[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 106 (Friday, July 29, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H7599-H7603]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        THE WAY FORWARD IN IRAQ

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 4, 2005, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price) is 
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, our country is facing a 
difficult, even desperate, situation in Iraq with an insurgency that 
seems to be gaining strength, a reconstruction effort that is lagging, 
and an international coalition that is deteriorating.
  President Bush seems determined to put the best face on the 
situation, but the American people are increasingly pessimistic and 
distrustful of what they hear. We are overdue for a major course 
correction. It is my intent today to make the case for such a 
correction and to outline what its major elements should be.
  What are our objectives in Iraq? A careful reading of the President's 
Fort Bragg speech of June 28 reveals a shift of emphasis, from standing 
up an independently functioning democracy to preventing Iraq from 
becoming a basing point for international terrorism. That is ironic, 
for most analysts, including the 9/11 Commission, agree that the Iraqi 
regime had no discernable link to the perpetrators of 9/11. It is our 
invasion and its chaotic aftermath that have attracted al Qaeda and 
other international terrorists to Iraq.
  In any event, by whatever definition of the American mission one 
chooses, our effort is falling short, dangerously short, of what it 
will take for Iraq to achieve self-rule and the capability of self-
defense and for the American occupation to end.
  The news of recent days leaves little doubt that the insurgency, 
which Vice President Cheney described as in its ``last throes,'' is 
anything but. In the last 2 weeks, insurgent attacks have intensified 
again, killing more than 200 people in Baghdad and towns to the

[[Page H7600]]

south. Last weekend we read of gunmen ambushing a wedding party, 
killing the bride and wounding the groom, apparently because of his 
Iraqi army affiliation--a heart-wrenching account that underscores the 
insurgents' brutality and their continuing ability to launch lethal 
attacks.
  General Abizaid, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, recently 
acknowledged that the insurgency has not diminished. In fact, estimates 
of the number of hardcore insurgents now range from 20,000 to 40,000, 
up from original U.S. estimates of 5,000. Attacks now average 70 per 
day, up from 25 per day 1 year ago. And car bombs average 135 per 
month, up from an average of 20 per month last summer.
  We are getting better at identifying potential attacks. Only 25 
percent of car bomb attacks are now successful compared to 90 percent 
last year. But while we have been able to reduce the insurgents' 
success rates threefold, they have increased the number of attacks 
sixfold. So the number of lethal attacks has actually doubled over the 
last year.
  How far have the Iraqi police, security forces, and officer corps 
come toward being able to secure the countryside and control terrorists 
and criminal activity? ``About half of Iraq's new police battalions are 
still being established and cannot conduct operations, while the other 
half of the police units and two-thirds of the new army battalions are 
only `partially capable' of carrying out counterinsurgency missions, 
and only with American help, according to a newly declassified Pentagon 
assessment'' the New York Times reports.
  The administration claims that approximately 170,000 Iraqis have been 
trained to assume security responsibilities. U.S. commanders in Iraq 
have stated that the training is limited, and Joint Chiefs Chairman 
Myers has publicly said that only about 40,000 are fully capable of 
deploying anywhere in Iraq. Other estimates go as low as 10,000 Iraqi 
security forces that are actually trained and capable of performing 
their security responsibilities.
  The equipping of these forces is also deficient. According to the 
Brookings Institution, the Iraqis only have 42 percent of required 
weapons, 24 percent of required vehicles, 19 percent of required 
communications equipment, and 29 percent of required body armor. The 
Iraqis are not now ready to provide their own national security, handle 
civil policing duties, or deal with the continuing and strong 
insurgency, nor will they be ready in the near future.
  What is the state of the reconstruction of Iraq? Successful 
reconstruction is critical to gaining the support of the Iraqi people 
and denying the insurgents the benefits of widespread popular 
discontent. We have made substantial headway in rebuilding bridges, 
roads, and railways; in rehabilitating the seaport of Umm Qasr, and 
installing and repairing telecommunications infrastructure both inside 
of Baghdad and for the international satellite gateway system.
  Despite these efforts, we have a long way to go. Nationwide, Iraq is 
only generating 75 percent of its electricity production goal and the 
nation only has an average of 12 hours of electricity per day. Oil 
production has barely reached 80 percent of its pre-war levels, and 
Iraqis are experiencing gas lines up to a mile long. Iraqi government 
sources cited in the Pentagon's report of July 21, 2005, put the 
unemployment rate at 28 percent, up from 22.5 percent 6 months ago. 
Most independent estimates of unemployment are closer to 40 percent.
  The top five problems Iraqis identified in an April, 2005, IRI survey 
are inadequate electricity, unemployment, health care, crime, and 
national security, all significant indicators of major reconstruction 
needs.

                              {time}  1315

  Are we on schedule for getting an Iraqi Constitution adopted and a 
legitimate, broadly representative government established? The National 
Assembly is to draft a Constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a 
national vote by October 15. On May 10, the National Assembly appointed 
a 55-member committee to begin drafting the permanent Constitution. The 
committee missed its own deadline to produce a preliminary draft by 
July 15. However, several working drafts have surfaced that have 
sparked serious complaints regarding constriction of the rights of 
women and a strict interpretation of Islam as a source of legislation.
  Despite these conflicts and the missing of the self-imposed deadline, 
Iraqi leaders say that a draft will be completed by the August 15 
deadline. Six subcommittees are working on specific issues of the new 
Constitution, including the thorny questions of Kurdish autonomy and 
the role of Islam in law. Many other contentious issues remain to be 
negotiated. There is a provision for a 6-month drafting extension if 
the Assembly cannot complete a draft by the specified deadline, but 
exercising this extension would delay all subsequent stages of the 
transition.
  Given the enormity of the task we face in Iraq, what is the condition 
of the Coalition of the Willing on which our efforts depend? The 
coalition has always been a pale imitation of the one the first 
President Bush assembled for the first Iraq war. For Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the U.S. share of overall troop numbers has never been less 
than 84 percent. And now the coalition is deteriorating further. 
Spain's troop commitment has gone from 1,300 to zero. Italy's 3,120 
troops will go to zero by early next year, as will Poland's 1,500. 
Other countries that have withdrawn their forces or are in the process 
of doing so include Bulgaria, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Hungary, Moldova, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the 
Philippines, Portugal, Thailand, Tonga, and Ukraine. In most cases, 
these withdrawals have taken place amid overwhelming public opposition 
in these countries to the war.
  Troop contingents of 12,000 from the United Kingdom and 2,800 from 
South Korea remain, but this war and occupation have mainly had an 
American face, and that has become more and more the case as erstwhile 
allies have fallen away. American troops strength now stands at about 
135,000, and many say that is not sufficient to complete the mission 
unless the training of Iraqis can be greatly accelerated. American 
casualties number 13,657, including 1,790 deaths. Of these, 1,653 
deaths have occurred since President Bush landed on the aircraft 
carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln to proclaim major combat operations 
successfully concluded.
  While there is no definitive source of information, we know that the 
human toll in Iraq is enormous. Estimates of noncombatant Iraqi deaths 
have reached 25,000, and the Pentagon reports that Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) combat deaths have now exceeded 2,000.
  As for the budget impact, outlays for Iraq operations are now about 
$1 billion per week. The cumulative cost of the Iraq war, occupation, 
and reconstruction has already exceeded $200 billion.
  In the face of all this, the American public's confidence is waning. 
This is not because Americans are cowed by the challenge we face in 
Iraq. Fully 57 percent in the NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll of July 
11 said it was important that America ``maintain its military and 
economic commitment there until Iraq is able to fully govern and police 
itself.'' But the public is increasingly skeptical of President Bush's 
rationale for going to war. They are doubtful that the administration 
has a plan for success, and they wonder if they are being told the 
truth by our country's leaders. More than half say they do not think 
the war was ``worth it.'' Only 40 percent say the Iraq war has made us 
safer from terrorism; 54 percent say less safe. Nearly 60 percent now 
disapprove of the job President Bush is doing in Iraq. This has helped 
drive his overall disapproval rating to 56 percent.
  The President's June 28 speech was widely anticipated as an 
opportunity for the Commander in Chief to give an honest assessment of 
progress to date and to chart a realistic and compelling course going 
forward. The setting of the speech, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was 
well chosen, giving the President the opportunity to express the 
admiration and the gratitude we all feel ``to our servicemen and women 
across the globe . . . for [their] courage under fire and service to 
our Nation,'' and for the sacrifices of their families as well.
  In other respects, however, the speech was a disappointment, offering

[[Page H7601]]

neither a candid assessment nor a specific strategy for success. The 
President spoke of ``significant progress,'' while glossing over the 
state of the insurgency and ignoring the falling off of international 
support. He furnished fewer details than I have already given in this 
presentation this afternoon. He offered no benchmarks by which success 
might be measured or his administration might be held accountable. He 
was defensive about past decisions and oblivious to the obvious need 
for course correction. As others have observed, he exposed the weakness 
of his arguments by rhetorically falling back on 9/11, despite the lack 
of any significant al Qaeda connection to prewar Iraq.
  The President asked Americans to stay the course, to continue to pay 
the heavy price of this war, without holding up his end of the bargain. 
He and his administration owe these brave men and women in uniform and, 
indeed, all Americans more than glib assurances and exhortations to 
steadfastness. He owes all of us a plan for success, for turning Iraq 
over to the Iraqis, avoiding a reversion to tyranny or chaos, and 
terminating the American occupation.
  The President's speech has now been improved on somewhat by the 
Department of the Defense's congressionally mandated report, 
``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,'' dated July 21, 2005. The 
report states, ``The criteria for withdrawing coalition forces from 
Iraq are conditions-based, not calendar-based. The development of the 
Iraqi Security Forces to a level at which they can take over primary 
responsibility for their own security is the threshold condition. ISF 
development in turn will be helped by progress in political, economic, 
and other areas.''
  This is only slightly more specific than the standard suggested in 
the President's speech, ``As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.''
  Only in limited instances does the report measure present performance 
against a defined goal, much less specify the conditions under which 
American responsibility can be scaled back. Moreover, the Pentagon 
almost always chooses the more optimistic among analysts' conclusions 
as to conditions in Iraq and apparently sees no need to defend those 
choices. Congress has required that this report be updated every 90 
days. Our leaders should insist that future reports meet a higher 
standard of candor and of relevance to future policy choices.
  The coherence of administration policy was thrown further into doubt 
this week by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Commander of 
U.S. forces in Iraq, General George Casey, in their comments reported 
from Baghdad. Rumsfeld, who last month suggested that the insurgency 
might last as many as 10 to 12 years, displayed a new urgency about 
moving the constitutional process and the training of security 
personnel along. Meanwhile, General Casey emerged from a meeting with 
Rumsfeld and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad to declare that ``fairly 
substantial reductions'' in U.S. troop levels might be possible by next 
spring and summer.

  That may be a tantalizing prospect politically, but the Pentagon owes 
the Congress and the public an accounting of the conditions that must 
be met, and how they are to be met, in order for such a policy to 
succeed.
  Mr. Speaker, the challenge of Iraq calls for leadership of a high 
order, leadership that is determined and confident, but does not 
mistake confidence for rigidity, or does not mistake determination for 
an unwillingness to acknowledge and learn from past mistakes.
  The Bush administration's Iraq policy has been plagued by far too 
many misjudgments and mistakes, and it would compound those mistakes to 
fail to learn from them now. We went to war with defective intelligence 
on the threat posed by Iraq, evidence selectively and sometimes 
misleadingly presented to Congress and the public. We went to war 
virtually unilaterally with too few allies and unwarranted disdain for 
the United Nations' program of weapons inspection and destruction. We 
went to war with unrealistic expectations as to how our occupation 
would be received, and with grossly deficient postwar planning. We 
undertook a war of choice, allowing ourselves to be diverted from the 
war on terrorism and other more dangerous international challenges, and 
foregoing other means for containing and controlling whatever threat 
Saddam Hussein represented.
  Our current situation in Iraq bears the marks of these past mistakes, 
and I believe history will judge George Bush and his administration 
harshly for them. In much of this, Congress was complicit, and I am 
even more convinced than I was on the day I cast my ``no'' vote that 
this body abdicated its responsibility when it gave the President, 
months in advance, open-ended authority to invade Iraq. But, while we 
must learn from the past, we must face resolutely forward. That means 
transcending past grievances, rethinking past positions, confronting 
the unvarnished truth as to our present situation, and weighing our 
realistic options.
  What alternative possibilities, in fact, lay before us? The President 
has proposed more of the same: persevere on our present course, despite 
abundant evidence that we are falling short. Others are urging 
unilateral withdrawal of American forces, some say on a preannounced, 
fixed timetable. More and more politicians and commentators are 
expressing this view. They point out that the presence of American 
troops is not only challenging the insurgency, but also fueling it. Our 
alien ``infidel'' presence is itself a rallying point for Iraqi 
insurgents and international terrorists. Moreover, some argue, Iraqis 
will be more likely to assume responsibility for assembling a workable 
government and developing their own security forces if they know that 
their dependence on U.S. troops is coming to an end.
  These arguments have merit, but they underestimate factors beyond the 
American military presence that are feeding the insurgency and could 
plunge Iraq into a civil war, or even the conditions of a failed state, 
after we are gone. They also underestimate the danger of encouraging 
our enemies to wait us out and then to strike with devastating force.
  There is, I believe, a better way. We should indeed signal clearly 
that we intend ultimately to bring our troops home, that we expect the 
Iraq Government to assume responsibility for the country's security, 
and that we have no plans for permanent bases or an ongoing military 
presence. But we should also put forward a strategy for success--a plan 
for course correction in Iraq, for recognizing and correcting policies 
that are not working, and for moving Iraq decisively towards self-
defense and self-rule.
  A strategy for success requires benchmarks by which we can measure 
progress and hold our own government accountable. One useful 
formulation was suggested by the House minority leader as an amendment 
to the fiscal year 2006 defense appropriations bill, but was, 
unfortunately, denied a vote by the Republican leadership. The 
amendment would have required the timely submission by the President to 
the Congress of a report specifying:
  ``(1) the criteria for assessing the capabilities and readiness of 
Iraqi security forces; goals for achieving appropriate capability and 
readiness levels for such forces, as well as for recruiting, training, 
and equipping such forces, and the milestones and timetable for 
achieving such goals.

                              {time}  1330

  ``(2) The estimated total number of Iraqi personnel trained at 
[these] levels . . . needed for Iraqi security forces to perform duties 
currently being undertaken by United States and coalition forces, 
including defending Iraq's borders and providing adequate levels of law 
and order throughout Iraq.
  ``(3) The number of United States and coalition advisors needed to 
support Iraqi security forces and associated ministries.
  ``(4) The measures of political stability for Iraq, including the 
important political milestones to be achieved over the next several 
years.''
  I would augment this list with benchmarks and goals for the 
reconstruction effort and for the involving of allies and multilateral 
organizations.
  What of the other ingredients of a strategy for success? Senator 
Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, gave a wide-ranging speech on June 21 that stressed the need 
to take advantage of

[[Page H7602]]

legitimate foreign offers to help Iraqi security forces and to share 
responsibility for Iraqi reconstruction internationally.
  Egypt has offered to train Iraqi police. The Jordanians have offered 
advanced military training for the officer corps. Even the French have 
offered to train 1,500 paramilitary police in France and send them back 
to Iraq. NATO is establishing an ISF training mission, and the alliance 
and its member states should be encouraged to do more. Senator Biden, 
for example, has proposed a small NATO force dedicated to border patrol 
and protection.
  We must have an ongoing crash course in the training and equipping of 
Iraqi police, security forces, and the officer corps. And the Bush 
administration should be far more aggressive in enlisting international 
partners in these efforts.
  The same goes for Iraqi political development and reconstruction. The 
Pentagon's July 21 report commends United Nations support of the 
constitutional development process and assistance in preparing for 
approaching referenda and elections. Recent international donors' 
conferences in Brussels on June 22 and Amman on July 18 made only 
limited progress in securing financing for Iraqi reconstruction and 
economic development.
  Most of the effort was aimed at getting donors to follow through on 
the approximately $33 billion pledged in 2003 in Madrid. Many potential 
donors conditioned future support on improvements in the security 
situation.
  Unfortunately, both the military and the reconstruction efforts 
continue to bear the marks of the Bush administration's early 
unilateralism. This must be overcome, as a matter of burden sharing and 
of ensuring the legitimacy and eventual success of the effort.
  Our reconstruction programs should have a steady focus on improving 
the lives of ordinary Iraqis. This will often require us to emphasize 
smaller-scale projects that have an immediate local impact, and/or that 
mainly employ Iraqis.
  It also means we should continue to provide reconstruction funds 
directly to our midlevel military officers. The Commanders Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) provided for the disbursement in fiscal year 
2004 of $549 million by U.S. commanders at the tactical level. Many 
Members of this body have returned from visits to Iraq, as I did from 
Kirkuk, impressed by the education and health facilities and the other 
projects these funds have made possible, with a minimum of red tape, 
and the trust and good will they have generated.
  Among the worthwhile Iraqi projects sponsored by the U.S. Agency For 
International Development, I am particularly familiar with the local 
government and civil society work of North Carolina-based RTI 
International.
  These projects have been forced to use a substantial portion of their 
funding to provide security, and some efforts have succumbed in a 
hostile environment. Yet RTI staff, many of them Iraqis, have helped 
establish representative and accountable governments in many localities 
and are currently implementing a training and management program for 
150 model health care centers in Iraq. This is difficult but important 
work, and it deserves our continuing support.
  In the midst of the challenges in Iraq, and the course correction we 
must undertake there, it is critical that we not lose sight of related 
undertakings in the region with a direct bearing on our prospects in 
Iraq. I will here mention only Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
  Over the past 3 years, the Afghan mission, directly related to 9/11 
and to the denial of a support structure or sanctuary to al Qaeda and 
other terrorist groups, has suffered by virtue of the President's 
initial fixation on Iraq and the human and material resources required 
by Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar remain at large. And it has often 
fallen to this Congress to augment administration budget requests for 
Afghanistan.
  The Taliban has managed to partially reconstitute itself in recent 
months. Insurgent attacks and government offenses since March have 
killed more than 800 in Afghanistan. The obvious intent at present is 
to disrupt the September 18 parliamentary elections, a critical step in 
Afghanistan's political development.
  In Afghanistan more than in Iraq, however, U.S. troops have the 
benefit of international assistance. The International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) has operated under NATO command since August 
2003, providing security and supporting nation-building activities.
  The ISAF currently numbers about 8,800 troops from 26 NATO and 11 
non-NATO partner countries, including Canada, Spain, France and 
Germany, all noticeably missing from Iraq.
  The provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), military-led groups that 
secure enclaves for the work of reconstruction, aid, and Afghanistan 
interior ministry personnel, also display increasing international 
participation. Of the 21 now in operation, 11 PRTs are U.S.-run, 10 are 
run by partner countries, and several U.S. teams are slated for 
takeover by NATO/ISAF forces.
  The Kabul government is still far from exercising effective authority 
throughout Afghanistan, and the Taliban and other enemy forces are 
displaying a disturbing resilience. Our Afghan mission is under severe 
challenge. We must not again be diverted.
  We must also expand the mission's international character and apply 
the lessons of multilateralism in Afghanistan to Iraq.
  Also critical to a strategy for success is determined U.S. diplomacy 
aimed at the two-state solution President Bush has advocated for the 
Middle East. The immediate challenge is to make certain the evacuation 
of Israeli settlers from Gaza undertaken by Prime Minister Sharon comes 
off successfully and peacefully, despite predictable attempts at 
sabotage from extremists on both sides.
  This will require redoubled Palestinian efforts to rein in terrorist 
groups and prevent attacks against Israeli troops and communities. The 
Israelis must give such efforts a chance and work with the Palestinian 
Authority to coordinate the logistics of the withdrawal and the freedom 
of movement in and out of Gaza after the withdrawal.
  Longer term, the parties must follow the path of mutual accommodation 
outlined in the Road Map, eventually undertaking final status 
negotiations. ``Gaza First'' must not become ``Gaza Last.'' But none of 
this will be easy, and it is unlikely to move forward without skillful 
and persistent U.S. diplomacy.
  The peace process has languished for 4 years, partially because of 
the disengagement of President Bush and his administration. This has 
been terribly costly to the Israelis and the Palestinians, who have 
endured 4 years of dashed hopes and recurring violence. But it has also 
been damaging to American interests in the region.
  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict fuels extremism and anti-American 
attitudes across the Middle East. It greatly complicates our prospects 
for success in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond.
  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has signaled that the second term 
will be different. To her credit, she returned to Israel and the West 
Bank last week as violent attacks escalated dangerously--a suicide 
bombing, rocket attacks, retaliatory air attacks--and Israeli tanks 
were lining up at the Gaza border.
  It is extremely important that she and the President stay the course, 
understanding that Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, important in its 
own right, is also critical to any strategy for success in the region.
  Mr. Speaker, the war in Iraq has been terribly costly in terms of 
lives, resources, and our country's diplomatic and security interests. 
Our challenge now is not merely to cut our losses, but to extricate 
ourselves in such a way that prevents Iraq from reverting to tyranny or 
chaos, that denies a basing point to international terrorism, and that 
leaves the country intact, able to defend and govern itself.
  We are not now on course to achieve this objective. The Bush 
administration neither has a strategy for success nor even acknowledges 
the need for course correction. We must do better. And it is the duty 
of this Congress to demand candor, accountability, and a strategy 
calibrated to achieve our goals.
  We must have an honest accounting of the state of the insurgency, the

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readiness of Iraq forces, the progress of the country's reconstruction 
and political development, and the extent of international 
collaboration and support.
  Where there are deficiencies, and the deficiencies are serious in all 
of these areas, the administration must provide benchmarks by which 
success can be measured and a plan specifying what it will take to 
reach our goals.
  Glib reassurances from the President are dangerous, postponing and 
preventing corrective action and opening wider the credibility gap with 
the American public.
  Those who commit troops to battle on behalf of this great country owe 
them and us an intelligent and realistic plan to succeed.
  Members of this body should demand such a plan and a frequent, 
truthful accounting of our success in reaching its goals from the 
President and his administration. A midcourse correction in Iraq is 
worthy of our Nation's best efforts, and the window of opportunity is 
closing.

                          ____________________