and
local, to help plan so that we will not have another Katrina episode
makes altogether good sense. This was not developed overnight, the
idea. In fact, it has been studied by the Secretary and the Department
for many months.
I want to quote briefly from a letter that I received just this
morning from the Department, from Secretary Chertoff, which says as
follows: ``Our proposal was formed after intensive consultations with
preparedness professionals, first responders, law enforcement
officials, the former leadership of'' the Department, ``and State and
local stakeholders.'' All of these people were involved in the
construction of this idea of creating a massive government-wide
directorate for preparedness planning.
``Our objective is to create a stronger capability to do preparedness
planning across the full spectrum of all hazards, both natural
disasters and terrorist attacks.''
Continuing to read: ``Critically, no structural changes were made to
FEMA prior to Hurricane Katrina.'' Katrina was under the old scheme.
``Going forward, our plan will significantly strengthen the planning
and preparedness actions of FEMA and the entire Department by ensuring
that a dedicated team will focus on these actions on a full-time,
urgent basis. Our preparedness directorate,'' the Secretary says,
``will integrate and leverage the capabilities of FEMA with those of
Coast Guard; TSA,'' Transportation Security Administration; the customs
agents, both on the border and internal, ``and Secret Service,'' among
others.
``FEMA is and should be a surge organization.'' We have forgotten
that.
[[Page H8399]]
FEMA develops with the surges of the moment. ``When incidents occur,
every asset of the organization and its entire leadership team surges
into the incident. ``Our proposal,'' the Secretary says, ``for a
preparedness organization supports FEMA's capacity to surge while
maintaining a systematic planning and exercise regime in support of
FEMA's mission and that of other DHS components. The directorate will
aggressively support FEMA's training and exercising needs.''
Continuing to read from the Secretary's letter: ``It aligns our
grant-making programs and our crucial training and exercising work in
support of the Department's all-hazards mission. The directorate will
include increased focus on issues broader than FEMA, including
infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and a new chief medical
officer.'' Those are not considered today in the present FEMA. We have
got to take a look at the broader picture. So those are the comments of
the Secretary.
Now, who supports the Secretary in bringing a broader perspective to
preparedness planning? Groups like the International Association of
Fire Chiefs. If there is a first responder organization that typifies
what they do, it is the fire departments and the fire chiefs, the
people who know best about preparing for disasters. They say this is a
critical change that is necessary, and I am quoting from their letter
to that effect: ``This preparedness directorate must be a new function
and must be separate and distinct from operational functions, although
it must coordinate with those operational functions.''
Quoting further from the International Association of Fire Chiefs:
``Currently, the U.S. Fire Administration is located within the
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate. Unfortunately, the
preparedness functions of the USFA are diminished because EP&R is
frequently focused on the operational response to disasters.'' That
makes sense.
They go on to say: ``It is critical that fire chiefs or other senior
fire service leaders be included in this directorate, along with other
State, local, and tribal first responders, so that they may provide
essential perspective in the creation of policy for DHS and not only in
the review or enactment of policy.'' This puts the fire chiefs in the
middle of the planning process, not at the other end. They are not
being told what to do. They are being asked what to do with this
proposal.
If Members vote for the Sabo motion, they are saying to the fire
chiefs, We do not care about you. We will tell you what to do. We do
not want you to tell us how we should do it before we do it.
We want to bring them into the planning process, not tell them what
to do at the end of the process.
In bringing about this directorate, the Department of the Secretary
over months went out and talked to all sorts of people and
organizations. I will give some examples, and I have got three pages
here of the listing of some of the people they have talked to.
Lee Baca, the Sheriff of L.A. County; Matt Bettenhausen, director of
the California Office of Homeland Security; Roger Vanderpool, director,
Arizona Department of Public Safety; Art Faulkner, liaison for
assistant director for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Alabama
Department of Homeland Security; Jim Timmony, police chief, City of
Miami; Mike Sherberger, director of the Office of Homeland Security,
Georgia; Illinois, Jonathan Schachter, City of Chicago; Art Cleaves,
director of Maine Emergency Management; John Cohen, Massachusetts
Homeland Security;
{time} 1115
Also Colonel Tom Robbins, Massachusetts State Police; Sid Casperson,
the Director of the New Jersey Office of Counterterrorism; Jim McMahon,
Director of New York State Office of Homeland Security; Brian Beatty,
Secretary of Public Safety in North Carolina; Doug Friez in North
Dakota; Ken Morckel, Director of Public Safety for Ohio; people from
Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia; the Federal Order of Police; the
International Associations of Chiefs of Police; and I could go on.
So, here is a list, a brief list, of some of the people contacted by
the Department as they came up with this idea to consolidate
preparedness planning in a single place, encompassing all of the
agencies of the Federal, State and local governments, people like the
fire chiefs and chiefs of police.
From the Major Cities Chiefs Association, a letter saying ``law
enforcement across the Nation supports the President's position that
the best way to prepare for a terrorist attack is to stop it from
happening. We feel that the Department should unify the components that
share this common mission. At present, the Prevention and Protection
Grants plans and intelligence are each in separate agencies. Long
overdue, the Nation would be well served by DHS directorate committed
solely to protecting the American people. For the first time, the
chiefs of police say, ``local law enforcement could work with a single
DHS directorate focused on our common goal to protect the American
people from another terrorist attack.''
Chiefs of police, fire chiefs, first responders, State and local
directors of homeland security all say the same thing: We have got to
consolidate and bring in one place the preparedness planning practice
within Homeland.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, it amazes me that Secretary Chertoff thinks there has
been no structural change to FEMA. I think everyone in the world knows
there has been a structural change to FEMA. It was an independent,
free-standing agency; now it is a weak part of a weak department. Where
are the records of all these people that the Secretary has talked to?
Maybe Congress, before we approve some fundamental restructuring,
should hear from one, two, three, maybe five outside witnesses, maybe
from some who ran FEMA when it was a good functioning agency even.
There has been no outside testimony that I know of. There was not in
our committee. There was not in the authorizing committee that I know
of. Maybe there was someplace. But let us have some people come and
testify to us so we can ask questions. That has not happened.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Price).
(Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in favor of
the motion to instruct conferees to reject Secretary Chertoff's plan to
further weaken and gut FEMA.
I and many of my colleagues have been raising these concerns about
the systematic deconstruction of FEMA and about reduced funding for our
first responders for many years now. Current and former FEMA officials
told me months ago that FEMA had become a hollowed-out agency and that
it was one major disaster short of collapse. Unfortunately, Katrina was
the disaster that substantiated that claim.
We should not be satisfied in laying the blame solely on the former
FEMA director. Two years ago, FEMA put out a warning that two-thirds of
our fire departments operate with staffing levels that do not meet the
minimum safe levels required by OSHA and the National Fire Protection
Association. What was the administration's response to that? It
proposed zeroing out the SAFER hiring program for firefighters and
proposed massive cuts to fire equipment grants. FEMA officials had
publicly called these grants one of the ``best bangs for the buck the
taxpayer gets.''
Overall, we are providing less funding for our first responders now
through FEMA and the Department of Justice than we did prior to 9/11.
When I asked Secretary Ridge 2 years ago why this administration was
cutting funding for police and other first responders, his response was
that supporting local law enforcement was not the Federal Government's
responsibility, no matter that they were the linchpin in all of the
Department of Homeland Security's planning.
Time and again, we have also warned of the dangers of moving away
from an ``all-hazards'' approach to preparedness and response, to a
terrorism-only approach.
FEMA used to be one of the leanest and most effective agencies in the
Federal Government. But then its cabinet level position was taken away
by the Bush administration. It was buried under tons of homeland
security bureaucracy. Its top posts were stripped
[[Page H8400]]
of experts and filled with campaign workers and friends of people in
power. Some of its best programs were taken away and stuffed into other
offices in Homeland Security.
As former Director Mike Brown testified yesterday, FEMA was de-
prioritized in Homeland Security and lost its political power, access
and funding. Its failure after Katrina was the result of a series of
decisions to under-fund key agency functions, to cut key personnel, and
to de-emphasize preparation for natural disasters. That failure had
dire consequences.
I am not saying this to play the political blame game. I am saying it
because we have to understand that this was the consequence of years of
neglect of FEMA and of our first responders by this administration and
this Congress. We need to understand this so we do not repeat these
same mistakes.
Instead of learning from the mistakes of FEMA, the Department of
Homeland Security appears intent on plowing ahead with plans to further
bury FEMA in the departmental bureaucracy and now to strip it of its
planning and preparedness responsibility. Republican leaders of this
House seem inclined to go along with that. But our vote today will show
whether politics and partisanship will trump sound policy.
Mr. Speaker, we exist as an institution to do more than just stay in
power. We ought to do what is right for the American people. Further
dismantling and burying FEMA is wrong. Further cutting funding and
support for our first responders is wrong.
When we make decisions that are based on a refusal to admit a
mistake, rather than a determination to learn from our mistakes,
Americans suffer and we lose some of our greatness. So I ask my
colleagues to support this motion to instruct.
Things are bad enough. Let us not make them worse.
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Hastings), the ranking member of the Committee on Rules.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota
(Mr. Sabo) began this discussion by saying we need smart, experienced
and independent people to take a hard look at the problems Katrina
exposed and identify solutions before we move organizational boxes
again. I cannot agree more. This motion to instruct is timely, and I
urge Members to support it.
The truth of the matter is, what Congress needs to do is what we were
taught as children, and that is to count to 10 and take a deep breath
when there is a problem.
Listen, we are not playing pin the tail on the elephant or the
donkey. We are dealing with tragic consequences of our fellow
Americans. Before shuffling boxes, we need a clear, unambiguous plan
for disaster preparedness, not something prepared in a back room.
We are 4 years out from 9/11, and obviously are woefully unprepared
for disaster. The majority is going forward with a 5-month, $500,000
investigation into what went wrong in Katrina, and that should
complement an independent investigation into what went right and what
went wrong.
How do we do what the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) says? How
do you integrate the military, how do you integrate the faith-based
institutions, how do you integrate the volunteers? Where is the
national registry for physicians?
We have not settled the issues from last year's storms and we
continue to use the term ``Katrina,'' but there was an Ophelia and
there is a Rita, and America's problems are continuing. Pass this
motion to instruct.
Mr. SABO. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms.
Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am on the authorizing
committee of the Committee on Homeland Security of this Congress, but I
am also someone who has just recently returned from the area of Rita,
and I hope that our vernacular will now be Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to support this motion to instruct. I respect my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle and I would hope that we
would break the firewall of partisanship and establish a bipartisan but
a forward-thinking mode to deal with the haplessness and helplessness
of Americans.
Many Americans will face tragedy in their life, either by fire,
volcano, earthquake, inland flooding or what we experienced, the
devastation of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. So the question is
not to accept what Secretary Chertoff has offered, a man who may be in
many ways qualified, but himself having no experience in understanding
how to address the devastation of an ongoing hurricane.
The reason I know this is because I was on the ground yesterday in
the damaged areas, listening to local officials, hearing their pain,
crying out for the simplest of items. ``Where are my generators? Where
is my ice? Where is my water? Where are the airplanes to take my
evacuees who are bedridden and nursing home patients out of this
region?'' And the only answer they had was deadening silence, or the
silence of generators sitting in buildings because there was no one to
give a single order.
That is what is the problem, there is no one in charge, and moving
boxes, Secretary Chertoff, is not the answer.
Support this motion to instruct, so that we can address the lives
that are lost and those who are surviving in Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita. We are sick and tired of being sick and tired of being
ignored.
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). The Chair would admonish
Members to address their remarks to the Chair, and not to others in the
second person.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, on this motion, there is lots of rhetoric here, but we
are simply saying, let us take the time to think. Shortly after the
flood with Katrina, somebody asked me what I thought we should do. I
said we should do something unusual in this place, take the time to
think before we jump to a conclusion.
Here we have plans by an agency developed some time ago that we
really have not looked at in Congress. Maybe everything that the
Secretary says is true. Maybe I am wrong and he is right; we should not
have an enhanced FEMA, we should have a weakened FEMA. But let us look
at it before we rush to say to do it.
I do not think you can separate preparedness from people with the
responsibility to carry it through. Henry Ford once said he did not
want a ``planned society,'' but he wanted a ``planning society.'' The
two are very fundamentally different. One is that you have a process of
thinking what you are going to do, and I think ultimately it has to be
tied in to those folks who were involved in implementing whatever plans
you are developing, which are constantly evolving.
Here we come with somebody who, it may look good to a lawyer who
likes a good, concise brief, but has not been involved in the day-to-
day responding to emergencies.
{time} 1130
The people I hear him talk to who respond to emergencies tell me that
it is just a very fundamental mistake to separate preparedness from the
people who implement those preparedness plans.
So, Mr. Speaker, if you want us to take a pause, think before we act,
to think before we let the Department act, vote ``yes'' on the Sabo
motion if we think there is a better chance we might do it right in the
end.
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of
the time.
Mr. Speaker, when Secretary Chertoff became the Secretary of the new
Department, he declared sort of a moratorium; and he went off with his
staff, and they began to discuss and think and plan about how to
improve the Department's capability to respond and prevent attacks
either by nature or by man; homeland security.
And one of the biggest things they found was that in the different
Departments of the government, there were agencies that had something
to do with responding to an emergency and being prepared for that, but
separate and apart from each other.
For example, the Coast Guard had their own preparedness group that
[[Page H8401]]
plans what they should do in an emergency. Of course, States have their
own plans, as they should. And local officials, mayors and the like,
have their own plans for response and preparedness. The military has
obviously planned for disasters. They have been prepared. And, of
course, the National Guard, the same way. The Corps of Engineers have
their own unit that deals with preparedness for disasters, and we could
go on. All across this government there are agencies within all of
these, or many of these Departments that are preparing for disasters.
The Secretary said we need an agency within Homeland Security where
all of these groups can come together under one roof and participate
and plan as one unit, not just the agencies of the Federal Government,
but States and localities as well. He went out, his people went out and
they talked to hundreds, literally hundreds of directors of State
homeland security groups, of fire chiefs and police and the first
responders all over the country, and there came back from all of those
people the unanimous idea: we need a single place where we can all go,
and know to go, both to plan and to inquire.
So that now, in this plan that the Secretary has, the police and the
firemen and the State emergency directors, as well as the Federal
agencies, all of them from the Coast Guard to the Secret Service, all
can come together in one place and do nothing but planning. They are
not concerned about doing the operational part of responding to an
emergency, that is FEMA and the various agencies. But for the planning
purposes, they want to be together.
So the Secretary says, okay, that is the way it shall be. And in his
reorganization plan, he agreed with all of the police chiefs and the
fire chiefs, the State planning directors, the emergency planners in
each State, the homeland security people in the States, and mayors, he
agreed with them and gave them what they wanted: a single place.
Let us not have another Katrina. Let us work together so that we each
know what we are supposed to do in the event that a disaster occurs.
So I urge my colleagues to reject this motion to instruct conferees.
Let these experts do their work. I am no expert on how to respond to a
fire or a disaster. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo) may know
more than I, but I doubt he is an expert either. We have experts who do
nothing but this. Let us put the experts in charge, and let them tell
us what we need to do, and let us then follow along and do what has to
be done to save lives.
The bottom line: if you are happy with the way FEMA planned for
Katrina, vote Sabo. If you think we can improve and we can do better in
planning for the next disaster, reject Sabo. Vote ``no.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the motion to instruct.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct
offered by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo).
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this question will
be postponed.
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