[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 75 (Wednesday, June 8, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H4285-H4290]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN STUDY GROUP
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mack). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 4, 2005, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) is
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, there are key moments in the life of our
country in the course of this Congress when the United States faces a
path towards democracy or towards war. That choice may be approaching
in the policies we face regarding Iran's development of nuclear
weapons.
I, for one, choose diplomacy over conflict; and I believe that the
United States and our allies can achieve our ends to the Iranian
nuclear program without a shot being fired in anger. This should be our
goal; and towards that end I join with my Democratic colleague, the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), to form the bipartisan House
Iran Study Group.
The mission of our group is to review the situation in Iran, to
measure the potential threat, to examine our military options, but most
importantly to find and promote diplomatic policies that advance our
security interests without a resort to arms.
I could not have chosen a better partner for this effort than my
colleague from New Jersey. He is, first and foremost, not a Republican
or a Democrat. He is an American. We both agree with Senator Arthur
Vandenberg's dictum, who said that partisanship should end at the
water's edge. We are also dedicated to the ideal that, when acting
abroad, Republicans and Democrats are joined together as Americans.
We formed the Iran Study Group last year to carefully review the
facts about Iran, to make sure the U.S. government is reviewing all of
its policy options and to push diplomacy towards a successful
conclusion. And I want to recognize my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this opportunity tonight. I
want to thank my friend from Illinois for his compliment. It is truly
appreciated, and I know it is shared on my side that I very much
appreciate, Mr. Speaker, my work with my colleague from Illinois. I
also want to point out that he is one of the Members here who simply
does not talk about his patriotism but he practices it.
He is active reservist. He serves his country in uniform on a regular
basis, as do his brother and sister reservists. I think he honors this
institution and this country by his service, and I thank him for it.
I appreciate the work we have done in our Iran Study Group. The
emphasis is on the word ``study.'' We think the country faces a truly
perilous situation with the prospect of the mullahs who run the Iranian
government obtaining a nuclear weapon. We have devoted ourselves to
analyzing how this problem came about and to carefully analyzing how we
might solve it.
Our intention tonight is to have a discussion of those solutions that
would be based on diplomacy, and I look forward to having my friend
from Illinois lead that discussion, and I will join it so I can
complement his points as to how we can solve this problem.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Andrews).
When we review the situation in Iran, we see a nation with a proud
Persian language and a culture that now is under a religious regime
that has a very weak hold on the voters of its nation.
Time and again old revolutionary leaders of Iran have lost elections
to reformers, but they keep power through the religious Guardian
Council, Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian Intelligence Service.
These ruling extremists have kept Iran as a pariah nation, unable to
build lasting ties to the West.
While nearly everyone under 40 in Iran favors good relations with the
West and even the United States, Iran's current Guardian Council
maintains her isolation.
Now, all U.S. Presidents, Republican and Democrat, since 1979 have
certified
[[Page H4286]]
that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, that Hezbollah would
collapse in the Middle East without the direct support of Iran's
intelligence service, the MOIS. And under the Guardian Council, Iran
took a clear turn towards nuclear weapons despite her status as a
signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I want to explicate the nature of the
regime of which he speaks. This Congress and our Presidents of both
parties did not choose the terrorists label lightly.
This is a regime which has its antecedent roots in the holding of
American diplomats hostage for 444 days, an image which we will not
soon forget. It is a regime where people are imprisoned and tortured
for dancing at wedding celebrations. It is a regime in which women who
express their points of view are brutalized, assaulted and tortured in
Iranian prisons. And perhaps the most striking piece of evidence as to
the real nature of this regime is found in the run-up to the elections
which are going to be held in Iran on the 17th of June, in 9 days.
1,014 people registered to be part of that election, to be on the
ballot for this election, and the ruling council that the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) made reference to under the Iranian system has
the right to chose who goes on the ballot and who does not.
I say this again. If you want to run for office, you file your
nominating petitions, and then a ruling council decides whether or not
you are worthy to be on the ballot. Of the 1,014 persons who filed to
be on the ballot on the June 17 election in Iran, six of them were
permitted to be on the ballot by the ruling council, six people out of
1,014 people.
{time} 2145
This is not a regime that can have a nuclear weapon. We have to start
this discussion from the proposition that it is unacceptable for a
regime of this dark nature to have a nuclear weapon.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I would agree. Iran had grand ambitions under
the Shah who planned to build 29 nuclear reactors. His plans and those
of his successors are ironic given Iran's location atop one of the
largest reserves of oil that emerged from the ground at less than a
cost of $2 a barrel. With the fall of the Shah, Iran's nuclear
ambitions were cut back but then revived with the help of Russia. Based
at Bushehr, the Russian nuclear reactor project gives Iran a clear path
to the production of plutonium despite Russia's assertions otherwise.
Until 2002, we had strong suspicions about Iran, but no clear
allegations that she had violated her solemn commitment to the United
Nations under the non-proliferation treaty; but then an exile group,
the National Council For Resistance of Iran, exposed clear, undeclared
nuclear activities, indicating uranium enrichment at that task; and the
Arak heavy water production facility gives Iran a clear path towards
the refinement of products which would become the center of a nuclear
weapon.
This was just not according to the exile group. After 2 years of
extensive inspections by the United Nations International Atomic Energy
Agency, they reported that Iran had undeclared centrifuge atomic vapor,
a laser isotope separation, a molecular laser isotope separation and
plutonium separation activities, all in direct violation of Iran's
formal obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the
safeguards agreement.
I yield to my colleague on these points.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I again thank my friend. It is important to
note that we have nearly a quarter century of active deception from the
Iranian regime on this point.
As recently as 4 years ago, 3 years ago, in international forums, the
representatives of this government were actively denying that they were
in pursuit of a nuclear weapon. For nearly a quarter century, we were
told by the Iranian regime that activities which appear to be nuclear
in nature were for a domestic energy program.
Now, one must find it curious that a nation that is sitting on one of
the largest supplies of crude oil in the world, that is an exporter to
the States, whose main export is crude, would find the need for a
nuclear energy program. That alone is a rather curious proposition; but
putting that aside, we had a quarter century of deception until, as the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) says, in 2002 resistance leaders
blew the whistle about the facilities at Arak and Natanz.
I want to be very clear, Mr. Speaker, that there has been controversy
in this Chamber about the existence of weapons of mass destruction and
ideological views coloring that discussion. There is no ideological
dispute here. There is factual understanding by the French, by the
Germans, by the British, by the EU, by the U.N., by every objective
party in this case. It is not in factual dispute that there is a
nuclear program going on in Iran.
Since the disclosures that became public in December of 2002, as the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) just said, we had a 2-year process
of inspections under the jurisdiction of the IAEA of the United
Nations, and they confirmed the existence of plutonium, or rather of
uranium, enrichment facilities. They confirmed the equipment and the
infrastructure necessary to make the other parts of a reactor,
including a centrifuge, that would lead up to the construction of a
nuclear weapon.
So we want to be very clear tonight that what is in controversy is
what will happen next with respect to development of this Iranian
program. What is in controversy is what we ought to do about it. What
is not in controversy is that the Iranians actively pursued a nuclear
weapons program and that they actively deceived the rest of the world
about that pursuit for a quarter of a century.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and I want to emphasize his
point that the violations we are talking about were not based on faulty
intelligence from the U.S. CIA. These violations that we are talking
about are documented in formal, open reports by the United Nations
international staff under Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei of the IAEA.
Inspections through June of 2003 showed many reporting failures by
Iran; and by mid-year, Iran admitted to enriching uranium,
purification, reprocessing and later admitted to the United Nations of
losing nuclear material that had been covered by her U.N. safeguards
agreement.
Iran built a centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz with 1,000 rotors
and started construction at another facility with 50,000 rotors. Iran
first claimed that it had not enriched uranium at all, and the IAEA
reported then that it had found contaminations of enriched uranium at
the Kalaye Electric Company, at one place, of 36 percent enriched
uranium; at another, 54 percent on imported components; and at another,
70 percent enriched uranium inside its workshop. Until these
discoveries by the U.N., Iran had only admitted to enriching uranium
once to a level of 7 percent.
After the A.Q. Khan network was exposed in Libya, Iran also admitted
to using advanced rotors of Pakistani design to enrich uranium. It also
admitted in May 2004 that it had separated plutonium in much larger
amounts than previously reported.
All of these actions point to a continuing effort by Iran to develop
nuclear materials beyond an enrichment level ever needed for civilian
power, giving us and the United Nations clear and convincing evidence
that it is dedicated to the production of a nuclear weapon in violation
of its commitment under the non-proliferation treaty at the U.N.
Now, Iran also has backed up its public statements with policy and
announced just last month enacting legislation requiring the Iranian
Government to develop nuclear technology, including enrichment of
uranium, but this is not just the only part of the threat.
Iran not only has a nuclear program; it also has an aggressive
missile development program, based on a North Korean missile, the No
Dong, which the Iranians call the Shahab 3.
Iran's missile program brings many key U.S. facilities and friends
into range, especially Israel. This is a picture of the latest Shahab 3
missile, almost 98 percent North Korean; and when you look at the range
of these systems, you see that U.S. facilities like the Fifth Fleet, or
our allies in Israel, come clearly into range.
[[Page H4287]]
When we look at this, we have a real danger now, nuclear weapons and
missiles to promptly deliver them that represent a long-term threat to
the Jewish State.
I yield to my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
This is truly a toxic combination of a dishonest regime that has
actively deceived the rest of the world for a quarter century, the most
lethal and deadly weapons known to man, and the ability to use those
weapons both in a conventional and unconventional sense.
As the gentleman from Illinois' (Mr. Kirk) map shows very clearly,
Iran tonight has the ballistic capability, has the ability to fire a
missile that could cause nuclear havoc to U.S. troops in Iraq, in
Kuwait, could cause the destruction of America's great friend in
Israel. This is a real and present danger, but beyond the conventional
danger is the asymmetric unconventional danger of the unconventional
use of a nuclear weapon in an unconventional way: in a suitcase, in a
rental truck, on a container being shipped into a port of the United
States.
The risk that we are discussing tonight is not only the risk that one
of the missiles that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) just
described would rain down on U.S. troops in the Middle East or on our
friends in Israel or in a friendly Arab state; the risk is that this
risk could manifest itself in Times Square or in the Nation's capitol
through the use of a nuclear weapon in an unconventional way. A toxic
combination of a Jihadist regime, a 25-year record of deception, and
the possession of this lethal technology is something we simply cannot
countenance.
Now there have been efforts, intense efforts over the last 18 months
or so to address this problem. I know that the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Kirk) is going to outline them, and we are going to talk about how
we support the intent of those efforts, how we are working through our
working group to try to buttress the efforts, but how we believe that
our country must be prepared both in the eventuality of the success of
the negotiations or the failure of the negotiations in order to protect
ourselves.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I point out the record of Iran is already
clear in the late 1980s and early 1990s when she used chemical weapons
and fired several hundred missiles in her war with Iraq.
Now, the U.S. and Israel, they are already spending hundreds of
millions of dollars building a defense system against incoming Iranian
missiles. If Iran's nuclear and missile programs go further, then the
United States and Israel will have to commit hundreds of millions of
more dollars to make sure that our allies in the Jewish State are able
to resist incoming Iranian weapons. I will note that a missile fired
from Iran, aimed, for example, at Tel-Aviv would arrive just 11 minutes
after lift off, putting the Middle East on a hair trigger.
Given all of this, the United Nations' reports of violations, Iran's
record of terror, nuclear and missile developments, all reported not by
the CIA or MI6, but by the United Nations, what should we do?
Some say that we should let Iran have nuclear weapons, that we cannot
stop technology, that we should not be able to classify the laws of
physics, and so Iran will get nuclear weapons; but if we acquiesce to
this, then this policy would commit us to a vast and expensive course
of building missile defenses to protect our allies. While the Middle
East would descend into a tense hair trigger peace, one irrational
leader, one miscalculation and millions could die in a nuclear Jihad.
It would also put nuclear weapons in the hands of the Guardian
Council, the same council that Presidents Carter and Reagan and Bush
and Clinton and Bush all certified were the number one supporters of
state terror, the men and women who funded operations like the
gentleman said who would put a suitcase or a car bomb in a Western
city.
I think we can do better. Some might say if this is so bad, then let
Israel remove this threat by military means. In fact, in 1981 Israel
destroyed Iraq's path to plutonium when it bombed the Osiraq reactor;
but when we look at Israel and a potential attack on Iran, we see a
vastly complicated operation of great cost and a chance of failure. At
best, such an operation could set back Iran for a few years. At worst,
it would enrage an enemy who would then use all of the means at her
disposal to attack the Jewish homeland.
An attack by Israel on Iran would also destroy what is our greatest
long-term asset in Iran, her young people, her young people who
overwhelmingly report that they support better relations with America.
I think we can do better. We can stand between appeasement under an
Iranian nuclear trigger or an attack against Iran. What could America
do?
Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding.
I certainly share the view that the Israelis did peace-loving people
around the world a huge favor in 1981 when they took out Saddam
Hussein's nuclear reactor program. The first Gulf War in 1991 and the
recent hostilities which endure to today would have looked very
different and much worse had Saddam been able to proceed with that
program.
It is tempting to exercise the so-called Israeli option this time, to
condone an action by the Israelis that would solve this problem. It is
tempting, but it is illusory because the nature of this program is
literally subterranean. Much of the developmental activity of the
Iranian nuclear program is underneath the Earth.
{time} 2200
They are not easily penetrated or perhaps not penetrable at all by an
air assault. As the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) has pointed out,
in addition to the dubious prospects of success as a military
proposition, there would be the unbelievable fallout of probably
unifying the Iranian population against us and our Israeli allies and
forfeiting what I believe is the best hope for a peaceful solution to
this problem which would be voluntary, indigenous change led by
progressive young Iranians who want to live in a country where they can
speak and worship and vote and live as they choose. Running the risk of
offending and alienating that block of forward-looking young Iranians
would be a risk I do not believe we should bear.
As the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) suggests, we need to resist
the temptation of saying that the Israelis can once again take care of
this problem as they did in 1981, because I do not think the record
shows that. What we need to do is devise a robust, effective plan to
sanction and leverage the Iranians toward a path of peace, rather than
a path of development of nuclear weapons.
There is a sincere attempt led by the British and the Germans and the
French to reach such a result. Most recently, that attempt has resulted
in an agreement in November of 2004 which calls for the suspension of
the Iranian enrichment program by the Iranians, an active inspection
program by the United Nations, and then the extension of economic
incentives so the Iranian economy may grow and prosper as a result of
that proposition. There is hope that that will succeed. I hope it will
succeed. I know the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) does as well.
But the record must also show that since November of 2004 there have
been at least three very serious problems reported with respect to
compliance with the agreement. According to the IAEA, that is the
United Nations arms inspection regime, Iran has limited IAEA access to
two secret Iranian military sites, including a large complex at Parchin
where suspected nuclear access may be taking place. Only two. The IAEA
inspectors visited the site in January of 2005, but Iran has not
allowed visits subsequently. So they have already begun to shut down
the inspections.
Secondly, Iran is also alleged to have withheld information and
conducted maintenance and other work on centrifuge equipment and
uranium conversion activities. So there is centrifuge work continuing
even though the official posture of the Iranian government is they have
suspended nuclear weapons activities.
Finally, Iran is also beginning construction of a heavy water
research reactor which could well be suited to plutonium production,
and I would note for the record that discussions between our European
allies and the Iranians do
[[Page H4288]]
not cover plutonium development of a weapon, they cover uranium
enrichment. There are two major pathways to achieve a nuclear weapon.
One is based on uranium, and one is based on plutonium. Even in its
best day, this agreement is not addressing plutonium.
So to answer the gentleman's question directly, what should we do, we
should anticipate what would happen if this agreement does not succeed,
and we would define success as the abandonment of the nuclear weapons
development program by the Iranians followed by a transparent
inspection regime so the rest of the world could verify that it has not
yet been restarted.
In order to do that, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) and I
believe, and I think Democrats and Republicans can come together and
believe, that a robust and effective program of economic sanctions is
what we need. I know the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) has worked
on one particular idea which I think has very strong merit and ask the
gentleman to outline that.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews)
and I support diplomacy with teeth. Over the last 18 months, the Iran
Study Group has met with our allies, the U.K., Germany and France, and
they have formed the EU-3 group to bring Iran back from the brink of an
unstable and expensive nuclear arms race.
The essence of the EU-3 offer is to provide Iran with a set of
carrots, spare parts for civilian aircraft, membership in the WTO,
access to loans, all if Iran provides international guarantees and
inspections to end the development of nuclear weapons. The EU-3's goal
is not quite as idealistic as it may sound. South Africa, Argentina,
Brazil and Ukraine all gave up nuclear weapons programs, and recently
so did Libya. Iran can, too, if we can find the right mix of diplomatic
incentives and disincentives for them.
I find the current U.S. policy debate on Iran is too simplistic. It
is just two-dimensional: Either let Iran have the bomb, putting the
Middle East under a nuclear hair trigger, or let Israel do it and have
another war.
President Kennedy faced a similar dilemma looking at Cuba, but he
broke out of the intellectual box that some would have him in to either
let the Cubans have nuclear weapons or invade. He thought of a new
policy, a quarantine, which allowed us to resolve the Cuban missile
crisis without a shot being fired.
Are there policies which we can employ which will help the European
Union succeed? I think there are. We all know this matter could be
referred to the United Nations Security Council. We know, using its
broad powers under Chapter 7 of the U.N. charter, the Security Council
could impose sanctions, putting enormous pressure on Iran and isolate
her completely.
What could those sanctions look like? We could do small things like
outlaw Iran's participation in the Football Soccer World Cup. We could
also ban airline flights in and out of Iran. We could block travel of
anyone in the Iranian government outside her borders. We could impose
comprehensive sanctions that would shrink Iran's economy. All of these
means have been authorized by the U.N. Security Council against other
countries and could be authorized by the United Nations against Iran if
she says no to the European Union.
But what if one member of the Security Council vetoes action against
Iran? Russia could veto action against Iran. She is, in fact, building
a reactor in Iran. China also has extensive and growing relations with
Iran. They could also veto action.
Some have talked about an oil quarantine against Iran. In fact, 20
percent of Iran's income is dependent on oil sales. An oil quarantine
would implode Iran's economy, but it would also hurt our economy. The
mullahs have threatened, if their sales were stopped, oil on the world
market could hit $100 a barrel. That would hurt us. It would also hurt
our allies in Japan and in Europe.
Are there other options available? In our bipartisan work in the
Congressional Iran Study Group, we found that Iran has a unique
vulnerability, one that opens a new window of diplomacy that could help
us achieve all of our objectives without a shot being fired, and here
is the vulnerability she has. Despite being a leading member of OPEC
and one of the largest oil producers in the world, Iran is heavily
dependent on foreign gasoline for her economic progress. In fact, one-
third of all Iranian gasoline must be imported from overseas.
Iran's director of planning at the National Iranian Oil Derivative
Distribution Company reported that Iran uses 67 million liters of
gasoline. Only 39 million liters can be produced in Iran. Policies to
expand oil refining capacity in Iran could in no way meet the demand;
and in fact in Tehran they regularly debate rationing gasoline,
ironically in a country that is a leading OPEC nation.
So we have this lever, a potential gasoline quarantine on Iran, a
quarantine which would not affect international oil markets but would
heavily affect just Iran alone. And if this policy was discussed, it
could give a huge impetus to the European Union effort which my
colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), and I both
think offers the best chance for working our way out of this threat
without anyone being hurt.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, gasoline is the Achilles' heel of the
Iranian autocrats. They have presided over such a dysfunctional country
that they are in a situation where they sell crude oil in huge amounts
to the rest of the world but import gasoline. Think about that. A
country that is literally awash in the basic stuff that gasoline is
made of cannot produce its own gasoline. Estimates go as high as 40
percent of the gasoline consumed by Iranian consumers is imported from
other countries.
Now another measure of the importance of what the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Kirk) is saying is this. Today when a citizen of Tehran
fills up his or her tank of gas, they pay 40 cents a gallon. I wish I
could go home and tell my constituents they were going to fill up their
gas tanks for 40 cents a gallon. Obviously, it costs a lot more to
produce gasoline than 40 cents a gallon in Iran, but this is such a
sensitive issue for the population of the country that the Iranian
parliament has voted, and as a matter of fact in January of this year
the Iranian parliament voted to freeze domestic prices for gasoline and
other fuels at 2003 levels.
Why did they do that? They did it because it would be so disruptive
to the society and the economy to have a price shock that would reflect
the true cost of a gallon of gasoline. If such a disruption occurred,
it would shake the control, the iron grip the autocrats have over this
country. They have identified their own weakness by freezing the price
of domestic gasoline.
What the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) is suggesting is a
surgical sanction. We are going to be I believe going to the U.N.
Security Council in this calendar year. That is my prediction. The
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) may not share that, but as I see
things unfolding. On June 6, Monday, the Iranians once again said they
would voluntarily suspend their uranium enrichment program until more
talks ensued with the Europeans.
The election I made reference to earlier, the one where 98 percent of
the candidates or more were expelled from the ballot, if we can call
that an election, will take place on June 17. The talks will resume at
some point in Geneva shortly after June 17.
I truly believe, given the track record we have seen thus far, that a
referral to the U.N. Security Council is very near. We have seen after
a dozen years of frustration with Iraqi sanctions that the U.N.
Security Council taking a vote does not do a lot in and of itself. They
took a lot of votes against Saddam Hussein over the course of a dozen
years, but people still suffered and died and nothing really changed.
The key question if, and I think when, we reach the point of the U.N.
Security Council, is what are we going to be asking for? Simply passing
a resolution that condemns the Iranians for deceiving the rest of the
world, violating their responsibilities under the nonproliferation
treaty and continuing with the development of a nuclear weapon is not
going to do it. It is going to take a meaningful sanction.
The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) has laid out a very meaningful
[[Page H4289]]
sanction. He has wisely avoided the stick-your-head-in-the-sand
approach of saying, if they have a few weapons, so what, they are a
small country. I fear we would find out the ``so what'' would be very
soon.
He has also avoided the risk to rush headlong into a military
solution to this problem. Military action should never be taken off the
table, never, but they should never be the first instinct or the first
option. I believe what the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) has
outlined makes eminent sense, given the internal politics of Iran.
{time} 2215
If Iran could only consume the gasoline that she produces
domestically, one of two things would happen and they are both very
disruptive to the regime. The first is that they would have to heavily
subsidize the production that they already have internally; they would
have to ration what people can use to hold the price down; and they
would have to give up something else. Either food prices would rise,
housing prices would rise, other energy prices would rise and the
standard of living of the average Iranian would drop rather
precipitously.
The other option would be to let the price of gasoline rise to meet
the market curve of supply and demand, which I believe would cause
chaos in that society. I believe that the hundreds and thousands of
young Iranians who have taken to the streets in recent years want a
change, and if the grip that their rulers have is weakened by the plan
that has been set forth here, so be it.
The gentleman from Illinois said a few minutes ago about optimism,
and he talked about Ukraine and about Libya and other countries giving
up nuclear weapons. Another source of optimism I would daresay is this:
If one went back and researched speeches made on this floor in 1985, if
Members had stood and said, you know, within 6 years, millions of
people in the Warsaw Pact countries are going to rise up and make
changes within their countries without a violent revolution by simply
demanding that change occur, they would have been hooted off this floor
as being hopelessly naive and unaware of the way things really were.
I am not suggesting that Iran is like the Eastern European countries.
I know the religion is different, the history is different, the culture
is different. But I truly believe that human nature is not different.
And I think that our 25-year-old students that we hear from in Tehran
want the same thing that our constituents want and the same thing those
brave Poles and Czechs and Germans and Ukrainians and Russians wanted,
which is to live freely. And if we send a message that we will stand by
them, I believe that they will be emboldened to try. And I think that
the gentleman from Illinois' idea is not only an effective sanction but
it is that powerful message.
Mr. KIRK. When we look at Iran, we have got an election coming up,
not only just six candidates, they just added two more, but there is a
key choice for the Iranian nation and the government to make, whether
to pursue this nuclear weapons program, against the wishes of France,
against the wishes of the United Kingdom, against the wishes of Germany
and the United Nations, the IAEA and the formal commitments of Iran
under the nuclear nonproliferation path, or to join the community of
nations and build a growing economy in Central Asia, at peace with her
neighbors, offering economic opportunity to her families.
But if she chooses the path of nuclear weapons and confrontation with
the European Union, we do not have to resort, in my judgment, to any
military means. We could impose a gasoline quarantine on Iran that
would quickly implode her economy. This gasoline quarantine on Iran
could be imposed by a coalition of the willing naval powers. But when
you look at the position of anyone trying to import gasoline into Iran
under an order of quarantine, you would find quickly that it would make
no economic sense to try to run that quarantine. In fact, in my
judgment, working with our British allies, Lloyd's of London likely
would pull the insurance contracts for nearly all of the tankers
attempting to service the Iranian market.
And working with our allies in the gulf who largely supply Iran's
need for gasoline, they could by bilateral action simply abrogate
contracts with Iran, making this quarantine fairly simple to operate
and administer. The effect of this would be heavily on Iran, would put
a number of people out of work, and with those thousands unemployed,
then asking their government, why are we embracing a policy of
confrontation, violating treaty commitments of our government and
throwing me and my family out of work instead of going the direction
that most people under the age of 40 would like to go in Iran, and that
is embracing the West and having positive direction.
I think this is diplomacy with teeth. This is a way to break out of
the intellectual box of either surrendering to an Iranian nuclear
program run by a government who has the most extensive terror
connections in the world or having some sort of war break out in the
Middle East between our Israeli allies and Iran. I for one think that
we should embrace a creative diplomatic posture that supports the
European Union, that increases their likelihood of success and makes
the Iranian government want to embrace a verifiable inspection regime
that follows the path of Ukraine, that follows the path of Libya, that
follows the path of Brazil and Argentina and South Africa and embraces
a non-nuclear future.
For us, this is tense times ahead. My colleague talked about
reference to the U.N. Security Council and any further action. We think
that Iran is quickly moving towards a nuclear capability and, if the
Guardian Council gets their way, could bring about a Middle East on a
nuclear hair trigger. I think we can do much better. I think pitting
our strength against their weakness, we can resolve this in a way that
everyone is much more secure.
I thank my colleague. I also want to conclude by saying this, before
I hand it over to him. We have had this debate on this floor as two
colleagues from different parties working together in a bipartisan
fashion. We have worked through the problem. We have met with
ambassadors, with officials from the State Department, with our Israeli
allies and reviewed carefully all of the options. I think on a
bipartisan level when you work through all of these options and you
listen to our allies and you listen to the experts, you will come to
about where we are, a chance for a peaceful resolution of this that
enhances security on a bipartisan basis. I think that represents the
best traditions of this House, especially in our foreign policy where
we set partisan differences aside.
I yield to conclude to my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend. It is characteristic of the gentleman
from Illinois that he is a creative thinker and someone who wants to
problem-solve rather than score political points. Working with him has
been a terrific experience and one that I look forward to continuing on
this and other ventures.
I think there is broad consensus in this House and in this country
between the two parties on two points. The first is that there is a
real and present threat to our survival in the form of Islamic jihadist
terror. September 11 is the most dramatic example, but there are
others. I think there are scarcely any people who believe that is not a
very serious threat.
Mr. KIRK. Did you lose constituents on September 11?
Mr. ANDREWS. Of course I did. And lost people I knew personally. I
think virtually everyone in New Jersey did in some way.
The second point of consensus is that America should always first use
its economic and diplomatic and spiritual creativity to work with our
friends and solve problems. No one here wants to rush to military
conflict. And when we do get in military conflict, that is when it can
be divisive and, frankly, should be, that we should have vigorous
debate. What I like so much about the gentleman from Illinois' idea is
that it fully employs the diplomatic and economic creativity of our
country, and I think it does rise to a spiritual level of what our
relationship will be with our friends in Iran for years to come. This
is a surgical sanction that uses the might of our private sector.
The gentleman from Illinois made reference to the insurance sector.
It is very true that the insurance industry
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is very unlikely to insure vessels that would run afoul of a quarantine
of gasoline. And if the insurers will not insure the cargo, the cargo
does not flow. If the cargo does not flow, you do not need a naval
quarantine. Frankly, the economics work in that advantage.
Secondly, this is a recognition that we want to share in the success
of our European friends. They deserve credit for bringing us to a point
where the Iranians are at least taking the position that they want to
suspend this program. They deserve credit for saying they are ready to
go to the Security Council, our British and French and German friends,
should that need become evident. So this is an extension of a
friendship with our allies in Western Europe, and it is a way to build
on the success that they have had without resorting to armed conflict
but by using the creative, economic and diplomatic tools at our
disposal.
Finally, I would say spiritually, I do not doubt that someday, my
daughters are 12 and 10, Jackie and Josie, and I think someday they
will go to Iran. I want them to go to Iran as exchange students or as
performers or as athletes or as people to visit friends that they have
met in college or graduate school. I do not want them to go there as
soldiers. We cannot ignore the reality that a jihadist despotic regime
is trying to get a nuclear weapon, and we cannot ignore the high
probability they will use it in ways that will terrify the world. But
understanding of that threat does not imply a rush to military action.
Instead, it implies a thoughtful, constructive plan such as the
gentleman from Illinois has laid out.
It is our intention to introduce a resolution that lays out the ideas
behind the gentleman from Illinois' discussion tonight. We want to
persuade both Democratic and Republican colleagues and the
administration to be supportive of this idea. We want to show that it
is a reflection of our partnership with our Western European allies.
And we want it to succeed. It is my hope that it is never necessary,
that the mere fact that this is being discussed will embolden
progressive, freedom-loving Iranians to take matters into their own
hands. But I think it is going to take more than that. And I think that
the idea the gentleman from Illinois has sketched out is one that will
work. It is pragmatic, it represents our best tools and values, and I
look forward to supporting it.
Mr. KIRK. I thank the gentleman and look forward to working with him
and advancing this. We will be introducing our resolution next week.
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