[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 123 (Wednesday, September 28, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H8395-H8401]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    MOTION TO GO TO CONFERENCE ON H.R. 2360, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                   SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2006

  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1 of rule 
XXII, and by direction of the Committee on Appropriations, I move to 
take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2360) making 
appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 2006, and for other purposes, with a Senate 
amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the 
conference asked by the Senate.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shaw). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers).
  The motion was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.


                 Motion to Instruct Offered by Mr. Sabo

  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
  The Clerk read as follows:

Motion To Instruct House Conferees H.R. 2360, FY2006 Homeland Security 
                Appropriations Bill Offered by Mr. Sabo

       Mr. Sabo moves that the managers on the part of the House 
     at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
     on the bill, H.R. 2360, be instructed to insist on the 
     headings and appropriation accounts in Title III of the 
     House-passed bill.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under rule XXII, the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Sabo) and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) each 
will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo).
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, Hurricane Katrina shined a bright spotlight on troubling 
gaps in our Nation's homeland security. We all saw what it means to be 
unprepared: people die and suffer needlessly.
  Americans are patiently waiting for competence and accountability 
from the Congress and the President. Our capacity to deal with 
catastrophe may actually have gotten worse since the Department of 
Homeland Security was created in 2003. The people demand that we fix 
what is broken.
  Last week, Secretary Chertoff told me about his vision for improving 
national preparedness and response. What he said scares the living 
daylights out of me. In the Department's sixth reorganization plan in 
2\1/2\ years, the Secretary proposes to sever the last ties between 
Federal disaster preparedness and response. He unveiled this proposal 
in July, before Katrina; and he is still determined to implement it on 
October 1.
  With all due respect, the Secretary is dead wrong about what is most 
needed at the Federal level to coordinate and lead local, State, and 
Federal agencies in preparing for and responding to a major disaster, 
whether it is natural or man-made. If we have learned one thing in the 
past month, it should be that disaster preparedness and response must 
go hand in hand. Not long ago, FEMA did that well. The agency was 
robust, proactive and proved how good planning and coordination are 
critical to effective response. Congress should demand a pause before 
Secretary Chertoff implements more organizational changes that will 
further

[[Page H8396]]

weaken FEMA. It is the first step toward fixing our broken emergency 
management system.
  This motion to instruct would do just that. It directs conferees to 
insist that the preparedness title of the conference agreement be in 
the same form as the House bill. The effect is to put a hold on the 
Secretary's reorganization plan for preparedness. Let me add that it 
lets other parts of his reorganization proceed. If he wants to take the 
air marshals from ICE and put them back in TSA where they were 
originally, fine. But this puts a hold on his preparedness plans.
  The House should take this stand. Otherwise, DHS will simply shuffle 
organizational boxes again instead of tackling head-on the problems 
that Hurricane Katrina laid bare. At the very least, we should take 
time to think through the Department's preparedness plans in light of 
Katrina. We need to analyze what went wrong so we know how to fix 
things before the next catastrophe. It should be clear to everyone that 
we have not yet learned those hard lessons.
  I see two keys to addressing the problems that Hurricane Katrina 
exposed: first, we need a unified, Federal ``all-hazards'' emergency 
management agency. It must have the stature, the resources and the 
clout to lead, coordinate, and demand the very best of local and State 
governments and other Federal agencies in planning for and responding 
to major disasters. Equally important, the President needs to appoint 
and empower well-qualified and respected emergency management 
professionals to lead this agency. There is no substitute for competent 
and accountable leadership.
  Mr. Speaker, before FEMA was merged with DHS, it was a robust and 
experienced FEMA. We can rebuild it. We still have the blueprints. If 
you want to take us another step in weakening FEMA, vote ``no'' on this 
motion to instruct. If you think we should maybe take some time to 
think, then vote ``yes,'' because it is the right thing to do.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the real question here is, if you are happy with 
the way the planning went to prepare for Katrina, vote for this motion 
to instruct conferees. But if you think that we can plan better for 
disasters in this country, including hurricanes like Katrina, then 
reject this motion and allow the Department, the government to bring 
together all of the agencies that might be involved in planning for a 
disaster into the same room. Not just FEMA. Bring the Coast Guard, 
bring the military, bring the border patrol, bring the Secret Service.
  Bring all of the agencies that deal with disasters or have a part of 
that into the same place, the same directorate, if you will, in the 
Department of Homeland Security so that we can properly plan and bring 
the resources to bear of the government in a timely way, at the outset, 
by properly preparing. FEMA is a FEMA-centric organization. It stays 
within its boundary and does a good job basically in responding, but 
not planning, not preparedness.
  The gentleman from Minnesota says early on in his statement, Katrina 
shined a bright spotlight on troubling gaps in our ability to deal with 
catastrophes. I could not agree more. That is why I think we need to 
allow the government to create a directorate for preparedness that is 
the broadest in its scope it can be, encompassing all of the agencies 
of the government, not just FEMA.
  The gentleman from Minnesota also said in his opening remarks, people 
demand that we fix what is broken. I agree with that as well. 
Ironically, however, his motion to instruct conferees would prevent our 
capability of being able to fix what is broken. To fix what is broken, 
which is preparedness, we need to be able to build a much broader-
scoped organization, looking just at preparedness for these disasters. 
A single preparedness directorate will be able to work not just with 
the Federal agencies but State and local governments as well to build a 
comprehensive preparedness strategy, focused not just on terrorist 
activities but certainly an all-hazards strategy.
  Consolidating all preparedness functions will assist the Department 
in successfully deploying this strategy throughout all levels of 
government where it is needed the most.
  The responsibility for preparedness exists in various agencies and 
levels of the government outside of FEMA. For example, the Coast Guard 
is not a part of FEMA. Do you want to prevent the Coast Guard from 
being able to help plan for rescuing people in case of a flood or 
disaster like Katrina?

                              {time}  1045

  I do not want to exclude the Coast Guard from that process. Do 
Members want to exclude the military and the National Guard from that 
process? This motion would keep things just as it is. I am not happy 
with things just as they are. Hurricane Katrina proved that it is not 
getting the job done.
  Do Members want to exclude the Corps of Engineers? They are not a 
part of the FEMA, they are part of the Army. Do Members want to prevent 
the Coast Guard, the National Guard, the military and all other 
agencies from helping plan to prepare for these disasters? I want them 
included, not excluded. Creating a directorate in the Department whose 
sole focus is preparedness will bring together all of these agencies 
and build a preparedness capability in DHS that does not currently 
exist.
  Also, keep in mind that FEMA will continue to be responsible for 
their portion of preparedness planning within this much-larger 
construct. They will continue to administer the Emergency Management 
Institute, which serves as the national focal point for the development 
and delivery of emergency management training and enhances the 
capabilities of Federal, State and local governments in order to 
minimize the impact of disasters. They will still be involved, deeply, 
in preparedness planning. But I think we need to add these other 
agencies into the mix so we know from the outset, from the git-go who 
is going to do what, when, where and why. What is wrong with that?
  The bottom line is that this reorganization will allow for better 
coordination among the various preparedness components within the much 
larger Department of Homeland Security and encourage learning and 
building off of each other. If FEMA were to be solely responsible for 
preparedness, the result will be a FEMA-centric approach, just within 
the small world of FEMA. DHS must develop a broader, all-hazards focus 
when it comes to preparedness, one that includes natural disasters and 
terrorist incidents.
  We know that somewhere in response to Hurricane Katrina, the system 
broke. To vote for this motion will perpetuate the status quo. If 
Members like things just as they are, then vote for the Sabo motion. 
But if Members want a much broader context of preparing for these 
disasters with all of the agencies of the government that could be 
involved in disaster relief and planning, if Members want all of them 
involved, then reject this motion and let the Department reorganize the 
preparedness part of getting ready for these terrible storms using all 
of the assets of the government, not just a small part.
  I urge Members to reject this motion and to allow the conferees to go 
about the business of conferring with the other body and bringing back 
a bill responsibly to this body.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I would hope that Congress would not repeat 
the mistakes that it has already made with respect to the Department of 
Homeland Security and FEMA. We all remember what happened after 9/11. 
The Congress, in knee-jerk fashion, passed the proposal to create a new 
Department of Homeland Security, a gargantuan agency. Up until that 
time there were 133 agencies that had something to do with homeland 
security.
  So what happened is that the Congress and the White House, in its 
infinite wisdom, took 22 of those 133 agencies, lumped them together in 
a huge bureaucracy. They did not include the FBI, they did not include 
the CIA, the two agencies most connected with dealing with terrorism. 
They took 22 agencies, lumped them together in a huge

[[Page H8397]]

bureaucracy, set up many layers of bureaucracy within that 
organization, and dumped FEMA into that organization.
  Up until that time, FEMA had been one of the stars of the previous 
administration under James Lee Witt when, for a change, that agency had 
been professionalized and depoliticized. But now what has happened is 
that since FEMA has been buried in homeland security, we have seen six 
separate reorganization plans for the Department of Homeland Security. 
We have had a number of directors, and now we have Mr. Chertoff sending 
us a letter raising two points that I find almost laughable.
  In his letter opposing this motion, Mr. Chertoff says that his 
proposal was formed after intensive consultations with preparedness 
professionals. The problem is we do not know who those professionals 
were and what they recommended because it all happened behind closed 
doors. It was an inside job. People who thought they knew better than 
anybody else got together with a proposed plan. I think that plan needs 
to have some critiquing from the outside, from professional people, 
before it goes into effect.
  Secondly, Mr. Chertoff says in his letter, ``No structural changes 
were made to FEMA prior to Hurricane Katrina.'' Does he not consider 
dumping FEMA into a huge bureaucracy where there are many layers that 
you have to go through before you can reach the President's phone, does 
he not think that is a major reorganization? Does he not think that 
taking away the grant program from FEMA is a major reorganization? He 
may not think so; I think they are.
  What I would simply suggest is that instead of, in a knee-jerk 
fashion, approving the reorganization plans of the gang that has 
demonstrated they cannot shoot straight, instead what we ought to do is 
get Chertoff down here in hearings before the committee. We ought to 
have Chertoff testify about his view about what happened, why we had 
the failures, what happened within FEMA, what are the faults within the 
agency, and let us have a detailed discussion of the problem. I would 
submit while I am sure this subcommittee can do a reasonable job of 
that, I think the country would feel far better off if we had an 
independent commission looking at the entire problem.
  The distinguished subcommittee chairman says if Members like the 
status quo, then vote for the Sabo motion. Quite the contrary. The 
purpose of the Sabo motion is to make certain that the people who are 
the status quo on this issue have somebody else looking over their 
shoulders before they make yet another unaccountable decision. This is 
too important to leave to the people who screwed it up the first time.
  Before we buy any more reorganizations on this level, we ought to 
bring those people down here, talk to them nose to nose. Mr. Brown was 
the President's appointment to FEMA. Mr. Brown testified yesterday that 
he inherited a robust organization when he was appointed FEMA director 
and that the Department of Homeland Security had stripped the agency of 
authority, positions, and dollars.
  We ought to bring them both down here, facing each other face to 
face, so they can have it out on the outside--not behind closed doors, 
but on the outside so we can get to the bottom of what the problem is. 
For Congress to just, in a knee-jerk fashion, pass whatever 
reorganization program the Homeland Security director sends down to us 
is patently irresponsible. It is once again neglecting our oversight 
duties. The problem is we do not pay the price when a mistake is made, 
the public does, and the best way to avoid that is to pass the Sabo 
motion.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Latham), a very hard-working member of the 
subcommittee.
  Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just say, if Members like the response to 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita, they are going to love this motion to 
instruct.
  The plan that is being proposed was thought of long before the 
hurricanes struck. It is a plan that recognizes exactly the problems 
that we have seen in our response to the hurricanes: The fact that 
there is not a coordinated plan, a preparation in place to respond to 
these types of disasters, whether they be man-made or natural 
disasters. This plan was thought out, and again, I want to emphasize 
before this disaster struck, and it recognizes the problems that we 
have in the bureaucracy.
  I think we should also remember that this is a motion to instruct 
conferees on the Committee on Appropriations, and Members are totally 
avoiding the authorizing committee of jurisdiction. There will be 
hearings. The Secretary will be brought before the committee to discuss 
this plan, to finally air out the differences.
  The gentleman is quite right in that sometimes we move in haste 
around here, such as to respond to 9/11. There is a big debate about 
FEMA being in Homeland Security. That was one of the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission, to basically dilute FEMA by putting it in an 
agency like that. That is why we have a committee of jurisdiction, the 
authorizers. This is not the way to do business around here. To just 
have a somewhat knee-jerk reaction to make a political point is not 
what we should be doing in this Congress.
  We need to represent the people. We need to represent the idea that 
we have to be prepared. We have seen by these disasters that what the 
Secretary is proposing is exactly right, that we need to have 
coordination between different agencies in this government to prepare. 
FEMA is an agency to respond to disasters. To have an agency to prepare 
that can actually talk to everyone involved in the preparation or 
should be involved is right.
  I also want to make a point that currently the Secretary has 
jurisdiction to make these changes, or has the authority under current 
law. So no matter what this motion to instruct says, the Secretary can 
go forward. But this idea of trying to make some kind of a political 
point and beating up on someone who is trying to put forth a plan to 
prepare this Nation for man-made or natural disasters is simply wrong.
  Mr. Speaker, I would again simply say if Members liked the response 
we had to these natural disasters, they will love this motion to 
instruct.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, let me quickly respond to my friend from Iowa. FEMA, we 
have spent the last year dismantling FEMA. What was FEMA? FEMA was not 
an operational agency, it was a coordinating agency. I do not 
understand all of this talk I am hearing today.
  It was working with State and local communities and making plans. It 
was to work with a wide variety of Federal agencies that go way beyond 
those that are included in the Department of Homeland Security. It 
existed with cabinet-level status. If the director of FEMA called a 
department head and they knew that the director of FEMA had the 
President's ear, they listened.
  Today I do not know that. Somebody that is three levels down in a new 
department that is floundering, is not working, calls some other agency 
and there is a slow response, surprise.
  Mr. Speaker, we had a system, we should have built on it. Instead, we 
destroyed it. We are saying okay, let us have Congress look at it a 
little bit. Mr. Chertoff is going to implement this on October 1.

                              {time}  1100

  There have been hearings in Congress, three. Four questions on FEMA; 
one on preparedness. And that was it. That is Congress' involvement in 
looking at the major restructuring of this program. Any outside 
witnesses? No.
  It is about time we do our work. Before we let somebody who has not 
done anything in his new office except draw a plan for restructuring 
have unbridled authority to do it, let us have Congress do some work.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar).
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and for a very impassioned statement. Rarely have I seen my 
colleague so intense on something as he has been here, which shows the 
depth of his conviction and the seriousness of this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago there was another reorganization plan for 
FEMA proposed by the Reagan administration. It would have drastically 
altered

[[Page H8398]]

the way FEMA conducts its business. It would have dramatically reduced 
the Federal share of covering the cost of disaster assistance. It 
elicited an outpouring of anger and animosity from local preparedness 
agencies and from Members of Congress.
  I chaired the investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of our 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation at the time. My colleague 
from Pennsylvania, Bill Clinger, the ranking Republican, and I launched 
a series of hearings on those proposals. Principal among the opponents 
of the plan was another Republican Member from Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, 
who vigorously opposed the administration's plan. Together, we 
developed legislation to correct the administration's proposal, reshape 
FEMA, and insert in its mission preparedness.
  That has been a constant. That has been a fundamental role of FEMA. 
And as the gentleman from Minnesota said, to coordinate, we envisioned 
that 20 years ago.
  This is the national response plan developed in December of 2004. In 
its mission statement by then-Congressman Tom Ridge, the mission 
states: ``The approach is unique and far reaching. It eliminates 
critical seams, ties together a complete spectrum of incident 
management activities to include the prevention of, preparedness for, 
response to, and recovery from terrorism, natural disasters, and other 
major emergencies.'' This is the Secretary, who, as a Member of 
Congress, understood the important role of FEMA in coordinating, in 
preparing for, responding to disasters.
  The motion of the gentleman from Minnesota would require FEMA and the 
Department to link disaster preparedness and response. The Chertoff 
plan would sever what is a vital link between disaster preparedness and 
response. It would move disaster preparedness out of FEMA. It would 
strip FEMA of that responsibility and leave it only with the ability to 
respond.
  That is not what local agencies want. That is not what they need in 
the gulf States, out on the west coast when there is an earthquake, in 
the Midwest when there are tornadoes. I will not say blizzards because 
we do pretty well handling blizzards in the upper Midwest. But to cut 
this critical linkage between preparedness and response is madness, in 
my view, from having had a very long experience, well over 20 years, 
looking over this critical agency, which I said, when we created the 
Department of Homeland Security, do not put FEMA in it.
  All they need is a link to Homeland Security to be a part of the team 
in response to whatever, weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist 
actions; but leave FEMA in its role to provide funding for predisaster 
mitigation, for preparedness, for coordination, and for response to 
disasters. That is its role, and that is the role that would be 
restored, protected, enhanced by the motion of the gentleman from 
Minnesota.
  We saw that tragedy of failure to coordinate, failure to prepare. The 
lessons of September 11 simply were not learned and applied in advance 
of Hurricane Katrina. On September 11 we knew that there were failures 
of communication between fire and police, among police units, among 
fire departments; and it was a recommendation of the September 11 
Commission that FEMA reorganize itself and fix those problems of 
communication so that we have an interoperability of communication 
systems among all the responders. We take this plan that Secretary 
Chertoff is going to go forward with and we will disintegrate that 
recommendation for interoperability, coordination, and preparedness and 
effective response.
  When I opposed the inclusion of FEMA in the Department of Homeland 
Security, I said imagine the situation the Department of Homeland 
Security has created. The floodwaters are rising up to the eaves of our 
house, we are sitting on the rooftop with a cell phone and a white 
handkerchief calling for FEMA's help, and we get an answer that they 
are out looking for terrorists. How many people have the Members seen 
sitting on the rooftops of their homes in the tragedy of Katrina?
  I said that in July, 2002. I said it on this floor on July 25, 2002. 
Do not put FEMA in this Department. Do not emasculate this agency. Five 
hundred people have been transferred out of this agency, $250 million 
cut from its budget; and the result was evident on our screens, 
television screens, all across America. Do not make that mistake again. 
Support the motion of the gentleman from Minnesota.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to instruct conferees to 
H.R. 2360, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill, to 
stop DHS from implementing one element of its pending reorganization 
plan because it will further weaken Federal Emergency Management Agency 
preparedness programs.
  The Administration's proposal is the sixth reorganization of DHS in 
two and a half years. This summer, as part of his new reorganization 
plan of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Secretary Chertoff 
proposed a new Preparedness Directorate--further stripping FEMA of 
duties and resources and severing the critical linkage between disaster 
preparedness and response.
  This plan was proposed by Secretary Chertoff before Hurricane Katrina 
struck and yet, in light of all of the problems, questions, and 
concerns with FEMA's and DHS' preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina, the Administration seems determined to go forward with the 
plan, disregarding any lesson that can be learned from the Katrina 
response.
  In his request, Secretary Chertoff ignores FEMA's critical ``all-
hazards'' approach to preparedness and response. He states: ``. . . 
Federal preparedness efforts need to be targeted toward addressing gaps 
in our terrorism and homeland security capabilities.''
  I have long believed that Federal preparedness must also address the 
critical gaps in our natural disaster preparedness capabilities. 
Hurricane Katrina tragically illustrated those critical gaps.
  Since the creation of the DHS, FEMA has been systematically weakened, 
programs and personnel transferred from one Directorate to another. 
This new plan would take away two more preparedness programs from 
FEMA--shifting them to the new Preparedness Directorate.
  It is critical that disaster preparedness and response be linked. 
Secretary Chertoff's plan calls for severing the vital link between 
disaster preparedness and response--moving disaster preparedness out of 
FEMA and leaving FEMA with only disaster response.
  This would be a mistake. The first responder community has told us 
that disaster preparedness and response go hand-in-hand. By joint 
planning and training, we best learn how to respond in a real crisis. 
Our response in a disaster is based on all of the preparedness that has 
been done in advance.
  Finally, this is not the time to be further weakening FEMA--we must 
take the time to learn from the mistakes of the response to Katrina.
  I urge my colleagues to support the motion to instruct conferees.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, the proposal to create within the Department a 
directorate dealing just with preparedness and bringing into that 
agency all of the other agencies of the government, Federal, State, and 
local, to help plan so that we will not have another Katrina episode 
makes altogether good sense. This was not developed overnight, the 
idea. In fact, it has been studied by the Secretary and the Department 
for many months.
  I want to quote briefly from a letter that I received just this 
morning from the Department, from Secretary Chertoff, which says as 
follows: ``Our proposal was formed after intensive consultations with 
preparedness professionals, first responders, law enforcement 
officials, the former leadership of'' the Department, ``and State and 
local stakeholders.'' All of these people were involved in the 
construction of this idea of creating a massive government-wide 
directorate for preparedness planning.
  ``Our objective is to create a stronger capability to do preparedness 
planning across the full spectrum of all hazards, both natural 
disasters and terrorist attacks.''
  Continuing to read: ``Critically, no structural changes were made to 
FEMA prior to Hurricane Katrina.'' Katrina was under the old scheme. 
``Going forward, our plan will significantly strengthen the planning 
and preparedness actions of FEMA and the entire Department by ensuring 
that a dedicated team will focus on these actions on a full-time, 
urgent basis. Our preparedness directorate,'' the Secretary says, 
``will integrate and leverage the capabilities of FEMA with those of 
Coast Guard; TSA,'' Transportation Security Administration; the customs 
agents, both on the border and internal, ``and Secret Service,'' among 
others.
  ``FEMA is and should be a surge organization.'' We have forgotten 
that.

[[Page H8399]]

FEMA develops with the surges of the moment. ``When incidents occur, 
every asset of the organization and its entire leadership team surges 
into the incident. ``Our proposal,'' the Secretary says, ``for a 
preparedness organization supports FEMA's capacity to surge while 
maintaining a systematic planning and exercise regime in support of 
FEMA's mission and that of other DHS components. The directorate will 
aggressively support FEMA's training and exercising needs.''
  Continuing to read from the Secretary's letter: ``It aligns our 
grant-making programs and our crucial training and exercising work in 
support of the Department's all-hazards mission. The directorate will 
include increased focus on issues broader than FEMA, including 
infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and a new chief medical 
officer.'' Those are not considered today in the present FEMA. We have 
got to take a look at the broader picture. So those are the comments of 
the Secretary.
  Now, who supports the Secretary in bringing a broader perspective to 
preparedness planning? Groups like the International Association of 
Fire Chiefs. If there is a first responder organization that typifies 
what they do, it is the fire departments and the fire chiefs, the 
people who know best about preparing for disasters. They say this is a 
critical change that is necessary, and I am quoting from their letter 
to that effect: ``This preparedness directorate must be a new function 
and must be separate and distinct from operational functions, although 
it must coordinate with those operational functions.''
  Quoting further from the International Association of Fire Chiefs: 
``Currently, the U.S. Fire Administration is located within the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate. Unfortunately, the 
preparedness functions of the USFA are diminished because EP&R is 
frequently focused on the operational response to disasters.'' That 
makes sense.
  They go on to say: ``It is critical that fire chiefs or other senior 
fire service leaders be included in this directorate, along with other 
State, local, and tribal first responders, so that they may provide 
essential perspective in the creation of policy for DHS and not only in 
the review or enactment of policy.'' This puts the fire chiefs in the 
middle of the planning process, not at the other end. They are not 
being told what to do. They are being asked what to do with this 
proposal.
  If Members vote for the Sabo motion, they are saying to the fire 
chiefs, We do not care about you. We will tell you what to do. We do 
not want you to tell us how we should do it before we do it.
  We want to bring them into the planning process, not tell them what 
to do at the end of the process.
  In bringing about this directorate, the Department of the Secretary 
over months went out and talked to all sorts of people and 
organizations. I will give some examples, and I have got three pages 
here of the listing of some of the people they have talked to.
  Lee Baca, the Sheriff of L.A. County; Matt Bettenhausen, director of 
the California Office of Homeland Security; Roger Vanderpool, director, 
Arizona Department of Public Safety; Art Faulkner, liaison for 
assistant director for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Alabama 
Department of Homeland Security; Jim Timmony, police chief, City of 
Miami; Mike Sherberger, director of the Office of Homeland Security, 
Georgia; Illinois, Jonathan Schachter, City of Chicago; Art Cleaves, 
director of Maine Emergency Management; John Cohen, Massachusetts 
Homeland Security;

                              {time}  1115

  Also Colonel Tom Robbins, Massachusetts State Police; Sid Casperson, 
the Director of the New Jersey Office of Counterterrorism; Jim McMahon, 
Director of New York State Office of Homeland Security; Brian Beatty, 
Secretary of Public Safety in North Carolina; Doug Friez in North 
Dakota; Ken Morckel, Director of Public Safety for Ohio; people from 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia; the Federal Order of Police; the 
International Associations of Chiefs of Police; and I could go on.
  So, here is a list, a brief list, of some of the people contacted by 
the Department as they came up with this idea to consolidate 
preparedness planning in a single place, encompassing all of the 
agencies of the Federal, State and local governments, people like the 
fire chiefs and chiefs of police.
  From the Major Cities Chiefs Association, a letter saying ``law 
enforcement across the Nation supports the President's position that 
the best way to prepare for a terrorist attack is to stop it from 
happening. We feel that the Department should unify the components that 
share this common mission. At present, the Prevention and Protection 
Grants plans and intelligence are each in separate agencies. Long 
overdue, the Nation would be well served by DHS directorate committed 
solely to protecting the American people. For the first time, the 
chiefs of police say, ``local law enforcement could work with a single 
DHS directorate focused on our common goal to protect the American 
people from another terrorist attack.''
  Chiefs of police, fire chiefs, first responders, State and local 
directors of homeland security all say the same thing: We have got to 
consolidate and bring in one place the preparedness planning practice 
within Homeland.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, it amazes me that Secretary Chertoff thinks there has 
been no structural change to FEMA. I think everyone in the world knows 
there has been a structural change to FEMA. It was an independent, 
free-standing agency; now it is a weak part of a weak department. Where 
are the records of all these people that the Secretary has talked to? 
Maybe Congress, before we approve some fundamental restructuring, 
should hear from one, two, three, maybe five outside witnesses, maybe 
from some who ran FEMA when it was a good functioning agency even.
  There has been no outside testimony that I know of. There was not in 
our committee. There was not in the authorizing committee that I know 
of. Maybe there was someplace. But let us have some people come and 
testify to us so we can ask questions. That has not happened.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Price).
  (Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in favor of 
the motion to instruct conferees to reject Secretary Chertoff's plan to 
further weaken and gut FEMA.
  I and many of my colleagues have been raising these concerns about 
the systematic deconstruction of FEMA and about reduced funding for our 
first responders for many years now. Current and former FEMA officials 
told me months ago that FEMA had become a hollowed-out agency and that 
it was one major disaster short of collapse. Unfortunately, Katrina was 
the disaster that substantiated that claim.
  We should not be satisfied in laying the blame solely on the former 
FEMA director. Two years ago, FEMA put out a warning that two-thirds of 
our fire departments operate with staffing levels that do not meet the 
minimum safe levels required by OSHA and the National Fire Protection 
Association. What was the administration's response to that? It 
proposed zeroing out the SAFER hiring program for firefighters and 
proposed massive cuts to fire equipment grants. FEMA officials had 
publicly called these grants one of the ``best bangs for the buck the 
taxpayer gets.''
  Overall, we are providing less funding for our first responders now 
through FEMA and the Department of Justice than we did prior to 9/11. 
When I asked Secretary Ridge 2 years ago why this administration was 
cutting funding for police and other first responders, his response was 
that supporting local law enforcement was not the Federal Government's 
responsibility, no matter that they were the linchpin in all of the 
Department of Homeland Security's planning.
  Time and again, we have also warned of the dangers of moving away 
from an ``all-hazards'' approach to preparedness and response, to a 
terrorism-only approach.
  FEMA used to be one of the leanest and most effective agencies in the 
Federal Government. But then its cabinet level position was taken away 
by the Bush administration. It was buried under tons of homeland 
security bureaucracy. Its top posts were stripped

[[Page H8400]]

of experts and filled with campaign workers and friends of people in 
power. Some of its best programs were taken away and stuffed into other 
offices in Homeland Security.
  As former Director Mike Brown testified yesterday, FEMA was de-
prioritized in Homeland Security and lost its political power, access 
and funding. Its failure after Katrina was the result of a series of 
decisions to under-fund key agency functions, to cut key personnel, and 
to de-emphasize preparation for natural disasters. That failure had 
dire consequences.
  I am not saying this to play the political blame game. I am saying it 
because we have to understand that this was the consequence of years of 
neglect of FEMA and of our first responders by this administration and 
this Congress. We need to understand this so we do not repeat these 
same mistakes.
  Instead of learning from the mistakes of FEMA, the Department of 
Homeland Security appears intent on plowing ahead with plans to further 
bury FEMA in the departmental bureaucracy and now to strip it of its 
planning and preparedness responsibility. Republican leaders of this 
House seem inclined to go along with that. But our vote today will show 
whether politics and partisanship will trump sound policy.
  Mr. Speaker, we exist as an institution to do more than just stay in 
power. We ought to do what is right for the American people. Further 
dismantling and burying FEMA is wrong. Further cutting funding and 
support for our first responders is wrong.
  When we make decisions that are based on a refusal to admit a 
mistake, rather than a determination to learn from our mistakes, 
Americans suffer and we lose some of our greatness. So I ask my 
colleagues to support this motion to instruct.
  Things are bad enough. Let us not make them worse.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Hastings), the ranking member of the Committee on Rules.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota 
(Mr. Sabo) began this discussion by saying we need smart, experienced 
and independent people to take a hard look at the problems Katrina 
exposed and identify solutions before we move organizational boxes 
again. I cannot agree more. This motion to instruct is timely, and I 
urge Members to support it.
  The truth of the matter is, what Congress needs to do is what we were 
taught as children, and that is to count to 10 and take a deep breath 
when there is a problem.
  Listen, we are not playing pin the tail on the elephant or the 
donkey. We are dealing with tragic consequences of our fellow 
Americans. Before shuffling boxes, we need a clear, unambiguous plan 
for disaster preparedness, not something prepared in a back room.
  We are 4 years out from 9/11, and obviously are woefully unprepared 
for disaster. The majority is going forward with a 5-month, $500,000 
investigation into what went wrong in Katrina, and that should 
complement an independent investigation into what went right and what 
went wrong.
  How do we do what the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) says? How 
do you integrate the military, how do you integrate the faith-based 
institutions, how do you integrate the volunteers? Where is the 
national registry for physicians?
  We have not settled the issues from last year's storms and we 
continue to use the term ``Katrina,'' but there was an Ophelia and 
there is a Rita, and America's problems are continuing. Pass this 
motion to instruct.
  Mr. SABO. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am on the authorizing 
committee of the Committee on Homeland Security of this Congress, but I 
am also someone who has just recently returned from the area of Rita, 
and I hope that our vernacular will now be Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to support this motion to instruct. I respect my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle and I would hope that we 
would break the firewall of partisanship and establish a bipartisan but 
a forward-thinking mode to deal with the haplessness and helplessness 
of Americans.
  Many Americans will face tragedy in their life, either by fire, 
volcano, earthquake, inland flooding or what we experienced, the 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. So the question is 
not to accept what Secretary Chertoff has offered, a man who may be in 
many ways qualified, but himself having no experience in understanding 
how to address the devastation of an ongoing hurricane.
  The reason I know this is because I was on the ground yesterday in 
the damaged areas, listening to local officials, hearing their pain, 
crying out for the simplest of items. ``Where are my generators? Where 
is my ice? Where is my water? Where are the airplanes to take my 
evacuees who are bedridden and nursing home patients out of this 
region?'' And the only answer they had was deadening silence, or the 
silence of generators sitting in buildings because there was no one to 
give a single order.
  That is what is the problem, there is no one in charge, and moving 
boxes, Secretary Chertoff, is not the answer.
  Support this motion to instruct, so that we can address the lives 
that are lost and those who are surviving in Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita. We are sick and tired of being sick and tired of being 
ignored.


                ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). The Chair would admonish 
Members to address their remarks to the Chair, and not to others in the 
second person.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, on this motion, there is lots of rhetoric here, but we 
are simply saying, let us take the time to think. Shortly after the 
flood with Katrina, somebody asked me what I thought we should do. I 
said we should do something unusual in this place, take the time to 
think before we jump to a conclusion.
  Here we have plans by an agency developed some time ago that we 
really have not looked at in Congress. Maybe everything that the 
Secretary says is true. Maybe I am wrong and he is right; we should not 
have an enhanced FEMA, we should have a weakened FEMA. But let us look 
at it before we rush to say to do it.
  I do not think you can separate preparedness from people with the 
responsibility to carry it through. Henry Ford once said he did not 
want a ``planned society,'' but he wanted a ``planning society.'' The 
two are very fundamentally different. One is that you have a process of 
thinking what you are going to do, and I think ultimately it has to be 
tied in to those folks who were involved in implementing whatever plans 
you are developing, which are constantly evolving.
  Here we come with somebody who, it may look good to a lawyer who 
likes a good, concise brief, but has not been involved in the day-to-
day responding to emergencies.

                              {time}  1130

  The people I hear him talk to who respond to emergencies tell me that 
it is just a very fundamental mistake to separate preparedness from the 
people who implement those preparedness plans.
  So, Mr. Speaker, if you want us to take a pause, think before we act, 
to think before we let the Department act, vote ``yes'' on the Sabo 
motion if we think there is a better chance we might do it right in the 
end.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of 
the time.
  Mr. Speaker, when Secretary Chertoff became the Secretary of the new 
Department, he declared sort of a moratorium; and he went off with his 
staff, and they began to discuss and think and plan about how to 
improve the Department's capability to respond and prevent attacks 
either by nature or by man; homeland security.
  And one of the biggest things they found was that in the different 
Departments of the government, there were agencies that had something 
to do with responding to an emergency and being prepared for that, but 
separate and apart from each other.
  For example, the Coast Guard had their own preparedness group that

[[Page H8401]]

plans what they should do in an emergency. Of course, States have their 
own plans, as they should. And local officials, mayors and the like, 
have their own plans for response and preparedness. The military has 
obviously planned for disasters. They have been prepared. And, of 
course, the National Guard, the same way. The Corps of Engineers have 
their own unit that deals with preparedness for disasters, and we could 
go on. All across this government there are agencies within all of 
these, or many of these Departments that are preparing for disasters.
  The Secretary said we need an agency within Homeland Security where 
all of these groups can come together under one roof and participate 
and plan as one unit, not just the agencies of the Federal Government, 
but States and localities as well. He went out, his people went out and 
they talked to hundreds, literally hundreds of directors of State 
homeland security groups, of fire chiefs and police and the first 
responders all over the country, and there came back from all of those 
people the unanimous idea: we need a single place where we can all go, 
and know to go, both to plan and to inquire.
  So that now, in this plan that the Secretary has, the police and the 
firemen and the State emergency directors, as well as the Federal 
agencies, all of them from the Coast Guard to the Secret Service, all 
can come together in one place and do nothing but planning. They are 
not concerned about doing the operational part of responding to an 
emergency, that is FEMA and the various agencies. But for the planning 
purposes, they want to be together.
  So the Secretary says, okay, that is the way it shall be. And in his 
reorganization plan, he agreed with all of the police chiefs and the 
fire chiefs, the State planning directors, the emergency planners in 
each State, the homeland security people in the States, and mayors, he 
agreed with them and gave them what they wanted: a single place.
  Let us not have another Katrina. Let us work together so that we each 
know what we are supposed to do in the event that a disaster occurs.
  So I urge my colleagues to reject this motion to instruct conferees. 
Let these experts do their work. I am no expert on how to respond to a 
fire or a disaster. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo) may know 
more than I, but I doubt he is an expert either. We have experts who do 
nothing but this. Let us put the experts in charge, and let them tell 
us what we need to do, and let us then follow along and do what has to 
be done to save lives.
  The bottom line: if you are happy with the way FEMA planned for 
Katrina, vote Sabo. If you think we can improve and we can do better in 
planning for the next disaster, reject Sabo. Vote ``no.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). Without objection, the 
previous question is ordered on the motion to instruct.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct 
offered by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this question will 
be postponed.

                          ____________________