[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 95 (Thursday, July 14, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8304-S8305]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Nelson of 
        Florida, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Salazar):
  S. 1397. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for 
an increase in the minimum end-strength level for active duty personnel 
for the United States Army, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Armed Services.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text 
of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

[[Page S8305]]

                                S. 1397

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``United States Army Relief 
     Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The 2004 National Military Strategy of the United 
     States assigns the Army the task of operating with the other 
     Armed Forces to provide for homeland defense, deter 
     aggression forward from and in four different regions around 
     the world, conduct military operations in two overlapping but 
     geographically disparate major campaigns, and win decisively 
     in one of those campaigns before shifting focus to the next 
     one.
       (2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
     Richard Myers, has directed that the Army must be able to 
     ``win decisively'' in one theater, even when it is committed 
     to a number of other contingencies.
       (3) While Congress lauds the current efforts by the 
     Administration to reduce demands upon ground forces by 
     continuing to pursue the transformation of the United States 
     military as a whole, the recent experiences of the Army in 
     Iraq serve to underscore the fact that there is, as of yet, 
     no substitute for having sufficient troops to conduct 
     personnel-intensive post-conflict missions.
       (4) The current force requirements posed by the ongoing 
     operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere as part of the 
     Global War on Terror are unsustainable for the long term and 
     undermine the ability of the United States military to 
     successfully execute the National Military Strategy.
       (5) Although the burden may be a heavy one, we as a nation 
     and as a people must not, will not, shy away from our 
     engagement in world affairs to defend our interests and to 
     defend those who are themselves defenseless.
       (6) Our engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater 
     Middle East is, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
     stated, a ``generational'' one.
       (7) Although our commitments in this region--and around the 
     world--are vital, the Army has been ``overused'' according to 
     the Chief of the United States Army Reserve.
       (8) The Army currently has approximately 499,000 active 
     duty troops, and these are backed up by nearly 700,000 
     members of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.
       (9) This number is a third less than the force level on 
     hand when the first Persian Gulf War was fought in 1991.
       (10) Approximately 150,000 of these troops are in Iraq. 
     Nearly 10,000 troops are in Afghanistan. 1,700 serve in 
     Kosovo. 37,000 serve on the Korean peninsula.
       (11) As of 2005 the relationship between the total number 
     of troops and the number of operationally deployed troops has 
     resulted, as the commanding general of the 18th Corps of the 
     Army at Fort Bragg remarked in 2004, in an active-duty force 
     that is ``stretched extraordinarily thin.''
       (12) A former Army Deputy Chief of Staff has stated that in 
     light of the growing operational demands upon it in the 
     strategic environment after September 11, 2001, that the Army 
     ``is too small to do its current missions''.
       (13) That former Army Deputy Chief of Staff further stated 
     that the current size of the Army, coupled with the current 
     demands upon it, has resulted in a loss of ``the resiliency 
     to provide either strategic balance--what you need if some 
     other thing flares up--or to be able to give a respite as the 
     troops rotate back from overseas areas where they've been in 
     combat.''
       (14) In its attempts to fulfill its missions with too few 
     troops, the Army has risked ``damaging'' the force 
     significantly or ``even breaking it in the next five years'', 
     according to a division commander during Operation Desert 
     Storm.
       (15) In a December 2004 letter to the Chief of Staff, 
     United States Army, the Chief of the United States Army 
     Reserve wrote that ``the current demands'' of operations in 
     the Middle East were ``spreading the Reserve force too thin'' 
     and that his command ``was in grave danger'' of being unable 
     to meet other missions abroad or domestically, and that the 
     Army Reserve was ``rapidly degenerating into a `broken force' 
     ''.
       (16) The letter referred to in paragraph (15) was intended, 
     the Chief of the United States Army Reserve wrote, not ``to 
     sound alarmist . . . [but] . . . to send a clear, 
     distinctive, signal of deepening concern'' to his superiors.
       (17) In addition to hampering the ability of the Army to 
     successfully complete the missions assigned to it, this 
     ``overuse'' has significant consequences for domestic 
     homeland security operations.
       (18) A disproportionate number of Federal, State, and local 
     first responders are also members of the National Guard or 
     Reserve.
       (19) At a time of strain for large municipalities 
     struggling to secure their infrastructure against the threat 
     of terrorism, the drain on available personnel as well as 
     budgets is unacceptable.
       (20) An increase of the end-strength of the Army is in the 
     best interests of the people of the United States and their 
     interests abroad, and is consistent with the duties and 
     obligations of Congress as set forth in the Constitution.
       (21) An increase of 100,000 troops over the permanently 
     authorized level for the Army for fiscal year 2004 of 482,000 
     troops will provide a long-term, lasting solution to the 
     current operational constraints and future mission 
     requirements of the Army.
       (22) Progress was made toward that solution when Congress 
     authorized an increase of 20,000 troops in the end-strength 
     of the Army for fiscal year 2005 in the Ronald W. Reagan 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
     (Public Law 108-375).
       (23) An increase in the permanent authorized end-strength 
     for the Army of 80,000 troops is required to meet the 
     100,000-troop increase level that will provide a lasting, 
     long-term solution to personnel problems currently being 
     experienced by the Army.
       (24) This number will equip the Army with sufficient 
     personnel so that it may not only engage in a stabilization 
     operation like Iraq, but so that it may do so while 
     maintaining optimal troop rotation schedules.
       (25) This conclusion is supported by the November 2003 
     testimony of the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, 
     Douglas Holtz-Eakin, before the Committee on Armed Services 
     of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 3. INCREASE IN END-STRENGTH FOR THE ARMY.

       Section 691 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(1), the authorization 
     for the number of members of the Army at the end of each 
     fiscal year as follows shall be not less than the number 
     specified for such fiscal year:
       ``(1) Fiscal year 2006, 522,400.
       ``(2) Fiscal year 2007, 542,400.
       ``(3) Fiscal year 2008, 562,400.
       ``(4) Fiscal year 2009, 582,400.
       ``(5) Any fiscal year after fiscal year 2009, 582,400.''.
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