[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 118 (Tuesday, September 20, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1903-E1904]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO DESTROY OUR NATION'S STOCKPILE OF DEADLY CHEMICAL 
                         WEAPONS BY APRIL 2007

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. ROBERT E. ANDREWS

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                      Tuesday, September 20, 2005

  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak about our 
responsibility to destroy our Nation's stockpile of deadly chemical 
weapons by April 2007, while also being forthright about the costs and 
time required to comply with this obligation. This is a commitment that 
we made to both the American people and the world when the Senate 
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. As outlined by 
statute, Congress retains a continuing oversight role in the CWC's 
implementation.
  So far, we've destroyed 37 percent of our total stockpile of chemical 
weapons. Without a doubt, the destruction of these chemical weapons is 
a complicated and costly process. No one is under the illusion that we 
will meet the 2007 deadline for complete destruction. Unfortunately, 
civilian officials in the Department of Defense have managed, and 
continue to manage, much of this program in a way that has guaranteed 
that we will not meet our treaty obligations by the deadline. In fact, 
we will be hard pressed to meet the five-year extension that we will be 
forced to apply for in April of 2006. More importantly, the Department 
of Defense continues to mislead Congress and the public about the true 
financial cost of, and time requirements for, complete destruction of 
the remaining two-thirds of our chemical weapons.
  I have become intimately involved with this issue because the Army 
has proposed to send four million gallons of VX hydrolysate from 
Newport, Indiana to a DuPont facility in New Jersey where it would be 
treated and then dumped into the Delaware River. I've joined with many 
of my colleagues from New Jersey and Delaware to shine a brighter light 
on this illogical proposal. I believe that our involvement has provided 
people who live near the Delaware River and people in Newport with much 
more information about this proposal than they would have received 
otherwise. But we have a long way to go.
  At our urging, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are taking a much closer look at 
this proposal. In April of this year they issued a report that could 
not recommend proceeding with the treatment and disposal at the DuPont 
facility until EPA's noted deficiencies are addressed. EPA's ecologic 
analysis indicated that there are too many unknowns to determine 
whether the ecologic risk from the discharge of treated VX hydrolysate 
to the Delaware River is acceptable.
  As decisions are being made about how to deal with hydrolysate at 
other chemical weapon sites, specifically the Blue Grass Depot in 
Kentucky and the Pueblo Depot in Colorado, I find it insightful to 
juxtapose findings by the Department of Defense related to those sites 
with proposals made regarding the hydrolysate at Newport. The 
Department of Defense agency responsible for destroying the weapons at 
Blue Grass has determined that shipping hydrolysate off-site isn't 
worth the trouble. While

[[Page E1904]]

under perfect conditions, off-site treatment could potentially offer 
cost and time savings, the conditions involved with the destruction of 
chemical weapons are far from perfect.

  With respect to Newport, the battle over off-site disposal has added 
at least three years and an indeterminable amount of taxpayer money to 
the final completion and cost of destruction of the 1,200 tons of VX 
stored there. I have repeatedly called for the release of a detailed 
cost-benefit analysis of various destruction options for the VX 
hydrolysate at Newport, but the Department of Defense refuses to 
provide this information. Recently the Department of Defense stated 
that one option for treating the VX hydrolysate, supercritical water 
oxidation, would add $300 million and an additional two years. But they 
provide absolutely no supporting evidence of this claim. In fact, some 
say that this method would cost $30 to $35 million and could be up and 
running in a year. Another key fact going unmentioned is that VX would 
continue to be neutralized while an on-site hydrolysate treatment 
facility is built. After all isn't neutralization of the VX the most 
important thing we want to accomplish? I call on the Department of 
Defense to provide a detailed justification of this $300 million dollar 
claim in addition to why they think it would add two years to final 
destruction.
  For too long the decision making process for the destruction of our 
chemical weapons has been a closed process that hasn't adequately 
considered the opinions of affected communities. I call on Congress to 
tighten its oversight of this program and demand a detailed 
justification of all possible ways to destroy chemical weapon 
hydrolysate at Newport, Blue Grass and Pueblo. Those communities have 
suffered long enough with the presence of these deadly weapons. We must 
demand a much better justification of why we should expose new 
communities to this risk. As seen by the frustrating and problematic 
path that the Department of Defense has followed in Newport since 
September 11, 2001, the stubborn pursuit of off-site disposal of 
hydrolysate has resulted in longer exposure to the threat of chemical 
weapons in our country while preventing us from meeting our treaty 
obligations. It is past due for Congress to take a much more active 
role in exercising its Constitutional responsibility of oversight of 
this effort.

                          ____________________