[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 119 (Wednesday, September 21, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10296-S10303]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. LEAHY:
  S. 1739. A bill to amend the material witness statute to strengthen 
procedural safeguards, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, under the Federal material witness statute 
our government is authorized to arrest a witness in order to secure his 
testimony in a criminal proceeding. In order to obtain a material 
witness warrant, the government must establish that the witness has 
information that is material to a criminal proceeding, and that it may 
become impracticable to secure the witness's presence at the proceeding 
by a subpoena. Once arrested, a material witness may be detained for a 
reasonable period, until his testimony can be secured by deposition or 
appearance in court.
  The material witness law was intended to ensure the appearance of 
witnesses in those rare cases where they might otherwise flee to avoid 
testifying in a criminal proceeding. This authority is an important 
tool for our government's law enforcement duties, but it must be 
exercised responsibly. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
noted in 2003, in the case of United States v. Awadallah, ``It would be 
improper for the government to use [the material witness statute] for 
other ends, such as the detention of persons suspected of criminal 
activity for which probable cause has not yet been established.'' Since 
September 11, 2001, however, that is exactly what the government has 
been doing. Indeed, senior Administration officials, including our 
current Attorney General, have admitted that the government routinely 
uses material witness warrants to detain suspects in the so-called war 
on terror.
  A report released this summer by Human Rights Watch and the American 
Civil Liberties Union identifies 70 men, including more than a dozen 
citizens, whom the Department of Justice

[[Page S10297]]

arrested as material witnesses in connection with its terrorism 
investigations. Many were never brought before a court or grand jury to 
testify for the simple reason that they were viewed not as witnesses, 
but as suspects. The evidence against these suspects was often flimsy 
at best, and would never have sufficed for criminal arrest and pre-
trial detention. This twisting of a narrow law designed to secure 
testimony into a broad preventive detention authority has resulted in 
some notorious abuses.
  Just days after 9/11, the FBI arrested eight Egyptian-born men in 
Evansville, IN--one a naturalized American citizen--as material 
witnesses, based on a bogus tip that they planned to fly a plane into 
the Sears Tower in Chicago. The men were held for more than a week in 
solitary confinement before being released. Many months later, the FBI 
issued a rare public apology to these men. That apology, while 
necessary, could not repair the damage that had been done to them and 
their families in the form of lost business, tainted reputations, and 
the accusing stares of their friends and neighbors.
  The case of Abdallah Higazy further highlights the danger that can 
occur when this authority is abused. Shortly after 9/11, the 30-year-
old Egyptian graduate student with a valid visa, was picked up after a 
security guard at a hotel located across the street from Ground Zero 
claimed to have found an aviation radio in the room where Higazy had 
stayed on 9/11. Higazy was held for more than a month in solitary 
confinement until he ultimately confessed that the radio was his. 
Higazy was then charged with lying to the FBI for initially denying 
possession of the radio. These charges were dropped after the true 
owner of the radio, an American pilot, went to the hotel to claim it.
  In another, higher profile case in May 2004, Portland attorney 
Brandon Mayfield was arrested as a material witness in connection with 
the Madrid train bombing. An email sent from the Portland FBI office to 
the Los Angeles FBI office the day before Mayfield's arrest refers to 
him as a ``Moslem convert'' and notes as a ``problem'' that there was 
not enough evidence to arrest him for a crime. After spending two weeks 
in prison, Mayfield was released and the FBI was expressing regret 
about the erroneous fingerprint match that led to his arrest.
  These and other examples of post-9/11 misuse of the material witness 
statute are documented in the HRW/ACLU report. As the report shows, 
such misuse does more than just circumvent the requirement of probable 
cause for a criminal arrest. Suspects arrested as material witnesses 
are denied the basic protections guaranteed to criminal defendants, 
including the right to view any exculpatory evidence and to be able to 
challenge the basis for their arrest and incarceration. The report 
concludes that the misuse of the material witness law ``threatens U.S. 
citizens and non-citizens alike because it reflects a lowering of the 
standards designed to protect everyone from arbitrary and unreasonable 
arrest and detention.''
  The bill I introduce today will ensure that the material witness law 
is used only for the narrow purpose that Congress originally intended, 
to obtain testimony, and not to hold criminal suspects without charge 
when probable cause is lacking.
  First, the bill raises the standard that the government must meet to 
obtain a material witness warrant. Under current law, a judge may order 
the arrest of a material witness if there is probable cause to believe 
that securing his presence by subpoena may become ``impracticable.'' 
Under the bill, there must be probable cause to believe that the 
witness has been served with a subpoena and failed or refused to appear 
as required, or clear and convincing evidence that the service of a 
subpoena is likely to result in the person fleeing or cannot adequately 
secure the appearance of the person as required.
  Second, the bill imports several due process safeguards from the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the arrest and 
arraignment of criminal defendants. Among other things, the bill 
requires that a material witness warrant specify that the testimony of 
the witness is sought in a criminal case or grand jury proceeding, and 
command that the witness be arrested and brought to court without 
unnecessary delay. The warrant must also inform the witness of his 
right to retain counselor or request that one be appointed. The right 
to counsel is already guaranteed to material witnesses under the 
Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a)(1)(g), and protects the 
witness from erroneous, unnecessary, and prolonged incarceration.
  The bill further provides that, upon arresting a material witness, 
the government must provide him with a copy of the warrant or inform 
him of the warrant's existence and purpose. A material witness must be 
brought before a judge ``without unnecessary delay''--a term that has 
been strictly interpreted when applied to the criminally accused. The 
initial appearance must be in the district of arrest or an adjacent 
district. At the initial appearance, the judge must inform the witness 
of the basis for his arrest and of his right to counsel. The judge must 
also allow the witness a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel. The judge must then determine whether the witness should be 
released or detained pending the taking of his testimony.
  Third, the bill establishes clear procedures for material witness 
detention hearings. Current law provides that material witnesses shall 
be treated in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3142, which governs the release 
or detention of defendants pending trial. Section 3142, however, 
contains many factors that are not applicable to material witnesses. 
For example, courts have held that a material witness may not be 
detained on the basis of dangerousness. (See Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 63 
n.15.) The bill clarifies that in detention hearings for material 
witnesses, flight risk is the only relevant factor. A court shall order 
a material witness detained only if no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the witness as 
required. As under current law, no witness may be detained because of 
inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of 
such witness can adequately be secured by deposition. In determining 
whether a material witness should be released or detained, the court 
shall take into account the available information concerning the 
history and characteristics of the witness, and may also consider 
challenges to the basis of the warrant.
  Fourth, the bill establishes the ``clear and convincing evidence'' 
standard used in other civil detention contexts for material witness 
detentions. Few courts have directly examined what standard of proof 
should be required of the government to demonstrate that no conditions 
of release can reasonably assure a witness's appearance. While the 
lower ``preponderance of the evidence'' standard may suffice for pre-
trial detention of defendants who pose a risk of flight, in the case of 
defendants there has also been a finding of probable cause to believe 
the person committed a crime. In the case of a witness, where there is 
no probable cause to believe the person committed a crime, the usual 
grounds for fearing flight--the defendant's aversion to risking a 
guilty verdict and attendant sentencing--are not present.
  Fifth, the bill imposes reasonable but firm time limits on the 
detention of material witnesses. Current law sets no firm limit on how 
long a witness may be incarcerated before being presented in a criminal 
proceeding or released. This has resulted, according to the recent 
report, in many witnesses enduring imprisonment for two or more months, 
and in one case for more than a year. Under my bill, a material witness 
may initially be held for not more than five days, or until his 
testimony can adequately be secured, whichever is earlier. That period 
may be extended for additional periods of up to five days, upon a 
showing of good cause for why the testimony could not adequately be 
secured during the previous five-day period. The total period of 
detention may not exceed 10 days for a grand jury witness, or 30 days 
for a trial witness, and in no case may a witness be held any longer 
than necessary to secure his testimony.
  Sixth, in recognition of the fact that material witnesses are not 
charged with any offense, the bill requires that they be held in a 
corrections facility that is separate, to the extent practicable, from 
persons charged with or convicted of a criminal offense, and under the 
least restrictive conditions possible.

[[Page S10298]]

  Finally, to facilitate congressional oversight, the bill requires the 
Justice Department to report annually on the use of the material 
witness law. Since 9/11, the Department has withheld information 
relating to material witnesses on the theory--in my view, a flawed 
theory--that such information is covered by the grand jury secrecy 
rule. It is hard to imagine how the release of generalized data, such 
as the aggregate number of people detained as material witnesses, could 
damage any reputational interest or any of the other interests 
protected by Rule 6(e).
  The recent, detailed report on post-9/11 uses of the material witness 
statute leaves no doubt that the law has been bent out of shape, with 
real consequences for citizens and non-citizens alike. My bill will 
restore the law to its original purpose and prevent future abuses. I 
urge its speedy passage.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be included in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1739

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. RELEASE OR DETENTION OF A MATERIAL WITNESS.

       (a) Amendments to Title 18.--Section 3144 of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 3144. Release or detention of a material witness

       ``(a) Arrest of Material Witness.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judicial officer may order the arrest 
     of a person as a material witness, if it appears from an 
     affidavit filed by a party in a criminal case before a court 
     of the United States, or by an attorney for the Government in 
     a matter occurring before a Federal grand jury, that there is 
     probable cause to believe that--
       ``(A) the testimony of such person is material in such case 
     or matter; and
       ``(B) the person has been served with a summons or subpoena 
     and failed or refused to appear as required.
       ``(2) Exception.--A judicial officer may waive the summons 
     or subpoena requirement described in paragraph (1)(B), if the 
     judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
     the service of a summons or subpoena--
       ``(A) is likely to result in the person fleeing; or
       ``(B) cannot adequately secure the appearance of the person 
     as required.
       ``(b) Warrant for Material Witness.--
       ``(1) Requirements.--A warrant issued under subsection (a) 
     shall--
       ``(A) contain the name of the material witness or, if the 
     name of such witness is unknown, a name or description by 
     which the witness can be identified with reasonable 
     certainty;
       ``(B) specify that the testimony of the witness is sought 
     in a criminal case or grand jury proceeding;
       ``(C) command that the witness be arrested and brought 
     without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer;
       ``(D) inform the witness of the witness's right to retain 
     counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the 
     witness cannot obtain counsel; and
       ``(E) be signed by a judicial officer.
       ``(2) Execution of warrant.--
       ``(A) Arrest of witness.--A warrant issued under subsection 
     (a) shall be executed by arresting the material witness.
       ``(B) Warrant to be provided to witness.--
       ``(i) In general.--Upon arrest, an officer possessing the 
     warrant shall show such warrant to the material witness.
       ``(ii) Warrant not in possession of arresting officer.--If 
     an officer does not possess the warrant at the time of arrest 
     of a material witness, an officer--

       ``(I) shall inform the witness of the existence and purpose 
     of the warrant; and
       ``(II) at the request of the witness, shall provide the 
     warrant to the witness as soon as possible.

       ``(3) Return of warrant.--
       ``(A) After execution.--After executing a warrant issued 
     under subsection (a), an officer shall return the warrant to 
     the judicial officer before whom the material witness is 
     brought in accordance with subsection (c).
       ``(B) Unexecuted warrant.--At the request of an attorney 
     for the United States Government, an unexecuted warrant shall 
     be brought back to and canceled by a judicial officer.
       ``(c) Initial Appearance.--
       ``(1) Appearance upon arrest.--A material witness arrested 
     pursuant to a warrant issued under subsection (a) shall be 
     brought without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer.
       ``(2) Place of initial appearance.--The initial appearance 
     of a material witness arrested pursuant to a warrant issued 
     under subsection (a) shall be--
       ``(A) in the district of arrest; or
       ``(B) in an adjacent district if--
       ``(i) the appearance can occur more promptly there; or
       ``(ii) the warrant was issued there and the initial 
     appearance will occur on the day of the arrest.
       ``(3) Procedures.--At the initial appearance described in 
     paragraph (2), a judicial officer shall--
       ``(A) inform a material witness of--
       ``(i) the warrant against the witness, and the application 
     and affidavit filed in support of the warrant; and
       ``(ii) the witness's right to retain counsel or to request 
     that counsel be appointed if the witness cannot obtain 
     counsel;
       ``(B) allow the witness a reasonable opportunity to consult 
     with counsel;
       ``(C) release or detain the witness as provided by 
     subsection (d); and
       ``(D) if the initial appearance occurs in a district other 
     than where the warrant issued, transfer the witness to such 
     district, provided that the judicial officer finds that the 
     witness is the same person named in the warrant.
       ``(d) Release or Detention.--
       ``(1) In general.--Upon the appearance before a judicial 
     officer of a material witness arrested pursuant to a warrant 
     issued under subsection (a), the judicial officer shall order 
     the release or detention of such witness.
       ``(2) Release.--
       ``(A) In general.--A judicial officer shall order the 
     release of a material witness arrested pursuant to a warrant 
     issued under subsection (a) on personal recognizance or upon 
     execution of an unsecured appearance bond under section 
     3142(b), or on a condition or combination of conditions under 
     section 3142(c), unless the judicial officer determines by 
     clear and convincing evidence that such release will not 
     reasonably assure the appearance of the witness as required.
       ``(B) Testimony secured by deposition.--No material witness 
     may be detained because of the inability of the witness to 
     comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such 
     witness can adequately be secured by deposition.
       ``(3) Detention.--
       ``(A) No reasonable assurance of appearance.--If, after a 
     hearing pursuant to the provisions of section 3142(f)(2), a 
     judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
     no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 
     assure the appearance of a material witness as required by 
     this section, such judicial officer may order that the 
     witness be detained for a period not to exceed 5 days, or 
     until the testimony of the witness can adequately be secured 
     by deposition or by appearance before the court or grand 
     jury, whichever is earlier.
       ``(B) Extension of detention.--
       ``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), upon the motion 
     of a party (or an attorney for the United States Government 
     in a matter occurring before a Federal grand jury), the 
     period of detention under subparagraph (A) may be extended 
     for additional periods of up to 5 days, or until the 
     testimony of a material witness can adequately be secured by 
     deposition or by appearance before the court or grand jury, 
     whichever is earlier.
       ``(ii) Limit.--The total period of detention under this 
     subparagraph may not exceed--

       ``(I) 30 days, where the testimony of the witness is sought 
     in a criminal case; or
       ``(II) 10 days, where the testimony of the witness is 
     sought in a grand jury proceeding.

       ``(C) Good cause required.--A motion under subparagraph (B) 
     shall demonstrate good cause for why the testimony of a 
     material witness could not adequately be secured by 
     deposition or by appearance before the court or grand jury 
     during the previous 5-day period.
       ``(4) Factors to be considered.--A judicial officer, in 
     determining whether a material witness should be released or 
     detained--
       ``(A) shall take into account the available information 
     concerning the history and characteristics of the witness, 
     including the information described in section 3142(g)(3)(A); 
     and
       ``(B) may consider challenges to the basis of the warrant.
       ``(5) Contents of release order.--A release order issued 
     under paragraph (2) shall comply with the requirements of 
     paragraphs (1) and (2)(B) of section 3142(h).
       ``(6) Contents of detention order.--A detention order 
     issued under paragraph (3) shall comply with the requirements 
     of section 3142(i), provided that a judicial officer shall 
     direct that a material witness be held--
       ``(A) in a facility separate and apart, to the extent 
     practicable, from persons charged with or convicted of a 
     criminal offense; and
       ``(B) under the least restrictive conditions possible.
       ``(e) Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the Attorney General shall provide to the Committees on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     an annual report regarding the use of this section by the 
     United States Government during the preceding 1-year period.
       ``(2) Content of report.--A report required under paragraph 
     (1) shall include--
       ``(A) the number of warrants sought under subsection (a), 
     and the number either granted or denied;
       ``(B) the number of material witnesses arrested pursuant to 
     a warrant issued under subsection (a) whose testimony was not 
     secured by deposition or by appearance before the court or 
     grand jury, and the reasons therefore; and
       ``(C) the average number of days that material witnesses 
     arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under subsection (a) 
     were detained.''.

[[Page S10299]]

       (b) Amendment to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.--Rule 
     46(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(h) Supervising Detention Pending Trial.--To eliminate 
     unnecessary detention, the court must supervise the detention 
     within the district of any defendants awaiting trial and of 
     any persons held as material witnesses.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. CRAPO (for himself, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Bunning):
  S. 1740. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow 
individuals to defer recognition of reinvested capital gains 
distributions from regulated investment companies; to the Committee on 
Finance.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, along with my 
colleagues Tim Johnson of South Dakota and Jim Bunning of Kentucky, an 
important bill that will allow Americans to save more for the long term 
and will better prepare them for a secure retirement. The Generating 
Retirement Ownership Through Long-Term Holding GROWTH, Act has 
substantial and growing bipartisan support in the House, and Senator 
Johnson and I are proud to introduce this bipartisan legislation that 
provides Americans a better tool to grow their long-term retirement 
savings.
  The GROWTH Act would allow investors in mutual funds to keep more 
retirement savings invested longer and growing longer by deferring 
taxation of automatically reinvested capital gains until fund shares 
are sold, rather than allowing those long-term gains--which generate no 
current income or cash in hand--to be taxed every year.
  To understand how beneficial this bill would be, it is important to 
understand the role of mutual funds in long-term retirement savings. 
Among households owning mutual funds, 92 percent are investing for 
retirement, with more than 70 percent saying their primary purpose in 
investing in funds is to prepare for retirement. Many of today's 
workers do not yet have in place the retirement savings supplement to 
Social Security that will prepare them for the future. In fact, almost 
half of American workers--nearly 71 million of 151 million workers--are 
not offered any form of pension or retirement savings plan at work.
  Meanwhile, the number of years spent in retirement is growing and the 
costs individuals can expect to bear in retirement are growing, too. 
The Employee Benefit Research Institute estimates that an individual 
retiring at age 65 in 2014 will need $285,000 just to cover health 
coverage premiums and expenses. Individual savings efforts also face 
significant obstacles. Those not covered by an employer's retirement 
plan, for example, can set aside a deductible IRA contribution of only 
$4,000 this year--$4,500 if they are age 50 or older.
  Mutual funds are a hugely important part of American workers' 
preparation for retirement, both through their employers' retirement 
plans and on their own. Mutual funds now make up half of the $3.2 
trillion held by American workers through 401(k) plans and other 
similar job-based savings programs. About 34 million American 
households hold mutual funds through their defined contribution plans. 
More than 30 million American households are saving through taxable 
mutual fund accounts, either as supplements to their employers' plans 
or because they do not have such plans.
  The GROWTH Act is also a good idea because it remedies an unfairness 
in the tax code that can make saving difficult for many Americans. 
Mutual fund investors who are struggling to save for retirement should 
not have to pay taxes on ``profits'' they have not realized. If they 
don't have money in hand, it makes no sense for them to have to pay 
taxes. The GROWTH Act would defer taxes until the mutual fund shares 
are sold and the investor has actual funds to pay the taxes.
  The GROWTH Act would be a valuable contributor to retirement savings 
efforts. Mutual fund savers who automatically reinvest are doing what 
policymakers want to see. They are holding for the long term, 
contributing to national savings, and building up their own retirement 
nest egg. These Americans should be encouraged to save--not discouraged 
through a tax on automatic reinvestments. The GROWTH Act is a step that 
will show immediate results, a step that will help tens of millions of 
American savers and ``should-be savers'' over the course of their 
working lives, and a step that with time can make a real difference in 
the retirement readiness of American families.
  I urge my colleagues to join Senator Johnson and me in supporting the 
GROWTH Act. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1740

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Generate Retirement 
     Ownership Through Long-Term Holding Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. DEFERRAL OF REINVESTED CAPITAL GAIN DIVIDENDS OF 
                   REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANIES.

       (a) In General.--Part III of subchapter O of chapter 1 of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to common 
     nontaxable exchanges) is amended by inserting after section 
     1045 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 1046. REINVESTED CAPITAL GAIN DIVIDENDS OF REGULATED 
                   INVESTMENT COMPANIES.

       ``(a) Nonrecognition of Gain.--In the case of an 
     individual, no gain shall be recognized on the receipt of a 
     capital gain dividend distributed by a regulated investment 
     company to which part I of subchapter M applies if such 
     capital gain dividend is automatically reinvested in 
     additional shares of the company pursuant to a dividend 
     reinvestment plan.
       ``(b) Definitions and Special Rules.--For purposes of this 
     section--
       ``(1) Capital gain dividend.--The term `capital gain 
     dividend' has the meaning given to such term by section 
     852(b)(3)(C).
       ``(2) Recognition of deferred capital gain dividends.--
       ``(A) In general.--Gain treated as unrecognized in 
     accordance with subsection (a) shall be recognized in 
     accordance with subparagraph (B)--
       ``(i) upon a subsequent sale or redemption by such 
     individual of stock in the distributing company, or
       ``(ii) upon the death of the individual.
       ``(B) Gain recognition.--
       ``(i) In general.--Upon a sale or redemption described in 
     subparagraph (A), the taxpayer shall recognize that portion 
     of total gain treated as unrecognized in accordance with 
     subsection (a) (and not previously recognized pursuant to 
     this subparagraph) that is equivalent to the portion of the 
     taxpayer's total shares in the distributing company that are 
     sold or redeemed.
       ``(ii) Death of individual.--Except as provided by 
     regulations, any portion of such total gain not recognized 
     under clause (i) prior to the taxpayer's death shall be 
     recognized upon the death of the taxpayer and included in the 
     taxpayer's gross income for the taxable year ending on the 
     date of the taxpayer's death.
       ``(3) Holding period.--
       ``(A) General rule.--The taxpayer's holding period in 
     shares acquired through reinvestment of a capital gain 
     dividend to which subsection (a) applies shall be determined 
     by treating the shareholder as having held such shares for 
     one year and a day as of the date such shares are acquired.
       ``(B) Special rule for distributions of qualified 5-year 
     gains.--In the case of a distribution of a capital gain 
     dividend (or portion thereof) in a taxable year beginning 
     after December 31, 2008, and properly treated as qualified 5-
     year gain (within the meaning of section 1(h), as in effect 
     after such date), subparagraph (A) shall apply by 
     substituting `5 years and a day' for `one year and a day'.
       ``(c) Section Not to Apply to Certain Taxpayers.--This 
     section shall not apply to--
       ``(1) an individual with respect to whom a deduction under 
     section 151 is allowable to another taxpayer for a taxable 
     year beginning in the calendar year in which such 
     individual's taxable year begins, or
       ``(2) an estate or trust.
       ``(d) Regulations.--The Secretary shall prescribe such 
     regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of 
     this section.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 852(b)(3)(B) of such Code is amended by adding 
     at the end the following new sentence: ``For rules regarding 
     nonrecognition of gain with respect to reinvested capital 
     gain dividends received by individuals, see section 1046.''.
       (2) The table of sections for part III of subchapter O of 
     chapter 1 of such Code is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1045 the following new item:

``Sec. 1046. Reinvested capital gain dividends of regulated investment 
              companies.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SMITH:
  S. 1743. A bill to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to 
investigate and assess penalties for price gouging with respect to oil 
and gas products; to

[[Page S10300]]

the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Post-Disaster 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005. This bill is designed to prohibit 
price gouging of oil or gas products in the immediate aftermath of a 
declared disaster.
  Hurricane Katrina had a devastating affect on the major oil and 
natural gas producing region of our Nation. This natural disaster has 
exposed our Nation's vulnerability to even short-term disruptions 
anywhere in the supply chain. Oil production curtailments, refinery 
shutdowns or pipeline disruptions can all cause price spikes in 
gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel.
  Directly following Hurricane Katrina, extreme price volatility of 
gasoline throughout the United States led to accusations of price 
gouging. Reports were made of individual retailers charging as much as 
$5.87 a gallon for gas. Even in my State of Oregon, which is less 
reliant on Gulf of Mexico production, prices spiked in the immediate 
aftermath of the hurricane.
  This bill declares that for the 30 days following the President's 
declaration of a disaster, it will be unlawful to engage in price 
gouging of oil or gas products for sale in the affected area, or of oil 
and gas products produced in the affected area for sale in interstate 
commerce.
  In addition, this bill authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to 
determine what represents a gross disparity in pricing and to prevent 
violations under this act using its authorities under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. Those authorities include seeking civil penalties of 
$11,000 per violation; assessing fines or repayment of illegal gains; 
freezing assets; and seeking preliminary injunctions, cease and desist 
orders or temporary restraining orders.
  Drastic increases in oil and gas products have a negative impact on 
consumers and businesses. That is why we must have a system in place 
that discourages price gouging in the wake of a disaster, and allows 
enough time for markets to return to normal.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1743

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Post-Disaster Consumer 
     Protection Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. PRICE GOUGING PROHIBITION FOLLOWING MAJOR DISASTERS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Affected area.--The term ``affected area'' means an 
     area affected by a major disaster declared by the President 
     under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
       (2) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal 
     Trade Commission.
       (3) Oil or gas products.--The term ``oil or gas products'' 
     means oil, gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, natural gas, or 
     home heating oil.
       (4) Price gouging.--The term ``price gouging'' means the 
     charging of an unconscionably excessive price by a supplier 
     of an oil or gas product.
       (5) Supplier.--The term ``supplier'' includes a seller, 
     reseller, wholesaler, or distributor of an oil or gas 
     product.
       (6) Unconscionably excessive price.--The term 
     ``unconscionably excessive price'' means a price charged--
       (A)(i) for an oil or gas product sold in an affected area 
     that represents a gross disparity, as determined by the 
     Commission, between the price charged by a supplier for that 
     product after a major disaster is declared and the average 
     price charged for that product by that supplier in the 
     affected area during the 30-day period immediately before the 
     President declares the existence of the major disaster; or
       (ii) for an oil or gas product produced in the affected 
     area for sale in interstate commerce that represents a gross 
     disparity, as determined by the Commission, between the price 
     charged by a supplier for that product after a major disaster 
     is declared and the average price charged for that product by 
     that supplier during the 30-day period immediately before the 
     President declares the existence of the major disaster;
       (B) that is not attributable to increased wholesale or 
     operational costs incurred by the supplier in connection with 
     the provision of the oil or gas product or to international 
     market trends; and
       (C) that is not attributable to a loss of production or 
     loss of pipeline transmission capability.
       (b) Price Gouging Involving Disaster Victims.--
       (1) Offense.--During the 30-day period following the date 
     on which a major disaster is declared by the President, it 
     shall be unlawful for a supplier to sell, or to offer to 
     sell, any oil or gas product at an unconscionably excessive 
     price as described in subsection (a)(6).
       (c) Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice.--
       (1) In general.--The provisions of this Act shall be 
     enforced by the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.). A violation of any provision of 
     this Act shall be treated as an unfair or deceptive act or 
     practice violating a rule promulgated under section 18 of the 
     Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a).
       (2) Actions by the commission.--The Commission may prevent 
     any person from violating this Act in the same manner, by the 
     same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and 
     duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the 
     Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were 
     incorporated into and made a part of this Act. Any entity 
     that violates any provision of this Act is subject to the 
     penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities 
     provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act in the same 
     manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, 
     power, and duties as though all applicable terms and 
     provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were 
     incorporated into and made a part of this Act.
       (d) Effect on Other Laws.--Nothing contained in this Act 
     shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commission 
     under any other provision of law.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. NELSON of Florida (for himself and Mr. Bingaman):
  S. 1744. A bill to prohibit price gouging relating to gasoline and 
diesel fuels in areas affected by major disasters; to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1744

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Price Gouging Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. PRICE GOUGING PROHIBITION FOLLOWING MAJOR DISASTERS.

       The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating sections 25 and 26 (15 U.S.C. 57c, 58) 
     as sections 26 and 27, respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after section 24 (15 U.S.C. 57b-5) the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 25. PROTECTION FROM PRICE GOUGING FOLLOWING MAJOR 
                   DISASTERS.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Affected area.--The term `affected area' means an 
     area affected by a major disaster declared by the President 
     under Federal law in existence on the date of enactment of 
     this subsection.
       ``(2) Price gouging.--The term `price gouging' means the 
     charging of an unconscionably excessive price by a supplier 
     in an affected area.
       ``(3) Supplier.--The term `supplier' means any person that 
     sells gasoline or diesel fuel for resale or ultimate 
     consumption.
       ``(4) Unconscionably excessive price.--The term 
     `unconscionably excessive price' means a price charged in an 
     affected area for gasoline or diesel fuel that--
       ``(A) represents a gross disparity, as determined by the 
     Commission in accordance with subsection (e), between the 
     price charged for gasoline or diesel fuel and the average 
     price of gasoline or diesel fuel charged by suppliers in the 
     affected area during the 30-day period immediately before the 
     President declares the existence of a major disaster; and
       ``(B) is not attributable to increased wholesale or 
     operational costs incurred by the supplier in connection with 
     the sale of gasoline or diesel fuel.
       ``(b) Determination of the Commission.--Following the 
     declaration of a major disaster by the President, the 
     Commission shall--
       ``(1) consult with the Attorney General, the United States 
     Attorney for the district in which the disaster occurred, and 
     State and local law enforcement officials to determine 
     whether any supplier in the affected area is charging or has 
     charged an unconscionably excessive price for gasoline or 
     diesel fuel provided in the affected area; and
       ``(2) establish within the Commission--
       ``(A) a toll-free hotline that a consumer may call to 
     report an incidence of price gouging in the affected area; 
     and
       ``(B) a program to develop and distribute to the public 
     informational materials in English and Spanish to assist 
     residents of the affected area in detecting and avoiding 
     price gouging.
       ``(c) Price Gouging Involving Disaster Victims.--
       ``(1) Offense.--During the 180-day period after the date on 
     which a major disaster is declared by the President, no 
     supplier shall sell, or offer to sell, gasoline or diesel 
     fuel in an affected area at an unconscionably excessive 
     price.

[[Page S10301]]

       ``(2) Action by commission.--
       ``(A) In general.--During the period described in paragraph 
     (1), the Commission shall conduct investigations to determine 
     whether any supplier in an affected area is in violation of 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Positive determination.--If the Commission determines 
     under subparagraph (A) that a supplier is in violation of 
     paragraph (1), the Commission shall take any action the 
     Commission determines to be appropriate to remedy the 
     violation.
       ``(3) Civil penalties.--A supplier that commits an offense 
     described in paragraph (1) may, in a civil action brought in 
     a court of competent jurisdiction, be subject to--
       ``(A) a civil penalty of not more than $500,000;
       ``(B) an order to pay special and punitive damages;
       ``(C) an order to pay reasonable attorney's fees;
       ``(D) an order to pay costs of litigation relating to the 
     offense;
       ``(E) an order for disgorgement of profits earned as a 
     result of a violation of paragraph (1); and
       ``(F) any other relief determined by the court to be 
     appropriate.
       ``(4) Criminal penalty.--A supplier that knowingly commits 
     an offense described in paragraph (1) shall be imprisoned not 
     more than 1 year.
       ``(5) Action by victims.--A person, Federal agency, State, 
     or local government that suffers loss or damage as a result 
     of a violation of paragraph (1) may bring a civil action 
     against a supplier in any court of competent jurisdiction for 
     disgorgement, special or punitive damages, injunctive relief, 
     reasonable attorney's fees, costs of the litigation, and any 
     other appropriate legal or equitable relief.
       ``(6) Action by state attorneys general.--An attorney 
     general of a State, or other authorized State official, may 
     bring a civil action in the name of the State, on behalf of 
     persons residing in the State, in any court of competent 
     jurisdiction for disgorgement, special or punitive damages, 
     reasonable attorney's fees, costs of litigation, and any 
     other appropriate legal or equitable relief.
       ``(7) No preemption.--Nothing in this section preempts any 
     State law.
       ``(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the 
     Commission shall submit to the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee 
     on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives a 
     report describing--
       ``(1) the number of price gouging complaints received by 
     the Commission for each major disaster declared by the 
     President during the preceding year;
       ``(2) the number of price gouging investigations of the 
     Commission initiated, in progress, and completed as of the 
     date on which the report is prepared;
       ``(3) the number of enforcement actions of the Commission 
     initiated, in progress, and completed as of the date on which 
     the report is prepared;
       ``(4) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the toll-free 
     hotline and program established under subsection (b)(2); and
       ``(5) recommendations for any additional action with 
     respect to the implementation or effectiveness of this 
     section.
       ``(e) Definition of Gross Disparity.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of enactment of this subsection, the 
     Commission shall promulgate regulations to define the term 
     `gross disparity' for purposes of this section.''.

     SEC. 3. EFFECT OF ACT.

       Nothing in this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, 
     affects any authority of the Federal Trade Commission in 
     existence on the date of enactment of this Act with respect 
     to price gouging actions.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. ENZI (for himself and Mr. Kennedy):
  S. 1745. A bill to expand the availability of resources under the 
Community Services Block Grant Act for individuals affected by 
Hurricane Katrina; read the first time.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is an honor to join Senator Enzi in 
introducing the Community Services Disaster Assistance Act.
  The bill contains additional support for State Community Service 
Block Grant offices, and community action agencies. Community Service 
Block Grant agencies provide low-income communities with the support 
they need to achieve self-sufficiency on a daily basis. Their programs 
and services include literacy, child health care, afterschool 
activities, low-income housing development, food stamps, and emergency 
shelter assistance.
  In the days after Hurricane Katrina, these agencies have been on the 
front lines. According to the National Association of State Community 
Service Programs, 32 States and their community action agencies have 
assisted over 65,000 evacuees. In this time of massive crisis, these 
agencies have been indispensable.
  This bill will help the State offices and agencies continue their 
amazing work. Community action agencies are already able to receive 
emergency funds from FEMA, and this bill expresses the sense of the 
Senate that emergency assistance should be made available immediately.
  The bill also authorizes State offices to transfer a portion of their 
funds for Community Service Block Grant administration or discretionary 
programs to the Gulf Coast States. Offices that wish to provide 
monetary support will be able to do so.
  The bill establishes a temporary income eligibility waiver for 
services funded by Community Services Block Grants in places designated 
as disaster areas. Evacuees will not have to worry about having the 
right paperwork ready, they will receive the services they need exactly 
when they need it.
  The bill also permits agencies and State offices to send their staff 
to federally designated disaster areas in other parts of the same State 
or in other states to provide disaster assistance.
  Support for this emergency work is more important today than ever. 
The States hit hardest by the Hurricane and flood were also some of the 
poorest. We in Congress have a responsibility to do all we can to help 
these States rebuild and thrive again. Passing this bill is a needed 
early step because it provides urgently needed assistance to invaluable 
community service organizations, and I urge my colleagues to approve 
it.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce new legislation, 
titled the Good Samaritan Liability Improvement and Volunteer 
Encouragement, or ``GIVE'' Act of 2005. I introduce this legislation to 
ensure that, as we continue to cope with the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, that one of our country's greatest assets--the willingness of 
the American people to give to their neighbors in need--is not 
inhibited by one of its greatest liabilities--a broken civil justice 
system.
  In addition, I will take a few moments to remind my colleagues of 
legislation that I introduced just before the August recess: the 
Respirator Access Assurance Act of 2005. This legislation is of even 
greater importance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina--its passage would 
help to ensure that the thousands of workers, volunteers, and citizens 
of New Orleans working to restore that great city have the necessary 
protection to sift through the clean-up.
  From its beginning, the United States has been a generous nation. 
Indeed, in commenting on his observations of America in 1831, French 
historian Alexis de Tocqueville praised Americans for voluntarily 
assisting their neighbors during times of need. He noted, ``When an 
American asks for the cooperation of his fellow citizens, it is seldom 
refused; and I have often seen it afforded spontaneously, and with 
great good will.''
  Since that time, America has continued to grow into an ever-more 
generous nation. As measured by financial contributions, giving by 
Americans is at an all-time high. According to the Giving USA 
Foundation, philanthropic donations totaled almost $250 billion in 2004 
and represented a 5 percent increase over the previous year. The chair 
of Giving USA notes that ``about 70 to 80 percent of Americans 
contribute annually to at least one charity.''
  Financial contributions are infinitely valuable. But, as we all know, 
the value of the gift of time cannot be underestimated. Each and every 
year, millions of Americans volunteer their time and their personal 
services to charity. Americans volunteer in soup kitchens, schools, and 
health clinics, devoting countless hours to assist others.
  And in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, we have seen this charitable 
spirit shine brighter than ever. In the short time since Katrina hit 
the Gulf Coast, Americans have given more than $600 million to disaster 
relief efforts. Millions of Americans have sent money, donated food, 
sent needed tools and equipment, given clothing, volunteered medical or 
other services, and otherwise helped in whatever manner they could.
  Perhaps most heartwarming of all, thousands of Americans have opened 
their homes to those who lost everything. I am particularly proud of my 
home State of Texas--where more than

[[Page S10302]]

250,000 of our neighbors sought shelter--and where virtually all of 
them have been able to find it.
  But just as America enjoys a culture of giving and volunteering, she 
also faces a culture of litigation. And this ``sue first, ask questions 
later'' culture has produced an environment of fear that often gives 
pause to some people who would otherwise wish to extend a helping hand.
  As Common Good co-founder and chair, Philip Howard pointed out in 
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee in June of 2004, ``[w]hat 
we have found is that, in dealings throughout society, Americans no 
longer feel free to act on their reasonable judgment. The reason is 
that they no longer trust our system of justice. . . No part of society 
is immune. Playgrounds have been stripped of anything athletic. Even 
seesaws are disappearing because town councils can't afford to be sued 
if someone breaks an ankle. . . There is a missing link in American 
justice--rulings on who can sue for what.''
  Unfortunately, volunteers and non-profits face this question every 
day. To what degree should people volunteering services or providing 
needed equipment and supplies be forced to choose between lending a 
helping hand or facing the specter of litigation? And, should non-
profit organizations such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army 
struggle to find appropriate housing for evacuees due to liability 
concerns?
  In an attempt to respond to these concerns, 8 years ago the late 
Senator Paul Coverdell sponsored and successfully worked to enact the 
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997--legislation that protects volunteers 
from many frivolous lawsuits. However, as helpful and well-intentioned 
as this legislation was, more needs to be done to sufficiently protect 
all those lending a hand to those in need.
  Consider, for example: Early this year, a jury in Milwaukee found the 
Catholic Archdiocese liable because a volunteer for a Catholic lay 
organization, driving her own car, ran a red light and caused an 
accident while delivering a statue of the Virgin Mary to an invalid 
person. Although the church does not direct the activities of this 
group, called the Legion of Mary, its meetings are held on church 
property. The jury decided the Archdiocese should pay $17 million to 
the paralyzed victim, an 82-year-old semi-retired barber.
  In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross and the Salvation 
Army are unable to coordinate efforts to set up emergency housing in 
private homes for evacuees because of liability issues.
  In the midst of administering chest compressions to a dying woman 
several days after Hurricane Katrina struck, Dr. Mark N. Perlmutter was 
ordered to stop by a federal official because he wasn't registered with 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. ``I begged him to let me 
continue,'' said Perlmutter, who left his home and practice as an 
orthopedic surgeon in Pennsylvania to come to Louisiana and volunteer 
to care for hurricane victims. ``People were dying, and I was the only 
doctor on the tarmac where scores of non-responsive patients lay on 
stretchers. Two patients died in front of me . . . I asked him to let 
me stay until I was replaced by another doctor, but he refused. He said 
he was afraid of being sued.''

  So, today, even as volunteers, businesses, and non-profit 
organizations across the Nation are working to return New Orleans and 
the gulf coast region to something close to normal--I feel it is 
crucial to ensure that those volunteers are protected from needless and 
frivolous litigation.
  That's why I am introducing today--and am proud to be joined by 
Senators Hutchison, Vitter, Lott, Grassley and Thune--the Good 
Samaritan Liability Improvement and Volunteer Encouragement, or GIVE 
Act of 2005.
  The legislation offers a comprehensive solution to the fear of 
litigation that unnecessarily burdens volunteers and often prevents the 
provision of necessary goods and services to those in need. It will 
provide protection for volunteers across the Nation, particularly those 
working in response to national disasters such as 9/11 or Hurricane 
Katrina. More specifically, the GIVE Act will provide that: Disaster 
relief volunteers, generally, are not liable for harm caused in 
carrying out their volunteer activities in connection with disaster 
relief, unless their act or omission constitutes willful, knowing or 
reckless misconduct; medical and other professionals can volunteer 
their services for disaster relief services based on being licensed in 
their home State regardless of where the declared disaster occurred; a 
disaster relief volunteer is protected from liability under the act 
even if the volunteer is not working for a specific non-profit 
organization; disaster relief volunteers can offer their services 
without subjecting their business partners or employers to liability; 
disaster relief volunteers are protected from punitive damages and non-
economic damages are apportioned according to percentage of fault; non-
profit organizations are not liable for the acts or omissions of their 
volunteers unless the organization has willfully disregarded or is 
recklessly indifferent to the safety of the individual harmed; all 
donors of goods or equipment--whether businesses, non-profits, or 
individuals--are not liable for harm caused by donating those items 
unless they acted with willful, knowing or reckless misconduct; and all 
litigation that proceeds despite any protections under this act or 
under the Volunteer Protection Act requires a high level of specificity 
and documentation in the claim and a review by a judge that the claim 
raises--as a matter of law--a genuine issue of material fact.
  I urge my colleagues to support these two pieces of legislation--
legislation designed to ensure that the fear of litigation that 
pervades our culture won't stand in the way of well-intentioned 
Americans trying to help their neighbors in need.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Reid, 
        Mr. Durbin, Mr. Schumer, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Mikulski, 
        Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Reed, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Sarbanes, 
        Mr. Kerry, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Akaka, Mrs. Feinstein, Mrs. 
        Boxer, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Bayh, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Corzine, Mr. 
        Dayton, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr. Obama):
  S. 1749. A bill to reinstate the application of the wage requirements 
of the Davis-Bacon Act to Federal contracts in areas affected by 
Hurricane Katrina; to the Committee on Health, Education, labor, and 
Pensions.
  Mr. KENNEDY. As we send hundreds of billions of dollars in Federal 
aid to the areas devastated by Hurrican Katrina, we must remember that 
we are just rebuilding highway and schools--we are rebuilding 
communities and neighborhoods. And the foundation of such communities 
is good jobs with fair wages.
  The winds of Katrina exposed to all of America just how much more 
work remains to be done to achieve equality and fairness in this 
country. We are a stronger country when we are a fairer country. Yet, 
as the Administration awards billions of dollars in contracts to many 
of their corporate friends, they decide that the men and women of the 
gulf coast don't deserve to be paid a fair wage. The victims of Katrina 
have lost everything, and now President Bush says it is okay for them 
to lose their fair wages too. That is why I am introducing this 
legislation to ensure that that the workers involved in the recovery 
and reconstruction effort after Hurricane Katrina will earn a 
prevailing wage.
  Many people harmed by Hurricane Katrina were already struggling to 
make ends meet. Mississippi and Louisiana rank 1st and 2nd among States 
by the percentage of people below the poverty line. Moreover, 
Mississippi and Louisiana rank 2nd and 3rd by the percentage of 
children below the poverty line. Now the devastation of hurricane has 
caused the jobs and businesses they relied on to disappear. Experts 
have said that from 400,000 to 1 million workers may become unemployed 
as a result of the hurricane, with the unemployment rate reaching 25 
percent or higher in the gulf region. Many affected workers will be 
unemployed for 9 months or longer.
  The new jobs in the clean up, recovery, and rebuilding of the area 
will be a major source of new employment, and we need to be sure that 
they pay decent wages. This is all that Davis-Bacon does: it simply 
ensures that workers on Federal Government

[[Page S10303]]

projects earn a typical wage. Otherwise the large size of Federal 
contracts can overwhelm a local labor market lead to bidding wars that 
drive wages down. Indeed, Representative Davis and Senator Bacon were 
Republicans who wanted to protect local contractors, who would not be 
able to compete in such a price war.
  Workers who take these jobs will already face special hazards. Each 
day the administration reveals more details about workers' exposure to 
elevated levels of e.coli, toxic chemicals from flooded Superfund 
sites, and contaminants from massive oil spills. These workers should 
not have to suffer below-market wages, too.
  But the President apparently believes that workers in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and parts of Florida don't even deserve to earn a 
decent wage for a day's work. He would have you believe that Davis-
Bacon wages are exorbitant--nothing could be further from the truth. 
Indeed, in areas affected by Katrina, some typical wages include: $9.16 
per hour sheet metal workers, in Pearl River County, MS, $10.00 per 
hour for laborers in Livingston Parish, LA, $8.54 hour for truckdrivers 
in Mobile County, AL. And Federal spending post-Hurricane Katrina 
should be lifting workers up, not forcing them into a race to the 
bottom.
  I urge the Congress to reverse the President's decision and to stand 
with the hardworking men and women of the gulf coast as they rebuild 
their towns and their lives.

                          ____________________