[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 98 (Tuesday, July 19, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8478-S8479]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        SECURING A LIABILITY AGREEMENT ON PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I have come to the Senate floor today to 
make my colleagues aware of an important achievement by the Bush 
administration to secure an agreement with the Russian Government to 
ensure that a major nonproliferation program moves forward. This 
agreement will resolve the longstanding disagreement on liability 
associated with the construction of Mixed Oxide, MOX, Fuel Fabrication 
Facility in Russia.
  This agreement will permit the U.S. and Russia to move forward with 
the construction of dual MOX fuel fabrication facilities to turn 
weapons-grade plutonium into civilian mixed-oxide fuel that can be 
burned in commercial nuclear reactors. Each side will dispose of 34 
tons of excess plutonium.
  Today the U.S.-Russian counterparts will agree to the terms of an 
agreement negotiated during the G8 summit in Scotland earlier this 
month. It was during this summit in which terrorists attempted to 
disrupt the meeting by setting off simultaneous explosions in the 
London subway, killing over 40 innocent victims. This senseless 
violence underscores the importance of eliminating the possibility, 
however remote, that terrorists might secure and use plutonium or 
highly enriched uranium in their acts of terror against civilian or 
military targets.
  As we see the world become more and more dangerous, it is critical 
that we make progress on reprocessing plutonium into MOX. Black 
marketers and terrorists would love to get their hands on this 
plutonium. President Bush has worked hard to engage President Putin on 
this issue, and as a result of that continuing dialogue there is now an 
agreement to implement a MOX program.
  I am very pleased that this agreement has been made because it will 
give us a surefire way to dispose of weapons-grade material while at 
the same time providing economic benefits to both countries. I am 
hopeful the Russian Duma will take quick action.
  This agreement breaks a 2-year diplomatic impasse that has stalled 
the construction of fuel fabrication facilities in the United States 
and Russia.
  I would like to recognize the efforts of Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Secretary of 
Energy Samuel Bodman, and the entire Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation 
within the NNSA. Both the State Department, which negotiated the 
diplomatic solutions, and the Department of Energy, which has 
responsibility for managing the design, construction, and operation of 
the Nation's first plutonium reprocessing plant, have been exceptional. 
Both teams have worked hard to realize the ultimate goal of eliminating 
34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from each of the U.S. and Russian 
stockpiles.
  Over the past year I have pressed the Department of Energy and the 
State Department to resolve the liability issue. Upon their 
confirmations, both Secretary Rice and Secretary Bodman have committed 
their full support, and they should be proud of their early success.
  The effort to address the elimination of excess weapons-grade 
material has been under consideration for over a decade. President 
George Bush's term initiated the earliest efforts to identify excess 
weapons-grade material. Over the next decade, the Clinton 
administration worked with then-President Yeltsin to consider options 
for eliminating excess material.
  In 1994, the National Academy of Sciences', NAS, report on the 
``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium'' found that 
excess material constituted a ``clear and present danger.'' That same 
year a joint DOE-DOD review found that 38.2 metric tons of plutonium 
and 174.3 metric tons of highly enriched uranium were surplus to U.S. 
defense needs. A programmatic environmental impact statement was 
undertaken to evaluate options for disposal of this material.
  In 1995, U.S. and Russian experts met at Los Alamos to provide 
recommendations on plutonium disposition. Since those early meetings 
the labs have contributed a considerable amount of time and effort to 
support this initiative. In fact, Los Alamos prepared the plutonium 
that is being used as the initial test fuel assembly currently being 
burned in the Catawba reactor owned by Duke Power.
  In April 1996, at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, it 
was determined that irradiating plutonium as part of a mixed oxide fuel 
in commercial reactors and vitrification are appropriate strategies for 
disposal.
  In June 1997, the Independent Holdren-Velikhov Commission issued a 
final report recommending a disposal pathway identified at the Moscow 
Summit. The report is a joint U.S. and Russian National Academy of 
Science review.
  In July 1998, the U.S. and Russia signed a Scientific and Technical 
Cooperation Agreement that provides for a joint, small-scale test of 
disposition pathways. This agreement also provided a 5-year liability 
agreement between the United States. and Russia for coverage of U.S. 
workers in Russia that expired in July 2003.
  In September 1998, President Clinton and President Yeltsin entered 
into a bilateral plutonium disposition agreement.
  In October 1998, I included $200 million in ``emergency'' funding 
dedicated entirely to plutonium disposition to demonstrate to Russia 
the firm U.S. commitment to plutonium disposition. This funding 
persuaded Russia to enter into serious negotiations. Today, $150 
million of those funds remains available for use to initiate 
construction.

  That same month, G8 members established the Multilateral Plutonium 
Disposition Group and committed to international financing of the 
Russian plutonium program. As of January 2005, total pledges from the 
U.S., U.K., Canada, Japan, Italy, and France total $865 million. I am 
confident that with the liability issue resolved additional funding 
will be made available to support the Russian effort. The U.S. will 
fulfill its commitment to build the U.S facility on it own.
  In March 1999, the U.S. awarded the MOX facility contract to Duke 
Cogema Stone and Webster--DCS--to design the U.S. MOX Fuel Fabrication 
Facility. In August, DOE awarded a contract to design the Pit 
Disassemble and Conversion Facility.
  In January 2000, DOE issued a Record of Decision on locating the pit 
conversion and fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River, SC.
  In September 2000, the United States and Russia signed the Plutonium 
Management and Disposition Agreement, which calls for each country to 
dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium

[[Page S8479]]

in parallel. It was agreed that construction would begin by 2003. 
Unfortunately, one item left unresolved in that agreement was the 
question of liability protection for the U.S. for work performed in 
Russia.
  In January 2001, the Bush administration began a year-long review of 
all nonproliferation programs with Russia. During this review, the 
contracting team submitted a construction authorization request to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for approval.
  January 2002, the administration decided to pursue a MOX-only pathway 
and put an end to further work on a vitrification program.
  In September 2002, MINATOM, the Russian counterpart to the Department 
of Energy, agreed to use an identical design of the U.S. proposed MOX 
facility.
  In July 2003, the temporary 5-year limited liability coverage 
provided under the 1998 Science and Technical Cooperation Agreement 
expired.
  In February 2004, without a formal agreement on liability, the U.S. 
announced a delay in the program. Plans to initiate construction in May 
2004 were delayed until May 2005.
  August 2004, the Russians begin site characterization work at the 
Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk, Russia, as a location of the MOX 
facility. The site has been cleared and is awaiting construction. 
Unlike the Savannah River site, which has a year-round construction 
season, the Seversk site is limited to work in the summer.
  In September 2004, Los Alamos shipped 125 kilograms of surplus 
plutonium to France for fabrication into MOX fuel assemblies for a test 
burn in a commercial U.S. reactor. This activity is undertaken in 
France since the design of the U.S and Russian fuel fabrication 
facility is identical to the French facility that is currently 
reprocessing spent commercial fuel for European and Asian customers. 
The shipments between the U.S. and France occurred without incident and 
the lead test assemblies are now being used in the Catawba reactor 
owned and operated by Duke Power.
  In December 2004, the engineering team completed the licensable 
design of the U.S facility, and the NRC awarded the construction permit 
for the U.S. facility in March 2005.
  On April 20, 2005, the U.S. offered a new liability agreement that 
was ultimately accepted by the Russian Government in July 2005. It took 
several months of intense lobbying to pressure the U.S. interagency 
process to produce a liability agreement that was not identical to the 
liability terms provided under the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Agreement.
  On July 19, 2005, the United States and Russia agreed to the terms of 
a final liability package. This agreement must go to President Putin to 
be drafted and published as a Presidential decree. Once circulated, 
Secretary Rice and her counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
will officially sign the agreement, which will then go to the Russian 
Duma for ratification.
  Once this document is signed by Secretary Rice, the Department of 
Energy will move forward with a site clearing activities in Savannah 
River, SC, with construction to commence in fiscal year 2006.
  I am proud of the fact that two different administrations have 
followed through on this bilateral initiative, and we are now 
approaching another critical juncture. Following a decade of successful 
and numerous scientific, environmental and regulatory reviews, we are 
at a stage where it is important that Congress maintain an adequate and 
reliable level of funding to complete construction.
  I am aware of the fact that the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees have reduced funding for MOX construction but have preserved 
the funding within other nonproliferation accounts. I am hopeful that 
during the consideration of the Senate defense authorization bill, 
Chairman Warner and Senator Levin will agree to restore the funding 
back into the MOX construction accounts.
  In addition, I am hopeful that I will be successful in convincing the 
House to restore critical funding that was eliminated from the MOX 
construction program. Of the $360 million requested for construction, 
the House only provided $35 million. Failure to provide adequate 
funding would undermine a decade of cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russia and do nothing to reduce the amount of excess plutonium.
  If we are unable to fully fund the construction program and keep the 
project on track it will prevent the U.S. from consolidating plutonium 
across the weapons complex and could result in a $100 million per year 
penalties to be paid to the State of South Carolina as mandated in the 
Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act. We have come too 
far to not complete this project.
  I have believed in this initiative from the beginning and believe we 
can do more to reduce the threat from nuclear proliferation. I am 
committed to seeing additional resources be used in securing Russian 
warheads beyond the reach of terrorists. I am committed to strong 
enforcement by the U.S. or International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, to 
break up the nuclear black market, where nuclear technology and 
scientific expertise can be bought for a price.
  The stakes are too high and the price too great to consider anything 
but an aggressive effort by the U.S. and our global partners to prevent 
the spread of nuclear material.

                          ____________________