[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 119 (Wednesday, September 21, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10257-S10258]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
Committee on Foreign Relations be discharged from further consideration
of S. 1713, and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report the bill by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1713) to make amendments to the Nonproliferation
Act of 2000 related to International Space Station payments.
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, on September 15 I introduced a bill to
amend the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-178. The
bill, S. 1713, provides authority for the administration to continue to
cooperate with the Russian Federation on the International Space
Station.
Current law prohibits certain payments from being made to Russia.
When Congress enacted the Iran Nonproliferation Act, INPA, it did so to
provide the President with a means to address proliferation of
ballistic missile-related and other dangerous dual-use technology to
Iran. Congress passed and the President signed legislation designed to
give the executive branch additional tools with which to address
Russian proliferation and the proliferation of other countries that are
transferring dangerous weapons technology to Iran. The legislation was
also meant to enhance significantly the ability of Congress to monitor
proliferation to Iran and oversee executive efforts to combat it.
With regard to Russia, at the time of its enactment, the rationale
for INPA restrictions on payments to Russia for cooperation on the
International Space Station was that the Russian Aviation and Space
Agency, RASA, could use any legal or operational authority it may have
had over certain organizations and entities that might be proliferating
to Iran to stop such activities.
I continue to believe that Russia must prevent proliferation to Iran
of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and the
technical know-how to make them.
The bill I introduced last week does not condone the proliferation
activities of Russian entities nor those of others proliferating to
Iran. It does allow the United States to meet its obligations under the
Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station. While it creates an exception for certain U.S. payments to
Russia in support of the space station, it also mandates that Congress
be kept aware of the specific Russian entities to which the United
States makes payments, and that the President determine that such
payments are not prejudicial to our nonproliferation policies with
respect to cruise and ballistic missile proliferation to Iran or other
state sponsors of terrorism.
Since the introduction of S. 1713, a question has arisen as to which
agreements might be negotiated under its authority that could, in fact,
obligate the United States to make payments beyond the date specified
in section 3 of that bill. It is my intention that no payments may be
made after January 1, 2012. Also, I understand that NASA intends to
accelerate its crew exploration vehicle, CEV, program so as to avoid
any complications that might arise as a result of continued U.S.
utilization of Russian-provided technology during the period between
the shuttle's retirement and the CEV becoming operational.
I want to thank all my colleagues for their cooperative consideration
of this bill. I urge the Senate to pass S. 1713.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be
read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the
table, and that any statements relating to the measure be printed in
the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The bill (S. 1713) was read the third time and passed, as follows:
S. 1713
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nonproliferation
Amendments Act of 2005''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence's most recent
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December
2003, states ``Russian entities during the reporting period
continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related
goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran,
India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining
technology and materials from Russian entities helped
accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and
continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian
efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-
sufficiency in missile production.''
(2) Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in testimony before the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on February
16, 2005, that ``Tehran probably will have the ability to
produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade''.
(3) Iran has--
(A) failed to act in accordance with the Agreement Between
Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June
19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards
Agreement'');
(B) acted in a manner inconsistent with the Protocol
Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards, signed at Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly
referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'');
(C) acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and
entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the
``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''); and
(D) resumed uranium enrichment activities, thus ending the
confidence building measures it adopted in its November 2003
agreement with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany.
(4) The executive branch has on multiple occasions used the
authority provided under section 3 of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) to impose sanctions on entities that have engaged
in activities in violation of restrictions in the Act
relating to--
(A) the export of equipment and technology controlled under
multilateral export control lists, including under the
Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile
Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement or otherwise having the potential to
make a material contribution to the development of weapons of
mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missile systems to
Iran; and
(B) the export of other items to Iran with the potential of
making a material contribution to Iran's weapons of mass
destruction programs or on United States national control
lists for reasons related to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or missiles.
(5) The executive branch has never made a determination
pursuant to section 6(b) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000 that--
(A) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian
Federation to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of
mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering
such weapons;
(B) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the
law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and
intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated
and continues to demonstrate a
[[Page S10258]]
sustained commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer to
Iran of goods, services, and technology that could make a
material contribution to the development of nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise
missile systems; and
(C) no entity under the jurisdiction or control of the
Government of the Russian Federation, has, during the 1-year
period prior to the date of the determination pursuant to
section 6(b) of such Act, made transfers to Iran reportable
under section 2(a) of the Act.
(6) On June 29, 2005, President George W. Bush issued
Executive Order 13382 blocking property of weapons of mass
destruction proliferators and their supporters, and used the
authority of such order against 4 Iranian entities, Aerospace
Industries Organization, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group,
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, and the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, that have engaged, or attempted to
engage, in activities or transactions that have materially
contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their
means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering
such weapons), including efforts to manufacture, acquire,
possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items.
SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000
RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
PAYMENTS.
(a) Treatment of Certain Payments.--Section 7(1)(B) of the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting after ``such date''
the following: ``, except that such term does not mean
payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the United
States Government, to meet the obligations of the United
States under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the
Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed at
Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27,
2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of
understanding, or contract related thereto, to January 1,
2012''.
(b) Reporting Requirements.--Section 6 of such Act is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) Report on Certain Payments Related to International
Space Station.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall, together with each
report submitted under section 2(a), submit to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives a
report that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom
the United States Government has, since the date of the
enactment of the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of
2005, made a payment in cash or in kind to meet the
obligations of the United States under the Agreement
Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998,
and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol,
agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related
thereto.
``(2) Content.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include--
``(A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each
entity or person identified in the report; and
``(B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of
the President that the payment was not prejudicial to the
achievement of the objectives of the United States Government
to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise missile
systems in Iran and other countries that have repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism, as
determined by the Secretary of State under section 620A(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)),
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''.
Mr. BENNETT. I thank the Chair. I now yield the floor so that the
Senator from Massachusetts can make his statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the committee and
the Senator from Utah for his courtesies. I know he is eager to get on
with the legislation, and I am particularly grateful to him for the
courtesy that he has extended this morning.
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