Congressional Record, Volume 151 Issue 101 (Friday, July 22, 2005)

[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 101 (Friday, July 22, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8717-S8740]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1042, which the clerk will
report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1042) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2006 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Pending:

Frist amendment No. 1342, to support certain youth
organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America and Girl
Scouts of America.
Inhofe amendment No. 1311, to protect the economic and
energy security of the United States.
Inhofe/Collins amendment No. 1312, to express the sense of
Congress that the President should take immediate steps to
establish a plan to implement the recommendations of the 2004
Report to Congress of the United States-China Economic and
Security Review Commission.
Inhofe/Kyl amendment No. 1313, to require an annual report
on the use of United States funds with respect to the
activities and management of the International Committee of
the Red Cross.
Lautenberg amendment No. 1351, to stop corporations from
financing terrorism.
Ensign amendment No. 1374, to require a report on the use
of riot control agents.
Ensign amendment No. 1375, to require a report on the costs
incurred by the Department of Defense in implementing or
supporting resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council.
Collins amendment No. 1377 (to Amendment No. 1351), to
ensure that certain persons do not evade or avoid the
prohibition imposed under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act.
Durbin amendment No. 1379, to require certain dietary
supplement manufacturers to report certain serious adverse
events.
Hutchison/Nelson (FL) amendment No. 1357, to express the
sense of the Senate with regard to manned space flight.
Thune amendment No. 1389, to postpone the 2005 round of
defense base closure and realignment.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia.

[[Page S8718]]

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I was present last night. We had a
colloquy among ourselves not unlike what took place today. The
Republican leader, Senator Frist, entrusted me with the management of
this bill. It was my decision with regard to the votes. It was my
decision that we file a cloture motion. I accept full responsibility
for those decisions. I am proud of the way we operate on this side,
where our leadership reposes in their managers those responsibilities;
I accept them. If, in due course, it proves to be in error, I accept
that responsibility. But I do believe, based on some 27 years of
experience managing this bill, that we can achieve the opportunity for
all Senators to have their amendments heard and voted upon in a timely
manner.
The matter of cloture, as it ripens on Tuesday, can be addressed by
the leadership, in consultation with the managers, and a determination
made as to whether it should or should not be invoked. I think that
decision, in large measure, would be dependent on what we can achieve
between now and Tuesday.
I look upon this in a very positive way. I have confidence in this
institution, confidence in the managers of this bill to see that it is
done in a fair and proper manner and done in the best interests
certainly of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield. For about 1 minute, I
will go back to the history, and I will not go through it all. Last
year, we spent 7 days on this bill. The 1st filing of cloture was on
the 11th day of debate, after considering 42 amendments. The 2nd filing
of cloture was on the 15th day of debate. I think it is totally
inappropriate to file cloture today.
I have no better friend in this body than the Senator from Virginia.
I was glad to hear what he basically just said, which is that he is
going to take a close look at where we are before this vote takes
place. He has always been openminded. I hope he will reconsider this
cloture motion. We are going to make progress today, even though there
are no votes.
It is difficult for Senators. Senator Kennedy is going to be offering
a very important amendment in a few moments, but the vote on that is
not going to take place until probably after the cloture because we
have so many amendments that are stacked up here. He deserves better
and, more importantly, the subject matter of the amendment deserves
better than to be debated on a Friday and then laid aside and not voted
on until many days later. Traditionally, we try to vote on amendments
after they are debated--shortly after, not days and days after they are
debated.
We are going to accommodate the demands of the schedule by trying to
offer a lot of amendments today and on Monday in order to see if we can
show enough progress here so that the motion for cloture will be
vitiated. That is our hope. I hope the Senator from Virginia will do
what he always does so magnificently, which is maintain an open mind,
keep options open, and see what kind of progress can be made to avoid a
divisive vote. It is inappropriate to have a cloture vote this soon
after the debate begins.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, just to finish, I have a practice of not
bringing up personal situations, and I am still going to refrain. If
continued to be pushed on this issue, I will recount several things
that occurred yesterday where I tried to accommodate interests on that
side of the aisle, and when it is said that not a Democratic vote was
taken, I know of one vote where I pleaded that it be made, found the
time, but the sponsors decided--and it was a joint amendment with a
Republican and a Democrat--not to do that.
I am not going to get involved in personal situations, but there is a
limit to the patience of the Senator from Virginia. On this matter by
Mr. Kennedy, I respect my good friend. Our friendship goes back as long
as any two Members in this Chamber. This amendment is an important
amendment, there is no question about it. But I ask the Senator from
Michigan, was not the same amendment voted on by the Senate 3 weeks
ago?
Mr. LEVIN. We will have to wait and see the precise nature of the
amendment.
Mr. WARNER. It is very similar, if not identical.
Mr. LEVIN. I commend my friend from Virginia for his temperament, his
ability to withhold any suggestion of personal comment. He is to be
commended. He is literally a role model for that. The Senator from
Virginia is correct. He showed great care for the Members of this body
yesterday, gave great consideration to the Members, and I commend him
for that.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts is
recognized.

Amendment No. 1415

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I join the ranking member of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Levin, in paying tribute to the Armed
Services Committee. I have been lucky enough to be on that committee
now for 24 years. I must say that all of us have the highest regard and
respect for the Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the committee.
There has never been a time that he has not been courteous and diligent
and thoughtful and considerate for those who have differing views that
come up before the committee.
I understand the remarks by the Senator from Michigan and also our
leader, Senator Reid; and although our friend takes the responsibility,
we have been around here long enough to know that the overall schedule
and timetable is made by the majority leader, with all due respect. He
has the responsibility, obviously, for the Senate and the Senate
agenda.
The part which is of concern is this, and I will mention this
briefly. When we have cloture, we find out that many amendments that
are related and are enormously important in terms of the subject
matter, which is the Defense authorization bill, are effectively
eliminated.
I took a quick look at some of the amendments that have been filed to
date. We have a Stabenow amendment to fully fund health care for
veterans. Nobody could watch the news last night and not understand the
challenge our veterans are having in getting coverage and being treated
well. That is true in my State, and the Nation was alerted again. We
have had some debate on that issue. It is an issue of enormous
importance. We make a commitment to those young men and women who
volunteer and fight in our wars that they are going to have their needs
attended to when they come back. They are not being attended to.

The Senator from Michigan, Ms. Stabenow, has an amendment that
probably would not be eligible after cloture. It is on pay equity for
reservists who are being deployed. We have so many being deployed over
in Iraq, and it is an important amendment to make sure they are to be
compensated. It is very important in terms of morale and, most of all,
in terms of fairness for the reservists.
Then there is reform of the Pentagon procurement, with all of the
kinds of challenges we have seen on the purchasing of the humvee. We
reviewed that last night once again. An article that was written in the
New York Times and the purchase conflict between the services, the lack
of priority that was given really as a result of a failure of our
procurement policies, we can do something about that, but we are not
going to do something about it if we have cloture. Then there is the
limitation of profits on defense contractors. We don't have to take a
lot of time on that issue, but I think the American taxpayer, when they
see hundreds of millions in windfall profits going to so many defense
contractors, would have to say that spending a few moments on that to
make sure, for example, the allegations that our troops are going to
get the food they deserve and need on time and not be given second-
level food is something that ought to be debated.
My amendment with Senator Feinstein and Senator Kerry on bunker
busters relates to the whole issue of nuclear proliferation and
stability. We probably would not be eligible to bring that up. There
have been important issues on funding for the cooperative threat
reduction, which is so important in terms of the nuclear proliferation,
with the very important and impressive study released this last week.

[[Page S8719]]

Those give you a little bit of a flavor, and they are related to
national security and defense. We are told we don't have time for that.
I have been here when we spent 2 full weeks debating bankruptcy and for
the credit card companies. The result of the bankruptcy bill we passed
here means the profits for the credit card companies are going up $5.6
billion this next year. We spent 2 weeks on that issue that will
benefit special interests. We spent more than a week on class action,
which will benefit very special interests. We spent more than a week on
highways. If you can spend more than a week on highways and you can
look after the credit card companies and you can look after the major
financial interests in class action, surely we can debate these issues
that are related to the security and well-being of the troops of this
country.
That is the point. I believe it is irrefutable myself. We were told
last night, well, we had heard that Senator Levin, Senator Reid, and
others might propose a commission to look into the whole question of
the torture policies that have taken place at Abu Ghraib. We had 12
different studies done by the Armed Services Committee, and we still
don't have anybody in the civilian areas that has been held
accountable, even though they were the architects of the torture
policy. This has given us a black eye all over the world. It has been
an incentive, and it is inflaming al-Qaida. It has been a recruiting
tool used in order to gather more recruits for al-Qaida.
It had been suggested that we have an independent commission review
that. And then guess what happened. Within a matter of hours, the White
House says, If that amendment is accepted, I will veto the bill that is
developing with Defense authorization. Imagine that. The President will
veto the bill if that amendment is accepted. He will veto the bill that
provides the resources for our fighting men and women if we are going
to have an independent kind of review about how we got into all of this
trouble in terms of torture and inflaming al-Qaida because of those
activities. They are going to veto the bill. Therefore, we are going to
have cloture.
We don't have to be around here for a number of years to understand
what is happening. That is just plain wrong, Mr. President. It is just
plain wrong. It is not the way this body ought to be doing business.
These issues are too important. People are ready to debate them.
We had the amendment that I have here, which is very similar to the
amendment Senator Feinstein and I offered earlier on another
appropriations bill. It is a matter of enormous importance in terms of
the issue of nuclear proliferation.
There is an excellent study this last week about the worst weapons in
the worst hands. The National Security Advisory Group is chaired by
Willian Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and is made up of an
extraordinary group of men and women who have spent their lives in
terms of national security and defense and talking about the dangers of
increased nuclear weapons. Well, we have now in this bill the design
for new nuclear weapons. They will say: No, we don't, it is only $4.5
million. Look at the Department of Energy's congressional budget, right
here on page 63, where cumulatively they are planning to spend a half
billion dollars on it. New nuclear weapon? We are looking at a new
nuclear weapon in the Defense authorization bill.

Look at the front page here of the New York Times, right up on the
top: ``New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways.'' What is the
greatest threat to our homeland security, a new nuclear weapon or--here
it is--``New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways.'' The second
story: Bombs set in London at four sites, failed to explode, no one
hurt. And we are going out and building another nuclear weapon.
We welcome the opportunity to address the Senate now on Friday, but
this is a matter of enormous importance and consequence. We are told
these issues are not as important as freeing the gun industry from
liability, a special interest. So we have an NRA check. I know where
the votes are on that. We are going to get another special interest
check. We have a special interest check for credit cards, a special
interest check because of class actions, and we are going to get
another one now from the NRA.
We are not going to have the chance for these Senators to be able to
debate pay equity for the reserves? Health care for veterans? No. We
don't have the time. What is more important to us? I have plans at the
end of next week along with everybody else, but what is more important
than continuing and finishing this legislation? That is what we are
supposed to do as Senators.
Mr. President, when you look over where we spend the time and how we
have spent the time, surely these issues that are of such fundamental
importance to our national security and to the security of the American
people deserve the kind of time our leader and Senator Levin have
suggested.
For the past 60 years, one of the principal tenets of the American
national security policy has been to limit the number of nuclear
weapons in the world and to limit the number of countries that possess
them.
In 1962, President Kennedy warned that if action weren't taken at
that time, there would be 20 nuclear weapon nations by the end of the
1970s. That is what he said in 1962. Because of initiatives he and
successive Presidents--Republican and Democrat--took to prevent that,
today there are only eight nuclear armed states.
Through careful negotiations, we arrived at the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the foundation of all current global nuclear arms
control. The nonproliferation treaty, signed in 1968, has long stood
for the fundamental principle that the world will be safer if nuclear
proliferation doesn't extend to other countries.
I send to the desk an amendment on behalf of myself, the Senator from
California, Mrs. Feinstein, and my colleague and friend, the Senator
from Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the pending
amendment is set aside.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy], for himself,
Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Bingaman,
proposes an amendment numbered 1415.

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To transfer funds authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration
for weapons activities and available for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator to the Army National Guard, Washington, District of
Columbia, chapter)

On page 378, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

SEC. 3114. TRANSFER OF FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR ROBUST NUCLEAR
EARTH PENETRATOR TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

(a) Reduction in Funds Available for Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator.--The amount authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security
Administration for weapons activities by section 3101(a)(1)
is hereby reduced by $4,000,000, which reduction shall be
allocated to amounts available for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator.
(b) Increase in Funds Available to Army National Guard,
Washington, District of Columbia, Chapter.--The amount
authorized to be appropriated by section 301(10) for
operation and maintenance for the Army National Guard is
hereby increased by $4,000,000, with the amount of such
increase to be available for the Army National Guard of the
District of Columbia, as follows:
(1) $2,500,000 shall be made available for urban terrorist
attack response training.
(2) $1,500,000 shall be made available for the procurement
of communications equipment.

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, in that compact of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the foundation of all global nuclear arms
control, 184 nations have voluntarily rejected nuclear weapons. These
include 40 states, such as Japan, Germany, Sweden, and Singapore, that
have the technical infrastructure to build nuclear arsenals if they
chose to do so.
In addition, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa, Argentina,
Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and others have turned away from nuclear
weapons because of the NPT and our leadership.

[[Page S8720]]

America led the way to a safer world by example. By adhering to these
carefully crafted agreements, we were able to discourage the spread of
dangerous nuclear weapons that would threaten our security.
However, the Bush administration has abandoned that course. Not only
has this White House expressed disdain for decades of nuclear arms
control, but it now threatens to launch a new nuclear arms race. As we
are discouraging North Korea and Iran from producing nuclear arms--and
as we are trying to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of
terrorists--the Bush administration recklessly proposes for the United
States to produce a new breed of nuclear weapon. President Bush and
Secretary Rumsfeld want to develop a new tactical nuclear weapon that
can burrow deep into the earth and destroy bunkers and weapon caches.
The new weapon they propose has the chilling title of robust nuclear
earth penetrator. They hold the dangerous and misguided belief that our
Nation's interests are served by developing what they consider a more
easily usable nuclear bomb--more easily usable nuclear bomb. That is
just what we need more of today.
Most Americans believe that is wrong. Therefore, the amendment that
Senator Feinstein and I offer today will halt this dangerous new policy
and redirect the $4 million in funds from the robust nuclear earth
penetrator research program to the National Guard for the more urgent
task of preventing another terrorist attack on our Nation's capital.
This action is especially warranted in light of the bombings in the
London subway. Instead of developing new nukes, we should address the
real-world challenges of terrorism that we face right here, right now.
In the end, the administration would like us to buy something we
don't need, that endangers us by its mere existence, and that makes our
important diplomatic goals much more difficult to achieve.
Our challenge in addressing nuclear nonproliferation issues is not
that there are too few nuclear weapons in the world, but that there are
too many; not that they are too difficult to use but too easy.
North Korea has recently acquired nuclear weapons and does not
hesitate to rattle them. Iran is widely thought to be moving forward on
the development of nuclear weapons capability. The increased
availability of nuclear technology to other nations is an ominous
development, especially when it is difficult to accept at face value
their statements that the technology is intended only for peaceful
purposes.
What moral authority do we have to ask other nations to give up their
desire for nuclear weapons of their own when we are developing a new
generation of such weapons of our own? How can we tell other nations
not to sell their nuclear technology to others when we are exporting
our own technology?
For the past 2 years, Congress has raised major doubts about the
bunker-buster program and significantly cut back on its funding. But
the administration still presses forward for their development. For
fiscal year 2004, they requested $15 million for it, and Congress
reluctantly provided half that amount. For 2005, they requested another
$27 million and submitted a 5-year request for nearly $500 million, and
Congress denied their request.
This year, nothing has changed. The fiscal year 2006 budget request
from the President includes $4 million for the Department of Energy to
study the bunker buster, and $4.5 million for the Department of Defense
for the same purpose. Thankfully, our colleagues in the House were
wiser and eliminated the funds.
The administration obviously is still committed to this reckless
approach. Secretary Rumsfeld made his position clear in January, when
he wrote to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham:

I think we should request funds in 06 and 07 to complete
the study . . . You can count on my support for your efforts
to revitalize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and to
complete the RNEP study.

The fiscal year 2006 budget requests funds only to complete the
feasibility study for these nuclear weapons, but we already know what
the next step is. In the budget sent to us last year, the
administration stated in plain language that they intend to develop it.
Ambassador Linton Brooks, the head of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, claims the future budget projection was merely a
placeholder ``in the event the President decides to proceed with the
development and Congress approves.'' But their fiscal year 2005 budget
clearly shows the administration's unmistakable intention to develop
and ultimately produce this weapon.
They would like us to believe this is a clean, surgical nuclear
weapon. They say it will burrow into underground targets, destroy them
with no adverse consequence for the environment. But science says such
claims are false.
A National Academy of Sciences April 2005 study confirms exactly what
most of us thought: that these nuclear weapons, like other nuclear
bombs, result in catastrophic nuclear fallout. They can poison tens of
millions of people and create radioactive lands for many years to come.
The study goes on to say:

Current experience and empirical predictions indicate that
the earth-penetrator weapons cannot penetrate to depths
required for total containment of the effects of a nuclear
explosion. To be fully contained, a 300 kiloton weapon would
have to be detonated at the bottom of a carefully stemmed
emplacement hole about 800 meters deep. Because the practical
penetrating depth of an earth penetrating weapon is only a
few meters--a small fraction of the depth for the full
containment--there will be blast, thermal, initial nuclear
radiation, and fallout effects--

From the use of the weapon.
Even if we were willing to accept the catastrophic damage a nuclear
explosion would cause, the bunker buster would still not be able to
destroy all the buried bunkers the intelligence community has
identified.
This chart, based on the data from the National Academy of Sciences,
depicts the simulated maximum effect of a 1-megaton earth-penetrating
weapon. This massively destructive weapon cannot reach more than 400
meters. All an adversary has to do is bury its bunker below that depth.
Bunker busters also require pinpoint accuracy to hit deeply buried
bunkers. But such accuracy requires precise intelligence about the
location of the target. As the study emphasized, an attack by a nuclear
weapon can be effective in destroying weapons or weapons materials,
including nuclear materials and chemical or biological agents, but only
if it is detonated in the actual chamber where the weapons or materials
are located. Even more disturbing, if the bomb is only slightly off
target, the detonation may cause the spread of deadly chemical and
germs, in addition to the radioactive fallout.
If it were clear that this weapon were needed to protect our troops,
then Congress would probably support it. But that is not the case. At
the House Armed Services Committee hearing in March, program chief
Linton Brooks once again was asked if there was a military requirement
for the bunker buster, and he categorically said:

No, there is not.

This chart shows how important it is that the bunker buster be
precise, in terms of targeting, or otherwise it is not going to destroy
the target, and the dangers of chemical and nuclear material
proliferation are dramatic.
Our military has no need for a nuclear bunker buster. Existing
conventional weapons have the ability to neutralize this threat. These
charts from the National Academy of Sciences show the types of deeply
buried, hardened bunkers the nuclear bunker buster is intended to
destroy. All bunkers must have air intakes, energy sources, and
entrances. If we can destroy them by conventional means, we have
accomplished our purpose.
The administration's effort to build a new class of nuclear weapon is
only further evidence of their reckless nuclear policy.
We have studied this issue long enough. It is ridiculous for the
administration to try to keep this program going, and it could be
suicidal for the Nation and for our troops. While the administration
studies a weapon that will never work and may never be used, it has
taken its eye off the true danger: terrorists with weapons of mass
destruction here at home in our subways and our train stations.
Protecting our Nation should be the administration's No. 1 priority
and, sadly, they have not learned that lesson from 9/11. The alarm bell
that went

[[Page S8721]]

off on September 11, 2001, is still ringing loudly. It rang in London
earlier this month and again yesterday. It rang in Madrid last year.
And it has been ringing in Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, and
elsewhere around the world in the nearly 4 years since the tragedy of
9/11.
In our Nation's Capital, the alarm bell continues to sound, but the
administration has been inexcusably slow in heeding its warning.
Our amendment will better protect our Nation's Capital from a
terrorist attack. It provides urgently needed funds to the Washington,
DC, National Guard to make up for the shortfalls they face in equipment
and training.
U.S. officials plainly state that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups
are determined to strike the United States again. And we all know that
our Nation's Capital is a prime target.
On July 10, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that
``the desire and the capability'' are there for another terrorist
attack in America.
The former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, ADM James Loy, told
the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 16:

We believe that attacking the homeland remains at the top
of al-Qaida's operational priority list . . . We believe that
their intent remains strong for attempting another major
operation here.

He says:

The probability of an attack is assessed to be high. . . .

FBI Director Robert Mueller told the Intelligence Committee on
February 16:

The threat posed by international terrorism, and in
particular from al-Qaida and related groups, continues to be
the gravest we face . . .

Despite these serious and terrifying threats, the DC National Guard,
which provides an indispensable role in responding to terrorist
attacks, has long received inadequate funding.
In a terrorist attack, the DC National Guard will be mobilized to
assist in evacuation efforts, provide security at the attack site, and
assist in mass casualty care. Mayor Williams and the city council
realize the vulnerability to such attacks and the potentially
catastrophic consequences if terrorists attack a train carrying
hazardous material.
According to a RAND analysis on terrorism and railroad security, 40
percent of freight being carried from city to city across the country,
including half of the Nation's hazardous material, is moved by rail. In
2003 alone, 11,000 railroad cars containing hazardous material passed
through Washington, DC.
We believe the administration's position in supporting the
development of a new nuclear weapon system is misguided. It is not
based on sound science. And there is a recognition that they do not
have their priorities straight. We have learned the lesson of this past
week, that what we have to do is expand our attention in terms of the
homeland security issue. That has to be our focus, and we learned that
again this morning in London.
Why the administration insists that they think our national security
is going to be enhanced and expanded by building a new system makes no
sense at all.
A final point. There are those who will say this is just a study; we
ought to be able to study; we ought to be able to study what progress
can be developed in terms of the shape of our warheads and the building
materials that are necessary to make it more effective; we live in a
dangerous world. All of which is true, we ought to be able to have a
study, but that is not what this is about.
As I have mentioned, the opposition, by and large, will say this is
just a study. Then we will have to come back to Congress and get the
approval.
See what the intention of this administration is. ``Department of
Energy, 2005 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities.'' Open
this to page 63. There it is.
They talk about what is going to be the request over the period of
these next 5 years, and it is $484 million. That is not a study. That
is the development of a weapons system. Those resources could be more
effectively used providing security at home, working through homeland
security, than developing a new weapons system which will make it more
complicated and more difficult for the United States to be the leader
in the world, which we have been under Republican and Democratic
Presidents since 1962, in reducing the number of countries that have
dangerous nuclear weapons. We should stay the course. That has been a
wise judgment and decision by Republican and Democratic Presidents. We
should not be about the business of developing new nuclear weapons,
which is going to upset that whole movement and make this country less
secure.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to pick up on my
distinguished colleague's last point with regard to the projected
budget cycle as it relates to this program. In fairness, the
distinguished Senator from Massachusetts should point out that while
that document outlines a proposal for a program, Congress carefully has
enacted the checks and balances such that every step of the way that
program has to be reviewed by the Congress, authorized, and
appropriated. Those are the types of checks and balances that should be
accorded a program of this significance.
I point out, and I read from the conference report on the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, the requirement for
specific authorization of Congress for commencement of engineering
development phase and subsequent phase of the robust nuclear earth
penetrator, section 3117 of the law, the Senate amendment contained in
provision 3135 that would require the Secretary of Energy to obtain
specific authorization from Congress to commence development
engineering phase of the nuclear weapons development process or any
subsequent phase of a robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon.
So I assure my colleagues, I assure the American public, Congress is
carefully monitoring each step of this proposed program.
My good friend from Massachusetts pointed out about the military
requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in appearing
before Congress, established the military requirement. Senators on the
other side of this debate have argued there is no military requirement,
as did my good friend and colleague from Massachusetts. Congress should
not be funding, he has argued. This is a case of getting so involved in
technology that we lose sight of the purpose behind the words.
I think it is extremely important that the record of this debate
reflect the following: In an appearance before the House Armed Services
Committee in February of this calendar year, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, addressed the following question:

Is there a military requirement for RNEP?

General Myers answered the question as follows:

Our combatant commander that is charged by this nation to
worry about countering the kind of targets, deeply buried
targets, certainly thinks there's a need for this study. And
General Cartwright has said such. I think that. I think the
Joint Chiefs think that. And so, the study is just that. It's
not a commitment to go forward with a system; it's just to
see if it's feasible.

It is just to see whether the technology of the United States can
take an existing warhead. There was some inference that we are
increasing the stockpile. It is very important to recognize we are
simply performing tests and evaluation on existing warheads to
determine whether they can be reconfigured to achieve the mission of
penetrating the earth to certain depths, depending on the consistency
of the soil and the above earth, and render less effective, if not
destroy, a potential situation beneath the earth, which definitely
challenges the security of this Nation and the world. It is as simple
as that.
So this whole debate is about whether a modest sum of money can be
continued to be applied to a program to determine a feasibility study.
Depending on the outcome, the Congress comes back in and then
establishes whether the facts justify, as well as the threat situation,
as well as the military needs, the next step of a program that would
take some several years to evolve and produce a weapon.
General Myers continued:

So we can argue over the definition of a ``military
requirement'' and when a ``military requirement'' is
established. We can

[[Page S8722]]

argue over when in the study of a concept--which is what we
are talking about here--when should the requirement be
established.
We can argue over definitions or we can listen to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commander of Strategic
Command, who advise the Congress that it is in the interest
of the United States to complete the feasibility study.

Somewhat regrettably, over the past 24 hours we have had a lot of
back and forth about time consumed on this, that and one of the other
things. I tend to be very indulging in the fact that the Senate is an
unusual body and there is the right to discuss whatever a Senator
wishes. But just 3 weeks ago we had this exact amendment before this
body, except for one change. Senator Feinstein had put the funds which
would be resulting from a cancellation towards the public debt, a
laudable purpose. It has nothing to do with the military requirements,
nothing to do with anything about the weapon. Senator Kennedy made one
small change: Let us take it from the public debt and give it to the DC
National Guard.
Well, I can understand how the DC National Guard is brought into a
clear focus in its responsibilities given the worldwide events of
recent times. I am not unmindful of those situations. But if there is a
need for funding for the D.C. National Guard, let it be brought forth
independently. It should not be a predicate or a basis for making a
major decision as to whether to go forward on this important research
program and study.

So I say to my colleagues, if there is a problem with the D.C.
National Guard, bring it to the attention of the managers. We will be
on this bill for a few days. We have time. We will take a look at it.
I am mindful of what occurred here last night and what occurred here
again this morning about how we are just grinding our wheels and not
being productive. This same identical amendment was rejected by the
Senate 3 weeks ago in a vote.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Kennedy amendment
dealing with the robust nuclear earth penetrator, or RNEP. This issue
has been discussed and debated at length many times. In fact, my
impression was that we had come at least legislatively to a conclusion.
The conclusion was that this was not a weapons system that would
materially aid our ability to advance national security purposes of the
United States.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Department of Energy
sought $15 million to fund the first year of what was to be a 3-year,
$45 million study to determine the feasibility of using one of two
existing large nuclear weapons as a robust nuclear earth penetrator.
They couched it in terms of a study. There is some discussion about
requirements and studies. My impression is that a requirement is a
formal decision made by the Department of Defense through elaborate
procedures. With respect to the particular nuclear penetrator to attack
deeply buried targets, I do not believe there is a formal requirement.
There is a general requirement to hold at risk hard, deeply buried
targets, but there are many different variations that could be applied
to that, and I do not believe the Department of Defense has yet come to
a conclusion, a requirement, that this mission can only be undertaken
by a robust nuclear penetrator.
Nevertheless, early on, several years ago the Department of Energy's
budget called for studies. Congress authorized and appropriated the $15
million for the first phase of this study by the Department of Energy,
but DOE was not to begin this work until it submitted a report setting
forth requirements for an RNEP and the target types that RNEP was
designed to hold at risk. DOE proposed their response in April of 2003,
and the funds were released to begin again this study. Once again, DOE
insisted that this was just a study. There was no decision to begin the
process of development and production that would lead to a weapon.
The following fiscal year 2004, DOE again sought $15 million for the
RNEP, but now Congress had become, I think rightfully, a little
skeptical of the technology, of the efficacy of this proposed weapon,
to do what it was intended to do, and as a result, only $7.5 million
was appropriated. DOE took the reduced funding and said: Still, this is
just a study. We just want to look at this concept. We study lots of
concepts. We certainly cannot inhibit the intellectual inquiry when it
comes to an issue of so much importance to our national security.
Now, in the 2005 budget request, after 2 years of various requests,
the true nature of the RNEP proposal is becoming much clearer. It does
not appear today to be just a study. DOE sought $27.5 million for RNEP
in the 2005 budget request. In addition, DOE included the RNEP in its
5-year budget report demonstrating that the real plan was to continue
with the RNEP project through the next 5 years through the development
stage and just up to the point at which production would begin.
Now it is no longer just a study. In fact, DOE is talking about
almost $500 million over the next several years to get ready to build
an RNEP. The cost of the feasibility study has also increased
dramatically from the initial $45 million--$15 million a year for 3
years--to now $145 million. If the study is increasing from $45 million
to $145 million, if that same progression is applied to development,
then right now we are talking about almost a billion dollars to get to
the point of development and production for this RNEP.
Finally, though, I think Congress had its fill with the study that
turned out to be a stalking horse for a production program, and in the
fiscal year 2005 budget cycle denied funding. I applaud particularly
our colleagues in the other body who were very much involved in this
decision on a bipartisan basis and decided that this program was not
worth the investment; that it was not a study; that if it was a true
study it could have been concluded and the results could have been
provided to decisionmakers for a more thoughtful review of this aspect
of national security.
The administration just did not get the message. So in 2006, this
budget request, DOE requested $4 million to start the RNEP feasibility
study again, and $14 million will be needed in fiscal year 2007 to
finish the study.
It should be apparent right now, this is not about a study. This is
about developing a weapons system to hold hard and deeply buried
targets at risk. The National Academy of Sciences conducted their own
study to look at the feasibility of doing this and the usefulness of
this type of weapons system, at the request of the Armed Services
Committee. Their study sheds a great deal of light on the practical
implications of this weapons system.
DOE says the RNEP project is to look at the feasibility of using a
bomb with a small nuclear yield to target hard and deeply buried
targets with minimal collateral damage on the surface and minimal
fallout. That would be a very important development, if it were
feasible. But the Academy points out in their study, and makes it
clear, that to really hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk the
RNEP would have to be very large and would not be contained. This is
about physics, I think, more than it is about wishful thinking. The
physics of the problem suggests if you really want to destroy that
target you can't use a small nuclear charge. You would have to use a
rather considerable one.
Therefore, the DOE is considering modifying an existing large-yield
nuclear weapon, the B-83, to be a nuclear penetrator. The B-83 nuclear
bomb has a 1-megaton yield. That is explosive power equivalent to 1
million tons of TNT, hardly a small, discrete weapon. The full megaton
yield of the B-83 would be needed to hold at risk a target buried 900
feet below the surface--because of engineering progress, you
effectively can burrow that far down and put facilities or intelligence
centers or other critical military installations at that depth. But not
only would the fallout not be contained after the detonation of this
large a weapon, the resulting radioactive debris that the B-83 would
put in the atmosphere would make the fallout worse. You would be
sending a charge down into the earth, exploding the earth, blowing it
up into the atmosphere and spreading the fallout. There would be
substantial casualties if it were used, and the fallout would spread
for hundreds of miles.
The National Academy of Sciences study makes it clear that in a
populated area, millions of people would be killed and injured.
Let me give sort of a rough comparison of the effects of the B-83
system. It

[[Page S8723]]

has yields ranging up to 1 megaton; that is 1 million tons of TNT. The
bomb we dropped on Hiroshima was 14 kilotons. It resulted in the death
of 140,000 people. The Nagasaki bomb was 21 kilotons; 73,000 people
died. The yield of the B-83 bomb is 71 times larger than that used at
Hiroshima and 47 times larger than Nagasaki. That would cause
incredible damage and casualties.
In a practical sense, if you are striking a critical installation,
most likely that installation is close enough to either an urban area
or close enough to other key terrain that a military commander would
have to think twice about dropping a nuclear bomb on such a target. The
reality is we could not operate in that area for years, because of
fallout, because of damage. If your goal were to ultimately destroy and
occupy an opposing foe, why would you essentially create a situation
where you could not even operate in the area?
The other thing about this whole approach to the RNEP is it fails to
recognize that we have precision conventional weapons that may not be
able to reach down 900 feet, but certainly these weapons can be used to
deal devastating blows to the communication networks that serve these
facilities and to the entrances. Eventually there has to be someplace
where you go into these tunnels. Those facilities, if they can be
identified, can be shut off by conventional munitions. The goal is to
neutralize the target, and that can be done, I think, more readily by
conventional weapons, particularly conventional precision weapons. So
the need for this system on a practical basis is not at all compelling
to me, and I do not believe it is compelling to the more thoughtful
people in the military, those who are thinking about these types of
situations.
There is another factor, too. Again, the presumption is that we are
going to have a nuclear device that we are going to use to take out a
deeply buried target, which could be in a circumstance where we would
be contemplating the first use of a nuclear weapon against one of these
targets. We have to be very sure that we have the kind of intelligence
that will support such extraordinary use of military power. If we
reflect back on Operation Iraqi Freedom, we thought there were nuclear
weapons--some people did. We thought there were chemical weapons and
thought there were biological weapons. Secretary Powell was before the
United Nations talking about these mobile biological vans.
The reality is our intelligence was very poor; certainly not
sufficient, in my view, to justify the use of a nuclear weapon like
this. So there is a further complication about ever using one of these
weapons; and that is, would we have the intelligence to support,
particularly, the first use of a nuclear weapon to take out a target
like this?
We do not need to spend $1 billion to develop to the point of
production an RNEP. I think our colleagues in the House, on a
bipartisan basis, figured this out last year. We should be equally
astute and adroit. We have conventional precision weapons that can deal
lethal blows to these types of installations. I think we should not
contemplate using nuclear weapons, such weapons as the B-83, which
would yield vast areas of a particular country literally uninhabitable
for months if not years. Also, by the way--which we found from our
adversaries, particularly from our adversaries in Iraq--they are fairly
astute about trying to counteract our weapons with their tactics. If
you were someone who was afraid that the United States might have such
a weapon like an RNEP and use it against you, I think there would be a
strong temptation to put that deeply buried target underneath a city,
underneath a historic or religious site, so that our choices would be
further complicated by the fact that we would be delivering a nuclear
device in an area where there could be significant population or
significant reasons to avoid the detonation of a nuclear bomb.
I think this funding is not appropriate. I join Senator Kennedy in
urging that we move to drop it. I urge my colleagues to vote for the
Kennedy amendment, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Warner). The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his comments. We
would disagree on this, but he is a skilled person in the defense of
our country, and I respect his comments.
Three weeks ago, this Senate voted 53 to 43 on this amendment. I am
glad we are having this debate. Some have said there is not enough time
to have a debate on these issues, to bring up and highlight points that
the other side may want to raise. But we just voted on it 3 weeks ago.
We voted on this twice last year. This amendment to strike this
language was defeated; the language was kept in the bill.
Overwhelmingly, the Senate has maintained its view that a study of this
robust nuclear earth penetrator is valid and needed and the Defense
Department and the Energy Department have certified to that and we
ought to go forward with it. But it is perfectly legitimate that we
talk about it.
I would just say this for emphasis, to follow up on Chairman Warner's
comments: The way this language is placed in this legislation, it
mandates explicitly that the Department of Energy or Department of
Defense cannot go forward to commence development engineering without
the specific approval of Congress.
This robust nuclear earth penetrator issue began being discussed by
the military in 1985, and when the need was recognized, it was
supported by the Clinton administration Defense and Energy Departments.
Secretary O'Leary specifically supported this. There were no
limitations of the kind I just mentioned in the language that came
forward during the Clinton administration to decide to conduct this
study. But now we are putting that in there to allay the concerns that
any might have, that somehow authorizing a study would result in
development and deployment of a weapons system. We know that cannot
happen without Congress's approval, but this really clamps it down to
say there would have to be an affirmative legislative act by Congress
before the Energy Department could go forward with developing any such
weapon as this.
I think that ought to allay the concerns. I will suggest that is why
there has been so much support for it on a bipartisan basis.
A couple of years ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote Chairman
Warner in support of the RNEP. He asked us to fund a feasibility and
cost study of it, and noted that:

I do not believe that these legislative steps will
complicate our ongoing efforts with North Korea, inasmuch as
the work was funded and authorized in last year's Defense
bill. I believe that North Korea has already factored RNEP
into its calculations. It is important for you to work on
these issues and please do not hesitate to call on me. . . .

Secretary Powell supported it and said it basically furthered our
foreign policy. So, again, this would be a multiyear feasibility study,
and we are talking about $4 million being spent on it. In the scheme of
our huge budget, I would say that is not excessive.
Suggestions have been made that somehow this indicates that we are
indifferent to nuclear weapons, the powers that they contain, the
danger that they represent, and that somehow this administration is not
sensitive to the need to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons in the
world. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Let me mention a few things about what this Nation is doing with
regard to its nuclear arsenal. We have already done more than any other
nation in the world to reduce our nuclear arsenal. We are committed to
huge reductions in our nuclear weapons. In the last 15 years, the
number of U.S. deployed strategic warheads has declined from 10,000 to
less than 6,000. Under the treaty we signed, the Moscow Treaty, we will
reduce our strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by
2012--from over 10,000. That is a huge reduction. In fact, we have
already dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988 and
eliminated nearly 90 percent of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
(Mr. Allard assumed the Chair.)
We have not produced high enriched uranium for weapons since 1964,
nor plutonium for weapons since 1988. In fact, we are the only nuclear
power in the world that has no capability at this moment to produce
nuclear weapons. We are simply relying on our old stockpile, and that
is a matter that a number of people are concerned about, but it is
true.

[[Page S8724]]

As Senator Allard, now I see is the Presiding Officer, who last year
chaired the strategic subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee that
deals with these issues, and I now chair that strategic subcommittee--
has gone on to bigger and better things--but it is an important
subcommittee and it deals with the strategic defense of America. We are
moving to incredible reductions in our nuclear weapons, but we are
going to keep something like 2,000. How does it threaten the world in
peace and make us a warmonger, if we can design and make a few of those
weapons capable of being effective against hardened targets?
Let's be realistic. People say, ``This is a new weapon. This is a new
weapon,'' even when we get to the bottom, 2,000 or more nuclear
weapons. What is wrong if we have figured out a way to use a targeted
nuclear weapon to deal with a hardened site? It makes a lot of sense.
It certainly does not indicate we are in a warmongering mode.
I have a number of other things I would say on this subject. I see
the Senator from California is here. I am pleased to yield the floor. I
assume the Senator from California is talking on Armed Services issues?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes.
Mr. SESSIONS. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from California is
recognized.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. I also thank the distinguished
Senator from Alabama.
I wish to speak on the bill. There is probably no one in the Senate I
have greater respect for than the chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services. He certainly does know his material. He certainly has put in
the years. He certainly has done the work.
I very profoundly disagree with what he has said with respect to the
robust nuclear earth penetrator. We have heard this is only a study,
that it is minor in scope, that we have debated this before. It is
certainly true, we have debated this before. We debated it before
because we feel strongly about this issue. We have debated it before
because the Congress eliminated the money last year. We have debated it
before because we have a strong passion and belief that this is the
wrong way for our Nation to go. The fact that we have debated this
issue before--Senator Kennedy, Senator Reed, Senator Levin, myself--
does not in any way, shape, or form downgrade or demean our arguments.
Let me discuss this program which is only ``a study.'' Let me discuss
for a moment the way this program started out.
It started with appropriations for the study of a robust nuclear
earth penetrator with a 5-year budget projection of $486 million. That
is how it started.
It also coincided with a program called ``advanced concepts
initiatives'' which is not in this authorization but which last year
envisioned the development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons of
under 5 kilotons, or battlefield nuclear weapons. That is about a third
the force that was used at Hiroshima, a 15-kiloton weapon. That is not,
as I say, in this bill.
It started out with a plan to build a Modern Pit Facility which could
produce up to 450 new plutonium pits--the pit being the trigger that
detonates a nuclear weapon. If you take a good look, you know you do
not need up to 450 plutonium pits for replenishment of the existing
nuclear arsenal. You may need 40 to 60. So if you put forward up to 450
plutonium pits, to me it is an indicator that there is a broader
program afoot.
Part of this is also an increase of the time to test readiness from 3
years to 18 months. What that says is: Beware, something is going on.
We want to be able to resume testing and we do not want to resume
testing within the normal 3-year delay, we want to move that up to 18
months. So, something is cooking.
The fact is, no one should doubt this authorization enables the
reopening of the nuclear door to the creation of a new generation of
nuclear weapons, in this case, a robust nuclear earth penetrator of 1
megaton. This is a major effort.
It is true, we fenced it, as the Senator from Alabama pointed out.
Before it goes beyond the engineering stage, it must come back to this
Senate for approval. But that does not signify that there is not a new
generation of nuclear weapons being studied, researched, advanced, and
authorized in this bill, specifically the $4 million for the robust
nuclear earth penetrator.
Our intention is being signaled to the rest of the world. The
Department has been clever in not revealing its hand. No longer does it
provide the 5-year cost of this study as it did last year. No longer
does it mention this effort in its statement of administration policy.
The statement of administration policies on the House Defense
Authorization and House Energy and Water Appropriations bills do not
mention a robust nuclear earth penetrator. Rather, the attempt was to
cloak the study in some kind of obfuscation, to divide it between two
budgets--Energy and Defense--half, $4 million here, the other $4.5
million in the other budget, with the hope that if one fails, the other
will get through.
But nonetheless, this is not minor in scope. The Modern Pit Facility
which could produce up to 450 new plutonium pits is not even being
discussed. There is supposed to be a study that will come back and
indicate how many pits are necessary to replenish the present nuclear
arsenal. That is not before the Senate. That is in this bill. There is
no study to indicate we need 450 pits today to refresh the existing
arsenal, particularly when that arsenal is being diminished in size.
The intention is clear. Obviously, the way you begin a new nuclear
weapon program is with a study, research, and engineering. So it is
true we are trying to catch it at the beginning. That is not a bad
thing. That is a very good thing.
The money, as was stated accurately, would go to the DC National
Guard to enable it to prepare for possible terrorist attacks in the
Nation's Capital. Many think this is a much more realistic use of this
money than a robust nuclear earth penetrator, especially when the laws
of physics say it is impossible to drive a missile deep enough in the
Earth to prevent the spewing of hundreds of millions of cubic yards of
radioactive waste and cause the death of hundreds of thousands, if not
millions of people.
It is true, we had this debate 3 weeks ago on the Energy and Water
appropriations bill. That was the other half of this request. We were
not successful with that vote. We said we would be back to debate this
issue. And we will be back again and again and again until we are able
to defeat this effort. It is morally wrong and I believe it jeopardizes
the national security of our country.
The House has had the good sense to decisively eliminate funding for
the robust nuclear earth penetrator, first under the leadership of
Representative David Hobson, the chairman of the Energy and Water
Appropriations Subcommittee. That bill eliminated the $4 million for
the Department of Energy portion of the robust nuclear earth
penetrator. Second, the House fiscal year 2006 Defense appropriations
bill limits research for a bunker buster to a conventional program.
Finally, during its mark of the 2006 Defense authorization bill--that
is the companion to the bill we are talking about this morning--the
House Armed Services Committee eliminated all of the Department of
Energy funding for the robust nuclear earth penetrator and transferred
the $4 million to the Air Force budget for work on a conventional
nonnuclear version. So there is a growing body of thought in three
specific efforts successfully concluded by the House of Representatives
that says we should not proceed with this program.
Let me recap: The House Energy and Water appropriations bill
eliminates $4 million. The House 2006 Defense appropriations bill
limits research to a conventional program. And finally, the House Armed
Services Committee eliminated all of the Department of Energy funding
for the nuclear earth penetrator and transferred it to work on a
conventional nonnuclear version.
It will be a very hot conference committee on these items. But the
House has taken the action in three ways rather completely.
We are not out on a limb. This is not some whim of a small faction of
Members of the Senate. We represent a majority of the Members of the
House of Representatives. I believe we represent a majority of thinking
of the American people. Polls have been done which

[[Page S8725]]

clearly show a bulk of the American people are, in fact, not in support
of commencing this research, of doing this study.
Let me give a fact sheet of a 2004 poll brought to my attention by
the Union of Concerned Scientists. It found most Americans do not
support the development of new nuclear weapons by the United States. A
substantial majority of Americans would oppose funding for the nuclear
bunker buster. Sixty-five percent of Americans say there is no need for
the United States to develop new types of nuclear weapons. They know
what the Senator from Rhode Island pointed out, that there are
conventional bunker busters that should be developed. They know the key
to this is good intelligence as to vent holes, ingress, egress areas,
intelligence which can lead us to ferret out a nuclear bunker buster.
Sixty-three percent found convincing the argument that the United
States would be setting a bad example by starting to develop new types
of nuclear weapons, and a large majority opposes using nuclear weapons
for anything other than a deterrent to prevent other countries from
using nuclear weapons. Eighty-one percent oppose the Bush
administration's revelation that they would countenance a first use of
nuclear weapons. Eighty-four percent oppose the United States using
threats of nuclear retaliation to attempt a deterrent attack on the
United States with chemical or biological weapons. And 57 percent
support the United States reaffirming a commitment to not use nuclear
weapons against countries that do not have nuclear weapons as a way of
encouraging those countries not to acquire or build nuclear weapons.
Americans have a clear preference for a much smaller nuclear arsenal.
Based on this poll, a substantial majority of Americans opposes the
study into the nuclear bunker buster. These findings also show
substantial distaste for nuclear weapons in general, with a clear
preference for a small nuclear arsenal designed only as a deterrent to
prevent other countries from using nuclear weapons.
I ask unanimous consent this fact sheet from the Union of Concerned
Scientists be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Support Amendments to the Energy & Water Appropriations Bill To Prevent
New Nuclear Weapons

The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) is a proposed
new nuclear weapon intended to burrow a few meters into rock
or concrete before exploding, thus generating a powerful
underground shock wave. Its intended targets are deeply
buried command bunkers or underground storage sites
containing chemical or biological agents.
Technical realities:
According to several recent scientific studies, RNEP would
have limited effectiveness at destroying underground targets
and would have substantial drawbacks. Specifically. . .
RNEP would produce tremendous radioactive fallout
RNEP could kill millions of people
RNEP would not be effective at destroying chemical or
biological agents
RNEP would not be effective at destroying deep or widely
separated bunkers.

The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator

The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP): RNEP is a
nuclear weapon that would burrow a few meters into the ground
before exploding and thus generate a powerful underground
shock wave. Its hypothetical targets are deeply buried
command bunkers or underground storage sites containing
chemical or biological agents.
The RNEP design: Weapons designers at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory intend to use an existing high-yield
nuclear warhead--the 1.2-megaton B83 nuclear bomb--in a
longer, stronger and heavier bomb casing. The B83 is the
largest nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, and nearly 100
times more powerful than the nuclear bomb used on Hiroshima.
Technicai realities: According to several recent scientific
studies, RNEP would not be effective at destroying many
underground targets, and its use could result in the death of
millions of people.
RNEP would produce tremendous radioactive fallout: A
nuclear earth penetrator cannot penetrate deep enough to
contain the nuclear fallout. Even the strongest casing will
crush itself by the time it penetrates 10-30 feet into rock
or concrete. For comparison, even a one-kiloton nuclear
warhead (less than 1/10th as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb)
must be buried at least 200-300 feet to contain its
radioactive fallout. The high yield RNEP will produce
tremendous fallout that will drift for more than a thousand
miles downwind. As, Linton Brooks, the head of the National
Nuclear Security Administration told Congress in April, the
laws of physics will [never allow a bomb to penetrate] far
enough to trap all fallout. This is a nuclear weapon that is
going to be hugely destructive over a large area.''
RNEP could kill millions of people: A simulation of RNEP
used against the Esfahan nuclear facility in Iran, using the
software developed for the Pentagon, showed that 3 million
people would be killed by radiation within 2 weeks of the
explosion, and 35 million people in Afghanistan, Pakistan and
India would be exposed to increased levels of cancer-causing
radiation.
RNEP would not be effective at destroying chemical or
biological agents: Unless the weapon detonates nearly in the
same room with the agents, it will not destroy them. Because
the United States is unlikely to know the precise location,
size and geometry of underground bunkers, a nuclear attack on
a storage bunker containing chemical or biological agents
would more likely spread those agents into the environment,
along with the radioactive fallout.
RNEP would not be effective against the deepest or widely
separated bunkers. The seismic shock produced by the RNEP
could only destroy bunkers to a depth of about a thousand
feet. Modern bunkers can be deeper than that, with a widely
separated complex of connected rooms and tunnels.
There are more effective conventional alternatives to RNEP:
Current precision-guided conventional weapons can be used to
cut off a bunker's communications, power, and air,
effectively keeping the enemy weapons underground and
unusable until U.S. forces secure them. Sealing chemical or
biological agents underground is far more sensible than
trying to blow them up.
The RNEP budget: RNEP is not just a feasibility study:
DOE's 2005 budget included a five-year projection--totaling
$484.7 million--to produce a completed warhead design and
begin production engineering by 2009. The FY06 budget request
includes $4 million for RNEP and $4.5 million to modify the
B-2 bomber to carry RNEP. Last year, David Hobson, Republican
chair of the House Appropriations Energy and Water
Development Subcommittee, zeroed out FY05 funding for the
program, stating, ``we cannot advocate for nuclear
nonproliferation around the globe, while pursuing more usable
nuclear weapons options here at home.''

Americans Oppose New Nuclear Weapons

A 2004 poll found that most Americans do not support the
development of new nuclear weapons by the United States and
strongly oppose the idea of the United States ever using a
nuclear weapon first. As Congress debates funding for the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), these results are
particularly relevant. Findings from the poll, which was
conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes
(PIPA), include:
A substantial majority of Americans would oppose funding
for the RNEP, or ``bunker buster.''
65% of Americans say there is no need for the United States
to develop new types of nuclear weapons.
63% found convincing the argument that the United States
would be setting a bad example by starting to develop new
types of nuclear weapons.
A large majority opposes using nuclear weapons for anything
other than a deterrent to prevent other countries from using
nuclear weapons.
81% oppose the United States ever using nuclear weapons
first.
84% oppose the United States using threats of nuclear
retaliation to attempt to deter an attack on the United
States with chemical or biological weapons.
57% percent support the United States reaffirming a
commitment to not use nuclear weapons against countries that
do not have nuclear weapons, as a way of encouraging those
countries not to acquire or build nuclear weapons.
Americans have a clear preference for a much smaller U.S.
nuclear arsenal.
100--The median answer for the number of nuclear weapons
Americans believe are needed to provide deterrence.
6,000--The approximate number of U.S. nuclear weapons, with
roughly 2,000 of these maintained on high alert status, ready
to be launched in a matter of minutes.
Based on this poll, a substantial majority of Americans
would oppose research into the RNEP, a new nuclear ``bunker
buster'' supported by the Bush administration. These findings
also show the U.S. public's distaste for nuclear weapons in
general, with a clear preference for a small nuclear arsenal
designed only as a deterrent to prevent other countries from
using nuclear weapons.
These poll results are from ``Public Believes Many
Countries Still Secretly Pursuing WMD,'' a media release
published by Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)
and Knowledge Networks. The poll was conducted with a
nationwide sample of 1,311 respondents from March 16-22,
2004. The margin of error was plus or minus 2.8%-4.5%,
depending on whether the question was administered to all or
part of the sample. The release can be found at: http://
www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/WMD/WMDpress__04__ 15__04.pdf
and the full poll at: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/WMD/
WMDreport__04__ 15__04.pdf.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Let me point out, House Armed Services Committee
member Sylvester Raiz stated that the

[[Page S8726]]

House committee took the ``N'' or nuclear out of the robust nuclear
earth penetrator program.
Remember, last year, in this strong statement I have just told you
about--in the deletion of funding of the $27.5 million for the earth
penetrator and the $9 million for advanced concepts that at the time
included a study for the development of the low-yield nuclear weapons--
Republicans and Democrats, authorizers and appropriators alike, joined
together to send a clear signal to the administration that the House
and Senate would not support moving forward with the development of a
new generation of nuclear weapons. If you consider this, along with the
facts I have just revealed, based on a polling of the American people,
you have to wonder why the administration comes back with a new request
this year.
In April of this year, a group of experts of the National Academies
of Sciences confirmed what we have long argued--that according to the
laws of physics, it is simply not possible for a missile casing on a
nuclear warhead to survive a thrust into the earth deep enough to take
out a hard and deeply buried military target without spewing millions
of tons of radiation into the atmosphere.
That is where we are--funding a study that the law of physics says
will not work. It is folly to me. And the repercussions are enormous.
The National Academies of Sciences study, commissioned by Congress to
study the anticipated health and environmental effects of the nuclear
earth penetrator, found the following: that current experience and
empirical predictions indicate that earth-penetrator weapons cannot
penetrate to depths required for total containment of the effects of a
nuclear explosion. It also found that in order to destroy hard and
deeply buried targets at 200 meters, or 656 feet, you would need a 300-
kiloton weapon. And in order to destroy a hard and deeply buried target
at 300 meters--that is 984 feet--you would need a 1-megaton weapon.
The point is, the deeper the bunker, the larger the nuclear blast
must be, and the greater the amount of nuclear fallout will be.
The number of casualties, they find, from an earth-penetrator weapon
detonated at a few meters' depth, which is all that can be achieved for
all practical purposes, is equal to that of a surface burst of the same
nuclear weapon. Do you know what we are contemplating here, what that
surface burst would be? It would be the largest spewing of
radioactivity in the history of the world. Enormous. If it were used in
North Korea, it would spread to South Korea and Japan. It is
unthinkable.
For attacks near or in densely populated areas using nuclear earth-
penetrator weapons on hard and deeply buried targets, the number of
casualties would range from thousands to more than a million, depending
primarily on weapon yield.
So once again, the bottom line is that a bunker buster cannot
penetrate into the earth deep enough to avoid massive casualties, and
there would be the spewing of millions of cubic feet of radioactive
materials into the atmosphere. This would result in the deaths of up to
a million people or more if used in densely populated areas.
So why are we doing this? What kind of Machiavellian thinking is
behind this reopening of the nuclear door?
Ambassador Linton Brooks of the National Security Administration
agrees with these findings. Earlier, in a congressional hearing,
Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher asked him how deep he thought a bunker
buster could go. Here is his answer from the transcript of the House
hearing. I quote:

. . . a couple of tens of meters maybe. I mean certainly--I
really must apologize for my lack of precision if we in the
administration have suggested that it was possible to have a
bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I don't
believe that--I don't believe the laws of physics will ever
let that be true.

And remember, we are talking about a 1-megaton bomb, 71 times the
size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima--71 times bigger than the 15-
kiloton bomb. The devastation from using such a weapon will be
catastrophic.
The National Academies of Sciences study is the strongest evidence to
date that we should not move forward with this study and that we should
put a stop to it once and for all. Again, the Senate should listen to
the experts and follow the House's lead.
So what is the main argument from opponents of this amendment, such
as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld? Their argument is: This is
just a study. Nothing is going to happen. Nobody is going to get the
idea: Oh, my goodness, the United States is moving in this direction;
we better move. North Korea: They are coming after us; we better get
there first. India, worried about Pakistan: Let's begin to develop it.
Pakistan, worried about India: Let's do the same thing.
I do not believe for a second this is just a study. This is the
beginning of a major effort to develop a new generation of nuclear
weapons, and nobody should think it is anything else but that.
This year, the request is $8.5 million. In fiscal year 2007, the
request will increase to $17.5 million, including $14 million for the
Department of Energy and $3.5 million for the Pentagon. And while the
administration is silent this year on how much it plans to spend on the
program in future years, we should not forget that last year's budget
request called for spending $486 million on the robust nuclear earth
penetrator over 5 years. So that part of the plan was revealed. This 5-
year figure was omitted this year, and that is deceiving, I believe.
But even if you accept the argument that this is just a study, that
does not justify moving forward with this program.
First, a study on the development of new nuclear weapons will still
greatly undermine our nuclear nonproliferation efforts by telling the
rest of the world that when it comes to nuclear weapons, do as we say
and not as we do. That is hypocrisy, pure and simple. How does that
make us safer from the prospect of nuclear terror? Answer: It does not.

In a letter to committee members of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, the Reverend John H. Ricard, bishop of Pensacola-Tallahassee
and chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, stated:

Nations that see the U.S. expanding and diversifying our
nuclear arsenal are encouraged to seek or maintain nuclear
deterrents of their own and ignore nonproliferation
obligations.

I could not agree more.
How will a study of new nuclear weapons help compel North Korea to
abandon its nuclear program? It will not. It will do exactly the
opposite. How will a study of new nuclear weapons help convince the
Iranians to respond and give up their own nuclear weapons? Answer: It
will not. Just as calling these nations part of the ``axis of evil''
has done nothing but instill in them the desire to develop their own
nuclear weapons programs. That, in fact, has been exactly the case.
In both cases, a study to develop new nuclear weapons, especially
when we already have a robust nuclear arsenal, only makes those weapons
more important to those who do not yet have them, such as Iran, or who
refuse to give them up, such as North Korea. And the proliferation of
nuclear weapons only increases the chances of them falling into the
hands of terrorists who will not be deterred by a nuclear bunker
buster.
Secondly, a study will not change the conclusions of the National
Academies of Sciences report: It is not possible to develop a nuclear
bunker buster that can burrow deep enough into the earth to contain
massive amounts of radioactivity fallout. The inevitable result will be
the deaths of up to a million people.
So why do we do it? Physics says it cannot be done, and somebody in
the Pentagon who does not know word one about physics says it can be.
Who do I trust? I do not trust the Pentagon, I do trust the Academies
of Sciences, on this point. This study will not change that simple
fact. And as Ivan Oelrich of the Federation of American Scientists
points out:

Any nation that can dig under a hundred meters of hard rock
can dig under a kilometer of hard rock.

Our adversaries will only have to build a bunker deeper than 400
meters to avoid the effects of a 1-megaton bomb that is 71 times bigger
than Hiroshima. It makes no sense.
Finally, a study will not change the fact that we need to improve our
intelligence capabilities in relation to underground targets. Why
aren't we putting that money into intelligence on

[[Page S8727]]

underground targets, where the vent shafts are, where the aromas come
up, where ingress, egress, and access is, to pinpoint locations? What
use is a nuclear bunker buster if we cannot locate and identify an
underground target which, ladies and gentlemen, is today the case?
What would have been the consequences if we had used a nuclear bunker
buster in Iraq to take out bunkers filled with chemical and biological
weapons--that did not exist? The fact is, we can improve our
intelligence capabilities and locate and identify targets. We can use
conventional weapons with specialized delivery systems to seal off
their vulnerable points, such as air ducts and entrances for personnel
and equipment.
We can also look at conventional bunker busters. Last month, I was
briefed by Northrop Grumman on a program they are working on with
Boeing to develop a conventional bunker buster--the Massive Ordnance
Penetrator--which is designed to go deeper than any nuclear bunker
buster and take out 25 percent of the underground and deeply buried
targets. This is a 30,000-pound weapon, 20 feet in length, with 6,000
pounds of high explosives. It will be delivered in a B-2 or B-52
bomber. It can burrow 60 meters in the ground through 5,000 PSI--pounds
per square inch--of reinforced concrete. It will burrow 8 meters into
the ground through 10,000 PSI reinforced concrete.
We have already spent $6 million on this program, and design and
ground testing are scheduled to be completed next year. Why are we
doing this nuclear bunker buster that cannot be done according to the
law of physics? We should focus on practical programs such as the
Northrop Grumman-Boeing program that will put these underground targets
at risk without reopening the nuclear door.
Let me look once again at the policies underlying this request.
The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which is a white paper put out by
the administration--singularly overlooked by this body but read widely
by the rest of the world--places nuclear weapons as part of the
strategic triad, therefore blurring the distinction between the
conventional and nuclear use. Why do this? One reason: It makes them
easier to use. It also discussed, for the first time, seven countries
that could be targets of U.S. nuclear weapons: Russia, China, Iraq,
Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria.
I did not write this. This is in the Nuclear Posture Review. Other
nations have seen this. This is foolish.
Secondly, National Security Directive-17, which came a few months
later, indicates that the United States will engage in a first use of
nuclear weapons--a historic statement in itself. We have never said we
would not engage in a first use. We have never said we would engage in
a first use. And here we say we would engage in a first use to respond
to a chemical or biological attack.
We could have done that in Iraq. What would have happened had we done
this? Would a nuclear bunker buster have been used in Iraq? I wonder.
Fortunately, we will never know.
My point is, these policies encourage other nations to develop
similar weapons, thereby putting American lives at risk and our
national security interests at risk. This isn't the example we should
set for the rest of the world. Indeed, I believe the United States can
take several actions to make better use of our resources and
demonstrate our commitment to keeping the world's most dangerous
weapons out of the world's most dangerous hands.
First, we should work to strengthen the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
Senator Hagel and I have introduced a sense of the Senate amendment to
this bill that calls on parties to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to
insist on strict compliance with the nonproliferation obligations of
the treaty and to undertake effective enforcement actions against
states that are in violation of their obligations; to agree to
establish more effective controls on sensitive technologies that can be
used to produce materials for nuclear weapons; to accelerate programs
to safeguard and eliminate nuclear weapons usable material to the
highest standards to prevent access by terrorists or other states; to
agree that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape
responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to
controlled materials and equipment acquired for peaceful purposes; and
to accelerate implementation of the NPT-related disarmament obligations
and commitments that would, in particular, reduce the world's
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material.
I urge my colleagues and the managers of this bill to support our
amendment.
Second, we should expand and accelerate Nunn-Lugar threat reduction
programs and provide the necessary resources to improve security and
take the rest of the Soviet era nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons arsenals and infrastructure out of circulation.
Third, we should strengthen and expand the ability of the Department
of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure and remove
nuclear weapons-usable materials from vulnerable sites around the
world.
Last year, Senator Domenici and I sponsored an amendment to the
fiscal year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act that authorized the
Secretary of Energy to lead an accelerated, comprehensive, worldwide
effort to secure, remove, and eliminate the threat by these materials.
Finally, as I noted previously, we should improve our intelligence
capabilities to locate and identify underground targets. There is a lot
of improvement needed.
In August, we will commemorate the 60th anniversaries of the two uses
of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Hiroshima, 140,000
people died. In Nagasaki, 100,000 people lost their lives. Two bombs,
240,000 people dead. The 1-megaton bomb of the robust nuclear earth
penetrator study is 71 times bigger than the bomb at Hiroshima. That is
what we are looking at. For shame.
What message do we send to the survivors of those attacks and to the
friends and families of the victims by moving forward with a study to
develop a nuclear bunker buster of 1 megaton? Let us acknowledge these
anniversaries and pay tribute to the victims by putting a stop to this
program once and for all. Let us work together on commonsense programs
that will make our country safer without reopening the nuclear door.
I urge my colleagues to follow the House lead, support this amendment
and kill this program.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Colorado yield for a unanimous
consent request?
Mr. ALLARD. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. I have talked to the chairman about this. I ask unanimous
consent, with the concurrence of the chairman, after Senator Allard has
completed, that the Chair then recognize Senator Salazar, and following
Senator Salazar, that then Senator Dorgan be recognized. It is a little
bit out of order because we have been going back and forth, but in
terms of time, I think it may be a fair apportionment.
Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, I would like to amend it
to enable the distinguished Senator from Alabama, whose subcommittee
has jurisdiction over at least one of the amendments of Senator Allard,
be permitted to use such time as he desires in the colloquy between the
three Senators.
Mr. LEVIN. I would ask Senator Sessions if he could give us an idea
as to about how long he would be so Senator Dorgan could plan his time.
Mr. SESSIONS. It would be no more than 5 minutes--less than that,
probably.
Mr. LEVIN. Could we then amend the unanimous consent request to
include Senator Sessions immediately following Senator Salazar, then it
would go to Senator Dorgan.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair.
Madam President, I rise in opposition to the amendment to strike the
$4 million appropriation for the robust nuclear earth penetrator
commonly known as RNEP. There are some comments made in the debate
today to which I would like to add my perspective because they were
basically incorrect.

[[Page S8728]]

We have been debating this amendment for the past 3 years. And we
have been passing this provision in the Senate, defeating any
amendments to take it out of legislation. In all the testimony I have
had over the past 3 years as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee,
which my distinguished colleague from Alabama now chairs, never once
has anybody, in testifying before that committee, said that there will
not be any nuclear fallout. Not once have they indicated that they felt
this was going to lead us into an arms race.
Here is what we have done. This is what they have talked about,
taking some of the nuclear warheads that we now have in our nuclear
arsenal and redesigning those in a way in which they might be more
effective, if we happen to have a deep bunker that is posing a threat
to Americans, whether American soldiers or American citizens.
We need to have a study. That is what this provision is all about.
What we are talking about is reducing the amount of collateral damage.
That means reducing the amount of, perhaps, nuclear fallout or perhaps
reducing the blast range because you take all that energy and you drive
it down into the ground instead of driving it in a horizontal
direction, which obviously means for collateral damage. They are
talking about focusing the study on the B-83 warhead which is part of
our arsenal today. That is all we are talking about, a study. We are
going to be looking at the current arsenal makeup of weapons that we
have to modify them to reduce collateral damage. I think that is a
commendable goal. I think it warrants the support of the Members of the
Senate.
This bill includes funding of $4 million to continue the Air Force-
led feasibility study. This is a study on the robust nuclear earth
penetrator. This is not a new issue for Congress to consider. In both
the defense authorization and the Energy and Water appropriations
bills, amendments have been offered to cut all funding for the robust
nuclear earth penetrator. These amendments have been defeated on
multiple occasions.
The purpose of the RNEP feasibility study is to determine if an
existing nuclear weapon can be modified to penetrate into hard rock in
order to destroy a deeply buried target that could be hiding weapons of
mass destruction or command and control assets. The Department of
Energy has modified nuclear weapons in the past to modernize their
safety and security and reliability aspects. We have also modified
existing nuclear weapons to meet our new military requirements. Under
the Clinton administration, we modified the B-61 so it could penetrate
frozen soils. The RNEP feasibility study is narrowly focused to
determine whether the B-83 warhead can be modified to penetrate hard
rock or reinforced underground facilities.
Funding research on options, both nuclear and conventional, for
attacking such targets is a responsible step for our country to take.
As many as 70 nations are developing or have built hardened and deeply
buried targets to protect command and communications and weapons of
mass destruction production and storage assets. Of that number, a
number of nations have facilities that are sufficiently hard and deep
enough that we cannot destroy most of them with our conventional
weapons. Some of them are so sophisticated that they are beyond the
current U.S. nuclear weapons capability.
I believe it is prudent and imperative that we fund this study. I
emphasize again, this is a study on the potential capabilities to
address this growing category of threat.
Should the Department of Energy determine, through this study, that
the robust nuclear earth penetrator can meet the requirements to hold a
hard and deeply buried target at risk, the Department still could not
proceed to full-scale weapon development, production or deployment
without an authorization and appropriation from Congress. Let me repeat
that. The Department of Energy cannot go ahead, beyond this study,
without the express authorization or appropriation from Congress.
Frankly, we should allow our weapons experts to determine if the
robust nuclear earth penetrator could destroy hardened and deeply
buried targets. That is the purpose of the study. Then Congress could
have the information it would need to make a responsible decision as to
whether development of such a program is appropriate and necessary to
maintain our Nation's security.
Again, I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment before us.

Amendment No. 1418

Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the
pending amendment so I may offer a number of amendments.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I send to the desk amendment No. 1418.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard], for himself and Mr.
McConnell, proposes an amendment numbered 1418.

Mr. ALLARD. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To require life cycle cost estimates for the destruction of
lethal chemical munitions under the Assembled Chemical Weapons
Alternatives program)

On page 66, after line 22, insert the following:

SEC. 330. LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF
LETHAL CHEMICAL MUNITIONS UNDER ASSEMBLED
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM.

Upon completion of 60 percent of the design build at each
site of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program,
the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons
Alternatives shall, after consultation with the congressional
defense committees, certify in writing to such committees
updated and revised life cycle cost estimates for the
destruction of lethal chemical munitions for each site under
such program.

Amendment No. 1419

Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the
pending amendment, and I call up amendment No. 1419.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard], for himself and Mr.
Salazar, proposes an amendment numbered 1419.

Mr. ALLARD. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To authorize a program to provide health, medical, and life
insurance benefits to workers at the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site, Colorado, who would otherwise fail to qualify for such
benefits because of an early physical completion date)

On page 378, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

SEC. 3114. RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR WORKERS AT ROCKY FLATS
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE, COLORADO.

(a) Program Authorized.--Subject to the availability of
funds under subsection (d), the Secretary of Energy shall
establish a program for the purposes of providing health,
medical, and life insurance benefits to workers at the Rocky
Flats Environmental Technology Site, Colorado (in this
section referred to as the ``Site''), who do not qualify for
such benefits because the physical completion date was
achieved before December 15, 2006.
(b) Eligibility for Benefits.--A worker at the Site is
eligible for health, medical, and life insurance benefits
under the program described in subsection (a) if the
employee--
(1) was employed by the Department of Energy, or by
contract or first or second tier subcontract to perform
cleanup, security, or administrative duties or
responsibilities at the Site on September 29, 2003; and
(2) would have achieved applicable eligibility requirements
for health, medical, and life insurance benefits as defined
in the Site retirement benefit plan documents if the physical
completion date had been achieved on December 15, 2006, as
specified in the Site project completion contract.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Health, medical, and life insurance benefits.--The term
``health, medical, and life insurance benefits'' means those
benefits that workers at the Site are eligible for through
collective bargaining agreements, projects, or contracts for
work scope.
(2) Physical completion date.--The term ``physical
completion date'' means the date

[[Page S8729]]

the Site contractor has completed all services required by
the Site project completion contract other than close-out
tasks and services related to plan sponsorship and management
of post-project completion retirement benefits.
(3) Plan sponsorship and program management of post-project
completion retirement benefits.--The term ``plan sponsorship
and program management of post-project completion retirement
benefits'' means those duties and responsibilities that are
necessary to execute, and are consistent with, the terms and
legal responsibilities of the instrument under which the
post-project completion retirement benefits are provided to
workers at the Site.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy in
fiscal year 2006 for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology
Site, $15,000,000 shall be made available to the Secretary to
carry out the program described in subsection (a).

Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I rise to discuss amendment No. 1419 and
the incredible achievements of the workers at the Department of
Energy's Rocky Flats environmental technology site and to offer an
amendment on behalf of these workers. Rocky Flats is located a few
miles northwest of Denver, CO. For four decades, this facility was the
Department of Energy's dedicated site for manufacturing plutonium pits
for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
This highly classified production facility was run by over 8,000
Coloradans who worked day and night for most of the Cold War and used
some of the most dangerous substances known to man, including
plutonium, beryllium, and uranium. The workers at Rocky Flats were
devoted to their jobs and believed in their mission. They risked their
lives on a daily basis and did so with the knowledge that their efforts
were contributing to the security of our Nation. They are heroes of the
Cold War and have earned our respect, admiration, and our appreciation.
When plutonium pit production ended in 1991, it was unclear what role
these workers would play in the cleanup of Rocky Flats. They could have
walked away from the job. They had performed their duty with excellence
for nearly 40 years. No one could ask them to do more. Yet the workers
at Rocky Flats were not ready to quit. They saw a new challenge in
front of them--a challenge they could not walk away from. They knew the
cleanup would be difficult and very dangerous, but they were not
deterred.
These workers stayed and, over the next decade, they performed
magnificently. Their task was anything but simple. Five large plutonium
processing facilities encompassing over a million square feet were
highly contaminated with dangerous radioactive material. The
contamination was so severe that these buildings were ranked among the
top 10 contaminated facilities in the DOE nuclear weapons complex.
Building No. 771, in particular, was even singled out by the national
media as ``the most dangerous building in America.''
The cleaning and eventual demolishing of these buildings was just the
beginning. Hundreds of vials of contaminated process piping interlaced
the complex. More than a dozen infinity rooms were so contaminated that
they had been sealed and abandoned--some for as long as 30 years.
Hundreds of tons of plutonium compound, uranium byproducts, and other
radioactive and toxic residues remained at Rocky Flats.
Yet the workers at Rocky Flats were not deterred. They had built
components using some of the most dangerous substances the world has
ever known. Now they were ready to tackle one of the most dangerous
cleanup projects ever contemplated.
In 1992, Rocky Flats was transferred to the DOE's environmental
management program for the purpose of cleaning up the contamination and
waste. Few knew where to begin. The unprecedented size and magnitude of
the project was simply daunting. It took years to just figure out the
best approach to the project. The expected cost was also staggering. In
1995, the cleanup was predicted to cost upward of $35 billion and to
take 70 years to complete.
When I came to the Senate in 1996, the cleanup of Rocky Flats had
been dragging out for nearly 4 years with little progress. Tons of
weapons-grade plutonium remained and most buildings at Rocky Flats had
not been touched. More than 2 million 55-gallon drums of waste needed
to be removed.
I found this lack of progress simply unacceptable. The safety of the
people of Colorado was at risk and the American taxpayer could ill
afford to allow this project to drag on indefinitely. At my urging, the
DOE, in 2000, finally put the resources into accelerating the cleanup
of Rocky Flats. Under the leadership of then-Under Secretary Bob Card,
and then-Assistant Secretary Jesse Roberson, the DOE took the
unprecedented step of rethinking its approach to the cleanup. These
creative leaders challenged the lead contractor, CH2M HILL, and the
workers at Rocky Flats to move much more aggressively. They were given
the seemingly impossible mission of completing the cleanup of the
massive contamination at Rocky Flats by 2007, at a cost of less than $7
billion.

Most scoffed at this approach. They believed there would be
considerable cost overruns and schedule delays. They didn't think CH2M
HILL could effectively execute this kind of contract. Most of all, they
doubted the commitment of the workers at Rocky Flats. They could not
fathom why these workers would work themselves out of a job. Even the
GAO doubted the ability of the workers at Rocky Flats to ship massive
quantities of waste required to achieve closure by 2006.
I, however, had faith in the workers at Rocky Flats. I am pleased to
state today that Kaiser-Hill and the workers at Rocky Flats have not
disappointed me. In fact, it appears that Kaiser-Hill and the workers
at Rocky Flats are far exceeding their cleanup commitments.
I cannot express the full extent of how proud I am of their
achievement. Listen to some of their accomplishments: All weapons grade
plutonium was removed in 2003.
More than 1,400 contaminated glove boxes and hundreds of process
tanks have been removed.
More than 400,000 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste has
been removed.
Six hundred and fifty of the eight hundred and two facilities have
been demolished.
All four uranium production facilities have been demolished.
All five plutonium production facilities have been demolished or will
be within the next 3 months.
Three hundred and ten of three hundred and sixty sites of soil
contamination have been remediated.
The last shipment of transuranic waste was shipped this past April.
It now appears that the cleanup of Rocky Flats will be completed--
completed--as early as this October, a full year ahead of schedule, and
save the American taxpayers not thousands, not millions, but billions
upon billions of dollars.
Mr. President, you can only appreciate the magnitude of this
accomplishment when you realize that within 6 years, Rocky Flats will
have been transformed from one of the dangerous places on Earth to a
beautiful and safe natural wildlife refuge.
I applaud the leadership provided by CH2M HILL. The management expert
provided by this company was critical to this effort. Kaiser-Hill took
the challenge head on despite the tough schedule and limited funding.
The company can be proud of its accomplishments and its contribution to
the safety of the people of Colorado.
Yet CH2M HILL could not have achieved the demanding goals established
by the Department of Energy without the hard work and determination of
the Rocky Flats workers. Most of these workers had to literally develop
an entire new skill set. They went from manufacturing plutonium pits to
dismantling glove boxes. They cleaned up rooms that were so
contaminated that they were forced to use the highest level of
respiratory protection available.
Perhaps more important, these workers were extraordinarily productive
even though they knew they were essentially working themselves out of a
job. With the completion of the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats,
they knew they would have to find employment elsewhere. There was no
guarantee that the next job would pay as much or provide the same level
of benefits.
Despite knowing they were going to lose their jobs, the workers at
Rocky Flats remained highly motivated and totally committed to their
cleanup

[[Page S8730]]

mission. They believed in what they were doing and worked hard to clean
up the facility as quickly and as safely as possible. They achieved
more in less time and with less money than anyone dreamed possible. I
am proud of the workers at Rocky Flats. I believe they have once again
earned our Nation's sincere appreciation and respect.
Given the sacrifice and dedication demonstrated by these workers, you
would think the Department of Energy would do everything it could to
ensure that these workers received the compensation and benefits they
have earned.
You would think assisting those workers who lose their retirement
benefits because of the early completion of the cleanup would be a top
priority of the Department. After all, these workers saved the
Department billions upon billions in cleanup costs.
Last year, it became clear to the DOE and to me that the cleanup at
Rocky Flats could be completed much earlier than anyone expected. The
workers were supportive of early closure but were concerned that some
of their colleagues would lose retirement benefits because of early
closure.
I share their concern and requested in last year's Defense
authorization bill that the DOE provide Congress with a report on the
number of workers who would not receive retirement benefits and the
cost of providing these benefits. After a lengthy delay, the DOE
reported that about 29 workers would not receive pension and/or
lifetime medical benefits because of early closure. The cost of
providing benefits to these workers is estimated to be just over $12
million.

To my dismay, I discovered the DOE's report was woefully incomplete.
I was subsequently informed that at least another 50 workers would have
qualified for retirement benefits had the DOE bothered to include those
workers who had already been laid off because of the accelerated
closure schedule.
Mr. President, this means as many as 75 workers at Rocky Flats will
lose their pensions, medical benefits, or, in some cases, both because
they worked faster, less expensively, and achieved more than they were
supposed to. They not only worked themselves out of a job but also out
of retirement benefits and medical care.
I find the Department of Energy's refusal to pay these benefits to be
outrageous.
Many of the workers at Rocky Flats served our Nation for over two
decades. They have risked their lives day in and day out, first by
building nuclear weapon components, and then by cleaning up some of the
most contaminated buildings in the world. All they have asked for in
return is to be treated with fairness and honesty.
To my disappointment, and to the disappointment of the workers at
Rocky Flats, the DOE cannot seem to keep its end of the bargain.
These workers would have received retirement benefits had the cleanup
continued to 2035, as originally predicted. The workers would have
received their retirement benefits had the cleanup continued to
December 15, 2006, as the site contract specified. But by accelerating
the cleanup by over a year and saving the taxpayers hundreds of
millions of dollars, these workers are left without the retirement
benefits they deserve and, I feel, have justly earned.
Mr. President, the Department's refusal to provide these benefits has
ramifications far beyond Rocky Flats. Because Rocky Flats is the first
major DOE cleanup site, workers at other sites around the country are
watching to see how the DOE treats the workers at Rocky Flats.
Unfortunately, they have seen how the DOE has failed to step up and
provide retirement benefits to those who have earned it.
The workers at other sites now have no incentive to accelerate
cleanup. Why should they? The Department of Energy hasn't lifted a
finger to help the workers at Rocky Flats. It would be foolish for
workers at other sites to think the DOE would act fairly with them if
they accelerated cleanup.
To me, the Department's decision is penny-wise and pound-foolish. By
refusing to provide these benefits, the Department saves money in the
short term. Yet by discouraging the workers from supporting
acceleration, the Department is going to cost the American taxpayers
hundreds of millions in additional funding in the long run.
I believe Congress needs to correct the Department's mistake before
it is too late.
Today, I offer an amendment that will provide some of the benefits to
those workers who have lost them because of early closure. I am pleased
that my colleague from Colorado, Senator Salazar, has agreed to
cosponsor this important amendment. I support his bipartisan effort.
The amendment is narrowly focused on providing health, medical, and
life insurance benefits to those workers affected.
This amendment is limited in the funding it provides. It is solely
focused on providing these benefits to those workers who would have
received health, medical, and life insurance benefits had the site
remained open until December 15, 2005, the date of the site cleanup
contract.
To be clear, these benefits are not an additional bonus for a job
well done, nor is it a going away present for those two decades of
service. The health, medical, and life insurance benefits are what
these workers have already earned--nothing more, nothing less.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. These workers have
earned these benefits, and it is up to this body to see they receive
it.
Let's not let the bureaucrats in the Department of Energy tarnish the
credibility of the Federal Government. It is time for this body to
correct this mistake before the Department's foolishness costs the
American taxpayers even more money in the future.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I think under the UC, I was given a
few minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I thank Senator Allard for his
leadership in the Senate and for his leadership on nuclear issues.
There is no one who understands the issue more. No one has been more
committed to effectively and efficiently eliminating the difficulties
at Rocky Flats than he has, and the Nation is in his debt. That I say
with certainty.
At one time in my life, I was a U.S. attorney and am aware that
Federal officials are limited in certain of their powers. Somebody
might say they have earned something, but maybe they have not legally
earned it. And if they have not legally earned it, they cannot be paid
for it.
I don't know where we will come out with this amendment the Senator
has offered. I know how committed Senator Allard and Senator Salazar
are to helping these employees, but I note that as I understand it,
these are not governmental employees but employees of a private
contractor. That complicates matters, to say the least.
We are talking about providing benefits to employees of a private
contractor over and above the collective bargaining agreement they had.
Since this program has been scheduled to be completed, they did have
benefits in the agreement for them for early termination and early
generous payments when this contract ended.
I say to my friend how much I respect him. I am telling you, Madam
President, he is working. He has almost shut down the Senate over this
issue, but I am not sure we can ask the Department of Energy and I am
not sure this Congress can take this step. We are closing BRAC sites
around the country. We have a chemical weapons facility in my State
destroying poison gases. I hope it finishes early. I am not sure we can
give every private contractor employee a bonus. Presumably the company
had that in their contract.
Those are the problems with which we are dealing. It is not a lack of
concern. It is real difficulties that exist. I salute both Senators
from Colorado for their interest in these employees. I share those
concerns.
Mr. ALLARD. Will the Senator from Alabama yield?
Mr. SESSIONS. I will be pleased to yield. I have just a minute, as I
know the Presiding Officer is committed to leaving and I am supposed to
replace her.
Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I appreciate the fine work of the
Senator from Alabama, a good friend of mine. There are a couple points
I would like to make.

[[Page S8731]]

The workers at Rocky Flats were paid by Federal dollars. They were
not technically employed by the Federal Government. Their benefits were
paid by the Federal Government. There is a commitment there, in my
view. This amendment tries to correct any legal problems we may have
there.
Again, I appreciate the concern and interest the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Strategic Affairs has toward this issue. I hope somehow
we can resolve this in all fairness, not only to the taxpayers but also
to the workers.
Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Senator.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, before my colleagues depart--I have been
engaged in a wide variety of activities here--can the Senator advise
me, through the Chair, are these to be pending amendments to be voted
on? Is there to be a further period of debate? We want to accommodate
the Senator's desire if he could give us a clarification of the
procedures he hopes to have.
Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, we may very well have to vote on these
pending amendments. I would like to have them available for that
purpose. I would like to continue to talk with the staff of the
Department of Energy and the chairman and his staff. But if necessary,
I would like to have an opportunity to have a vote on this amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator consider seeking the votes now so they
are in that category? Does the Senator wish to have a rollcall vote,
Madam President?
Mr. ALLARD. The proper request is, I ask for their consideration.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendments are pending.
Mr. WARNER. I think that is sufficient clarification.
Mr. ALLARD. We would like to have a vote on the amendments.
Mr. WARNER. At the appropriate time, we can arrange that.
I thank the distinguished Senators from Colorado.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. SALAZAR. Madam President, I rise in strong support of amendment
No. 1419 offered by Senator Allard, my good friend from Colorado. I
fully support it. I think it demonstrates the bipartisan nature of this
particular amendment.
Let me make two points with respect to Rocky Flats. First and
foremost, I think this Nation should be very grateful to the workers of
Rocky Flats for having done what they did during almost five decades to
make sure we did everything within our power to bring about an end to
the Cold War. The men and women who worked at Rocky Flats were
principally responsible for creating the nuclear arsenal we had in our
Nation that allowed us to be strong during the Cold War, that allowed
us to then bring the Cold War to an end.
At the same time, it is important for us to recognize that within the
Department of Energy complex today, there are numerous sites that are
undergoing very difficult, very complex, and very expensive cleanups.
The men and women of Rocky Flats, who have been working there for
decades, have been the ones who have taught the United States of
America, including the Department of Energy, what it is we have to do
to make sure we can move forward with an efficient, effective cleanup
that will cost less money.
Indeed, the contract for the cleanup of Rocky Flats had called for
that contract to be completed at the end of this year, 2005. But
because of the good work of the men and women at Rocky Flats, that
schedule has been expedited.

Indeed, when one looks back at the history of Rocky Flats over the
last several years, there was a time when it was thought Rocky Flats
would not be cleaned up and ready for closure until 2010. Later it was
2007, and moved back to 2006. Yet employees working with CH2M HILL at
Rocky Flats have brought the conclusion of Rocky Flats to probably
October of this year, which is only a few months away.
For the employees who worked at Rocky Flats during this timeframe,
they had an expectation that the contract would be in place through the
end of December 31, 2005. The amendment which has been authored by
Senator Allard and by myself and offered to our colleagues to consider
simply recognizes the contribution of these employees so they are, in
fact, made whole.
With all due respect to my friend from Alabama, I have to say these
employees were Federal employees and were brought in to continue the
work that had to be done there at Rocky Flats with respect to the
cleanup.
The amount of money we are asking for in this amendment is a small
amount relative to the billions and billions of dollars that have been
spent in the Department of Energy complex and cleanups that have not
been as successful as the one at Rocky Flats.
I join my colleague Senator Allard in urging bipartisan support for
this amendment because it recognizes, first, the men and women who
helped us bring about the end of the Cold War and, second, the men and
women who helped us demonstrate to this country how it is you take a
facility contaminated with plutonium and how it is you clean it up in
record time, and which will serve as a model for America as we move
forward in the cleanup of DOE facilities.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from North Dakota.

Amendment No. 1415

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I have come to the floor to offer a couple
of amendments. First I will say a few words about the amendment offered
by the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from California.
Senator Feinstein was speaking on it when I came to the Chamber today.
That is the question of money that is designated to begin research on
the construction, hopefully, according to those who want it, of an
earth penetrating bunker buster nuclear weapon.
There is somewhere in the neighborhood of 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear
weapons on this Earth. Mr. President, 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons
exist on this Earth. And now we have people talking about building new
nuclear weapons in this country, building designer nuclear weapons,
creating a new category of nuclear weapons, beginning to test nuclear
weapons once again. That strikes me as pretty foolhardy because our
responsibility as the world's superpower is to lead in a direction that
tries to prevent nuclear weapons from ever entering into the hands of
terrorists or rogue nations or adversaries. Our leadership
responsibility is to try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to
convince others not to build nuclear weapons.
Let me read from Time magazine, March 11, 2002.

For a few harrowing weeks last fall, a group of U.S.
officials believed that the worst nightmare of their lives--
something even more horrific than 9/11--was about to come
true. In October, an intelligence alert went out to a small
number of Government agencies, including the Energy
Department's top secret Nuclear Emergency Search Team based
in Nevada. The report said terrorists were thought to have
obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon from the Russian arsenal
and planned to smuggle it into New York City.
The source of the report was an agent code name Dragonfire
who intelligence officials believed was of ``undetermined''
reliability. But Dragonfire's claim tracked with a report
from a Russian general who believed his forces were missing a
10-kiloton nuclear weapon.
Since the mid-'90s, proliferation experts have suspected
that several portable nuclear devices might be missing from
the Russian stockpile. That made this Dragonfire report
alarming. So did this: Detonated in lower Manhattan, a 10-
kiloton bomb would kill some 100,000 civilians. . . . And
counterterrorist investigators there went on their highest
state of alert.

That was from Time magazine, March of 2002. Many of us heard reports
of this before. It said following 9/11 in October of that year, there
was a rumor that intelligence officials took seriously that terrorists
had acquired a nuclear weapon and were intending to smuggle that
nuclear weapon into a major American city and detonate it.
Interestingly, no one believed it was impossible for someone to have
obtained a nuclear weapon. There are 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons
on this Earth. We hear the stories about the then-Russian nuclear
stockpile of thousands of weapons without adequate control and
maintenance, some reports about the command and control of those
weapons being dealt with with pencil notations and notebook paper. So
it was not beyond the pale that someone could have stolen a nuclear

[[Page S8732]]

weapon. Neither did intelligence officials doubt that having stolen a
nuclear weapon, terrorists would be able to find a way to detonate a
nuclear weapon.
Why do I mention this? Because with the thousands of nuclear weapons
that exist in this world, the acquisition of one nuclear bomb by a
terrorist group detonated in a major city in this country or in other
countries will cause a catastrophe unlike any we have ever known.
(Mr. LUGAR assumed the Chair.)
That ought to persuade us that our responsibility is to do everything
humanly possible, as the world's most powerful nation, to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons, to prevent terrorists in rogue nations from
ever acquiring nuclear weapons, and to begin reducing the number of
nuclear weapons. That is our leadership responsibility. That
responsibility falls to our country and yet we have people who say,
well, not to worry about that; in fact, let us talk about building new
nuclear weapons; let us design different nuclear weapons. There is even
talk about potentially using a nuclear weapon. There is discussion
about beginning testing nuclear weapons. I think that sort of thing is
reckless because it sends a signal to the rest of the world that we are
not really serious about trying to reduce the number of nuclear weapons
in this world.
We should be serious about it. It ought to be the highest priority
for this country to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt the
ability of terrorists to ever acquire a nuclear weapon with which they
would threaten thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of
people.
This Defense authorization bill is spending a great deal of money on
an antiballistic missile defense system, kind of a catcher's mitt, in
case a terrorist organization or rogue nation would launch an
intercontinental ballistic missile against our country with a nuclear
warhead. This antiballistic missile program is kind of a catcher's mitt
to go up and catch a speeding bullet and hit it with another speeding
bullet. Frankly, it is the least likely threat to this country. The
threat that a terrorist organization or a rogue nation would acquire an
intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead and
then shoot it at our country, that is one of the least likely
scenarios.
The most likely scenario would be a terrorist or rogue nation
acquiring a nuclear weapon through theft or some other device and then
deciding to put it in the trunk of a rusty car sitting in a dock in New
York City or putting it in one of the many containers that show up at
an American port on a container ship. After all, there are 5.7 million
containers that show up at our ports. Only a very small percentage are
ever inspected. That is a much greater, much more likely threat to this
country.
I have great concern about those who talk so easily about our country
building new nuclear weapons, perhaps even using a nuclear weapon. We
have heard that language in recent years, talking about the need to
create designer nuclear weapons. Our responsibility is far greater than
that. I believe our responsibility as a world leader is to lead in the
direction of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; to do everything
humanly possible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to do
everything humanly possible to control the nuclear weapons that now
exist and safeguard those nuclear weapons that now exist.
Since the Presiding Officer is from the State of Ohio, I will show
something I have shown many times that is in my desk. I ask unanimous
consent to show my colleagues two pieces of information.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. This happens to be from a wing strut of a backfire bomber
that the Soviets used to fly when we were in the Cold War. My
assumption perhaps is that this bomber carried nuclear weapons. In the
Cold War, the nuclear weapons on top of missiles were aimed at our
country. The nuclear weapons carried in the bomb bay of a backfire
bomber did not mean good things for our country.
How did I acquire a piece of an airplane that was part of a Soviet
bomber? This happens to be sawed off the wing of that airplane. It was
sawed off the wing of an airplane at American taxpayer expense, one of
the most successful things we have ever done. The reason I mention it
now is the Presiding Officer's name is on that legislation, and through
a program advanced by Senators Lugar and Nunn, we have had remarkable
success in reducing the weapons delivery systems.
This is from a bomber. This is the ground-up copper wire of a
submarine that used to stealthily move under the waters of our oceans,
again with nuclear weapons, with warheads prepared to aim at American
cities. How did I acquire copper wire from a submarine that belonged to
the Soviet Union? That submarine was taken apart, dismantled, as a
result of arms control agreements that dismantled weapons delivery
systems that at one point threatened America.
It is now in this form, a piece of a bomber and copper wire from a
submarine, which I hold in my hand on the Senate floor because programs
like the Nunn-Lugar program, things like arms control agreements, do
work and can work to reduce the threat in this country. I have had this
in my desk for some while and have used it only to demonstrate that our
responsibility as a world leader is to lead in the direction of doing
everything humanly possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on
this Earth, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue nations,
terrorists, and other countries that desperately wish to acquire them,
and to safeguard the nuclear weapons that already exist in our arsenal
to make certain that they are not acquired by other interests.
That is a diversion from the point I was making but an important one,
I think. I came here to say that I support the amendment that has been
offered today. I do not support the spending of money for the
development of a designer nuclear weapon, bunker busters, whatever it
might be called. It seems to me that is moving in exactly the wrong
direction.
Since I think the most likely threat is a stolen nuclear weapon put
in the trunk of a rusty car at an American dock or an American city, I
would hope that we would begin to spend as much time and resources
dealing with the most likely threats as we do dealing with the most
unlikely threat, and that is the spending of billions and billions of
dollars to create an electronic catcher's mitt, an antiballistic
missile system, in the belief that a rogue nation or a terrorist would
acquire an ICBM and then arm it with a nuclear warhead.
Could that conceivably happen? Perhaps, but it is the least likely
threat we face from terrorists. The most likely threat is the theft of
a nuclear weapon and the placement of that in the trunk of a car or in
a container on a ship, and I hope we will spend as much time worrying
about that and dealing with that as we do the other.
Again, that is sort of a long way of saying I support the amendment
that has been offered to strip the funding for the robust nuclear earth
penetrator bunker buster.

Amendment No. 1426

I send an amendment to the desk, and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
laid aside.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an
amendment numbered 1426.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate on the declassification
and release to the public of certain portions of the Report of the
Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and to
urge the President to release information regarding sources of foreign
support for the hijackers involved in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001)

At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1073. SENSE OF SENATE ON DECLASSIFICATION OF PORTIONS OF
THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:

[[Page S8733]]

(1) The Administration has prevented the release to the
American public of 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 2001.
(2) The contents of the redacted pages discuss sources of
foreign support for some of the hijackers involved in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks while they were in the
United States.
(3) The Administration's decision to classify this
information prevents the American people from having access
to information about the involvement of certain foreign
governments in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
(4) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested that the
President release the 28 pages.
(5) The Senate respects the need to keep information
regarding intelligence sources and methods classified, but
the Senate also recognizes that such purposes can be
accomplished through careful selective redaction of specific
words and passages, rather than effacing content entirely.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the President should declassify the 28-page section of
the Joint Inquiry into The Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001, that deals with foreign sources of support for the
hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks; and
(2) only those portions of the report that would directly
compromise ongoing investigations or reveal intelligence
sources and methods should remain classified.

Mr. DORGAN. This amendment that I have offered is a sense-of-the-
Senate amendment and it deals with this booklet. It is, as published,
December 2002, ``A Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After The Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001,'' a report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, dated
December 2, 2002.
It was the first evaluation of intelligence related to the attack
against this country on September 11, 2001.
On page 395, and I will read a portion of it, it begins a discussion
about something that is very sensitive and then it turns to 396 and
subsequent pages. As we can see, those pages are blank. There are 28
pages in the middle of this book that are blank. They are blank because
they are classified at the moment as top secret. Members of Congress
can, under certain conditions, go and read this top secret material. I
and a good number of my colleagues have. Previously, I and other
colleagues have as well brought to the attention of the Senate the need
for this information to be declassified.
The amendment that I offer is very simple. It says that the President
should declassify the 28-page section of the joint inquiry into the
terrorist attacks of September 11 that deals with foreign sources of
support for the hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001, attack.
The American people have been prevented from seeing this. I will, in
a moment, quote from Senator Shelby and Senator Graham, then-chairman
and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, both of
whom felt that this information should be made available to the
American people. But it has never been made available to the American
people.
Let me read the page prior to the 28 pages that have been redacted.
Page 395:

Finding: Through its investigation, the Joint Inquiry
developed information suggesting specific sources of foreign
support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they
were in the United States.

Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia. The
finding says they developed information suggesting specific sources of
foreign support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were
in the United States. The joint inquiry's review confirmed that the
intelligence community also has information, much of which has yet to
be independently verified, concerning these potential sources of
support.

Instead, the Joint Inquiry referred a detailed compilation
of information it had uncovered in documents and interviews
to the FBI and CIA for further investigation by the
Intelligence Community and, if appropriate, law enforcement
agencies.

It talks then at the end of this page about the joint inquiry, which
states:

It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the
kind of extensive investigation that would be required to
determine the true significance of such alleged support to
the hijackers. On the one hand, it is possible that these
kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA
memorandum, ``incontrovertible evidence that there is support
for these terrorists,'' blank, blank, blank.

At that point, it is redacted.
This was classified at the White House. These documents went to the
White House, then to be published publicly, and prior to publication 28
pages were classified top secret. That is why in the middle of this
booklet we see 28 pages with no information.
There was a call to declassify it because a substantial amount of
information in the press and elsewhere raised questions about this
issue.
I will read from The Washington Post at this point in time, December
12, 2002:

Leaders of the congressional panel ending an investigation
of the September 11, 2001, terrorism attacks yesterday
accused the administration of refusing to declassify
information about possible Saudi Arabian financial links to
U.S.-based terrorists because the material would be
embarrassing and would heighten political tensions with the
desert kingdom.

Continuing from The Washington Post:

In releasing the panel's final report on the intelligence
agencies' performance before the attacks, Sen. Bob Graham (D-
Fla.), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, and
Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.), the vice chairman, said the
information on Saudi Arabia should be made public to inform
the public about a continued source of support for anti-
American terrorism groups. Doing so also would put more
pressure on the U.S. government to force the Saudis to sever
their financial links to charities and individuals who
support terrorism, they said.

In other comments, Senator Shelby said that he believed 90 to 95
percent of this should be made available to the American people and
would not compromise any intelligence sources.
The President was asked about this issue. He was asked actually in a
Rose Garden appearance back at that point before a meeting with King
Saud, where the President said he had no qualms at all about rebuffing
the request to release this information publicly because he said there
is an ongoing investigation into the 9/11 attacks, and we do not want
to compromise the investigation.
Well, even the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia to the United States
called for the release of this information because there was
substantial speculation about what it said. I cannot say what it said
on the Senate floor because it is top secret. I can read what Senator
Shelby has said and what Senator Graham said on the Senate floor. I can
show that in this report there are 28 pages which the American people
are not allowed to see. I can say that there are published reports--and
I have read them into the record now from The Washington Post and
others and I will read into the record, if it is necessary, the
comments from my two colleagues who were the chairman and ranking
member of the Intelligence Committee, that references Saudi Arabia. The
point is even the Government of Saudi Arabia suggested and said
publicly that this material should be declassified and made public.
Senator Shelby, the vice chairman of the congressional inquiry at
that point, reiterated his view that 90 to 95 percent of the classified
pages could be released without jeopardizing national security.
My point is this. I have reviewed the top secret material. I am sure
many of my colleagues have. They all should. It contains information
that the American people have a right to see.
Let me again read the lead to the 28 redacted pages. Again, I am
reading from the Joint Intelligence Committee Report:

Through its investigation, the joint inquiry developed
information suggesting specific sources of foreign support
for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were in the
United States.

Every Member of the Senate should read that top secret material. But
every American citizen should have access, to understand what it says,
because it should not be classified. It is unfair. It is unfair to the
American people, and I submit it is unfair to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi
Arabian Government has said it ought to be unclassified.
I have on a previous occasion offered this amendment to the Senate.
There was an objection, so I offer the same amendment again today. It
is now 4 years from the date of that attack. It is now long past the
time when investigation is ongoing. The President said he would not
declassify this because

[[Page S8734]]

there is an ongoing investigation into 9/11, and we don't want to
compromise it. That investigation by the 9/11 Commission, authorized by
the Congress--that investigation is over. So this excuse is no longer
an excuse.
I submit the American people have a right to know if there were those
who provided support to the 9/11 terrorists who were in this country
and preparing to launch the attack on 9/11. If there were those foreign
governments, foreign interests, or as the report indicated simply,
``foreign sources of support,'' then the American people have a right
to know.
My amendment is a very simple amendment, painfully simple. Once
again, I offer it to say it is the sense of the Senate that this
information shall be declassified. We ask the President to declassify
this information and see that it is made available to the American
people.
I was intending to read this. I think I shall not--perhaps just a
paragraph or two of it.
My colleague, Senator Graham from Florida, who in fact stood at this
desk and made this statement, he was then-chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. Senator Shelby, who I described as chairman, was chairman at
one point, and then Senator Graham as the ranking member, and then it
switched and Senator Graham was chairman. During this particular time,
Senator Graham, as chairman, and Senator Shelby, as vice chairman, both
agreed that the bulk of this ought to be made available to the American
people. Let me just quote the statement made on the floor of the Senate
by our colleague, Senator Graham, the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. He is describing this.

This report makes a very compelling case, based on the
information submitted by the agencies themselves, that there
was a foreign government which was complicitous in the
actions leading up to September 11, at least as it relates to
some of the terrorists who were present in the United States.
There are two big questions yet to be answered. Why would
this government have provide the level of assistance--
financial, logistical, housing, support service--to some of
the terrorists and not to all of the terrorists? We asked
that question. There has been no response.
My own hypothesis--and I will describe it as that--

I am continuing to quote Senator Graham--

is that in fact similar assistance was being provided to
all or at least most of the terrorists. The difference is
that we happened, because of a set of circumstances which are
contained in these 28 censored pages, to have an unusual
window on a few of the terrorists. We did not have a similar
window on others. Therefore, it will take more effort to
determine if they were, in fact, receiving that assistance.

I continue to quote Senator Graham of Florida.

An even more serious question is what would lead us to
believe that if there was this infrastructure of a foreign
government supporting some of the 19 terrorists, that as soon
as September 11 concluded, as soon as the last flames were
put out at the Pentagon, the World Trade Center and on the
field in Pennsylvania, all that infrastructure was
immediately taken down? Again, this is my hypothesis: I don't
believe it was taken down. I believe that infrastructure is
likely to still be in place assisting the next generation of
terrorists who are in the United States.

Those are very fundamental questions, and if the public had access to
these 28 pages, they would be demanding answers.
That is a response from the chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, not some partisan, with sentiments echoed largely by the
vice chairman of the committee, about the top secret classification of
those 28 pages.
My amendment, once again, simply says I believe the American people
have the right to know what is on these pages. These 28 pages are
blank. I know what is there. Some of my colleagues know what is there
because we are able to see top secret material. The American people
don't know what is there, and they should.
Having read it, I simply say they ought to have the right to see it
as well, and my amendment is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment that would
ask the President to make available, to declassify this material, so
there are no longer questions about what it says.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague, and I
assure him, in consultation with the chairman and indeed the ranking
member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, his amendment will be
given every careful consideration.

Mr. President, at this time I know there is another Senator.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am not finished. I thought you were
asking me to yield for a question.
Mr. WARNER. Yes, I wasn't quite certain. I thought there was a brief
time in which you were going to address the Senate. I am trying to
accommodate one of your colleagues.
Mr. DORGAN. I have one additional amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Can the Senator advise the Chair and the Senate the time
you would require?
Mr. DORGAN. I indicated to my colleague I would be speaking about 20
minutes, but I have one additional amendment that probably will take
about 10 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Very well, Mr. President. We will all wait that period of
time. Thank you.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the
Senator from North Dakota, if it is not already locked in, then the
Senator from Colorado be recognized to introduce three amendments which
will take a total of--about how long?
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, approximately 15 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. Approximately 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my understanding was we had ample time
this afternoon. I will truncate my remarks. I had intended to speak
longer than 10 minutes, but I don't want to disadvantage my colleague
on the floor or disadvantage those managing the bill. I will come back
on Monday and speak at greater length about the amendment I will offer
now and keep my comments short at this moment.
Mr. WARNER. I would very much appreciate it if the Senator will
accommodate the Senate in that way.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending
amendment be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 1429

(Purpose: To establish a special committee of the Senate to investigate
the awarding and carrying out of contracts to conduct activities in
Afghanistan and Iraq and to fight the war on terrorism)

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment for myself, Senator
Durbin, and Senator Lautenberg. I send the amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself,
Mr. Durbin, and Mr. Lautenberg, proposes an amendment
numbered 1429.

Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that deals with a
subject I have previously brought to the floor of the Senate, so far
unsuccessfully, but my hope is this time perhaps I will have better
luck. It deals with the question of dramatic waste, fraud, and abuse in
contracting, particularly with respect to the war effort in Iraq.
In the early 1940s, 1941 to be exact, Harry Truman, a Democrat from
the State of Missouri, serving here in the Senate when a Democratic
President was in the White House, decided that he wanted to have an
investigation of what he considered substantial waste, fraud, and abuse
in Pentagon spending and spending by contractors. I am sure it was
uncomfortable for a Democrat in the White House to have a member of his
own party in the Senate pushing, but he did. He kept pushing as only
Harry Truman could, and created finally a Truman committee, a special
committee. They held hearings all around the country. They were
relentless. They found massive amounts of waste, fraud, and abuse in
spending--yes, even during the war effort. It was, perhaps,
uncomfortable for everybody that this was going on, that this kind of
inquiry existed. But Harry Truman was not about to take a ``no'' answer

[[Page S8735]]

from anybody, so he pushed and pushed.
Finally, it came on the radar screen in the Senate that when you
spend money, particularly when you are at war, you can't have people
profiteering. It has to be spent effectively in support of this
country's interests in support of our troops.
We have a war in Iraq. We have soldiers in harm's way in Afghanistan.
We are moving massive quantities of money out the door in the
Congress--$81 billion here, $45 billion there, $55 billion there. It
is, in many cases, going to contractors--some substantial amounts to
replenish Defense Department accounts, but a substantial amount to
contractors.
We hear substantial waste, fraud, and abuse. It almost makes you
sick. This is a picture of $2 million wrapped in Saran wrap. In fact,
the guy standing right here said they were playing football, playing
catch with bundles of hundred-dollar bills. What were they doing with
this? They were actually giving money to contractors in Iraq.
Contractors were told: Bring a bag, we pay in cash. Bring a bag because
we pay in cash over here.
This picture shows what was going on. The guy who did this testified
before a committee at a hearing that I held. I don't need to go through
a lot of charts, but ``Uncle Sam Looks Into Meal Bills, Halliburton
Refunds $27 Million.''
We had one example: Halliburton corporation charging the American
taxpayer. They were feeding 42,000 a day--at least that is what they
were charging for, 42,000 meals a day. Guess what. They were only
serving 14,000 meals a day.
I came from a small town that had a really small restaurant. I can
understand them missing a cheeseburger or two, but a corporation that
overcharges the Federal Government for feeding soldiers by 28,000 meals
a day?
Then we had another hearing. We had one of the food service
supervisors in Iraq who works for a subsidiary of Halliburton. He said
we were feeding food that was outdated and expired, expired stamps on
it by as much as a year.
I see the Washington Times had a little blurb today. They mentioned
that. People were writing in and saying: That is nothing, we used to
eat old K rations. Does anybody believe it is right that when we send
our soldiers to Iraq and we have food hauled over by a contractor and
we pay for good food to be fed to our troops, and then they end up with
food that is expired for a year, they say that is OK, serve it to the
troops; and if a convoy comes through and is subject to attack the
supervisor says, you grab that food out, pull the shells out and
shrapnel out, and feed it to the troops. I put that testimony in the
Record.
Let me tell you, a top civilian official at the Corps of Engineers,
involved in awarding sole-source contracts to companies like
Halliburton--and there are more involved--the top civilian official is
a wonderful woman with a wonderful record who has worked for years for
this country. Here is what she said. And by the way, she is paying for
it with her career because whistleblowing is not looked upon with favor
by the old boys network. Here is what she said, Bunny Greenhouse:

I can unequivocally state that the abuse related to the
contracts awarded to K.B.R. Halliburton represents the most
blatant and improper contract abuse I have witnessed during
the course of my professional career. She is paying for this
bit of honesty with her career because the good old boys
don't like to hear that.

The question is, for all the things that are being done--payment to
have a room air conditioned, have the contractor come pick up a bag of
cash, and it goes to a subcontractor--pretty soon the American
taxpayers' payment to have room air conditioning, turns out the room
has a little fan in it and we paid for air conditioners.
It is unbelievable what is going on. There are 85,000 brand new
trucks left on the roadside because they had a flat tire, to be trashed
and torched. Plugged fuel pumps? Dump the truck.
It is unbelievable what is going on in waste, fraud, and abuse. I
have held five hearings in the policy committee on this. We had
whistleblowers who have the courage to show up and talk about what is
going on. There are 50,000 tons of nails laying in the sands of Saudi
Arabia because they ordered the wrong size, so they dump them on the
sands. The American taxpayer will pay for that. Need some towels for
troops? The Halliburton subsidiary orders towels for troops and they
nearly doubled the cost of the towels so they could put their logo on
the towels.
Yes, it is going on all the time. It is unbelievable. And nobody does
a thing about it. Nothing. Do you think this Congress is holding
aggressive oversight hearing? None. Nobody is interested. Why? Because
it would embarrass somebody. Meanwhile the American taxpayer is taking
a bath and the troops are being poorly served, in my judgment, with
this sort of nonsense.
My amendment is simple. I will speak at some length on Monday. I want
to truncate this for the sake of the time problems my colleagues have.
My amendment is very simple. My amendment calls for the establishment
of a Truman-type committee again that would do the oversight that is
not being done by this Congress. It will be bipartisan. It seems to me
we have an obligation to the American people and we have an obligation
to our troops. I offer the amendment and I will come back and speak
later.
In the interest of time problems, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague. The Senator brings
to the Senate a very serious proposal. It will be given serious
consideration.
At this time, the Senator from Colorado desires to be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Before the distinguished Senator addresses the Senate, I
see our distinguished colleague from Connecticut. If I could inquire as
to the Senator's wishes. We are trying to arrange a schedule.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Virginia. Five
minutes is the maximum I require.
Mr. DORGAN. If I might I make one comment, I defamed my friend, the
Presiding Officer. I suggested some while ago he was from Ohio. He, in
fact, is from Indiana. I have known that all along, and those in the
Northern Great Plains see everything out there as east. But my
distinguished colleague Senator Lugar, to whom I refer, is from
Indiana. I talked about Nunn-Lugar and the wonderful work done. I want
to make sure I identify it correctly.
Mr. LEVIN. We, the defamed people from Michigan, are really from
Ohio.
Mr. WARNER. If I might ask that the Senator from Connecticut be
recognized following the remarks by the Senator from Ohio--the Senator
from Colorado.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. SALAZAR. It is, indeed, fortunate to be a Senator from the State
of Colorado.
I start my comments by giving my appreciation to the Senator from
Virginia, Senator Warner, and to the Senator from Michigan, Senator
Levin, for their great leadership in putting together what is a very
good bill.
I also thank their staffs because at the end of the day I know how
much of the work goes into these major pieces of legislation put
together by our great staffs. Judy Ainslee and Rick DeBobes have done a
fantastic job on behalf of the United States, on behalf of the Senate.
I thank them for their efforts.

Amendments Nos. 1421, 1422, and 1423, en bloc

I ask that the pending amendment be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I have a series of amendments at the
desk, Nos. 1421, 1422, and 1423. I ask they be called up en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Salazar] proposes amendments
numbered 1421, 1422, and 1423, en bloc.

Mr. SALAZAR. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendments be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments are as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 1421

(Purpose: To rename the death gratuity payable for deaths of members of
the Armed Forces as fallen hero compensation)

At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

[[Page S8736]]

SEC. 642. RENAMING OF DEATH GRATUITY PAYABLE FOR DEATHS OF
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS FALLEN HERO
COMPENSATION.

(a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1475(a), by striking ``have a death gratuity
paid'' and inserting ``have fallen hero compensation paid''.
(2) In section 1476(a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a death gratuity'' and
inserting ``fallen hero compensation''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``A death gratuity'' and
inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
(3) In section 1477(a), by striking ``A death gratuity''
and inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
(4) In section 1478(a), by striking ``The death gratuity''
and inserting ``The amount of fallen hero compensation''.
(5) In section 1479 (1), by striking ``the death gratuity''
and inserting ``fallen hero compensation''.
( 6) In section 1489--
(A) in subscction (a), by striking ``a gratuity'' in the
mattcr preceding paragTaph (1) and inserting ``fallcn hero
compensation''; and
(B) in suhscetion (b) (2), by inserting ``or othcr
assistanee'' after ``lesser death gratuity''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) Such subchapter is further amended by striking ``Death
gratuity:'' each place it appears in the heading of sections
1475 through 1480 and 1489 and inserting ``Fallen hero
compensation:''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such
subchapter is amended by striking ``Death gratuity:'' in the
items relating to sections 1474 through 1480 and 1489 and
inserting ``Fallen hero compensation:''.
(c) General References.--Any reference to a death gratuity
payable under subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10, United
States Code, in any law, regulation, document, paper, or
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a
reference to fallen hero compensation payable under such
subchapter, as amended by this section.

amendment no. 1422

(Purpose: To provide that certain local educational agencies shall be
eligible to receive a fiscal year 2005 payment under section 8002 or
8003 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965)

At the end of subtitle G of title V, insert the following:

SEC. 585. APPLICATIONS FOR IMPACT AID PAYMENT.

Notwithstanding paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 8005(d)
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 7705(d)(2), (3)), the Secretary of Education shall
treat as timely filed, and shall process for payment, an
application under section 8002 or section 8003 of such Act
for fiscal year 2005 from a local educational agency that--
(1) for each of the fiscal years 2000 through 2004,
submitted an application by the date specified by the
Secretary of Education under section 8005(c) of such Act for
the fiscal year; and
(2) submits an application for fiscal year 2005 during the
period beginning on February 2, 2004, and ending on the date
of enactment of this Act.

amendment no. 1423

(Purpose: To provide for Department of Defense support of certain
Paralympic sporting events)

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following:

SEC. 330. PROVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR
CERTAIN PARALYMPIC SPORTING EVENTS.

Section 2564 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following
new paragraphs:
``(4) A sporting event sanctioned by the United States
Olympic Committee through the Paralympic Military Program.
``(5) A national or international Paralympic sporting event
(other than one covered by paragraph (3) or (4)) which is--
``(A) held in the United States or any of its territories
or commonwealths;
``(B) governed by the International Paralympic Committee;
and
``(C) sanctioned by the United States Olympic Committee.'';
and
(2) in subsection (d)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Secretary''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Not more than $1,000,000 may be expended in any
fiscal year to provide support for events specified under
paragraph (5) of subsection (c).''.

Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, before discussing these amendments, I
underscore the great importance of this legislation. This legislation
sends an important message to our troops and to their families, to the
important work it funds, and the important signal it sends to the world
from the United States of America.
Today, more than 15,000 people from my State are serving overseas in
support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan. Many of these soldiers, air men and women, reservists, and
National Guard men and women are preparing for their second tour of
duty away from their families.
The 4,000 soldiers of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment are in Iraq
for their second tour of duty, and 1,800 soldiers from the 43rd Area
Support Group and 130 from the 571st Medical Company are also overseas,
while the 947th Engineering Company and the second of the 135th
Aviation Battalion are preparing to leave for Iraq in the fall.
I give a sincere welcome home to all 3,762 soldiers from the 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry, who are returning to their families
in Colorado Springs as I stand in the Senate today.
The most moving thing I have done since coming to the Senate some 6
months ago was a bipartisan trip which I took to Iraq led by Senator
Harry Reid from Nevada. On that trip I saw many moving things, though
nothing more impressive than our troops and their dedication to the
mission and to their units.
Shortly after returning to the United States from Iraq, I dropped a
line to Lieutenant Colonel ``Mac'' from Colorado whom I had met on the
trip. I inquired how he was doing, and in responding he wrote:

Our troops' spirits remain high. Some more than others, as
I've worked and received permission to allow about 40 of our
troops to redeploy early, as the pace of our support has
decreased and will remain steady but not too hectic over the
next six months of our deployment. Having worked the plan
from start to final approval, I am personally happy knowing
that they will be able to spend more quality time with their
loved ones. I know my place is here, and will remain until we
all leave in early Autumn.

That one response from one lieutenant colonel underscored our troops'
dedication to the cause we are engaged in. This young man with his own
family back in Colorado Springs was celebrating that members of his
unit--not he--were returning home to their families. Thousands of
troops are making that same selfless sacrifice every day. We owe each
of them the best possible equipment and training. They and their
families also should expect that we will ensure their quality of life.
The $441 billion bill in the amendments we have adopted in the last
day will begin to do just that. That bill authorizes a total of $109
billion in appropriations to the Department of Defense for military
personnel, and $236 million of that amount is more than the President's
budget requested.
In my State of Colorado, where more than 9,000 troops are currently
deployed overseas, I am especially mindful of the important quality-of-
life investments that have been included in this bill.
The bill would provide a 3.1-percent across-the-board pay raise for
military personnel. That is important to honor our men and women in
uniform. It authorizes the payment of imminent danger pay to
servicemembers hospitalized as a result of wounds they have incurred as
a result of hostile action for the duration of their hospitalization.
That is a move in the right direction. It would permanently increase
the fallen hero compensation for servicemembers killed in combat or
combat-related activities from $12,000 to $100,000. With the inclusion
of Senator Levin's important amendment, it will ensure that the family
of any active-duty soldier who was killed will qualify for this
important assistance.
The legislation also permanently increases the maximum amount of
coverage for group life insurance from $250,000 to $400,000. That is
the right start. I am hopeful with the inclusion of Senator Nelson's
amendment we will eliminate the survivor benefit plan dependency
indemnity compensation offset and fix serious inequities in how the
military treats the survivors of military retirees.
The bill also extends several bonuses relating to recruiting and
retention, including the selected reserve reenlistment bonus, the ready
reserve enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, the prior service
enlistment bonus, the enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for active-
duty members, and the retention bonus for servicemembers with critical
military skills.
I will cosponsor an amendment with my friends Senators Lieberman,
Clinton, and Nelson, to increase the size of our Active-Duty Army by
80,000 troops. Increasing the size of our military will reduce the
strain placed on individual

[[Page S8737]]

soldiers, improving the quality of their lives and their families'
lives. It will allow our fighting men and women to spend more time at
home with their families between deployments. It will address what is
today an overstretched American Army. Most importantly, adding 80,000
troops will help to defend our Nation at home and abroad with the
strongest military in the world.

Our health care for our troops and their families also is addressed.
This bill would extend health care coverage under TRICARE Prime for the
children of active-duty servicemembers who died while on active duty
and who have been on active duty for a period of more than 30 days, so
the dependent child would be able to receive TRICARE until age 21.
After the inclusion on Thursday of the excellent bipartisan amendment
offered by Senators Graham and Clinton, it will ensure access to
TRICARE for Guard and Reserve and that care will continue.
This bill also requires the Secretary of Defense to report to
Congress about the adverse health effects that may be associated with
the use of antimalaria drugs.
This is a good bill. The bill is vitally important for the work it
also funds. It funds $78.2 billion for procurement. It authorizes $127
billion for operations and maintenance. It does a lot to support our
investment in creating a strong defense for our Nation.
I am particularly pleased the committee included $6.4 million to
construct a Space Warning Squadron Support Facility at the Greeley Air
National Guard Station. Our air guard provides a vital service at that
station, but the current facility is substandard by anyone's measure.
When personnel leave that facility, they drape plastic over their
computers today so they are not destroyed by the water that leaks
through the roof.
I am also pleased with the inclusion of the amendment offered by my
colleagues from Kentucky, Senators McConnell and Bunning, and my good
friend from Colorado, Senator Allard, that we are prepared to take
another positive step forward in meeting our responsibility to destroy
the chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Army Depot. I am also
hopeful with the efforts of my good friend Senator Allard and efforts I
have undertaken with him, we will be able to wrap up the cleanup of
Rocky Flats in a successful manner.
This bill is important because it sends a message to the world. There
is no more comprehensive statement of our dedication to defend this
country and to maintain our position in the world. Our enemies should
never take comfort in any sense that America is disengaging from the
world. This bill sends a very clear message on two vitally important
threats.
On Wednesday, a group of leading defense and foreign policy experts,
led by former Defense Secretary Perry, concluded:

. . . the gravest threat facing America today is a terrorist
detonating a nuclear bomb in one of our cities. The National
Security Advisory Group judges that the Bush Administration
is taking insufficient actions to counter this threat.

We must do better. Knowing that such a horrendous act is even
possible, we must take every step possible now to ensure it does not
come about.
This bill authorizes $415 million for DOD's Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, taking an important first step in locking down,
perhaps, the most ready source of nuclear materials for terrorists.
With the inclusion of the Lugar amendment, of which I was proud to be
a cosponsor, I hope we will begin to cut through the red tape that has
hindered our efforts at locking down this threat for far too long. I
commend my colleague from Indiana for his leadership over the decades
on this effort.
Authorizing a total of $50 billion in supplemental appropriations for
this next fiscal year for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and the global war on terror, the bill also tells the world we are not
deterred by the hateful attacks on buses and trains in London or on
cars in Baghdad.
We are prepared, once again, to fulfill our obligations to fund the
effort in Iraq. I repeat my plea to the President that he frankly
discuss his plan for success in Iraq with the American people while he
candidly informs Americans about how we will pay for it.
I am also hopeful that as this bill moves forward to its final form,
the amendments I have called up for consideration will also be
included.
Amendment No. 1421 would simply change the name of the ``death
gratuity'' to ``fallen hero compensation.'' This amendment was approved
by the Senate in the supplemental appropriations bill but was dropped
in conference.
``Death gratuity'' is the name for the assistance that taxpayers make
available to military survivors. The term ``gratuity'' means gift. Not
one of the widows, widowers, or children left behind think of that
money as a gift. This is a simple change. There should be no opposition
from Members of this body to include that name change. It more properly
reflects the sacrifices military survivors have made and more properly
expresses the gratitude and dignity we as a nation owe these families.
Amendment No. 1423, the Paralympic amendment, would allow the
Pentagon's Office of Special Events to provide support to national and
international Paralympic competitions hosted in the United States with
a million-dollar limit on support in any one year. The Office of
Special Events today supports the regular Olympics and other
international sporting events. All this amendment does is to say we
will treat our disabled athletes with the same support and respect.
The amendment would also allow support of a new USOC program that has
been developed to assist with the rehabilitation of disabled veterans
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a simple amendment that
addresses a very important issue, especially to the disabled veterans
who are returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom.
Amendment No. 1422 is another amendment that improves upon this bill.
It will restore badly needed educational impact aid funding to the El
Paso School District, which educates the children of more than 60
percent of the military personnel serving our Nation at the Fort Carson
military base in Colorado.
For the 2004-2005 fiscal year, the El Paso School District submitted
its application for impact aid to the Department of Education on time,
but due to inadvertence and, perhaps, bureaucratic misdirection and
mistake, it was deemed to be untimely because they failed to submit the
application in electronic format. As a result, the school district that
serves mostly military families was assessed a 10-percent penalty. This
amendment will deem the school district's application as timely. The
money is already in the Department of Education's budget. Thus, this
amendment does not take money away from another source or another
State.
One may ask, What connection does this have to our service personnel?
And why is it so critical to the support of our military personnel?
First of all, 60 percent of the 5,500 El Paso School District
students belong to military families stationed at Fort Carson, and they
will be impacted by the cut in the amount of money available for their
education.
Many of the loved ones of the students and staff of the El Paso
School District have been deployed to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. In fact, over 11,000 soldiers from Fort Carson are currently
deployed in Iraq today. That is over one-half of the fort's total
forces. Many units from Fort Carson are now starting their second and
third tours of duty in Iraq. Sadly, over 50 service personnel from Fort
Carson have died in active duty in Iraq over the last several years.
Without the funds we are requesting, the school district will be
forced to lay off teachers and cut educational programs that educate
the families of service personnel. Our military personnel sacrifice a
great deal for our freedom. We owe it to them to restore the
educational funding for their children.
In closing, I am reminded once again of the thousands of Macs--just
like the valiant lieutenant colonel I met in Kuwait--who are standing
guard each and every day to protect our Nation. I am mindful of their
families--in my own State, in Colorado Springs, in Denver,

[[Page S8738]]

in Grand Junction; in small, rural communities, and in every State and
community throughout our Nation--awaiting their return or dreading
their departure. We owe them, as the Senate, our best work.
This bill is very good work. As I started my comments today, I
commended the leadership of my friends from Michigan and Virginia and
their staffs for their great work. I hope our Democrats and Republicans
will join together, as we move forward, to bring this legislation to
successful conclusion because it is important for a strong defense for
our country.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to assure our distinguished
colleague from Colorado that we will give very careful consideration to
his amendments.
Have they been sent to the desk, I ask the Presiding Officer?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that they be set
aside, such that the Senator from Connecticut is to be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let me thank the
Senator from Colorado for his extremely thoughtful and sensitive
statement about what this bill is all about. I thank him for his kind
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
Let me first thank the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, and the ranking
member, the distinguished Senator from Michigan, for the extraordinary
work they have done in bringing this bill forward. I am honored to be a
member of the committee and proudly support its work.

Amendment No. 1389

Mr. President, I rise today to speak specifically about amendment No.
1389 offered by the Senator from South Dakota, Mr. Thune. I am one of
many cosponsors of this amendment. Its intention is to delay the
implementation of the current round of base realignment and closures,
the so-called BRAC, until we are better able to assess our defense
needs.
The news from London in the last few days reminds us in the most
stark and stunning ways of the fact that we are at war. It may not feel
like that to most of us. It is a different kind of war. But there is an
enemy out there worldwide who is committed to achieving some kind of
victory over us and our allies and establishing a regime in a
significant part of the world that would be fanatical, hateful, and, to
say the least, undermine our national security and our national
principles.
In the midst of such a war, it seems to me the reduction of our base
structure has to be done with real care. The point of Senator Thune's
amendment, to delay this process, is this: One, we are in a war. As
Senator Salazar said with great effect and poignancy, we have tens of
thousands of American soldiers coming and going from Iraq, using bases
in a way we may not have foreseen when this particular base realignment
and closure process began.
We also are being asked and the Commission is being asked to make
final judgments about some very important military installations in our
country but before our final facts are before the Commission, the
Congress, and the Pentagon. That is the intention of the Thune
legislation, which, as I say, I am a cosponsor of--to put the brakes
on, to say, let's not rush to judgment. Because in some cases of bases
the Pentagon has recommended be closed, we may look back and say: This
rush to judgment has really been a dash to disaster, that we have
closed some military facilities we will urgently need in the years
ahead.
Of course, I support cutting excess and unneeded defense spending and
support saving money where we can. That is why I earlier voted for the
BRAC round. But I think Senator Thune and I, and so many others, when
we saw the recommendations come out--now, in the middle of a war, based
on information that is incomplete--we said to ourselves: Let's just
step back a bit and get the facts we need before we make these final
judgments.
Let me state it clearly. I have a local interest in this. The
Pentagon has recommended, as all my colleagues know, the closing of
Submarine Base New London, an extraordinary, in my opinion, national
asset. But the point I want to make is if you close, God forbid,
Submarine Base New London or some of these other bases that are
recommended for closure, that is it. This is not like turning off the
water in your house when you go away for a summer vacation, and when
you come back and turn it back on, there is the water. If you close a
base like Submarine Base New London, it is never going to be opened
again. Therefore, you have to be able to reach a conclusion that not
only is it not of military value today and in the near future, but it
never will be; that is, in decades ahead, in an uncertain world. In
this case of this submarine base--and I fear in some of the others--the
facts that were used as a basis for the judgment do not stand up.
Too often, monetary savings have been confused with military value,
and military value has been based on judgments that are incomplete. And
here I come to one of our larger points: The Pentagon is now in the
midst of its Quadrennial Defense Review, the most significant
overarching review of America's military needs and goals for the
future. That review is due next year. But we are being asked through
BRAC and eventually in Congress to make final judgments on these bases
before the final information is in, in the midst of a war.
I can tell you about Submarine Base New London, which I know best.
The recommendation to close seems to be based on an estimate of the
size of our submarine force, our attack submarine force, in the years
ahead, which is the lowest anyone has ever seen and lower than every
other study that has been done. I suppose if the base is closed, it
will prejudge the fact. But I fear we will look back and say in the
years ahead, as we face rising pure competitors: Why did we ever do
that? I have enough confidence in this particular Base Realignment and
Closure Commission and the independence and strength with which they
are going at their responsibilities, at every turn making it clear they
are not just going to be a rubberstamp for the Pentagon, that they are
not going to allow Submarine Base New London to be closed. But I worry
there are bases across this Nation that are recommended for closing on
insubstantial, incomplete information that we will regret having
closed. This amendment No. 1389 says: Let's just step back for a while.
Let's wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review is in. Let's wait until
we see the return of some more of our troops from Iraq so we know what
our base needs are here at home. Let us not rush to judgment.
We are talking about our national security in a time of war, in an
uncertain world, with rising new superpowers, but much more menacing
than that: rogue states and nonstate actors gaining access to weapons
of mass destruction. We have to get this right. I believe Senator
Thune's amendment would help us do that.
Mr. President, I will just say one final word about the news from
London. I am sure the distinguished occupant of the chair, like myself,
has been following these developments closely. They remind us that
there is an insidious group out there, a fanatical group that will
strike at civilians and try to strike panic in the hearts of average
citizens to gain their political goals.
What has been as stirring as the attacks in London have been
revolting has been the reaction of the British people. It really does
remind us of their strength and determination during the Second World
War. It is an inspiration. Most of all, I hope it will send a message
to these terrorists that they may strike, but we are stronger than they
are. Our principles are superior to theirs. They will never defeat us.
I thank our friends from Britain, the average citizens, whose actions
and words speak so loudly to us of their faith in the future, for
giving us that model and that inspiration. We stand with them today as
they have stood with us on so many previous days.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Amendments Nos. 1343, 1430 through 1432, En Bloc

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

[[Page S8739]]

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if my distinguished ranking member is
prepared, we are about to send a series of amendments to the desk which
have been cleared on both sides. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent
that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc, the amendments be
agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table.
Finally, I ask that any statements relating to any of these individual
amendments be printed in the Record.
Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments were agreed to, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 1343

(Purpose: To increase the limit on the value of assistance that may be
provided to eligible entities to carry out procurement technical
assistance programs operating on less than a Statewide basis)

On page 237, after line 17, add the following:

SEC. 846. INCREASED LIMIT APPLICABLE TO ASSISTANCE PROVIDED
UNDER CERTAIN PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS.

Section 2414(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``$150,000'' and inserting ``$300,000''.

AMENDMENT NO. 1430

(Purpose: To clarify certain authorities relating to adoptions by
members of the Armed Forces)

At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

SEC. 653. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN
INTERMEDIARIES UNDER CERTAIN AUTHORITIES
RELATING TO ADOPTIONS.

(a) Reimbersement for Adoption Expenses.--Section
1052(g)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ``or other source authorized to place children for
adoption under State or local law'' after ``qualified
adoption agency''.
(b) Treatment as Children for Medical and Dental Care
Purposes.--Section 1072(6)(D)(i) of such title is amended by
inserting 11, or by any other source authorized by State or
local law to provide adoption placement,'' after
``(recognized by the Secretary of Defense)''.

AMENDMENT NO. 1431

(Purpose: To require a Comptroller General study on the features of
successful personnel management systems of highly technical and
scientific workforces)

At the end of title XI, add the following:

SEC. 1106. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY ON FEATURES OF
SUCCESSFUL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OF
HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC WORKFORCES.

(a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall conduct a study to identify the features of
successful personnel management systems of the highly
technical and scientific workforces of the Department of
Defense laboratories and similar scientific facilities and
institutions.
(b) Elements.--The study required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An examination of the flexible personnel management
authorities, whether under statute or regulations, currently
being utilized at Department of Defense demonstration
laboratories to assist in the management of the workforce of
such laboratories.
(2) An identification of any flexible personnel management
authorities, whether under statute or regulations, available
for use in the management of Department of Defense
laboratories to assist in the management of the workforces of
such laboratories that are not currently being utilized.
(3) An assessment of personnel management practices
utilized by scientific and technical laboratories and
institutions that are similar to the Department of Defense
laboratories.
(4) A comparative analysis of the specific features
identified by the Comptroller General in successful personnel
management systems of highly technical and scientific
workforces to attract and retain critical employees and to
provide local management authority to Department of Defense
laboratory officials.
(c) Purposes.--The purposes of the study shall include--
(1) the identification of the specific features of
successful personnel management systems of highly technical
and scientific workforces;
(2) an assessment of the potential effects of the
utilization of such features by Department of Defense
laboratories on the missions of such laboratories and on the
mission of the Department of Defense as a whole; and
(3) recommendations as to the future utilization of such
features in Department of Defense laboratories.
(d) Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Authorities.--The
laboratory personnel demonstration authorities set forth in
this subsection are as follows:
(1) The authorities in section 342(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law
103-337; 108 Stat. 2721), as amended by section 1114 of the
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398 (114
Stat. 1654A-315)).
(2) The authorities in section 1101 of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note).
(e) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
study required by this section. The report shall include--
(1) a description of the study;
(2) an assessment of the effectiveness of the current
utilization by the Department of Defense of the laboratory
personnel demonstration authorities set forth in subsection
(d); and
(3) such recommendations as the Comptroller General
considers appropriate for the effective use of available
personnel management authorities to ensure the successful
personnel management of the highly technical and scientific
workforce of the Department of Defense laboratories.
(f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(2) the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and
Government Reform of the House of Representatives.

AMENDMENT NO. 1432

(Purpose: To extend the effective date of the Higher Education Relief
Opportunities for Students Act of 2003)

At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

SEC. 653. EXTENSION OF EFFECTIVE DATE.

Section 6 of the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for
Students Act of 2003 (20 U.S.C. 1070 note) is amended by
striking ``September 30, 2005'' and inserting ``September 30
2007''.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, subject to anything my distinguished
colleague would want to do, I would like to have the Senate go into
morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we are ready to proceed on a number of
amendments, but we are going to withhold those as an accommodation to,
I gather, a lot of folks here who want to go out right now. We will
then offer the amendment on the Berlin cafe which has not yet been
cleared. We will hold that off until Monday. And remarks on RNEP I will
withhold until Monday. The national missile defense we also will
withhold until Monday, if that is the desire of the chairman.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my ranking member for his usual
courtesy and our ability to work out matters to accommodate both sides
of the aisle.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if I could inquire, while we are waiting, I will
also withhold an amendment which is ready to go which I don't know if
it has been cleared or not on the time and material contract abuses. I
will withhold that until Monday. If we have a moment, if we could ask a
parliamentary inquiry, how many amendments now have been laid aside and
are pending for either vote by rollcall or voice vote or acceptance?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen first-degree amendments and one
second-degree amendment have been laid aside.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is a matter that must come before
the Senate.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on
Tuesday, July 26, when the Senate resumes the Defense authorization
bill, and notwithstanding the provisions of rule XXII, there then be 20
minutes of debate divided between Senators Collins and Lautenberg;
provided further that following the use or yielding back of the time,
the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Collins amendment No.
1377, to be modified to be a first-degree amendment, to be followed by
a vote in relation to the Lautenberg amendment; provided further that
no second degrees be in order to the above amendments prior to the
vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S8740]]

Cloture Motion

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

Cloture Motion

We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on S. 1042, an
original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2006 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
Bill Frist, John Warner, Michael Enzi, John Cornyn, Jon
Kyl, Richard Burr, Kit Bond, Lindsey Graham, John E.
Sununu, Chuck Grassley, Mike DeWine, Lamar Alexander,
James Talent, Pat Roberts, Johnny Isakson, Conrad
Burns, Richard G. Lugar.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the live
quorum under rule XXII be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCONNELL. For the information of our colleagues, this vote will
occur on Tuesday.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be able to join with
my colleagues, Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa, and Senators Boxer and
Harkin in support of an amendment to the FY06 National Defense
Authorization Act that would transfer one of our Nation's greatest
battleships, the USS Iowa to the State of California for permanent
donation status.
I understand the affection that many Iowans have for this important
ship and that a model of the USS Iowa can be viewed in the Rotunda of
the Iowa State Capitol. Therefore, I truly appreciate the support of
Senators Grassley and Harkin for helping to ensure that the USS Iowa
will have a permanent home in California.
I was privileged to have the opportunity to introduce legislation in
1998 and 1999 to assist in transporting the USS Iowa from Newport, RI,
to Suisun Bay in San Francisco, where it now sits as part of the Navy's
Reserve Fleet. Through its transfer from reserve to donation status,
any port community in California will have the opportunity to
competitively bid for the battleship.
While I am sure a number of communities in California will be
interested, I understand that the Port of Stockton has already begun
making preparations and raising money to bid on this project.
Having the USS Iowa as a permanent floating museum in California will
be an honor for my State and a tremendous memorial to the thousands of
sailors who served aboard this battleship over the past 6 decades.
The USS Iowa, nicknamed the ``big stick,'' was first launched in
August 1942 and commissioned in February 1943 under the command of
Capt. John L. McCrea. In August 1943 it was mobilized for the first
time along the Atlantic coast to protect against the threat of German
battleships believed to be operating in Norwegian waters.
In one of the more memorable moments of the battleship's history, the
USS Iowa carried President. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Casablanca on his
way to the Teheran Conference in November 1943, and afterwards provided
the President transportation back to the United States. The USS Iowa
engaged in combat for the first time after it was deployed to the
Pacific theater as the flagship of Battleship Division 7.
During the early months of 1943, as part of the battle for the
Marshall Islands, the USS Iowa supported U.S. aircraft carrier strikes
and helped support numerous air strikes near Micronesia and neighboring
islands. It was next deployed to assist U.S. forces in combat in the
South Pacific near New Guinea and joined the Marianas campaign in June
1943.
During the Battle of the Philippines, the Iowa ably drove back and
neutralized a series of air raids attempted by the Japanese middle
fleet. Throughout the winter of 1944, the USS Iowa continued to engage
in action off the Philippine coast until it was directed to return to
the U.S. for maintenance in January 1945.
From January 1945 through March 1945, the Battleship Iowa received a
full overhaul in the Port of San Francisco before steaming off for
Okinawa to take part in combat operations near Japan. Arriving in
April, the Iowa supported U.S. air strikes against Japan and the
surrounding islands until the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

The ship was honored to be one of the few American battleships to
sail into Tokyo Bay with the occupation forces and take part in the
surrender ceremonies. After returning to the West Coast following the
war, the USS Iowa operated in reserve status until it was
decommissioned for the first time in March 1949.
In August 1951, after hostilities broke out in Korea, the USS Iowa
was recommissioned and mobilized to that region. In March 1952, the
battleship was deployed to the war zone as the flagship of VADM Robert
Briscoe, the Commander of the 7th Fleet. For the next 7 months, the
Iowa was fully engaged in support of the U.N. troops, bombarding
strategic targets throughout North Korea.
Following the cessation of combat, the USS Iowa was sent to Norfolk,
VA, to receive an overhaul in October 1952. For the next 5 years, the
Iowa was engaged in training maneuvers in Northern Europe, including
NATO exercises, and in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1958, it was
decommissioned for the second time and made part of the Atlantic
Reserve Fleet based at Philadelphia.
Despite being decommissioned twice, the USS Iowa was renovated and
upgraded in April 1984, and was recommissioned for the third time as
part of President Reagan's plan to expand the Navy to 600 ships.
Throughout the 1980s, the battleship spent the majority of its
deployment in the waters off the European coast while also taking tours
of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.
Despite surviving two wars and numerous combat engagements over its
long history, the USS Iowa suffered its worst catastrophe in April 1989
when one of its 16-inch gun turrets blew up, causing the death of 47
sailors. The source of the explosion was never conclusively identified,
in spite of a thorough investigation of the incident by the Navy. Even
with its damaged turret, the Iowa went on to further assignments in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea until it was decommissioned for the
final time at Norfolk, VA, on October 26, 1990.
In early 1998, I was contacted by city officials in San Francisco
requesting help with bringing the USS Iowa out to the west coast.
Together with Senator Boxer, we introduced legislation in October 1998,
as part of the FY99 Defense Authorization Act, to provide for the
transfer of the USS Iowa to San Francisco.
The next year I worked with colleagues in the California
congressional delegation to secure $3 million to pay for the transport
of the battleship from Rhode Island to California. On April 20, 2001,
the USS Iowa finally arrived in San Francisco and has been berthed at
Suisun Bay since that time.
This amendment ensures that this amazing battleship, which earned
nine battle stars for its World War II service and two battle stars in
the Korean war, will be memorialized permanently as a floating museum
in California.
Once again, I thank Senators Grassley, Boxer, and Harkin for their
support on this important provision.
I ask unanimous consent that this statement be placed in the Record
next to the relevant amendment.

____________________