[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 93 (Tuesday, July 12, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8132-S8133]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            IRAQ TRIP REPORT

 Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, during the July 4th recess, I 
traveled to Iraq and Jordan to evaluate the progress of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my trip report 
be entered into the Record at this point.

       I spent two days--July 5 and 6--in Iraq and the morning of 
     July 7 in Jordan. I believe mine was the first Congressional 
     delegation to overnight in Iraq since the start of the war. 
     It was also my fifth post-war trip to Iraq.
       In Iraq, I spent a day and a half in Baghdad meeting with 
     U.S. Embassy and military personnel and with Members of the 
     Government of Iraq, including the President and Prime 
     Minister. Additionally, I met with numerous Sunni Arabs, 
     including officials of the Government, a member of the Iraqi 
     National Assembly, and representatives of political groups, 
     including some who had just been added to the Assembly's 
     constitutional drafting committee. I also met with the 
     Chairman of the constitutional drafting committee and the UN 
     Special Representative, whose staff is advising on the 
     drafting of the constitution.
       I spent the remainder of the second day in Iraq in Fallujah 
     in the Sunni Triangle, where I was able to meet with a number 
     of U.S. servicemen and women, and was privileged to have 
     dinner with ten Marine Corps and Navy personnel from 
     Michigan.
       Once again, I was deeply impressed by the dedication and 
     professionalism of our servicemen and women and with their 
     very high morale. I told them that the Congress and the 
     American people are proud of them and back them one hundred 
     percent, regardless of differing positions on the 
     Administration's policies.
       One purpose of my trip was to gauge the level of the 
     insurgency. I found strong support for the recent assessment 
     of General Abizaid, the regional U.S. Commander, that the 
     insurgency is not weakening and that the flow of foreign 
     jihadists into Iraq has increased. I found no support for 
     Vice President Cheney's view that the insurgency is in its 
     ``last throes.''
       Another purpose of my trip was to assess the current and 
     potential level of participation of the Sunni Arabs in the 
     political and constitutional drafting processes, including 
     the likelihood that the Iraqi constitution would be completed 
     by August 15th (and therefore not needing to utilize the one 
     six month extension allowed under Iraqi law). I was surprised 
     by the optimism of most Iraqis that the constitution would be 
     agreed by August 15th and particularly that the Sunni Arab 
     participants (recently increased by 15) would likely be 
     supportive of the draft. If that is true, that will pave the 
     way for a referendum on the draft constitution on October 
     15th and a national election on December 15th.
       If this optimism is not borne out, however, a way must be 
     found to bring pressure to bear on the parties to make the 
     reasonable compromises that will be required for agreement on 
     the constitution. Everyone whom I met on this trip advised 
     that none of the Iraqis--not just Shia and Kurd, but also 
     Sunni Arab--want U.S. forces to leave now. They want our 
     forces to be less visible and Iraqi security forces to be 
     more visible, but they want us to stay for now.
       Given that fact and given the consensus that a political 
     solution is necessary if there is any prospect of defeating 
     the insurgency, we need to make clear to the Iraqis that if 
     they are unable to reach agreement on the constitution, we 
     will reconsider our presence in Iraq and that all options 
     will be on the table, including withdrawal. (The logic of 
     that position is that if a political settlement is essential 
     if there is a chance of lessening the insurgency, that 
     without a political settlement the insurgency is not going to 
     be defeated even with our presence.)
       I focused on meeting with members of the Sunni Arab 
     community, as I believe they are the key to a successful 
     political process in Iraq. Most of them realize it was a 
     mistake for them not to have participated in the January 
     elections and they want to participate in the drafting of a 
     constitution and in the follow-on elections. At the same 
     time, the so-called former regime element that is fueling the 
     insurgency in an attempt to block a political settlement 
     comes from the Sunni Arab community, and too many members of 
     that community sympathize with and provide support for the 
     insurgents.
       There are a number of issues that will need to be resolved 
     if a draft constitution is to be agreed upon by August 15th. 
     These include the role of Islam; the form of the government 
     (i.e. parliamentary or presidential); the relationship 
     between the national government and the provinces and the 
     degree to which natural resources will belong to the 
     provinces or the national government; and the degree of 
     autonomy that will reside in the regions. Since the oil 
     resources of Iraq are located in the Shia south and the 
     Kurdish north, these are issues that are extremely important 
     to the Sunni Arabs, whose area lacks oil resources.
       The decision of the National Assembly to accept 15 Sunni 
     Arabs as members of the constitutional drafting committee, 
     despite the Sunni Arabs lack of participation in the 
     election, hopefully augurs well for the kind of compromises 
     that will need to be made by all three of the main political 
     factions for a draft constitution to be reached.
       Although the successful drafting of a constitution, with 
     the active participation of the Sunni Arab community, is very 
     important and may help create an environment within which the 
     insurgency can be dramatically reduced, it will not 
     automatically achieve that result. The Sunni Arabs with whom 
     we met, although from different groups, complained of the 
     extended detention of their brethren, the perceived focus of 
     raids by Coalition and Iraqi security forces on their 
     community, the forced unemployment of hundreds of thousands 
     of Sunni Arabs fired in the de-Baathification process and 
     denied the pensions to which they contributed. They expressed 
     a preference for the U.S. military to leave the cities and to 
     locate on bases removed from populated areas, and the need 
     for at least a rough estimate as to when Coalition forces 
     will be withdrawn.
       I explored in depth the training and equipping of Iraqi 
     security forces. It is clear that a great deal of time was 
     wasted during the existence of the Coalition Provisional 
     Authority or CPA. While it appears that progress is being 
     made now, it is moving slowly and will take quite some time 
     before Iraqis will be capable of dealing with the insurgency 
     on their own.
       In his recent speech to the nation on Iraq, President Bush 
     said, with respect to the training and equipping of Iraqi 
     security forces, that ``as Iraqis stand up, we will stand 
     down.'' General Casey, the overall commander on the ground in 
     Iraq, acknowledged to me that he is working on a plan whereby 
     units of the Iraqi security forces would first partner with 
     Coalition military units and gradually take the lead in 
     military operations, then will assume control in selected 
     provinces, and gradually assume control more broadly until 
     they ultimately can control the entire country. Part of that 
     plan provides for Coalition forces to be reduced as Iraqi 
     security forces become more and more capable.
       I also spoke to General Casey and to Iraqi officials about 
     the need for greater progress in the review of Iraqis 
     detained by Coalition or Iraqi forces and the need to either 
     release or try them. While some progress has been made in 
     this area, it has been too slow in coming and much more must 
     be done and done quickly.
       In Jordan, I was pleased to be able to meet with King 
     Abdullah. King Abdullah had just finished presiding over the 
     closing session of a three day International Islamic 
     Conference that he had organized. This visionary and 
     critically important Conference was attended by top Muslim 
     authorities from around the globe. It was aimed at finding 
     common principles among various Muslim schools of thought and 
     isolating and deligitimatizing those who preach violence in 
     the name of Islam.
       Two things need to happen within the next 40 days to 
     improve chances of a successful outcome in Iraq.
       A draft of the Iraqi constitution needs to be agreed and 
     sent to the National Assembly by the constitutional committee 
     no later than August 15--the timetable the Iraqis have set 
     for themselves. All of the people with whom I spoke--whether 
     Sunni, Shia, or Kurd--agree that that date should and can be 
     met.
       There also needs to be a more detailed road map for drawing 
     down U.S. forces. General Casey, commander of the multi-
     national forces in Iraq, has said that it should be possible 
     for a fairly significant reduction in U.S. force levels in 
     the first few months of next year. But what is so far missing 
     are the decision criteria for determining when that reduction 
     can begin so that presidential rhetoric and statements of 
     intent are turned into a credible and reassuring roadmap for 
     Iraqis taking ownership of the risks and responsibility for 
     their own security and survival.
       After much prodding by Congress, the Administration has 
     finally created and implemented a capability assessment 
     system for determining the readiness of Iraqi military and 
     police units to conduct counter-insurgency operations--
     whether alongside of Coalition units, or in the lead but with 
     Coalition support, or independently. Now there must be a 
     detailed plan, mutually agreed to by the Coalition and 
     Iraqis, with measurable benchmarks to determine progress, and 
     with a reasonable estimate of the time required to reach 
     those benchmarks. Only in this way can we know the 
     approximate number of Iraqi units that need to be capable 
     of counterinsurgency operations so that coalition units 
     can first withdraw from cities and other visible locations 
     and begin a withdrawal from the country as a whole.
       It is essential that such a plan be promptly agreed to and 
     implemented, and its outline publicly announced, so as to 
     provide reassurance to the American public which is 
     expressing growing concern about simply being told we need to 
     ``stay the course'' in Iraq, and to the Iraqi public which 
     needs to see that U.S. forces will not be in their country 
     indefinitely. Both publics must see that the President's 
     statement that ``as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down'' 
     is not just a bumper sticker slogan.
       Secretary Rice has said that we will be in Iraq as long as 
     we are needed. Without adopting and implementing a measured 
     and credible plan, coalition forces could be ``needed'' for 
     an indeterminate time. Without such a plan, Iraqis may never 
     assume the

[[Page S8133]]

     responsibility for taking back their country from the 
     insurgents and taking the risks and making the compromises 
     necessary to chart their own destiny.
       Finally, while I was surprised by the high level of 
     optimism about the August 15 date being met for agreement on 
     a draft Iraqi constitution, I was given a sobering assessment 
     about the current and future strength of the insurgency.
       Even if the timetable for adopting a constitution is met, 
     and even if a plan is agreed upon for phasing in capable 
     Iraqi military forces to take over responsibility for 
     security so U.S. forces in Iraq can simultaneously be 
     reduced, there is still great uncertainty that the insurgency 
     will be eliminated or lessened in the near term.
       But, while taking those steps doesn't guarantee success, 
     they could help change the dynamic in Iraq and provide the 
     only way a poorly thought through and mistake ridden U.S. 
     policy in Iraq can still reach a successful 
     conclusion.

     

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