[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 72 (Thursday, May 26, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5946-S5962]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERT BOLTON TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED 
                STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume executive session for the consideration of Calendar 
No. 103, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read the nomination of John Robert Bolton, of 
Maryland, to be the Representative of the United States of America to 
the United Nations.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the time 
until 6 p.m. will be equally divided between the chairman and ranking 
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which 1 hour will be 
reserved under the control of the Senator from Ohio, Mr. Voinovich, and 
with the exceptions just noted by consent.
  The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will yield shortly to distinguished 
colleagues who have sought an opportunity to speak for the first time 
on the nomination of John Bolton. I had the privilege of addressing the 
Senate yesterday for over 50 minutes in which I attempted to outline 
all of the best reasons for John Bolton's confirmation, which I hope 
will occur today. I believe he will be an outstanding representative of 
our country, a very able diplomat to the United Nations.
  During the course of my comments--now reflected, because they were 
delivered yesterday, in the Congressional Record today--we attempted to 
go through each of the case histories of interviews completed by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in response to the questions or 
allegations made about the nominee. Affirmatively, I have tried to 
point out the tens of very able Americans who have endorsed John 
Bolton, including a large number of former Secretaries of State, 
Defense, National Security Directors, and, most importantly, people who 
have worked with him at the United Nations, at USAID.
  I ask Members to reference the specifics of my speech yesterday, if 
there are questions with regard to the work done by the able staff on 
both sides of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to make certain 
that each of the arguments that has been presented has been met and 
fairly argued.
  During the entirety of the debate yesterday, the arguments that were 
made were not new ones. They may be important ones, and perhaps they 
will be reargued today. But I ask Members to think constructively now 
about the President of the United States, his desire for reform of the 
United Nations, and his desire to have John Bolton there at the United 
Nations to work in that capacity for reform of an institution that the 
United States wishes to see much stronger, more able, and certainly a 
valuable part of American diplomacy and national security policy.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California is 
recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I listen to my distinguished chairman, and 
I wonder who he is actually talking about when he says there is so much 
support for John Bolton. There has been an unprecedented outcry of 
Republicans and Democrats against this nomination.
  I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the votes on U.S. 
ambassadors at the United Nations since 1945.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  Votes on U.S. Ambassadors to the UN

       Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (1945-1946): Voice Vote
       Warren R. Austin (1947-1953): Unanimous Consent
       Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1953-1960): Unanimous Consent
       James J. Wadsworth (1960-1961): Unanimous Consent
       Adlai E. Stevenson (1961-1965): Unanimous Consent
       Arthur J. Goldberg (1965-1968): Unanimous Consent
       George W. Ball (1968-1968): Unanimous Consent
       James Russell Wiggins (1968-1969): Unanimous Consent
       Charles W. Yost (1969-1971): Unanimous Consent
       George Bush (1971-1973): Unanimous Consent
       John A. Scali (1973-1975): Unanimous Consent
       Daniel P. Moynihan (1975-1976): Unanimous Consent
       William W. Scranton (1976-1977): Unanimous Consent
       Andrew J. Young (1977-1979) 89-3 :
       Donald F. McHenry (1979-1981) 83-0 :
       Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (1981-1985) 81-0 :
       Vernon A. Walters (1985-1989): Voice Vote
       Thomas R. Pickering (1989-1992) 99-0 :
       Edward Joseph Perkins (1992-1993): Unanimous Consent
       Madeleine K. Albright (1993-1997): Unanimous Consent
       Bill Richardson 100-0 (1997-1998):
       Richard Holbrooke (1999-2001) 81-16 :
       John D. Negroponte (2001-2004): Voice Vote
       John C. Danforth (2004-2005): Voice Vote

  Mrs. BOXER. What this will show for the record is that starting in 
1945, we have had voice votes and unanimous consent votes on almost all 
of these nominees. There were few exceptions. Andrew Young got the post 
89 to 2; Donald McHenry, 83 to nothing--so they had votes--Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, 81 to nothing. The largest ``no'' vote was Richard 
Holbrooke, who had 16 against him. Bill Richardson was 100 to nothing; 
John Negroponte, voice vote; Danforth, voice vote.
  I am putting this in the Record because when you listen to my friends 
who are supporting John Bolton, you would think that this is just a 
run-of-the-mill type appointment, that it is usual to have this kind of 
firestorm. Nothing could be further from the truth. This nomination is 
a diversion from the consensus candidates that we have had in the past. 
Since my chairman talked about all the support John Bolton has, I ask 
unanimous consent to print in the Record in a letter dated May 9, 2005.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                              Updated May 9, 2005.
     Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
     Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen 
         Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lugar and Senator Biden: We have noted with 
     appreciation the moves of President Bush at the beginning of 
     his second term to improve U.S. relations with the countries 
     of the European Union and of the United Nations. Maintaining 
     these ties and the willingness of those countries to 
     cooperate with the United States is essential to U.S. 
     security.
       It is for this reason that we write you to express our 
     concern over the nomination of John R. Bolton to be permanent 
     representative of the United States at the United Nations. We 
     urge you to reject that nomination.
       By virtue of service in the State Department, USAID and 
     Justice Departments, John Bolton has the professional 
     background needed for this position. But his past activities 
     and statements indicate conclusively that he is the wrong man 
     for this position at a time when the U.N. is entering a 
     critically important phase of modernization, seeking to 
     promote economic development and democratic reforms and 
     searching for ways to cope better with proliferation crises 
     and a spurt of natural disasters and internal conflicts.
       John Bolton has an exceptional record of opposition to 
     efforts to enhance U.S. security through arms control. He led 
     a campaign against ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
     Test Ban Treaty. Today, the administration is pressing for 
     development of new types of nuclear weapons. John Bolton 
     blocked more extensive international agreement to limit sales 
     of small arms, the main killer in internal wars. He led the 
     fight to continue U.S. refusal to participate in the Ottawa 
     Landmine Treaty. Today, the U.S. has joined Russia and China 
     in insisting on the right to continue to deploy antipersonnel 
     landmines. John Bolton crafted the U.S. withdrawal from the 
     joint efforts of 40 countries to formulate a verification 
     system for the Biological Weapons Convention and blocked 
     continuation of these efforts in a period of increasing 
     concern over potential terrorist use of these weapons and of 
     terrorist access to the stocks of countries covertly 
     producing these weapons. John Bolton's unsubstantiated claims 
     that Cuba and Syria

[[Page S5947]]

     are working on biological weapons further discredited the 
     effect of U.S. warnings and U.S. intelligence on weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       John Bolton led the successful campaign for U.S. withdrawal 
     from the treaty limiting missile defenses (ABM Treaty). The 
     effects of this action included elimination of the sole 
     treaty barrier to the weaponization of space. In the face of 
     decades of votes in the U.N. General Assembly calling for 
     negotiation of a treaty to block deployment of weapons in 
     space, he has blocked negotiation in the Geneva Conference on 
     Disarmament of a treaty on this subject. The administration 
     has repeatedly proposed programs calling for weapon 
     deployment in space.
       As chief negotiator of the 2002 Moscow Treaty on 
     withdrawing U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons from field 
     deployment, John Bolton structured a treaty without its own 
     verification regime, without required progress reports from 
     both sides, without the requirement to destroy warheads 
     withdrawn from deployment, and without provision for 
     negotiating continued reductions. Under his guidance, the 
     State Department repudiated important consensus agreements 
     reached in the year 2000 Review Conference of the Non-
     proliferation Treaty and has even blocked the formulation 
     of an agenda for the next review conference to be held in 
     May 2005.
       Under John Bolton as Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
     International Security, the State Department has continued to 
     fail to resolve the impasse with Russia about the legal 
     liability of U.S. personnel working with Russia on the 
     security of the huge arsenal of nuclear, chemical and 
     biological weapons of the former Soviet Union and has failed 
     to accelerate measures aimed at the safety and security of 
     this huge arsenal from theft, illegal sale and terrorist 
     access.
       John Bolton's insistence that the U.N. is valuable only 
     when it directly serves the United States, and that the most 
     effective Security Council would be one where the U.S. is the 
     only permanent member, will not help him to negotiate with 
     representatives of the remaining 96 percent of humanity at a 
     time when the U.N. is actively considering enlargement of the 
     Security Council and steps to deal more effectively with 
     failed states and to enhance the U.N.'s peacekeeping 
     capability.
       John Bolton's work as a paid researcher for Taiwan, his 
     idea that the U.S. should treat Taiwan as a sovereign state, 
     and that it is fantasy to believe that China might respond 
     with armed force to the secession of Taiwan do not attest to 
     the balanced judgment of a possible U.S. permanent 
     representative on the Security Council. China is emerging as 
     a major world power and the Taiwan issue is becoming more 
     acute.
       At a time when the U.N. is struggling to get an adequate 
     grip on the genocidal killing in Darfur, Sudan, Mr. Bolton's 
     skepticism about U.N. peacekeeping, about paying the U.N. 
     dues that fund peacekeeping, and his leadership of the 
     opposition to the International Criminal Court, originally 
     proposed by the U.S. itself in order to prosecute human 
     rights offenders, will all make it difficult for the U.S. to 
     play an effective leadership role at a time when the U.N. 
     itself and many member states are moving to improve U.N. 
     capacity to deal with international problems.
       Given these past actions and statements, John R. Bolton 
     cannot be an effective promoter of the U.S. national interest 
     at the U.N. We urge you to oppose his nomination.
           Sincerely,
       The Hon. Terrell E. Arnold, Former Deputy Director, Office 
     of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (Reagan), 
     Former U.S. Consul General, Sao Paulo, Brazil (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Romania, Chile, and India (Nixon, Ford, 
     Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Robert L. Barry, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Bulgaria and Indonesia (Reagan, Clinton), Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
     Affairs (Carter), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
     for European Affairs (Carter).
       Ambassador Josiah H. Beeman, Former U.S. ambassador to New 
     Zealand and Western Samoa (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Maurice M. Bernbaum, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Ecuador and Venezuela (Eisenhower, Johnson).
       Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Binns, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Honduras (Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Richard J. Bloomfield, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Ecuador and Portugal (Ford, Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Peter Bridges, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Somalia (Reagan).
       Ambassador George Bruno, Former U.S. ambassador to Belize 
     (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Edward Brynn, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Burkina Faso and Ghana (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), Former 
     Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 
     African Affairs (Clinton).
       Ambassador George Bunn, Former member of U.S. delegation to 
     the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations (Johhson), 
     Former U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference 
     (UN) (Johnson).
       Ambassador (ret.) A. Peter Burleigh, Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia 
     (Reagan), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
     Intelligence and Research (G.H.W. Bush), Former Ambassador 
     and Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State 
     (G.H.W. Bush), Former Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the 
     Maldives (Clinton), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Personnel (Clinton), Former U.S. Deputy Permanent 
     Representative to the UN and Acting Permanent Representative 
     to the UN (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Patricia M. Byrne, Former Deputy U.S. 
     Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council (Reagan), 
     Former U.S. ambassador to Mali and Burma (Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) James Cheek, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Sudan and Argentina (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Paul M. Cleveland, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to New Zealand and Western Samoa and Malaysia (Reagan, G.H.W. 
     Bush), Former U.S. representative to the Korean Energy 
     Development Organization (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Carleton S. Coon, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Nepal (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Jane Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Bangladesh (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) James F. Creagan, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Honduras (Clinton), Former U.S. Consul General, Sao Paulo, 
     Brazil (G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) T. Frank Crigler, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Rwanda and Somalia (Ford, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) John H. Crimmins, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to the Dominican Republic and Brazil (Johnson, Nixon, Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) Richard T. Davies (signed before he 
     passed away on March 30, 2005), Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Poland (Nixon, Ford, Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) John Gunther Dean, Former Deputy for 
     CORDS, Military Region 1, Vietnam (Nixon), Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Cambodia, Denmark, Lebanon, Thailand, India 
     (Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean, Former U.S. representative 
     to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna 
     (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Willard A. DePree, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Mozambique and Bangladesh (Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) Robert S. Dillon, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Lebanon (Reagan), Former Deputy Commissioner General of 
     the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) 
     (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Donald B. Easum, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Nigeria and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (Nixon, Ford, 
     Carter), Former Assistant Secretary of State for African 
     Affairs (Nixon, Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) William B. Edmondson, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to South Africa (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Nancy H. Ely-Raphel, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Slovenia (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) James Bruce Engle, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Dahomey (Nixon, Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) Richard K. Fox, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Trinidad and Tobago (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Lincoln Gordon, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Brazil (Kennedy, Johnson), Former Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Inter-American Affairs (Johnson).
       Ambassador (ret.) Robert Grey, Jr., Former U.S. 
     representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva 
     (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Holsey Gates Handyside, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Mauritania (Ford, Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) William C. Harrop, Former ambassador to 
     Israel, Kenya, and Zaire (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), 
     Former Inspector General, U.S. Department of State (Nixon).
       Ambassador (ret.) Samuel F. Hart, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Ecuador (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Arthur A. Hartman, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to France and the Soviet Union (Carter, Reagan), Former 
     Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Nixon).
       Ambassador Ulric Haynes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Algeria (Carter).
       Ambassador Gerald B. Helman, Former U.S. ambassador to the 
     United Nations, Geneva (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Robert T. Hennemeyer, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Gambia (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) H. Kenneth Hill, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Bulgaria (G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) John L. Hirsch, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Sierra Leone (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Lewis Hoffacker, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Nixon).
       Ambassador (ret.) H. Allen Holmes, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Portugal (Reagan), Former Assistant Secretary of State for 
     Political-Military Affairs (Reagan), Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
     (Clinton).
       The Hon. Thomas L. Hughes, Former Director, Bureau of 
     Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State 
     (Kennedy, Johnson).
       Ambassador (ret.) Dennis Jett, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Mozambique and Peru (Clinton).
       Ambassador James A. Joseph, Former U.S. ambassador to South 
     Africa (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Philip M. Kaiser, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Senegal, Mauritania, Hungary, Austria (Kennedy, Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Robert V. Keeley, Former U.S. Ambassador 
     to Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Greece (Ford; Carter, Reagan), 
     Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African 
     Affairs (Carter).
       Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Former Deputy Director, U.S. Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (Carter).

[[Page S5948]]

       Ambassador (ret.) Andrew I. Killgore, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Qatar (Carter).
       Ambassador Henry L. Kimelman, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Haiti (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Roger Kirk, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Somalia and Romania (Nixon, Ford, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Dennis H. Kux, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Ivory Coast (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) James F. Leonard, Former Deputy U.S. 
     Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Ford, 
     Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Samuel W. Lewis, Former Assistant 
     Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs 
     (Ford), Former Director of Policy Planning, State Department 
     (Clinton), Former ambassador to Israel (Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Princeton N. Lyman, Former Assistant 
     Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs 
     (Clinton), Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs, U.S. 
     Department of State (G.H.W. Bush), Former U.S. ambassador to 
     South Africa and Nigeria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) David L. Mack, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     the United Arab Emirates (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) Richard Cavins Matheron, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Swaziland (Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Charles E. Marthinsen, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Qatar (Carter, Reagan).
       Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Director of the Strategic 
     Programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
     (Reagan), Senior ACDA representative on U.S. START delegation 
     (Reagan).
       Ambassador Carol Moseley-Braun, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     New Zealand and Samoa (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Ambler H. Moss Jr., Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Panama (Carter, Reagan), Former Member, U.S.-
     Panama Consultative Committee (Carter, Reagan, Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Leonardo Neher, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Burkina Faso (Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) David D. Newsom, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Libya, Indonesia, the Philippines (Johnson, Nixon, 
     Carter), Former Assistant Secretary of State for African 
     Affairs (Nixon), Former Undersecretary of State for Political 
     Affairs (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Donald R. Norland, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to the Netherlands, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and Chad 
     (Johnson, Ford, Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) David Passage, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Botswana (G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) Edward L. Peck, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Iraq and Mauritania (Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Perry, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Bulgaria (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Christopher H. Phillips, Former Deputy 
     U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Nixon), Former 
     U.S. ambassador to Brunei (G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) Sol Polansky, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Bulgaria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador Stanley R. Resor, Former Secretary of the Army 
     (Johnson, Nixon), Former U.S. representative to the Mutual 
     and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna (Nixon, Ford, 
     Carter).
       Ambassador Nicholas A. Rey, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Poland (Clinton).
       John B. Rhinelander, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department 
     of State (Nixon), Legal adviser to the U.S. Strategic Arms 
     Limitation Delegation (SALT I) (Nixon).
       Ambassador (ret.) Stuart W. Rockwell, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Morocco (Nixon).
       Ambassador James R. Sasser, Former U.S. ambassador to the 
     People's Republic of China (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Cynthia P. Schneider, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to The Netherlands (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Talcott W. Seelye, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Tunisia and Syria (Nixon, Ford, Carter).
       The Hon. John Shattuck, Former Assistant Secretary of State 
     for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (Clinton), Former 
     Chairman, Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on 
     Religious Freedom Abroad (Clinton) Former U.S. ambassador to 
     the Czech Republic (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
     Affairs (Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and 
     Poland (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).
       Ambassador Richard Sklar, Former U.S. ambassador to the 
     United Nations for Management and Reform (Clinton).
       Ambassador Robert Solwin Smith, Former U.S. ambassador to 
     Ivory Coast (Nixon, Ford) Former Deputy and Acting Assistant 
     Secretary of State for Africa (Nixon) Former Deputy Permanent 
     Delegate to UNESCO (Truman, Eisenhower).
       Ambassador (ret.) Carl Spielvogel, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to the Slovak Republic (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Monteagle Stearns, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Greece and Ivory Coast (Ford, Carter, Reagan), Former Vice 
     President, National Defense University (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Andrew L. Steigman, Former Ambassador to 
     Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe (Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) Michael Sterner Former, U.S. ambassador 
     to the United Arab Emirates (Nixon, Ford), Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) John Todd Stewart Former, U.S. ambassador 
     to Moldova (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Richard W. Teare, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Harry E. T. Thayer, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Singapore (Carter, Reagan).
       The Hon. Hans N. Tuch, Career Minister, U.S. Foreign 
     Service, USIA.
       Ambassador (ret.) Theresa A. Tull, Former, U.S. ambassador 
     to Guyana and Brunei (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton).
       Ambassador William J. vanden Heuvel, Former Deputy U.S. 
     Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Carter), 
     Former U.S. representative to the United Nations, Geneva 
     (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Christopher van Hollen, Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka (Nixon, 
     Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) Richard N. Viets, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Tanzania and Jordan (Carter, Reagan).
       Ambassador (ret.) Frederick Vreeland, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Morocco (G.H.W. Bush), Former Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary of State for the Near East (G.H.W. Bush).
       Ambassador (ret.) Lannon Walker, Former Principal Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Carter, 
     Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Senegal, Nigeria, and 
     Ivory Coast (Reagan, G.H.W Bush, Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Alexander F. Watson, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Peru (Reagan) Former Deputy Permanent 
     Representative to the United Nations (G.H.W. Bush), Former 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 
     (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Melissa F. Wells, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zaire, Estonia 
     (Ford, Reagan, Carter, Clinton), Former U.S. representative 
     to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
     (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Thomas G. Weston, Former Special 
     Coordinator for Cyprus (Clinton, G.W. Bush), Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
     Affairs (Clinton).
       Ambassador (ret.) Robert E. White, Former U.S. ambassador 
     to Paraguay and El Salvador (Carter), Former Deputy U.S. 
     Permanent Representative to the Organization of American 
     States (Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) James M. Wilson, Jr., Former Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and Pacific Affairs 
     (Nixon), Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
     Affairs, Department of State (Ford).
       Ambassador (ret.) W. Howard Wriggins, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Sri Lanka (Carter).
       Ambassador (ret.) Kenneth S. Yalowitz, Former U.S. 
     ambassador to Belarus and Georgia (Clinton).
  Mr. President, this is a letter going to the Honorable Richard Lugar, 
the Honorable Joseph Biden, our chair and ranking member. It is an 
unprecedented letter:

       We write to express our concern over the nomination of John 
     R. Bolton to be Permanent Representative of the U.S. at the 
     United Nations, and we urge you to reject that nomination.

  This is from 102 very distinguished Americans who have served their 
country under both Republican and Democratic Presidents. I am going to 
read off some of the names for the record: The Honorable Terrell 
Arnold, who worked under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter; Ambassador, 
retired, Harry Barnes, who worked under Nixon, Ford, and Reagan; 
Ambassador Robert Barry, who served under Reagan, Clinton, and Carter; 
Ambassador Josiah Beeman, who served under Clinton; Ambassador Maurice 
Bernbaum, who served under Eisenhower and Johnson; Ambassador Jack 
Binns, who served Carter and Reagan; Ambassador Richard Bloomfield, who 
served under Ford, Carter, and Reagan; Ambassador Peter Bridges, who 
served under Reagan; Ambassador George Bruno, who served under Bill 
Clinton; Ambassador Edward Brynn, who served under George H.W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton.
  I could go on and on, but I think placing this in the Record for my 
colleagues to see will undermine the comments that are made about how 
much support this particular nominee has. That is simply glossing over 
the record. That is what is happening in this debate--glossing over the 
record by my friends, who are saying: Oh, what is the problem? So he is 
a bully, so he tries to fire people, so we have all these letters--and 
it goes on. Their ultimate point is that he is just what we need at the 
United Nations.
  I come out very differently. This is just what we don't need at the 
United Nations. We have a credibility problem in the world right now, 
and we need someone to walk in there, such as John Danforth walked in 
there, with credibility. I don't think we should be considering the 
nomination today. I made

[[Page S5949]]

that clear when I put a hold on the nomination. I lifted that hold 
because, clearly, colleagues believed they wanted to begin debate and, 
with due deference, I lifted the hold.
  The fact is, we don't have the information we have requested from the 
State Department and from the administration. You may think, well, 
maybe there is so much information out there, what more could there be 
on John Bolton? Well, I answer it this way. I have colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle coming up to me and saying: Do you have any more? Do 
you have a smoking gun on John Bolton? What else is out there? We heard 
what is out there. Do you have a smoking gun? The answer I give them is 
we not only have found several smoking guns but several bodies who were 
there to tell what happened to them. We found the victims. They are out 
there. They were saved only because there were folks who served higher 
than John Bolton, who said to him: You are wrong, you are bullying 
people, you are twisting their words, you are exerting politics in what 
should be clearly an independent intelligence function. And because of 
that, John Bolton was saved from himself. But we have the smoking guns 
and the victims, which we will talk about. But our colleagues want more 
information.
  Well, there are three big pieces of information out that we have not 
received. One is of deepest concern to our ranking member, Joe Biden, 
who has done an excellent job. Frankly, he and his staff and all of our 
staffs have done an extraordinary job. One piece of information deals 
with Mr. Bolton's interest in finding out intelligence matters that 
were revealed on some intercepts. We think it is very important because 
we don't know who was the target of Mr. Bolton's interest in the 10 
times when he requested to see these intercepts.
  It is a very important matter because, from what you can tell from 
the information we have so far, Mr. Bolton had a very clear agenda in 
his work at the State Department. What that agenda appears to be, from 
what we know, is hyping up the threat from various countries. We 
already know what a hyped-up threat can do. We have lost 1,600-plus of 
our beautiful soldiers in Iraq because of a hyped-up threat. There are 
more than 12,000 wounded. So when we are discussing John Bolton and his 
proclivity to try to exaggerate and twist intelligence information, 
this is not some theoretical dispute about whether he has an ideology, 
or whatever. That is not the question. The question is: Could his 
action have resulted in perhaps another conflict, or certainly more 
tension? The fact is, it could have--if he wasn't stopped by the higher 
ups. And now we hear that the higher ups are saying to Senators: Don't 
worry, we will control him at the U.N.
  Mr. President, I don't want someone to have to be controlled at the 
United Nations. John Danforth didn't have to be controlled. Mr. 
Negroponte didn't have to be controlled. Jean Kirkpatrick didn't have 
to be controlled. Daniel Patrick Moynihan didn't have to be controlled. 
Bill Richardson didn't have to be controlled. They knew what the policy 
of the United States of America was. They respected independent 
intelligence analysts. They never tried to twist information to fit 
their preconceived notions of what the world should look like. That is 
why this information is important.
  There are two other areas that we are interested in, also, dealing 
with a speech that Mr. Bolton prepared on Syria. Somehow we cannot get 
the draft of that speech. We think that is important. There is another 
area we have asked for, which is that one of Mr. Bolton's assistants 
who works with him has private clients, and we have asked to see the 
list of those private clients. We have not been able to get that 
either. So out of due respect for the United States Senate and for each 
of us as Senators, we are not an arm of the executive branch. We are a 
proud independent branch of Government. It gets you back to the whole 
issue of checks and balances.
  We have every right to see this information. If John Bolton can see 
these intercepts, why can't Joe Biden see them, who is our ranking 
member on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and someone whom everybody 
respects around here as being very cautious and careful? And there is 
not one scintilla of evidence that Joe Biden ever did something to 
undermine any administration's foreign policy. He bends over backward 
the other way. So that is a reason we should not be having this vote 
right now. We need to have more time to work on the administration to 
get this information--these intercepts, the speech, and the conflict of 
interest of the gentleman who now works for Mr. Bolton, Matthew 
Friedman. Mr. Friedman's former clients, as best we can tell, included 
the Government of Nigeria and also Fernando Marcos. We don't know who 
else is there. We would like to put an end to the speculation that 
someone is working in a top position for Mr. Bolton who has outside 
clients, which could pose conflicts of interest.
  There was a report in the Washington Post that got our attention on 
the front page some weeks ago, which said Condi Rice gave a message to 
the top staff not to cooperate with the Congress. Immediately I wrote 
to her. I got a letter back from her assistant. I wrote her a letter 
and she sent me back a letter from her assistant that said: We are 
cooperating. That report was false. We are going to turn over 
everything.
  I ask Senators on both sides: Don't you have pride in what you do? 
Don't you feel good about what you do? Don't you believe that being a 
Senator deserves some respect? Don't you believe you deserve to have 
information? Well, if you do, you should not vote to proceed with this 
nomination at this time, just based on the fact that we have not gotten 
the information.
  I think we are continuing to see the arrogance of power from this 
administration and a disregard for the checks and balances. We don't 
need a ruler in the White House; we need a government. We don't need 
someone who will rule us; we need someone who will govern with us. That 
is what this is about--a lack of respect for members of the committee.
  Beyond that, as I said, we do have a lot of smoking guns on this 
nominee, and we do have the victims of his actions. I will spend some 
time talking about that. It will be repetitive because each colleague 
has seen the information. You heard the very emotional testimony of 
Senator Voinovich, who feels so strongly about this, and he has laid it 
out in his fashion. Senator Biden has laid it out, as have others. I 
will lay it out in my fashion.
  Politicizing intelligence. What does that mean? It means that you 
have a political agenda, you try to use intelligence by cherry-picking 
it or twisting it to make your point. It is dangerous. It is 
exceedingly dangerous. There was a report in a British newspaper that 
had documentation from someone in the military in Britain who said, in 
fact, that is what happened in Iraq. We don't know that right now 
because we have not had that particular investigation. We only know 
that we made big mistakes on the intelligence front. But we didn't look 
at it saying: Did people in the office cherry-pick? Did they politicize 
intelligence? We don't know the answer. That is what the British 
documents say. We don't know that here. We were supposed to look at it, 
and I hope we will because history deserves an answer and so do the 
families of our soldiers who are dead.
  Politicizing intelligence is dangerous for our country. And now we 
think about probably one of the first assignments our U.N. ambassador 
may well have, which is to convince the U.N. Security Council about the 
threats posed by other nations, such as Iran and North Korea. I don't 
see Mr. Bolton having credibility, given his record of politicizing 
intelligence to be able to convince other countries that there is a 
problem. Maybe Secretary Rice will have to come over there. Maybe the 
President will have to speak to the U.N. instead. Would it not be good 
to have someone at the U.N. who had credibility walking in, such as 
Senator Danforth had? Would that not be important? Mr. Bolton won't 
have the credibility because he has a record of trying to remove 
intelligence analysts who disagreed with him, and he also attempted to 
exaggerate intelligence to fit his views.
  So this issue of using political pressure and the power of your 
position to twist the arms of independent intelligence analysts is, I 
believe, the most serious issue concerning John Bolton

[[Page S5950]]

because we know this could lead to unjustified war, and we should not 
promote someone who has a history of exaggerating threats, or at least 
trying to exaggerate threats that are not supported by intelligence.
  When you hear me make this comment, you might say: Well, Senator 
Boxer, you are a strong Democrat. Who else supports this view that 
politicizing intelligence is what John Bolton did? How about the former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford, 
who testified that Bolton's berating of analyst Christian Westermann 
had a ``chilling effect''--his words--a chilling effect within that 
agency and that analysts in INR--that is the intelligence research arm 
of the State Department--were very negatively affected by the incident. 
So we have John Bolton trying to get rid of Christian Westermann, by 
everyone's account a very honorable, bright intelligence officer doing 
his work, and it negatively affected, according to Carl Ford--by the 
way, Carl Ford describes himself as a conservative Republican. What did 
he say? He said his hero is Dick Cheney. Here we have a self-described 
conservative Republican, and his hero is Dick Cheney. He says John 
Bolton had a chilling effect within the intelligence agency, and John 
Bolton negatively affected that whole operation there.
  Mr. Ford said further the only reason, at the end of the day, that 
political pressure did not work on Mr. Westermann was because, 
thankfully, he said, the analyst was strong enough to say no to Bolton.
  I want to say on the floor of the Senate to Mr. Westermann I have 
never met him, I do not know him, I do not know his politics--I want to 
say to him: Thank you for the courage that you displayed in the face of 
a bully in such a high-level position.
  By the way, one of the things Senator Dodd did, and I thought he did 
it brilliantly, was to point out that Bolton reached down, way down to 
Mr. Westermann. That was not someone he worked with, that was a peer. 
He reached down to this individual who had never, in his whole career, 
had a negative thing said about him, and tried to twist his arm to get 
the intelligence he wanted, and when he could not do it, tried to get 
him fired. That is just the first one. So we have the smoking gun with 
the testimony of Carl Ford, and then we have the victim, Mr. 
Westermann.
  Mr. Bolton did not stop there. We refer to this gentleman as Mr. 
Smith because he is in the CIA. He is the national intelligence officer 
for Latin America. Bolton attempted to have him removed from his 
position because he disagreed with the views that Bolton expressed 
about Cuba in a speech saying that the views Mr. Bolton wanted to 
express in his speech did not reflect the intelligence community's 
assessment. This incident shows how far Mr. Bolton would go to pressure 
the intelligence community.
  Mr. Bolton worked in the State Department. He reached way down to get 
Mr. Westermann fired. But then he goes to a completely different 
agency, over which he does not even have any influence--or should not 
have--and he tried to ruin the career of an analyst he had never even 
met.
  It is one thing to challenge intelligence analysts to say: You know, 
my information is thus and so, and you don't seem to reflect it in your 
thinking. Let's talk about it. That is fine. We do that all the time in 
debate. I know when I am preparing for a talk such as this on the floor 
of the Senate, I will have my staff come in and say: I don't see it 
that way. Why do you see it that way? And you try to figure out what is 
the right thing to say, the right thing to do, and the thing on which 
you will not be challenged. But Mr. Bolton threatens retribution when 
the intelligence does not conform to his views. That is a disaster to 
promote someone such as that.
  Robert Hutchings, former chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council, describes the risk of politicizing intelligence this way:

       I think every judgment ought to be challenged and 
     questioned. But . . . when it goes beyond that to a search 
     for a pretty clearly defined preformed set of judgments, then 
     it turns into politicization. And . . . even when it is 
     successfully resisted . . . it creates a climate of 
     intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging . . 
     .

  What does he mean by that? This is a man who is an expert in 
intelligence. Conformity is dangerous because it means there is no 
discussion, no debate about what the truth is, where we are going. We 
need to have diverse voices. But at the end of the day, people have to 
understand that when they are speaking for the United States of 
America, they must speak the truth, as we know it at the time, based on 
the information we know.
  First, we have politicizing intelligence, which is a disaster. Then 
we have a pattern of retribution against lower level employees, which I 
believe leads to paralysis in the workplace. When you have a 
circumstance where Colin Powell had to come over to talk to these 
intelligence analysts and tell them, Don't worry, we are with you, keep 
doing your job, do not be intimidated, that is an extraordinary 
circumstance, and that is what happened in the case of Mr. Bolton. He 
had so harmed the morale of the intelligence agents, as Mr. Ford, a 
conservative Republican testified, that Colin Powell had to take time 
out to go over and speak to these analysts.
  This is not a question of partisan politics. This nominee has as many 
Republicans opposed to him as he does Democrats, and maybe even more.
  So we have the politicizing of intelligence which is very dangerous 
for our people, and we have retribution against lower level employees. 
When Mr. Bolton was asked about this, he brushed it off: Oh, I didn't 
really, didn't matter--I am paraphrasing--I shrugged it off, just got 
it off my chest. Yet he sought to remove Christian Westermann for 
disagreeing with him over intelligence in Cuba. Not once and shrug it 
off, not twice and shrug it off, but the record shows three times over 
a 5-month period he went after Mr. Westermann.
  This is confirmed by Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary for 
the INR--that is the State Department intelligence division--Thomas 
Fingar, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for INR; and Fred Fleitz, 
Chief of Staff to John Bolton; Neil Silver, an INR office manager; and 
Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Colin Powell.

  Bolton said to the committee: No, it was nothing, it was no biggie, I 
got it off my chest, I shrugged it off, I did not do anything. Carl 
Ford, Thomas Fingar, Fred Fleitz, Neil Silver, and Larry Wilkerson--
most of those people from the Bush administration--said: No, he tried 
to remove Mr. Westermann three times over a 5-month period. And Mr. 
Bolton sought to remove Mr. Smith over at the CIA, over whom Mr. Bolton 
had no authority whatsoever. We know that Bolton and his staff 
discussed the removal of this person over several months, and Bolton 
personally went out to CIA headquarters to seek Mr. Smith's removal.
  Let me say that again. We have retribution against independent 
intelligence analysts, three times in 5 months against Westermann, and 
Mr. Bolton went all the way out to the CIA to get rid of Mr. Smith. Who 
confirms this? John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of the CIA, Stu Cohen, 
former acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and Alan 
Foley, Director of the CIA Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation and 
Arms Control.
  We have not only the smoking gun, but the two victims. Now we have 
another person. Bolton also wrongly accused Rexon Ryu--a highly 
regarded midlevel State Department officer--of withholding a document 
from him. Eight months after the incident, Bolton denied Ryu a 
significant new assignment working on the G8 summit. This is confirmed 
by John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.
  Of all the people you want to promote, it would not be somebody who 
people in his own party say tried to politicize intelligence, tried to 
dish out retribution on independent intelligence analysts and because 
someone did not give him a piece of paper, he denied him a very 
important new assignment.
  Then, in 1994, we have a bizarre report of Bolton allegedly chasing a 
woman through a hotel lobby in Moscow, pounding on her door, falsely 
telling her colleagues she was under criminal investigation. How do we 
know that? There is a contemporaneous account provided by a colleague 
of this woman who said, yes, she called him during that whole time and 
told him everything that happened.

[[Page S5951]]

  In addition to these examples, we have learned that Mr. Bolton tried 
to have a State Department lawyer removed from a case involving 
sanctions and tried to have two unnamed State Department officers 
removed over policy differences.
  So there is a clear pattern of politicizing intelligence, which is 
dangerous for this country, and seeking retribution against lower level 
employees. You know what I find very significant is that the reason 
John Bolton failed in every one of his efforts, no matter how hard he 
tried--and we have the records, he tried--is because another official 
stepped in to stop John Bolton from his abusive behavior. One time it 
was Assistant Secretary Ford who prevented the retribution from taking 
place, again, a conservative Republican. In another instance, the 
Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin, under this President George 
Bush, had to step in when an analyst's job was threatened. Even 
Secretary Armitage, who was the Assistant Secretary to Colin Powell, 
was forced to intervene to prevent Bolton from removing a State 
Department lawyer from a particular case.
  Who is going to prevent Mr. Bolton from handing out this type of 
retribution when he is in New York managing 150 Americans? Secretary 
Rice has told Senator Voinovich that Mr. Bolton would be closely 
supervised as U.N. Ambassador. How embarrassing is that? How 
embarrassing is that, a U.N. Ambassador who has to be closely 
supervised by the Secretary of State. She is going to make sure he does 
not step out of line. She has other things to do.
  I want to quote Senator Voinovich in the Foreign Relations Committee 
when he said:

       Why in the world would you want to send someone to the U.N. 
     that has to be supervised?

  We have a circumstance here, and I want to say to Senator Voinovich 
what courage he has to step out on this and what credibility he has. I 
have watched Senator Voinovich, and I never remember him speaking out 
against a Presidential appointee ever. This is a momentous and 
difficult thing to do for Senator Voinovich. But this leads me to my 
third reason to oppose the Bolton nomination--not only politicizing 
intelligence, not only seeking retribution, but unprecedented 
opposition from both parties. I put into the Record already a list of 
102 former ambassadors who oppose this nominee, most of whom worked in 
the Reagan administration, some in the Ford administration, the Carter 
administration, the George H.W. Bush administration. But let's hear 
what some of the Republicans have said about Mr. Bolton. Here are the 
comments of Carl Ford, self-described conservative Republican, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for their Intelligence Division within 
State:

       He is a quintessential kiss up, kick down sort of guy. 
     There are a lot of them around . . . But the fact is he 
     stands out, that he's got a bigger kick and it gets bigger 
     and stronger the further down the bureaucracy he is kicking.

  And here is a quote from Lawrence Wilkerson, the former Chief of 
Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, who, as we all know, was the 
Secretary of State in George Bush's first term. This is really 
unprecedented, to get these kinds of quotes from people who served 
under Republican administrations about the Republican nomination.

       My objections to . . . him being our Ambassador at the U.N. 
     stems from two basic things. One, I think he is a lousy 
     leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that have to 
     be led . . . Second, I differ from a lot of people in 
     Washington both friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton as 
     to his quote `brilliance' unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a 
     man who counted beans . . . and had no willingness--and, in 
     many cases no capacity--to understand the other things that 
     were happening around those beans. And that's a recipe for 
     problems at the United Nations.

  This is Elizabeth Jones, former Assistant Secretary for European and 
Eurasian Foreign Affairs:

       I don't know if he's incapable of negotiation but he's 
     unwilling.

  And here we want someone at the U.N. to reform the U.N., to 
straighten out the U.N., to change it for the better, and you are 
sending someone who is shown, as she says, as being unwilling to 
negotiate and maybe even incapable of it.
  John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, 
October 2001 to July 2004--so this is very recent--says:

       I believe it would be fair to say that some of the officers 
     within my bureau complained that they felt undue pressure to 
     conform to the views of Under Secretary Bolton versus the 
     views they thought they could support.

  John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA for a while. He 
was Acting Director before they put Mr. Goss in place.

       It is perfectly all right for a policy maker to express 
     disagreement with an NIO or an analyst, and it's perfectly 
     all right for them to challenge such an individual 
     vigorously, challenge their work vigorously. But I think it's 
     different to then request because of the disagreement that 
     the person be transferred . . . Therefore [I] had a strong 
     negative reaction to the suggestion about moving him.

  And he was talking about Mr. Smith, the intelligence analyst who Mr. 
Bolton tried to get removed from his portfolio. I have told you about 
the letters the committee has received. The committee never asked for 
these letters. A letter with more than 100 former diplomats who oppose 
the nomination. In the letter that I put in--I didn't read the letter 
to you. I will just read it now in part. This letter is signed by 
people who served the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush 
administrations.

       [John Bolton's] past activities and statements indicate 
     conclusively that he is the wrong man for this position at a 
     time when the U.N. is entering a critically important phase 
     of modernization, seeking to promote economic development and 
     democratic reforms and searching for ways to cope better with 
     proliferation crises and spurt of natural disasters and 
     internal conflicts.

  I talked about how unprecedented this opposition is to such a post. 
Since 1945, the Senate has confirmed 24 nominees to serve as U.N. 
ambassador. Of these 24, only 2 received any opposition and nothing of 
the level of opposition we see to John Bolton. The people who received 
some opposing views were Andrew Young and Richard Holbrooke. That was 
about pretty much it on the list as I saw it.
  Let me see if there is anybody else.
  That is it. All the rest, unanimous consent or everybody voted for 
them.
  Unprecedented, polarizing, divisive, and partisan appointment.
  Now, there is a fourth reason I oppose this nomination, and I hope my 
colleagues will consider this. John Bolton holds views on the U.N. and 
international law that shatter his credibility in the world. You want 
to send someone over there who doesn't have to be babysat by 
Condoleezza Rice. You don't want to send someone over there who doesn't 
tell the truth. You want to send someone over there you do trust and 
who comes to the job with credibility.
  I ask you this, my colleagues: Mr. Bolton in a speech--and I have 
seen the actual film--said:

       There is no United Nations.

  ``There is no United Nations.'' We are going to send someone to the 
United Nations who says there is no United Nations. He also said:

       If the U.N. Secretariate building in New York lost 10 
     floors, it wouldn't make a bit of difference

  Now, what kind of credibility does he have walking onto the floor of 
the--even if he is babysat by Condi Rice, who says she is going to 
watch over him--what kind of credibility does this man have? He has 
this record of politicizing intelligence. He has this record of 
retribution. He has the most unprecedented opposition of anyone.

  I see the Senator from Connecticut has come, and I thank him, Senator 
Dodd, for working so hard on this. It is not easy. Senator Dodd rarely 
steps out like this on a Presidential appointment. It is extraordinary. 
And when we look at the votes of all the U.N. ambassadors since 1945, 
only twice did we even have anybody get a few ``no'' votes. It is 
unprecedented. It is unprecedented. And there are all these reasons for 
it.
  If you really want to reform the U.N., which we all do, we should not 
be sending John Bolton. He simply does not have the credibility to do 
it. He doesn't have the credibility to convince wavering countries to 
be on our side. He has been inaccurately compared to Jeane Kirkpatrick. 
If you look at some of the U.N. ambassador's, former U.N. Ambassador 
Jeane Kirkpatrick's comments, she talked about the following. She said:

       U.N. votes matter because they affect widely held views 
     about perceptions of

[[Page S5952]]

     power, about effectiveness, and about legitimacy.

  What did John Bolton say. He said:

       Many Republicans in Congress and perhaps the majority not 
     only don't care about losing a General Assembly vote, but 
     they actually see it as a make my day outcome.

  How does this bring John Bolton credibility?
  I wish to take a moment to just ask my friend from Connecticut if he 
is prepared to speak at this time because if so, I would wind down.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from 
California, I came over to hear my colleague's remarks. I appreciate 
her courtesy.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator.
  I have how many minutes remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California has 3 minutes 
remaining.
  Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent to have an additional 5 minutes. 
I will close down in 3 minutes.
  So we have reason after reason after reason here. Senator Voinovich 
laid out the record. He read from the record. I am going to close with 
something I hope every single Member of this Senate will listen to. 
John Bolton did not tell the truth to the committee. I am going to 
repeat that. John Bolton did not tell the truth to the Foreign 
Relations Committee. He said he shrugged off the issue. He shrugged off 
the issue with these people he tried to fire. He said he just dropped 
by the CIA on his way home from work. He said he didn't try to dish out 
retribution or try to fire anybody at all. He said a lot of things that 
weren't true to our committee. And that is very serious. He wasn't 
truthful with us. He didn't give us honest accounts. He didn't tell us 
the truth about how he tried on many occasions to fire these analysts. 
And if nothing else I have said matters about the retribution, about 
the twisting of arms to get intelligence to build up a phony case 
against other countries, if the fact that he said there was no United 
Nations doesn't move you, or if that 10 stories were gone it wouldn't 
matter, if you don't care anything about that, I think you ought to 
care about telling the truth before a committee of the Senate. And we 
have had chapter and verse. We have it cold here.
  For all those reasons, I hope we will not vote for John Bolton. And 
if we do not get the information Senators Biden and Dodd are pushing so 
hard for, we should delay this until we see that information because it 
is a matter of right and wrong. It is right for us to get that 
information. It is wrong for the administration to withhold it. We are 
a separate but equal branch with the White House.
  I thank my colleagues. I know this was a long statement, but this is 
a very important issue. And it is not just one reason against John 
Bolton; there are about six. I hope I have laid them out.
  I thank you very much, Mr. President. I yield the floor and note the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. BOXER. I ask would ask the time in the quorum be divided equally 
between both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would note that has been requested. 
It is so ordered.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the 
nomination of John Bolton. The question for me is, in a position of 
exceptional importance to the United States and our Government, that of 
representative to the world body--the United Nations, is John Bolton 
the kind of person who can best represent the interests of the United 
States? Is John Bolton the kind of personality who can negotiate and 
talk and establish personal relationships with the representatives of 
the other nations of the world as we try to carry forward the agenda of 
the United States? To those two questions, the answer is clearly no.
  There are examples of former representatives to the United Nations, 
nominated by Republican Presidents--such as Ambassador Negroponte, such 
as a former Senator and former Ambassador John Danforth--who embody the 
type of person you would want representing our country before the 
United Nations.
  This position is particularly critical to our country at this time 
because two of the greatest threats to the interests of the United 
States are North Korea and Iran, and their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
  Clearly we have an interest in preventing both countries from 
possessing the bomb, even though it looks as though North Korea already 
does. We ought to be making sure that at the end of the day North Korea 
does not have weapons of mass destruction that they can proliferate all 
over the world, particularly into the hands of terrorists.
  The same with Iran. There is no evidence that Iran has a bomb now, 
but clearly the evidence is there that Iran is trying to achieve that. 
We need a representative in the United Nations who can help us work 
with other nations, particularly European nations, with regard to Iran. 
Also, we must focus on the nations in the region of North Korea, so, at 
the end of the day these two countries do not have nuclear weapons. 
This is in the clear interests not only of the United States, but it is 
in the clear interests of the world. Otherwise, you raise the 
possibility of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials getting into the 
hands of terrorists. And once that happens, Katie bar the door, we 
would have a whole new and extreme threat to the interests of the 
civilized world.
  Is John Bolton the person who we think can establish those personal 
relationships within the United Nations? The relationships that we will 
need in order to get Europe to help us with Iran, and in order to get 
help with North Korea. I think that answer is clearly no.
  The stakes are high. That is why I speak with passion. That is why I 
have spoken with passion as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.
  But there is more. The ``more'' is simple. Should John Bolton be 
promoted based on his performance in his existing job as arms control 
negotiator? Should he be promoted? I think the answer is clearly no 
because John Bolton has not done a good job. Look at those two nations 
I just mentioned, North Korea and Iran. Have we gotten anywhere in our 
arms control negotiations with regard to those two countries in the 
last 4 years when he was Under Secretary for Arms Control? The answer 
to that is no.
  Why should we be promoting an individual who has not done his job 
well into a position of even higher visibility--I will not say of 
greater importance--of higher visibility as a representative of our 
country? It is clear to me that we should not.
  If we didn't have this deal here about supporting the President's 
nominations, do you think if Senators on that side of the aisle voted 
their conscience, they would support this nomination? I think the 
answer is clearly no. Senator Voinovich has had the courage to stand up 
and call it as he sees it. I do not know Mr. Bolton, but I have 
observed him and I have observed his demeanor and I have looked at his 
record. I think his record is one that does not suggest we elevate him 
to this position of extreme prominence in the representation of the 
interests of the United States before the United Nations, particularly 
at this delicate time when we need our best representative at the 
United Nations. I think at the end of the day it is clear he should not 
be our representative at the United Nations. Therefore, I am going to 
vote no on the nomination of John Bolton.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time 
since Senator Nelson of Florida yielded the floor be charged against 
Republican-controlled time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of 
John Bolton to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. The President 
has made an inspired choice.
  Mr. Bolton has the necessary experience, the knowledge of the U.N. 
system and the confidence of the President to be a successful advocate 
of U.S. policy at the United Nations.
  As Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security, Mr. Bolton has taken a tough line

[[Page S5953]]

against the tyrants and the despots who wish to harm us.
  He has stood up to Iran and North Korea, refusing to appease their 
nuclear ambitions.
  Mr. Bolton is candid about his disdain for rogue regimes. He's not 
going to be dancing with Kim Jong Il--he called him a tyrannical 
dictator. That is fine with me. He has also been candid about the 
weaknesses of the United Nations. That is fine with me too.
  The United States has sent forceful, blunt-speaking ambassadors to 
the United Nations before like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, and the United States has been better for it.
  Senator Moynihan called the U.N. ``a dangerous place'' for American 
interests.
  That is why it is necessary to send Mr. Bolton to the U.N.--to make 
sure that American interests are advanced.
  He is outspoken, but he also is a skilled diplomat, who knows how to 
work with friends and allies, and has a proven track record of success 
in building coalitions to support vital objectives.
  It was John Bolton who led the effort to create the Proliferation 
Security Initiative--a multinational coalition of nations, working 
together in unprecedented ways to stop the transport of dangerous 
weapons and materials at sea, on land and in the air. Some 60 nations 
are now supporting this effort.
  When he was Assistant Secretary of International Organization 
Affairs, with the United Nations as part of his portfolio, he was the 
one responsible for the repeal of the odious 1975 ``Zionism is Racism'' 
resolution that was passed in the United Nations.
  At a time when the United Nations continues to be plagued by scandal 
and mismanagement, the United States needs a strong presence to reform 
that body.
  Just look at the scandals the UN is facing on oil-for-food, sexual 
abuse, theft, and sexual harassment:
  We now know that Saddam Hussein, corrupt U.N. officials, and corrupt 
well-connected countries were the real benefactors of the Oil-for-Food 
Program.
  They skimmed their illegal gain from illegal oil shipments, financial 
transactions, kickbacks, and surcharges and allowed Saddam Hussein to 
build up his armed forces and live in the lap of luxury while his 
people starved.
  There have been allegations of sexual abuse in peacekeeping 
operations by U.N. personnel going back at least ten years, most 
recently in the Congo where 150 allegations of rape, pedophilia, and 
prostitution are being investigated.
  The theft of $3.8 million by an employee of the World Meteorological 
Organization led to the revelation that Mohammed Hassan apparently 
cashed an undetermined number of checks for his own enrichment, but his 
colleagues chose not to speak out.
  There was a recent whitewash by the Secretary General of sexual 
harassment by two senior U.N. officials, the High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the United Nation's top oversight official.
  This list of current scandals does not even begin to touch on broader 
issues such as the proper role of the United Nations and the need for 
fiscal responsibility and austerity. There has been a 42 percent 
increase in the U.N. regular budget over the past 10 years. The United 
Nations is supposed to have a zero nominal growth budget.
  Those funds support programs with questionable value. We are all 
painfully aware that the United Nations has a Commission on Human 
Rights which includes notorious human rights abusers such as Sudan, 
China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe.
  The United Nations is imploding under the weight of its own scandals. 
And these scandals are helping to unveil the cronyism that is corroding 
the U.N. system. The U.N. is in desperate need of reform--and in 
desperate need of a reformer like John Bolton. Perhaps most 
importantly, John Bolton is a strong believer in sovereignty.
  The principle of state sovereignty is what undergirds the entire 
international system.
  Yet today we see respect for state sovereignty eroding all around us. 
We see it in the International Criminal Court's claim of authority to 
try the citizens of countries that have not consented to ICC 
jurisdiction. We see it in the U.N. false claim to have sole authority 
to permit the use of force.
  These trends are dangerous, not only because the erosion of 
sovereignty is a threat to freedom, but because the erosion of respect 
for state sovereignty absolves states of their sovereign 
responsibilities to deal with problems within their borders.
  It gives states an excuse to punt problems to supra-national bodies, 
like the UN and the ICC, instead of taking responsibility for problems 
that originate within their border from poor national governance. In 
the war on terror, every state needs to meet its sovereign 
responsibilities. As sovereignty has eroded, terrorists have taken 
advantage of these trends. John Bolton has the fortitude to stand up 
for what is right, fight the good fight, and prevail.
  Secretary Rice called John Bolton a tough-minded diplomat. That's 
exactly what the U.S. needs at the U.N.---and exactly what the U.N. 
needs from the U.S.
  Let me conclude by reinforcing why this body should support John 
Bolton's nomination. The U.S. does not need a U.N. representative for 
the world. We need a U.S. representative to the world. We need someone 
who has the interests of our country first and foremost in his mind as 
he represents us at the U.N.
  There are many anti-U.S. forces at the U.N. Appeasement has never 
worked in dealing with aggressors. And it will not work for our country 
at the U.N.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I say to my friend, the junior Senator 
from Nevada, he is right on target as he always is. The Senator is 
right: The policy of appeasement is what we have been watching for a 
long time. I have often said an appeaser is a guy who feeds his friends 
to the alligators hoping they eat him last.
  Hiram Mann said:

     No man survives when freedom fails,
     The best men rot in filthy jails,
     And those who cry appease, appease
     Are hanged by those they tried to please.

  John Bolton is not that appeaser. I am so much in support of this 
man. I have been listening to the criticisms, and I cannot figure who 
they are talking about. My feelings about John Bolton can be summed up 
by the former Governor of Massachusetts, William Weld. He is not 
someone I very often quote, very often agree with, but William Weld 
said:

       He's strong medicine, all right, but sometimes strong 
     medicine is needed, such as it is at the United Nations 
     today.

  I think he is actually very correct in that. My colleagues know I 
have many concerns about the United Nations and about Kofi Annan. I 
have been quite outspoken and a critic of his and the United Nations in 
general. It seems every day we hear new reasons to express outrage 
about the performance of the United Nations.
  There are clearly abundant problems in the United Nations, 
particularly related to the Iraqi Oil for Food Program. We are not 
talking about thousands of dollars; we are talking about millions of 
dollars. We are talking about dollars with ties to the actual family of 
Kofi Annan.
  Do not get me wrong, the United Nations should be a tremendous force 
for good in the world by providing a place for countries to cooperate 
and pursue and achieve the original missions of the U.N. founders: to 
promote freedom, peace, respect for human rights.
  Unfortunately, it has been a disaster. I have grave concerns about 
the means that have been employed, reportedly, to achieve those ends.
  The U.N. peacekeeping missions have been questionable. In addition, 
these operations rely heavily on the use of U.S. troops and funding in 
a way that threatens our military readiness and unfairly taxes our 
resources.
  Other serious concerns are questions about the focus of the United 
Nations on its inefficient structure and massive bureaucracy which 
wastes American taxpayer dollars. This is significant because the 
United Nations operates by collection of assessments and dues. Each 
member of the United Nations is required to pay a certain percentage of 
the organization's budget based on their size and based on their 
ability to pay. I never quite understood the formula.

[[Page S5954]]

  Since January of 2001, the United States was assessed 22 percent of 
the regular budget of the United Nations even though all nations, 
regardless of size, get the same vote in the General Assembly. This 
leads to the situation where the United States is forced to both 
subsidize the United Nations and go along with many of the decisions 
that are against our national interests.
  As Americans, we should have no problem leading the way on the global 
stage on issues of peace, human dignity, and liberty, but the U.N.'s 
action in recent years has made it clear that the organization has lost 
its moorings. Unless things change for the better, we will want to 
reevaluate our support.
  In addition to financial matters, there are several other areas in 
which the U.N. has shown itself to be badly in need of reform. I 
mentioned the oil-for-food scandal. We know about that. That has 
received a lot of attention--not enough but a lot of attention.
  One of the elements of the oil-for-food scandal has not gotten as 
much attention, and that is what Saddam Hussein's regime was doing with 
the money they got by skimming from oil contracts negotiated under the 
program. As we learned from Charles Duelfer's Iraqi Survey Group 
report:

       The ISG has been investigating Iraq's procurement process, 
     sources of finance, the involvement of foreign firms, and the 
     specific types of goods that were sought, Iraq utilized a 
     complex and well developed procurement system hidden by an 
     effective denial and deception strategy. By the late 1990s, 
     Iraq, in contravention of U.N. sanctions, pursued the 
     procurement of military goods and technical expertise for 
     military capabilities . . .
       . . . Money also was obtained from kickback payments made 
     on contracts set up through the U.N.'s Oil for Food Program. 
     Iraq derived several billion dollars between 1999 and 2003 
     from oil smuggling and kickbacks. One senior regime official 
     estimated Iraq earned $4 billion from illicit oil sales from 
     1999 to 2002. By levying a surcharge on Oil for Food 
     contracts, Iraq earned billions more during the same period.
       . . . this was revenue outside U.N. control and provided 
     resources the regime could spend without restriction . . .
       . . . Iraq imported banned military weapons, technology, 
     and dual-use goods through Oil for Food contracts. Companies 
     in several countries were involved in these efforts. Direct 
     roles by government officials are also clearly established.

  If this is the kind of program the U.N. runs, I don't know how anyone 
can get away with saying it does not need serious reform.
  Another outrageous abuse of U.N. authority took place in the Democrat 
Republic of Congo. The U.N.'s own watchdog department, the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services, investigated alleged abuse by the U.N. 
peacekeeping forces in the northeastern Congolese town of Bunia and 
found a pattern of sexual exploitation of women and children which it 
said was continuing at the time of the report. U.N. peacekeepers 
working in the Democrat Republic of Congo sexually abused girls as 
young as 13. I have been to both Congos many time, and I have watched 
these things going on.
  The other day I was in the Congo and I saw a fleet of cars, about 400 
cars. I asked what they were. They had the U.N. symbol. They were cars 
that were going to take the peacekeeping people to remote areas of 
Africa.
  I suggest for the reading of anyone who is interested in that part of 
the country, ``King Leopold's Ghost.'' It tells what has happened in 
that country. I cannot help but believe that many of these U.N. 
peacekeepers are continuing to abuse these people, as we have seen in 
the past.
  I have spoken many times on this floor about the redundant and 
counterproductive bureaucracy that has been built up, layer upon layer, 
providing cushy jobs with no accountability and little, if any, 
transparency. And I have also noted in the past the exorbitant cost of 
the renovation of the U.N. headquarters, for which American taxpayers 
are again footing the bill, we think. These issues, and others like 
them, remain unresolved and will continue to undermine the U.N.'s 
legitimacy around the world.
  There are so many things we hear about over and over again, about the 
abuse of power of these peacekeepers going in, but I would like to 
share with you a personal experience. About 3 weeks ago, I was in 
Uganda, and in northern Uganda, on the southern Sudan border, there is 
a terrorist group there that has been operating for 30 years, with the 
same individual. They will go in and raid these camps, take these kids 
out--I am talking about 12-year-old kids--and arm them with guns, teach 
them to fight, and then send them back home to murder their parents. 
And if they don't do it, they cut their hands off.
  Now, this is going on today. I saw it. I was there. Where is the 
United Nations? They are not there. They are not doing anything. I 
often wonder what they are doing. But something has to happen to change 
all of that.
  That is where this nominee comes in. After reviewing John Bolton's 
credentials, I cannot tell you how strongly I endorse him. He has 
served as Under Secretary of State, is extremely qualified to hold the 
position of ambassador to the United Nations, and has an impressive 
record as an accomplished lawyer, diplomat, and scholar.
  My colleagues have extolled Mr. Bolton's successes as a reformer in 
this Chamber before. He has a reputation of toughness, reliability, 
honor, and, yes, tenacity. Because of these very reasons, I believe Mr. 
Bolton will be extremely effective in this position and will best 
represent President Bush and the United States at the United Nations.
  I have often watched the United Nations and have wondered sometimes, 
who is on our side? I can assure you, with John Bolton there, you are 
going to have someone on our side.
  We have already spent a great deal of time discussing the Democrats' 
obstructionism this week, so I will only say a few words about that 
now. The various political ploys used to hold up Mr. Bolton's 
nomination were frustrating and ridiculous, and were based on nothing 
more than personal dislike, attacks on this administration's policy, 
and a misguided and irresponsible vision for the United Nations.
  Now, I have heard criticism that John Bolton should not be confirmed 
because he has opposed the U.N. activities and he has said negative 
things about the United Nations. That is all the more reason we should 
confirm him in this position. I often think how they say: Well, he 
doesn't like the United Nations. Why should we send him as our 
representative? That is exactly the kind of person who needs to be 
there to effect some changes. It is like saying, if you have a prison, 
that you need to have a convict running the prison. No, you do not. You 
need to have somebody who is wanting to come up with some reforms. So 
we need somebody who will reform the mess that is up there.
  There are a lot of us who have said for a long period of time that we 
ought to just get out, just give up, that the United Nations is not 
looking after our best interests. I think with John Bolton there that 
will change. He has a proven record of success. He will do a great job. 
It is broke. He can fix it. We need to confirm his nomination.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I wish to join my colleague from Oklahoma 
and other colleagues who have risen today to support the nomination of 
John Bolton to be our U.N. ambassador.
  The United Nations is a unique institution, obviously. It is an 
institution which has gone through its good times and some bad times. 
Many of us, on our side of the aisle especially, have been critical of 
the United Nations over the years for different activities, whether 
they have been policy driven or, in some cases, just the operations 
aspects of the United Nations. But I think, at least for my part, I 
agree that it is an extremely important institution, that it represents 
an attempt by the community of nations across the world to find a forum 
where they can interact and, hopefully, reach conclusions which are 
constructive to mankind generally and especially address issues which 
cannot and should not be addressed by nation states individually, such 
as issues involving large expansions of disease, issues involving the 
treatment of children around the world, issues involving the questions 
of war.
  It is important we have a forum where nations can come together and 
try to work together and, if they disagree, at least have the 
disagreements be more transparent and, therefore, the ability, 
hopefully, to reach agreements, and at least have the capacity to 
temper those disagreements, which is more probable of occurring as a 
result of transparency.

[[Page S5955]]

  It is an institution which, by its very nature, is going to have 
difficulty reaching consensus and moving forward on extremely complex 
issues and issues which are intensely felt because of the fact that it 
represents such a diverse collection of the world, almost the entire 
world, for all intents and purposes, nation states which all have 
different purposes and interests.
  But it is a very important forum, and it is something that we, as a 
country, clearly were one of the originators of in San Francisco after 
the war. It actually is the outgrowth of Woodrow Wilson's concepts with 
the League of Nations. We have helped it evolve and grow, and we have 
basically underwritten it. The American taxpayers, for better or worse, 
pay approximately 25 percent of all the costs the U.N. incurs, whether 
they are operational costs or peacekeeping costs. That number varies 
between those two accounts, but the number is very significant.
  I used to chair the appropriating committee which had jurisdiction 
over those funds, and it was frustrating at times to send the money 
because I felt their actions in a number of areas, to be kind, maybe 
involved a bit of mismanagement, to be kind, and in other areas were 
just misguided but were part of the whole.
  As a participating member state, we have an obligation to support the 
institution and to try to correct it from within. How do you correct it 
from within? I think this administration has made a very aggressive 
effort to try to make the U.N. more accountable, first in the area of 
operations, in the area of just the basic management of the 
institution, reducing the amount of patronage, reducing the amount of 
misallocation of funds. This administration has focused aggressively on 
that. And secondly, this administration has made a very aggressive 
effort in the area of initiating policy, policy which may impact how we 
deal with AIDS in Africa, how we deal with the health care problems 
across the world, and the pandemics that are coming at us, regrettably, 
and how we deal, obviously, with peacekeeping initiatives in a variety 
of different pressure points around the world, especially in the Middle 
East and in Africa and, of course, in the Balkans to some degree.
  So we have, as a Government--and this Government specifically, the 
Government under President George Bush--aggressively pursued policies 
to try to focus the U.N. on trying to be a better managed place and 
being an institution which better, more effectively reflects policies 
of democracy and liberty. That has been our basic theme in trying to 
work within the U.N. structure.
  John Bolton brings to the table the expertise necessary to continue 
that initiative. He may be rough around the edges on occasion. There is 
no question about that. But there is also nothing wrong with that. If 
being rough around the edges on occasion is a detriment, a personality 
trait which people should not have, then I guess there are a lot of us 
here who should not be in the Senate.
  The fact is, you have to be aggressive and you have to be willing to 
assert your view and the views that you are projecting as a 
representative of this country if you are going to be effective in 
making a case for this Nation. John Bolton will accomplish that in the 
U.N., in my opinion. In fact, it is his type of personality in the 
sense of his willingness to aggressively advocate a position which is 
consistent with our promotion, as a nation, of liberty, democracy, and 
honesty within the management of the U.N. ``Honesty'' may be too strong 
a word, but at least more efficiency within the management of the U.N. 
That will be the greatest strength that he brings to the table there. 
People will understand clearly where America is coming from, and it is 
important they understand that. And the American taxpayer will know 
that we, within the hallways of the U.N., will have someone who is 
going to advocate for efficient and effective use of those tax dollars 
we are sending there. That is our right, I believe, as taxpayers, to 
ask for that type of leadership within the U.N.

  So John Bolton, in my opinion, with his broad expertise in foreign 
policy and with his commitment to promoting this administration's 
commitment to the promotion of liberty and the promotion of democracy 
across the globe, and to fighting terrorism, is the right person for 
this job. I regret he has been held up. And it appears Members of the 
other side intend to try to filibuster his appointment.
  A President should have, just as a matter of policy, a person in the 
position at the U.N. who is of his choosing. This is the right of a 
President, to send a person to the U.N. who the President feels most 
effectively will advocate the policies of the administration because it 
is, after all, the President who has the primary responsibility of 
promoting foreign policy within our Government structure. It is not the 
responsibility of the Congress, although there are a lot of folks in 
this body who appear to think they are Secretary of State. The fact is, 
the Constitution does not provide that portfolio to the Congress, it 
provides it to the President and the President's appointees to Cabinet-
level positions, which the U.N. ambassador position represents.
  So it seems highly inappropriate that we should be holding up his 
nomination unless someone can show definitively that he does not have 
the personal integrity or the personal honesty to serve in the 
position. If individuals disagree with his ability or his capacity to 
carry out the job, that is not really our call, unless that 
disagreement is a function of honesty, integrity relative to the 
individual's qualifications, because in this instance it is the 
President's right to pick the individual he thinks can carry out the 
job most effectively, and the President has picked John Bolton.
  I have not heard anything from anybody that calls into question John 
Bolton's integrity or honesty. I heard a lot of people who expressed 
frustration about maybe how he manages individuals, but that clearly is 
not the criteria for rejecting a nominee to a Cabinet-level position. 
If it were, there would have been a lot of nominees rejected under 
every President who has ever nominated individuals because all of us 
have warts, and many of those people who have been nominated to Cabinet 
positions clearly had a number of warts.
  So I do think it is inappropriate to pursue a filibuster in this 
instance. To have a policy disagreement with the President as to the 
way he approaches the U.N., that may be appropriate. That policy 
disagreement can be debated, but it should not ensue or lead logically 
to a filibuster of an individual who has a nomination to the position 
because it is, after all, the President's right to choose individuals 
to serve at his Cabinet-level positions. Those individuals should be 
confirmed in a timely manner so that the President has the capacity to 
pursue foreign policy initiatives and the leadership of this Nation on 
the issues of foreign policy with a full complement, a full team of 
individuals to support his initiatives.
  I do hope we will move forward to a final vote on Mr. Bolton this 
afternoon. People who feel he is the wrong choice--and they may have 
policy differences with the President on how we are pursuing liberty 
and democracy across the globe--can vote against him on that basis, but 
at least give him a vote, and give him a vote promptly.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the nomination of John 
Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
  Let me begin, briefly, by stating what this nomination and debate is 
not about. It is not about reform at the United Nations. There is not a 
single Member of this body who I know of who does not agree with the 
notion that we ought to be doing everything we can to make the United 
Nations a stronger institution, a more meaningful one, in today's 
world, where more direct actions can be taken where problems exist 
around the world to make it more efficient, to function better. All of 
us agree with that, and all of us agree that whoever assumes this 
position as ambassador from the United States to the U.N. ought to play 
a critical role in that effort. That is not in question here. That is 
not a matter of debate.
  What is also not a matter of debate is the style of the particular 
nominee in question. I think all of us in this city certainly respect 
the fact that some people's style is a little more brusque than others, 
can be a little more blunt

[[Page S5956]]

than others. I do not know of anyone, certainly on this side of the 
aisle--or that side, for that matter--who disagrees with a nominee 
because they do not particularly like their style, although they may 
have been particularly rough on some employees. We may not applaud it. 
We may not like it. We may think it is unwise and bad management style. 
But almost nobody in this Chamber on either side has objections to this 
nominee solely because of the question of reform at the United Nations 
or whether Mr. Bolton's style is objectionable or not.
  My objection to this nomination focuses on one single issue. Members 
will have to decide for themselves whether they think this issue is of 
such importance that it would disqualify Mr. Bolton from the position 
he has now been nominated to or allow him to go forward.
  The facts are no longer in debate. It is often said in this Chamber, 
you are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your 
own facts. The facts are overwhelming in terms of the allegation that 
Mr. Bolton, whatever his motivations may have been--and I suspect I 
know what they were--decided that because he disagreed with some 
intelligence analysts, he wanted them removed from their jobs.
  I have never objected, nor would I--in fact, I agree with my 
colleague from Michigan who spoke so eloquently, that, in fact, there 
ought to be more debate between policy centers and intelligence 
analysts. What was missing during the debate on Iraq, as to the issue 
of weapons of mass destruction, was the absence of debate between 
policymakers and intelligence analysts. None of us, that I know of, 
disagree with the notion that there ought to be more debate. Where 
policy setters disagree with intelligence analysis, they ought to 
express that objection and tell people they think it is wrong. But if 
you go beyond just disagreeing, if you go beyond forceful debate, if 
you reach down and decide you are going to remove or try to remove an 
intelligence analyst from their position because you don't like what 
they are saying to you, that then crosses a line.
  I don't care whether it is a Democratic administration or a 
Republican one. If this body, by a vote of confirmation says to a 
person who seeks the position of ambassador to the United Nations, that 
even though you have tried to fire intelligence analysts because you 
disagreed with their analysis, then I think we send a dreadful signal 
at the very time in the world that our credibility on intelligence is 
in question.
  We all know that to be the case, regrettably. We have been through a 
dreadful period where intelligence was very wrong in assuming there 
were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. So the issue for this Senator 
is, did Mr. Bolton do this or not? And if he did, why are we even 
considering this nomination? Because anyone, regardless of the 
administration, their political persuasion or ideology, who tries to 
fire people, not debate, not disagree with them, not reprimand some 
higher official because he disagrees with what they are saying, but to 
reach down and fire an analyst at the CIA or the Department of State 
because you don't like what they were telling you, in my view, crosses 
a line.
  This body has an obligation to the American public to stand up and 
say: We will not tolerate that.
  This is far more important than Mr. Bolton. It is far more important 
even than this President or this Congress.
  The issue goes far beyond any individuals. It goes to the heart of 
whether we are going to have credible intelligence which we, as Members 
of Congress, can believe, and our allies around the world, and from 
those we seek to find support on various foreign policies who will 
understand the purposes for which we are seeking their support. That is 
what I worry about more than anything else.
  Yesterday I spoke on the floor about the availability of information. 
The reason I had requested, and that we have an expedited version of a 
cloture motion, doesn't have to do with whether or not Mr. Bolton 
should have an up or down vote. I want to have an up or down vote on 
Mr. Bolton. But I also believe this body has a right to information.
  When the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the vice chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee are deprived the opportunity to read the 
names on the intelligence intercepts, the names Mr. Bolton could see, 
that his staff could see, but that the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee and the ranking member, the chairman and ranking member of 
the Foreign Relations Committee are deprived the opportunity to see, 
then we are not getting the information we ought to have in order to 
make an intelligent decision.

  The only vehicle I have available to me is to say, I am going to 
insist upon a 60-vote criteria unless you give us the information. It 
is 11:20. I am still waiting. There is no reason for us to have to have 
a cloture vote this afternoon. Instead, we can have a simple up-or-down 
vote on Mr. Bolton at 6 o'clock tonight, if in the next hour or two the 
administration would release those names to the chairman and ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee, and the chairman and ranking 
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the information Senator 
Biden is seeking regarding the matter of the supposed weapons of mass 
destruction in Syria. There are not a lot of documents. It wouldn't 
take much time. But if we can't get those documents, if we are not 
being allowed to see the very things the nominee had a right to see, 
then I don't think we are being treated as a coequal branch of 
Government that has a right, through the appropriate means, with the 
appropriate members. I am not suggesting every member of the committees 
should see these names, but that the appropriate people we have 
designated historically have access to that kind of information for a 
nomination such as the one before us.
  I am still hopeful that will happen. I am not so naive as to be 
unaware of what we have just been through in the debate about 
filibusters on Federal judges. I would not have brought up this 
nomination right now in the wake of that. I thought we were going to 
deal with Federal judges, not the nominee to the United Nations. But 
the majority, as is its right, sets the agenda. They have asked this 
Congress, this Senate to debate the issue of Mr. Bolton.
  I am put in the position of saying: I guess after all of this you can 
do what you want and deny us that information. I would hope some of my 
Republican friends, despite the fact they are going to vote for Mr. 
Bolton, would vote with us on the cloture motion. I took some interest 
in the fact that even on the House Republican side, the difficulty that 
major committees of the Congress, both the House and the Senate, are 
having in getting information from this administration is growing. If 
we don't at some point stand up for our rights as a constitutionally 
designated coequal branch of Government, then this administration will 
receive the message that we don't care about this and that we can deny 
this Congress anything we want and they will do nothing about it.
  So aside from how you feel about Mr. Bolton, yes or no, it is 
important for this institution to stand up for its rights and to demand 
this information as we have a right to.
  I am hopeful we can still get the information and not have to go 
through a cloture vote at 6 o'clock this evening.
  Let me get back to the subject matter of Mr. Bolton himself. The 
reasons for my concern are primarily focused on one issue. That is, of 
course, whether Mr. Bolton tried to fire people within the CIA and the 
State Department because he did not like the analysis they were giving 
him.
  What is extraordinary about this nomination, first and foremost, is 
the number of people on whom we have relied, considering their status, 
who oppose this nomination. I would like to read the names. I am not 
suggesting all of these people are opposed to Mr. Bolton, but the basis 
upon which we have determined that Mr. Bolton tried to fire two 
intelligence analysts relied primarily on the names on this particular 
chart. I want to read the names and the positions they hold. It was 
these individuals, more than anything else, who made a significant 
difference in our conclusions that Mr. Bolton had, in fact, tried to 
fire these individuals.
  John McLaughlin was the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.

[[Page S5957]]

  These individuals are either presently members of the Bush 
administration, this President, or were formerly members of the Bush 
administration.
  Larry Wilkerson was chief of staff to Secretary Colin Powell; Robert 
Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. The dates of 
their service are here. They are all dates that run roughly 2002, 2003, 
up to the present time, or just a month or so ago.
  Stuart Cohen, Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; 
Alan Foley, head of the CIA's Office of Weapons, Intelligence, 
Nonproliferation, and Arms Control; Jamie Miscik, Deputy Director of 
Intelligence at the CIA; Thomas Hubbard, United States Ambassador to 
South Korea, a Bush appointee; John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Nonproliferation; Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research; Christian Westermann, analyst for the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Neil Silver, Office 
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; INR supervisor, we don't 
use his name here, the immediate supervisor of Mr. Westermann; Fred 
Fleitz, acting chief of staff of John Bolton; Wil Taft, Department of 
State legal advisor; and a Department of State attorney whose name we 
are not using as well in the office of legal advisor.
  These are 15 individuals either presently serving in the Bush 
administration or having previously served. It is on them that we 
relied. It is their damning statements that confirm without any 
question that Mr. Bolton essentially tried to have these intelligence 
analysts fired. They also provided other damaging information.
  I have been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 24 
years. Those who have served with me know it is rare, indeed, for this 
member to get up and object to a Presidential nomination, particularly 
one that is not a lifetime appointment. In fact, as my colleagues who 
have served with me for some time know, I have been one of only a 
handful who have supported nominees of Republican administrations. I 
was one of two Democrats who supported John Tower when he was nominated 
to be Secretary of Defense under President Bush's father. I supported 
John Ashcroft in the first administration of the current President 
Bush, one of only a handful of Democrats who did that.
  I tried to recall an instance when I have taken such a strong 
objection to another nominee in 24 years. I can't recall one that has 
gone this far. I have had my objections to others, but they usually 
didn't reach this particular point. So it is uncomfortable for me to 
come to the floor to engage, over almost the last 2 months, in this 
nomination. But when you add the names of 102 former ambassadors, 15 
present or former members of the Bush administration, these are not 
Democrats, these are not some left-wing organizations that are out 
there objecting to John Bolton. These are serious people who do a 
serious job, many of them career officials who have served our country 
with great distinction over the years. These individuals are the ones 
on whom we relied to draw their conclusion.
  I am going to share with my colleagues their statements, not mine, 
not the names of some Democrats who might have some political 
motivation but, rather, people who care about our country, care about 
the United Nations, believe it needs reform, believe we need a strong 
person there to engage in that kind of reform, but believe John Bolton 
is not the person who ought to be receiving the nomination.
  The committee did an extensive review of all the allegations related 
to this nominee. Committee staff, on a bipartisan basis, conducted more 
than 30 interviews of individuals with knowledge of the nominee. There 
was excellent cooperation on the part of most of those staff we sought 
to interview. I believe the work of this Senate has been assisted by 
these individuals who courageously came forward to answer questions and 
provide information that in many cases they would rather not have done. 
These individuals did not want to speak ill of another Republican or a 
former colleague. But they acted as dutiful citizens, patriots, and 
cooperated with the committee's efforts to fully explore matters 
related to the nomination of John Bolton. Regardless of how this Senate 
disposes of this nomination, these individuals have done a service to 
our country. We should honor them for doing so, for having the courage 
to come forward and to be honest when asked questions about this 
nominee.
  Mr. Bolton's behavior clearly troubled a number of people who have 
worked directly with him over the last number of years.
  Former Assistant Secretary of State Carl Ford, a self-proclaimed 
conservative Republican, described Mr. Bolton as ``the quintessential 
kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy.'' He also labeled Mr. Bolton a ``serial 
abuser.''
  We did not hear from any people disabusing the committee of that 
view. That he has an abusive management style is problematic, but as I 
said at the outset, that would not be justification for voting against 
Mr. Bolton to be the ambassador to the United Nations. This is not 
about style. It is not about reform of the U.N. It is about whether 
this individual tried to fire intelligence analysts in his position as 
Under Secretary of State.
  However, when Mr. Bolton harnesses that management style of his, as 
he has over the last 4 years, to affect intelligence judgments or to 
stifle the consideration of alternative policy opinions, then I think 
he has crossed the line over what is acceptable behavior. Why? Because 
those actions go directly to the heart of the integrity of U.S. 
intelligence and the firewall that must exist between policy and 
intelligence to ensure the integrity of that intelligence. Again, I 
emphasize, this is not about a disagreement. It is not about a 
policymaker disagreeing with an intelligence analyst.
  Intelligence analysts do not speak ex cathedra. They are not sitting 
there coming to conclusions that we ought not to question. That is 
legitimate. In fact, we need more questioning. The issue is whether one 
ought to go beyond questioning and decide to remove someone because you 
disagree with their conclusions.
  When this committee convened last month to consider the matter, we 
had irrefutable evidence--this is not conjecture--and this body has to 
decide whether you are going to send this man forward in the face of 
irrefutable evidence that on 5 different occasions over the past 48 
months, Mr. Bolton tried to have 2 intelligence analysts removed from 
their jobs--one at the State Department and one at the CIA--because 
these individuals would not clear the language Mr. Bolton wanted to 
use, which was not supported by available intelligence.
  I emphasize another point that needs to be made. When Mr. Bolton 
speaks as John Bolton, he can say whatever he wants. But when he gets 
up and says, ``I am speaking on behalf of the United States,'' then 
there is a different standard. When you speak on behalf of our country, 
you cannot just say anything you want. You have to rely on the best 
intelligence we have. You may disagree with that and you can fight over 
it, but in the final analysis you cannot offer your own opinions when 
you are expressing them as the U.S. views. You can say John Bolton 
believes this. If Mr. Bolton wants to speak to the Heritage Foundation 
and say, ``I believe the following,'' I may think he is profoundly 
wrong, but I would fight with my life for John Bolton to be able to say 
it. That is first amendment rights.
  It is when Mr. Bolton gets up and says, ``I am speaking on behalf of 
the United States of America and I want to say the following,'' and 
then he absolutely contradicts what is being concluded by the 
intelligence analysts here, at that point, it seems to me he has a 
higher responsibility than he has shown.
  Carl Ford's testimony was a watershed for me. Never in my 24 years as 
a Senator have I ever witnessed one high-ranking, former administration 
official testify as vociferously and as strongly as Mr. Ford did 
against a colleague. That is exactly what he did last month. Carl Ford 
made it clear why he did so. He believed Mr. Bolton's actions caused a 
chill among his intelligence analysts--so much so that the Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, had to buck up the employees to assure them that 
they should not succumb to political pressure.
  Because we have talked a lot about this, I used this chart in the 
Foreign

[[Page S5958]]

Relations Committee. I realize from a distance it looks like a lot of 
spaghetti. What it amounts to is the chart of the positions of the 
State Department, beginning with the Secretary of State, Deputy 
Secretary of State, Chief of State, Executive Secretary, and the 
various Under Secretary positions here. The third one is Mr. Bolton, 
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. 
That is his responsibility, this group right here. He was in charge of 
the people who worked in this particular column.
  Where did that intelligence analyst work? He worked down here. You 
have to go way down to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
Research, Carl Ford, who was head of the INR. This intelligence analyst 
was down here; that is where Mr. Westermann worked. He was not directly 
in Mr. Bolton's line of command, but in a separate division. He is a 
GS-14 at this level.
  You need to understand what happened here. This was a case where Mr. 
Bolton doesn't get ahold of Mr. Ford and say: I have a problem with 
your intelligence analyst because I disagree with what he said. I think 
he is wrong and I want to argue about it.
  Mr. Bolton reaches down out of his line and drags this guy up to his 
office and begins to berate him for the job he has done. That is 
objectionable to me, and outrageous. If it ended there, that is 
dreadful behavior and nobody ought to do that without clearing what you 
want to say with the people who are responsible for that individual's 
work. If it ended there, maybe I would just vote against the nominee 
and I would not make the case on that basis alone. It is what happens 
afterward. It is not just berating. There is no doubt that there would 
be chill in the Department if an Under Secretary of State dragged an 
intelligence analyst to his office and word goes out. As we all know, 
in institutions the word flies around immediately. One of our fellow 
workers has been dragged up to the Under Secretary's office and 
screamed at because he didn't like his conclusions. That is why Colin 
Powell, the guy at the top, had to go down to these offices--down here 
on the chart--and explain to them that they did the right thing. You, 
Mr. Westermann, did the right thing. You are not supposed to succumb to 
political pressure. You tell people what they think they need to hear, 
and if they don't like it and disagree with you, that is one thing. But 
you did the right thing. It was wrong by implication, because why would 
the Secretary of State go down here and bring these analysts together 
and remind them that they had done their job if he felt Mr. Westermann 
being dragged up to Mr. Bolton's office was not wrong? That is why the 
Secretary of State did that. He went down there to tell those people 
not to worry about this, do your jobs. I think the Secretary was 
worried that the word would go out to these analysts that if you don't 
want to get in trouble, start to agree with Mr. Bolton when he 
disagrees with you; that is the easy thing to do. If he tells the 
analyst you ought to say the following, you better say that. If you do, 
you won't be brought up to his office and bellowed at. That is 
dangerous and that is one of the reasons we have such concern about 
this nomination.

  As I said, this was the conclusion of Secretary Powell, according to 
Mr. Wilkerson, his chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson, who was the chief of 
staff of Secretary Powell, testified before the staff of the Foreign 
Relations Committee the following: Secretary Powell ``went down into 
the bowels of the building and talked to people about not being 
inhibited by, or in any way fearful of, people on the seventh floor, or 
leadership in general, questioning their analyses or their statements 
or whatever.''
  Mr. Bolton had a very selective recollection about his interactions 
and intentions with respect to intelligence analysts at the State 
Department and the CIA during his appearance before the committee.
  Mr. Bolton told the committee:

       I didn't seek to have these people fired. I didn't seek to 
     have discipline imposed on them. I said, ``I've lost trust in 
     them.'' And are there other portfolios they could follow. It 
     wasn't anything to me that I followed at great length. I made 
     my point and moved on.

  Committee staff interviews and review of State and CIA documents 
paint a very different picture indeed. What is that picture?
  First, with respect to Mr. Westermann. Six months after this event I 
have described on the chart with--this run-in occurred, Mr. Bolton was 
still seeking to have Mr. Westermann removed from his job as the 
biological weapons expert analyst at the Intelligence and Research 
Division of the State Department.
  Mr. Bolton's recollection about what he did with respect to the CIA 
analyst was likewise clouded on April 11. As to the so-called ``Mr. 
Smith,'' as we called him to protect identity, Mr. Bolton said:

       I had one part of one conversation with one person one time 
     on ``Mr. Smith,'' and that was it. I let it go.

  We now know that much more than that occurred. Let me lay it out for 
you.
  In addition to a meeting with the Acting Chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, we now know from e-mails that Mr. Bolton 
considered raising the matter directly with the Director of the CIA, 
George Tenet. We know as well that he continued to conspire with former 
Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich and his office for a period of 
4 months after he first ``lost confidence'' in ``Mr. Smith'' to have 
him removed from his job.
  Also under consideration by Mr. Reich and Bolton were other punitive 
measures--we know this now--such as denial of country clearance for Mr. 
Smith's official travel throughout Latin America, banning him from all 
meetings held in their bureaus. And the ultimate act of pettiness--
consider revoking his State Department building pass.
  I am not making this stuff up. He said he had ``one part of one 
conversation with one person one time, and I let it go.''
  Hardly. The facts are overwhelming here regarding what he tried to do 
both at the State Department and the CIA.
  We have also learned that other intelligence analysts were having 
difficulties with Mr. Bolton's office.
  Jami Miscik, Deputy Director for Intelligence, 2002 to 2005, in the 
Bush administration, told the committee staff that Mr. Bolton had a 
reputation for being difficult to deal with. She noted that 
``interaction between policymakers and the intelligence community 
usually goes more smoothly than it often did . . . in the cases with 
Mr. Bolton . . . It is rare that . . . a single policymaker is known 
for having . . . pretty regularly contentious kinds of issues in this 
regard.''
  We know as well that expert intelligence officials disapproved of and 
resisted Mr. Bolton's efforts to ``cherry-pick'' intelligence for 
ideological purposes.
  Dean Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 2003 
to 2005, described the ``cherry-picking'' problem in the context of 
what Mr. Bolton wanted the Intelligence Committee to bless with respect 
to Syria's weapons of mass destruction capabilities:

       Mr. Bolton took isolated facts and made much more of them 
     to build a case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It 
     was a sort of cherry picking of little factoids and little 
     isolated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest 
     possible case.

  We also know that Deputy Secretary Armitage didn't trust Mr. Bolton's 
judgments when it came to making public speeches. We have heard this 
from others, such as George Voinovich, as well as Carl Levin, as well 
as Barbara Boxer and others, who have spoken on this matter.

  Mr. Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff, told the committee:

       There were problems on a number of occasions with Under 
     Secretary Bolton's proposed remarks. . . . The Deputy, Mr. 
     Armitage, made a decision and communicated that decision to 
     me, that John Bolton would not give any testimony, nor would 
     he give any speech, that wasn't cleared first by Rich 
     Armitage.

  With all of the other duties Deputy Secretary Armitage had in 
managing the Department in Secretary Powell's absence, he also felt he 
had to babysit Mr. Bolton because the normal clearance procedures 
established by the Department didn't work with Mr. Bolton. Yet, this 
body is now being asked to vote to send Mr. Bolton to New York, where 
he will be unsupervised on a daily basis. Lord only knows the kind of 
problems that can ensue with Mr. Bolton, given his past performance.
  Individuals under Bolton's direct line of authority also took issue 
with the

[[Page S5959]]

rigidity of his views. John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State 
for Nonproliferation and a career diplomat, told committee staff that 
Mr. Bolton ``tended to hold onto his own views strongly and . . . he 
tended not to be enthusiastic about alternative views. And he did not 
encourage us to provide our views to the Secretary.''
  Again, I am not arguing about someone's style here. But when you have 
125 employees at the U.N. and the only things you want to hear are the 
things you agree with, that is a management style that is dangerous for 
a person who is going to work with all of the nations we have to build 
relationships with in the U.N. We all do this as Senators. We know when 
a staff member gets up and wants to tell us an alternative view, it is 
uncomfortable. We would like them to agree with us. We also know how 
vitally important it is as Senators that people in our offices who have 
the willingness to stand up and know when they do, they are not going 
to be threatened with their jobs, or considered for removal because 
they are telling us something we don't want to hear. We understand the 
value of that. Mr. Bolton doesn't. That is dangerous.
  Mr. Wolf said:

       Some of the officers within the nonproliferation bureau 
     complained that they felt undue pressure to conform to the 
     views of the Under Secretary, versus the views that they 
     thought they could support.

  That is a dangerous statement, that we have somebody who is about to 
take on a position who would make others feel they were unfit or are 
being pressured to conform their views.
  All of these matters I have just mentioned cause me grave concern 
about this nomination. But what troubled me the most were the 
devastating comments made by Secretary Powell's chief of staff, Mr. 
Wilkerson, an individual who on a day-to-day basis was in a position to 
know what was going on in the Department and what foreign policy 
challenges the Secretary of State was attempting to manage.
  This is what he has to say about Mr. Bolton's single-minded 
preoccupation with sanctioning every Chinese entity he could find which 
might have violated nonproliferation standards:

       Are we actually stopping China's proliferation through 
     sanctions that was dangerous to our interests? Or are we 
     doing it, and ignoring problems that cry out for cures, 
     diplomatic? The one time I had a conversation with John about 
     this, I asked him, ``How do you go beyond sanctions, John? 
     War?'' Mr. Bolton replied, ``It is not my business.''

  Mr. Wilkerson also explained to our committee staff why he believes 
Mr. Bolton is ill suited for the U.N. position. I am quoting Mr. 
Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff. This is not some liberal 
left-leaning Senator or Congressman or columnist talking about Mr. 
Bolton. This is the former chief of staff of a Republican Secretary of 
State under George Bush--this President's administration:

       One, I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 
     people up there at the United Nations that have to be led; 
     they have to be led well, and they have to be led properly. 
     And I think, in that capacity, if he goes up there--

  Speaking about Mr. Bolton--

     you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year.
       Second, I differ with a lot of people in Washington, as to 
     his brilliance. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted 
     beans . . . had no willingness--and in many cases no capacity 
     to understand other things that were happening around those 
     beans. And that is just a recipe for problems at the United 
     Nations.

  These are very serious conclusions from an individual who was a loyal 
and trusted member of Secretary Powell's team, and they go to the heart 
of whether Mr. Bolton has the capacity to carry out his duties at the 
United Nations. This is not about whether we like the nominee's views 
on the United Nations, arms control, or Cuba. He is entitled to his 
personal views about any of those matters, and he should not be 
disqualified from any office because he has them. But for the interests 
of the United States to be served at the United Nations, there has to 
be a balance between ideology and pragmatism.
  The individual on the spot in New York will be called upon, from time 
to time, to strike that balance. He also must have the credibility to 
make the best case for the United States before that international 
body. These things are at the heart of effective diplomacy.
  Ambassador Negroponte was able to strike that balance between 
ideology and pragmatism and have the credibility to make the case of 
the United States before the U. N. Security Council. Senator John 
Danforth, a former colleague, was able to do so as well.
  Based on what we have learned about Mr. Bolton in recent days, I 
seriously doubt he is willing or able to strike that balance, and I now 
know, given his penchant for stretching intelligence and pressuring 
analysts, that his credibility will be challenged by other U.N. 
members.
  Our colleagues brush aside this problem by saying Mr. Bolton will be 
getting his instructions from Secretary Rice. Mr. President, that is 
just not realistic at all. Much of the guidance that is developed for 
our U.N. ambassadors is developed cooperatively between Washington and 
New York. What gets said at the United Nations by a representative is, 
in large measure, shaped by our reporting from our mission in New York. 
I feel Mr. Bolton will be incapable of making the kind of judgments 
that move the diplomatic process forward.
  We all know these are difficult times. Our responsibilities in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are significant and costly. Other challenges to 
international peace and stability loom large on the horizon--Iran, 
North Korea, the Middle East. The humanitarian crises in Africa and 
Asia cry out for attention. The United States cannot solve these 
problems all by ourselves. We know that. We need tremendous 
international assistance and cooperation to address them, and the 
logical focal point for addressing that international support is the 
United Nations. It makes sense.
  But international support will not be automatically forthcoming and 
will require, as we all know, U.S. leadership at the U.N. to build the 
case for such cooperation. That U.S. leadership must necessarily be 
embodied in the individual who serves as our ambassador to the United 
Nations is obvious.
  Based on what I know today about Mr. Bolton, I believe he is 
incapable of demonstrating that kind of leadership. The ambassador to 
the United Nations is a very important position. The individual who 
assumes that position is necessarily the face of our country before the 
world.
  For all the reasons I have cited--Mr. Bolton's management style, his 
attack on the intelligence community, his tunnel vision, his lack of 
diplomatic temperament--I do not believe he is our man to be the face 
at the United Nations.
  But of all those reasons, I come back to the one I made at the 
outset. It is not about style, it is not about reform at the United 
Nations, it is not about Mr. Bolton's views on a variety of subject 
matters. Our colleagues have to make a decision. We now know, 
categorically, without any question whatsoever, that this nominee tried 
to fire intelligence analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Department of State. That evidence comes from his own colleagues, 
from people with whom he has served, not from outside groups or members 
of this body.
  The decision for our colleagues today is whether or not we promote 
someone who has done that and what message it sends to the analyst 
community, what message it sends to our allies, and what message it 
sends to our adversaries, for that matter, around the globe. That this 
individual who engaged in such reprehensible behavior, in my view, 
should be given the position of U.N. ambassador to represent the United 
States at this critical hour, I think is a massive mistake.
  Again, I am still hopeful that in the remaining hours of this debate, 
the administration will see fit to provide the additional information 
for which we have asked for almost 2 months. I regret deeply having to 
ask my colleagues to vote on a cloture motion. I have said, if cloture 
is invoked, we will vote immediately on Mr. Bolton. If it is not 
invoked, it will layover, and we will continue to try to get the 
information.
  I have no desire to filibuster this nomination. I do have a desire to 
see the Senate stand up for its rights when it seeks information--
information the nominee had access to but the chairmen and 
ranking members of the Intelligence Committee and Foreign Relations 
Committee were denied. That is a precedent we need not make with this 
decision.

[[Page S5960]]

  My hope is our colleagues will support the opposition on the cloture 
motion and, if we get a vote on Mr. Bolton today, we reject this 
nominee. There are many qualified, blunt, forceful people who can 
assume this job who embrace the President's view on foreign policy and 
who will do a very good job at the United Nations. John Bolton is not 
that individual.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. DODD. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I commend the very able Senator from 
Connecticut both for his statement and for the letter that he and the 
ranking member of the committee, Senator Biden, sent to a number of us 
about the necessity of trying to get these materials which we have 
sought.
  Clearly the Congress needs this information in order to do its job. 
The position of the Senator from Connecticut on the cloture motion, as 
I understand it, is that we ought not to invoke cloture and move to a 
vote on Bolton until the material is provided. If the material is made 
available and we are in a position to make judgments, then I take it we 
can move forward in the normal course of the debate toward a final vote 
on Bolton's nomination; is that correct?
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in response to my friend and colleague from 
Maryland, that is exactly the point.
  Mr. SARBANES. That strikes me as an eminently reasonable position. It 
needs to be made clear that there is material the executive branch is 
refusing to make available to the Senate, and which we need in order to 
be adequately informed in carrying out our responsibilities of advising 
and consenting on this nomination.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if I may respond to my colleague from 
Maryland, I was going to recite to him--because I think some of my 
colleagues may think this Senator from Connecticut has raised this 
issue in the last 24 hours as a delaying tactic--I want to point out to 
my colleagues the chronology which begins actually on April 11--
approaching 2 months ago. Then there were subsequent requests on April 
14, April 22, April 29, May 4, May 18, as well as even as late, as of 
course, we all know, yesterday.
  I want to make it clear that from very early on, we tried to get this 
information. I emphasize, again, these are names Mr. Bolton has seen, 
his staff has seen, and we are not asking every Member see, only the 
ranking members and the chairmen of the Intelligence Committee and the 
Foreign Relations Committee, to let them know whether or not the names 
coincide with the names of people we have run across in our examination 
of Mr. Bolton to be a nominee to the U.N.
  The chairman of the Intelligence Committee will tell you they had an 
interview with General Hayden and he showed them some documents. But in 
his letter to our colleagues last evening, the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee very honestly pointed out that the names of the 
19 individuals in the 10 intercepts he sought are redacted. The only 
pertinent information is those names and the motivation Mr. Bolton had 
in seeking that information.
  The heart of the request--even the Intelligence Committee chairman 
cannot see it. Yet Mr. Bolton could see it, his staff could see it. But 
the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee is not allowed to see 
it. Every Senator ought to be outraged about that. If we let them get 
away with it here, they will get away with it every single day 
hereafter. Either we stand up for our rights as a Senate, as a coequal 
branch of Government, or we do not.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator from Connecticut yield?
  Mr. DODD. Yes, I yield.
  Mr. SARBANES. It is not every single day hereafter for this 
administration; it becomes a precedent for every administration. And I 
suggest to all Members of the Senate that they may find themselves, 
down the road at some point, seeking information they think is relevant 
and having it denied to them by the executive branch, citing the 
refusal to provide the information in the Bolton case as a precedent 
for the action they are taking.
  Mr. DODD. Again, the Senator from Maryland is absolutely correct. 
These issues come back and come around and the word spreads: You can 
get away with this. It is not just this administration. The Senator is 
correct. Future administrations will use this as an example of why they 
do not have to comply with the request because previous Congresses 
allowed this information to be kept secret when Senate committees were 
seeking it.
  Mr. President, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). The Senator has 19 minutes.
  Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent that the remaining time I have be 
divided between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from 
Massachusetts. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed, also asked for 
time. I had 60 minutes, and want to give up some time.
  Mr. MARTINEZ. If I can make an inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. MARTINEZ. My understanding is the Senator from Arizona was going 
to be recognized during this timeframe for his remarks.
  Mr. DODD. I have a little less than 20 minutes remaining. What I want 
to do is give the 20 minutes I have left to my colleagues to use. Mr. 
President, I make that request, that the time remaining be divided 
between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
remaining time is divided between the Senator from Maryland and the 
Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. DODD. And Senator Reed from Rhode Island also seeks some of that 
time. Just Senator Reed and Senator Kennedy. The Senator Maryland has 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, first, I commend the very able Senator 
from Connecticut not only for his statement on the floor, but the very 
reasoned and judicious way he has proceeded in considering this 
nomination.
  I join with those who think the refusal to provide the information 
constitutes a sufficient basis not to invoke cloture while we continue 
to press the administration to provide the information the Senate needs 
in order to do its job.
  I spoke yesterday with the distinguished Ranking Member of the 
committee, Senator Biden, on the floor about this issue, and I have 
done so again here today with my friend, the Senator from Connecticut. 
I strongly urge my colleagues to take that position because it is a 
very important question of the role the Senate should play, and whether 
we really are an independent branch of the Government that will act to 
carry out our responsibilities.
  Let me now address the substance of the Bolton nomination. In the 60 
years since the founding of the United Nations, a number of 
extraordinarily distinguished men and women have been chosen to 
represent us in that body as the U.S. ambassador: Warren Austin, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., James Wadsworth, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, 
George W. Ball, James Russell Wiggins, Charles Yost, George Bush, John 
Scali, Daniel P. Moynihan, William Scranton, Andrew Young, Donald 
McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters, Thomas Pickering, Edward 
Joseph Perkins, Madeleine Albright, Bill Richardson, Richard Holbrooke, 
John Negroponte, and John Danforth.
  The fact that at least 17 of them, spanning 8 administrations--
Republican and Democratic--have been elevated to serve on the 
President's Cabinet demonstrates the critical importance in which this 
position historically has been held.
  The fact that we proudly remember so many of these names, after the 
passage of a number of years, underscores both the visibility of the 
U.N. ambassador and the statesmanship that the position requires. On a 
daily basis, our ambassador to the U.N. speaks to the entire world on 
behalf of the United States.
  The comments our ambassador makes and the relationships he or she 
cultivates make the difference between a United States that is 
respected as a leader in the world, setting an example of American 
values and principles, and a United States that is ignored and 
misunderstood.

[[Page S5961]]

  In today's world, this difference affects the lives of millions at 
home and abroad. The United Nations is not a tool to be used ``when it 
suits our interest and when we can get others to go along,'' as Mr. 
Bolton has suggested but is, rather, an essential and ongoing forum for 
the advancement of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of U.S. 
national security interests.
  The U.N. makes decisions that affect war and peace. It helps to 
determine whether the United States will have international support and 
allies or will be forced to undertake difficult missions on its own in 
the face of broad opposition across the globe. Skillful work at the 
U.N. enables us to have burden sharing, both in terms of the commitment 
of human resources and the commitment of financial sources.
  The United Nations offers us an opportunity to make our case to the 
world, to demonstrate international leadership, and to build 
multilateral cooperation. As Secretary General Annan commented in a 
recent speech, the U.N. ``is not just a building in Manhattan, or a 
piece of international machinery. It embodies a conviction on the part 
of people everywhere that we live on a small planet, and that our 
safety, our prosperity, our rights--indeed, our freedoms--are 
indivisible.'' For this reason, our representatives at the United 
Nations must be men and women of exceptional wisdom and credibility, 
who can listen and persuade, whose counsel and leadership other nations 
will seek and rely upon.
  Despite the need for a U.N. ambassador who recognizes and can make 
the most of the U.N.'s potential and promise, we have before us now a 
nominee to be our ambassador to the U.N., who over a number of years 
has demonstrated outright hostility toward the United Nations as an 
institution and toward the fundamental legitimacy of international law. 
Mr. Bolton has argued repeatedly that the United States has no legal 
obligation to pay its dues to the United Nations and that treaties are 
nothing more than ``political commitments''.
  He called the Law of the Sea Treaty, which has been endorsed by our 
military and submitted by President Bush as an urgent priority for 
Senate advice and consent, ``an illegitimate method of forcing 
fundamental policy changes on the United States outside the customary 
political process.'' He is quoted as saying:

       It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to 
     international law even when it may seem in our short term 
     interest to do so--because, over the long-term, the goal of 
     those who think that international law really means anything 
     are those who want to constrict the United States.

  To send someone as our ambassador to the United Nations who does not 
demonstrate a basic respect for the institution and its legal 
foundations is a disservice to our national interests. This has nothing 
to do with whether reforms are needed at the U.N. or whether we should 
more closely monitor its activities. Many of us are committed to doing 
both of those things. It is a very basic question of one's mindset 
about the United States, about the United Nations and about 
international law. If other nations believe that the U.S. is not out to 
reform the United Nations but to undercut it, then they are likely not 
to be receptive to any of our criticisms or recommendations.
  Secondly, it is clear that Mr. Bolton does not have the diplomatic 
skills or, indeed, the demeanor to represent our country effectively at 
the U.N. There are certainly moments when the situation may call for 
bluntness, when abandoning diplomatic niceties can convey the urgency 
of a particular issue or position. However, Mr. Bolton has shown a 
propensity for making extreme and provocative statements that have 
caused unnecessary conflict and confrontation. It is not an occasional 
outburst that might, on occasion, be justified by the situation but, 
regrettably, a routine way of doing business.
  Does it help us in trying to shape the direction in which the U.N. is 
to move when Mr. Bolton says that the Security Council should have one 
permanent member, the United States, ``because that is the real 
reflection of the distribution of power in the world''?
  Does anyone think that Mr. Bolton's assertion that ``if the U.N. 
Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a 
bit of difference'' will help us in persuading other countries to 
support U.N. reform efforts?
  These are not isolated misstatements or slips of the tongue but, 
rather, his customary and consistent approach to dealing with others 
who disagree with him. Even given the opportunity to demonstrate a less 
confrontational approach, he has repeatedly declined to do so. Mr. 
Bolton, time and again, has shown himself singularly lacking in the 
willingness to hear, to consider, and to respect opposing points of 
view.
  Contrast that attitude with these comments made by Ambassador 
Moynihan and Ambassador Kirkpatrick when they were nominated for this 
position. Ambassador Moynihan, in his confirmation hearing before the 
committee, said:

       A certain principled statement of views on both sides can 
     be useful: it requires that we respect what others think and 
     try to understand what they think and ask that they do the 
     same in return. . . . Things where we disagree are marginal 
     compared with where we do agree. And yet it is so easy to 
     grow estranged at the first problem, the first question is 
     how to get away from a confrontation system back to the quest 
     for understanding and agreement in a situation where this is 
     wholly possible and entirely necessary.

  Similarly, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in her confirmation hearing before 
the committee, said:

       I do not think that one should ever seek confrontation. 
     What I have every intention and hope of doing is to operate 
     in a low key, quiet, persuasive and consensus-building way.

  This nomination came out of the committee without recommendation. 
There was a 9-to-9 divided vote. By contrast, all of the previous 
nominees to be U.N. ambassador were brought to the floor by very strong 
committee votes and approved on the floor by very strong votes--most of 
them unanimous, none of them really close.

  In addition to Mr. Bolton's extreme policy views and his 
confrontational demeanor, there is the issue of his professional 
conduct. There is ample evidence that he has attempted to politicize 
intelligence in a way that I believe has harmed our Nation's diplomacy.
  Mr. Bolton sought the transfer of two intelligence analysts with whom 
he disagreed on substantive matters. He repeatedly attempted to stretch 
the facts to back his own ideological predisposition. He created such a 
climate of intimidation in the State Department that the Secretary of 
State found it necessary to set up a special meeting with the 
Intelligence and Research Bureau in order to directly reassure the 
analysts.
  To make matters worse, Mr. Bolton told the committee that he had not 
tried to have analysts punished or disciplined, and he denied that he 
sought retribution against them. He said, ``I shrugged my shoulders, 
and I moved on,'' when his attempts to have them reassigned were 
rebuffed.
  And yet we have learned from extensive interviews with numerous 
administration officials that he did try to have the analysts removed 
from their positions, that he did seek to punish people for disagreeing 
with him, and he did persist in his efforts for many months after, as 
he says, he shrugged his shoulders and moved on.
  That he was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts does not speak for 
Mr. Bolton. What it speaks to is the steadiness and determination of 
those professionals who withstood his demands, who refused to bend to 
the inordinate pressure he was applying.
  Given this conduct, when he goes before the United Nations to make a 
statement about evidence of nuclear weapons production or a terrorist 
plot or whatever it may be, what credibility will he have, knowing that 
he sought repeatedly to punish intelligence analysts who delivered 
contradictory information; knowing that he is sort of a man who, as 
Robert Hutchings, the former chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council, put it, ``took isolated facts and made much of them to build a 
case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort of cherry 
picking of little factoids and little isolated bits were drawn out to 
present the starkest possible case''?
  We need a credible spokesman at the United Nations, and Mr. Bolton's 
conduct casts serious doubt on his ability to be one.
  Moreover, Mr. Bolton's poor administrative and management skills, in 
my view, raise serious questions as to whether he can exercise a senior 
leadership role. The testimony of Carl

[[Page S5962]]

Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, was 
especially powerful on this point. Mr. Ford told the committee:

       In my experience, throughout my time in the executive 
     branch, I've really never seen someone so abusive to such a 
     subordinate person.

  He said he could think of no one else who comes even close to John 
Bolton in terms of the way that he abuses his power and authority with 
``little'' people.
  Secretary Powell's Chief of Staff, Larry Wilkerson, described to the 
committee staff the kinds of problems he had on a daily basis in 
dealing with Bolton.

       Assistant secretaries, principal deputy assistant 
     secretaries, acting assistant secretaries coming into my 
     office and telling me, ``Can I sit down?''
       ``Sure, sit down. What's the problem?''
       ``I've got to leave.''
       ``What's the problem?''
       ``Bolton.''

  When asked if he got similar complaints about other Under 
Secretaries, he replied:

       On one occasion, on one particular individual. The rest 
     were all about Undersecretary Bolton.

  In summarizing this experience Wilkerson stated, ``I think he's a 
lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there''--meaning at 
the U.S. mission to the U.N.--``that have to be led. They have to be 
led well, and they have to be led properly.''
  Being ambassador to the United Nations is not just a representational 
job; it is also a management job. There are 125 full-time, permanent 
State Department employees working there at our mission alongside 
numerous detailees from other agencies and departments. The ambassador 
has supervisory responsibility over all these people. Most are career 
civil servants, and they are there to represent the policies of the 
President and to serve the interests of the Nation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
   Mr. SARBANES. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 minutes to 
conclude the statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SARBANES. What are they going to do up there in New York if John 
Bolton repeats the kind of abusive behavior that led people in the 
State Department, under incredible pressure, to seek the support and 
counsel of their assistant secretaries? There will be no one in New 
York to shield them from the wrath and vindictiveness of John Bolton.
  Mr. President, unfortunately, it seems to have become, for some, a 
favorite pastime to assault the United Nations. They blame it for 
failing to resolve many of the problems that have occurred in the 
world. But I think we have to acknowledge that the U.N. has a role to 
play in preventing conflict and promoting cooperation. Skillful U.S. 
leadership at the United Nations can enhance our national interest in a 
very significant way, and part of that skilled leadership is to send an 
ambassador who has credibility and the wisdom necessary to carry out 
his responsibilities.
  This nominee falls far short of that standard. Mr. President, 102 
retired diplomats have taken the extraordinary step of sending a letter 
urging the Senate to reject the nomination.
  Finally, let me say just this word about the witnesses who came 
forward to the committee to testify about Mr. Bolton's past conduct. 
These people, in effect, volunteered themselves to give what they 
thought would be an accurate view of Mr. Bolton's behavior. It took a 
lot of courage for people like Mr. Ford, Mr. Wilkerson, Mr. Hutchings, 
Ambassador Hubbard, and others to come forward. I am very concerned 
they may pay a price for this brave action, and I very deeply regret if 
this should turn out to be the case. I think their motive in coming 
forward was to promote the national interests of our country. In that 
sense, I think they are true patriots. They have nothing to gain by 
opposing the nomination.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. SARBANES. In fact, they have much to lose.
  Mr. President, this nomination ought to be defeated. I urge my 
colleagues to join me in opposing it. We can do better, and, for the 
sake of our country, we must do better.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to ask if we could get a 
unanimous consent request here. The Senator from Arizona, my colleague 
from Arizona, I believe is next. How long does he wish?
  Mr. KYL. I would like to speak for 10 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Massachusetts?
  Mr. KENNEDY. Nine minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arizona be 
recognized for 10 minutes, the Senator from Massachusetts for 10 
minutes, and me for 10 minutes following that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KENNEDY. Reserving the right to object, may I ask that Senator 
Obama be recognized subsequent to that?
  Mr. McCAIN. Fine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I would like to be recognized as well in 
the ensuing sequence. My understanding is it has been going back and 
forth between the sides. The Senator from Connecticut spoke, and then 
the Senator from Maryland spoke. That caused us to have a little bit of 
a scheduling issue, so I would like to continue on that schedule and 
then allow myself to be recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask that the Senator from Florida be recognized 
following Senator Obama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request before the Chair is Senator Kyl 
for 10 minutes, Senator Kennedy for 10 minutes, Senator McCain for 10 
minutes, Senator Obama for 15 minutes, and the Senator from Florida for 
15 minutes.
  Is there any objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

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