[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 71 (Wednesday, May 25, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5933-S5936]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. SNOWE (for herself, Mr. Thune, Ms. Collins, Mr. Sununu, 
        Ms. Murkowski, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Dodd, Mr. 
        Gregg, Mr. Lott, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Bingaman, and 
        Mr. Lautenberg):
  S. 1127. A bill to require the Secretary of Defense to submit to 
Congress all documentation related to the Secretary's recommendations 
for the 2005 round of defense base closure and realignment; read the 
first time.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill designed 
to ensure the Department of Defense releases both to the Congress and 
to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission all of the information 
used in generating its recommendations in the current BRAC round.
  First, I want to thank the bill's sponsors for their support in this 
effort--Senators Thune, Collins, Sununu, Murkowski, Domenici, 
Lieberman, Dodd, Gregg, Lott, Johnson, Corzine, and Bingaman. I 
appreciate their recognition of the critical importance of ensuring we 
are given the information it is only right we have with regard to this 
base closure process.
  Under the current Base Closing and Realignment statute, the Secretary 
of Defense shall make:

     all information used by the Secretary to prepare the 
     recommendations under this subsection available to Congress, 
     including any committee or member of Congress.

  The Secretary owes this same obligation to the BRAC Commission and to 
the Comptroller General of the United States.
  Moreover, the Secretary of Defense is required to produce the data 
justifying their base closing decisions within 7 days--7 days. The 2005 
BRAC list was released on Friday, May 13. Here we are, nearly two weeks 
later, and the Department of Defense continues to flout a key 
requirement of the very BRAC statute that gives it base closure 
authority in the first place. This amounts to a blatant refusal by the 
Pentagon to back up its highly questionable decisions to close a number 
of military facilities that are absolutely irreplaceable and 
indispensable to our national security.
  Closing bases--or effectively shuttering them through massive 
realignment--of the magnitude that we are dealing with could only have 
been made by ignoring or misapplying BRAC criteria. The Defense 
Department's subsequent refusal to release the very data on which such 
decisions were made effectively shrouds the entire process in secrecy, 
depriving the bases and communities impacted, as well as the BRAC 
Commission, from gaining access to the very data needed to review the 
Pentagon's decisions.
  What type of data am I talking about? To us a few examples from my 
own office's experience, the Department of the Navy has yet to release 
a detailed breakdown of cost of closure assessments, including factors 
applied by the COBRA model if they did not do actual cost estimates. We 
have yet to see all of the options considered by the Chief of Naval 
Operations or the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to reduce excess 
capacity in shipyards, including

[[Page S5934]]

closure, realignment, workload shifts and private sector capacity. We 
have still not received a detailed breakdown of cost of operations 
assessment, including shipyard and base costs.
  These are just a few specific examples of what has not been provided. 
Other general categories would include data on the economic impact on 
existing communities, the degree to which the Defense Department looked 
into the ability of Maine's bases to accommodate future mission 
capabilities, and the impact of costs related to potential 
environmental restoration, waste management, environmental compliance 
restoration, readiness, future mission requirements. There are a number 
of such issues that are included in the base closing statute that 
requires the Defense Department to consider in making its evaluation 
and making, as well, its original determination, in terms of which 
bases they would recommend for closure or realignment.

  The Defense Department's stall tactics are most acutely felt by those 
currently preparing to make presentations before realignment or closure 
of their specific bases. Here we are, on May 25, almost 2 weeks after 
the release of the base-closing list, and yet this critical data is 
still being sequestered behind Pentagon walls, and the communities 
affected by these closures are now forced to fly blind as they make 
their cases before the base-closing commission.
  How hamstrung are these advocates, including many of my colleagues in 
the Senate and in the House of Representatives? Allow me to elaborate.
  The first base-closing hearings are expected to take place in Salt 
Lake City on June 7, less than 2 weeks from now. How are the advocates 
for Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho or Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service stations in Kansas City and St. Louis supposed to 
prepare for a case, for a hearing in less than 2 weeks with this 
critical data being withheld?
  The scheduled base-closing hearings to follow are no less forgiving. 
In fact, between June 15 and June 30, base-closing commission hearings 
will be held in the following cities: Fairbanks, AK; Portland, OR; 
Rapid City, SD; Dallas, TX; Grand Forks, ND; Clovis, NM; Buffalo, NY; 
Charlotte, NC; and Atlanta, GA.
  In my case, in the State of Maine, in Portsmouth, NH, for Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard, for Brunswick Air Force station, for the Defense 
Accounting Service in Limestone, ME, those will be scheduled on July 6 
in Boston.
  We are all working feverishly, as many of my colleagues are, along 
with State governments and all officials, to get our presentations for 
these most vital and critical hearings in order. Yet given the current 
blackout of backup data, that task is akin to defending one's self in a 
criminal case without the prosecutor putting forth the supposedly 
incriminating evidence.
  This Department of Defense has taken foot dragging and obfuscation to 
new state-of-the-art levels. The bill I am introducing today will make 
clear that this delinquency will result in serious consequences.
  So the legislation I am introducing is very straightforward and to 
the point. First, it states that the Department of Defense has 7 days 
from the date of the enactment of this law in which to release all of 
its supporting data for its realignment and closure decisions. Second, 
if this 7-day deadline is not met, the entire base-closing process of 
2005 is canceled. Third, even if this deadline is met, all the base-
closing statutory deadlines are pushed back by the number of days that 
the Defense Department delayed in producing this data.
  This legislation is the full embodiment of fairness and due process. 
It ensures that those bases in communities attempting to prevent 
closures or realignment have access to the same facts the Pentagon did, 
and that failure to provide that information will carry appropriate 
consequences. And it is our last chance to reverse the egregious 
decisions made in the closing and realignment process.
  The integrity of the base-closing process and of the decisions that 
are made on individual facilities depends on the accuracy of the data 
used and on the validity of the calculations and comparisons made using 
this data. Congress and the base-closing commission simply cannot 
discharge their responsibilities under the base-closing statute without 
this most vital information.
  It would be bad enough if it were only the Congress and the 
Commission that were being hindered in carrying out our collective 
duties with regard to the base-closing process. But it is the 
communities where these bases are located that are suffering the 
greatest harm through their inability to find out what the basis of the 
Department's decision to close these installations was.
  These towns and cities that have supported these bases for decades--
or in some cases, like Kittery, ME, and Portsmouth, NH; Brunswick Air 
Station in Limestone, ME, for centuries--are being harmed through DOD's 
continued delay in making this data available. The community groups are 
handicapped in their efforts to understand the Department's base-
closing analysis, assumptions, and conclusions therefore in their 
efforts to provide accurate rebuttal arguments or information to the 
Commission that the Department of Defense may not have considered.
  So the communities not only have suffered the shock of potentially 
losing what is in most cases the single most important economic engine 
in their communities, but to add insult to injury, have not been given 
the full picture of why these installations they rely upon and that 
relied upon them was among those chosen to close. That cannot be 
allowed to stand.
  Indeed, I am certain DOD will realize it cannot continue to withhold 
this information and will ultimately get to the bottom of this. We will 
then be able to see the weaknesses in the Navy's arguments with respect 
to the facilities in Maine. We will see that the facts indisputably 
prove there is no way to reasonably conclude this Nation should forfeit 
the long and distinguished history embodied in these facilities in a 
critical report like Kittery-Portsmouth Naval Shipyard or Brunswick 
Naval Air Station that are unequal in their performance.
  We will also make sure the base-closing commission has the 
information with respect to the role that the Defense Accounting 
Services has played in Limestone, ME, the very anchor for the 
conversion of the former Loring Air Force Base closed in one of the 
last rounds of 1991 that certainly devastated that area and the State 
of Maine when we lost more than 10,000 that led to the outmigration of 
more than 20,000 in our northern county. It really was devastating to 
also learn that the Department of Defense decided to select Defense 
Accounting Services not only in Limestone but across this country. It 
was the very anchor for conversion to help mitigate the loss of this 
most crucial base up in northern Maine.
  We will see that the facts undisputedly prove that the Navy ignored 
aspects of the base-closing criteria that I happen to believe can only 
lead to a finding that Brunswick Naval Air Station, as the only 
remaining fully operational airfield in the Northeastern United States, 
plays a singular, critical role in this Nation's homeland security and 
homeland defense posture and must continue to do so in the future. It 
really was inconceivable to me that the Department of Defense would 
also recommend closing Kittery-Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the finest 
shipyard of its kind in the U.S. Navy.

  In fact, the day before the base-closing list was announced on May 
13, the Secretary of the Navy issued a Meritorious Unit Commendation to 
Kittery-Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for, in its words, ``superbly and 
consistently performing its missions,'' establishing benchmarks above 
and beyond both the public and private sector, having established, in 
their words, again, ``a phenomenal track record'' when it came to cost 
and quality and schedule and safety.
  In fact, it had just been awarded the top safety award--the only 
facility in the Department of Defense and the only facility in the 
Navy, and only the second in the Department of Defense. That is a 
remarkable track record.
  It also saves money for the taxpayers, and it saves time and money 
for the Navy. In fact, when it comes to refuelings at Kittery-
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, it saves $75 million on average compared to 
the other yards that do the same work. It saves $20 million when it 
comes to overhauls

[[Page S5935]]

compared to the other yards that do the same work. It saves 6 months in 
time in sending the ships back to sea sooner on refuelings compared to 
the other yards that do the same work. And it saves 3 months in time on 
overhauls compared to other yards that do the same work.
  So one would argue, and certainly would ask the question, as I did of 
the Secretary of the Navy, what message does that send to the men and 
women of that shipyard when they are the overachievers, doing the best 
work and told they are No. 1 of its kind in its category, and we are 
saying, well, we are going to transfer that work elsewhere, to those 
who have not performed the equivalent result when it comes to time and 
money.
  They are No. 1. But we are sending a message to those who are the 
best, we tell them the next day, well, you know what. You are doing 
such a great job that we have decided to close.
  When it comes to Brunswick Naval Air Station, it is the only 
remaining active military airfield in the Northeast. The Northeast is 
home to 18 percent of America's population. It was, obviously, the 
region that received the most devastating attack on American soil on 
September 11.
  And now we hear from the Defense Department that we want to realign 
this base--essentially, it is tantamount to closure--when it is a 
state-of-the-art facility, well positioned strategically, with 
unincumbered airspace of 63,000 miles--space of which to expand many 
times over--well positioned on our coastline for conducting 
surveillance in the North Atlantic sealane so important to extending 
the maritime domain awareness of the Coast Guard when it comes to one 
of the greatest threats facing America; that is, the shipments of 
weapons of mass destruction. So it raises a number of questions as to 
why these facilities were designated by the Department of Defense for 
closure.
  What is even more disturbing is that in order to make the case before 
the base-closing commission, in an extremely limited period of time 
compared to the four previous base-closing rounds--which I am 
intimately familiar with, having been part of them in the past; we had 
6 months--in this base-closing round, we have 4 months. It is on an 
expedited timeframe; therefore, it makes it even more difficult, more 
problematic, to make your case, when every day is going to count, and 
the Department of Defense is withholding all of the information upon 
which we have to make our case.
  We are required by law to have that information because in order to 
make your case, you have to prove that the Department of Defense 
deviated substantially--deviated substantially--from the criteria in 
the base-closing statute when it comes to military value, operational 
readiness, the closing costs, the costs of operations of that 
particular facility, the economic impacts, so on and so on.
  Now, it certainly is a mystery to me as to how the Defense Department 
could have made all these decisions--33 major base closings and another 
29 realignments and many more for adjustments--and yet they cannot 
ensure that the information and the data they utilized is forthcoming. 
Well, then, it just raises the question, How did they make these 
decisions in the first place? Why have they not readily turned over the 
information that we require in order to make our case?
  For the Commission to overturn a decision recommendation by the 
Department of Defense, it requires us to make a case that they deviated 
substantially from the criteria set forth in the base-closing statute. 
So it is obvious we need the information because not to have the 
information they used inhibits us and prohibits us from making the 
documentations that are required under the law.
  I think it is a fundamental flouting of the law. We have insisted, 
day in and day out, we need this information. We deserve to have this 
information. The men and women who work at these military facilities 
who serve our country deserve to have this information. It is important 
to our national security interests because we need to know the 
information upon which this Defense Department predicated its 
assumptions. And it is not enough just to get their conclusions, it is 
not enough just to get their assumptions, we need all of the empirical 
data that was used to make those assumptions and conclusions. How did 
they arrive at those decisions?
  For example, when you look at the force structure of submarines, the 
new attack submarines, on which the Portsmouth Naval Yard works, those 
decisions have to be predicated on 55 attack submarines, 55. That was 
included in the base-closing criteria, 2004. The force structure at 
that time was 55 attack submarines--still is--but the Department of 
Defense is changing their force structure after they already made the 
recommendations. How can they make a recommendation based on 55 attack 
submarines but then decide, well, maybe a year later we can reduce that 
number? We have already made the decision.
  It raises a considerable number of questions about the flawed 
information and the flawed process. Yet we have not had an opportunity 
to evaluate it. We have lost a critical 2 weeks in this process and, 
again, as I said, on a very expedited timeframe in which to make these 
decisions, to evaluate the information, and to submit our case before 
the base-closing commission in the scheduled hearings over this next 
month.
  If the Department of Defense does not provide this information in a 
timely manner, then this round of base closings is fundamentally flawed 
and is designed to close critical military infrastructure at a time 
when our Nation faces a changing, unpredictable threat environment, 
and, therefore, it should be brought to an end. If they cannot provide 
this information in a timely fashion, that is exactly what should 
occur.
  I believe it does really underscore the integrity and the lack of the 
integrity in this process because it certainly stands to reason, and 
certainly it is a fair assumption to make, that the Department of 
Defense should be able to turn over instantaneously all of the 
information they used to make these critical decisions. After all, 
they have had a considerable period of time in which to make these 
decisions. So, therefore, it should not be very difficult to provide 
that information. But we continue to get the consistent stonewalling 
and obfuscation that is preventing us from evaluating these decisions 
in order to do what is required under the law to demonstrate how these 
decisions are faulty and to evaluate the information. We deserve no 
less than that.

  So I thank my colleagues for joining me in this effort to compel the 
Department of Defense to stand up and be accountable for this 
decisionmaking process and to release the data that we deserve that led 
to these decisions with respect to base closings so we understand 
exactly how they arrived at their decisions that are so critical and 
central to our national security.
  I regret we are in this position in the first place. I opposed this 
base-closing process. It certainly should have been deferred. We should 
have considered the overseas base closings before we looked at domestic 
installations. In fact, that certainly was an issue in the overseas 
base-closing report that was issued recently. So we do not have an 
overall structure in which to consider the macroplans. That is what 
should have been done. We should be looking at all these issues in a 
totality because we are in a very different environment than we were 
even pre-September 11, 2001, and our threat environment has to be 
looked through an entirely different prism.
  In fact, as I mentioned on the floor just about a year ago, in 
attempting to defer this process until we had a chance to evaluate 
overseas bases, one of the issues I looked at was the track record of 
the Department of Defense in terms of ascertaining the future threat 
environments. What could they anticipate were future threats? I have to 
say that I was somewhat shocked by the findings because I evaluated the 
force structure reports and military threat assessments that were 
required to be accompanied with the base-closing rounds in previous 
years.
  It was interesting. I decided to discern, exactly when did they 
anticipate a threat of terrorism, asymmetric threats, or threats to our 
homeland security? And it was a startling and abysmal picture because 
they had a significantly flawed track record. The first time that a 
threat to our homeland security was even mentioned was

[[Page S5936]]

in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997. Mr. President, 1997--that 
was 4 years before September 11. At that time, with the previous base-
closing rounds, these base-closing commissions were required to make a 
6-year outlook for the potential threats and anticipated threats--6 
years. Now, with this base-closing round, it requires 20 years. But 
even with 6 years out, they could not even discern a threat to our 
homeland security. They mentioned it in the Quadrennial Defense Review 
of 1997, but it was a fourth-tier concern. And that was 4 years out 
from September 11--4 years out from September 11.
  Nineteen days after September 11, we had another quadrennial defense 
review issued by the Department of Defense. Al-Qaida wasn't even 
mentioned in that quadrennial defense review. It wasn't even mentioned 
19 days after September 11.
  So I think that gives you a measure of the understanding that the 
Department of Defense has not had an accurate or reliable determination 
of potential threats this country could face--not even 4 years out, not 
even 19 days after September 11--to the degree that al-Qaida was a 
threat to this country. That is the problem, Mr. President. We do not 
have an accurate picture.
  This base-closing round is required to ascertain the threat 
environment and projecting 20 years out. Mind you, over the last more 
than 10 years, all throughout the nineties, when we had the World Trade 
Center bombing, Khobar Towers, Kenya, and Tanzania, all throughout that 
decade--and we had the USS Cole in 2000--there was only one time in 
that decade there was a mention of homeland security in any fashion. I 
think that is pretty telling.
  So the fact that the Department of Defense cannot bring forward the 
information that validates or invalidates their assumptions and 
conclusions is particularly troubling in this threat environment. I 
regret we are in the situation today of having to beg, plead, and 
persuade to try to get some glimmer into the insights, into the 
documentation evaluation they made in reaching these final conclusions. 
More than anything else, the statute requires those to be making the 
case before the Base Closing Commission to determine how the Department 
of Defense deviated substantially from the criteria. How are we to 
know, if they don't depend upon the very department who makes the 
decision, has the information, and has yet to transmit them forthwith 
to all of the respective delegations and officials who are given the 
opportunity to make the case before the Base Closing Commission?

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