[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 101 (Friday, July 22, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8717-S8740]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1042, which the clerk will 
report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1042) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2006 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.
  Pending:

       Frist amendment No. 1342, to support certain youth 
     organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America and Girl 
     Scouts of America.
       Inhofe amendment No. 1311, to protect the economic and 
     energy security of the United States.
       Inhofe/Collins amendment No. 1312, to express the sense of 
     Congress that the President should take immediate steps to 
     establish a plan to implement the recommendations of the 2004 
     Report to Congress of the United States-China Economic and 
     Security Review Commission.
       Inhofe/Kyl amendment No. 1313, to require an annual report 
     on the use of United States funds with respect to the 
     activities and management of the International Committee of 
     the Red Cross.
       Lautenberg amendment No. 1351, to stop corporations from 
     financing terrorism.
       Ensign amendment No. 1374, to require a report on the use 
     of riot control agents.
       Ensign amendment No. 1375, to require a report on the costs 
     incurred by the Department of Defense in implementing or 
     supporting resolutions of the United Nations Security 
     Council.
       Collins amendment No. 1377 (to Amendment No. 1351), to 
     ensure that certain persons do not evade or avoid the 
     prohibition imposed under the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act.
       Durbin amendment No. 1379, to require certain dietary 
     supplement manufacturers to report certain serious adverse 
     events.
       Hutchison/Nelson (FL) amendment No. 1357, to express the 
     sense of the Senate with regard to manned space flight.
       Thune amendment No. 1389, to postpone the 2005 round of 
     defense base closure and realignment.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia.

[[Page S8718]]

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I was present last night. We had a 
colloquy among ourselves not unlike what took place today. The 
Republican leader, Senator Frist, entrusted me with the management of 
this bill. It was my decision with regard to the votes. It was my 
decision that we file a cloture motion. I accept full responsibility 
for those decisions. I am proud of the way we operate on this side, 
where our leadership reposes in their managers those responsibilities; 
I accept them. If, in due course, it proves to be in error, I accept 
that responsibility. But I do believe, based on some 27 years of 
experience managing this bill, that we can achieve the opportunity for 
all Senators to have their amendments heard and voted upon in a timely 
manner.
  The matter of cloture, as it ripens on Tuesday, can be addressed by 
the leadership, in consultation with the managers, and a determination 
made as to whether it should or should not be invoked. I think that 
decision, in large measure, would be dependent on what we can achieve 
between now and Tuesday.
  I look upon this in a very positive way. I have confidence in this 
institution, confidence in the managers of this bill to see that it is 
done in a fair and proper manner and done in the best interests 
certainly of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield. For about 1 minute, I 
will go back to the history, and I will not go through it all. Last 
year, we spent 7 days on this bill. The 1st filing of cloture was on 
the 11th day of debate, after considering 42 amendments. The 2nd filing 
of cloture was on the 15th day of debate. I think it is totally 
inappropriate to file cloture today.
  I have no better friend in this body than the Senator from Virginia. 
I was glad to hear what he basically just said, which is that he is 
going to take a close look at where we are before this vote takes 
place. He has always been openminded. I hope he will reconsider this 
cloture motion. We are going to make progress today, even though there 
are no votes.
  It is difficult for Senators. Senator Kennedy is going to be offering 
a very important amendment in a few moments, but the vote on that is 
not going to take place until probably after the cloture because we 
have so many amendments that are stacked up here. He deserves better 
and, more importantly, the subject matter of the amendment deserves 
better than to be debated on a Friday and then laid aside and not voted 
on until many days later. Traditionally, we try to vote on amendments 
after they are debated--shortly after, not days and days after they are 
debated.
  We are going to accommodate the demands of the schedule by trying to 
offer a lot of amendments today and on Monday in order to see if we can 
show enough progress here so that the motion for cloture will be 
vitiated. That is our hope. I hope the Senator from Virginia will do 
what he always does so magnificently, which is maintain an open mind, 
keep options open, and see what kind of progress can be made to avoid a 
divisive vote. It is inappropriate to have a cloture vote this soon 
after the debate begins.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, just to finish, I have a practice of not 
bringing up personal situations, and I am still going to refrain. If 
continued to be pushed on this issue, I will recount several things 
that occurred yesterday where I tried to accommodate interests on that 
side of the aisle, and when it is said that not a Democratic vote was 
taken, I know of one vote where I pleaded that it be made, found the 
time, but the sponsors decided--and it was a joint amendment with a 
Republican and a Democrat--not to do that.
  I am not going to get involved in personal situations, but there is a 
limit to the patience of the Senator from Virginia. On this matter by 
Mr. Kennedy, I respect my good friend. Our friendship goes back as long 
as any two Members in this Chamber. This amendment is an important 
amendment, there is no question about it. But I ask the Senator from 
Michigan, was not the same amendment voted on by the Senate 3 weeks 
ago?
  Mr. LEVIN. We will have to wait and see the precise nature of the 
amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. It is very similar, if not identical.
  Mr. LEVIN. I commend my friend from Virginia for his temperament, his 
ability to withhold any suggestion of personal comment. He is to be 
commended. He is literally a role model for that. The Senator from 
Virginia is correct. He showed great care for the Members of this body 
yesterday, gave great consideration to the Members, and I commend him 
for that.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts is 
recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1415

  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I join the ranking member of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Levin, in paying tribute to the Armed 
Services Committee. I have been lucky enough to be on that committee 
now for 24 years. I must say that all of us have the highest regard and 
respect for the Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the committee. 
There has never been a time that he has not been courteous and diligent 
and thoughtful and considerate for those who have differing views that 
come up before the committee.
  I understand the remarks by the Senator from Michigan and also our 
leader, Senator Reid; and although our friend takes the responsibility, 
we have been around here long enough to know that the overall schedule 
and timetable is made by the majority leader, with all due respect. He 
has the responsibility, obviously, for the Senate and the Senate 
agenda.
  The part which is of concern is this, and I will mention this 
briefly. When we have cloture, we find out that many amendments that 
are related and are enormously important in terms of the subject 
matter, which is the Defense authorization bill, are effectively 
eliminated.
  I took a quick look at some of the amendments that have been filed to 
date. We have a Stabenow amendment to fully fund health care for 
veterans. Nobody could watch the news last night and not understand the 
challenge our veterans are having in getting coverage and being treated 
well. That is true in my State, and the Nation was alerted again. We 
have had some debate on that issue. It is an issue of enormous 
importance. We make a commitment to those young men and women who 
volunteer and fight in our wars that they are going to have their needs 
attended to when they come back. They are not being attended to.

  The Senator from Michigan, Ms. Stabenow, has an amendment that 
probably would not be eligible after cloture. It is on pay equity for 
reservists who are being deployed. We have so many being deployed over 
in Iraq, and it is an important amendment to make sure they are to be 
compensated. It is very important in terms of morale and, most of all, 
in terms of fairness for the reservists.
  Then there is reform of the Pentagon procurement, with all of the 
kinds of challenges we have seen on the purchasing of the humvee. We 
reviewed that last night once again. An article that was written in the 
New York Times and the purchase conflict between the services, the lack 
of priority that was given really as a result of a failure of our 
procurement policies, we can do something about that, but we are not 
going to do something about it if we have cloture. Then there is the 
limitation of profits on defense contractors. We don't have to take a 
lot of time on that issue, but I think the American taxpayer, when they 
see hundreds of millions in windfall profits going to so many defense 
contractors, would have to say that spending a few moments on that to 
make sure, for example, the allegations that our troops are going to 
get the food they deserve and need on time and not be given second-
level food is something that ought to be debated.
  My amendment with Senator Feinstein and Senator Kerry on bunker 
busters relates to the whole issue of nuclear proliferation and 
stability. We probably would not be eligible to bring that up. There 
have been important issues on funding for the cooperative threat 
reduction, which is so important in terms of the nuclear proliferation, 
with the very important and impressive study released this last week.

[[Page S8719]]

  Those give you a little bit of a flavor, and they are related to 
national security and defense. We are told we don't have time for that. 
I have been here when we spent 2 full weeks debating bankruptcy and for 
the credit card companies. The result of the bankruptcy bill we passed 
here means the profits for the credit card companies are going up $5.6 
billion this next year. We spent 2 weeks on that issue that will 
benefit special interests. We spent more than a week on class action, 
which will benefit very special interests. We spent more than a week on 
highways. If you can spend more than a week on highways and you can 
look after the credit card companies and you can look after the major 
financial interests in class action, surely we can debate these issues 
that are related to the security and well-being of the troops of this 
country.
  That is the point. I believe it is irrefutable myself. We were told 
last night, well, we had heard that Senator Levin, Senator Reid, and 
others might propose a commission to look into the whole question of 
the torture policies that have taken place at Abu Ghraib. We had 12 
different studies done by the Armed Services Committee, and we still 
don't have anybody in the civilian areas that has been held 
accountable, even though they were the architects of the torture 
policy. This has given us a black eye all over the world. It has been 
an incentive, and it is inflaming al-Qaida. It has been a recruiting 
tool used in order to gather more recruits for al-Qaida.
  It had been suggested that we have an independent commission review 
that. And then guess what happened. Within a matter of hours, the White 
House says, If that amendment is accepted, I will veto the bill that is 
developing with Defense authorization. Imagine that. The President will 
veto the bill if that amendment is accepted. He will veto the bill that 
provides the resources for our fighting men and women if we are going 
to have an independent kind of review about how we got into all of this 
trouble in terms of torture and inflaming al-Qaida because of those 
activities. They are going to veto the bill. Therefore, we are going to 
have cloture.
  We don't have to be around here for a number of years to understand 
what is happening. That is just plain wrong, Mr. President. It is just 
plain wrong. It is not the way this body ought to be doing business. 
These issues are too important. People are ready to debate them.
  We had the amendment that I have here, which is very similar to the 
amendment Senator Feinstein and I offered earlier on another 
appropriations bill. It is a matter of enormous importance in terms of 
the issue of nuclear proliferation.
  There is an excellent study this last week about the worst weapons in 
the worst hands. The National Security Advisory Group is chaired by 
Willian Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and is made up of an 
extraordinary group of men and women who have spent their lives in 
terms of national security and defense and talking about the dangers of 
increased nuclear weapons. Well, we have now in this bill the design 
for new nuclear weapons. They will say: No, we don't, it is only $4.5 
million. Look at the Department of Energy's congressional budget, right 
here on page 63, where cumulatively they are planning to spend a half 
billion dollars on it. New nuclear weapon? We are looking at a new 
nuclear weapon in the Defense authorization bill.

  Look at the front page here of the New York Times, right up on the 
top: ``New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways.'' What is the 
greatest threat to our homeland security, a new nuclear weapon or--here 
it is--``New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways.'' The second 
story: Bombs set in London at four sites, failed to explode, no one 
hurt. And we are going out and building another nuclear weapon.
  We welcome the opportunity to address the Senate now on Friday, but 
this is a matter of enormous importance and consequence. We are told 
these issues are not as important as freeing the gun industry from 
liability, a special interest. So we have an NRA check. I know where 
the votes are on that. We are going to get another special interest 
check. We have a special interest check for credit cards, a special 
interest check because of class actions, and we are going to get 
another one now from the NRA.
  We are not going to have the chance for these Senators to be able to 
debate pay equity for the reserves? Health care for veterans? No. We 
don't have the time. What is more important to us? I have plans at the 
end of next week along with everybody else, but what is more important 
than continuing and finishing this legislation? That is what we are 
supposed to do as Senators.
  Mr. President, when you look over where we spend the time and how we 
have spent the time, surely these issues that are of such fundamental 
importance to our national security and to the security of the American 
people deserve the kind of time our leader and Senator Levin have 
suggested.
  For the past 60 years, one of the principal tenets of the American 
national security policy has been to limit the number of nuclear 
weapons in the world and to limit the number of countries that possess 
them.
  In 1962, President Kennedy warned that if action weren't taken at 
that time, there would be 20 nuclear weapon nations by the end of the 
1970s. That is what he said in 1962. Because of initiatives he and 
successive Presidents--Republican and Democrat--took to prevent that, 
today there are only eight nuclear armed states.
  Through careful negotiations, we arrived at the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the foundation of all current global nuclear arms 
control. The nonproliferation treaty, signed in 1968, has long stood 
for the fundamental principle that the world will be safer if nuclear 
proliferation doesn't extend to other countries.
  I send to the desk an amendment on behalf of myself, the Senator from 
California, Mrs. Feinstein, and my colleague and friend, the Senator 
from Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the pending 
amendment is set aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy], for himself, 
     Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Bingaman, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 1415.

  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To transfer funds authorized to be appropriated to the 
 Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration 
   for weapons activities and available for the Robust Nuclear Earth 
    Penetrator to the Army National Guard, Washington, District of 
                           Columbia, chapter)

       On page 378, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

     SEC. 3114. TRANSFER OF FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR ROBUST NUCLEAR 
                   EARTH PENETRATOR TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF 
                   THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

       (a) Reduction in Funds Available for Robust Nuclear Earth 
     Penetrator.--The amount authorized to be appropriated to the 
     Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration for weapons activities by section 3101(a)(1) 
     is hereby reduced by $4,000,000, which reduction shall be 
     allocated to amounts available for the Robust Nuclear Earth 
     Penetrator.
       (b) Increase in Funds Available to Army National Guard, 
     Washington, District of Columbia, Chapter.--The amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by section 301(10) for 
     operation and maintenance for the Army National Guard is 
     hereby increased by $4,000,000, with the amount of such 
     increase to be available for the Army National Guard of the 
     District of Columbia, as follows:
       (1) $2,500,000 shall be made available for urban terrorist 
     attack response training.
       (2) $1,500,000 shall be made available for the procurement 
     of communications equipment.

  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, in that compact of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the foundation of all global nuclear arms 
control, 184 nations have voluntarily rejected nuclear weapons. These 
include 40 states, such as Japan, Germany, Sweden, and Singapore, that 
have the technical infrastructure to build nuclear arsenals if they 
chose to do so.
  In addition, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa, Argentina, 
Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and others have turned away from nuclear 
weapons because of the NPT and our leadership.

[[Page S8720]]

  America led the way to a safer world by example. By adhering to these 
carefully crafted agreements, we were able to discourage the spread of 
dangerous nuclear weapons that would threaten our security.
  However, the Bush administration has abandoned that course. Not only 
has this White House expressed disdain for decades of nuclear arms 
control, but it now threatens to launch a new nuclear arms race. As we 
are discouraging North Korea and Iran from producing nuclear arms--and 
as we are trying to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 
terrorists--the Bush administration recklessly proposes for the United 
States to produce a new breed of nuclear weapon. President Bush and 
Secretary Rumsfeld want to develop a new tactical nuclear weapon that 
can burrow deep into the earth and destroy bunkers and weapon caches. 
The new weapon they propose has the chilling title of robust nuclear 
earth penetrator. They hold the dangerous and misguided belief that our 
Nation's interests are served by developing what they consider a more 
easily usable nuclear bomb--more easily usable nuclear bomb. That is 
just what we need more of today.
  Most Americans believe that is wrong. Therefore, the amendment that 
Senator Feinstein and I offer today will halt this dangerous new policy 
and redirect the $4 million in funds from the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator research program to the National Guard for the more urgent 
task of preventing another terrorist attack on our Nation's capital.
  This action is especially warranted in light of the bombings in the 
London subway. Instead of developing new nukes, we should address the 
real-world challenges of terrorism that we face right here, right now.
  In the end, the administration would like us to buy something we 
don't need, that endangers us by its mere existence, and that makes our 
important diplomatic goals much more difficult to achieve.
  Our challenge in addressing nuclear nonproliferation issues is not 
that there are too few nuclear weapons in the world, but that there are 
too many; not that they are too difficult to use but too easy.
  North Korea has recently acquired nuclear weapons and does not 
hesitate to rattle them. Iran is widely thought to be moving forward on 
the development of nuclear weapons capability. The increased 
availability of nuclear technology to other nations is an ominous 
development, especially when it is difficult to accept at face value 
their statements that the technology is intended only for peaceful 
purposes.
  What moral authority do we have to ask other nations to give up their 
desire for nuclear weapons of their own when we are developing a new 
generation of such weapons of our own? How can we tell other nations 
not to sell their nuclear technology to others when we are exporting 
our own technology?
  For the past 2 years, Congress has raised major doubts about the 
bunker-buster program and significantly cut back on its funding. But 
the administration still presses forward for their development. For 
fiscal year 2004, they requested $15 million for it, and Congress 
reluctantly provided half that amount. For 2005, they requested another 
$27 million and submitted a 5-year request for nearly $500 million, and 
Congress denied their request.
  This year, nothing has changed. The fiscal year 2006 budget request 
from the President includes $4 million for the Department of Energy to 
study the bunker buster, and $4.5 million for the Department of Defense 
for the same purpose. Thankfully, our colleagues in the House were 
wiser and eliminated the funds.
  The administration obviously is still committed to this reckless 
approach. Secretary Rumsfeld made his position clear in January, when 
he wrote to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham:

       I think we should request funds in 06 and 07 to complete 
     the study . . . You can count on my support for your efforts 
     to revitalize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and to 
     complete the RNEP study.

  The fiscal year 2006 budget requests funds only to complete the 
feasibility study for these nuclear weapons, but we already know what 
the next step is. In the budget sent to us last year, the 
administration stated in plain language that they intend to develop it. 
Ambassador Linton Brooks, the head of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, claims the future budget projection was merely a 
placeholder ``in the event the President decides to proceed with the 
development and Congress approves.'' But their fiscal year 2005 budget 
clearly shows the administration's unmistakable intention to develop 
and ultimately produce this weapon.
  They would like us to believe this is a clean, surgical nuclear 
weapon. They say it will burrow into underground targets, destroy them 
with no adverse consequence for the environment. But science says such 
claims are false.
  A National Academy of Sciences April 2005 study confirms exactly what 
most of us thought: that these nuclear weapons, like other nuclear 
bombs, result in catastrophic nuclear fallout. They can poison tens of 
millions of people and create radioactive lands for many years to come.
  The study goes on to say:

       Current experience and empirical predictions indicate that 
     the earth-penetrator weapons cannot penetrate to depths 
     required for total containment of the effects of a nuclear 
     explosion. To be fully contained, a 300 kiloton weapon would 
     have to be detonated at the bottom of a carefully stemmed 
     emplacement hole about 800 meters deep. Because the practical 
     penetrating depth of an earth penetrating weapon is only a 
     few meters--a small fraction of the depth for the full 
     containment--there will be blast, thermal, initial nuclear 
     radiation, and fallout effects--

  From the use of the weapon.
  Even if we were willing to accept the catastrophic damage a nuclear 
explosion would cause, the bunker buster would still not be able to 
destroy all the buried bunkers the intelligence community has 
identified.
  This chart, based on the data from the National Academy of Sciences, 
depicts the simulated maximum effect of a 1-megaton earth-penetrating 
weapon. This massively destructive weapon cannot reach more than 400 
meters. All an adversary has to do is bury its bunker below that depth.
  Bunker busters also require pinpoint accuracy to hit deeply buried 
bunkers. But such accuracy requires precise intelligence about the 
location of the target. As the study emphasized, an attack by a nuclear 
weapon can be effective in destroying weapons or weapons materials, 
including nuclear materials and chemical or biological agents, but only 
if it is detonated in the actual chamber where the weapons or materials 
are located. Even more disturbing, if the bomb is only slightly off 
target, the detonation may cause the spread of deadly chemical and 
germs, in addition to the radioactive fallout.
  If it were clear that this weapon were needed to protect our troops, 
then Congress would probably support it. But that is not the case. At 
the House Armed Services Committee hearing in March, program chief 
Linton Brooks once again was asked if there was a military requirement 
for the bunker buster, and he categorically said:

       No, there is not.

  This chart shows how important it is that the bunker buster be 
precise, in terms of targeting, or otherwise it is not going to destroy 
the target, and the dangers of chemical and nuclear material 
proliferation are dramatic.
  Our military has no need for a nuclear bunker buster. Existing 
conventional weapons have the ability to neutralize this threat. These 
charts from the National Academy of Sciences show the types of deeply 
buried, hardened bunkers the nuclear bunker buster is intended to 
destroy. All bunkers must have air intakes, energy sources, and 
entrances. If we can destroy them by conventional means, we have 
accomplished our purpose.
  The administration's effort to build a new class of nuclear weapon is 
only further evidence of their reckless nuclear policy.
  We have studied this issue long enough. It is ridiculous for the 
administration to try to keep this program going, and it could be 
suicidal for the Nation and for our troops. While the administration 
studies a weapon that will never work and may never be used, it has 
taken its eye off the true danger: terrorists with weapons of mass 
destruction here at home in our subways and our train stations.
  Protecting our Nation should be the administration's No. 1 priority 
and, sadly, they have not learned that lesson from 9/11. The alarm bell 
that went

[[Page S8721]]

off on September 11, 2001, is still ringing loudly. It rang in London 
earlier this month and again yesterday. It rang in Madrid last year. 
And it has been ringing in Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, and 
elsewhere around the world in the nearly 4 years since the tragedy of 
9/11.
  In our Nation's Capital, the alarm bell continues to sound, but the 
administration has been inexcusably slow in heeding its warning.
  Our amendment will better protect our Nation's Capital from a 
terrorist attack. It provides urgently needed funds to the Washington, 
DC, National Guard to make up for the shortfalls they face in equipment 
and training.
  U.S. officials plainly state that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups 
are determined to strike the United States again. And we all know that 
our Nation's Capital is a prime target.
  On July 10, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that 
``the desire and the capability'' are there for another terrorist 
attack in America.
  The former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, ADM James Loy, told 
the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 16:

       We believe that attacking the homeland remains at the top 
     of al-Qaida's operational priority list . . . We believe that 
     their intent remains strong for attempting another major 
     operation here.

  He says:

       The probability of an attack is assessed to be high. . . .

  FBI Director Robert Mueller told the Intelligence Committee on 
February 16:

       The threat posed by international terrorism, and in 
     particular from al-Qaida and related groups, continues to be 
     the gravest we face . . .

  Despite these serious and terrifying threats, the DC National Guard, 
which provides an indispensable role in responding to terrorist 
attacks, has long received inadequate funding.
  In a terrorist attack, the DC National Guard will be mobilized to 
assist in evacuation efforts, provide security at the attack site, and 
assist in mass casualty care. Mayor Williams and the city council 
realize the vulnerability to such attacks and the potentially 
catastrophic consequences if terrorists attack a train carrying 
hazardous material.
  According to a RAND analysis on terrorism and railroad security, 40 
percent of freight being carried from city to city across the country, 
including half of the Nation's hazardous material, is moved by rail. In 
2003 alone, 11,000 railroad cars containing hazardous material passed 
through Washington, DC.
  We believe the administration's position in supporting the 
development of a new nuclear weapon system is misguided. It is not 
based on sound science. And there is a recognition that they do not 
have their priorities straight. We have learned the lesson of this past 
week, that what we have to do is expand our attention in terms of the 
homeland security issue. That has to be our focus, and we learned that 
again this morning in London.
  Why the administration insists that they think our national security 
is going to be enhanced and expanded by building a new system makes no 
sense at all.
  A final point. There are those who will say this is just a study; we 
ought to be able to study; we ought to be able to study what progress 
can be developed in terms of the shape of our warheads and the building 
materials that are necessary to make it more effective; we live in a 
dangerous world. All of which is true, we ought to be able to have a 
study, but that is not what this is about.
  As I have mentioned, the opposition, by and large, will say this is 
just a study. Then we will have to come back to Congress and get the 
approval.
  See what the intention of this administration is. ``Department of 
Energy, 2005 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security 
Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities.'' Open 
this to page 63. There it is.
  They talk about what is going to be the request over the period of 
these next 5 years, and it is $484 million. That is not a study. That 
is the development of a weapons system. Those resources could be more 
effectively used providing security at home, working through homeland 
security, than developing a new weapons system which will make it more 
complicated and more difficult for the United States to be the leader 
in the world, which we have been under Republican and Democratic 
Presidents since 1962, in reducing the number of countries that have 
dangerous nuclear weapons. We should stay the course. That has been a 
wise judgment and decision by Republican and Democratic Presidents. We 
should not be about the business of developing new nuclear weapons, 
which is going to upset that whole movement and make this country less 
secure.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to pick up on my 
distinguished colleague's last point with regard to the projected 
budget cycle as it relates to this program. In fairness, the 
distinguished Senator from Massachusetts should point out that while 
that document outlines a proposal for a program, Congress carefully has 
enacted the checks and balances such that every step of the way that 
program has to be reviewed by the Congress, authorized, and 
appropriated. Those are the types of checks and balances that should be 
accorded a program of this significance.
  I point out, and I read from the conference report on the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, the requirement for 
specific authorization of Congress for commencement of engineering 
development phase and subsequent phase of the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator, section 3117 of the law, the Senate amendment contained in 
provision 3135 that would require the Secretary of Energy to obtain 
specific authorization from Congress to commence development 
engineering phase of the nuclear weapons development process or any 
subsequent phase of a robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon.
  So I assure my colleagues, I assure the American public, Congress is 
carefully monitoring each step of this proposed program.
  My good friend from Massachusetts pointed out about the military 
requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in appearing 
before Congress, established the military requirement. Senators on the 
other side of this debate have argued there is no military requirement, 
as did my good friend and colleague from Massachusetts. Congress should 
not be funding, he has argued. This is a case of getting so involved in 
technology that we lose sight of the purpose behind the words.
  I think it is extremely important that the record of this debate 
reflect the following: In an appearance before the House Armed Services 
Committee in February of this calendar year, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, addressed the following question:

       Is there a military requirement for RNEP?

  General Myers answered the question as follows:

       Our combatant commander that is charged by this nation to 
     worry about countering the kind of targets, deeply buried 
     targets, certainly thinks there's a need for this study. And 
     General Cartwright has said such. I think that. I think the 
     Joint Chiefs think that. And so, the study is just that. It's 
     not a commitment to go forward with a system; it's just to 
     see if it's feasible.

  It is just to see whether the technology of the United States can 
take an existing warhead. There was some inference that we are 
increasing the stockpile. It is very important to recognize we are 
simply performing tests and evaluation on existing warheads to 
determine whether they can be reconfigured to achieve the mission of 
penetrating the earth to certain depths, depending on the consistency 
of the soil and the above earth, and render less effective, if not 
destroy, a potential situation beneath the earth, which definitely 
challenges the security of this Nation and the world. It is as simple 
as that.
  So this whole debate is about whether a modest sum of money can be 
continued to be applied to a program to determine a feasibility study. 
Depending on the outcome, the Congress comes back in and then 
establishes whether the facts justify, as well as the threat situation, 
as well as the military needs, the next step of a program that would 
take some several years to evolve and produce a weapon.
  General Myers continued:

       So we can argue over the definition of a ``military 
     requirement'' and when a ``military requirement'' is 
     established. We can

[[Page S8722]]

     argue over when in the study of a concept--which is what we 
     are talking about here--when should the requirement be 
     established.
       We can argue over definitions or we can listen to the 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commander of Strategic 
     Command, who advise the Congress that it is in the interest 
     of the United States to complete the feasibility study.

  Somewhat regrettably, over the past 24 hours we have had a lot of 
back and forth about time consumed on this, that and one of the other 
things. I tend to be very indulging in the fact that the Senate is an 
unusual body and there is the right to discuss whatever a Senator 
wishes. But just 3 weeks ago we had this exact amendment before this 
body, except for one change. Senator Feinstein had put the funds which 
would be resulting from a cancellation towards the public debt, a 
laudable purpose. It has nothing to do with the military requirements, 
nothing to do with anything about the weapon. Senator Kennedy made one 
small change: Let us take it from the public debt and give it to the DC 
National Guard.
  Well, I can understand how the DC National Guard is brought into a 
clear focus in its responsibilities given the worldwide events of 
recent times. I am not unmindful of those situations. But if there is a 
need for funding for the D.C. National Guard, let it be brought forth 
independently. It should not be a predicate or a basis for making a 
major decision as to whether to go forward on this important research 
program and study.

  So I say to my colleagues, if there is a problem with the D.C. 
National Guard, bring it to the attention of the managers. We will be 
on this bill for a few days. We have time. We will take a look at it.
  I am mindful of what occurred here last night and what occurred here 
again this morning about how we are just grinding our wheels and not 
being productive. This same identical amendment was rejected by the 
Senate 3 weeks ago in a vote.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Kennedy amendment 
dealing with the robust nuclear earth penetrator, or RNEP. This issue 
has been discussed and debated at length many times. In fact, my 
impression was that we had come at least legislatively to a conclusion. 
The conclusion was that this was not a weapons system that would 
materially aid our ability to advance national security purposes of the 
United States.
  In the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Department of Energy 
sought $15 million to fund the first year of what was to be a 3-year, 
$45 million study to determine the feasibility of using one of two 
existing large nuclear weapons as a robust nuclear earth penetrator.
  They couched it in terms of a study. There is some discussion about 
requirements and studies. My impression is that a requirement is a 
formal decision made by the Department of Defense through elaborate 
procedures. With respect to the particular nuclear penetrator to attack 
deeply buried targets, I do not believe there is a formal requirement. 
There is a general requirement to hold at risk hard, deeply buried 
targets, but there are many different variations that could be applied 
to that, and I do not believe the Department of Defense has yet come to 
a conclusion, a requirement, that this mission can only be undertaken 
by a robust nuclear penetrator.
  Nevertheless, early on, several years ago the Department of Energy's 
budget called for studies. Congress authorized and appropriated the $15 
million for the first phase of this study by the Department of Energy, 
but DOE was not to begin this work until it submitted a report setting 
forth requirements for an RNEP and the target types that RNEP was 
designed to hold at risk. DOE proposed their response in April of 2003, 
and the funds were released to begin again this study. Once again, DOE 
insisted that this was just a study. There was no decision to begin the 
process of development and production that would lead to a weapon.
  The following fiscal year 2004, DOE again sought $15 million for the 
RNEP, but now Congress had become, I think rightfully, a little 
skeptical of the technology, of the efficacy of this proposed weapon, 
to do what it was intended to do, and as a result, only $7.5 million 
was appropriated. DOE took the reduced funding and said: Still, this is 
just a study. We just want to look at this concept. We study lots of 
concepts. We certainly cannot inhibit the intellectual inquiry when it 
comes to an issue of so much importance to our national security.
  Now, in the 2005 budget request, after 2 years of various requests, 
the true nature of the RNEP proposal is becoming much clearer. It does 
not appear today to be just a study. DOE sought $27.5 million for RNEP 
in the 2005 budget request. In addition, DOE included the RNEP in its 
5-year budget report demonstrating that the real plan was to continue 
with the RNEP project through the next 5 years through the development 
stage and just up to the point at which production would begin.
  Now it is no longer just a study. In fact, DOE is talking about 
almost $500 million over the next several years to get ready to build 
an RNEP. The cost of the feasibility study has also increased 
dramatically from the initial $45 million--$15 million a year for 3 
years--to now $145 million. If the study is increasing from $45 million 
to $145 million, if that same progression is applied to development, 
then right now we are talking about almost a billion dollars to get to 
the point of development and production for this RNEP.
  Finally, though, I think Congress had its fill with the study that 
turned out to be a stalking horse for a production program, and in the 
fiscal year 2005 budget cycle denied funding. I applaud particularly 
our colleagues in the other body who were very much involved in this 
decision on a bipartisan basis and decided that this program was not 
worth the investment; that it was not a study; that if it was a true 
study it could have been concluded and the results could have been 
provided to decisionmakers for a more thoughtful review of this aspect 
of national security.
  The administration just did not get the message. So in 2006, this 
budget request, DOE requested $4 million to start the RNEP feasibility 
study again, and $14 million will be needed in fiscal year 2007 to 
finish the study.
  It should be apparent right now, this is not about a study. This is 
about developing a weapons system to hold hard and deeply buried 
targets at risk. The National Academy of Sciences conducted their own 
study to look at the feasibility of doing this and the usefulness of 
this type of weapons system, at the request of the Armed Services 
Committee. Their study sheds a great deal of light on the practical 
implications of this weapons system.
  DOE says the RNEP project is to look at the feasibility of using a 
bomb with a small nuclear yield to target hard and deeply buried 
targets with minimal collateral damage on the surface and minimal 
fallout. That would be a very important development, if it were 
feasible. But the Academy points out in their study, and makes it 
clear, that to really hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk the 
RNEP would have to be very large and would not be contained. This is 
about physics, I think, more than it is about wishful thinking. The 
physics of the problem suggests if you really want to destroy that 
target you can't use a small nuclear charge. You would have to use a 
rather considerable one.
  Therefore, the DOE is considering modifying an existing large-yield 
nuclear weapon, the B-83, to be a nuclear penetrator. The B-83 nuclear 
bomb has a 1-megaton yield. That is explosive power equivalent to 1 
million tons of TNT, hardly a small, discrete weapon. The full megaton 
yield of the B-83 would be needed to hold at risk a target buried 900 
feet below the surface--because of engineering progress, you 
effectively can burrow that far down and put facilities or intelligence 
centers or other critical military installations at that depth. But not 
only would the fallout not be contained after the detonation of this 
large a weapon, the resulting radioactive debris that the B-83 would 
put in the atmosphere would make the fallout worse. You would be 
sending a charge down into the earth, exploding the earth, blowing it 
up into the atmosphere and spreading the fallout. There would be 
substantial casualties if it were used, and the fallout would spread 
for hundreds of miles.
  The National Academy of Sciences study makes it clear that in a 
populated area, millions of people would be killed and injured.
  Let me give sort of a rough comparison of the effects of the B-83 
system. It

[[Page S8723]]

has yields ranging up to 1 megaton; that is 1 million tons of TNT. The 
bomb we dropped on Hiroshima was 14 kilotons. It resulted in the death 
of 140,000 people. The Nagasaki bomb was 21 kilotons; 73,000 people 
died. The yield of the B-83 bomb is 71 times larger than that used at 
Hiroshima and 47 times larger than Nagasaki. That would cause 
incredible damage and casualties.
  In a practical sense, if you are striking a critical installation, 
most likely that installation is close enough to either an urban area 
or close enough to other key terrain that a military commander would 
have to think twice about dropping a nuclear bomb on such a target. The 
reality is we could not operate in that area for years, because of 
fallout, because of damage. If your goal were to ultimately destroy and 
occupy an opposing foe, why would you essentially create a situation 
where you could not even operate in the area?
  The other thing about this whole approach to the RNEP is it fails to 
recognize that we have precision conventional weapons that may not be 
able to reach down 900 feet, but certainly these weapons can be used to 
deal devastating blows to the communication networks that serve these 
facilities and to the entrances. Eventually there has to be someplace 
where you go into these tunnels. Those facilities, if they can be 
identified, can be shut off by conventional munitions. The goal is to 
neutralize the target, and that can be done, I think, more readily by 
conventional weapons, particularly conventional precision weapons. So 
the need for this system on a practical basis is not at all compelling 
to me, and I do not believe it is compelling to the more thoughtful 
people in the military, those who are thinking about these types of 
situations.
  There is another factor, too. Again, the presumption is that we are 
going to have a nuclear device that we are going to use to take out a 
deeply buried target, which could be in a circumstance where we would 
be contemplating the first use of a nuclear weapon against one of these 
targets. We have to be very sure that we have the kind of intelligence 
that will support such extraordinary use of military power. If we 
reflect back on Operation Iraqi Freedom, we thought there were nuclear 
weapons--some people did. We thought there were chemical weapons and 
thought there were biological weapons. Secretary Powell was before the 
United Nations talking about these mobile biological vans.
  The reality is our intelligence was very poor; certainly not 
sufficient, in my view, to justify the use of a nuclear weapon like 
this. So there is a further complication about ever using one of these 
weapons; and that is, would we have the intelligence to support, 
particularly, the first use of a nuclear weapon to take out a target 
like this?
  We do not need to spend $1 billion to develop to the point of 
production an RNEP. I think our colleagues in the House, on a 
bipartisan basis, figured this out last year. We should be equally 
astute and adroit. We have conventional precision weapons that can deal 
lethal blows to these types of installations. I think we should not 
contemplate using nuclear weapons, such weapons as the B-83, which 
would yield vast areas of a particular country literally uninhabitable 
for months if not years. Also, by the way--which we found from our 
adversaries, particularly from our adversaries in Iraq--they are fairly 
astute about trying to counteract our weapons with their tactics. If 
you were someone who was afraid that the United States might have such 
a weapon like an RNEP and use it against you, I think there would be a 
strong temptation to put that deeply buried target underneath a city, 
underneath a historic or religious site, so that our choices would be 
further complicated by the fact that we would be delivering a nuclear 
device in an area where there could be significant population or 
significant reasons to avoid the detonation of a nuclear bomb.
  I think this funding is not appropriate. I join Senator Kennedy in 
urging that we move to drop it. I urge my colleagues to vote for the 
Kennedy amendment, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Warner). The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his comments. We 
would disagree on this, but he is a skilled person in the defense of 
our country, and I respect his comments.
  Three weeks ago, this Senate voted 53 to 43 on this amendment. I am 
glad we are having this debate. Some have said there is not enough time 
to have a debate on these issues, to bring up and highlight points that 
the other side may want to raise. But we just voted on it 3 weeks ago. 
We voted on this twice last year. This amendment to strike this 
language was defeated; the language was kept in the bill. 
Overwhelmingly, the Senate has maintained its view that a study of this 
robust nuclear earth penetrator is valid and needed and the Defense 
Department and the Energy Department have certified to that and we 
ought to go forward with it. But it is perfectly legitimate that we 
talk about it.
  I would just say this for emphasis, to follow up on Chairman Warner's 
comments: The way this language is placed in this legislation, it 
mandates explicitly that the Department of Energy or Department of 
Defense cannot go forward to commence development engineering without 
the specific approval of Congress.
  This robust nuclear earth penetrator issue began being discussed by 
the military in 1985, and when the need was recognized, it was 
supported by the Clinton administration Defense and Energy Departments. 
Secretary O'Leary specifically supported this. There were no 
limitations of the kind I just mentioned in the language that came 
forward during the Clinton administration to decide to conduct this 
study. But now we are putting that in there to allay the concerns that 
any might have, that somehow authorizing a study would result in 
development and deployment of a weapons system. We know that cannot 
happen without Congress's approval, but this really clamps it down to 
say there would have to be an affirmative legislative act by Congress 
before the Energy Department could go forward with developing any such 
weapon as this.
  I think that ought to allay the concerns. I will suggest that is why 
there has been so much support for it on a bipartisan basis.
  A couple of years ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote Chairman 
Warner in support of the RNEP. He asked us to fund a feasibility and 
cost study of it, and noted that:

       I do not believe that these legislative steps will 
     complicate our ongoing efforts with North Korea, inasmuch as 
     the work was funded and authorized in last year's Defense 
     bill. I believe that North Korea has already factored RNEP 
     into its calculations. It is important for you to work on 
     these issues and please do not hesitate to call on me. . . .

  Secretary Powell supported it and said it basically furthered our 
foreign policy. So, again, this would be a multiyear feasibility study, 
and we are talking about $4 million being spent on it. In the scheme of 
our huge budget, I would say that is not excessive.
  Suggestions have been made that somehow this indicates that we are 
indifferent to nuclear weapons, the powers that they contain, the 
danger that they represent, and that somehow this administration is not 
sensitive to the need to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons in the 
world. Nothing could be further from the truth.
  Let me mention a few things about what this Nation is doing with 
regard to its nuclear arsenal. We have already done more than any other 
nation in the world to reduce our nuclear arsenal. We are committed to 
huge reductions in our nuclear weapons. In the last 15 years, the 
number of U.S. deployed strategic warheads has declined from 10,000 to 
less than 6,000. Under the treaty we signed, the Moscow Treaty, we will 
reduce our strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 
2012--from over 10,000. That is a huge reduction. In fact, we have 
already dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988 and 
eliminated nearly 90 percent of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
  (Mr. Allard assumed the Chair.)
  We have not produced high enriched uranium for weapons since 1964, 
nor plutonium for weapons since 1988. In fact, we are the only nuclear 
power in the world that has no capability at this moment to produce 
nuclear weapons. We are simply relying on our old stockpile, and that 
is a matter that a number of people are concerned about, but it is 
true.

[[Page S8724]]

  As Senator Allard, now I see is the Presiding Officer, who last year 
chaired the strategic subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee that 
deals with these issues, and I now chair that strategic subcommittee--
has gone on to bigger and better things--but it is an important 
subcommittee and it deals with the strategic defense of America. We are 
moving to incredible reductions in our nuclear weapons, but we are 
going to keep something like 2,000. How does it threaten the world in 
peace and make us a warmonger, if we can design and make a few of those 
weapons capable of being effective against hardened targets?
  Let's be realistic. People say, ``This is a new weapon. This is a new 
weapon,'' even when we get to the bottom, 2,000 or more nuclear 
weapons. What is wrong if we have figured out a way to use a targeted 
nuclear weapon to deal with a hardened site? It makes a lot of sense. 
It certainly does not indicate we are in a warmongering mode.
  I have a number of other things I would say on this subject. I see 
the Senator from California is here. I am pleased to yield the floor. I 
assume the Senator from California is talking on Armed Services issues?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from California is 
recognized.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. I also thank the distinguished 
Senator from Alabama.
  I wish to speak on the bill. There is probably no one in the Senate I 
have greater respect for than the chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services. He certainly does know his material. He certainly has put in 
the years. He certainly has done the work.
  I very profoundly disagree with what he has said with respect to the 
robust nuclear earth penetrator. We have heard this is only a study, 
that it is minor in scope, that we have debated this before. It is 
certainly true, we have debated this before. We debated it before 
because we feel strongly about this issue. We have debated it before 
because the Congress eliminated the money last year. We have debated it 
before because we have a strong passion and belief that this is the 
wrong way for our Nation to go. The fact that we have debated this 
issue before--Senator Kennedy, Senator Reed, Senator Levin, myself--
does not in any way, shape, or form downgrade or demean our arguments.
  Let me discuss this program which is only ``a study.'' Let me discuss 
for a moment the way this program started out.
  It started with appropriations for the study of a robust nuclear 
earth penetrator with a 5-year budget projection of $486 million. That 
is how it started.
  It also coincided with a program called ``advanced concepts 
initiatives'' which is not in this authorization but which last year 
envisioned the development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons of 
under 5 kilotons, or battlefield nuclear weapons. That is about a third 
the force that was used at Hiroshima, a 15-kiloton weapon. That is not, 
as I say, in this bill.
  It started out with a plan to build a Modern Pit Facility which could 
produce up to 450 new plutonium pits--the pit being the trigger that 
detonates a nuclear weapon. If you take a good look, you know you do 
not need up to 450 plutonium pits for replenishment of the existing 
nuclear arsenal. You may need 40 to 60. So if you put forward up to 450 
plutonium pits, to me it is an indicator that there is a broader 
program afoot.
  Part of this is also an increase of the time to test readiness from 3 
years to 18 months. What that says is: Beware, something is going on. 
We want to be able to resume testing and we do not want to resume 
testing within the normal 3-year delay, we want to move that up to 18 
months. So, something is cooking.
  The fact is, no one should doubt this authorization enables the 
reopening of the nuclear door to the creation of a new generation of 
nuclear weapons, in this case, a robust nuclear earth penetrator of 1 
megaton. This is a major effort.
  It is true, we fenced it, as the Senator from Alabama pointed out. 
Before it goes beyond the engineering stage, it must come back to this 
Senate for approval. But that does not signify that there is not a new 
generation of nuclear weapons being studied, researched, advanced, and 
authorized in this bill, specifically the $4 million for the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator.
  Our intention is being signaled to the rest of the world. The 
Department has been clever in not revealing its hand. No longer does it 
provide the 5-year cost of this study as it did last year. No longer 
does it mention this effort in its statement of administration policy. 
The statement of administration policies on the House Defense 
Authorization and House Energy and Water Appropriations bills do not 
mention a robust nuclear earth penetrator. Rather, the attempt was to 
cloak the study in some kind of obfuscation, to divide it between two 
budgets--Energy and Defense--half, $4 million here, the other $4.5 
million in the other budget, with the hope that if one fails, the other 
will get through.
  But nonetheless, this is not minor in scope. The Modern Pit Facility 
which could produce up to 450 new plutonium pits is not even being 
discussed. There is supposed to be a study that will come back and 
indicate how many pits are necessary to replenish the present nuclear 
arsenal. That is not before the Senate. That is in this bill. There is 
no study to indicate we need 450 pits today to refresh the existing 
arsenal, particularly when that arsenal is being diminished in size.
  The intention is clear. Obviously, the way you begin a new nuclear 
weapon program is with a study, research, and engineering. So it is 
true we are trying to catch it at the beginning. That is not a bad 
thing. That is a very good thing.
  The money, as was stated accurately, would go to the DC National 
Guard to enable it to prepare for possible terrorist attacks in the 
Nation's Capital. Many think this is a much more realistic use of this 
money than a robust nuclear earth penetrator, especially when the laws 
of physics say it is impossible to drive a missile deep enough in the 
Earth to prevent the spewing of hundreds of millions of cubic yards of 
radioactive waste and cause the death of hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions of people.
  It is true, we had this debate 3 weeks ago on the Energy and Water 
appropriations bill. That was the other half of this request. We were 
not successful with that vote. We said we would be back to debate this 
issue. And we will be back again and again and again until we are able 
to defeat this effort. It is morally wrong and I believe it jeopardizes 
the national security of our country.
  The House has had the good sense to decisively eliminate funding for 
the robust nuclear earth penetrator, first under the leadership of 
Representative David Hobson, the chairman of the Energy and Water 
Appropriations Subcommittee. That bill eliminated the $4 million for 
the Department of Energy portion of the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator. Second, the House fiscal year 2006 Defense appropriations 
bill limits research for a bunker buster to a conventional program. 
Finally, during its mark of the 2006 Defense authorization bill--that 
is the companion to the bill we are talking about this morning--the 
House Armed Services Committee eliminated all of the Department of 
Energy funding for the robust nuclear earth penetrator and transferred 
the $4 million to the Air Force budget for work on a conventional 
nonnuclear version. So there is a growing body of thought in three 
specific efforts successfully concluded by the House of Representatives 
that says we should not proceed with this program.
  Let me recap: The House Energy and Water appropriations bill 
eliminates $4 million. The House 2006 Defense appropriations bill 
limits research to a conventional program. And finally, the House Armed 
Services Committee eliminated all of the Department of Energy funding 
for the nuclear earth penetrator and transferred it to work on a 
conventional nonnuclear version.
  It will be a very hot conference committee on these items. But the 
House has taken the action in three ways rather completely.
  We are not out on a limb. This is not some whim of a small faction of 
Members of the Senate. We represent a majority of the Members of the 
House of Representatives. I believe we represent a majority of thinking 
of the American people. Polls have been done which

[[Page S8725]]

clearly show a bulk of the American people are, in fact, not in support 
of commencing this research, of doing this study.
  Let me give a fact sheet of a 2004 poll brought to my attention by 
the Union of Concerned Scientists. It found most Americans do not 
support the development of new nuclear weapons by the United States. A 
substantial majority of Americans would oppose funding for the nuclear 
bunker buster. Sixty-five percent of Americans say there is no need for 
the United States to develop new types of nuclear weapons. They know 
what the Senator from Rhode Island pointed out, that there are 
conventional bunker busters that should be developed. They know the key 
to this is good intelligence as to vent holes, ingress, egress areas, 
intelligence which can lead us to ferret out a nuclear bunker buster. 
Sixty-three percent found convincing the argument that the United 
States would be setting a bad example by starting to develop new types 
of nuclear weapons, and a large majority opposes using nuclear weapons 
for anything other than a deterrent to prevent other countries from 
using nuclear weapons. Eighty-one percent oppose the Bush 
administration's revelation that they would countenance a first use of 
nuclear weapons. Eighty-four percent oppose the United States using 
threats of nuclear retaliation to attempt a deterrent attack on the 
United States with chemical or biological weapons. And 57 percent 
support the United States reaffirming a commitment to not use nuclear 
weapons against countries that do not have nuclear weapons as a way of 
encouraging those countries not to acquire or build nuclear weapons.
  Americans have a clear preference for a much smaller nuclear arsenal. 
Based on this poll, a substantial majority of Americans opposes the 
study into the nuclear bunker buster. These findings also show 
substantial distaste for nuclear weapons in general, with a clear 
preference for a small nuclear arsenal designed only as a deterrent to 
prevent other countries from using nuclear weapons.
  I ask unanimous consent this fact sheet from the Union of Concerned 
Scientists be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Support Amendments to the Energy & Water Appropriations Bill To Prevent 
                          New Nuclear Weapons

       The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) is a proposed 
     new nuclear weapon intended to burrow a few meters into rock 
     or concrete before exploding, thus generating a powerful 
     underground shock wave. Its intended targets are deeply 
     buried command bunkers or underground storage sites 
     containing chemical or biological agents.
       Technical realities:
       According to several recent scientific studies, RNEP would 
     have limited effectiveness at destroying underground targets 
     and would have substantial drawbacks. Specifically. . .
       RNEP would produce tremendous radioactive fallout
       RNEP could kill millions of people
       RNEP would not be effective at destroying chemical or 
     biological agents
       RNEP would not be effective at destroying deep or widely 
     separated bunkers.

                  The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator

       The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP): RNEP is a 
     nuclear weapon that would burrow a few meters into the ground 
     before exploding and thus generate a powerful underground 
     shock wave. Its hypothetical targets are deeply buried 
     command bunkers or underground storage sites containing 
     chemical or biological agents.
       The RNEP design: Weapons designers at Lawrence Livermore 
     National Laboratory intend to use an existing high-yield 
     nuclear warhead--the 1.2-megaton B83 nuclear bomb--in a 
     longer, stronger and heavier bomb casing. The B83 is the 
     largest nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, and nearly 100 
     times more powerful than the nuclear bomb used on Hiroshima.
       Technicai realities: According to several recent scientific 
     studies, RNEP would not be effective at destroying many 
     underground targets, and its use could result in the death of 
     millions of people.
       RNEP would produce tremendous radioactive fallout: A 
     nuclear earth penetrator cannot penetrate deep enough to 
     contain the nuclear fallout. Even the strongest casing will 
     crush itself by the time it penetrates 10-30 feet into rock 
     or concrete. For comparison, even a one-kiloton nuclear 
     warhead (less than 1/10th as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb) 
     must be buried at least 200-300 feet to contain its 
     radioactive fallout. The high yield RNEP will produce 
     tremendous fallout that will drift for more than a thousand 
     miles downwind. As, Linton Brooks, the head of the National 
     Nuclear Security Administration told Congress in April, the 
     laws of physics will [never allow a bomb to penetrate] far 
     enough to trap all fallout. This is a nuclear weapon that is 
     going to be hugely destructive over a large area.''
       RNEP could kill millions of people: A simulation of RNEP 
     used against the Esfahan nuclear facility in Iran, using the 
     software developed for the Pentagon, showed that 3 million 
     people would be killed by radiation within 2 weeks of the 
     explosion, and 35 million people in Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
     India would be exposed to increased levels of cancer-causing 
     radiation.
       RNEP would not be effective at destroying chemical or 
     biological agents: Unless the weapon detonates nearly in the 
     same room with the agents, it will not destroy them. Because 
     the United States is unlikely to know the precise location, 
     size and geometry of underground bunkers, a nuclear attack on 
     a storage bunker containing chemical or biological agents 
     would more likely spread those agents into the environment, 
     along with the radioactive fallout.
       RNEP would not be effective against the deepest or widely 
     separated bunkers. The seismic shock produced by the RNEP 
     could only destroy bunkers to a depth of about a thousand 
     feet. Modern bunkers can be deeper than that, with a widely 
     separated complex of connected rooms and tunnels.
       There are more effective conventional alternatives to RNEP: 
     Current precision-guided conventional weapons can be used to 
     cut off a bunker's communications, power, and air, 
     effectively keeping the enemy weapons underground and 
     unusable until U.S. forces secure them. Sealing chemical or 
     biological agents underground is far more sensible than 
     trying to blow them up.
       The RNEP budget: RNEP is not just a feasibility study: 
     DOE's 2005 budget included a five-year projection--totaling 
     $484.7 million--to produce a completed warhead design and 
     begin production engineering by 2009. The FY06 budget request 
     includes $4 million for RNEP and $4.5 million to modify the 
     B-2 bomber to carry RNEP. Last year, David Hobson, Republican 
     chair of the House Appropriations Energy and Water 
     Development Subcommittee, zeroed out FY05 funding for the 
     program, stating, ``we cannot advocate for nuclear 
     nonproliferation around the globe, while pursuing more usable 
     nuclear weapons options here at home.''

                  Americans Oppose New Nuclear Weapons

       A 2004 poll found that most Americans do not support the 
     development of new nuclear weapons by the United States and 
     strongly oppose the idea of the United States ever using a 
     nuclear weapon first. As Congress debates funding for the 
     Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), these results are 
     particularly relevant. Findings from the poll, which was 
     conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes 
     (PIPA), include:
       A substantial majority of Americans would oppose funding 
     for the RNEP, or ``bunker buster.''
       65% of Americans say there is no need for the United States 
     to develop new types of nuclear weapons.
       63% found convincing the argument that the United States 
     would be setting a bad example by starting to develop new 
     types of nuclear weapons.
       A large majority opposes using nuclear weapons for anything 
     other than a deterrent to prevent other countries from using 
     nuclear weapons.
       81% oppose the United States ever using nuclear weapons 
     first.
       84% oppose the United States using threats of nuclear 
     retaliation to attempt to deter an attack on the United 
     States with chemical or biological weapons.
       57% percent support the United States reaffirming a 
     commitment to not use nuclear weapons against countries that 
     do not have nuclear weapons, as a way of encouraging those 
     countries not to acquire or build nuclear weapons.
       Americans have a clear preference for a much smaller U.S. 
     nuclear arsenal.
       100--The median answer for the number of nuclear weapons 
     Americans believe are needed to provide deterrence.
       6,000--The approximate number of U.S. nuclear weapons, with 
     roughly 2,000 of these maintained on high alert status, ready 
     to be launched in a matter of minutes.
       Based on this poll, a substantial majority of Americans 
     would oppose research into the RNEP, a new nuclear ``bunker 
     buster'' supported by the Bush administration. These findings 
     also show the U.S. public's distaste for nuclear weapons in 
     general, with a clear preference for a small nuclear arsenal 
     designed only as a deterrent to prevent other countries from 
     using nuclear weapons.
       These poll results are from ``Public Believes Many 
     Countries Still Secretly Pursuing WMD,'' a media release 
     published by Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 
     and Knowledge Networks. The poll was conducted with a 
     nationwide sample of 1,311 respondents from March 16-22, 
     2004. The margin of error was plus or minus 2.8%-4.5%, 
     depending on whether the question was administered to all or 
     part of the sample. The release can be found at: http://
www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/WMD/WMDpress__04__ 15__04.pdf 
     and the full poll at: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/WMD/
WMDreport__04__ 15__04.pdf.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Let me point out, House Armed Services Committee 
member Sylvester Raiz stated that the

[[Page S8726]]

House committee took the ``N'' or nuclear out of the robust nuclear 
earth penetrator program.
  Remember, last year, in this strong statement I have just told you 
about--in the deletion of funding of the $27.5 million for the earth 
penetrator and the $9 million for advanced concepts that at the time 
included a study for the development of the low-yield nuclear weapons--
Republicans and Democrats, authorizers and appropriators alike, joined 
together to send a clear signal to the administration that the House 
and Senate would not support moving forward with the development of a 
new generation of nuclear weapons. If you consider this, along with the 
facts I have just revealed, based on a polling of the American people, 
you have to wonder why the administration comes back with a new request 
this year.
  In April of this year, a group of experts of the National Academies 
of Sciences confirmed what we have long argued--that according to the 
laws of physics, it is simply not possible for a missile casing on a 
nuclear warhead to survive a thrust into the earth deep enough to take 
out a hard and deeply buried military target without spewing millions 
of tons of radiation into the atmosphere.
  That is where we are--funding a study that the law of physics says 
will not work. It is folly to me. And the repercussions are enormous. 
The National Academies of Sciences study, commissioned by Congress to 
study the anticipated health and environmental effects of the nuclear 
earth penetrator, found the following: that current experience and 
empirical predictions indicate that earth-penetrator weapons cannot 
penetrate to depths required for total containment of the effects of a 
nuclear explosion. It also found that in order to destroy hard and 
deeply buried targets at 200 meters, or 656 feet, you would need a 300-
kiloton weapon. And in order to destroy a hard and deeply buried target 
at 300 meters--that is 984 feet--you would need a 1-megaton weapon.
  The point is, the deeper the bunker, the larger the nuclear blast 
must be, and the greater the amount of nuclear fallout will be.
  The number of casualties, they find, from an earth-penetrator weapon 
detonated at a few meters' depth, which is all that can be achieved for 
all practical purposes, is equal to that of a surface burst of the same 
nuclear weapon. Do you know what we are contemplating here, what that 
surface burst would be? It would be the largest spewing of 
radioactivity in the history of the world. Enormous. If it were used in 
North Korea, it would spread to South Korea and Japan. It is 
unthinkable.
  For attacks near or in densely populated areas using nuclear earth-
penetrator weapons on hard and deeply buried targets, the number of 
casualties would range from thousands to more than a million, depending 
primarily on weapon yield.
  So once again, the bottom line is that a bunker buster cannot 
penetrate into the earth deep enough to avoid massive casualties, and 
there would be the spewing of millions of cubic feet of radioactive 
materials into the atmosphere. This would result in the deaths of up to 
a million people or more if used in densely populated areas.
  So why are we doing this? What kind of Machiavellian thinking is 
behind this reopening of the nuclear door?
  Ambassador Linton Brooks of the National Security Administration 
agrees with these findings. Earlier, in a congressional hearing, 
Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher asked him how deep he thought a bunker 
buster could go. Here is his answer from the transcript of the House 
hearing. I quote:

     . . . a couple of tens of meters maybe. I mean certainly--I 
     really must apologize for my lack of precision if we in the 
     administration have suggested that it was possible to have a 
     bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I don't 
     believe that--I don't believe the laws of physics will ever 
     let that be true.

  And remember, we are talking about a 1-megaton bomb, 71 times the 
size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima--71 times bigger than the 15-
kiloton bomb. The devastation from using such a weapon will be 
catastrophic.
  The National Academies of Sciences study is the strongest evidence to 
date that we should not move forward with this study and that we should 
put a stop to it once and for all. Again, the Senate should listen to 
the experts and follow the House's lead.
  So what is the main argument from opponents of this amendment, such 
as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld? Their argument is: This is 
just a study. Nothing is going to happen. Nobody is going to get the 
idea: Oh, my goodness, the United States is moving in this direction; 
we better move. North Korea: They are coming after us; we better get 
there first. India, worried about Pakistan: Let's begin to develop it. 
Pakistan, worried about India: Let's do the same thing.
  I do not believe for a second this is just a study. This is the 
beginning of a major effort to develop a new generation of nuclear 
weapons, and nobody should think it is anything else but that.
  This year, the request is $8.5 million. In fiscal year 2007, the 
request will increase to $17.5 million, including $14 million for the 
Department of Energy and $3.5 million for the Pentagon. And while the 
administration is silent this year on how much it plans to spend on the 
program in future years, we should not forget that last year's budget 
request called for spending $486 million on the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator over 5 years. So that part of the plan was revealed. This 5-
year figure was omitted this year, and that is deceiving, I believe. 
But even if you accept the argument that this is just a study, that 
does not justify moving forward with this program.
  First, a study on the development of new nuclear weapons will still 
greatly undermine our nuclear nonproliferation efforts by telling the 
rest of the world that when it comes to nuclear weapons, do as we say 
and not as we do. That is hypocrisy, pure and simple. How does that 
make us safer from the prospect of nuclear terror? Answer: It does not.

  In a letter to committee members of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, the Reverend John H. Ricard, bishop of Pensacola-Tallahassee 
and chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, stated:

       Nations that see the U.S. expanding and diversifying our 
     nuclear arsenal are encouraged to seek or maintain nuclear 
     deterrents of their own and ignore nonproliferation 
     obligations.

  I could not agree more.
  How will a study of new nuclear weapons help compel North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear program? It will not. It will do exactly the 
opposite. How will a study of new nuclear weapons help convince the 
Iranians to respond and give up their own nuclear weapons? Answer: It 
will not. Just as calling these nations part of the ``axis of evil'' 
has done nothing but instill in them the desire to develop their own 
nuclear weapons programs. That, in fact, has been exactly the case.
  In both cases, a study to develop new nuclear weapons, especially 
when we already have a robust nuclear arsenal, only makes those weapons 
more important to those who do not yet have them, such as Iran, or who 
refuse to give them up, such as North Korea. And the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons only increases the chances of them falling into the 
hands of terrorists who will not be deterred by a nuclear bunker 
buster.
  Secondly, a study will not change the conclusions of the National 
Academies of Sciences report: It is not possible to develop a nuclear 
bunker buster that can burrow deep enough into the earth to contain 
massive amounts of radioactivity fallout. The inevitable result will be 
the deaths of up to a million people.
  So why do we do it? Physics says it cannot be done, and somebody in 
the Pentagon who does not know word one about physics says it can be. 
Who do I trust? I do not trust the Pentagon, I do trust the Academies 
of Sciences, on this point. This study will not change that simple 
fact. And as Ivan Oelrich of the Federation of American Scientists 
points out:

       Any nation that can dig under a hundred meters of hard rock 
     can dig under a kilometer of hard rock.

  Our adversaries will only have to build a bunker deeper than 400 
meters to avoid the effects of a 1-megaton bomb that is 71 times bigger 
than Hiroshima. It makes no sense.
  Finally, a study will not change the fact that we need to improve our 
intelligence capabilities in relation to underground targets. Why 
aren't we putting that money into intelligence on

[[Page S8727]]

underground targets, where the vent shafts are, where the aromas come 
up, where ingress, egress, and access is, to pinpoint locations? What 
use is a nuclear bunker buster if we cannot locate and identify an 
underground target which, ladies and gentlemen, is today the case?
  What would have been the consequences if we had used a nuclear bunker 
buster in Iraq to take out bunkers filled with chemical and biological 
weapons--that did not exist? The fact is, we can improve our 
intelligence capabilities and locate and identify targets. We can use 
conventional weapons with specialized delivery systems to seal off 
their vulnerable points, such as air ducts and entrances for personnel 
and equipment.
  We can also look at conventional bunker busters. Last month, I was 
briefed by Northrop Grumman on a program they are working on with 
Boeing to develop a conventional bunker buster--the Massive Ordnance 
Penetrator--which is designed to go deeper than any nuclear bunker 
buster and take out 25 percent of the underground and deeply buried 
targets. This is a 30,000-pound weapon, 20 feet in length, with 6,000 
pounds of high explosives. It will be delivered in a B-2 or B-52 
bomber. It can burrow 60 meters in the ground through 5,000 PSI--pounds 
per square inch--of reinforced concrete. It will burrow 8 meters into 
the ground through 10,000 PSI reinforced concrete.
  We have already spent $6 million on this program, and design and 
ground testing are scheduled to be completed next year. Why are we 
doing this nuclear bunker buster that cannot be done according to the 
law of physics? We should focus on practical programs such as the 
Northrop Grumman-Boeing program that will put these underground targets 
at risk without reopening the nuclear door.
  Let me look once again at the policies underlying this request.
  The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which is a white paper put out by 
the administration--singularly overlooked by this body but read widely 
by the rest of the world--places nuclear weapons as part of the 
strategic triad, therefore blurring the distinction between the 
conventional and nuclear use. Why do this? One reason: It makes them 
easier to use. It also discussed, for the first time, seven countries 
that could be targets of U.S. nuclear weapons: Russia, China, Iraq, 
Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria.
  I did not write this. This is in the Nuclear Posture Review. Other 
nations have seen this. This is foolish.
  Secondly, National Security Directive-17, which came a few months 
later, indicates that the United States will engage in a first use of 
nuclear weapons--a historic statement in itself. We have never said we 
would not engage in a first use. We have never said we would engage in 
a first use. And here we say we would engage in a first use to respond 
to a chemical or biological attack.
  We could have done that in Iraq. What would have happened had we done 
this? Would a nuclear bunker buster have been used in Iraq? I wonder. 
Fortunately, we will never know.
  My point is, these policies encourage other nations to develop 
similar weapons, thereby putting American lives at risk and our 
national security interests at risk. This isn't the example we should 
set for the rest of the world. Indeed, I believe the United States can 
take several actions to make better use of our resources and 
demonstrate our commitment to keeping the world's most dangerous 
weapons out of the world's most dangerous hands.
  First, we should work to strengthen the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. 
Senator Hagel and I have introduced a sense of the Senate amendment to 
this bill that calls on parties to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to 
insist on strict compliance with the nonproliferation obligations of 
the treaty and to undertake effective enforcement actions against 
states that are in violation of their obligations; to agree to 
establish more effective controls on sensitive technologies that can be 
used to produce materials for nuclear weapons; to accelerate programs 
to safeguard and eliminate nuclear weapons usable material to the 
highest standards to prevent access by terrorists or other states; to 
agree that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape 
responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to 
controlled materials and equipment acquired for peaceful purposes; and 
to accelerate implementation of the NPT-related disarmament obligations 
and commitments that would, in particular, reduce the world's 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material.
  I urge my colleagues and the managers of this bill to support our 
amendment.
  Second, we should expand and accelerate Nunn-Lugar threat reduction 
programs and provide the necessary resources to improve security and 
take the rest of the Soviet era nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons arsenals and infrastructure out of circulation.
  Third, we should strengthen and expand the ability of the Department 
of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure and remove 
nuclear weapons-usable materials from vulnerable sites around the 
world.
  Last year, Senator Domenici and I sponsored an amendment to the 
fiscal year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act that authorized the 
Secretary of Energy to lead an accelerated, comprehensive, worldwide 
effort to secure, remove, and eliminate the threat by these materials.
  Finally, as I noted previously, we should improve our intelligence 
capabilities to locate and identify underground targets. There is a lot 
of improvement needed.
  In August, we will commemorate the 60th anniversaries of the two uses 
of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Hiroshima, 140,000 
people died. In Nagasaki, 100,000 people lost their lives. Two bombs, 
240,000 people dead. The 1-megaton bomb of the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator study is 71 times bigger than the bomb at Hiroshima. That is 
what we are looking at. For shame.
  What message do we send to the survivors of those attacks and to the 
friends and families of the victims by moving forward with a study to 
develop a nuclear bunker buster of 1 megaton? Let us acknowledge these 
anniversaries and pay tribute to the victims by putting a stop to this 
program once and for all. Let us work together on commonsense programs 
that will make our country safer without reopening the nuclear door.
  I urge my colleagues to follow the House lead, support this amendment 
and kill this program.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Colorado yield for a unanimous 
consent request?
  Mr. ALLARD. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I have talked to the chairman about this. I ask unanimous 
consent, with the concurrence of the chairman, after Senator Allard has 
completed, that the Chair then recognize Senator Salazar, and following 
Senator Salazar, that then Senator Dorgan be recognized. It is a little 
bit out of order because we have been going back and forth, but in 
terms of time, I think it may be a fair apportionment.
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, I would like to amend it 
to enable the distinguished Senator from Alabama, whose subcommittee 
has jurisdiction over at least one of the amendments of Senator Allard, 
be permitted to use such time as he desires in the colloquy between the 
three Senators.
  Mr. LEVIN. I would ask Senator Sessions if he could give us an idea 
as to about how long he would be so Senator Dorgan could plan his time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. It would be no more than 5 minutes--less than that, 
probably.
  Mr. LEVIN. Could we then amend the unanimous consent request to 
include Senator Sessions immediately following Senator Salazar, then it 
would go to Senator Dorgan.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, I rise in opposition to the amendment to strike the 
$4 million appropriation for the robust nuclear earth penetrator 
commonly known as RNEP. There are some comments made in the debate 
today to which I would like to add my perspective because they were 
basically incorrect.

[[Page S8728]]

  We have been debating this amendment for the past 3 years. And we 
have been passing this provision in the Senate, defeating any 
amendments to take it out of legislation. In all the testimony I have 
had over the past 3 years as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee, 
which my distinguished colleague from Alabama now chairs, never once 
has anybody, in testifying before that committee, said that there will 
not be any nuclear fallout. Not once have they indicated that they felt 
this was going to lead us into an arms race.
  Here is what we have done. This is what they have talked about, 
taking some of the nuclear warheads that we now have in our nuclear 
arsenal and redesigning those in a way in which they might be more 
effective, if we happen to have a deep bunker that is posing a threat 
to Americans, whether American soldiers or American citizens.
  We need to have a study. That is what this provision is all about. 
What we are talking about is reducing the amount of collateral damage. 
That means reducing the amount of, perhaps, nuclear fallout or perhaps 
reducing the blast range because you take all that energy and you drive 
it down into the ground instead of driving it in a horizontal 
direction, which obviously means for collateral damage. They are 
talking about focusing the study on the B-83 warhead which is part of 
our arsenal today. That is all we are talking about, a study. We are 
going to be looking at the current arsenal makeup of weapons that we 
have to modify them to reduce collateral damage. I think that is a 
commendable goal. I think it warrants the support of the Members of the 
Senate.
  This bill includes funding of $4 million to continue the Air Force-
led feasibility study. This is a study on the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator. This is not a new issue for Congress to consider. In both 
the defense authorization and the Energy and Water appropriations 
bills, amendments have been offered to cut all funding for the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator. These amendments have been defeated on 
multiple occasions.
  The purpose of the RNEP feasibility study is to determine if an 
existing nuclear weapon can be modified to penetrate into hard rock in 
order to destroy a deeply buried target that could be hiding weapons of 
mass destruction or command and control assets. The Department of 
Energy has modified nuclear weapons in the past to modernize their 
safety and security and reliability aspects. We have also modified 
existing nuclear weapons to meet our new military requirements. Under 
the Clinton administration, we modified the B-61 so it could penetrate 
frozen soils. The RNEP feasibility study is narrowly focused to 
determine whether the B-83 warhead can be modified to penetrate hard 
rock or reinforced underground facilities.
  Funding research on options, both nuclear and conventional, for 
attacking such targets is a responsible step for our country to take. 
As many as 70 nations are developing or have built hardened and deeply 
buried targets to protect command and communications and weapons of 
mass destruction production and storage assets. Of that number, a 
number of nations have facilities that are sufficiently hard and deep 
enough that we cannot destroy most of them with our conventional 
weapons. Some of them are so sophisticated that they are beyond the 
current U.S. nuclear weapons capability.
  I believe it is prudent and imperative that we fund this study. I 
emphasize again, this is a study on the potential capabilities to 
address this growing category of threat.
  Should the Department of Energy determine, through this study, that 
the robust nuclear earth penetrator can meet the requirements to hold a 
hard and deeply buried target at risk, the Department still could not 
proceed to full-scale weapon development, production or deployment 
without an authorization and appropriation from Congress. Let me repeat 
that. The Department of Energy cannot go ahead, beyond this study, 
without the express authorization or appropriation from Congress.
  Frankly, we should allow our weapons experts to determine if the 
robust nuclear earth penetrator could destroy hardened and deeply 
buried targets. That is the purpose of the study. Then Congress could 
have the information it would need to make a responsible decision as to 
whether development of such a program is appropriate and necessary to 
maintain our Nation's security.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment before us.


                           Amendment No. 1418

  Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the 
pending amendment so I may offer a number of amendments.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I send to the desk amendment No. 1418.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard], for himself and Mr. 
     McConnell, proposes an amendment numbered 1418.

  Mr. ALLARD. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require life cycle cost estimates for the destruction of 
    lethal chemical munitions under the Assembled Chemical Weapons 
                         Alternatives program)

       On page 66, after line 22, insert the following:

     SEC. 330. LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF 
                   LETHAL CHEMICAL MUNITIONS UNDER ASSEMBLED 
                   CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM.

       Upon completion of 60 percent of the design build at each 
     site of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, 
     the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons 
     Alternatives shall, after consultation with the congressional 
     defense committees, certify in writing to such committees 
     updated and revised life cycle cost estimates for the 
     destruction of lethal chemical munitions for each site under 
     such program.


                           Amendment No. 1419

  Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the 
pending amendment, and I call up amendment No. 1419.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard], for himself and Mr. 
     Salazar, proposes an amendment numbered 1419.

  Mr. ALLARD. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To authorize a program to provide health, medical, and life 
    insurance benefits to workers at the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site, Colorado, who would otherwise fail to qualify for such 
         benefits because of an early physical completion date)

       On page 378, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

     SEC. 3114. RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR WORKERS AT ROCKY FLATS 
                   ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE, COLORADO.

       (a) Program Authorized.--Subject to the availability of 
     funds under subsection (d), the Secretary of Energy shall 
     establish a program for the purposes of providing health, 
     medical, and life insurance benefits to workers at the Rocky 
     Flats Environmental Technology Site, Colorado (in this 
     section referred to as the ``Site''), who do not qualify for 
     such benefits because the physical completion date was 
     achieved before December 15, 2006.
       (b) Eligibility for Benefits.--A worker at the Site is 
     eligible for health, medical, and life insurance benefits 
     under the program described in subsection (a) if the 
     employee--
       (1) was employed by the Department of Energy, or by 
     contract or first or second tier subcontract to perform 
     cleanup, security, or administrative duties or 
     responsibilities at the Site on September 29, 2003; and
       (2) would have achieved applicable eligibility requirements 
     for health, medical, and life insurance benefits as defined 
     in the Site retirement benefit plan documents if the physical 
     completion date had been achieved on December 15, 2006, as 
     specified in the Site project completion contract.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Health, medical, and life insurance benefits.--The term 
     ``health, medical, and life insurance benefits'' means those 
     benefits that workers at the Site are eligible for through 
     collective bargaining agreements, projects, or contracts for 
     work scope.
       (2) Physical completion date.--The term ``physical 
     completion date'' means the date

[[Page S8729]]

     the Site contractor has completed all services required by 
     the Site project completion contract other than close-out 
     tasks and services related to plan sponsorship and management 
     of post-project completion retirement benefits.
       (3) Plan sponsorship and program management of post-project 
     completion retirement benefits.--The term ``plan sponsorship 
     and program management of post-project completion retirement 
     benefits'' means those duties and responsibilities that are 
     necessary to execute, and are consistent with, the terms and 
     legal responsibilities of the instrument under which the 
     post-project completion retirement benefits are provided to 
     workers at the Site.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy in 
     fiscal year 2006 for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology 
     Site, $15,000,000 shall be made available to the Secretary to 
     carry out the program described in subsection (a).

  Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I rise to discuss amendment No. 1419 and 
the incredible achievements of the workers at the Department of 
Energy's Rocky Flats environmental technology site and to offer an 
amendment on behalf of these workers. Rocky Flats is located a few 
miles northwest of Denver, CO. For four decades, this facility was the 
Department of Energy's dedicated site for manufacturing plutonium pits 
for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
  This highly classified production facility was run by over 8,000 
Coloradans who worked day and night for most of the Cold War and used 
some of the most dangerous substances known to man, including 
plutonium, beryllium, and uranium. The workers at Rocky Flats were 
devoted to their jobs and believed in their mission. They risked their 
lives on a daily basis and did so with the knowledge that their efforts 
were contributing to the security of our Nation. They are heroes of the 
Cold War and have earned our respect, admiration, and our appreciation.
  When plutonium pit production ended in 1991, it was unclear what role 
these workers would play in the cleanup of Rocky Flats. They could have 
walked away from the job. They had performed their duty with excellence 
for nearly 40 years. No one could ask them to do more. Yet the workers 
at Rocky Flats were not ready to quit. They saw a new challenge in 
front of them--a challenge they could not walk away from. They knew the 
cleanup would be difficult and very dangerous, but they were not 
deterred.
  These workers stayed and, over the next decade, they performed 
magnificently. Their task was anything but simple. Five large plutonium 
processing facilities encompassing over a million square feet were 
highly contaminated with dangerous radioactive material. The 
contamination was so severe that these buildings were ranked among the 
top 10 contaminated facilities in the DOE nuclear weapons complex. 
Building No. 771, in particular, was even singled out by the national 
media as ``the most dangerous building in America.''
  The cleaning and eventual demolishing of these buildings was just the 
beginning. Hundreds of vials of contaminated process piping interlaced 
the complex. More than a dozen infinity rooms were so contaminated that 
they had been sealed and abandoned--some for as long as 30 years. 
Hundreds of tons of plutonium compound, uranium byproducts, and other 
radioactive and toxic residues remained at Rocky Flats.
  Yet the workers at Rocky Flats were not deterred. They had built 
components using some of the most dangerous substances the world has 
ever known. Now they were ready to tackle one of the most dangerous 
cleanup projects ever contemplated.
  In 1992, Rocky Flats was transferred to the DOE's environmental 
management program for the purpose of cleaning up the contamination and 
waste. Few knew where to begin. The unprecedented size and magnitude of 
the project was simply daunting. It took years to just figure out the 
best approach to the project. The expected cost was also staggering. In 
1995, the cleanup was predicted to cost upward of $35 billion and to 
take 70 years to complete.
  When I came to the Senate in 1996, the cleanup of Rocky Flats had 
been dragging out for nearly 4 years with little progress. Tons of 
weapons-grade plutonium remained and most buildings at Rocky Flats had 
not been touched. More than 2 million 55-gallon drums of waste needed 
to be removed.
  I found this lack of progress simply unacceptable. The safety of the 
people of Colorado was at risk and the American taxpayer could ill 
afford to allow this project to drag on indefinitely. At my urging, the 
DOE, in 2000, finally put the resources into accelerating the cleanup 
of Rocky Flats. Under the leadership of then-Under Secretary Bob Card, 
and then-Assistant Secretary Jesse Roberson, the DOE took the 
unprecedented step of rethinking its approach to the cleanup. These 
creative leaders challenged the lead contractor, CH2M HILL, and the 
workers at Rocky Flats to move much more aggressively. They were given 
the seemingly impossible mission of completing the cleanup of the 
massive contamination at Rocky Flats by 2007, at a cost of less than $7 
billion.

  Most scoffed at this approach. They believed there would be 
considerable cost overruns and schedule delays. They didn't think CH2M 
HILL could effectively execute this kind of contract. Most of all, they 
doubted the commitment of the workers at Rocky Flats. They could not 
fathom why these workers would work themselves out of a job. Even the 
GAO doubted the ability of the workers at Rocky Flats to ship massive 
quantities of waste required to achieve closure by 2006.
  I, however, had faith in the workers at Rocky Flats. I am pleased to 
state today that Kaiser-Hill and the workers at Rocky Flats have not 
disappointed me. In fact, it appears that Kaiser-Hill and the workers 
at Rocky Flats are far exceeding their cleanup commitments.
  I cannot express the full extent of how proud I am of their 
achievement. Listen to some of their accomplishments: All weapons grade 
plutonium was removed in 2003.
  More than 1,400 contaminated glove boxes and hundreds of process 
tanks have been removed.
  More than 400,000 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste has 
been removed.
  Six hundred and fifty of the eight hundred and two facilities have 
been demolished.
  All four uranium production facilities have been demolished.
  All five plutonium production facilities have been demolished or will 
be within the next 3 months.
  Three hundred and ten of three hundred and sixty sites of soil 
contamination have been remediated.
  The last shipment of transuranic waste was shipped this past April.
  It now appears that the cleanup of Rocky Flats will be completed--
completed--as early as this October, a full year ahead of schedule, and 
save the American taxpayers not thousands, not millions, but billions 
upon billions of dollars.
  Mr. President, you can only appreciate the magnitude of this 
accomplishment when you realize that within 6 years, Rocky Flats will 
have been transformed from one of the dangerous places on Earth to a 
beautiful and safe natural wildlife refuge.
  I applaud the leadership provided by CH2M HILL. The management expert 
provided by this company was critical to this effort. Kaiser-Hill took 
the challenge head on despite the tough schedule and limited funding. 
The company can be proud of its accomplishments and its contribution to 
the safety of the people of Colorado.
  Yet CH2M HILL could not have achieved the demanding goals established 
by the Department of Energy without the hard work and determination of 
the Rocky Flats workers. Most of these workers had to literally develop 
an entire new skill set. They went from manufacturing plutonium pits to 
dismantling glove boxes. They cleaned up rooms that were so 
contaminated that they were forced to use the highest level of 
respiratory protection available.
  Perhaps more important, these workers were extraordinarily productive 
even though they knew they were essentially working themselves out of a 
job. With the completion of the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats, 
they knew they would have to find employment elsewhere. There was no 
guarantee that the next job would pay as much or provide the same level 
of benefits.
  Despite knowing they were going to lose their jobs, the workers at 
Rocky Flats remained highly motivated and totally committed to their 
cleanup

[[Page S8730]]

mission. They believed in what they were doing and worked hard to clean 
up the facility as quickly and as safely as possible. They achieved 
more in less time and with less money than anyone dreamed possible. I 
am proud of the workers at Rocky Flats. I believe they have once again 
earned our Nation's sincere appreciation and respect.
  Given the sacrifice and dedication demonstrated by these workers, you 
would think the Department of Energy would do everything it could to 
ensure that these workers received the compensation and benefits they 
have earned.
  You would think assisting those workers who lose their retirement 
benefits because of the early completion of the cleanup would be a top 
priority of the Department. After all, these workers saved the 
Department billions upon billions in cleanup costs.
  Last year, it became clear to the DOE and to me that the cleanup at 
Rocky Flats could be completed much earlier than anyone expected. The 
workers were supportive of early closure but were concerned that some 
of their colleagues would lose retirement benefits because of early 
closure.
  I share their concern and requested in last year's Defense 
authorization bill that the DOE provide Congress with a report on the 
number of workers who would not receive retirement benefits and the 
cost of providing these benefits. After a lengthy delay, the DOE 
reported that about 29 workers would not receive pension and/or 
lifetime medical benefits because of early closure. The cost of 
providing benefits to these workers is estimated to be just over $12 
million.

  To my dismay, I discovered the DOE's report was woefully incomplete. 
I was subsequently informed that at least another 50 workers would have 
qualified for retirement benefits had the DOE bothered to include those 
workers who had already been laid off because of the accelerated 
closure schedule.
  Mr. President, this means as many as 75 workers at Rocky Flats will 
lose their pensions, medical benefits, or, in some cases, both because 
they worked faster, less expensively, and achieved more than they were 
supposed to. They not only worked themselves out of a job but also out 
of retirement benefits and medical care.
  I find the Department of Energy's refusal to pay these benefits to be 
outrageous.
  Many of the workers at Rocky Flats served our Nation for over two 
decades. They have risked their lives day in and day out, first by 
building nuclear weapon components, and then by cleaning up some of the 
most contaminated buildings in the world. All they have asked for in 
return is to be treated with fairness and honesty.
  To my disappointment, and to the disappointment of the workers at 
Rocky Flats, the DOE cannot seem to keep its end of the bargain.
  These workers would have received retirement benefits had the cleanup 
continued to 2035, as originally predicted. The workers would have 
received their retirement benefits had the cleanup continued to 
December 15, 2006, as the site contract specified. But by accelerating 
the cleanup by over a year and saving the taxpayers hundreds of 
millions of dollars, these workers are left without the retirement 
benefits they deserve and, I feel, have justly earned.
  Mr. President, the Department's refusal to provide these benefits has 
ramifications far beyond Rocky Flats. Because Rocky Flats is the first 
major DOE cleanup site, workers at other sites around the country are 
watching to see how the DOE treats the workers at Rocky Flats. 
Unfortunately, they have seen how the DOE has failed to step up and 
provide retirement benefits to those who have earned it.
  The workers at other sites now have no incentive to accelerate 
cleanup. Why should they? The Department of Energy hasn't lifted a 
finger to help the workers at Rocky Flats. It would be foolish for 
workers at other sites to think the DOE would act fairly with them if 
they accelerated cleanup.
  To me, the Department's decision is penny-wise and pound-foolish. By 
refusing to provide these benefits, the Department saves money in the 
short term. Yet by discouraging the workers from supporting 
acceleration, the Department is going to cost the American taxpayers 
hundreds of millions in additional funding in the long run.
  I believe Congress needs to correct the Department's mistake before 
it is too late.
  Today, I offer an amendment that will provide some of the benefits to 
those workers who have lost them because of early closure. I am pleased 
that my colleague from Colorado, Senator Salazar, has agreed to 
cosponsor this important amendment. I support his bipartisan effort. 
The amendment is narrowly focused on providing health, medical, and 
life insurance benefits to those workers affected.
  This amendment is limited in the funding it provides. It is solely 
focused on providing these benefits to those workers who would have 
received health, medical, and life insurance benefits had the site 
remained open until December 15, 2005, the date of the site cleanup 
contract.
  To be clear, these benefits are not an additional bonus for a job 
well done, nor is it a going away present for those two decades of 
service. The health, medical, and life insurance benefits are what 
these workers have already earned--nothing more, nothing less.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. These workers have 
earned these benefits, and it is up to this body to see they receive 
it.
  Let's not let the bureaucrats in the Department of Energy tarnish the 
credibility of the Federal Government. It is time for this body to 
correct this mistake before the Department's foolishness costs the 
American taxpayers even more money in the future.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I think under the UC, I was given a 
few minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I thank Senator Allard for his 
leadership in the Senate and for his leadership on nuclear issues. 
There is no one who understands the issue more. No one has been more 
committed to effectively and efficiently eliminating the difficulties 
at Rocky Flats than he has, and the Nation is in his debt. That I say 
with certainty.
  At one time in my life, I was a U.S. attorney and am aware that 
Federal officials are limited in certain of their powers. Somebody 
might say they have earned something, but maybe they have not legally 
earned it. And if they have not legally earned it, they cannot be paid 
for it.
  I don't know where we will come out with this amendment the Senator 
has offered. I know how committed Senator Allard and Senator Salazar 
are to helping these employees, but I note that as I understand it, 
these are not governmental employees but employees of a private 
contractor. That complicates matters, to say the least.
  We are talking about providing benefits to employees of a private 
contractor over and above the collective bargaining agreement they had. 
Since this program has been scheduled to be completed, they did have 
benefits in the agreement for them for early termination and early 
generous payments when this contract ended.
  I say to my friend how much I respect him. I am telling you, Madam 
President, he is working. He has almost shut down the Senate over this 
issue, but I am not sure we can ask the Department of Energy and I am 
not sure this Congress can take this step. We are closing BRAC sites 
around the country. We have a chemical weapons facility in my State 
destroying poison gases. I hope it finishes early. I am not sure we can 
give every private contractor employee a bonus. Presumably the company 
had that in their contract.
  Those are the problems with which we are dealing. It is not a lack of 
concern. It is real difficulties that exist. I salute both Senators 
from Colorado for their interest in these employees. I share those 
concerns.
  Mr. ALLARD. Will the Senator from Alabama yield?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I will be pleased to yield. I have just a minute, as I 
know the Presiding Officer is committed to leaving and I am supposed to 
replace her.
  Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, I appreciate the fine work of the 
Senator from Alabama, a good friend of mine. There are a couple points 
I would like to make.

[[Page S8731]]

  The workers at Rocky Flats were paid by Federal dollars. They were 
not technically employed by the Federal Government. Their benefits were 
paid by the Federal Government. There is a commitment there, in my 
view. This amendment tries to correct any legal problems we may have 
there.
  Again, I appreciate the concern and interest the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Strategic Affairs has toward this issue. I hope somehow 
we can resolve this in all fairness, not only to the taxpayers but also 
to the workers.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Senator.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, before my colleagues depart--I have been 
engaged in a wide variety of activities here--can the Senator advise 
me, through the Chair, are these to be pending amendments to be voted 
on? Is there to be a further period of debate? We want to accommodate 
the Senator's desire if he could give us a clarification of the 
procedures he hopes to have.
  Mr. ALLARD. Madam President, we may very well have to vote on these 
pending amendments. I would like to have them available for that 
purpose. I would like to continue to talk with the staff of the 
Department of Energy and the chairman and his staff. But if necessary, 
I would like to have an opportunity to have a vote on this amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator consider seeking the votes now so they 
are in that category? Does the Senator wish to have a rollcall vote, 
Madam President?
  Mr. ALLARD. The proper request is, I ask for their consideration.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendments are pending.
  Mr. WARNER. I think that is sufficient clarification.
  Mr. ALLARD. We would like to have a vote on the amendments.
  Mr. WARNER. At the appropriate time, we can arrange that.
  I thank the distinguished Senators from Colorado.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Madam President, I rise in strong support of amendment 
No. 1419 offered by Senator Allard, my good friend from Colorado. I 
fully support it. I think it demonstrates the bipartisan nature of this 
particular amendment.
  Let me make two points with respect to Rocky Flats. First and 
foremost, I think this Nation should be very grateful to the workers of 
Rocky Flats for having done what they did during almost five decades to 
make sure we did everything within our power to bring about an end to 
the Cold War. The men and women who worked at Rocky Flats were 
principally responsible for creating the nuclear arsenal we had in our 
Nation that allowed us to be strong during the Cold War, that allowed 
us to then bring the Cold War to an end.
  At the same time, it is important for us to recognize that within the 
Department of Energy complex today, there are numerous sites that are 
undergoing very difficult, very complex, and very expensive cleanups. 
The men and women of Rocky Flats, who have been working there for 
decades, have been the ones who have taught the United States of 
America, including the Department of Energy, what it is we have to do 
to make sure we can move forward with an efficient, effective cleanup 
that will cost less money.
  Indeed, the contract for the cleanup of Rocky Flats had called for 
that contract to be completed at the end of this year, 2005. But 
because of the good work of the men and women at Rocky Flats, that 
schedule has been expedited.

  Indeed, when one looks back at the history of Rocky Flats over the 
last several years, there was a time when it was thought Rocky Flats 
would not be cleaned up and ready for closure until 2010. Later it was 
2007, and moved back to 2006. Yet employees working with CH2M HILL at 
Rocky Flats have brought the conclusion of Rocky Flats to probably 
October of this year, which is only a few months away.
  For the employees who worked at Rocky Flats during this timeframe, 
they had an expectation that the contract would be in place through the 
end of December 31, 2005. The amendment which has been authored by 
Senator Allard and by myself and offered to our colleagues to consider 
simply recognizes the contribution of these employees so they are, in 
fact, made whole.
  With all due respect to my friend from Alabama, I have to say these 
employees were Federal employees and were brought in to continue the 
work that had to be done there at Rocky Flats with respect to the 
cleanup.
  The amount of money we are asking for in this amendment is a small 
amount relative to the billions and billions of dollars that have been 
spent in the Department of Energy complex and cleanups that have not 
been as successful as the one at Rocky Flats.
  I join my colleague Senator Allard in urging bipartisan support for 
this amendment because it recognizes, first, the men and women who 
helped us bring about the end of the Cold War and, second, the men and 
women who helped us demonstrate to this country how it is you take a 
facility contaminated with plutonium and how it is you clean it up in 
record time, and which will serve as a model for America as we move 
forward in the cleanup of DOE facilities.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from North Dakota.


                           Amendment No. 1415

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I have come to the floor to offer a couple 
of amendments. First I will say a few words about the amendment offered 
by the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from California. 
Senator Feinstein was speaking on it when I came to the Chamber today. 
That is the question of money that is designated to begin research on 
the construction, hopefully, according to those who want it, of an 
earth penetrating bunker buster nuclear weapon.
  There is somewhere in the neighborhood of 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear 
weapons on this Earth. Mr. President, 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons 
exist on this Earth. And now we have people talking about building new 
nuclear weapons in this country, building designer nuclear weapons, 
creating a new category of nuclear weapons, beginning to test nuclear 
weapons once again. That strikes me as pretty foolhardy because our 
responsibility as the world's superpower is to lead in a direction that 
tries to prevent nuclear weapons from ever entering into the hands of 
terrorists or rogue nations or adversaries. Our leadership 
responsibility is to try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to 
convince others not to build nuclear weapons.
  Let me read from Time magazine, March 11, 2002.

       For a few harrowing weeks last fall, a group of U.S. 
     officials believed that the worst nightmare of their lives--
     something even more horrific than 9/11--was about to come 
     true. In October, an intelligence alert went out to a small 
     number of Government agencies, including the Energy 
     Department's top secret Nuclear Emergency Search Team based 
     in Nevada. The report said terrorists were thought to have 
     obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon from the Russian arsenal 
     and planned to smuggle it into New York City.
       The source of the report was an agent code name Dragonfire 
     who intelligence officials believed was of ``undetermined'' 
     reliability. But Dragonfire's claim tracked with a report 
     from a Russian general who believed his forces were missing a 
     10-kiloton nuclear weapon.
       Since the mid-'90s, proliferation experts have suspected 
     that several portable nuclear devices might be missing from 
     the Russian stockpile. That made this Dragonfire report 
     alarming. So did this: Detonated in lower Manhattan, a 10-
     kiloton bomb would kill some 100,000 civilians. . . . And 
     counterterrorist investigators there went on their highest 
     state of alert.

  That was from Time magazine, March of 2002. Many of us heard reports 
of this before. It said following 9/11 in October of that year, there 
was a rumor that intelligence officials took seriously that terrorists 
had acquired a nuclear weapon and were intending to smuggle that 
nuclear weapon into a major American city and detonate it.
  Interestingly, no one believed it was impossible for someone to have 
obtained a nuclear weapon. There are 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons 
on this Earth. We hear the stories about the then-Russian nuclear 
stockpile of thousands of weapons without adequate control and 
maintenance, some reports about the command and control of those 
weapons being dealt with with pencil notations and notebook paper. So 
it was not beyond the pale that someone could have stolen a nuclear

[[Page S8732]]

weapon. Neither did intelligence officials doubt that having stolen a 
nuclear weapon, terrorists would be able to find a way to detonate a 
nuclear weapon.
  Why do I mention this? Because with the thousands of nuclear weapons 
that exist in this world, the acquisition of one nuclear bomb by a 
terrorist group detonated in a major city in this country or in other 
countries will cause a catastrophe unlike any we have ever known.
  (Mr. LUGAR assumed the Chair.)
  That ought to persuade us that our responsibility is to do everything 
humanly possible, as the world's most powerful nation, to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons, to prevent terrorists in rogue nations from 
ever acquiring nuclear weapons, and to begin reducing the number of 
nuclear weapons. That is our leadership responsibility. That 
responsibility falls to our country and yet we have people who say, 
well, not to worry about that; in fact, let us talk about building new 
nuclear weapons; let us design different nuclear weapons. There is even 
talk about potentially using a nuclear weapon. There is discussion 
about beginning testing nuclear weapons. I think that sort of thing is 
reckless because it sends a signal to the rest of the world that we are 
not really serious about trying to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 
in this world.
  We should be serious about it. It ought to be the highest priority 
for this country to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt the 
ability of terrorists to ever acquire a nuclear weapon with which they 
would threaten thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of 
people.
  This Defense authorization bill is spending a great deal of money on 
an antiballistic missile defense system, kind of a catcher's mitt, in 
case a terrorist organization or rogue nation would launch an 
intercontinental ballistic missile against our country with a nuclear 
warhead. This antiballistic missile program is kind of a catcher's mitt 
to go up and catch a speeding bullet and hit it with another speeding 
bullet. Frankly, it is the least likely threat to this country. The 
threat that a terrorist organization or a rogue nation would acquire an 
intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead and 
then shoot it at our country, that is one of the least likely 
scenarios.
  The most likely scenario would be a terrorist or rogue nation 
acquiring a nuclear weapon through theft or some other device and then 
deciding to put it in the trunk of a rusty car sitting in a dock in New 
York City or putting it in one of the many containers that show up at 
an American port on a container ship. After all, there are 5.7 million 
containers that show up at our ports. Only a very small percentage are 
ever inspected. That is a much greater, much more likely threat to this 
country.
  I have great concern about those who talk so easily about our country 
building new nuclear weapons, perhaps even using a nuclear weapon. We 
have heard that language in recent years, talking about the need to 
create designer nuclear weapons. Our responsibility is far greater than 
that. I believe our responsibility as a world leader is to lead in the 
direction of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; to do everything 
humanly possible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to do 
everything humanly possible to control the nuclear weapons that now 
exist and safeguard those nuclear weapons that now exist.
  Since the Presiding Officer is from the State of Ohio, I will show 
something I have shown many times that is in my desk. I ask unanimous 
consent to show my colleagues two pieces of information.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. This happens to be from a wing strut of a backfire bomber 
that the Soviets used to fly when we were in the Cold War. My 
assumption perhaps is that this bomber carried nuclear weapons. In the 
Cold War, the nuclear weapons on top of missiles were aimed at our 
country. The nuclear weapons carried in the bomb bay of a backfire 
bomber did not mean good things for our country.
  How did I acquire a piece of an airplane that was part of a Soviet 
bomber? This happens to be sawed off the wing of that airplane. It was 
sawed off the wing of an airplane at American taxpayer expense, one of 
the most successful things we have ever done. The reason I mention it 
now is the Presiding Officer's name is on that legislation, and through 
a program advanced by Senators Lugar and Nunn, we have had remarkable 
success in reducing the weapons delivery systems.
  This is from a bomber. This is the ground-up copper wire of a 
submarine that used to stealthily move under the waters of our oceans, 
again with nuclear weapons, with warheads prepared to aim at American 
cities. How did I acquire copper wire from a submarine that belonged to 
the Soviet Union? That submarine was taken apart, dismantled, as a 
result of arms control agreements that dismantled weapons delivery 
systems that at one point threatened America.
  It is now in this form, a piece of a bomber and copper wire from a 
submarine, which I hold in my hand on the Senate floor because programs 
like the Nunn-Lugar program, things like arms control agreements, do 
work and can work to reduce the threat in this country. I have had this 
in my desk for some while and have used it only to demonstrate that our 
responsibility as a world leader is to lead in the direction of doing 
everything humanly possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on 
this Earth, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue nations, 
terrorists, and other countries that desperately wish to acquire them, 
and to safeguard the nuclear weapons that already exist in our arsenal 
to make certain that they are not acquired by other interests.
  That is a diversion from the point I was making but an important one, 
I think. I came here to say that I support the amendment that has been 
offered today. I do not support the spending of money for the 
development of a designer nuclear weapon, bunker busters, whatever it 
might be called. It seems to me that is moving in exactly the wrong 
direction.
  Since I think the most likely threat is a stolen nuclear weapon put 
in the trunk of a rusty car at an American dock or an American city, I 
would hope that we would begin to spend as much time and resources 
dealing with the most likely threats as we do dealing with the most 
unlikely threat, and that is the spending of billions and billions of 
dollars to create an electronic catcher's mitt, an antiballistic 
missile system, in the belief that a rogue nation or a terrorist would 
acquire an ICBM and then arm it with a nuclear warhead.
  Could that conceivably happen? Perhaps, but it is the least likely 
threat we face from terrorists. The most likely threat is the theft of 
a nuclear weapon and the placement of that in the trunk of a car or in 
a container on a ship, and I hope we will spend as much time worrying 
about that and dealing with that as we do the other.
  Again, that is sort of a long way of saying I support the amendment 
that has been offered to strip the funding for the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator bunker buster.


                           Amendment No. 1426

  I send an amendment to the desk, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
laid aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1426.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate on the declassification 
  and release to the public of certain portions of the Report of the 
Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and to 
urge the President to release information regarding sources of foreign 
    support for the hijackers involved in the terrorist attacks of 
                          September 11, 2001)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. SENSE OF SENATE ON DECLASSIFICATION OF PORTIONS OF 
                   THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF 
                   SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:

[[Page S8733]]

       (1) The Administration has prevented the release to the 
     American public of 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry into 
     Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the 
     Terrorist Attacks of September 2001.
       (2) The contents of the redacted pages discuss sources of 
     foreign support for some of the hijackers involved in the 
     September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks while they were in the 
     United States.
       (3) The Administration's decision to classify this 
     information prevents the American people from having access 
     to information about the involvement of certain foreign 
     governments in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
       (4) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested that the 
     President release the 28 pages.
       (5) The Senate respects the need to keep information 
     regarding intelligence sources and methods classified, but 
     the Senate also recognizes that such purposes can be 
     accomplished through careful selective redaction of specific 
     words and passages, rather than effacing content entirely.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the President should declassify the 28-page section of 
     the Joint Inquiry into The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
     2001, that deals with foreign sources of support for the 
     hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
     attacks; and
       (2) only those portions of the report that would directly 
     compromise ongoing investigations or reveal intelligence 
     sources and methods should remain classified.

  Mr. DORGAN. This amendment that I have offered is a sense-of-the-
Senate amendment and it deals with this booklet. It is, as published, 
December 2002, ``A Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community 
Activities Before and After The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001,'' a report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, dated 
December 2, 2002.
  It was the first evaluation of intelligence related to the attack 
against this country on September 11, 2001.
  On page 395, and I will read a portion of it, it begins a discussion 
about something that is very sensitive and then it turns to 396 and 
subsequent pages. As we can see, those pages are blank. There are 28 
pages in the middle of this book that are blank. They are blank because 
they are classified at the moment as top secret. Members of Congress 
can, under certain conditions, go and read this top secret material. I 
and a good number of my colleagues have. Previously, I and other 
colleagues have as well brought to the attention of the Senate the need 
for this information to be declassified.
  The amendment that I offer is very simple. It says that the President 
should declassify the 28-page section of the joint inquiry into the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 that deals with foreign sources of 
support for the hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001, attack.
  The American people have been prevented from seeing this. I will, in 
a moment, quote from Senator Shelby and Senator Graham, then-chairman 
and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, both of 
whom felt that this information should be made available to the 
American people. But it has never been made available to the American 
people.
  Let me read the page prior to the 28 pages that have been redacted. 
Page 395:

       Finding: Through its investigation, the Joint Inquiry 
     developed information suggesting specific sources of foreign 
     support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they 
     were in the United States.

  Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia. The 
finding says they developed information suggesting specific sources of 
foreign support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were 
in the United States. The joint inquiry's review confirmed that the 
intelligence community also has information, much of which has yet to 
be independently verified, concerning these potential sources of 
support.

       Instead, the Joint Inquiry referred a detailed compilation 
     of information it had uncovered in documents and interviews 
     to the FBI and CIA for further investigation by the 
     Intelligence Community and, if appropriate, law enforcement 
     agencies.

  It talks then at the end of this page about the joint inquiry, which 
states:

       It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the 
     kind of extensive investigation that would be required to 
     determine the true significance of such alleged support to 
     the hijackers. On the one hand, it is possible that these 
     kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA 
     memorandum, ``incontrovertible evidence that there is support 
     for these terrorists,'' blank, blank, blank.

  At that point, it is redacted.
  This was classified at the White House. These documents went to the 
White House, then to be published publicly, and prior to publication 28 
pages were classified top secret. That is why in the middle of this 
booklet we see 28 pages with no information.
  There was a call to declassify it because a substantial amount of 
information in the press and elsewhere raised questions about this 
issue.
  I will read from The Washington Post at this point in time, December 
12, 2002:

       Leaders of the congressional panel ending an investigation 
     of the September 11, 2001, terrorism attacks yesterday 
     accused the administration of refusing to declassify 
     information about possible Saudi Arabian financial links to 
     U.S.-based terrorists because the material would be 
     embarrassing and would heighten political tensions with the 
     desert kingdom.

  Continuing from The Washington Post:

       In releasing the panel's final report on the intelligence 
     agencies' performance before the attacks, Sen. Bob Graham (D-
     Fla.), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, and 
     Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.), the vice chairman, said the 
     information on Saudi Arabia should be made public to inform 
     the public about a continued source of support for anti-
     American terrorism groups. Doing so also would put more 
     pressure on the U.S. government to force the Saudis to sever 
     their financial links to charities and individuals who 
     support terrorism, they said.

  In other comments, Senator Shelby said that he believed 90 to 95 
percent of this should be made available to the American people and 
would not compromise any intelligence sources.
  The President was asked about this issue. He was asked actually in a 
Rose Garden appearance back at that point before a meeting with King 
Saud, where the President said he had no qualms at all about rebuffing 
the request to release this information publicly because he said there 
is an ongoing investigation into the 9/11 attacks, and we do not want 
to compromise the investigation.
  Well, even the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia to the United States 
called for the release of this information because there was 
substantial speculation about what it said. I cannot say what it said 
on the Senate floor because it is top secret. I can read what Senator 
Shelby has said and what Senator Graham said on the Senate floor. I can 
show that in this report there are 28 pages which the American people 
are not allowed to see. I can say that there are published reports--and 
I have read them into the record now from The Washington Post and 
others and I will read into the record, if it is necessary, the 
comments from my two colleagues who were the chairman and ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee, that references Saudi Arabia. The 
point is even the Government of Saudi Arabia suggested and said 
publicly that this material should be declassified and made public.
  Senator Shelby, the vice chairman of the congressional inquiry at 
that point, reiterated his view that 90 to 95 percent of the classified 
pages could be released without jeopardizing national security.
  My point is this. I have reviewed the top secret material. I am sure 
many of my colleagues have. They all should. It contains information 
that the American people have a right to see.
  Let me again read the lead to the 28 redacted pages. Again, I am 
reading from the Joint Intelligence Committee Report:

       Through its investigation, the joint inquiry developed 
     information suggesting specific sources of foreign support 
     for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were in the 
     United States.

  Every Member of the Senate should read that top secret material. But 
every American citizen should have access, to understand what it says, 
because it should not be classified. It is unfair. It is unfair to the 
American people, and I submit it is unfair to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 
Arabian Government has said it ought to be unclassified.
  I have on a previous occasion offered this amendment to the Senate. 
There was an objection, so I offer the same amendment again today. It 
is now 4 years from the date of that attack. It is now long past the 
time when investigation is ongoing. The President said he would not 
declassify this because

[[Page S8734]]

there is an ongoing investigation into 9/11, and we don't want to 
compromise it. That investigation by the 9/11 Commission, authorized by 
the Congress--that investigation is over. So this excuse is no longer 
an excuse.
  I submit the American people have a right to know if there were those 
who provided support to the 9/11 terrorists who were in this country 
and preparing to launch the attack on 9/11. If there were those foreign 
governments, foreign interests, or as the report indicated simply, 
``foreign sources of support,'' then the American people have a right 
to know.
  My amendment is a very simple amendment, painfully simple. Once 
again, I offer it to say it is the sense of the Senate that this 
information shall be declassified. We ask the President to declassify 
this information and see that it is made available to the American 
people.
  I was intending to read this. I think I shall not--perhaps just a 
paragraph or two of it.
  My colleague, Senator Graham from Florida, who in fact stood at this 
desk and made this statement, he was then-chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee. Senator Shelby, who I described as chairman, was chairman at 
one point, and then Senator Graham as the ranking member, and then it 
switched and Senator Graham was chairman. During this particular time, 
Senator Graham, as chairman, and Senator Shelby, as vice chairman, both 
agreed that the bulk of this ought to be made available to the American 
people. Let me just quote the statement made on the floor of the Senate 
by our colleague, Senator Graham, the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee. He is describing this.

       This report makes a very compelling case, based on the 
     information submitted by the agencies themselves, that there 
     was a foreign government which was complicitous in the 
     actions leading up to September 11, at least as it relates to 
     some of the terrorists who were present in the United States.
       There are two big questions yet to be answered. Why would 
     this government have provide the level of assistance--
     financial, logistical, housing, support service--to some of 
     the terrorists and not to all of the terrorists? We asked 
     that question. There has been no response.
       My own hypothesis--and I will describe it as that--

  I am continuing to quote Senator Graham--

       is that in fact similar assistance was being provided to 
     all or at least most of the terrorists. The difference is 
     that we happened, because of a set of circumstances which are 
     contained in these 28 censored pages, to have an unusual 
     window on a few of the terrorists. We did not have a similar 
     window on others. Therefore, it will take more effort to 
     determine if they were, in fact, receiving that assistance.

  I continue to quote Senator Graham of Florida.

       An even more serious question is what would lead us to 
     believe that if there was this infrastructure of a foreign 
     government supporting some of the 19 terrorists, that as soon 
     as September 11 concluded, as soon as the last flames were 
     put out at the Pentagon, the World Trade Center and on the 
     field in Pennsylvania, all that infrastructure was 
     immediately taken down? Again, this is my hypothesis: I don't 
     believe it was taken down. I believe that infrastructure is 
     likely to still be in place assisting the next generation of 
     terrorists who are in the United States.

  Those are very fundamental questions, and if the public had access to 
these 28 pages, they would be demanding answers.
  That is a response from the chairman of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, not some partisan, with sentiments echoed largely by the 
vice chairman of the committee, about the top secret classification of 
those 28 pages.
  My amendment, once again, simply says I believe the American people 
have the right to know what is on these pages. These 28 pages are 
blank. I know what is there. Some of my colleagues know what is there 
because we are able to see top secret material. The American people 
don't know what is there, and they should.
  Having read it, I simply say they ought to have the right to see it 
as well, and my amendment is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment that would 
ask the President to make available, to declassify this material, so 
there are no longer questions about what it says.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague, and I 
assure him, in consultation with the chairman and indeed the ranking 
member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, his amendment will be 
given every careful consideration.

  Mr. President, at this time I know there is another Senator.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am not finished. I thought you were 
asking me to yield for a question.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, I wasn't quite certain. I thought there was a brief 
time in which you were going to address the Senate. I am trying to 
accommodate one of your colleagues.
  Mr. DORGAN. I have one additional amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Can the Senator advise the Chair and the Senate the time 
you would require?
  Mr. DORGAN. I indicated to my colleague I would be speaking about 20 
minutes, but I have one additional amendment that probably will take 
about 10 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Very well, Mr. President. We will all wait that period of 
time. Thank you.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the 
Senator from North Dakota, if it is not already locked in, then the 
Senator from Colorado be recognized to introduce three amendments which 
will take a total of--about how long?
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, approximately 15 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Approximately 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my understanding was we had ample time 
this afternoon. I will truncate my remarks. I had intended to speak 
longer than 10 minutes, but I don't want to disadvantage my colleague 
on the floor or disadvantage those managing the bill. I will come back 
on Monday and speak at greater length about the amendment I will offer 
now and keep my comments short at this moment.
  Mr. WARNER. I would very much appreciate it if the Senator will 
accommodate the Senate in that way.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending 
amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1429

(Purpose: To establish a special committee of the Senate to investigate 
  the awarding and carrying out of contracts to conduct activities in 
        Afghanistan and Iraq and to fight the war on terrorism)

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment for myself, Senator 
Durbin, and Senator Lautenberg. I send the amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself, 
     Mr. Durbin, and Mr. Lautenberg, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1429.

  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that deals with a 
subject I have previously brought to the floor of the Senate, so far 
unsuccessfully, but my hope is this time perhaps I will have better 
luck. It deals with the question of dramatic waste, fraud, and abuse in 
contracting, particularly with respect to the war effort in Iraq.
  In the early 1940s, 1941 to be exact, Harry Truman, a Democrat from 
the State of Missouri, serving here in the Senate when a Democratic 
President was in the White House, decided that he wanted to have an 
investigation of what he considered substantial waste, fraud, and abuse 
in Pentagon spending and spending by contractors. I am sure it was 
uncomfortable for a Democrat in the White House to have a member of his 
own party in the Senate pushing, but he did. He kept pushing as only 
Harry Truman could, and created finally a Truman committee, a special 
committee. They held hearings all around the country. They were 
relentless. They found massive amounts of waste, fraud, and abuse in 
spending--yes, even during the war effort. It was, perhaps, 
uncomfortable for everybody that this was going on, that this kind of 
inquiry existed. But Harry Truman was not about to take a ``no'' answer

[[Page S8735]]

from anybody, so he pushed and pushed.
  Finally, it came on the radar screen in the Senate that when you 
spend money, particularly when you are at war, you can't have people 
profiteering. It has to be spent effectively in support of this 
country's interests in support of our troops.
  We have a war in Iraq. We have soldiers in harm's way in Afghanistan. 
We are moving massive quantities of money out the door in the 
Congress--$81 billion here, $45 billion there, $55 billion there. It 
is, in many cases, going to contractors--some substantial amounts to 
replenish Defense Department accounts, but a substantial amount to 
contractors.
  We hear substantial waste, fraud, and abuse. It almost makes you 
sick. This is a picture of $2 million wrapped in Saran wrap. In fact, 
the guy standing right here said they were playing football, playing 
catch with bundles of hundred-dollar bills. What were they doing with 
this? They were actually giving money to contractors in Iraq. 
Contractors were told: Bring a bag, we pay in cash. Bring a bag because 
we pay in cash over here.
  This picture shows what was going on. The guy who did this testified 
before a committee at a hearing that I held. I don't need to go through 
a lot of charts, but ``Uncle Sam Looks Into Meal Bills, Halliburton 
Refunds $27 Million.''
  We had one example: Halliburton corporation charging the American 
taxpayer. They were feeding 42,000 a day--at least that is what they 
were charging for, 42,000 meals a day. Guess what. They were only 
serving 14,000 meals a day.
  I came from a small town that had a really small restaurant. I can 
understand them missing a cheeseburger or two, but a corporation that 
overcharges the Federal Government for feeding soldiers by 28,000 meals 
a day?
  Then we had another hearing. We had one of the food service 
supervisors in Iraq who works for a subsidiary of Halliburton. He said 
we were feeding food that was outdated and expired, expired stamps on 
it by as much as a year.
  I see the Washington Times had a little blurb today. They mentioned 
that. People were writing in and saying: That is nothing, we used to 
eat old K rations. Does anybody believe it is right that when we send 
our soldiers to Iraq and we have food hauled over by a contractor and 
we pay for good food to be fed to our troops, and then they end up with 
food that is expired for a year, they say that is OK, serve it to the 
troops; and if a convoy comes through and is subject to attack the 
supervisor says, you grab that food out, pull the shells out and 
shrapnel out, and feed it to the troops. I put that testimony in the 
Record.
  Let me tell you, a top civilian official at the Corps of Engineers, 
involved in awarding sole-source contracts to companies like 
Halliburton--and there are more involved--the top civilian official is 
a wonderful woman with a wonderful record who has worked for years for 
this country. Here is what she said. And by the way, she is paying for 
it with her career because whistleblowing is not looked upon with favor 
by the old boys network. Here is what she said, Bunny Greenhouse:

       I can unequivocally state that the abuse related to the 
     contracts awarded to K.B.R. Halliburton represents the most 
     blatant and improper contract abuse I have witnessed during 
     the course of my professional career. She is paying for this 
     bit of honesty with her career because the good old boys 
     don't like to hear that.

  The question is, for all the things that are being done--payment to 
have a room air conditioned, have the contractor come pick up a bag of 
cash, and it goes to a subcontractor--pretty soon the American 
taxpayers' payment to have room air conditioning, turns out the room 
has a little fan in it and we paid for air conditioners.
  It is unbelievable what is going on. There are 85,000 brand new 
trucks left on the roadside because they had a flat tire, to be trashed 
and torched. Plugged fuel pumps? Dump the truck.
  It is unbelievable what is going on in waste, fraud, and abuse. I 
have held five hearings in the policy committee on this. We had 
whistleblowers who have the courage to show up and talk about what is 
going on. There are 50,000 tons of nails laying in the sands of Saudi 
Arabia because they ordered the wrong size, so they dump them on the 
sands. The American taxpayer will pay for that. Need some towels for 
troops? The Halliburton subsidiary orders towels for troops and they 
nearly doubled the cost of the towels so they could put their logo on 
the towels.
  Yes, it is going on all the time. It is unbelievable. And nobody does 
a thing about it. Nothing. Do you think this Congress is holding 
aggressive oversight hearing? None. Nobody is interested. Why? Because 
it would embarrass somebody. Meanwhile the American taxpayer is taking 
a bath and the troops are being poorly served, in my judgment, with 
this sort of nonsense.
  My amendment is simple. I will speak at some length on Monday. I want 
to truncate this for the sake of the time problems my colleagues have. 
My amendment is very simple. My amendment calls for the establishment 
of a Truman-type committee again that would do the oversight that is 
not being done by this Congress. It will be bipartisan. It seems to me 
we have an obligation to the American people and we have an obligation 
to our troops. I offer the amendment and I will come back and speak 
later.
  In the interest of time problems, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague. The Senator brings 
to the Senate a very serious proposal. It will be given serious 
consideration.
  At this time, the Senator from Colorado desires to be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Before the distinguished Senator addresses the Senate, I 
see our distinguished colleague from Connecticut. If I could inquire as 
to the Senator's wishes. We are trying to arrange a schedule.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Virginia. Five 
minutes is the maximum I require.
  Mr. DORGAN. If I might I make one comment, I defamed my friend, the 
Presiding Officer. I suggested some while ago he was from Ohio. He, in 
fact, is from Indiana. I have known that all along, and those in the 
Northern Great Plains see everything out there as east. But my 
distinguished colleague Senator Lugar, to whom I refer, is from 
Indiana. I talked about Nunn-Lugar and the wonderful work done. I want 
to make sure I identify it correctly.
  Mr. LEVIN. We, the defamed people from Michigan, are really from 
Ohio.
  Mr. WARNER. If I might ask that the Senator from Connecticut be 
recognized following the remarks by the Senator from Ohio--the Senator 
from Colorado.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. SALAZAR. It is, indeed, fortunate to be a Senator from the State 
of Colorado.
  I start my comments by giving my appreciation to the Senator from 
Virginia, Senator Warner, and to the Senator from Michigan, Senator 
Levin, for their great leadership in putting together what is a very 
good bill.
  I also thank their staffs because at the end of the day I know how 
much of the work goes into these major pieces of legislation put 
together by our great staffs. Judy Ainslee and Rick DeBobes have done a 
fantastic job on behalf of the United States, on behalf of the Senate. 
I thank them for their efforts.


             Amendments Nos. 1421, 1422, and 1423, en bloc

  I ask that the pending amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I have a series of amendments at the 
desk, Nos. 1421, 1422, and 1423. I ask they be called up en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Salazar] proposes amendments 
     numbered 1421, 1422, and 1423, en bloc.

  Mr. SALAZAR. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendments be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 1421

(Purpose: To rename the death gratuity payable for deaths of members of 
             the Armed Forces as fallen hero compensation)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

[[Page S8736]]

     SEC. 642. RENAMING OF DEATH GRATUITY PAYABLE FOR DEATHS OF 
                   MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS FALLEN HERO 
                   COMPENSATION.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 1475(a), by striking ``have a death gratuity 
     paid'' and inserting ``have fallen hero compensation paid''.
       (2) In section 1476(a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a death gratuity'' and 
     inserting ``fallen hero compensation''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``A death gratuity'' and 
     inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
       (3) In section 1477(a), by striking ``A death gratuity'' 
     and inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
       (4) In section 1478(a), by striking ``The death gratuity'' 
     and inserting ``The amount of fallen hero compensation''.
       (5) In section 1479 (1), by striking ``the death gratuity'' 
     and inserting ``fallen hero compensation''.
       ( 6) In section 1489--
       (A) in subscction (a), by striking ``a gratuity'' in the 
     mattcr preceding paragTaph (1) and inserting ``fallcn hero 
     compensation''; and
       (B) in suhscetion (b) (2), by inserting ``or othcr 
     assistanee'' after ``lesser death gratuity''.
       (b) Clerical Amendments.--
       (1) Such subchapter is further amended by striking ``Death 
     gratuity:'' each place it appears in the heading of sections 
     1475 through 1480 and 1489 and inserting ``Fallen hero 
     compensation:''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such 
     subchapter is amended by striking ``Death gratuity:'' in the 
     items relating to sections 1474 through 1480 and 1489 and 
     inserting ``Fallen hero compensation:''.
       (c) General References.--Any reference to a death gratuity 
     payable under subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10, United 
     States Code, in any law, regulation, document, paper, or 
     other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a 
     reference to fallen hero compensation payable under such 
     subchapter, as amended by this section.


                           amendment no. 1422

 (Purpose: To provide that certain local educational agencies shall be 
 eligible to receive a fiscal year 2005 payment under section 8002 or 
      8003 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965)

       At the end of subtitle G of title V, insert the following:

     SEC. 585. APPLICATIONS FOR IMPACT AID PAYMENT.

       Notwithstanding paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 8005(d) 
     of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 7705(d)(2), (3)), the Secretary of Education shall 
     treat as timely filed, and shall process for payment, an 
     application under section 8002 or section 8003 of such Act 
     for fiscal year 2005 from a local educational agency that--
       (1) for each of the fiscal years 2000 through 2004, 
     submitted an application by the date specified by the 
     Secretary of Education under section 8005(c) of such Act for 
     the fiscal year; and
       (2) submits an application for fiscal year 2005 during the 
     period beginning on February 2, 2004, and ending on the date 
     of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 1423

   (Purpose: To provide for Department of Defense support of certain 
                      Paralympic sporting events)

       At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 330. PROVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR 
                   CERTAIN PARALYMPIC SPORTING EVENTS.

       Section 2564 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraphs:
       ``(4) A sporting event sanctioned by the United States 
     Olympic Committee through the Paralympic Military Program.
       ``(5) A national or international Paralympic sporting event 
     (other than one covered by paragraph (3) or (4)) which is--
       ``(A) held in the United States or any of its territories 
     or commonwealths;
       ``(B) governed by the International Paralympic Committee; 
     and
       ``(C) sanctioned by the United States Olympic Committee.''; 
     and
       (2) in subsection (d)--
       (A) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Secretary''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Not more than $1,000,000 may be expended in any 
     fiscal year to provide support for events specified under 
     paragraph (5) of subsection (c).''.

  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, before discussing these amendments, I 
underscore the great importance of this legislation. This legislation 
sends an important message to our troops and to their families, to the 
important work it funds, and the important signal it sends to the world 
from the United States of America.
  Today, more than 15,000 people from my State are serving overseas in 
support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan. Many of these soldiers, air men and women, reservists, and 
National Guard men and women are preparing for their second tour of 
duty away from their families.
  The 4,000 soldiers of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment are in Iraq 
for their second tour of duty, and 1,800 soldiers from the 43rd Area 
Support Group and 130 from the 571st Medical Company are also overseas, 
while the 947th Engineering Company and the second of the 135th 
Aviation Battalion are preparing to leave for Iraq in the fall.
  I give a sincere welcome home to all 3,762 soldiers from the 2nd 
Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry, who are returning to their families 
in Colorado Springs as I stand in the Senate today.
  The most moving thing I have done since coming to the Senate some 6 
months ago was a bipartisan trip which I took to Iraq led by Senator 
Harry Reid from Nevada. On that trip I saw many moving things, though 
nothing more impressive than our troops and their dedication to the 
mission and to their units.
  Shortly after returning to the United States from Iraq, I dropped a 
line to Lieutenant Colonel ``Mac'' from Colorado whom I had met on the 
trip. I inquired how he was doing, and in responding he wrote:

       Our troops' spirits remain high. Some more than others, as 
     I've worked and received permission to allow about 40 of our 
     troops to redeploy early, as the pace of our support has 
     decreased and will remain steady but not too hectic over the 
     next six months of our deployment. Having worked the plan 
     from start to final approval, I am personally happy knowing 
     that they will be able to spend more quality time with their 
     loved ones. I know my place is here, and will remain until we 
     all leave in early Autumn.

  That one response from one lieutenant colonel underscored our troops' 
dedication to the cause we are engaged in. This young man with his own 
family back in Colorado Springs was celebrating that members of his 
unit--not he--were returning home to their families. Thousands of 
troops are making that same selfless sacrifice every day. We owe each 
of them the best possible equipment and training. They and their 
families also should expect that we will ensure their quality of life.
  The $441 billion bill in the amendments we have adopted in the last 
day will begin to do just that. That bill authorizes a total of $109 
billion in appropriations to the Department of Defense for military 
personnel, and $236 million of that amount is more than the President's 
budget requested.
  In my State of Colorado, where more than 9,000 troops are currently 
deployed overseas, I am especially mindful of the important quality-of-
life investments that have been included in this bill.
  The bill would provide a 3.1-percent across-the-board pay raise for 
military personnel. That is important to honor our men and women in 
uniform. It authorizes the payment of imminent danger pay to 
servicemembers hospitalized as a result of wounds they have incurred as 
a result of hostile action for the duration of their hospitalization. 
That is a move in the right direction. It would permanently increase 
the fallen hero compensation for servicemembers killed in combat or 
combat-related activities from $12,000 to $100,000. With the inclusion 
of Senator Levin's important amendment, it will ensure that the family 
of any active-duty soldier who was killed will qualify for this 
important assistance.
  The legislation also permanently increases the maximum amount of 
coverage for group life insurance from $250,000 to $400,000. That is 
the right start. I am hopeful with the inclusion of Senator Nelson's 
amendment we will eliminate the survivor benefit plan dependency 
indemnity compensation offset and fix serious inequities in how the 
military treats the survivors of military retirees.
  The bill also extends several bonuses relating to recruiting and 
retention, including the selected reserve reenlistment bonus, the ready 
reserve enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, the prior service 
enlistment bonus, the enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for active-
duty members, and the retention bonus for servicemembers with critical 
military skills.
  I will cosponsor an amendment with my friends Senators Lieberman, 
Clinton, and Nelson, to increase the size of our Active-Duty Army by 
80,000 troops. Increasing the size of our military will reduce the 
strain placed on individual

[[Page S8737]]

soldiers, improving the quality of their lives and their families' 
lives. It will allow our fighting men and women to spend more time at 
home with their families between deployments. It will address what is 
today an overstretched American Army. Most importantly, adding 80,000 
troops will help to defend our Nation at home and abroad with the 
strongest military in the world.

  Our health care for our troops and their families also is addressed. 
This bill would extend health care coverage under TRICARE Prime for the 
children of active-duty servicemembers who died while on active duty 
and who have been on active duty for a period of more than 30 days, so 
the dependent child would be able to receive TRICARE until age 21.
  After the inclusion on Thursday of the excellent bipartisan amendment 
offered by Senators Graham and Clinton, it will ensure access to 
TRICARE for Guard and Reserve and that care will continue.
  This bill also requires the Secretary of Defense to report to 
Congress about the adverse health effects that may be associated with 
the use of antimalaria drugs.
  This is a good bill. The bill is vitally important for the work it 
also funds. It funds $78.2 billion for procurement. It authorizes $127 
billion for operations and maintenance. It does a lot to support our 
investment in creating a strong defense for our Nation.
  I am particularly pleased the committee included $6.4 million to 
construct a Space Warning Squadron Support Facility at the Greeley Air 
National Guard Station. Our air guard provides a vital service at that 
station, but the current facility is substandard by anyone's measure. 
When personnel leave that facility, they drape plastic over their 
computers today so they are not destroyed by the water that leaks 
through the roof.
  I am also pleased with the inclusion of the amendment offered by my 
colleagues from Kentucky, Senators McConnell and Bunning, and my good 
friend from Colorado, Senator Allard, that we are prepared to take 
another positive step forward in meeting our responsibility to destroy 
the chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Army Depot. I am also 
hopeful with the efforts of my good friend Senator Allard and efforts I 
have undertaken with him, we will be able to wrap up the cleanup of 
Rocky Flats in a successful manner.
  This bill is important because it sends a message to the world. There 
is no more comprehensive statement of our dedication to defend this 
country and to maintain our position in the world. Our enemies should 
never take comfort in any sense that America is disengaging from the 
world. This bill sends a very clear message on two vitally important 
threats.
  On Wednesday, a group of leading defense and foreign policy experts, 
led by former Defense Secretary Perry, concluded:

     . . . the gravest threat facing America today is a terrorist 
     detonating a nuclear bomb in one of our cities. The National 
     Security Advisory Group judges that the Bush Administration 
     is taking insufficient actions to counter this threat.

  We must do better. Knowing that such a horrendous act is even 
possible, we must take every step possible now to ensure it does not 
come about.
  This bill authorizes $415 million for DOD's Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, taking an important first step in locking down, 
perhaps, the most ready source of nuclear materials for terrorists.
  With the inclusion of the Lugar amendment, of which I was proud to be 
a cosponsor, I hope we will begin to cut through the red tape that has 
hindered our efforts at locking down this threat for far too long. I 
commend my colleague from Indiana for his leadership over the decades 
on this effort.
  Authorizing a total of $50 billion in supplemental appropriations for 
this next fiscal year for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the global war on terror, the bill also tells the world we are not 
deterred by the hateful attacks on buses and trains in London or on 
cars in Baghdad.
  We are prepared, once again, to fulfill our obligations to fund the 
effort in Iraq. I repeat my plea to the President that he frankly 
discuss his plan for success in Iraq with the American people while he 
candidly informs Americans about how we will pay for it.
  I am also hopeful that as this bill moves forward to its final form, 
the amendments I have called up for consideration will also be 
included.
  Amendment No. 1421 would simply change the name of the ``death 
gratuity'' to ``fallen hero compensation.'' This amendment was approved 
by the Senate in the supplemental appropriations bill but was dropped 
in conference.
  ``Death gratuity'' is the name for the assistance that taxpayers make 
available to military survivors. The term ``gratuity'' means gift. Not 
one of the widows, widowers, or children left behind think of that 
money as a gift. This is a simple change. There should be no opposition 
from Members of this body to include that name change. It more properly 
reflects the sacrifices military survivors have made and more properly 
expresses the gratitude and dignity we as a nation owe these families.
  Amendment No. 1423, the Paralympic amendment, would allow the 
Pentagon's Office of Special Events to provide support to national and 
international Paralympic competitions hosted in the United States with 
a million-dollar limit on support in any one year. The Office of 
Special Events today supports the regular Olympics and other 
international sporting events. All this amendment does is to say we 
will treat our disabled athletes with the same support and respect.
  The amendment would also allow support of a new USOC program that has 
been developed to assist with the rehabilitation of disabled veterans 
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a simple amendment that 
addresses a very important issue, especially to the disabled veterans 
who are returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom.
  Amendment No. 1422 is another amendment that improves upon this bill. 
It will restore badly needed educational impact aid funding to the El 
Paso School District, which educates the children of more than 60 
percent of the military personnel serving our Nation at the Fort Carson 
military base in Colorado.
  For the 2004-2005 fiscal year, the El Paso School District submitted 
its application for impact aid to the Department of Education on time, 
but due to inadvertence and, perhaps, bureaucratic misdirection and 
mistake, it was deemed to be untimely because they failed to submit the 
application in electronic format. As a result, the school district that 
serves mostly military families was assessed a 10-percent penalty. This 
amendment will deem the school district's application as timely. The 
money is already in the Department of Education's budget. Thus, this 
amendment does not take money away from another source or another 
State.
  One may ask, What connection does this have to our service personnel? 
And why is it so critical to the support of our military personnel?
  First of all, 60 percent of the 5,500 El Paso School District 
students belong to military families stationed at Fort Carson, and they 
will be impacted by the cut in the amount of money available for their 
education.
  Many of the loved ones of the students and staff of the El Paso 
School District have been deployed to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. In fact, over 11,000 soldiers from Fort Carson are currently 
deployed in Iraq today. That is over one-half of the fort's total 
forces. Many units from Fort Carson are now starting their second and 
third tours of duty in Iraq. Sadly, over 50 service personnel from Fort 
Carson have died in active duty in Iraq over the last several years.
  Without the funds we are requesting, the school district will be 
forced to lay off teachers and cut educational programs that educate 
the families of service personnel. Our military personnel sacrifice a 
great deal for our freedom. We owe it to them to restore the 
educational funding for their children.
  In closing, I am reminded once again of the thousands of Macs--just 
like the valiant lieutenant colonel I met in Kuwait--who are standing 
guard each and every day to protect our Nation. I am mindful of their 
families--in my own State, in Colorado Springs, in Denver,

[[Page S8738]]

in Grand Junction; in small, rural communities, and in every State and 
community throughout our Nation--awaiting their return or dreading 
their departure. We owe them, as the Senate, our best work.
  This bill is very good work. As I started my comments today, I 
commended the leadership of my friends from Michigan and Virginia and 
their staffs for their great work. I hope our Democrats and Republicans 
will join together, as we move forward, to bring this legislation to 
successful conclusion because it is important for a strong defense for 
our country.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to assure our distinguished 
colleague from Colorado that we will give very careful consideration to 
his amendments.
  Have they been sent to the desk, I ask the Presiding Officer?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that they be set 
aside, such that the Senator from Connecticut is to be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let me thank the 
Senator from Colorado for his extremely thoughtful and sensitive 
statement about what this bill is all about. I thank him for his kind 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  Let me first thank the chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, and the ranking 
member, the distinguished Senator from Michigan, for the extraordinary 
work they have done in bringing this bill forward. I am honored to be a 
member of the committee and proudly support its work.


                           Amendment No. 1389

  Mr. President, I rise today to speak specifically about amendment No. 
1389 offered by the Senator from South Dakota, Mr. Thune. I am one of 
many cosponsors of this amendment. Its intention is to delay the 
implementation of the current round of base realignment and closures, 
the so-called BRAC, until we are better able to assess our defense 
needs.
  The news from London in the last few days reminds us in the most 
stark and stunning ways of the fact that we are at war. It may not feel 
like that to most of us. It is a different kind of war. But there is an 
enemy out there worldwide who is committed to achieving some kind of 
victory over us and our allies and establishing a regime in a 
significant part of the world that would be fanatical, hateful, and, to 
say the least, undermine our national security and our national 
principles.
  In the midst of such a war, it seems to me the reduction of our base 
structure has to be done with real care. The point of Senator Thune's 
amendment, to delay this process, is this: One, we are in a war. As 
Senator Salazar said with great effect and poignancy, we have tens of 
thousands of American soldiers coming and going from Iraq, using bases 
in a way we may not have foreseen when this particular base realignment 
and closure process began.
  We also are being asked and the Commission is being asked to make 
final judgments about some very important military installations in our 
country but before our final facts are before the Commission, the 
Congress, and the Pentagon. That is the intention of the Thune 
legislation, which, as I say, I am a cosponsor of--to put the brakes 
on, to say, let's not rush to judgment. Because in some cases of bases 
the Pentagon has recommended be closed, we may look back and say: This 
rush to judgment has really been a dash to disaster, that we have 
closed some military facilities we will urgently need in the years 
ahead.
  Of course, I support cutting excess and unneeded defense spending and 
support saving money where we can. That is why I earlier voted for the 
BRAC round. But I think Senator Thune and I, and so many others, when 
we saw the recommendations come out--now, in the middle of a war, based 
on information that is incomplete--we said to ourselves: Let's just 
step back a bit and get the facts we need before we make these final 
judgments.
  Let me state it clearly. I have a local interest in this. The 
Pentagon has recommended, as all my colleagues know, the closing of 
Submarine Base New London, an extraordinary, in my opinion, national 
asset. But the point I want to make is if you close, God forbid, 
Submarine Base New London or some of these other bases that are 
recommended for closure, that is it. This is not like turning off the 
water in your house when you go away for a summer vacation, and when 
you come back and turn it back on, there is the water. If you close a 
base like Submarine Base New London, it is never going to be opened 
again. Therefore, you have to be able to reach a conclusion that not 
only is it not of military value today and in the near future, but it 
never will be; that is, in decades ahead, in an uncertain world. In 
this case of this submarine base--and I fear in some of the others--the 
facts that were used as a basis for the judgment do not stand up.
  Too often, monetary savings have been confused with military value, 
and military value has been based on judgments that are incomplete. And 
here I come to one of our larger points: The Pentagon is now in the 
midst of its Quadrennial Defense Review, the most significant 
overarching review of America's military needs and goals for the 
future. That review is due next year. But we are being asked through 
BRAC and eventually in Congress to make final judgments on these bases 
before the final information is in, in the midst of a war.
  I can tell you about Submarine Base New London, which I know best. 
The recommendation to close seems to be based on an estimate of the 
size of our submarine force, our attack submarine force, in the years 
ahead, which is the lowest anyone has ever seen and lower than every 
other study that has been done. I suppose if the base is closed, it 
will prejudge the fact. But I fear we will look back and say in the 
years ahead, as we face rising pure competitors: Why did we ever do 
that? I have enough confidence in this particular Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission and the independence and strength with which they 
are going at their responsibilities, at every turn making it clear they 
are not just going to be a rubberstamp for the Pentagon, that they are 
not going to allow Submarine Base New London to be closed. But I worry 
there are bases across this Nation that are recommended for closing on 
insubstantial, incomplete information that we will regret having 
closed. This amendment No. 1389 says: Let's just step back for a while. 
Let's wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review is in. Let's wait until 
we see the return of some more of our troops from Iraq so we know what 
our base needs are here at home. Let us not rush to judgment.
  We are talking about our national security in a time of war, in an 
uncertain world, with rising new superpowers, but much more menacing 
than that: rogue states and nonstate actors gaining access to weapons 
of mass destruction. We have to get this right. I believe Senator 
Thune's amendment would help us do that.
  Mr. President, I will just say one final word about the news from 
London. I am sure the distinguished occupant of the chair, like myself, 
has been following these developments closely. They remind us that 
there is an insidious group out there, a fanatical group that will 
strike at civilians and try to strike panic in the hearts of average 
citizens to gain their political goals.
  What has been as stirring as the attacks in London have been 
revolting has been the reaction of the British people. It really does 
remind us of their strength and determination during the Second World 
War. It is an inspiration. Most of all, I hope it will send a message 
to these terrorists that they may strike, but we are stronger than they 
are. Our principles are superior to theirs. They will never defeat us. 
I thank our friends from Britain, the average citizens, whose actions 
and words speak so loudly to us of their faith in the future, for 
giving us that model and that inspiration. We stand with them today as 
they have stood with us on so many previous days.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.


            Amendments Nos. 1343, 1430 through 1432, En Bloc

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

[[Page S8739]]

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if my distinguished ranking member is 
prepared, we are about to send a series of amendments to the desk which 
have been cleared on both sides. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc, the amendments be 
agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table. 
Finally, I ask that any statements relating to any of these individual 
amendments be printed in the Record.
  Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 1343

(Purpose: To increase the limit on the value of assistance that may be 
   provided to eligible entities to carry out procurement technical 
     assistance programs operating on less than a Statewide basis)

       On page 237, after line 17, add the following:

     SEC. 846. INCREASED LIMIT APPLICABLE TO ASSISTANCE PROVIDED 
                   UNDER CERTAIN PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
                   PROGRAMS.

       Section 2414(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``$150,000'' and inserting ``$300,000''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 1430

   (Purpose: To clarify certain authorities relating to adoptions by 
                      members of the Armed Forces)

         At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 653. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN 
                   INTERMEDIARIES UNDER CERTAIN AUTHORITIES 
                   RELATING TO ADOPTIONS.

         (a)  Reimbersement for Adoption Expenses.--Section 
     1052(g)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting ``or other source authorized to place children for 
     adoption under State or local law'' after ``qualified 
     adoption agency''.
         (b) Treatment as Children for Medical and Dental Care 
     Purposes.--Section 1072(6)(D)(i) of such title is amended by 
     inserting 11, or by any other source authorized by State or 
     local law to provide adoption placement,'' after 
     ``(recognized by the Secretary of Defense)''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 1431

  (Purpose: To require a Comptroller General study on the features of 
    successful personnel management systems of highly technical and 
                         scientific workforces)

       At the end of title XI, add the following:

     SEC. 1106. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY ON FEATURES OF 
                   SUCCESSFUL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OF 
                   HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC WORKFORCES.

       (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study to identify the features of 
     successful personnel management systems of the highly 
     technical and scientific workforces of the Department of 
     Defense laboratories and similar scientific facilities and 
     institutions.
       (b) Elements.--The study required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An examination of the flexible personnel management 
     authorities, whether under statute or regulations, currently 
     being utilized at Department of Defense demonstration 
     laboratories to assist in the management of the workforce of 
     such laboratories.
       (2) An identification of any flexible personnel management 
     authorities, whether under statute or regulations, available 
     for use in the management of Department of Defense 
     laboratories to assist in the management of the workforces of 
     such laboratories that are not currently being utilized.
       (3) An assessment of personnel management practices 
     utilized by scientific and technical laboratories and 
     institutions that are similar to the Department of Defense 
     laboratories.
       (4) A comparative analysis of the specific features 
     identified by the Comptroller General in successful personnel 
     management systems of highly technical and scientific 
     workforces to attract and retain critical employees and to 
     provide local management authority to Department of Defense 
     laboratory officials.
       (c) Purposes.--The purposes of the study shall include--
       (1) the identification of the specific features of 
     successful personnel management systems of highly technical 
     and scientific workforces;
       (2) an assessment of the potential effects of the 
     utilization of such features by Department of Defense 
     laboratories on the missions of such laboratories and on the 
     mission of the Department of Defense as a whole; and
       (3) recommendations as to the future utilization of such 
     features in Department of Defense laboratories.
       (d) Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Authorities.--The 
     laboratory personnel demonstration authorities set forth in 
     this subsection are as follows:
       (1) The authorities in section 342(b) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 
     103-337; 108 Stat. 2721), as amended by section 1114 of the 
     Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398 (114 
     Stat. 1654A-315)).
       (2) The authorities in section 1101 of the Strom Thurmond 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
     (Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note).
       (e) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit 
     to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
     study required by this section. The report shall include--
       (1) a description of the study;
       (2) an assessment of the effectiveness of the current 
     utilization by the Department of Defense of the laboratory 
     personnel demonstration authorities set forth in subsection 
     (d); and
       (3) such recommendations as the Comptroller General 
     considers appropriate for the effective use of available 
     personnel management authorities to ensure the successful 
     personnel management of the highly technical and scientific 
     workforce of the Department of Defense laboratories.
       (f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and 
     Government Reform of the House of Representatives.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 1432

 (Purpose: To extend the effective date of the Higher Education Relief 
                Opportunities for Students Act of 2003)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 653. EXTENSION OF EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Section 6 of the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for 
     Students Act of 2003 (20 U.S.C. 1070 note) is amended by 
     striking ``September 30, 2005'' and inserting ``September 30 
     2007''.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, subject to anything my distinguished 
colleague would want to do, I would like to have the Senate go into 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we are ready to proceed on a number of 
amendments, but we are going to withhold those as an accommodation to, 
I gather, a lot of folks here who want to go out right now. We will 
then offer the amendment on the Berlin cafe which has not yet been 
cleared. We will hold that off until Monday. And remarks on RNEP I will 
withhold until Monday. The national missile defense we also will 
withhold until Monday, if that is the desire of the chairman.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my ranking member for his usual 
courtesy and our ability to work out matters to accommodate both sides 
of the aisle.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if I could inquire, while we are waiting, I will 
also withhold an amendment which is ready to go which I don't know if 
it has been cleared or not on the time and material contract abuses. I 
will withhold that until Monday. If we have a moment, if we could ask a 
parliamentary inquiry, how many amendments now have been laid aside and 
are pending for either vote by rollcall or voice vote or acceptance?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen first-degree amendments and one 
second-degree amendment have been laid aside.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is a matter that must come before 
the Senate.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on 
Tuesday, July 26, when the Senate resumes the Defense authorization 
bill, and notwithstanding the provisions of rule XXII, there then be 20 
minutes of debate divided between Senators Collins and Lautenberg; 
provided further that following the use or yielding back of the time, 
the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Collins amendment No. 
1377, to be modified to be a first-degree amendment, to be followed by 
a vote in relation to the Lautenberg amendment; provided further that 
no second degrees be in order to the above amendments prior to the 
vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S8740]]

                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on S. 1042, an 
     original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     2006 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
     for military construction, and for defense activities of the 
     Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for 
     such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
     purposes.
         Bill Frist, John Warner, Michael Enzi, John Cornyn, Jon 
           Kyl, Richard Burr, Kit Bond, Lindsey Graham, John E. 
           Sununu, Chuck Grassley, Mike DeWine, Lamar Alexander, 
           James Talent, Pat Roberts, Johnny Isakson, Conrad 
           Burns, Richard G. Lugar.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the live 
quorum under rule XXII be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. For the information of our colleagues, this vote will 
occur on Tuesday.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be able to join with 
my colleagues, Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa, and Senators Boxer and 
Harkin in support of an amendment to the FY06 National Defense 
Authorization Act that would transfer one of our Nation's greatest 
battleships, the USS Iowa to the State of California for permanent 
donation status.
  I understand the affection that many Iowans have for this important 
ship and that a model of the USS Iowa can be viewed in the Rotunda of 
the Iowa State Capitol. Therefore, I truly appreciate the support of 
Senators Grassley and Harkin for helping to ensure that the USS Iowa 
will have a permanent home in California.
  I was privileged to have the opportunity to introduce legislation in 
1998 and 1999 to assist in transporting the USS Iowa from Newport, RI, 
to Suisun Bay in San Francisco, where it now sits as part of the Navy's 
Reserve Fleet. Through its transfer from reserve to donation status, 
any port community in California will have the opportunity to 
competitively bid for the battleship.
  While I am sure a number of communities in California will be 
interested, I understand that the Port of Stockton has already begun 
making preparations and raising money to bid on this project.
  Having the USS Iowa as a permanent floating museum in California will 
be an honor for my State and a tremendous memorial to the thousands of 
sailors who served aboard this battleship over the past 6 decades.
  The USS Iowa, nicknamed the ``big stick,'' was first launched in 
August 1942 and commissioned in February 1943 under the command of 
Capt. John L. McCrea. In August 1943 it was mobilized for the first 
time along the Atlantic coast to protect against the threat of German 
battleships believed to be operating in Norwegian waters.
  In one of the more memorable moments of the battleship's history, the 
USS Iowa carried President. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Casablanca on his 
way to the Teheran Conference in November 1943, and afterwards provided 
the President transportation back to the United States. The USS Iowa 
engaged in combat for the first time after it was deployed to the 
Pacific theater as the flagship of Battleship Division 7.
  During the early months of 1943, as part of the battle for the 
Marshall Islands, the USS Iowa supported U.S. aircraft carrier strikes 
and helped support numerous air strikes near Micronesia and neighboring 
islands. It was next deployed to assist U.S. forces in combat in the 
South Pacific near New Guinea and joined the Marianas campaign in June 
1943.
  During the Battle of the Philippines, the Iowa ably drove back and 
neutralized a series of air raids attempted by the Japanese middle 
fleet. Throughout the winter of 1944, the USS Iowa continued to engage 
in action off the Philippine coast until it was directed to return to 
the U.S. for maintenance in January 1945.
  From January 1945 through March 1945, the Battleship Iowa received a 
full overhaul in the Port of San Francisco before steaming off for 
Okinawa to take part in combat operations near Japan. Arriving in 
April, the Iowa supported U.S. air strikes against Japan and the 
surrounding islands until the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

  The ship was honored to be one of the few American battleships to 
sail into Tokyo Bay with the occupation forces and take part in the 
surrender ceremonies. After returning to the West Coast following the 
war, the USS Iowa operated in reserve status until it was 
decommissioned for the first time in March 1949.
  In August 1951, after hostilities broke out in Korea, the USS Iowa 
was recommissioned and mobilized to that region. In March 1952, the 
battleship was deployed to the war zone as the flagship of VADM Robert 
Briscoe, the Commander of the 7th Fleet. For the next 7 months, the 
Iowa was fully engaged in support of the U.N. troops, bombarding 
strategic targets throughout North Korea.
  Following the cessation of combat, the USS Iowa was sent to Norfolk, 
VA, to receive an overhaul in October 1952. For the next 5 years, the 
Iowa was engaged in training maneuvers in Northern Europe, including 
NATO exercises, and in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1958, it was 
decommissioned for the second time and made part of the Atlantic 
Reserve Fleet based at Philadelphia.
  Despite being decommissioned twice, the USS Iowa was renovated and 
upgraded in April 1984, and was recommissioned for the third time as 
part of President Reagan's plan to expand the Navy to 600 ships. 
Throughout the 1980s, the battleship spent the majority of its 
deployment in the waters off the European coast while also taking tours 
of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.
  Despite surviving two wars and numerous combat engagements over its 
long history, the USS Iowa suffered its worst catastrophe in April 1989 
when one of its 16-inch gun turrets blew up, causing the death of 47 
sailors. The source of the explosion was never conclusively identified, 
in spite of a thorough investigation of the incident by the Navy. Even 
with its damaged turret, the Iowa went on to further assignments in the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea until it was decommissioned for the 
final time at Norfolk, VA, on October 26, 1990.
  In early 1998, I was contacted by city officials in San Francisco 
requesting help with bringing the USS Iowa out to the west coast. 
Together with Senator Boxer, we introduced legislation in October 1998, 
as part of the FY99 Defense Authorization Act, to provide for the 
transfer of the USS Iowa to San Francisco.
  The next year I worked with colleagues in the California 
congressional delegation to secure $3 million to pay for the transport 
of the battleship from Rhode Island to California. On April 20, 2001, 
the USS Iowa finally arrived in San Francisco and has been berthed at 
Suisun Bay since that time.
  This amendment ensures that this amazing battleship, which earned 
nine battle stars for its World War II service and two battle stars in 
the Korean war, will be memorialized permanently as a floating museum 
in California.
  Once again, I thank Senators Grassley, Boxer, and Harkin for their 
support on this important provision.
  I ask unanimous consent that this statement be placed in the Record 
next to the relevant amendment.

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