[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 121 (Monday, September 26, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10395-S10414]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                           Senate Priorities

  Mr. President, in the days and weeks since Katrina, there is no doubt 
that the American people have done their part to help.
  I watched an interview over the weekend with a representative of the 
Red Cross who said they would soon be at $1 billion in money having 
come to the Red Cross from people of good will in the United States.
  I think the American people have done their part to help, but I 
think--and I say this with some hesitation but certainly with as much 
affirmation as I can--the Republican-controlled Congress has not done 
its share. It has been a month. We have seen Hurricane Katrina come and 
go. We have seen Hurricane Rita come and go. And here we are, having 
done next to nothing to get victims the urgent relief they need.
  Instead of letting the Senate address Katrina disaster relief in a 
comprehensive way, Republicans have spent the last 4 weeks debating the 
Commerce-State-Justice appropriations bill and the agriculture 
appropriations bill. These are important pieces of legislation but not 
nearly as important as the disaster relief measures that would give 
these people help immediately. These appropriations bills do little to 
help the victims. They do not offer us the opportunity to do more.
  These bills, when they come to the floor, are in a parliamentary 
fashion

[[Page S10397]]

where they cannot be amended except in very strict ways. People who 
want to offer amendments dealing with Katrina have to use some 
political gyrations to be able to get a vote, and that is a two-thirds 
number they have to come up with to have it passed, which is very 
difficult to do. So I would hope we could get to some of these bills 
quickly.
  I have said this before, and I do not want to sound like a broken 
record, but yesterday we lost three more troops in Iraq. I got a call 
late last night from Colonel Herbert, who is with the Nevada National 
Guard, a person who has devoted his life to the military. He said: 
Senator, I lost two of my men yesterday in a helicopter that went down 
in Afghanistan. He felt very bad. One of the pilots and one of the crew 
chiefs, both from Nevada, were killed.
  This morning I was at Bethesda Naval Medical Center. As I walked in, 
there was a man in a wheelchair, missing both legs, and obviously he 
had had some trauma to his head. The naval officer who was with me 
indicated he was one who had been in the hospital, then left, and now 
is back. But yet in the Senate we have not done a bill to take care of 
these people.
  In spite of the fact we have almost 2,000 Americans who have been 
killed in Iraq--we are spending upwards of $2.5 billion a week in 
Iraq--and that we are causing the ranks of the veterans to increase 
dramatically, we do not have a bill to take care of them. We have a 
bill, but we are not allowed to bring it to the floor. The Defense 
authorization bill, which sets up the funding and the other matters to 
take care of the active personnel who wear the uniform of the United 
States, plus our Guard and Reserve, plus the many obligations we as a 
nation have to our veterans--we are not debating that bill to do that. 
We spent a couple days on it.
  These bills average about 2 weeks before we finish them. We are not 
going to that bill because the Republican-controlled Senate will not 
let us. We are going to do something that is unusual. We just heard 
from the distinguished majority leader that after we finish the Roberts 
nomination, we are going to bypass the Defense authorization bill and 
go to the Defense appropriations bill which we have not authorized.
  What we normally do is we authorize within certain limits and then we 
bring the appropriations bills to the floor of the Senate and 
appropriate moneys for what we have authorized. We have not authorized 
anything, but we are going to appropriate, anyway.
  There are lots of amendments pending. My staff and Senator Levin's 
staff worked with counterparts on the Republican side Friday to say: We 
will get rid of all our amendments. We will have 10 or 12 amendments. 
That is all we want. We would have one that would relate to the gulf, 
to Katrina, and the other 10 or 11 would be related to the Defense 
authorization bill. There is still no approval on that.
  So those people who care about what is going on in Iraq--and that is 
most everyone--and those who care about what is going on in 
Afghanistan--and that is most everyone--should understand the bill we 
are not going to take up gives our troops and veterans the assistance 
they need.
  Senator Warner and Senator Levin, who are the chairman and ranking 
member of that committee, have provided in the bill before the Senate 
$21 billion in new spending for the military, $50 billion extra for 
covering operations in Iraq, and a 3.1-percent pay raise and other 
benefits to people in the United States military, which we are not 
going to be able to debate or vote on. We are not going to be able to 
amend the bill. That is too bad. It is really too bad. I think it shows 
a lack of respect for the people in the military, as indicated by my 
trip to Bethesda today.
  In addition to that, we made little progress on S. 1637, the Katrina 
Emergency Relief Act of 2005. This is a bill that we Democrats 
submitted. It is a relief plan to give health care, housing, education, 
and financial relief to those people who need it. It was introduced the 
week after the hurricane. We still have not been able to get an 
agreement from the majority--Senate Republicans--as to how to proceed 
on this bill. None of the items have made it here to the desk, but yet 
we hear people complaining that Katrina is going to cost too much money 
and they want to start making cuts in Government programs. I am happy 
to take a look at that. But the first place we should look is at the 
budget here in the Senate. In the Senate, we authorize and appropriate, 
we pass a budget, and then we execute that with something called 
reconciliation. The budget we are working on is immoral. And those are 
not my words; those are words that were written by the leaders--not 
some offshoot groups--the leaders, the chief executives of the major 
Protestant religions in the United States--Lutherans, Methodists, 
Episcopalians, and others. I read into the Record the night we had that 
measure on the floor a letter from them saying: The budget is immoral. 
Don't vote for it. It passed with a party-line vote. The Republicans 
passed this, what they referred to as an immoral document. Let's not 
execute that. These church leaders were visionary. They knew then it 
was immoral. Today it is even worse.

  What are we being asked to do with the reconciliation? We are being 
asked to give $70 billion in added tax cuts to the rich--$70 billion. 
We are being asked to cut $10 billion from Medicaid. Medicaid, a 
medical program that goes to the poorest of the poor, we are being 
asked to cut $10 billion from that. That is in this budget we are being 
asked to execute. We are being asked to cut student loans, to cut food 
stamps. If we want a big offset, get rid of the $70 billion tax cut 
now.
  Times have changed. Our priorities must change with them. America can 
do better. We can start doing better today with bipartisan health care 
relief for survivors of Katrina. We have all heard about how the State 
governments of Louisiana, Mississippi, and even Alabama are struggling 
to provide health care. But many States in the region and elsewhere 
that have accepted thousands of Katrina evacuees are facing a similar 
problem. There are 60,000 evacuees in Arkansas.
  We know no matter how hard these States try, they lack the resources 
to do what is needed, and many survivors will be left behind--and have 
been left behind. Only the Federal Government has the resources to 
address the evacuees' health care and other needs.
  Fortunately, Senator Grassley, the chairman of the Finance Committee, 
and the ranking member, Max Baucus, set aside partisan differences and 
recognized this fact, that help is needed--and needed now--and they 
have come together and crafted a compromise to ensure that Katrina's 
victims will be covered under Medicaid, wherever they are, with full 
Federal funding.
  This package does not provide coverage regardless of income, as my 
bill would have, but it is a good compromise. Senators Grassley and 
Baucus are to be commended. It will provide relief to many who need it. 
We need to pass this bill. We need to get the House to agree with this 
bipartisan approach so we can get the bill to the President's desk as 
soon as possible. We need to do this now. Proceeding with business as 
usual, while the administration relies on bureaucratic waivers on a 
State-by-State basis, will not, and has not, gotten the job done.
  The White House approach will not provide care, for example, to a 55-
year-old grandmother or father who has found a job but still needs 
health care. It will not ensure uniform coverage from State to State. 
It will not expedite the process for victims and States who have 
already waited too long. It will not ease the financial burden that 
destination States are being asked to shoulder, such as Arkansas. And 
it will not provide relief to the States hit by Hurricane Katrina. In 
fact, it may make their situations even worse.
  The Finance Committee bill enjoys bipartisan support in the Senate, 
and support from our Governors, State Medicaid directors, and numerous 
patient and provider groups.
  There is no reason to wait any longer. We were ready to clear the 
bill Thursday. It was cleared on our side. It was all ready to go. Not 
on that side. We said: Let's wait a couple hours. No. We couldn't do it 
on Thursday. ``Let's come in Friday to do it.'' ``No, we can't do it on 
Friday.'' ``Let's do it on Monday.'' ``Can't do it on Monday''--
although we are going to ask sometime today unanimous consent that we 
take this bill up and pass it. Our side has and will agree. I would 
hope we can do that. It is so important. States are

[[Page S10398]]

being hurt. They cannot bear the burden of the disaster that befell us.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). Under the previous order, the 
time from 1:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. will be under the control of the 
majority leader or his designee.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this afternoon, the Senate begins the 
debate on the confirmation of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief 
Justice of the United States. It is not an overstatement to note this 
is a historic debate. At the age of 50, Judge Roberts, if confirmed, 
has the potential to serve as Chief Justice until the year 2040 or 
beyond.
  Today, Justice John Paul Stevens, at the age of 85, continues to 
serve. If you project Judge Roberts ahead 35 years, it would be to the 
year 2040. Obviously, by that time it will be a very different world. 
There will be very different issues which will confront the Court with 
the advances in technology, with the advances in brain scanning, key 
questions as to how far the privilege against self-incrimination goes 
to scan someone's brain. Will it be like a blood test and fingerprints 
or will it be viewed as invasive and a violation of a right to privacy? 
Those are the kinds of issues which Judge Roberts will confront if 
confirmed as Chief Justice.
  He also has the potential to project a new image on the Supreme 
Court. That Court has been buffeted by a whole series of 5-to-4 
decisions. Candidly, some of them are inexplicable, where you have, 
this year, the Supreme Court of the United States saying that Texas 
could display the Ten Commandments outdoors, but Kentucky could not 
display the Ten Commandments indoors. There are some minor differences, 
but it is hard to understand how the Ten Commandments can be shown in 
Texas but not in Kentucky by a 5-to-4 vote.
  Under the very important legislation of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, the Supreme Court had two 5-to-4 decisions 3 years 
apart. One, in a case captioned Garrett v. University of Alabama, in 
2001, the Supreme Court declared the title unconstitutional which dealt 
with discrimination against the disabled in employment.
  Three years later, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of another title of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act which dealt with access to public accommodations. We have seen a 
proliferation of opinions with multiple concurrences, making them very 
hard to understand. Earlier this year, the Judiciary Committee took up 
the issue of what was happening in Guantanamo, and a study was 
undertaken on three opinions handed down by the Supreme Court in June 
of last year. On one case, they couldn't get a majority, a plurality of 
four, so there was no holding. In the other two cases, there were 
concurrences and dissents. You have a pattern which exists where 
Justice A will write a concurring opinion, joined by Justice B, and 
Justice B will write a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice A 
and Justice C.
  This is an issue which was considered during the course of Judge 
Roberts' hearings. It is one where a new judge, a new Chief Justice at 
the age of 50, will have an opportunity to make some very systemic 
changes in the way the Court functions. When Judge Roberts was 
questioned about his ability to handle this matter--first during the 
informal meeting in my office and later in the hearings--he said he 
thought he could handle it because, in his many appearances before the 
Supreme Court, some 39 in number, it was a dialog among equals. I was 
impressed by his concept of a dialog among equals, that he considered 
himself as a lawyer arguing before the Court to be dealing with equals. 
I have had occasion three times to appear before the Supreme Court, and 
it didn't seem to me like a dialog among equals. But when you have been 
there 39 times and you know the Justices as well as he does--and the 
word is that the Justices very much applaud his nomination to be Chief 
Justice--he has the potential almost from a running start to bring a 
new day and a new era to the Supreme Court. That is a very attractive 
feature about his projection as Chief Justice.
  We know the famous historical story about Earl Warren's becoming 
Chief Justice in 1953. The Court was then faced with Brown v. Board of 
Education, the desegregation case. There were many disputes in the 
Court at that time. They had to carry the case over. Chief Justice 
Warren was able to get a unanimous Court, which was important, so that 
contentious issue was one where nine Justices agreed and came down with 
an opinion which was obviously difficult to implement but had a great 
deal more stature because of its unanimity. So here is an extra bonus 
for the Court, an extra bonus for America, if confirmed as Chief 
Justice: the potential that Judge Roberts has to promote a new day and 
a new era for the Court administratively.
  On his qualifications, Judge Roberts was rated ``well qualified'' by 
the American Bar Association. It is understandable, since he was a 
summa cum laude graduate of Harvard College, magna cum laude graduate 
of Harvard Law School; had a very distinguished career as assistant to 
Attorney General William French Smith, after serving as a clerk to a 
distinguished Second Circuit judge, Henry Friendly; then served as 
clerk to then Associate Justice William Rehnquist; then, following his 
work with Attorney General William French Smith, became associate White 
House counsel; practiced with the prestigious law firm of Hogan & 
Hartson--Hogan & Hartson was prestigious before Judge Roberts got there 
but a lot more so after he was there and, frankly, after he left--then 
his status as a premier appellate lawyer; then the Supreme Court with 
some 39 cases.
  It was my view that Judge Roberts has a broad, expansive 
understanding of the application of the Constitution. He said:

       They

--referring to the Framers--

     were crafting a document that they intended to apply in a 
     meaningful way down through the ages.

  While he would not quite accept my characterization of agreement with 
Justice John Marshall Harlan on the document being a living thing, he 
did say that the core principles of liberty and due process had broad 
meaning as applied to evolving societal conditions. He is not an 
originalist. He is not looking to original intent. But he sees the 
Constitution for the ages and adaptable to evolving societal 
conditions.
  On the issue of how many questions he answered before the Judiciary 
Committee, I believe he answered more than most but, candidly, did not 
answer as many questions as I would like to have had him answer. I will 
detail that in the course of this brief presentation.
  I have observed, in the 10 Supreme Court nominations where I have had 
the privilege to participate on the Judiciary Committee, that nominees 
answer about as many questions as they believe they have to in order to 
be confirmed. But it has become an evolving process. A view of some of 
the history of Supreme Court nominations is relevant to see what has 
happened, what is in the course of happening, and what the next nominee 
may face.
  The Senate Judiciary Committee has conducted hearings on nominees 
only since 1916--that is, for the Supreme Court--with the nomination of 
Louis Brandeis by President Woodrow Wilson. Justice Brandeis did not 
appear. The first time a nominee appeared before the committee was in 
1925. The nominee was Harlan Fiske Stone. An issue had arisen as to 
whether there was a political motivation in the controversial 
investigation into the conduct of Judge Burton Wheeler. Justice Stone 
asked to appear to respond to the allegations. He did so, and he was 
confirmed.
  In 1939, President Roosevelt nominated Felix Frankfurter, who 
initially refused to appear personally, but after being attacked for 
his foreign birth, his religious beliefs, and his associations, 
Frankfurter decided to appear. He read from a prepared statement, 
refused to discuss his personal views on issues before the Supreme 
Court. His hearing lasted only an hour and a half in duration and did 
not set a precedent for future nominees.

  In 1949, Sherman Minton, who had been a U.S. Senator, became the only 
Supreme Court nominee to refuse to testify before the Judiciary 
Committee. Minton wrote to the committee:

       I feel the personal participation by the nominee in the 
     committee proceedings related to his nomination presents a 
     serious question of propriety, particularly when I

[[Page S10399]]

     might be required to express my views on highly controversial 
     and litigious issues affecting the Court.

  Notwithstanding Minton's refusal, the committee conducted its hearing 
in Minton's absence and confirmed him. It wasn't until 1955, with the 
nomination of Justice John Marshall Harlan, that nominees have appeared 
regularly before the Judiciary Committee. Only since 1981, following my 
own election in 1980, have the hearings taken on a little different 
approach as to what the nominees will answer. Justice O'Connor declined 
to answer many questions. The next nomination hearing was that for 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was a sitting Associate Justice. Initially 
Justice Rehnquist declined to appear, then was advised that if he 
wanted to be confirmed, he would have to appear. It was a contentious 
hearing. As the record shows, Chief Justice Rehnquist was confirmed by 
a vote of 65 to 33. He did answer a great many questions, although he 
did not answer a great many questions.
  I asked him a bedrock question as to whether Congress had the 
authority to take away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on the first amendment. He declined to answer. Overnight 
a Senate staffer brought me an article which had been written by a 
young Arizona lawyer in 1958 by the name of William H. Rehnquist which 
appeared in the Harvard Law Record. The young Arizona lawyer, William 
H. Rehnquist, was very tough on the Senate Judiciary Committee for the 
way it conducted its hearings for Charles Whittaker. Charles Whittaker 
was from Kansas City. There are two Kansas Cities--one in Kansas and 
one in Missouri. Justice Whittaker lived in one and practiced law in 
the other. A big to-do was made about the fact that it would be an 
honor to two States if he was confirmed, where he worked and where he 
lived.
  This young lawyer from Arizona, Bill Rehnquist, didn't think that 
amounted to a whole lot. He chastised the Senate Judiciary Committee 
for not asking about due process and other constitutional issues. So in 
the face of his declination to answer my questions on taking 
jurisdiction away from the Supreme Court on the first amendment, I 
asked him if he was that William H. Rehnquist from Arizona. He said, 
yes, that was true, he was.
  I said: Did you write this article?
  He said: Yes, I did. Then he added quickly: And I was wrong.
  So that didn't end the issue because having the authority of this 
young lawyer from Arizona, pretty good reasoning, I pursued the 
questions. Finally, he answered the question on could the Congress take 
away the jurisdiction of the Court on the first amendment. He said, no, 
the Congress could not do that.
  So naturally I then asked about the fourth amendment, search and 
seizure. Could the Congress take away the jurisdiction from the Supreme 
Court on search and seizure. He declined to answer that. I went to 
amendment five on privilege against self-incrimination. Again he 
declined. And then six, on right to counsel, and seven, and eight on 
cruel and unusual punishment. Then I asked him a follow-up question: 
Why would he answer on the first amendment but not on any of the 
others? As you may suspect, he refused to answer that question as well.
  It was my judgment that Chief Justice Rehnquist passed muster. It was 
a battle. And then Justice Scalia came before the Senate following 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Scalia would not answer any questions. 
As I have said--and really too apocryphal--Justice Scalia wouldn't even 
give his serial number. He would only give his name and rank. Prisoners 
of war are compelled to answer questions, but only three--name, rank, 
and serial number. But as I have said, and I have said this to Justice 
Scalia in interpersonal banter, he wouldn't even give us his serial 
number. But it was perhaps an exhausted Senate following the 
confirmation of Chief Justice Rehnquist or perhaps it was Justice 
Scalia's superb academic and professional record, he would not even 
answer the question as to whether he would uphold Marbury v. Madison, a 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1803 where the 
Court undertook the authority to interpret the Constitution and to 
interpret the law and to be the final arbiter of the Constitution.

  Then in 1987 the Judiciary Committee considered the nomination of 
Judge Bork from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Judge Bork 
had very extensive writings in law reviews and books, many speeches, 
had a very extensive paper trail, a controversial paper trail. Judge 
Bork had written that absent original intent there was no judicial 
legitimacy, and absent judicial legitimacy, there could not be judicial 
review. Understandably, the committee had many questions for Judge 
Bork, and in that context Judge Bork felt compelled to answer the 
questions.
  In the interim between Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, Senator 
DeConcini and I--Senator DeConcini being another member of the 
Judiciary Committee--had prepared a resolution to be submitted to the 
Judiciary Committee which would delineate an appropriate line of 
questions for nominees in trying to set some standards and trying to 
set some parameters as to what we felt, what questions were appropriate 
and what questions had to be answered to warrant confirmation. After 
the proceedings as to Judge Bork, we felt it unnecessary to move ahead 
with that kind of a resolution.
  The nomination of Justice Kennedy followed, and Justice Souter and 
the other Justices, Justice Thomas, who answered a great many 
questions, and then the nomination of Justice Ginsburg and the 
nomination of Justice Breyer. These nomination proceedings found the 
nominees answering some, not answering others, but essentially 
following the rule that they answered about as many questions as they 
felt they had to.
  Judge Roberts answered more questions than most. He answered the 
question about the right of privacy in a very positive manner in 
response to questions which I asked, which Senator Kohl asked, and 
which others answered. He said there was a right of privacy. He said 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v. 
Connecticut was a correct decision and he extended the contraception 
issue beyond marriage to those who were single, saying that right of 
privacy existed, and upheld the propriety of the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the Eisenstadt case. Other nominees had refused to 
answer such questions.
  I felt that Judge Roberts did not answer some questions which I 
thought should have been answered. For example, I asked him about the 
appropriate standard for testing constitutionality under the commerce 
clause. We found in United States v. Lopez in 1995 that the Supreme 
Court of the United States had cut back on congressional authority of 
the Congress which had been in existence for almost 60 years. Then in 
the case of the United States v. Morrison, the Court struck down 
portions of legislation designed to protect women against violence. 
They did so on the stated principle that they disagreed with the 
congressional ``method of reasoning.'' When I heard about that 
rationale, it seemed to me to be inappropriate. What was the Court's 
method of reasoning which was superior to the congressional method of 
reasoning? I find the matter of unique historical importance that the 
columns of the Senate are lined up exactly evenly with the columns of 
the Supreme Court.
  Interestingly, in an early draft of the Constitution, the Senate was 
given the authority to appoint Supreme Court Justices. I have seen or 
visualized, conceptualized a certain parody with those columns lined up 
exactly the same. When I read the opinion of the Supreme Court 5 to 4 
in the United States v. Morrison, striking down portions of the 
legislation to protect women against violence, I wondered what was 
there in the Supreme Court which led them to a method of reasoning 
superior to a congressional method of reasoning? What happens when you 
move across the short space of green between the Supreme Court columns 
and the Senate's columns?
  As the dissent pointed out, the opinion of the Court must have 
presumed some unique form of judicial competency. If you have a unique 
form of ``judicial competency,'' you must have a form of congressional 
incompetency which is hardly fitting in an analysis of cases and facts 
and a determination of

[[Page S10400]]

constitutionality with the separation of powers between the Congress 
and the Court.
  In the case of United States v. Morrison, the factual record exists 
``showing reports on gender bias from the task force in 21 states and 8 
separate reports'' issued by Congress in its committees over a long 
course of time. The dissent detailed all of the evidentiary basis and 
then concluded ``there was a mountain of evidence.''
  When I wrote to Justice Roberts by letter dated August 8 and August 
23, I had alerted him to this case and this question. At this point, I 
ask unanimous consent the full text of those letters be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                    Commitee on the Judiciary,

                                   Washington, DC, August 8, 2005.
     Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.
     E. Barrett Prettyman Courthouse,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Judge Roberts: I write to give you advance notice of 
     some of the issues I will be asking at your confirmation 
     hearing. In addition to identifying topics, I think it is 
     helpful to outline the background for the questions to save 
     time at the hearing.
       In addition to the commentaries of scholars and others 
     about the Supreme Court's judicial activism and the Court's 
     usurping Congressional authority, members of Congress are 
     irate about the Court's denigrating and, really, 
     disrespectful statements about Congress' competence. In U.S. 
     v. Morrison, the Court rejects Congressional findings because 
     of ``our method of reasoning''. As the dissent notes, the 
     Court's judgment is ``dependent upon a uniquely judicial 
     competence'' which implicitly criticizes a lesser quality of 
     Congressional competence.
       In Morrison, the Court invalidated, by a 5-4 vote, 
     legislation on gender-motivated crimes of violence involving 
     three Virginia Polytechnical Institute football players who 
     were accused of raping a fellow student.
       Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, interpreting the 
     Commerce Clause, held Congress cannot regulate ``non-
     economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
     conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.'' The 
     Court acknowledged the ``contrast with the lack of 
     Congressional findings that we faced in Lopez'' and the Act 
     was ``supported by numerous findings regarding the serious 
     impact of gender-motivated violence on victims and their 
     families.''
       Writing for four dissenters, Justice Souter referred to 
     ``the mountain of data assembled by Congress here showing the 
     effects of violence against women on interstate commerce.'' 
     Citing longstanding precedents, the dissent said:
       ``The business of the courts is to review the Congressional 
     assessment not for soundness but simply for the rationality 
     of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact.''
       Noting the obvious advantage Congress has in its fact-
     finding procedures contrasted with the Court's limitations, 
     the Souter dissent said:
       ``The fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue for 
     the courts in the first instance . . . but for the Congress 
     where institutional capacity for gathering evidence and 
     taking testimony far exceeds ours.''
       The Souter dissent further specified:
       ``The record includes reports on gender bias from task 
     forces in 21 states and we have the benefit of specific 
     factual finding in eight separate reports issued by Congress 
     and its committees over the long course leading to its 
     enactment.''
       From the New Deal Court in 1937 to the abrupt reversals in 
     Lopez and Morrison, Congressional authority under the 
     Commerce clause had gone unchallenged based on Justice 
     Harlan's rationale in the 1968 case Maryland v. Wirtz:
       ``But where we find the legislators . . . have a rational 
     basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the 
     protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.''
       In the face of decades of precedents and a ``mountain of 
     data,'' Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Congress' findings 
     because of our ``method of reasoning.''
       To this Senator, who has labored through 25 years of 
     intense legislative hearings and fact-finding plus prior 
     public service and experience in the real world, my immediate 
     reaction is to wonder how the Court can possibly assert its 
     superiority in its ``method of reasoning'' over the reasoning 
     of the Congress.
       The Souter dissent attacks the majority's ``'method of 
     reasoning'' dictum questioning the Court's judgment is 
     ``dependent upon a uniquely judicial competence.'' The 
     dissent then points out:
       ``. . . these formalistic contrived confines of commerce 
     power in large measure provoked the judicial crisis of 1937'' 
     so that ``one might reasonably have doubted that Members of 
     this Court would ever again toy with a return to the days 
     before NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation which 
     brought the earlier and nearly disastrous experiment to an 
     end.''
       The Souter dissent further notes the categorical formalism 
     ``. . . is useful in serving a conception of Federalism.'' A 
     reinvigoration of Federalism is, of course, the hallmark 
     agenda of the judicial activism of the Rehnquist Court.
       Even with the Souter dissent referencing the crisis of 
     1937, I do not suggest any move as radical as President 
     Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Court. I do see a great deal 
     of popular and Congressional dissatisfaction with the 
     judicial activism; and, at a minimum, the Senate's 
     determination to confirm new justices who will respect 
     Congress' constitutional role.
       My questions are:
       (1) Is there any real justification for the Court's 
     denigrating Congress' ``method of reasoning'' in our 
     constitutional structure of separation of power where the 
     elected Congress has the authority to decide public policy on 
     issues such as gender-based violence effecting interstate 
     commerce?
       (2) Is there any possible basis for the Court's 
     characterization of ``uniquely judicial competence'' 
     implicitly criticizing a lesser quality of Congressional 
     competence?
       (3) Do you agree with Justice Harlan's jurisprudence 
     concerning legislation on the ``rational basis'' test as 
     embraced by the dissent contrasted with the majority opinion?
       (4) What is your thinking on the jurisprudence of U.S. v. 
     Lopez and U.S. v. Morrison which overturned almost 60 years 
     of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause?
           Sincerely,
     Arlen Specter.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                  Washington, DC, August 23, 2005.
     Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.
     U.S. Department of Justice,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Judge Roberts: Supplementing my letter on the Commerce 
     Clause, this letter deals with Supreme Court decisions on the 
     Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which I intend to ask 
     you about at your confirmation hearing.
       Like my first letter on the Commerce Clause, I am concerned 
     about the Supreme Court's judicial activism which has usurped 
     Congressional authority by creating, as Justice Scalia's 
     dissent in Tennessee v. Lane states, a ``flabby test'' which 
     is an ``invitation to judicial arbitrariness by policy driven 
     decision-making''. The ``ill-advised'' result, as the Scalia 
     dissent further notes, is for the Court to set itself up as 
     ``taskmaster'' to determine that Congress has done its 
     ``homework'' which demonstrates lack of respect for a co-
     equal branch of government.
       Except for the swing vote of Justice O'Connor and the 
     dramatic image of a paraplegic crawling up the steps to a 
     courtroom, it is hard to discern a significant legal 
     difference between Alabama v. Garrett, decided in 2001 
     involving ADA Title I discrimination in Employment, and 
     Tennessee v. Lane, decided in 2004 involving ADA Title II 
     discrimination in pubic accommodations.
       In Lane, a 5-4 decision, with Justice O'Connor in the 
     majority, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act 
     in mandating access by a paraplegic who had to crawl up the 
     steps to a second floor courtroom to answer criminal charges. 
     In Garrett, a 5-4 majority, with Justice O'Connor in the 
     majority, the Court declared the Act unconstitutional in 
     seeking to hold the state liable for employment 
     discrimination.
       These decisions pose two major problems: (1) A lack of 
     stability or predictability in the law because the two cases, 
     decided three years apart, are virtually indistinguishable; 
     and (2) The Court's judicial activism in functioning as a 
     super-legislature.
       Dissenting in Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that 
     the majority referenced the same Congressional task force's 
     ``unexamined, anecdotal'' evidence that the Court had already 
     rejected in Garrett. Contrary to that assertion, the records 
     in the two cases, which appear to be similar, seem to contain 
     overwhelming evidence to support the Congressional findings.
       Title II of ADA involved in Lane was supported by 13 
     Congressional hearings and a special task force that had 
     gathered evidence from every state in the Union. Similarly, 
     Title I of ADA involved in Garrett was based on task force 
     field hearings in every state attended by more than 30,000 
     people including thousands who had experienced discrimination 
     with roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state 
     governments.
       Notwithstanding those findings, the Garrett Court 
     concluded:
       ``The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails 
     to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of 
     irrational state discrimination in employment against the 
     disabled.''
       Writing for four justices, Justice Breyer's dissent found 
     ample evidence to support the legislation noting:
       ``Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from 
     across the Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem and more 
     easily find an appropriate remedy.''
       The dissent makes three more related points:
       (1) ``Moreover, unlike judges, Members of Congress are 
     elected.''
       (2) ``. . . The Courts do not `sit as a superlegislature to 
     judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy 
     determinations' '' and
       (3) ``To apply a rule designed to restrict Courts as if it 
     restricted Congress' legislative power is to stand the 
     underlying principle--a principle of judicial restraint--on 
     its head.''
       In imposing liability on the states in Lane, the Supreme 
     Court justifies abrogating the

[[Page S10401]]

     states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by enforcing fundamental 
     rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. To do that, under the 
     Court's reasoning, there must be ``a congruence and 
     proportionality'' between the injury and the remedy imposed. 
     That leaves the Court substantial latitude, as a matter of 
     interpretation, to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional 
     notwithstanding the enormous evidentiary support for 
     Congress' public policy determinations.
       Justice Scalia's dissent in Lane attacked the ``congruence 
     and proportionality standard'' calling it a ``flabby test'' 
     and an ``invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy 
     driven decision making.'' The dissent added:
       ``Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress' 
     taskmaster. Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) 
     must regularly check Congress' homework to make sure that 
     it has identified sufficient constitutional violations to 
     make its remedy constitutional and proportional. As a 
     general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to 
     constitutional roles that bring us into conflict with a 
     coequal branch of Government.''
       Justice Scalia then carved out a new rationale for 
     disagreeing with the ADA's remedy, unmentioned when he joined 
     the majority three years earlier in Garrett, that the 
     Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state racial 
     discrimination and ``do not apply to this field of social 
     policy far removed from the principal object of the Civil War 
     amendments.''
       My questions are:
       (1) Aren't the ``congruence and proportionality standard'' 
     and Chief Justice Rehnquist's ``method of reasoning'' dictum 
     in Morrison examples of manufactured rationales used by the 
     Supreme Court to exercise the role of super legislature and 
     make public policy decisions which is the core Congressional 
     role under the Constitution?
       (2) Without invoking the ``flabby test'' and engaging in an 
     ``invitation to judicial arbitrariness by policy driven 
     decision making'' embodied in the ``congruence and 
     proportionality standard,'' wouldn't a preferable test of 
     constitutionality be the standard applied by Justice Harlan 
     to the Commerce clause in Maryland v. Wirtz, and again 
     invoked in Gonzales v. Raisch:
       ``But where we find the legislators . . . have a rational 
     basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the 
     protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end''?
       (3) Isn't there a lack of respect for Congress demonstrated 
     by the Supreme Court as Justice Scalia points out that it is 
     ``ill advised'' for the Court to set itself up as 
     ``taskmaster'' to determine that Congress has done its 
     ``homework'' and to strike down Acts of Congress as Chief 
     Justice Rehnquist did in Morrison by impugning our ``method 
     of reasoning''?
       (4) Using the maxim that ``hard cases make bad laws'', 
     should there be any place in the judicial decision-making 
     process to make allowances for the unique and sympathetic 
     factual situation in Lane where a paraplegic had to crawl up 
     the courthouse steps?
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.

       P.S. Following the release of my prior letter on the 
     Commerce Clause, there were misrepresentations that my 
     questions asked how you would have decided specific prior 
     cases. That is not true. The questions were carefully crafted 
     to elicit your thinking on your jurisprudence and judicial 
     philosophy as opposed to how you would have decided specific 
     cases.

  Mr. SPECTER. At this juncture, it might be appropriate to note that 
Republicans have the floor until 2:30, and if one of my colleagues is 
to come over, I may speak a more abbreviated period of time, we will 
have time for another speaker to take the floor before Senator Leahy is 
recognized under the unanimous consent request at 2:30.
  I asked Judge Roberts the questions which I had set forth in the 
letter that I referred to, What is an appropriate jurisprudential 
standard on the commerce clause? Is it the one which has been followed 
for so many years, which is a substantial basis for the congressional 
decision, or is it some ``method of reasoning'' which is impossible to 
understand even in the context of a record from a task force in 21 
States and 8 separate reports to the Congress?
  Judge Roberts declined to answer the question. I pressed him and 
finally said we would have to agree to disagree. But it seems to me 
when you have a question about philosophy, about judicial approach, 
about what is the proper standard to apply on constitutionality of a 
congressional exercise of authority under the commerce clause, that is 
the kind of question which should be answered, not sufficient to vote 
``no,'' but candidly the beginning of being a little bit tempting.
  Then I asked him about the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the 
two cases I have already referred to under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act.
  In Garrett v. Alabama, in the year 2001, the Supreme Court struck 
down a title of the Americans With Disabilities Act which dealt with 
discrimination in employment involving Ms. Barrett, who had breast 
cancer. And then, 3 years later with an identical record--the records 
are the same in all titles of the Americans With Disabilities Act--you 
had a striking case of a paraplegic, a case called Tennessee v. Lane, 
where the parapalegic had to crawl up the steps to a courtroom. The 
issue there was whether there was discrimination under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act on access. The Supreme Court of the United 
States, in a 5-to-4 decision, said that was constitutional.
  It is inexplicable how, given two titles of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act with identical records, the Court could find one to be 
constitutional and the other to be unconstitutional. I asked Judge 
Roberts about that. Again, he declined to answer.
  The Supreme Court in both Garrett and Lane adopted a brand new 
standard for testing constitutionality of congressional action under 
section V of the 14th amendment as contrasted with the right of the 
States for immunity from suit under the 11th amendment.
  The Supreme Court of the United States picked up a doctrine which 
they had adopted in a case called City of Boerne v. Flores. In 1997, 
when the Supreme Court overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993, legislation which had been very carefully considered by the 
Congress of the United States, the Supreme Court said that act was 
unconstitutional because it did not satisfy a test of congruence and 
proportionality. When I read that standard, I wondered what it meant. 
Congruence and proportionality. Where did the Court get this standard? 
They plucked it right out of thin air. There was no basis for this kind 
of a standard.
  Justice Scalia, in dissenting in the Lane case, said it was a 
``flabby test'' which was put into effect in order to allow the Supreme 
Court to engage in policymaking decisions, in effect, judicial 
legislation.
  The dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia in the Lane case took the 
Court to task for an ``ill-advised opinion'' where they acted as the 
taskmaster of the Congress to see that the Congress was doing its 
homework. Like the Supreme Court decision in Morrison attacking our 
method of reasoning, it seemed to me the Court had gone much too far in 
challenging the competency of the Congress in striking down 
congressional authority.
  Again, I ask Judge Roberts, what about this test of congruence and 
proportionality? Does it have any basis in the law? Is there any 
rationality in what the Court did in these two cases under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act? Again, he declined to answer.
  After talking to a number of my colleagues, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee will give very serious consideration to legislation which 
would give the Congress standing to defend the constitutionality of the 
statutes which it enacts. Standing is a very delicate subject and there 
are a great many cased where people seek to go to court to enforce the 
Endangered Species Act or to enforce a variety of laws. Congress has 
the authority to grant standing.
  It seems to me that it might be a good occasion for Congress to 
exercise this authority to grant standing to Congress. Why should we 
rely upon the litigants to defend the constitutionality of these 
enactments which we pass very carefully and very laboriously, as we did 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act? That is a move which might have material implications 
on reasserting the balance of power and the separation of power between 
Congress and the Court.
  If we have standing, we can have our own counsel, we can proceed to 
brief the cases, we can proceed to have someone argue it on our behalf. 
We may be able to stop the flood of actions by the Supreme Court which 
have reversed acts of Congress, the actions by an activist Court 
engaged in judicial legislation and doing it under the guise of 
illusory standards such as congruence and proportionality, standards 
plucked out of thin air. They disagree with our method of reasoning 
when there is no basis for asserting superiority of reasoning by the 
Supreme Court over the Congress.
  When we talk about this judicial activism, we are talking about a 
form of

[[Page S10402]]

activity which is abhorred by both the right and the left on the 
political spectrum. My distinguished colleague, Senator Hatch, who 
preceded me as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and I have 
discussed the decision of the Supreme Court in striking down the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and it is one which candidly 
defies logic. But the Court decided to undertake that restriction of 
congressional authority, and it did so in that case.
  The issue of how many questions a nominee must answer will be before 
the Senate again on the next nomination to replace retiring Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor. The refusal of nominees to answer questions where 
the case is likely to come before the Court is, in my opinion, well-
founded.
  Judge Roberts answered more questions than many. Justice Scalia, for 
example, as I said, would not even comment on Marbury v. Madison. Judge 
Roberts did not answer questions where, in his judgment, the case was 
likely to come before the Supreme Court. If the case is to come before 
the Supreme Court, as a matter of judicial independence, the nominee 
ought not to answer that question.
  I said in advance of the hearings, and I said during the hearings, 
that any Senator had a right to ask any question which he or she chose, 
including how a case would be decided, and that the nominee had the 
right to answer or decline to answer as the nominee chose, and that it 
was my view that if a question did involve a question on a case likely 
to come before the Court, the nominee was within his rights to decline 
to answer.
  The public does not understand the issue of judicial independence and 
the ramifications of answering a question on a case likely to come 
before the Court. The public in the opinion polls wanted to know what 
Judge Roberts thought about a woman's right to choose. The public 
wanted to know whether he would uphold Roe v. Wade or overrule Roe v. 
Wade.
  It seems to me this is a classic case of the irresistible force 
meeting the immovable object. The immovable object is judicial 
independence--not to make a commitment in advance on a case likely to 
come before the Court--and the sort of irresistible object is the 
public interest in knowing.
  During the course of the hearings on Judge Roberts, Senator after 
Senator was moving right into the area of wanting to know how Judge 
Roberts would decide a case. I pressed Judge Roberts on the issue of 
stare decisis and on the value he would place on precedent, on Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, on some 38 cases where the Supreme Court of the 
United States had an opportunity to overrule Roe and declined to do so. 
I asked him about a doctrine which had been articulated in some 
quarters about Casey being a superprecedent and took a step on coining 
a new concept called the super-duper precedent. It has not landed too 
well, but sometimes these new ideas take a while to gestate.
  I believe the next nominee is going to face very close questioning. 
It is my thought, already expressed by a number of Senators--and 
Senators on both the right and the left--that Senators want to know 
more about the thinking of the new nominee than Judge Roberts was 
willing to give.
  Judge Roberts was able to run between the raindrops in a hurricane 
because of his unique talent; his record was so extraordinary that he 
was able to fend off many questions. A number of Senators have stated a 
reason for a ``no'' vote is Judge Roberts' refusal to answer questions 
and their lack of sufficient knowledge as to where he stands.
  It is a virtual certainty--in fact, you can strike ``virtual''--it is 
a certainty that the next nominee will have these questions and many 
more. Some would say that Judge Roberts would be replacing Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, so that when you have somebody perhaps on the same 
ideological line, although that is by no means certain from Judge 
Roberts' answers, the fact is you just do not know how Judge Roberts is 
going to rule on Roe v. Wade or other controversial issues. Again, I 
repeat, that is, in my opinion, as it should be as a matter of judicial 
independence. If there is any rule as to what happens, it is a rule of 
surprise as to what nominees do.
  There is no doubt that the hearings in the Judiciary Committee have 
become more contentious because of concern about the highly 
controversial issues, and it is more than the issue of choice in Roe v. 
Wade, it is the issue of congressional authority versus the action of 
the Supreme Court in declaring laws unconstitutional. It is in the 
issue of religious freedom as embodied in the Religious Restoration Act 
where there is concern from both the right and from the left.

  It was this kind of angst, this kind of unease which led me to the 
suggestion that the President defer a replacement for Justice O'Connor 
until the end of the June term, at a point where we would know a great 
deal more about Judge Roberts. But in the context where there are 
uncertainties as to two votes, it compounds the angst and anxiety as to 
what may occur.
  I called Justice O'Connor, as I said in the meeting involving the 
President, Senator Frist, Senator Reid, Senator Leahy, the Vice 
President, Chief of Staff Andy Card, and myself. I said I called 
Justice O'Connor and asked her if she would be willing to stay on--
obviously quite a sacrifice--and she said she would if she was asked. 
But that is the President's call, and the President has indicated he is 
going to proceed in a timely manner where the expectation is the 
nomination will be made, my estimate would be, shortly if not 
immediately after a decision is made by the Senate on the Roberts 
nomination.
  It is going to be a contentious hearing. The contentious quality was 
bubbling just below the surface during the hearing of Judge Roberts. 
There are a number of factors already stated, already articulated which 
would pose even more of a contentious issue.
  I ask unanimous consent, although I don't know if I need to, to 
introduce a bill at this point, and it is right in line with the issues 
involved in the Roberts nomination. That is legislation that will call 
for televising the Supreme Court of the United States.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is in order to introduce 
this measure. It will be received and appropriately referred.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
  The nomination of Judge Roberts to be Chief Justice has created a 
great deal of interest, and I think the televised hearings have 
captured the imagination of the American people. I have long believed 
that the Court ought to be televised. There is a certain reluctance of 
the Court for television as a change in practice and as a change in 
procedure, but there is much to recommend it.
  Televising the House of Representatives and the Senate has produced a 
great deal more public understanding on the important activities we 
undertake here and what we do.
  The Supreme Court of the United States in 1980, in a case captioned 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, set the rationale for televising the 
Court when the Supreme Court itself said:

       Instead of acquiring information about trials firsthand 
     observation or by word of mouth from those who attend, people 
     now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic 
     media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of acting 
     as a service for the public. Media presence--

The intended subject here--

     contributes to the understanding of the rule of law and the 
     comprehension of the function of the entire criminal justice 
     system.

  That would be true for the entire justice system.
  The Congress has the established authority to set the date when the 
Supreme Court starts its session. We have legislated that it should be 
the first Monday in October. We have the authority to establish the 
number of Justices--nine. We all recall the famous court-packing effort 
by President Roosevelt in about 1937. We could increase the number as 
we would choose. The Congress has the authority to establish a quorum, 
which is set at six for the Court to function. The Congress has the 
authority to establish a timetable for the disposition of habeas corpus 
cases, capital punishment. We establish the timetable for the Federal 
courts under the Speedy Trial Act. Of course, the final arbiter in all 
of these cases is the Supreme Court of the United States.
  So if the Supreme Court should decide that legislation enacted by 
Congress to call for being televised was violative of the Constitution, 
they would have the final word. But in the context where the Supreme 
Court decides the cutting edge questions of our

[[Page S10403]]

day--the question of choice, the question of the right to die, the 
question of the Ten Commandments, the question of establishment of 
religion, the question of the free exercise clause, the question of the 
death penalty, the question of exonerating the innocent--it is very 
much in the public interest, in my view, to have the Supreme Court 
televised.
  We all know the momentous decision of the Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Gore. On that occasion, when I walked across the green to attend the 
argument, the square block was overloaded with television trucks 
because of the enormous interest, but the television cameras could not 
go inside. At that time, Senator Biden and I wrote to the Chief Justice 
and asked that the Court be open for television. We received a letter 
of declination. As I recollect, the Court did have a transcript which 
was released right after the oral argument concluded.
  I believe proceedings of the Court could be televised with due regard 
to the security and safety of the members of the Court. Under the 
proposed legislation, the Court would have the authority in a 
particular case to stop the television if it felt it necessary.
  In conclusion, as we approach the confirmation of Judge Roberts to be 
Chief Justice, I urge my colleagues to take a close look at his record. 
The conventional wisdom is that the nomination is assured at this 
point. I believe that is true. Nevertheless, I think there is value in 
rolling up the score. We frequently cite the vote of 98 to 0 for 
Scalia; only three votes against Justice Ginsburg; 52 to 48 for Justice 
Thomas. I believe a strong vote for Judge Roberts would give him added 
stature. It is pretty hard to add stature to the Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, but I believe it would add a modicum of stature.
  As the President ponders the nominee to replace Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor, it is my hope that there will be balance maintained on the 
Court. With the uncertainties of the vote of Judge Roberts, the 
uncertainties of the vote of a new nominee, and the prospects of 
retirements in the immediate future, the composition of the Court could 
change, and the rule of law is structured on stability. The rule of law 
is structured on expectations being fulfilled, and reliance, and it is 
enhanced by not having sharp turns.
  The nomination of Judge Roberts to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist 
may work out to be a substitution of people with about the same 
judicial approach. Although it is far from certain exactly how Judge 
Roberts will rule, there is no doubt that Justice O'Connor was a swing 
vote, tipping the scale. I believe that is a factor to be considered.
  While I would like to see more women, a Hispanic, and more African 
Americans on the Court, I urge the President to name the very best 
person he can find. We could use a Brandeis or a Holmes on the Supreme 
Court. I am not saying we do not have one now, but if we do, we could 
use more.
  President Bush disarmed his critics by nominating Judge Roberts with 
his extraordinary record, and I urge the President to nominate the very 
best person he can, regardless of gender, ethnicity, or any other 
factor.
  I draw the attention of my colleagues to the full text of my remarks 
of Monday, September 19, 2005.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I appreciate the leadership of Senator 
Specter in this confirmation process. We stayed on track and on time 
better than at any time I can remember. We had a lot of people with a 
lot of strong views and ideas they wanted to express and they were 
given plenty of time to do that. We had 30-minute rounds of questioning 
and then 20-minute rounds. Some got more who asked for it. Judge 
Roberts was appropriately forthcoming under certain circumstances and 
appropriately failing to be drawn into discussions of cases that may 
come before him.
  I think things went well. A lot of people doubted whether we would be 
in position to have a vote this week, but the Senator from Pennsylvania 
was tireless. He stayed as long as it took. He listened to all of it, 
chaired the hearings, and kept us going straight, and made sure on 
occasion the witness had a chance to answer. Sometimes he was given 
more questions and interruptions than he was given a chance to answer. 
The Senator did a great job and I want to thank him for that.
  I also join the Senator in saying that one never knows what a judge 
will be confronted with 10, 12, 15, 20 years from now. We might as well 
get the best person we can get who can deal with those questions that 
are unanticipated now and who can construct a philosophy of the 
judiciary that will be healthy and faithful to the Constitution, to the 
people who have ratified that Constitution, who have elected the 
representatives, to be respectful of all of that, and who understands 
the proper role of a judge.
  I think Judge Roberts meets every one of those qualities. I think he 
is an extraordinary individual. Everyone who has been watching the 
hearings has been very impressed. I think he represents the American 
ideal of what a judge should be. The President deserves great credit 
for nominating the best.
  I asked Professor Fried of Harvard, who is a former Solicitor General 
of the United States and had himself argued cases before the Supreme 
Court--he is now at Harvard teaching philosophy of law--how would he 
rank Judge Roberts as an advocate before the Supreme Court, and he said 
the best, as so have certain legal magazines that rate the best lawyers 
in the country.
  I think the people like him. I think his idea that judges should show 
modesty and be faithful to the Constitution, his expression that the 
greatest threat to the Court could be judicial activism, where the 
people feel the judges are not faithful to the Constitution and are 
imposing their political views on the people that are not required by 
the Constitution, that this is a threat to the rule of law because at 
some point in the future the Court may have to call on the American 
people to do things they do not want to do, they may not be popular, to 
be faithful to the Constitution. To erode and give away that good 
respect the American people have for the courts and the law would be a 
mistake.
  I want to express how strongly I feel that our nominee is an 
extraordinary individual. I saw on C-SPAN today John Roberts' former 
coach and teacher, and he said he was the finest student we had in our 
school and the finest student the school has ever produced. He did not 
hesitate to say that. He coached him in wrestling. He played football. 
He was top academically in the class and cared about those kinds of 
things. He worked hard and he was honest. He said, I remember when he 
came up at graduation and they gave the award for the finest student in 
English, it was John G. Roberts; they gave the one for French, and it 
was John Roberts; in Latin, it was John Roberts; mathematics, it was 
John Roberts. He said nobody, none of the students, had the slightest 
doubt that he deserved those honors and he earned them, because of both 
his work and his intelligence.
  John Roberts went to Harvard to do his undergraduate degree, finished 
Harvard in 3 years, not 4, and was magna cum laude on his graduation 
from Harvard in 3 years. Then he went to law school at Harvard, 
likewise did exceedingly well, and was selected for Law Review, which 
is a great honor for a student in law school to be selected for the Law 
Review. I suppose some of us might grumble, but most people would 
probably admit that the Harvard Law Review is the finest, most 
prestigious Law Review in the country. His fellow members of the Law 
Review elected him to be managing editor of the Law Review, which again 
is an affirmation of their respect for him and his abilities.
  After law school, he clerked for Judge Friendly, one of the great 
circuit judges in America. This is the court of appeals that is just 
below the Supreme Court. I note that outstanding law graduates apply 
for these courts of appeal clerkships. There are not that many of them. 
They are very coveted and only the best students are selected.
  Judge Friendly, one of the great circuit judges in the last 50 years 
in the United States, would have been very competitive. Many students 
would have liked to have clerked for him. He chose John Roberts.
  After that, I am sure Judge Friendly recommended him--or however it 
occurred, he was recommended to Chief Justice Rehnquist. I believe 
Justice

[[Page S10404]]

Rehnquist was not chief at that time but a justice on the Supreme 
Court. He clerked for the Supreme Court, the very Court on which he 
will now sit. Trust me, it is an honor for a lawyer to be chosen to 
clerk for the U.S. Supreme Court, because they want the very best young 
lawyers who can help them decide the most complex cases. So I think 
that is something we should remember.

  Then he is in private practice. He goes to the Department of Justice. 
He is called over as part of Fred Fielding's efforts to bring the 
brightest to the White House. He found him and snatched him away to the 
White House. He was White House counsel under President Reagan, helped 
President Reagan carry out his agenda, an agenda that 48 States 
affirmed when he was reelected by one of the largest votes in history.
  Some have tried to say, oh, he worked in the Reagan White House. He 
was conservative and out of the mainstream. President Reagan carried 48 
States. He was not out of the mainstream. We have some leftists in this 
country who are out of the mainstream, but I do not think because he 
worked in the Reagan White House anybody could suggest he is not a 
mainstream lawyer.
  He later becomes principal Deputy Solicitor General in the Department 
of Justice. The Solicitor General represents the United States of 
America before the Supreme Court. That is the job many lawyers call the 
greatest lawyer job in the world, to be able to represent the United 
States of America before the Supreme Court. That is a great honor. He 
was the principal deputy. He argued cases there and in private 
practice. He has argued a total of 39 cases before the Supreme Court. I 
am sure there is no lawyer in America his age who has argued 39 cases 
before the Supreme Court. We have maybe a few lawyers in the Senate. I 
know Jon Kyl has argued two cases before the Supreme Court. I doubt 
there are any of us who have; maybe others who have done it. It will 
not be me. But 39 means he is a professional practitioner before the 
Supreme Court, a student of the Supreme Court, so good that when anyone 
else is preparing to make an argument for the Court, they want to have 
a moot court practice before John Roberts because he knows how the 
Court thinks, what the issues are, how the cases are handled.
  I asked him to explain what a Chief Justice on the Court does and how 
the Supreme Court works. He explained in great detail about how cases 
are tried in the trial courts, the U.S. district courts, how every word 
is written down. They have juries. They have lawyers who argue the case 
before the juries. The judge makes rulings on the law and the evidence. 
After the case is over, a transcript is prepared. If someone wishes to 
appeal, they do so, and they point out what in that record is in error 
and argue that the case should be reversed or some other remedy. They 
go first to the court of appeals, such as where Judge Friendly served. 
We have 11 circuit courts of appeal and the DC Circuit in the United 
States. They review the record. The lawyers argue why this transcript 
proved a judge committed error or error occurred. They argue why the 
case should be affirmed or not affirmed. They submit briefs on that, 
citing the record and the detailed facts, and why they believe their 
views should be affirmed. It goes up that way. They have oral 
arguments. Then the court of appeals judges meet, discuss it, and they 
render a written opinion. Then if someone is not happy with that, they 
can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
  All of this is already prepared before it gets to the judge. They 
have oral arguments, and then they have briefs. Then friends of the 
court submit briefs and everybody can submit briefs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time reserved for the majority has 
expired.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I ask to have 1 minute to wrap up.
  Mr. LEAHY. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SESSIONS. They meet with their fellow judges, they read the law 
and the transcripts, and they make a decision after all of that.
  I asked him, isn't that why, Judge Roberts, you ought not to 
blithely, here in this Senate committee room, start expressing opinions 
on cases when they have not had all the study in advance to clarify the 
issues?
  He answered that yes.
  Madam President, I see the distinguished ranking member of our 
committee, Senator Leahy. I will note he has worked hard to make sure 
that every opportunity has been presented on his side. He had every 
question answered. He got extra time for people who wanted extra time. 
But after hearing it all, I think he made the right decision in his 
choice to vote for Judge Roberts. He was an effective advocate for his 
views of his members and at the same time I think he made an 
independent decision that I respect. I enjoyed working with him and I 
think we did a pretty good job with these hearings--although my 
daughter told me not long ago, she said: Daddy, it was pretty clear who 
the brightest bulb in that room was, and it was not the Senators.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time from 2:30 
until 3:30 p.m. will be under the control of the Democratic leader or 
his designee.
  The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, we are beginning our debate today on the 
Roberts nomination. We know the vote will not come today, but I urge 
Members for him and against him to come and speak. I say that because 
there are very few decisions we face here in the Senate that are as 
consequential or as enduring as the one we face today. Few in our 
Nation's history have served as Chief Justice of the United States. It 
is a unique and significant position. Once one assumes it, he or she 
holds it for life. To put that in perspective, we have had 43 
Presidents. We have only had 16 Chief Justices of the United States.
  I explained last week why I was supporting John Roberts's nomination 
to be Chief Justice. It was neither an easy decision nor was it a 
hurried decision. But it was a decision that my conscience led me 
toward.
  I thank Senators Reid, Kennedy, Kerry, Bingaman, Boxer, Pryor, Obama, 
Nelson of Nebraska, and others for their thoughtful remarks these past 
few days. I commend to the Senate each of the statements on both sides 
made in the Judiciary Committee meeting on Thursday.
  I must say, as the Democratic leader of that committee, I believe the 
Democratic Senators distinguished themselves by the thoughtful manner 
in which they proceeded. The hearing record upon which the Senate can 
draw in making this decision is as full as it is largely through their 
diligence. Now each Senator has to carefully weigh this question and 
decide it for himself or herself.
  Regardless of how Senators decide to vote on this nomination, the 
Democratic members of the Judiciary Committee can all be proud that we 
have done our job, we have fulfilled our constitutional responsibility 
to fully, fairly, and openly review this nomination on its merits. For 
that I thank them all.
  I note that it is true that Democratic Senators are not all voting in 
lockstep. Each Senator individually gave this nomination serious 
consideration. They each honored their constitutional duty and their 
obligation to the American people in reviewing this nomination.
  Democratic Senators kept open minds throughout this process, unlike 
some partisan cheerleaders who rallied to endorse the White House 
decision long before the first day of hearings opened. I urged my 
colleagues on this side of the aisle to wait until we had the hearings 
before they made a decision either for or against the nominee. I 
thought that was the most responsible thing for any Senator to do.
  I have served in the Senate for more than 30 years, much of that time 
on the Judiciary Committee. This is the 11th Supreme Court Justice 
nomination on which I cast my vote. I am one vote out of 100, but I 
recognize that those 100 of us privileged to serve in the Senate are 
entrusted with protecting the rights of 280 million of our fellow 
citizens. Just think for a moment, the Chief Justice is there to 
protect the rights of all 280 million Americans. Only 101 Americans can 
have a say in who is going to be Chief Justice: The President, of 
course, with the nomination, and then the 100 Members of the

[[Page S10405]]

U.S. Senate who have to stand in the shoes of 280 million Americans.
  There is no entitlement to confirmation for lifetime appointments on 
any court or any nomination by any President, Democratic or Republican. 
Americans deserve a Supreme Court that acts in its finest tradition as 
a source of justice. The Supreme Court must be an institution where the 
Bill of Rights and human dignity are honored, preserved, and protected.
  As I considered this nomination, I reflected on the hearings and my 
meetings with Judge Roberts. While I believe Judge Roberts should and 
could have been more forthcoming, I was encouraged by some of his 
answers to my questions both at the hearings and during our nearly 3 
hours of face-to-face meetings.
  I took Judge Roberts at his word when he gave the committee 
assurances that he would respect congressional authority. His steadfast 
reliance on the Supreme Court's recent Raich decision as significant 
precedent, contravening further implications from Lopez and Morrison, 
was intended to reassure us that he would not join in what has been a 
continuing assault on congressional authority. I heard him and I rely 
on him to be true to the impression he created. To do otherwise would 
greatly undermine Congress's ability to serve the interest of 
Americans, to protect the environment, to ensure equal justice, and to 
provide health care and other basic resources that are so vitally 
important to some of our neediest citizens. I think he knows that now.
  I was also struck by Judge Roberts's admiration for Justice Robert 
Jackson and for Justice Jackson's protection of fundamental rights, 
including the right of unpopular speech under the first amendment. We 
all know we don't have to fight to protect popular speech. It protects 
itself. We have to fight to protect unpopular speech under the first 
amendment. Justice Jackson's protection of unpopular speech, and his 
willingness to serve as a check on Presidential authority, are among 
the finest actions by any Justice in our history.
  I expect Judge Roberts to act in the tradition of Justice Jackson and 
serve as an independent check on the President. When he joins the 
Supreme Court, he can no longer simply defer to Presidential authority. 
We know we are in a period in which the executive has had a complicit--
and I believe compliant--Republican Congress that has not served as an 
effective check or balance. Without the Court to fulfill its own 
constitutional role as check and balance, excess will continue; the 
balance will be further tilted.
  Justice Roberts said he went to law school because of his love of the 
law and the rule of law. I was struck by that comment. I was struck by 
it because it was the same thing that motivated me when I entered 
Georgetown Law School here in this city. The purpose of the law is to 
serve justice. A Justice on our highest Court needs to know in his 
core, in his entire being, that the words engraved in the Vermont 
marble on the Supreme Court building are not just ``Under Law'' but 
``Equal Justice Under Law,'' and that under our great national charter 
it is not just the rule of law that a Justice must serve but the cause 
of justice. The rule is there so we can serve the cause of justice.
  As Chief Justice, John Roberts will be responsible for the way in 
which the judicial branch administers justice for all Americans. I was 
encouraged that he said he would provide a fifth vote in staying an 
execution when four other Justices voted to review a capital case. 
Effective judicial review is all the more important in an era in which 
so many innocent citizens have been sent to death row.
  I respect those who come to different conclusions about this 
nomination. Actually, when I listened to those who came to different 
conclusions, I readily acknowledge the unknowable at this moment. 
Perhaps they are right and I am wrong. Only time will tell. But in my 
judgment, in my experience, especially in my conscience, I find it 
better to vote ``yes'' than ``no.'' My Vermont roots, which are deep 
and cherished in my family, have always told me to go with my 
conscience and that is what I have done in this decision.
  Judge Roberts is a man of integrity. For me, a vote to confirm 
requires faith that the words he spoke to us had meaning. I take him at 
his word that he does not have an ideological agenda and that he will 
be his own man as Chief Justice. I take him at his word that he will 
steer the Court to serve as an appropriate check of potential abuses of 
Presidential power. I hope and trust he will.
  This nomination process we complete this week provides some important 
lessons for the President as he renews his efforts to select a 
successor to Justice O'Connor. Last week Chairman Specter--I might add, 
parenthetically, a chairman who ran a superb hearing in the best 
tradition of the Senate, making sure that both Republicans and 
Democrats were heard and that questions were asked--and I, along with 
the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate, met with President 
Bush. I urged him to follow through with meaningful consultation this 
time, to share with us his intentions, and to seek our advice before he 
chooses; to use both parts of the advice and consent clause of the 
Constitution.
  I remain concerned by the administration's lack of cooperation with 
the Senate on Judge Roberts's nomination. We did start off well with 
some early efforts at consultation. I praised the President for that. 
But then those early efforts didn't result in meaningful discussions.
  The President's naming of Judge Roberts, first to replace Justice 
O'Connor and then swapping that for the vacancy left by Justice 
Rehnquist, came as a surprise both to Republicans and Democrats, not as 
a result of meaningful consultation. I believe there could and should 
have been consultation with the Senate on the nomination of someone to 
serve as the 17th Chief Justice of the United States, and I am sorry 
there was not. Many other Senators, including many Republican Senators, 
have offered similar advice.
  Chairman Specter has appropriately counseled that the next nominee 
should be someone who promotes stability on the Court, much like 
Justice O'Connor. Senator Graham urged the President to listen to 
Democrats and what we have to say as he considers his next nominee. 
What we are saying could easily be summed up by quoting the President's 
campaign promise. We are asking him, in this case especially, to be a 
uniter, not a divider, for the sake of the country--not for the sake of 
the 100 Senators but for the sake of the country.
  I thought the White House did not help the Roberts nomination by 
withholding information that has traditionally been shared with the 
Senate. The Administration treated Senators' requests for information 
with very little respect for the constitutional role the Senate is 
expected to fulfill in this process. Actually, the Administration 
stonewalled entirely the very narrowly tailored request for a very 
small number of important work papers from John Roberts's time as the 
principal political deputy to Kenneth Starr at the Solicitor General's 
Office. This decision did not help the nominee. I suspect he could very 
easily have answered questions about those papers. But the choice was 
taken out of his hands, and the choice was made at the White House.
  That should not be allowed to establish a new standard because it 
would override the precedent from Chief Justice Rehnquist's hearings 
and others. Previous Presidents have had the appropriate respect for 
the constitutional process and worked with the Senate to provide such 
materials.
  I urge the Administration to go back to precedent, to work with us 
and cooperate on future nominations.
  Finally, some Republican Senators did not help the confirmation 
process by urging the nominee not to provide fuller answers during the 
course of the hearings.
  I say that because, again, I remind all Senators, it would be the 
same thing whether it was a Democratic President who made nominations. 
No matter who makes the nomination, Democratic President or Republican 
President, we are the only 100 people in this country out of 280 
million Americans who get to vote on the nomination and we should not 
start off by asking a nominee or telling the nominee not to answer any 
questions.
  I can't imagine too many of our constituents would like that. I know 
thousands of questions were mailed in by Americans from all over who 
would

[[Page S10406]]

have liked to ask questions, and they could not be asked.
  These hearings which we hold in the Senate are the best and only 
opportunity for the American people to hear from the nominee on 
important issues that affect all of us. The hearings we hold are the 
best and only opportunity to hear directly from the nominee about his 
or her judicial philosophy.
  The President asked for a dignified process and an up-or-down vote. 
That is what we accomplished in the Judiciary Committee. With the 
Senate vote this week, we will complete our action and grant the 
Senate's consent. The hearings were dignified and they were fair. 
Chairman Specter has every reason to be proud of what the committee 
accomplished under his leadership.
  And I must say, I was personally very humbled by what the Democratic 
leader, Senator Reid, said about the senior Senator from Vermont this 
afternoon on the Senate floor. I appreciate hearing that from my dear 
friend, Senator Reid.
  With the benefit of lessons learned from this nomination, the 
President is facing a new opportunity to unite this country around a 
nominee to succeed Justice O'Connor.
  I hope the President and those around him are listening this 
afternoon.
  Now more than ever--with Americans fighting and dying in Iraq every 
day, with hundreds of thousands of our fellow Americans being displaced 
by disasters here at home--now more than ever is the time to unite 
rather than divide this Nation. The Supreme Court belongs to each and 
every American, not to any political party or any faction. For our 
country's sake, for the sake of all Americans, no matter what their 
politics might be, I urge the President to make a choice that unites us 
and doesn't divide us.
  I will have more to say as the week goes on.
  I see the distinguished Senator from Maryland in the Chamber. I yield 
to her such time as she may need.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Thank you, very much.
  Madam President, I rise today to address one of the most significant 
and far-reaching decisions a Senator makes--the vote on the 
confirmation of a Supreme Court Justice.
  This vote will have an immense impact on current and future 
generations, because we are voting on a person who will lead the Court 
for the next 20 years.
  I compliment Chairman Specter and Ranking Member Leahy for the way 
the whole process within the Senate was conducted.
  I think we owe to the President, as well as to the nominee, a 
dignified process that focuses on intellectual rigor, substantive 
discussion, and plain good manners. I believe overall that process was 
indeed dignified and open.
  This vote is crucial. A Senator is only called upon to make two 
decisions in our career that are either irrevocable or irretrievable. 
One is the decision to go to war. Once we vote to go to war, to put our 
troops in harm's way, we cannot say a day later, Oops, we changed our 
minds or, 6 months later, cut off the money. Once they go, they go, and 
we have to stick with them.
  The other is the confirmation of members of the Supreme Court. Those 
are lifetime appointments, and they can only be removed for an 
impeachable offense, to be tried here in the Senate.
  So this decision is among the top two that we are called upon to 
make.
  We make budget decisions, and we can change it later. We make a 
legislative decision--most of our legislation is for 3 years' 
authorization we can always change it. But not this decision.
  The people of Maryland have entrusted me with the right to make this 
decision, and I take it seriously. I really pondered this and what I 
thought about this nomination. Two of my main questions were: No. 1, 
what will it mean for the fundamental constitutional liberties that has 
meant so much to so many? And two, what will a Chief Justice Roberts 
mean to our future?
  After a thorough and careful review of his record and his testimony, 
I must state now that I will oppose the confirmation of Judge Roberts 
to be the Chief Justice.
  I do so because I have too many doubts about the direction a Roberts 
Court will take us--persistent, nagging doubts about his positions on 
nondiscrimination, and the right of privacy in personal decisions, and 
in public policy.
  On nondiscrimination, I just couldn't get to what his views were. Is 
it thorough? Is it broad? Is it narrow? On the issue of privacy, his 
views sounded eerily like those of Clarence Thomas's that were given to 
reassure us, only to find that they are not what we heard.
  On the issue of discrimination, I am looking at very specific issues 
such as the Voting Rights Act, Americans with Disability Act, title IX, 
which has meant so much to combat gender discrimination in education.
  And, of course, on the right of privacy. What will this mean for 
personal decisions related to a woman's reproductive choice, or public 
policy in terms of where we are going to safeguard our records and 
safeguard ourselves.
  When I decided how I would vote on the nominee, I looked at three 
threshold criteria: One, is the nominee competent? Second, is the 
nominee a man of integrity?
  I believe every Senator knows, having both met Judge Roberts and from 
also reviewing his background, he is competent. He is endorsed by the 
American Bar Association. I also truly believe he is a man of personal 
integrity.
  But what about the nominee protecting core constitutional values and 
guarantees that are central to our system of government? I really do 
not know the answer to this question.
  Based on his writings and his testimony, as I said, I am left with 
these persistent doubts about whether he will safeguard civil rights, 
the right to privacy, and equal protection under the law.
  I have approached this nomination very seriously. I have approached 
it with an open mind and an open door.
  I have personally met with Judge Roberts. I found him to be very 
intelligent, to be very affable. Although he is personally appealing, 
personal demeanor is not synonymous with personal philosophy. Personal 
demeanor is not synonymous with judicial philosophy. It is not his 
demeanor that we are voting on. We are voting on what will his judicial 
philosophy mean to the Court, and particularly with his being its Chief 
Justice.
  When I looked at the hearings, they occurred as I was moving my 
Commerce-State-Justice bill. I put in a couple of shifts, which I know 
the Presiding Officer does as well--one shift being here in the Senate 
with my colleague, Senator Shelby, getting an appropriations bill 
through, and then I would go home and do a second shift and watch the 
Roberts hearings on C-SPAN so that I could hear his words personally 
about those answers.
  Then, after listening to the hearings, I reviewed the testimony. I 
reviewed his writings and I also reviewed the testimony of others.
  I was disappointed that we didn't have access to documents from 16 
cases that he prepared while he worked for Solicitor General's office 
in the previous Bush administration, which would have given us insight, 
even though similar documents were given when Justice Rehnquist was 
nominated.
  I tried to get insight into his legal reasoning and judicial 
philosophy.
  Is he smart? Yes. Is he experienced? Yes. As a young man, was he flip 
and a bit cheeky? The answer is yes. But put me in that column, too. I 
understand that. We all mature. But as we mature, we sometimes distance 
ourselves from those remarks. Yet Judge Roberts did not distance 
himself from those remarks.
  I was puzzled by it. I did not quite understand it. I read and 
pursued it further.
  In the hearings, he had the opportunity to let us know whether he 
would ensure personal rights, but he didn't clear up the uncertainty. 
He didn't back away from his record and his writings. He wouldn't tell 
us if he shared the views of his clients. Again, he left too many 
doubts about whether he will safeguard the rights that Marylanders and 
all Americans rely on each day.
  He did say that he would follow the rule of law. I believe that. But 
you

[[Page S10407]]

know, coming to a decision in the Supreme Court, unlike the lower 
court, is not necessarily only following the law. It is not a 
mechanical decision. It is not like punching in a legal question, you 
go to the 15 precedents and out comes the printout. This is 
interpretation of the law at the highest level. And the Supreme Court 
has the authority to create precedent, not only follow precedent.
  So I couldn't get to where Judge Roberts was going. Take an example 
such as civil rights. One of the most important civil rights is the 
right to vote--cherished, fought for both through social movements and 
our wars. Yet Judge Roberts left me with serious doubts.
  One of the most compelling testimonies during the hearing was that of 
Congressman John Lewis. He was a hero of the civil rights movement. He 
marched side by side and hands on with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. When 
John Lewis speaks, we listen. He raised questions about whether Judge 
Roberts would support the basic guarantee of the Voting Rights Act, the 
law that ensures every citizen may vote and that there should be no 
barriers, no publicly sanctioned barriers to participation in the 
voting process. Yet as a young lawyer in the Reagan administration, 
Roberts held a very restrictive view.
  John Lewis spoke about section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which is 
an important section because it seeks to remedy not only intentional 
discrimination and barriers to participation but also the effects of 
discrimination on under represented groups.
  Judge Roberts held a very restrictive view, as I said. He argued that 
only intentional discrimination violated the law.
  If that argument prevailed, it would have made it impossible to 
change discriminatory voting practices that stood in the way of African 
Americans voting and holding elective office.
  Let us take the poll tax, for example, a repugnant and despicable 
practice that has now been outlawed. The poll tax was a barrier that 
prevented African Americans from voting. But what could we do? Look at 
one person at a time? No. Section 2 bars it, because it was a 
discriminatory practice that affected a whole group of people.
  During the hearings, Judge Roberts could have clarified or changed 
his views.
  Yet he said nothing to distance himself from that very narrow 
legalistic viewpoint that would have maintained barriers to 
participation, and we have no idea what principles he might apply to a 
case that would come before the Court like, for example, on the so-
called voter verified paper trail. We do not know today where he stands 
on such important voting rights issues.
  Now to disability rights. He left doubts about whether he would 
provide disabled Americans with guarantees under the law for equal 
opportunity, particularly to education. Again, going back to being that 
lawyer in the Reagan administration, he wrote a memo attacking a 
Federal court decision that would have provided a deaf child with 
learning tools. He thought this was too burdensome on the local school 
system, local government and, therefore, the State. He believed that 
States should not be required to provide these same equal opportunities 
to handicapped children and that the burden it placed on the states had 
to be evaluated. He called the lower court's decision an activist one.
  What would this mean for disabled children? What would this mean for 
his interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act? This raises 
doubts for me as to if he would apply a cost-benefit analysis to other 
areas of discrimination. Certainly when we look at disability and the 
equal opportunity or an opportunity for education, we have to look at 
the benefit, not at the cost.
  And now title IX. That has changed the face of American scholarships 
and of American sports. Title IX, for those who might not be familiar 
with it, prevents gender discrimination in education. It says that 
schools that receive Federal funds can't treat men and women 
differently. That means there has to be parity--not sameness but 
parity--in the number of sports programs, access to classes, and 
opportunities for scholarships. That meant there had to be girl's 
soccer teams at college just like there were boy's football teams; that 
there had to be girl's lacrosse just like there was boy's lacrosse.
  Let's take a look at what that has meant. It was phenomenal. All of a 
sudden, girls were getting scholarships for basketball, for playing 
lacrosse, and for playing soccer. Aren't we proud of what we have done? 
We can only look at the Olympics and see our so-called ``all star'' 
basketball team lost to Puerto Rico, but our girl's team brought home 
the gold. People such as soccer player Mia Hamm passed the torch to the 
next generation, which will go on and win the gold and give us such 
honor. That is what title IX meant. It meant if you wanted to go to 
school and sports was your thing, you would not be restricted because 
you were a girl.
  In his writings, Judge Roberts argued that the only part of the 
school receiving direct Federal aid but not the whole school would not 
have abided by title IX protection. That would have meant schools could 
discriminate in their athletics or scholarships even when another part 
of the school got federal funds. In his testimony, he did nothing to 
back away from this view.
  What would the Roberts Court mean to millions of girls who now have 
access to scholarships? What would this mean to thousands of girls who 
right now this afternoon are heading for practice in middle school, 
working at it in high school, and ready to go? In my own home State, we 
are known for producing Olympic gymnastics stars, primarily out of 
Montgomery County, stars such as Dominique Dawes. Right now at that gym 
in Montgomery County are young girls working to either be able to go on 
to the Olympics, or if they do not make the Olympic team, on to make 
the college team. We should never close the door to that kind of heart 
and soul and hard work because of gender. Where would the Roberts Court 
be on that? Would he close that door? I am not so sure. That is why I 
come back to these nagging doubts.
  Finally, in the area of the constitutional, protected right to 
privacy, I appreciate Judge Roberts speaking on the right to privacy. 
He certainly said more on it than some other nominees have. Yet what he 
said does not tell us what he thinks about how far the right of privacy 
extends. He said he supported Griswold. Griswold upheld the right of 
married couples to buy contraception. Connecticut banned the sale of 
contraception to married couples. So under the right of privacy, the 
Supreme Court said that if you are married, you have the freedom to buy 
family-planning mechanisms.
  In many of his answers, he sounded as if he was assuring members that 
the right of privacy is settled law, stating that ``I believe in 
precedent,'' et cetera. But many of these answers sounded like Clarence 
Thomas, eerily like Clarence Thomas. Thomas said there is a 
constitutional right to privacy. He did not say how he would apply it 
to the most personal choices or what it would mean to public policy. 
Since Clarence Thomas has gone to the Supreme Court, we know he does 
not quite follow what we thought he was assuring us he would. In fact, 
I don't know if Judge Thomas really supports the right of privacy in 
the Constitution.
  Roberts followed the same script. He refused to clarify his previous 
dismissal of Roe v. Wade, nor would he elaborate on what the right to 
privacy includes. What would that mean to the future of reproductive 
rights? What would that mean to privacy rights in general?
  This is important because I am voting not only about today, I am 
voting about tomorrow. If Mr. Roberts is confirmed at age 50, he will 
be on the Court for the next 20 or more years. And we wish him good 
health. But just think how profoundly society has changed with the 
internet and information technology. Where we were 20 years ago. Where 
was the Internet 20 years ago? We did not have laptops; laptops were 
big boxes. What about 30 years ago? What was the computer? They were 
big machines in big warehouses.
  Twenty years ago, we would not have thought about privacy rights in 
this context. But now, because of the Internet and computerization, we 
think about all the issues related to our right of privacy. Think how 
they can plunge in with your financial records, your medical records, 
the so-called data-

[[Page S10408]]

mining where they know everything about you and find out all your 
moves. Who do you want to have access to that? Who do you want to 
protect your basic rights?
  What will technology mean 20 years from now? What will that 
technology mean in terms of right of privacy? How do we need to protect 
our privacy?
  Today have a national debate on privacy, the right for security of 
our country versus our own personal privacy. The right of search. The 
right, literally, of intrusion in our records. The PATRIOT Act would 
give us some sets of rules; the ACLU would frown on others. It is 
likely many of these decisions will go to the Supreme Court. Where will 
those decisions be made? They have to be made to serve the national 
interest but also to serve the principles of the Constitution. I am not 
dictating what the decision should be, but I can dictate who I want on 
the Supreme Court to listen to that delicate balance between preserving 
the security needs of our country with one's ability to be left alone 
from the intrusions of government.
  How would Judge Roberts apply the right of privacy in a world where 
all our most personal health and financial records can be easily stored 
and shared?
  So here we are now at this decision point. As I have looked at this, 
I have too many doubts about what Judge Roberts will mean for the 
Supreme Court--caused by what he said and what he didn't say. I believe 
the American people were entitled to know what he thinks. The American 
people are entitled to know if judge Roberts will be a protector of 
their most basic and fundamental rights. I would have been more 
comfortable if in any way he would have said how he was different from 
that young, cheeky lawyer trying to write up attention-getting briefs. 
Something that would have moved him to say: Oh, that was my client, not 
me. I never wanted him to say how he would rule on cases in the future 
or any pending before the Court. But I would have liked to have known 
who is this man for whom I am voting. What he believes is what he is 
and it will shape the Supreme Court for the next 20 years.
  Several times, I came right up to the threshold. As I said, there are 
many magnetic aspects about the Roberts nomination, but at the end of 
the day and after careful review, I have too many doubts about his 
commitment to nondiscrimination, the right of privacy, and equal 
protection under the law. So when my name is called for this 
nomination, I will vote no.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for a few minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Dorgan are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Under the previous order, the time from 3:30 to 4:30 will be under 
the control of the majority.
  The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak to the nomination of 
Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. to be the next Chief Justice of the United 
States of America. After a careful and considered review of his 
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, his overall record, 
and a personal meeting with Judge Roberts in July, I have concluded 
that Judge John Roberts should be confirmed as the 17th Chief Justice 
of the United States.
  I first want to express my deepest gratitude to my good friend and 
colleague, Senator Specter, who--as Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee--was extraordinary in leading the nomination process to fill 
the first Supreme Court vacancy in 11 years, the longest such interval 
since the administration of President James Monroe 181 years ago. 
Together with Ranking Member Leahy, Senator Specter ensured a thorough, 
rigorous, and civil examination of the individual who now comes before 
the full Senate for a confirmation vote.
  I have not arrived at my decision lightly. It has been said that, of 
all the entities in government, the Supreme Court is the most closely 
identified with the Constitution and that no other branch or agency has 
as great an opportunity to speak directly to the rational and moral 
side of American character, to bring the power and moral authority of 
government to bear directly upon the citizenry.
  The Supreme Court passes final, legal judgment on many of the most 
profound social issues of our time. The Court is uniquely designed to 
accept only those cases that present a substantial and compelling 
question of Federal law, cases for which the Court's ultimate 
resolution will not be applied merely to a single, isolated dispute 
but, rather, will guide legislatures, executives, and all other courts 
in their broader development and interpretation of law and policy.
  In the end, ours is a government of both liberty and order, State and 
Federal authority, and checks and balances. The remarkable challenge of 
calibrating these fundamental balance points is entrusted, ultimately, 
to the nine justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
  To help meet the extraordinary challenges of this role, any nominee 
for the Court must have a powerful intellect, a principled 
understanding of the Court's role, and a sound commitment to judicial 
method.
  Moreover, the nominee for Chief Justice must also, among other 
leadership skills, engender collegiality and respect among all of the 
justices in order to facilitate the consensus of majority, command the 
respect of lower Federal courts, and faster cooperation with the 
States' highest courts. And the nominee must have a keen understanding 
of, and a disciplined respect for, the great and tremendous body of law 
that precedes them to warrant our consent.
  These are the threshold qualifications against which a person chosen 
by the President of the United States to serve as just the 17th Chief 
Justice of the United States must be measured. And all the more so when 
our Nation would undoubtedly bear the mark of the nominee for decades 
to come.
  Indeed, given the age of this particular nominee, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that John Roberts may indeed serve longer than 
Chief Justice Marshall, who--with his 34 year tenure--still stands as 
our longest serving Chief Justice. If confirmed, Judge Roberts could 
well directly impact the Nation for a half century and for decades 
beyond. He would conceivably be entrusted with the ``care of the 
constitution'' for the next 40 years.
  It is against the backdrop of this reality that we also evaluate the 
record of Judge Roberts. And from a professional standpoint, it is 
clear that Judge John Roberts is one of the most highly-qualified 
individuals ever to be nominated for the Supreme Court, given his 
experience clerking for both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and 
the Supreme Court, and serving as counsel to a President, Attorney 
General and Solicitor General and given he is one of the most respected 
lawyers in the Nation who has argued 39 cases before the Supreme Court 
and currently serves on the second highest court in the land with 
unanimous consent of this Chamber just a few years ago. So I applaud 
the President for selecting an individual who indisputably possesses 
the professional credentials to serve as Chief Justice.
  Concurrently, however, I believe there are four additional threshold 
qualifications that are critical to assess and evaluate the nominee. 
They are judicial temperament, integrity, methodology, and philosophy, 
and by their nature, are more challenging to measure. That is why I 
have arrived at my conclusions based on a thorough analysis of the 
complete and accumulated record accompanying Judge Roberts's 
nomination.

[[Page S10409]]

  With regard to the matter of judicial temperament, the members of the 
Judiciary Committee rightly and vigorously questioned the nominee on 
the tone and content of memoranda he authored as counsel to the Reagan 
administration in the 1980s.
  Because these memos presented opinions on such critical issues as 
civil rights, the right to privacy, and gender equity--including a 1984 
memorandum regarding a letter I initiated as a member of the U.S. House 
of Representatives requesting the Administration not to intervene in a 
Federal court decision on the matter of women receiving lower pay 
because they often work in different jobs than men--I would have 
welcomed a more direct and forceful refutation of these documents.
  At the same time, Judge Roberts did testify that, ``Of course gender 
discrimination is a serious problem. It's a particular concern of mine 
. . . and always has been. I grew up with three sisters, all of whom 
work outside the home. I married a lawyer who works outside the home. I 
have a young daughter who I hope will have all of the opportunities 
available to her without regard to any gender discrimination . . .''
  Further, when probed about memoranda on vital civil rights issues, 
Judge Roberts's stated to the committee that he believes Congress has 
the power to guarantee civil rights for all Americans.
  As an example, when he was asked, ``Do you believe that the Court had 
the power to address segregation of public schools on the basis of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution?'', Roberts responded, 
``yes''. And when questioned by Senator Kennedy, John Roberts agreed 
with the approach taken by Justice O'Connor in upholding an affirmative 
action program within a university's admissions policy.
  With regard to the right to privacy, in responding to concerns that 
he characterized this fundamental right as a ``so-called right to 
privacy'' in one Reagan administration memorandum, Judge Roberts 
testified that he does believe the Constitution guarantees such a 
right, that he was representing the administration's views in his 
memorandum, and he elaborated that this right emanates from at least 
five different sources--the first, third, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth 
amendments--with the due process clause of the 5th and 14th amendments 
applying substantively as well as procedurally with respect to the 
right to privacy.
  To quote Judge Roberts: ``There's a right to privacy to be found in 
the liberty clause of the 14th Amendment. I think there is a right to 
privacy protected as part of the liberty guarantee in the due process 
clause. It's protected substantively.'' And specifically, he testified 
that he ``agree[d] with the Griswold Court's conclusion that marital 
privacy extends to contraception'' and agreed with the later Eisenstadt 
decision that confirmed this right for unmarried couples as well.
  And finally in regard to the qualification embodied by judicial 
temperament, Judge Roberts offered the committee that some of the 
memoranda in question owed their content to a more youthful discretion 
some 25 years ago and that others merely reflected the views of his 
clients.
  In the end, whatever one takes from the universe of exchanges before 
the committee, I have concluded that the combination of this testimony 
with the judge's current reputation among lawyers and peers for 
discretion, modesty, and humility is the more accurate and 
contemporaneous measure of the man whose name stands before us today.
  And that conclusion is buttressed by an examination of another of the 
threshold qualifications--judicial methodology--which directly reflects 
a judge's commitment to the essential tenets of fairness and judicial 
integrity.
  In making this assessment, it is most instructive to consider the 
emphasis Judge Roberts has placed on judicial process in adjudicating 
cases. Rather than a ``top down'' approach wherein a decision is made 
and then the opinion is written to support that position, Judge Roberts 
has espoused a ``bottom up'' approach to decision-making--meaning that 
he will work through the specific facts and law of each case, and then 
arrive at a conclusion based on that analysis.
  As regards judicial integrity, I believe we can all agree it is 
absolutely essential that a judge be fair and open minded. Our citizens 
simply must have confidence that a judge who hears their legal claims 
does not do so with a closed mind.
  A judge must be truly committed to providing a full and fair day in 
court, and to arriving at decisions based on the facts and applicable 
law, not on any personal agenda or ulterior motive. For it is when the 
latter occurs that the public justifiably loses faith in the 
independence and fairness of our courts.
  I conclude that no such faith should be lost here with Judge Roberts. 
He is, by all accounts, a man of sound character whose integrity is 
widely respected by Democratic and Republican lawyers alike.
  To illustrate the essence of his judicial integrity, I recall during 
the course of our meeting in July that he indicated it was not uncommon 
for him to author an entire legal opinion before reaching the 
conclusion that the reasoning was wrong leading him to a different 
decision.
  He also spoke at length about his year as a law clerk to the late 
Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit, one of the most respected 
legal minds of our time, and a mentor and legal role model for Judge 
Roberts.
  He recounted how Judge Friendly was assigned the duty of writing an 
opinion for the three judge panel that heard a certain case. But once 
Judge Friendly began trying to write what was supposed to be the 
majority opinion, he realized that the reasoning behind the ruling 
simply was not sound.
  So after a number of failed attempts, Judge Friendly finally 
circulated a folder to each of this colleagues containing two opinions, 
with this note attached,--``The first opinion fulfills my obligation 
for writing the majority opinion. The second is my dissent in the 
case.'' Judge Friendly's ``dissent'' was so persuasive that it 
ultimately became the majority opinion.
  Again, this is reflected in Judge Robert's approach that is 
demonstrated in his methodical writings and decisions.
  While serving on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals between 2003 and 
2005, John Roberts wrote opinions in 49 of 169 cases. And his final 
rulings in those 49 cases bear the very balance of his analysis. For 
example, he has ruled both for and against the government, both for and 
against corporations, and both for and against labor unions.
  Moreover, he has shown a capacity for consensus, writing separately 
in only 7 of the 169 cases before the Circuit Court. This record of 
collegiality would bode well for the current Supreme Court which can 
benefit from more consensus opinions.
  And of the 49 opinions Judge Roberts authored, only seven were 
appealed to the Supreme Court and all seven were denied. Again, all of 
these facts stand in testament to the meticulous methodology and the 
``bottom up'' approach followed by Judge John Roberts.
  I recognize that some believe that the fourth and final threshold 
qualification I referenced--the matter of judicial philosophy--should 
be a factor for Presidents, but it should not be one the Senate 
considers in its confirmation process. I respectfully disagree.
  In my view, the Senate must also consider the nominee's sense of the 
limits and horizons of the great promises of our Constitution, and of 
the nominee's specific view of the proper role of the Supreme Court in 
deciding whether to take such cases and, if so, the method used to rule 
upon them.
  The inquiry into Judge Roberts' judicial philosophy assumed 
particular significance for all of us who value the Court's landmark 
rulings. Decisions protecting the rights of privacy, of civil rights, 
and of women seeking equal protection in the workplace--just to name a 
few--comprise an important and settled body of the Court's case law.
  Entire generations of Americans have come to live their lives in 
reliance upon the Court's rulings in these key areas, and overruling 
these precedents would simply roll back decades of societal advancement 
and impose substantial disruption and harm.
  Therefore, central to the question of a nominee's judicial philosophy 
is his views on one of the cornerstones of jurisprudence, and that is, 
judicial precedent. Because it was once said--by a

[[Page S10410]]

Professor Walter Murphy--the Court is bound by the ``wisdom of the 
past, not the free choice of the present.''
  On this vital matter, John Roberts has firmly stated to me his belief 
that precedent plays a crucial role in the judicial process, and the 
fact, a precedent has been directly challenged and upheld deserves 
respect from the Court.
  In the course of our July meeting, John Roberts expressed to me that 
judges must keep in mind that they are not the first ones to address 
most legal issues that arise, and that stability in the law is key to 
maintaining the legitimacy of the courts. When I solicited his thoughts 
with respect to, Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision in the Dickerson 
case to uphold the Miranda decision even as the Chief Justice Rehnquist 
opposed Miranda itself, John Roberts concurred with the Chief Justice's 
principled deference to the doctrine of precedent.
  As Judge Roberts later indicated to the judiciary committee:

       I do think that it is a jolt to the legal system when you 
     overrule a precedent. Precedent plays an important role in 
     promoting stability and evenhandedness . . . It is not enough 
     that you may think the prior decision was wrongly decided.

  Furthermore, Judge Roberts is on record stating that nothing in his 
personal beliefs, including his religion, would prevent him from 
faithfully applying the laws of our land. As well, he indicated that 
nothing in his personal views would prevent him from applying Supreme 
Court precedent as governed by the doctrine of stare decisis.
  Thus, he acknowledged the crucial interest by the doctrine of stare 
decisis to promote stability and predictability, and therefore respect 
for the law. This commitment to stare decisis takes on, of course, a 
special significance for this issue of privacy that I and so many 
Americans accept and embrace as a basic and established right. So, 
essentially, with regard to a landmark case such as Roe v. Wade, Judge 
Roberts has outlined the process he would apply in reviewing such a 
challenge.
  Specifically, Judge Roberts explained, that, in essence, Roe is 
buffered by the Casey decision, which affirmed the essential holding of 
Roe and therefore serves as the more immediate precedent of the Court.
  And he responded to Senator Specter that Roe is ``settled as a 
precedent of the court, entitled to respect under principles of stare 
decisis. And those principles, applied in the Casey case, explain when 
cases should be revisited and when they should not. And it is settled 
as a precedent of the court, yes.''
  Mr. President, given the totality of the record before us, I have 
concluded from his testimony regarding both his judicial methodology 
and his judicial philosophy that Judge Roberts is not predisposed to 
overturning the settled precedent represented by Roe. Obviously, none 
of us can know with certainty how Judge Roberts would vote on any 
particular case. But we can assess his methodology and analysis in 
approaching cases, based on his responses to questions posed by the 
committee throughout this confirmation process.
  Finally, in meeting with Judge Roberts, I also expressed my view that 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's approach on the Court epitomizes a 
critical nexus between the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
and the ``real world'' impact of those decisions on the lives of the 
American people. As Justice Frankfurter once wrote, the most 
fundamental questions that arise from the Constitution are decided 
``not from reading the Constitution but from reading life.''
  That sense of perspective will be critical in fulfilling the enormous 
responsibility Judge Roberts will have serving as Chief Justice. And 
Judge Roberts has indicated in compelling terms that his approach is to 
stand back and consider the larger implications of any future ruling 
and I would encourage him to continue with that model on the Court.
  It is not an exaggeration to suggest that Judge John Roberts has the 
potential to become one of the preeminent Chief Justices in modern 
times.
  Of course, no Member of this body can forecast with 100 percent 
accuracy the shape of the Supreme Court under John Roberts. 
Nonetheless, in evaluating the universe of the threshold qualifications 
I have outlined, the entirety of the legal and judicial record 
regarding Judge Roberts points to a fair minded judge with deep respect 
for the rule of law, the independence of the courts, and the judicial 
method . . . a judge committed to stability in the law, and to the 
established judicial principles for reviewing and upholding precedent.
  There is little doubt that Judge John Roberts will have the 
opportunity to author a legacy for America that will reverberate for 
the ages. After intensive examination, it is my conclusion that the 
totality of the record before us, has earned him the privilege of 
writing that legacy as the next Chief Justice of the United States. 
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, the Constitution gives us a solemn duty 
when it comes to the confirmation of an individual to sit on the U.S. 
Supreme Court. While the President is to nominate that individual, it 
is our duty in the Senate to decide whether to provide our consent.
  When it comes to whether Judge John Roberts should be the 17th Chief 
Justice of the United States, I have little trouble providing mine. 
Judge Roberts is one of the most accomplished legal minds of his 
generation. He has argued 39 separate cases before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and he served with great distinction for 2 years on the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. He is certainly an eloquent 
spokesman for the rule of law, and he has received a ``unanimously well 
qualified'' rating from the American Bar Association, a rating that 
specifically addresses his openmindedness and freedom from bias and 
commitment to equal justice under the law.
  I will vote to confirm Judge Roberts. I encourage my colleagues to do 
the same.
  I think it might be helpful for us to consider this afternoon what we 
have learned about Judge Roberts over the past several months.
  First, we have learned something about his judicial philosophy. 
Judges should not make policy. They don't pass laws or implement 
regulations. Instead, in the words of Justice Byron White, judges 
simply decide cases, nothing more. Judge Roberts embodies this 
philosophy.
  During our hearing in the Judiciary Committee, he told us:

       The role of the judge is limited. A judge is to decide the 
     cases before them. They are not to legislate. They are not to 
     execute the laws.

  Time and again he repeated his belief that judges should play a 
limited and modest role. During the confirmation hearings, he said this 
to Senator Hatch, Senator Grassley, Senator Graham, Senator Cornyn, and 
Senator Kohl. He told Senator Kyl:

       Judges and Justices do not have a side in these disputes. 
     Rather, they need to be on the side of the Constitution.

  Judge Roberts explained his philosophy clearly and, yes, in plain 
English without using fancy words or resorting to long dissertations. 
By the end of last week, there was little doubt where Judge Roberts 
stood.
  He believes that judges play a limited and modest role and, to use 
his own words, ``judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the 
other way around.''
  Second, over the past several months, we have learned that the 
American people share our view that Judge Roberts will be fair, 
openminded, and modest as Chief Justice. We need to look no further 
than the editorial pages of America's papers to know that Judge Roberts 
has broad support.
  The Los Angeles Times put it bluntly:

       It will be a damning indictment of petty partisanship in 
     Washington if an overwhelming majority of the Senate does not 
     vote to confirm John G. Roberts, Jr., to be the next Chief 
     Justice of the United States. As last week's confirmation 
     hearings made clear, Roberts is an exceptionally well-
     qualified nominee, well within the mainstream of American 
     legal thought, who deserves broad bipartisan support. If a 
     majority of Democrats in the Senate vote against Roberts, 
     they will reveal themselves as nothing more than self-
     defeating obstructionists.

  The Washington Post has offered a similar sentiment:

       John G. Roberts, Jr., should be confirmed as Chief Justice 
     of the United States. He is overwhelmingly well qualified, 
     possesses an

[[Page S10411]]

     unusually keen legal mind and practices collegiality of the 
     type an effective Chief Justice must have. He shows every 
     sign of commitment to restraint and impartiality. Nominees of 
     comparable quality have, after rigorous hearings, been 
     confirmed nearly unanimously. We hope Judge Roberts will 
     similarly be approved by a large bipartisan vote.

  Papers from my home State of Ohio have also given Judge Roberts their 
approval. The Akron Beacon Journal, a paper that endorsed Al Gore in 
2000, and then John Kerry in 2004, called Roberts ``supremely 
qualified.'' They went on to write:

       Judge Roberts is eminently qualified. He has a sharp mind, 
     a sound temperament, and a keen understanding of the 
     collegiality required to run an effective Supreme Court.

  According to the Cleveland Plain Dealer:

       In selecting a leader for the U.S. courts, intellect and 
     probity are far more important than predictable political 
     philosophy. In the instance of John Roberts, it is difficult 
     to find, even among his most committed opponents, anyone who 
     will deny his intellectual superiority. His ethics are 
     unimpeached. He is, by all measures, a fair mind. There is no 
     reason to doubt that he will make an outstanding Chief 
     Justice.

  The Dayton Daily News described Judge Roberts in straightforward 
terms:

       Ya gotta like the guy. Judge John Roberts' 3-day appearance 
     before the Senate was impressive. Facing a Judiciary 
     Committee full of people who obviously consider themselves 
     expert on constitutional issues, he displayed mastery. He was 
     familiar with just about any case the Senators could name. He 
     discussed not only their main thrusts, but their nuances. His 
     decency was as unmistakable as his brilliance and diligence. 
     He bears no ill will toward any group that Democrats in the 
     Senate are concerned about--minorities, women, working 
     people, handicapped people, the poor.

  These sentiments in these papers are certainly echoed by many of my 
constituents. For instance, Eric Brandt from Pataskala, OH, wrote in 
strong support of Judge Roberts:

       The citizens of this State and country deserve a fairminded 
     jurist who does not use the power of the bench to usurp the 
     elected voice of the people.

  Robert Hensley from College Corner, OH, made a similar point:

       I believe it is imperative we have judges who rule 
     according to our Constitution and not their own beliefs and 
     ideas. I believe John Roberts is such a man.

  And Al Law from Perrysburg, OH, had this to say:

       We need prudent jurists who understand the proper role of 
     the court, and [Judge Roberts] is such a man.

  Clearly, these citizens saw what we saw during the hearings last 
week. Judge John Roberts is a modest, decent, and fair man who actually 
fully understands the limited role that judges should play in our 
constitutional system of government.
  Finally, over the past few months, we have heard from those 
individuals who really know John Roberts the best. His colleagues in 
the bar, Democrats and Republicans alike, have overwhelmingly supported 
Judge Roberts' elevation to the Supreme Court.
  As I mentioned earlier, the American Bar Association has given Judge 
Roberts a rating of ``unanimously well qualified,'' its highest 
possible rating. As Steve Tober, the chairman of the ABA Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, explained, Judge Roberts has ``the 
admiration and respect of his colleagues on and off the bench. And, he 
is, as we have found, the very definition of collegial.''
  We have also heard from Judge Roberts' friends and coworkers and 
learned that they respect and admire him. Maureen Mahoney, former 
Deputy Solicitor General of the United States, said Judge Roberts ``is 
probably the finest lawyer of his generation.'' She described the 
assistance he provided her in her own career, and testified from her 
personal experience that he had an enduring commitment to providing 
equal opportunity to women in the workplace.
  Another example, Professor Kathryn Webb, a lifelong Democrat who said 
that she does not support President Bush, nonetheless said that Judge 
Roberts has her ``full and enthusiastic support.''
  Bruce Botelho, the mayor of Juneau, AK, a self-proclaimed liberal 
Democrat, offered his full support. The mayor worked closely with Judge 
Roberts on several cases and described him as ``the most remarkable and 
inspiring lawyer I have ever met.''
  Finally, Catherine Stetson, a partner at Hogan & Hartson and a 
longtime colleague of Judge Roberts, offered her praise as well. She 
told us how Judge Roberts helped her transition back into the workplace 
after the birth of her first child. According to Stetson, Judge Roberts 
supported her in both of her roles as lawyer and as mother, ``and he 
did it quietly and without fanfare.'' She explained how Judge Roberts 
was instrumental in helping her become a partner at Hogan & Hartson, 
despite the unfounded concerns of others that her obligations as a new 
mother might interfere somehow with her ability to do the job.
  All of these individuals have something in common. What they have in 
common is they know Judge Roberts personally. They have seen him handle 
cases. They have seen him deal with clients. They know him as an 
individual. They know him as a human being. They have worked with him. 
Each one of them supports his nomination to be the next Chief Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
  It is true that we have heard comments and some testimony from well-
intended individuals who oppose Judge Roberts, but I must say these 
individuals do not know Judge Roberts the way Maureen Mahoney does, 
they did not work with him the way Mayor Botelho has, and they have not 
dealt with Judge Roberts on a day-to-day basis the way Catherine 
Stetson has.
  To be sure, over the past several months we have learned a great deal 
about who John Roberts is. We know about his extraordinary professional 
accomplishments. We have seen the overwhelming bipartisan support that 
he has earned from his colleagues in the legal profession. We have 
heard from John Roberts himself in a very eloquent defense of the rule 
of law. For all of these reasons, I will vote to confirm Judge John 
Roberts as the 17th Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and I 
certainly urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allen). The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, last week the Judiciary Committee gave its 
solid, bipartisan recommendation that the Senate confirm John G. 
Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Senate 
should follow that recommendation with a substantial bipartisan vote 
supporting this exceptional nominee. As the Los Angeles Times put it 
when endorsing Judge Roberts, anything short of an overwhelming vote 
would be an indictment of petty partisanship.
  I think Judge Roberts is the most analyzed and evaluated Supreme 
Court nominee in history. The American Bar Association, whose rating my 
Democratic colleagues once hailed as the gold standard for evaluating 
judicial nominees, completed two exhaustive reviews. Each time the ABA 
unanimously gave Judge Roberts its highest well-qualified rating.
  The ABA, by the way, includes in its criterion of judicial 
temperament such important qualities as compassion, openmindedness, 
freedom from bias, and commitment to equal justice under law.
  Judge Roberts spent almost 20 hours before the Judiciary Committee 
while Senators asked him 673 questions. Senators then asked him 243 
more questions in writing. Judge Roberts provided nearly 3,000 pages to 
the Judiciary Committee, including his published articles, 
congressional testimony, transcripts from interviews, speeches, and 
panel discussions and material related to the dozens of cases that he 
argued before the U.S. Supreme Court.
  The Judiciary Committee obtained more than 14,000 pages of material 
in the public domain, including the opinions Judge Roberts authored and 
joined while on the U.S. Court of Appeals and legal briefs from his 
years at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson and as Deputy Solicitor 
General in the first Bush administration.

  As if all of that were not enough, the Judiciary Committee obtained a 
staggering 82,943 pages of additional material from the National 
Archives and both the Reagan and Bush Libraries regarding Judge 
Roberts' service in those administrations. Total that up, and we have 
more than 100,000 pages of material on a 50-year-old nominee. That 
amounts to about 2,000 pages for every year of his life.

[[Page S10412]]

  By orders of magnitude, this is more information than any Senators 
have had about any previous Supreme Court nominee.
  The real debate over this nomination is about the standard we should 
apply to this mountain of information. The standard a Senator applies 
reflects a particular job description, what a Senator believes judges 
should do in our system of government. For some Senators, it is a 
political job description. They see judges as playing a political role, 
delivering results favoring certain political interests, setting or 
changing policy, creating new rights, defending social progress, and 
blazing a trail toward justice and equality.
  Not surprisingly, Senators who believe in this kind of political job 
description ask political questions and apply political standards 
during the hiring process.
  During the hearing, for example, the distinguished assistant minority 
leader, a member of the Judiciary Committee, told Judge Roberts he 
needed to know the nominee's personal values. Personal values are a 
condition for judicial service only if judges make their decisions 
based on their personal values. This is a political standard.
  The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, a former Judiciary 
Committee chairman, has repeatedly said that the central question is, 
in his words, Whose side will Judge Roberts be on when different kinds 
of cases come before him?
  Demanding that judges take sides before cases even begin is, again, a 
political standard.
  Last week on the Senate floor, the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Kerry, said he could not support Judge Roberts because, as he put it:

       I can't say with confidence that I know on a sufficient 
     number of critical constitutional issues how he would rule.

  Basing support for a judicial nominee on a checklist of results, 
without regard for the facts or the law in each case, is a political 
standard.
  The Senator from California, Mrs. Boxer, last week announced her 
opposition to Judge Roberts and described her standard by asking: Who 
will be the winners if we confirm Judge Roberts?
  This question, of course, completely contradicts the age-old teaching 
of parents in California, my home State of Utah, and everywhere else 
that it does not matter if one wins or loses but how they play the 
game.
  Focusing on the political correctness of a judge's results rather 
than the judicial correctness of his reasoning is a political standard.
  Other Senators, and I place myself squarely in this camp, use a 
judicial standard. We see judges as playing a judicial rather than a 
political role.
  During his hearing, Judge Roberts properly compared judges to umpires 
who apply rules they did not make and cannot change to a contest before 
them.
  Can anyone imagine conditioning an umpire's employment on knowing 
before he officiates his first game which teams on the roster will win 
or lose?
  Similarly, judges must not take sides before a case begins.
  Senators who believe in a judicial job description ask judicial 
questions and apply judicial standards during the hiring process, and 
during the hearing process as well, I might add.
  I want to know, for example, whether Judge Roberts believes he can 
make law at all, not the particular law he would make. I want to know 
whether parties will win before him because the law favors their side, 
not because he does.
  Like America's Founders, I believe it makes all the difference for 
our liberty whether judges occupy a judicial or a political role in our 
system of government.
  In the Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote, quoting the 
political philosopher, Montesquieu, that there is no liberty at all if 
judicial power is not separated from legislative and executive power.
  The separation of powers is literally the lynchpin of liberty. That 
principle had a 200-year-old pedigree when America's Founders listed as 
a reason for seeking independence that King George had made judges 
dependent upon his political will.
  We must insist on appointing judges who meet a judicial rather than a 
political standard.

  I will list some of the evidence that Judge Roberts meets this 
judicial standard.
  Judge Roberts told the Judiciary Committee that a judge is obligated 
to respect precedent, and he described in some detail the principles 
guiding how judges utilize those prior decisions.
  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, do they 
believe that judges should not respect precedent? Do they reject the 
traditional principles of stare decisis that Judge Roberts outlined? If 
so, my friends should try to make that case to the American people. If 
not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that judges should respect 
precedent, then they should vote to confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts repeatedly insisted that judges must be impartial. Here 
is how he put it:

       I think people on both sides need to know that if they go 
     to the Supreme Court that they're going to be on a level 
     playing field, the judge is going to interpret the law, that 
     the judge is going to apply the Constitution and not take 
     sides in their dispute.

  That was said by Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., on September 13, 2005.
  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, are they 
saying that judges should instead be partial, that judges should 
actually take sides, that people coming before the Court do not deserve 
the confidence that judges will be fair? If that is what they believe, 
I invite them to try to make that case to the American people. If not, 
if they agree with Judge Roberts that judges should be impartial, then 
they should confirm his nomination.
  Judge Roberts said that judges must be open to the views of their 
judicial colleagues. This is a mark of modesty and humility he 
consistently said should characterize judges. If my friends on the 
other side of this nomination oppose this nomination, are they arguing 
that judges should not consider anyone else's views but narrowly insist 
that they are always right? If so, then once again they should make 
their case to the American people. If not, if they agree with Judge 
Roberts that modest judges remain open to consider what others have to 
say, then they should vote for his nomination.
  Judge Roberts told us that judges are not politicians. If my friends 
on the other side oppose this nomination, do they really believe that 
judges, and not elected legislators, should make the law and determine 
public policy? Do my friends really believe that there is no difference 
between what the Justices do across the street in the Supreme Court and 
what we do in this Chamber? If so, I wish them luck trying to make that 
case to the American people. If not, if they agree with America's 
Founders and with Judge Roberts that judges are not politicians, they 
should vote to confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts says judges are the servants of the law. If my friends 
on the other side oppose this nomination, do they believe judges are 
instead the masters of the law? Do they believe the Constitution is 
whatever the Supreme Court says it is? If so, then I invite them to 
make that case to the American people. If not, if they agree with 
America's Founders that the Constitution governs the judicial as well 
as the legislative branch, if they agree with Judge Roberts that judges 
are as subject to the rule of law as the parties before them, then my 
friends should vote to confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts pledged that, as he has done on the appeals court 
bench, he will approach every case with an open mind and consider each 
case on its own merits.
  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, do they 
believe instead judges should have a closed mind on issues that come 
before them, that judges should prejudge issues in cases even before 
they know the facts?
  If so, then I urge my friends to try and convince the American 
people.
  If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that judges should safeguard 
their impartiality and keep an open mind, then they should vote to 
confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts said:

       The role of the judge is limited, that judges are to decide 
     the cases before them, they're not to legislate.

  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, do they 
believe instead judges have an unlimited role,

[[Page S10413]]

that judges should decide cases not properly before them, and that 
judges should do the legislating?
  If so, I urge them to try to make that case before the American 
people.
  If not, if they share Judge Roberts' view about the proper limited 
judicial role, then they should vote to confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts said judges must decide cases--and I am quoting him 
again--judges must decide cases:

     according to the rule of law, not their own social 
     preferences, not their policy views, not their personal 
     preferences, but according to the rule of law.

  Again, that was on September 13, 2005.
  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, do they 
believe judges should decide cases based on their personal preferences 
or policy views rather than the rule of law?
  If so, again, they should make this case to the American people.
  If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that the rule of law trumps 
a judge's personal views, then they should vote to confirm this 
nomination.
  Judge Roberts said when Congress enacts a statute, we do not expect 
judges to substitute their judgment for ours but to implement our view 
of what we are accomplishing. If my friends on the other side oppose 
this nomination, are they instead saying judges should substitute their 
judgment for ours?
  If so, again, they should make that case to the American people.
  If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that Congress's intent 
should prevail regarding Congress's own statutes, then they should vote 
to confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts said:

       I don't think the Court should be the task master of 
     Congress. I think the Constitution is the Court's task master 
     and it's Congress' task master as well.

  That was said on September 14 of this year.
  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, do they mean 
the Supreme Court should in fact be the taskmaster of Congress, and 
even of the Constitution itself?
  If so, then I wish them well, trying to convince the American people 
by making that case to the American people.
  If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that the Constitution is the 
taskmaster of both Congress and the Supreme Court, then they should 
vote to confirm this nomination.
  Judge Roberts told us the Bill of Rights does not change during times 
of war or crisis. If my friends on the other side oppose this 
nomination, are they arguing for setting aside the Bill of Rights in 
times of war or crisis?
  If so, then they should make their case to the American people.
  If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that neither the Bill of 
Rights nor a judge's obligation to uphold the rule of law is suspended 
in a time of war or crisis, then they should vote to uphold this 
nomination.
  I want to quote Judge Roberts again because his particular words are 
very important. He said:

       If the Constitution says that the little guy should win, 
     the little guy is going to win in court before me. But if the 
     Constitution says that the big guy should win, well, then, 
     the big guy is going to win, because my obligation is to the 
     Constitution.

  He said that on September 15 of this year.
  If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, are they 
arguing that whoever the little guy might be must win, regardless of 
what the facts and regardless of what the law requires? Are they saying 
judges should disregard their oaths to do justice without respect to 
persons?
  If so, I will be watching with great expectation as they try to make 
that case to the American people.
  If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that the law, not the judge, 
determines who wins, if they agree with Judge Roberts that the judge's 
obligation is to the Constitution and not to a particular side, then 
they should confirm this nomination.
  These examples show the type of judge John Roberts is on the appeals 
court, the kind of Justice John Roberts will be on the Supreme Court. 
Judge Roberts knows the difference between politics and law. He knows 
as a judge he must settle legal disputes by interpreting and applying 
law and leave the politics to the politicians.

  We have all the information we need about this exceptional nominee. 
If we apply a judicial rather than a political standard, the Senate 
will confirm him as the Nation's 17th Justice overwhelmingly and 
without delay.
  Judge Roberts is one of the finest nominees ever to come before the 
Congress of the United States, and in particular the Senate confirming 
body. Not only was he an excellent student, graduating from Harvard in 
only 3 years as an undergraduate, but he became the top graduate in law 
school and the editor in chief of the Harvard Law Review, a position 
everybody in this Chamber has to respect and admire.
  He also served as a clerk for Judge Friendly, one of the greatest 
circuit court judges this country has ever seen. He served as a clerk 
for Chief Justice Rehnquist.
  I was impressed at the Rehnquist funeral to see some 95 former clerks 
paying respect to their Justice Rehnquist, some of whom were my fellow 
Utahns.
  He then worked in the White House counsel's office as a young man and 
served with distinction there. He then went on to become Deputy 
Solicitor General of the United States and did a terrific job while 
there. He rose to become one of the top partners in one of the top law 
firms in this country and argued 39 cases before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Hardly anybody can make that claim today.
  I have asked various Justices on the Supreme Court who they consider 
to be the best appellate lawyer to appear before them, and invariably 
the name John Roberts comes up from the Justices themselves.
  I was intrigued that Justice Stevens is overjoyed that John Roberts 
is going to join them on the Court because he has such respect for John 
Roberts.
  I have to say in 20 hours of testimony, how could anybody vote 
against him? I have to say also it concerns me that there will be some 
who will. I suggest if they would vote against Judge Roberts for the 
Supreme Court, then I doubt sincerely there is any nominee this 
President could put forth they would vote for, and that is a sorry case 
and I think a sad indictment.
  I urge everybody in this body to vote for this outstanding nominee 
for Chief Justice of the United States. In doing so, I don't think 
anybody who does is going to be sorry afterward. Yes, I believe him to 
be conservative. Yes, I believe he is not going to be an activist on 
the bench. Yes, I believe he will honor and sustain the law--and I know 
one thing: he is going to approach the law as intelligently as any 
person who has ever been nominated to the Supreme Court. I think people 
who watched those hearings have to come to the same conclusion. If they 
do, then I hope our colleagues who have announced they are going to 
vote against him will change their mind, do what is right, and vote for 
him.
  Remember, when now Justices Ginsburg and Breyer came before this 
body, I was the leader on the Judiciary Committee. I have to say, we 
Republicans all knew both of those now Justices were social liberals, 
that they disagreed with many of the things we believed and we 
disagreed with many of the things they believed. But they were both 
qualified and they were put forth by the then President of the United 
States, President William Jefferson Clinton. And Presidents deserve 
respect on these nominations.
  Justice Ginsburg was confirmed on a vote of 96 to 3, and I believe 
Justice Breyer was confirmed on a vote of 87 to 9, which means 
virtually every Republican voted for both of them. We did not take the 
political way. I have to say I don't think others should take it here 
in this case with this person who everybody acknowledges is 
exceptionally well qualified, including the American Bar Association.
  I recommend everybody vote for Judge Roberts, and in the end you are 
going to be able to go to sleep at night knowing you did the right 
thing.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S10414]]

  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I come to the Chamber today to discuss 
the nomination of Judge John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the 
United States.
  Last week, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the nomination of 
Judge Roberts to be the next Chief Justice of the United States by a 
13-to-5 margin. This came after weeks of exhaustive research by the 
Judiciary Committee and a thorough set of hearings.
  While I wish the White House would have been more cooperative during 
the process by releasing a more comprehensive set of documents relating 
to Judge Roberts' work in the executive branch, I do believe the 
committee hearings were conducted in a fair and dignified manner, and I 
do have some understanding of where Judge Roberts' judicial views fall 
within the political spectrum.
  After careful review of Judge Roberts' testimony and the information 
prepared by the Judiciary Committee, I have come to the conclusion that 
Judge Roberts should be confirmed by the Senate to be Chief Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. It is my intention to vote in favor of his 
confirmation when his nomination comes for a full vote before the 
Senate later this week.
  There are few decisions of greater consequence that I will ever be 
asked to make than whether to approve an individual for a lifetime 
appointment as Chief Justice of our Nation's highest Court. While there 
is no absolute certainty how Judge Roberts will conduct himself as 
Chief Justice when he is confirmed, it is my belief that he appears to 
be a thoughtful and respected jurist who possesses integrity and great 
legal skills. I see no reason to believe that the nominee is an 
ideologue or otherwise outside the broad mainstream of contemporary 
conservative legal thinking. In addition, it is important to note that 
with the confirmation of Judge Roberts to replace Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the balance of the Court will be maintained.
  It is the prerogative of the President to nominate whomever he sees 
fit to lifetime appointments to the Federal judiciary, so it should 
come as no surprise that President Bush has nominated a conservative 
jurist such as Judge Roberts for the Supreme Court. While I have voted 
against President Bush's nominees to the lower Federal courts on a 
modest number of instances, I have voted roughly 200 times to confirm 
judicial nominees who I believed were conservative Republicans of great 
legal skill and who deserved bipartisan respect. With the nomination of 
Judge Roberts, I am once again prepared to support a qualified, 
conservative judicial nominee. However, with this vote I also send a 
message to President Bush that I hope his nominee to fill the vacancy 
of retiring Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor will as well be a 
person of great legal skill and who has the ability to garner strong 
bipartisan support.
  In my home State of South Dakota, we have seen difficult and 
polarizing political battles over the past few years. I believe South 
Dakotans as well as all Americans desire a bipartisan centrist approach 
to government. Our Nation is governed best when it is governed from the 
broad bipartisan mainstream but not by the extremes of the political 
far left or far right. I encourage President Bush to nominate someone 
for Justice O'Connor's seat who will further unite the citizens of our 
great Nation rather than drive a political wedge between them. The 
proper legal foundation for America is found in the broad mainstream of 
contemporary jurisprudence. It is my hope that Judge Roberts will unite 
Americans and serve the Supreme Court in a fair and prudent and 
centrist manner.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


         Unanimous Consent Agreement--Executive Calendar No. 1

  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous 
consent that at 5:30 today the Senate proceed to executive session to 
consider the following treaty on today's Executive Calendar: No. 1. I 
further ask unanimous consent that the treaty be considered as having 
passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the 
presentation of the resolution of ratification, that any committee 
conditions, declarations, or reservations be agreed to as applicable, 
that any statements be printed in the Record, and that at 5:30 today 
the Senate vote on the resolution of ratification; further that when 
the resolution of ratification is voted upon, the motion to reconsider 
be laid upon the table, and the President be notified of the Senate's 
action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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