[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 71 (Wednesday, May 25, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5876-S5914]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERT BOLTON TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED 
                STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

  Mr. FRIST. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
now proceed to the consideration of Executive Calendar No. 103, the 
nomination of John Bolton, to be U.N. ambassador; provided further that 
the debate up to 6:30 this evening be equally divided between the 
chairman and ranking member; I further ask that if a cloture motion is 
filed on the nomination, notwithstanding the provisions of rule XXII, 
that vote occur at 6 p.m. on Thursday with a live quorum waived; 
provided further that when the Senate resumes debate on the nomination 
on Thursday, all time until 6 p.m. be equally divided as stated above; 
further, that if cloture is invoked on the nomination, the Senate then 
proceed to a vote on the confirmation of the nomination with no further 
intervening action or debate; provided further that following that 
vote, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action and 
the Senate resume legislative Senate; finally, I ask consent during the 
debate on the nomination, Senator Voinovich be in control of 1 hour of 
debate.
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, could we have some assurance 
from the distinguished majority leader that we will have an early time 
in the morning to come to work and we do not spend all the morning on 
morning business.
  Mr. FRIST. Madam President, calling upon my earlier cardiac surgical 
days, we will start as early in the morning as the Democratic leader 
would like.
  In all seriousness, we will agree upon a time in the morning so that 
we will have plenty of time.
  Mr. REID. I also say if, in fact, there is more time needed tonight, 
would the distinguished leader allow Members to move past 6:30 tonight 
on debate.
  Mr. FRIST. Madam President, we would be happy to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the nomination.
  The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of John Robert 
Bolton, of Maryland, to be the Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations, with the rank and status of Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and the Representative of the United 
States of America in the Security Council of the United Nations.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate meets today to debate the 
nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. 
In this capacity, he would play an important role in securing greater 
international support for the national security and foreign policy 
objectives of the United States. It is my judgment that Secretary 
Bolton should be confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
  In recent years, the Foreign Relations Committee has made a special 
effort to work in a bipartisan manner. For 3 straight years, we have 
reported out foreign affairs authorization bills by unanimous votes. 
During the last Congress, we met 247 times, which was 50 percent more 
frequently than any other committee in the Senate. In almost every 
case, the subject of the meeting and the selection of witnesses enjoyed 
bipartisan support.
  We have undertaken the cooperative path, not because we always agree, 
but because we know the stakes are high for our country in the 
international arena. We face severe threats capable of undermining our 
national security and our economic well-being. We believe we should 
strive to approach these questions with as much unity as possible.
  On the John Bolton nomination, our committee could not develop a 
consensus position. From the start, members had widely divergent views 
of Secretary Bolton and his suitability for the U.N. ambassadorship. 
Members formed different opinions about the nominee based on their 
assessment of the role of the United Nations, their interpretation of 
Secretary Bolton's statements, their judgments on the testimony of many 
witnesses, their perspectives on managerial conduct, their philosophy 
on how much latitude a President should have in nominating 
subordinates, and many other factors.
  On top of these different perspectives, allegations were raised about 
Secretary Bolton that led to an expanded inquiry. Republicans and 
Democrats differed on some procedural aspects related to this inquiry, 
as well as on the relevance of some allegations and documents. Despite 
these substantive disagreements, we were able to work together in an 
effort that represents one of the most intense and most far-reaching 
examinations of a nominee in my experience.
  The Foreign Relations Committee has interviewed 29 witnesses, 
producing approximately 1,000 pages of transcripts. We have received 
and reviewed more than 830 pages of documents from the State 
Department, from USAID, and the CIA regarding the Bolton nomination. We 
have questioned Secretary Bolton in person for 7 hours, and we have 
received responses to nearly 100 questions for the record, many 
containing numerous subparts. The depth and breadth of the 11-week 
inquiry is particularly notable, given that Secretary Bolton has been 
confirmed 4 times by the Senate already and that most of us have had 
personal experiences with him.
  I thank both Democrat and Republican members of our Foreign Relations 
Committee for their patience and their perseverance throughout this 
process. Although we disagree in our conclusions, we share the view 
that the committee must work together even when we have different 
perspectives. We also agreed that the nomination has provided an 
opportunity for debate on larger issues related to the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy.

  At the core of any nomination process is the question of whether the 
nominee is qualified to undertake the task for which he or she is 
nominated. I have no doubt Secretary Bolton is extremely well 
qualified. He has just served 4 years in a key under secretary position 
that technically outranks the post for which he is being nominated. He 
has succeeded in several high-profile negotiation settings. He was the 
primary negotiator in the creation of the successful Proliferation 
Security Initiative and the landmark Moscow Treaty. He played a large 
role in the agreement with Libya on the surrender of that nation's 
weapons of mass destruction program and the ``10 Plus 10 Over 10'' 
agreement that resulted in $10 billion in pledges from other G-8 
countries to secure former Soviet Union weapons of mass destruction 
arsenals. These are among the Bush administration's most important and 
indisputable foreign policy successes.
  Opponents have argued that Secretary Bolton's personality will 
prevent him from being effective at the U.N., but his diplomatic 
successes over the last 4 years belie that expectation. Few in 
Government have thought more about U.N. reform than has John

[[Page S5877]]

Bolton. He served 4 years as the Assistant Secretary of State 
overseeing international organizations under the first President Bush. 
He has written and commented extensively on that subject.
  During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Bolton demonstrated an 
impressive command of issues related to the United Nations. Senator 
Biden acknowledged to the nominee at his hearing that:

       There is no question you have extensive experience in UN 
     affairs.

  Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage recently told reporters:

       John Bolton is eminently qualified. He's one of the 
     smartest guys in Washington.

  Secretary Bolton also demonstrated his ability to get things done 
prior to becoming Under Secretary of State. Perhaps the best example is 
his initiative to repeal U.N. Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism 
with racism.
  In May 1991, as Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations, John Bolton refused to accept the common wisdom that 
repealing this infamous resolution was impossible. He and his staff 
initiated a campaign to change votes in the General Assembly, even 
though they were advised they would not be successful. Within a few 
months, they had made substantial progress. By the fall, the State 
Department put its full weight behind that effort. On December 16, 
1991, the U.N. General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution by a 
vote of 111 to 25.
  In the private sector, Secretary Bolton made some blunt statements 
about the United Nations. Many of these statements were made in 
academic or think-tank settings where debate on these subjects was 
encouraged. Many of the quotes that have been repeated by opponents 
came in the context of much larger speeches that were more nuanced. The 
fact that he has strong views and a long record of commentary on the 
job that he is about to undertake should not be disqualifying.
  During our hearing with Secretary Bolton, he spoke of the United 
Nations important role in international security. He has emphasized 
that he wants the institution to work well on behalf of international 
security and the interests of the United States.
  Beyond qualifications, we should recognize that Secretary Bolton has 
the confidence of the President of the United States and the Secretary 
of State. The President has made it clear this is not a casual 
appointment. He wants a specific person to do a specific job. President 
Bush has a reform agenda in mind at the U.N. This reform agenda is 
generally supported by the U.N. Secretary General who has put forward a 
reform plan of his own. The President wants John Bolton, an avowed and 
knowledgeable reformer, to carry out that reform agenda. Kofi Annan has 
welcomed John Bolton's appointment.
  I would emphasize that Secretary Bolton is being appointed to a 
position that is within the chain of command of the President and the 
Secretary of State. The Ambassador to the United Nations reports 
directly to the President and to the Secretary of State. In fact, 
historically this ambassadorship has reflected directly on the 
President. The ambassador is seen as the President's voice at the U.N. 
Consequently, there are few positions in Government where the President 
should have more latitude in choosing his nominee. In my judgment, it 
would take absolutely extraordinary circumstances for the Senate to 
tell the President he cannot have his choice to carry out his 
directives at the U.N., even though the nominee is highly experienced 
and knowledgeable about U.N. affairs.
  At times during this process, opponents have suggested that Secretary 
Bolton sits outside the mainstream in the Bush administration. The 
problem with this assertion is that President Bush is telling us this 
is not so. President Bush is telling us Secretary Bolton accurately 
reflects his views about the U.N. and how that institution should be 
reformed. President Bush is saying Secretary Bolton is his considered 
choice to implement his policies and diplomatic initiatives at the 
United Nations.

  Some observers who want a different program than the President's may 
not agree with the President's choice, but the results of the 2004 
election give the President the responsibility and the right to 
nominate like-minded representatives and to define who a like-minded 
representative is.
  We have ample evidence that the United Nations is in need of reform. 
The Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional hearing on 
the U.N. oil-for-food scandal more than a year ago. Since that time, 
through the work of Paul Volcker, our own colleague on the committee, 
Senator Coleman, and many others, we have learned much more about the 
extent of the corruption and mismanagement involved. This knowledge has 
supported the case for reform.
  We know billions of dollars that should have been spent on 
humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam Hussein's regime 
through a system of surcharges, bribes, and kickbacks. This corruption 
depended upon members of the U.N. Security Council who were willing to 
be complicit in these activities. It also depended on U.N. officials 
and contractors who were dishonest, inattentive, or willing to make 
damaging compromises in pursuit of a compassionate mission.
  The U.N. reform is not a new issue. The structure and the role of the 
United Nations have been debated in our country almost continuously 
since the U.N. was established in 1945. But in 2005 we may have a 
unique opportunity to improve the operations of the U.N. The 
revelations of the oil-for-food scandal and the urgency of 
strengthening global cooperation to address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, 
nuclear proliferation, and many other international problems have 
created momentum in favor of constructive reforms at the U.N.
  Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed a substantial reform plan 
that will provide a platform for further reform initiatives and 
discussions. The United States must be a leader in the effort to 
improve the United Nations, particularly its accountability. At a time 
when the United States is appealing for greater international help in 
Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in troubled spots around the world, a 
diminishment of U.N. credibility because of scandal reduces United 
States options and increases our own burdens.
  Secretary Bolton has become closely associated with the U.S. efforts 
to reform the U.N. If he goes to the U.N. and helps achieve reform, the 
U.N. will gain in credibility, especially with the American people. If 
reform moves forward, Secretary Bolton will be in an excellent position 
to help convince skeptics that reform has occurred and that the United 
Nations can be an effective partner in achieving global security. If we 
reject Secretary Bolton, President Bush's hand will be weakened at the 
U.N. We will recover, but we will have wasted time. And we will have 
strengthened the position of reform opponents.
  In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7 
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democratic members 
of the Foreign Relations Committee expressed their opposition to the 
nomination on policy grounds. A March 8 Associated Press report states:

       Almost immediately after Bolton's nomination was announced, 
     Democrats objected.

  The March 8 edition of the Baltimore Sun said:

       Reaction from Senate Democrats promised contentious 
     confirmation hearings for Bolton when he goes before the 
     Foreign Relations Committee.

  In several cases, the statements by Democrats were unequivocal in 
opposition. In several other cases, statements were very negative, 
leaving open only the smallest of possibilities that the Senator would 
ultimately support the nominee. In all of these cases, objections were 
based on Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United 
Nations.
  Senator Dodd said that Secretary Bolton's ``antipathy to the U.N. 
will prevent him from effectively discharging his duties as our 
ambassador.''
  Senator Kerry said that the Bolton nomination was ``the most 
inexplicable appointment the President could make to represent the 
United States to the world community.''
  Senator Boxer said of Secretary Bolton:

       He's contemptuous of the U.N.

  By March 31, still almost 2 weeks before the first Bolton hearings, a 
Los Angeles Times report noted:


[[Page S5878]]


       Democrats are likely to vote unanimously against John R. 
     Bolton when his nomination to be United States ambassador to 
     the United Nations comes before the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee . . . according to Democratic and Republican 
     lawmakers and aides.

  Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of his 
substantive views and his past statements. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that the ethical inquiry into Secretary Bolton's background 
has been pressed by Members who had planned to vote against him even 
before we began interviewing witnesses. They have the right to ask 
questions, and the committee of jurisdiction has a responsibility to 
follow up on credible allegations. But we should also understand that 
at times the inquiry has followed a more prosecutorial path than most 
nominees have had to endure.
  Our committee staff has worked long and hard to run down the salvo of 
allegations that were levied at Secretary Bolton. The end result is 
that many of the accusations have proven to be groundless or, at worst, 
overstated. New information has cast others in a different light. There 
is no doubt that Secretary Bolton has been blunt and combative in 
defense of his perspectives. Indeed, this is one of the qualities that 
President Bush and Secretary Rice have cited as a reason for their 
selection of this nominee.

  As I have said previously, Secretary Bolton's blunt style alienated 
some colleagues. Our review showed that on several occasions he made 
incorrect assumptions about the behavior and motivations of 
subordinates. A few other times he failed to use proper managerial 
channels or unnecessarily personalized internal disputes. But there is 
no evidence that he has broken laws or engaged in serious ethical 
misconduct. The picture is one of an assertive policymaker with an 
intense commitment to his missions--missions that, in fact, were 
supported by President Bush.
  With regard to the most serious charge, that Secretary Bolton sought 
to improperly manipulate intelligence, the insights we have gained do 
not support the conclusion. He may have disagreed with intelligence 
findings, but in the end he always accepted the final judgment of the 
intelligence community, and he always delivered speeches in their 
cleared form.
  During this inquiry, there has been an implication that if the 
nominee challenged or opposed the conclusions of intelligence analysts, 
he somehow committed an ethical violation. I think we need to be very 
precise that arguing in favor of one's own reading of intelligence 
within the context of an internal policy debate is not wrongdoing. 
Intelligence reports are not sacrosanct. They involve interpretation. 
They are intended to stimulate debate.
  Many Senators participate in classified briefings. The word 
``briefing'' is a misnomer because, as Senators, we spend much of the 
time during briefings questioning the panel. We probe to determine not 
just what analysts think but why they think it, and often we challenge 
their conclusions.
  Earlier this year, for example, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee held a highly classified briefing on North Korea in which one 
of our members pointedly disputed the conclusions of the briefer. There 
was a blunt exchange of views, and no resolution to this disagreement 
was achieved. I am doubtful that any of us who have attended a good 
number of intelligence briefings have not done the same thing on 
occasion. My point is that the act of challenging or disputing 
intelligence conclusions is not in and of itself wrong.
  Some have appeared shocked that Secretary Bolton might have 
challenged intelligence conclusions or advanced alternative 
interpretations, even though the same thing happens every day in 
multiple departments and agencies. Congress has the benefit of 
something called the ``speech and debate clause.''
  Article I, section 6 of the Constitution states that Members of 
Congress ``shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the 
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session 
of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the 
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.''
  The Founders put this extraordinary provision in the Constitution 
because they saw the value of debate. The context surrounding arguments 
within an administration over intelligence is different, but the 
principle is the same. Policymakers should be free to exert opinions 
and interpretations during the policymaking process. Clearly, there are 
lines that should not be crossed. Some may argue that Secretary Bolton 
crossed these lines. But the proof is in the result. After fighting for 
his interpretation, Secretary Bolton conformed to the clearance process 
and gave the speeches as they had been approved.
  It has been charged that Secretary Bolton sought to retaliate in some 
way against analysts and others with whom he disagreed. Our inquiry 
looked into these cases thoroughly, and in each one I believe the 
allegations are overstated.
  In the case of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the 
committee heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a procedural 
issue, and Mr. Westermann continued in his job.
  We should recall that the focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Mr. 
Bolton should not have raised his objections directly with Mr. 
Westermann, not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue. Our 
Democratic colleagues last month made much of the fact that after this 
incident Secretary Powell had to go all the way down to INR to boost 
morale. But we heard from Secretary Powell's chief of staff that such 
visits were not uncommon. It was part of the Secretary's leadership 
style to visit with staff in the ``bowels of the building,'' including 
INR.
  In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the committee staff 
has viewed make it clear that Secretary Bolton's primary objection was 
over disparaging and inaccurate comments the analyst made to Members of 
Congress about a speech. Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the 
CIA. Although the NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by 
Secretary Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time, and other 
witnesses have told the committee that if he did not get the promotions 
he felt he deserved, it was for other reasons. Again, as far as 
Secretary Bolton was concerned, the dispute was procedural. There was 
no attempt to fabricate intelligence.
  Other allegations related to managerial style show the same pattern 
upon examination--disagreement over procedure, not policy. In the case 
of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in the non-proliferation bureau 
under Secretary Bolton, no policy issues were involved at all. 
Secretary Bolton believed--incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's 
supervisor--that Mr. Ryu had deliberately neglected to share 
information with Bolton's office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for 
a job that would have required him to work closely with Secretary 
Bolton. Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition 
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post instead, 
an assignment to the deputy secretary.
  The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by the other 
side, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully supported what 
Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only because of miscommunication 
that Secretary Bolton thought the attorney had given out wrong 
information on a case involving sanctions against a Chinese company. 
The State Department Legal Advisor, Will Taft, told our staff that he 
quickly straightened things out. The attorney stayed on the case, and 
he even wrote the affidavit that Secretary Bolton later submitted to 
court.
  Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary Bolton's 
chief of staff, we learned, went to an INR analyst to complain that he 
had inappropriately attached to a CIA document a cover memo that took 
exception to some of the CIA's findings regarding China. No action was 
sought against the analyst and none was taken. The issue was 
procedural, no intelligence was manipulated, and Secretary Bolton was 
not even directly involved, because he was out of the country at the 
time.
  Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into question 
regarding his testimony before our committee on April 11. Senator Biden 
questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to the CIA to learn about the 
National Intelligence Council. Stuart Cohen, the acting head of the 
NIC, said that while he could not recall why Secretary

[[Page S5879]]

Bolton wanted to come, it was ``perfectly reasonable'' to believe that 
was the reason. In fact, he added, ``I was delighted at the prospect 
that somebody would come out wanting to know more about the NIC.'' He 
also said that Secretary Bolton only talked about reassigning, not 
firing, the NIO just as Mr. Bolton testified. Our investigation has 
found nothing contrary to Secretary Bolton's claim that his dispute 
with Mr. Westermann was over procedure, not policy.
  Former Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, called the 
committee after Secretary Bolton's testimony about a controversial 
speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton testified that 
Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the speech afterwards. The 
ambassador told us he indeed had thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, 
but only for making certain changes in the speech that he had 
requested. Ambassador Hubbard told our staff that he wanted to correct 
the record on that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton of 
being deliberately misleading.
  That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that opponents of 
the nomination have questioned. Our investigation showed that many of 
these speeches and congressional testimony were preceded by strong 
policy debates within the administration. As one witness told our 
staff, ``That's how good policy is made.'' In each case we found that, 
in the end, Secretary Bolton delivered a speech that was properly 
cleared and that expressed official U.S. policy.
  One of the most sensationalized accusations against Secretary Bolton 
is that 11 years ago, he chased a woman around a Moscow hotel throwing 
things at her. This is problematic first because the behavior described 
seems so out of place. But secondly, because it has been very difficult 
for our staffs, despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to 
ascertain just what happened.
  The woman, Melody Townsel, who lives in Dallas, admits that she is a 
liberal Democrat who worked for Mothers Opposing Bush in the last 
election. Ms. Townsel also told our staffs that her original 
accusation, contained in a letter that was made public, may have been 
too strong in some places. She said: `` `Chasing' may not be the best 
word.'' What she meant was that Secretary Bolton would approach her 
whenever he saw her at the hotel where they were both staying because, 
as she describes it, she did not want to meet with him over a legal 
matter. It is important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private 
lawyer at that time. He was not representing the U.S. Government. He 
was working for a company against which Ms. Townsel had made some very 
serious charges--charges which proved unfounded--that could have cost 
his company an important USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
  Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, which are said 
to have occurred in public or open areas of the hotel. Moreover, 
although she claimed this was a highly traumatic encounter and that she 
told several people about it, staff had difficulty finding others who 
knew about it. Three people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard 
her complaints at the time of the events told staff that they had no 
recollection of Ms. Townsel mentioning Mr. Bolton. Her boss, Charles 
Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, who hired her for the post, 
said she never mentioned it to him. Neither did her immediate 
supervisor back in Washington. An employee of a sister company who 
assisted Ms. Townsel in making her charges against the prime contractor 
on her project and with whom she said she was in close touch at the 
time, also knows nothing about it. Staffs talked to three 
representatives of the contractor, a small Virginia firm which has long 
experience working for USAID overseas. Those officials also heard 
nothing about this encounter. They said that Secretary Bolton was in 
Moscow at that time, but he was working as a consultant for a health 
project they were involved in, not doing legal work for them. We did 
find one of her friends and co-workers from that time, who was not in 
Moscow, who recalls talking with her by telephone about it, as well as 
a subordinate of hers in a later USAID-funded project who recalls her 
mentioning it.
  Ultimately, Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID project in the 
former Soviet Union, and the company she accused of mismanagement was 
awarded more USAID contracts and continues to be well regarded.
  The original charge against Secretary Bolton is uncorroborated and 
overstated. On the basis of what we do know, there is nothing to offset 
Secretary Bolton's long record of public service in several 
administrations. It has been charged that collectively the allegations 
against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable pattern of behavior. This 
is an unfortunate argument by opponents because it depends on doubts 
arising from an intense investigation of accusations, many of which had 
no substantiation. By its nature, it also discounts the dozens of 
positive testimonials on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former 
coworkers who attest to his character and his effectiveness.
  We need to think clearly about the context of the allegations leveled 
against Secretary Bolton. First, this has been an extremely public 
inquiry. By its nature, it has encouraged anyone with a grudge or 
disagreement with Secretary Bolton, stretching back to 1983, to come 
forward and tell their story. There have been no thematic limits on the 
allegations that opponents of the nominee have asked to be 
investigated.
  I simply submit that no one working in Washington in high-ranking 
positions for that long would come out unscathed from such a process. 
Any assertive policymaker will develop opponents based on stylistic 
differences, personal disputes, or partisan disagreements. Most Members 
of the Senate have been in public life for decades. If we were 
nominated for a similar position of responsibility after our terms in 
the Senate, how many of us would want the same standard to be applied 
to our confirmation process? How many of us would want any instance of 
conflict or anger directed at our staffs or our colleagues to be fair 
game?
  Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all the way to 
1983. Thus, we are subjecting 22 years of Secretary Bolton's career to 
a microscope. This included service in many Government jobs, as well as 
time spent in the private sector. Given the length of John Bolton's 
service in high-ranking positions, it is inevitable he would have a 
conflict with coworkers of various ranks and political persuasions. He 
would have had literally thousands of contacts, meetings, and issues to 
deal with during his career. In this context, the volume of alleged 
incidents is not that profound.
  Third, in John Bolton's case, unsubstantiated charges may seem more 
material than they are because he has a reputation for being an 
aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should not be a disqualifying 
factor, especially for posts that historically have included a number 
of blunt, plain-spoken individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our 
former colleague, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has 
cited John Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons he has picked 
him for this particular job.
  It is easy to say any inquiry into any allegation is justified if we 
are pursuing the truth, but as Senators who are frequently called upon 
to pass judgment on nominees, we know reality is more complicated than 
that. We want to ensure that nominees are qualified, skilled, honest, 
and open.
  Clearly, we should pursue credible reports of wrongdoing, but in 
doing so, we should understand that there can be human and 
organizational costs if the inquiry is not focused and fair.
  We have all witnessed quality nominees who have had to endure a 
contentious nomination process that opened them up to any charge 
leveled from any direction. Both Republicans and Democrats have been 
guilty of employing prosecutorial tactics to oppose nominees with whom 
they did not agree. Some would say that nominees are fair game. If they 
accept appointment, they enter the public arena where no quarter will 
be given. But we need capable people who are willing to serve our 
Government and the American people.
  Among all the other qualifications, it seems we have required 
nominees to subject themselves and their families to partisan scrutiny. 
This has implications well beyond this current nomination.

[[Page S5880]]

  Our Democratic colleagues have recognized this fact when they have 
defended Democratic nominees in the past. With respect to one nominee 
in October 1993, Senator Biden said:

       The Senate does nothing to fulfill its responsibility to 
     advice and consent on Presidential nominations and does 
     nothing to enhance its reputation as the world's greatest 
     deliberative body by entertaining a long and disagreeable 
     litany of past policy disagreements, nor by entertaining 
     anonymous and probably false allegations.

  With regard to a troubled 1999 nomination, Senator Dodd quite 
insightfully stated:

       I am one, Mr. Chairman, who worries deeply about our 
     ability to attract the best our society can produce to serve 
     our country. It is not easy to submit yourselves and your 
     families to the kind of public scrutiny that a nomination 
     of this magnitude involves. We have got to sort out some 
     ways in which we can go through this process without 
     making it so discouraging to people that those who watch 
     the process who think one day they might like to serve 
     their country will be discouraged from doing so in any 
     administration, and I am deeply worried that if we do not 
     get a better handle on this, that will be the net result 
     of what we accomplish.

  Senator Dodd also provided comments for a March 1, 1997, Washington 
Post article about the travails of a different nominee. He said:

       It's getting harder and harder to get good people to serve 
     in government. Advice and consent does not have to be abuse.

  In an investigation of this type, we constantly have to ask, where do 
you draw the line? Where does legitimate due diligence turn into 
partisanship? Where does the desire for the truth turn into a 
competition over who wins and who loses? Not every line of the inquiry 
is justified by our curiosity or even our suspicions.
  The Foreign Relations Committee has focused a great deal of energy 
examining several accusations against the nominee. This may leave some 
observers with the false impression that John Bolton's service has been 
dominated by discord and conflict. We need to acknowledge that a great 
many officials with whom he has worked have endorsed him and many 
subordinates have attested to his managerial character. I would like to 
cite just a few of the comments received by the committee in support of 
Secretary Bolton.
  Former Secretaries of State James Baker, Larry Eagleburger, Alexander 
Haig, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz, former Secretaries of Defense 
Frank Carlucci and James Schlesinger, former Ambassadors Jeane 
Kirkpatrick and Max Kampelman, former National Security Adviser Richard 
Allen, former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth 
Adelman, former Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire and former 
Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt strongly endorsed 
Secretary Bolton in a letter to the committee. They said:

       It is a moment when we must have an ambassador in place 
     whose knowledge, experience, dedication and drive will be 
     vital to protecting the American interest in an effective, 
     forward-looking United Nations. . . . Secretary Bolton, like 
     the administration, has his critics of course. Anyone as 
     energetic and effective as John [Bolton] is bound to 
     encounter those who disagree with some or even all of the 
     administration's policies. But the policies for which he is 
     sometimes criticized are those of the President and the 
     Department of State which he has served with loyalty, 
     honor and distinction.

  Andrew Natsios, the current USAID administrator and M. Peter 
McPherson, a former USAID administrator, along with 37 officials who 
worked with John Bolton during his year at USAID wrote:

       We know John to be a forceful policy advocate who both 
     encourages and learns from rigorous debate. We know him to be 
     a man of balanced judgment. And we know him to have a sense 
     of humor, even about himself. John leads from in front with 
     courage and conviction--especially positive qualities, we 
     believe, for the assignment he is being asked to take on. He 
     is tough but fair. He does not abuse power or people. John is 
     direct, yet thoughtful in his communication. He is highly 
     dedicated, working long hours in a never-ending quest to 
     maximize performance. Yet he does not place undue time 
     demands on his staff, recognizing their family obligations. 
     What he does demand from his staff is personal honesty and 
     intellectual clarity.

  Another letter from former Attorneys General Ed Meese and Dick 
Thornburgh; former Governors William Weld and Frank Keating; former 
counsels to the President C. Boyden Gray and Arthur Culvahouse Jr.; and 
39 other distinguished Officials stated:

       Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know him to be a 
     man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply devoted to 
     the service of this country and the promotion of our foreign 
     policy interests as established by this President and 
     Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his 
     part that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our 
     collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined 
     with our own experiences in government and in the private 
     sector, more than counterbalances the credibility of those 
     who have tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a 
     lifetime.

  Another letter came from 21 former officials who worked with John 
Bolton in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs. It states:

       Despite what has been said and written in the last few 
     weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or 
     its mission. Quite the contrary--under John's leadership the 
     organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original 
     charter. John's energy and innovation transformed IO from a 
     State Department backwater into a highly appealing work place 
     in which individuals could effectively articulate and advance 
     U.S. policy and their own careers as well.

  A letter also arrived from 43 of John Bolton's former colleagues at 
the American Enterprise Institute. It stated:

       As we have followed the strange allegations suddenly 
     leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days and reflected among 
     ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come to 
     realize how much we learned from him, and how deep and 
     lasting were his contributions. . . . Contrary to the 
     portrayals of his accusers, he combines a temperate 
     disposition, good spirit, and utter honesty with his well-
     known attributes of exceptional intelligence and intensity of 
     purpose. This is a rare combination and, we would think, 
     highly desirable for an American ambassador to the United 
     Nations.

  Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote in a recent 
letter to Secretary Bolton:

       To combine, as you do, clarity of thought, courtesy of 
     expression and an unshakeable commitment to justice is rare 
     in any walk of life. But it is particularly so in 
     international affairs. A capacity for straight talking rather 
     than peddling half-truths is a strength and not a 
     disadvantage in diplomacy. Particularly in the case of a 
     great power like America, it is essential that people know 
     where you stand and assume that you mean what you say. With 
     you at the UN, they will do both. Those same qualities are 
     also required for any serious reform at the United Nations 
     itself, without which cooperation between nations to defend 
     and extend liberty will be far more difficult.

  During consideration of the Bolton nomination, we have spent a good 
deal of time scrutinizing individual conversations and incidents that 
happened several years ago. Regardless of how each Senator plans to 
vote, we should not lose sight of the larger national security issues 
concerning UN reform and international diplomacy that are central to 
this nomination.
  The President has tapped Secretary Bolton to undertake this urgent 
mission. Secretary Bolton has affirmed his commitment to fostering a 
strong United Nations. He has expressed his intent to work hard to 
secure greater international support at the UN for the national 
security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. He has 
stated his belief in decisive American leadership at the UN, and 
underscored that an effective United Nations is very much in the 
interest of U.S. national security.
  I believe that the President deserves to have his nominee represent 
him at the United Nations. I am hopeful that we will vote to send this 
nominee to the United Nations without further delay and with a maximum 
amount of enthusiactic support.
  I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I ask that the time now be equally charged to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S5881]]

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that quorum calls 
be charged equally against both sides for the duration of the debate on 
the Bolton nomination.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to state what is obvious to 
the Chair and my colleagues, that I will oppose the nomination of John 
Bolton to be U.S. representative to the United Nations. I regret, 
frankly, we are even debating this nomination while the administration 
continues to withhold relevant material about Mr. Bolton that the 
committee has requested, and for which no reasonable explanation has 
been given as to why it has not been provided other than they do not 
think the information is ``relevant'' to our inquiry. I will return to 
that issue later today.
  The job to which Mr. Bolton has been nominated is one of the most 
important ambassadorships the President fills. It is, in fact, the most 
important one. In the past, it has often held Cabinet rank. Leading 
figures of their day have held that job, people such as Republican 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Democrat Adlai Stevenson, President George Herbert 
Walker Bush, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard 
Holbrooke, Senator Jack Danforth. Aside from the President and the 
Secretary of State, the U.N. ambassador is the best known face of 
American diplomacy.
  It is a job that in my view requires a person with diplomatic 
temperament, a person willing to listen to other points of view, and 
blessed with the power to be able to persuade, such as President Bush's 
father George Herbert Walker Bush was.
  It is a job that requires a person of great credibility, such as 
Governor Adlai Stevenson.
  It is a job that requires a person who is not an ideologue, such as 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat who served a Republican 
President as ambassador to the United Nations.
  And it is a job, in my view, that requires a person who has the 
complete confidence of the President of the United States and Secretary 
of State, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick did.
  Mr. Bolton is not that person. He is no diplomat, as evidenced by his 
contempt for opposing views and his inability or unwillingness to 
listen. His credibility is in grave doubt, as evidenced by his repeated 
efforts to distort facts to fit preformed views. He is an ideologue--a 
bright ideologue, but nonetheless an ideologue, as evidenced by his 
long record both in and out of Government. And he lacks the trust and 
confidence of his superiors, as evidenced by the fact that the 
Secretary of State has felt the need to assure Senators in this Chamber 
that Mr. Bolton will be ``closely supervised.'' As one of our 
colleagues said, why in the Lord's name would you send someone to the 
United Nations who had to be ``closely supervised?''

  The job of U.N. ambassador is important, to state the obvious, 
because of the many challenges the United States confronts in the year 
2005. I would argue it is a more important post than at any time since 
1962 and the Cuban missile crisis. We confront a monumental threat by 
radical Islamic fundamentalists bent on destroying America and our 
allies. We confront a radical regime in North Korea and a theocracy in 
Iran that seek nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We 
confront the challenge of building democratic states in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, two countries that have known mostly dictatorship and 
suffering for generations. We confront the challenges of the AIDS 
pandemic, war and humanitarian catastrophes across the African 
continent, and the threat of instability in every continent.
  Despite our vast economic and military power we cannot--or I should 
say more appropriately, we need not--face these challenges alone. 
America's security is enhanced when we work with our allies, and the 
United Nations is one of the places we can find them. Our security is 
enhanced when even those who are not considered our allies understand 
that the threat that we are concerned about is common to all of us, to 
them as well as us, to almost all nation states.
  For better or worse, the United Nations is an essential forum for the 
advancement of U.S. foreign policy and national security interests in 
the year 2005--a troublesome forum but in fact a necessary forum. For 
better or worse, the U.N. Security Council makes decisions that affect 
international security and stability. Granted, they cannot make any 
decision without the United States signing off--we can veto it--but 
they have the ability to isolate us instead of isolating those who 
should be isolated.
  For better or worse, the United Nations provides a means for the 
United States to gain international support for difficult missions it 
seeks to undertake, not only in our interest but in the interest of 
others, allowing us to share the cost and burdens with others and not 
put it all on the back of the American taxpayer.
  The United Nations is not perfect, as the Presiding Officer well 
knows--far from it. It needs significant reform--again as the Presiding 
Officer knows. But let's not equate reform of the United Nations with 
John Bolton, as some of our colleagues have attempted to do. We have, 
under the leadership of Jesse Helms and with my help, passed the Helms-
Biden legislation reforming portions of the United Nations. Much more 
needs to be done.
  I would note that when we had John Danforth, an incredibly well 
respected ambassador, up until a couple of months ago, and before him 
Mr. Negroponte, there was not all this talk about the primary 
responsibility being reform. They were fully capable of dealing with 
reform.

  I would point out that not even the Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice, believes John Bolton is necessary for reforming the United 
Nations. Four days after the Bolton nomination was announced, Dr. Rice 
appointed another person, Dr. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, ``to serve as the 
Secretary's senior advisor and chief interlocutor on United Nations 
reform.'' The State Department press release announcing the appointment 
made no mention of Mr. Bolton.
  Mr. Bolton was not picked because his job was United Nations reform. 
That is the job of every U.S. ambassador to the U.N., or part of the 
job. No, this debate is not about U.N. reform or U.N. interests; it is 
about whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton is in the national 
interests of the United States of America. I firmly believe, as my 
friend from Ohio, Mr. Voinovich, does, that it is not in the U.S. 
interests.
  There are four reasons to vote no on Mr. Bolton. Each, standing 
alone, in my view, would justify a negative vote, but taken together 
they provide an overwhelming case. What is even more extraordinary is 
that much of the evidence for this case comes from senior officials in 
the Bush administration who worked with Mr. Bolton. The bulk of the 
evidence to make the cases I am about to make came from senior 
Republican administration officials who worked with Mr. Bolton. They 
had nothing to gain and a good deal to lose by appearing before our 
committee, but everyone came voluntarily. No one had to be subpoenaed. 
We asked and they came.
  The first reason Mr. Bolton should, in my view, be denied the 
ambassadorship to the United Nations is that Mr. Bolton repeatedly 
sought to remove intelligence analysts who disagreed with him. Mr. 
Bolton was not content to fight the normal policy battles. He had to 
crush people, even if they were just doing their jobs.
  One analyst was Christian Westermann, an expert on biological and 
chemical weapons with a 20-year career in the U.S. Navy who worked in 
the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research after 
retiring from the U.S. military.
  In February of 2002, Mr. Westermann was asked by Mr. Bolton's staff, 
which is standard operating procedure, to begin the intelligence 
community clearance process for three sentences that Mr. Bolton wanted 
to put in a speech about the biological weapons effort of Cuba. The 
speech was not made

[[Page S5882]]

yet; the speech was in the making. What is a normal operating procedure 
in this State Department, the last State Department, and the ones 
before that, is that when a policymaker wishes to include in a speech 
intelligence data or assertions that the U.S. government or the 
intelligence community believes thus and so, it has to be cleared first 
by the intelligence community.
  Mr. Westermann, the State Department's intelligence analyst for 
biological weapons, had two roles in this process of clearing these 
three sentences. One was to transmit the material to a clearance 
coordinator at the CIA who would then seek clearance from all the other 
intelligence agencies in the Government--Defense Intelligence, et 
cetera, a whole panoply of the intelligence community. The second 
function Mr. Westermann had as the intelligence officer at the State 
Department for biological weapons was to provide the substantive 
comments of his Bureau--that is, INR--on Mr. Bolton's text to this 
clearance coordinator; in other words, in addition to what the other 
intelligence agencies thought about these three sentences, to say what 
the intelligence analysts in the State Department thought about these 
three sentences.
  In performing that latter function, Mr. Westermann proposed 
alternative language to the three sentences submitted by Mr. Bolton's 
staff, a standard means of trying to help a policymaker say something 
about classified matters so that the sources and methods are not 
compromised and so that the statement is consistent with the 
intelligence community's judgments on that point being spoken to. When 
Mr. Bolton found out that Mr. Westermann suggested alternative 
language, he hit the roof. He summoned Mr. Westermann to his office and 
gave him a tongue lashing.
  Look, Mr. Westermann does not work directly for Mr. Bolton. There is 
within the State Department Mr. Bolton's operation, the people who work 
directly for him, and then there is the intelligence operation, INR, 
headed at the time by a guy named Carl Ford. At the bottom of the food 
chain is the guy in charge of biological weapons as an intelligence 
analyst; that is, Mr. Westermann.
  Mr. Bolton summoned Mr. Westermann into his office and, according to 
Mr. Westermann, Bolton was ``red faced'' and yelling at him. When Mr. 
Westermann tried to explain what he had done, Mr. Bolton threw him out 
of his office.
  Then, over the course of the next 6 months, Mr. Bolton tried on three 
separate occasions to have Mr. Westermann removed from his position. 
During the committee hearing, Mr. Bolton grudgingly conceded that he 
sought to remove Mr. Westermann from his portfolio, but he tried to 
minimize his involvement. Mr. Bolton suggested that he asked one of Mr. 
Westermann's supervisors to give Mr. Westermann a new portfolio, but 
then, he said, ``I shrugged my shoulders and moved on.'' But the 
evidence is clear that Mr. Bolton did not, as he said, ``move on.'' He 
tried twice more to remove Mr. Westermann, the biological weapons 
expert. A few days later, he tried to remove him, and then several 
months later.
  My friend from Indiana--and as we say here, he is my friend--argues 
this does not matter. Mr. Westermann kept his job, no harm, no foul--my 
words. But the system had to work overtime to counteract the harmful 
effects of this episode. Don't take my word for it. Listen to Carl 
Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for INR, who says he 
supports the President and, in his words, is a huge fan of Vice 
President Cheney, and not anyone who has ever been accused of being a 
liberal Democrat.

  Mr. Ford testified that the analysts in his Bureau were ``very 
negatively affected by this incident--they were scared.'' Ford said 
that after the Westermann incident, he tried to make the best of a bad 
situation by using the incident as a training vehicle to explain to his 
people how to handle similar situations if they came up. At Ford's 
request, Secretary Powell made a special trip to speak to the INR 
analysts, where Mr. Powell singled out Mr. Westermann and told the 
analysts they should continue to ``speak truth to power.'' They had to 
do this because Mr. Bolton was allergic to people delivering news that 
his proposed language was not supported by the evidence.
  As one of Mr. Westermann's supervisors recounted, Mr. Bolton declared 
``he wasn't going to be told what he could say by a mid-level munchkin 
analyst.'' At the U.N., the special representative has to listen to a 
lot of people who disagree with him and then report back faithfully on 
what they are saying. Is Mr. Bolton capable of doing that?
  The second analyst Mr. Bolton tried to remove from his position is a 
more remarkable case for two reasons: The analyst worked in another 
agency; and his portfolio did not involve Mr. Bolton's area of 
responsibility, which was arms control and weapons of mass destruction.
  The analyst was the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. 
He disputed language on Cuba that was used in a speech Mr. Bolton had 
given, and that he then wanted to give again in congressional 
testimony.
  During the committee hearing, Mr. Bolton again tried to minimize his 
actions, stating that his effort to remove this individual was ``one 
part of one conversation with one person, one time . . . and that was 
it, I let it go.''
  The evidence shows that he did not let it go but, rather, that he and 
his staff actively discussed the removal of this National Intelligence 
Officer over the course of 4 months.
  In early June of 2002, an aide to Mr. Bolton circulated a draft 
letter from Mr. Bolton and Ambassador Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Latin America. The draft was addressed to Director of 
Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. George Tenet.
  The draft letter urged the immediate replacement of the National 
Intelligence Officer and indicated that Bolton and Reich would take 
several measures on their own, including banning the National 
Intelligence Officer from official meetings at the State Department and 
from official travel in the Western Hemisphere.
  A response to the e-mail from a colleague reported that he discussed 
the same matter with Mr. Bolton, whom he said ``would prefer at this 
point to handle this in person with [Mr.] Tenet.''
  The following month--again, going to the issue of whether he tried to 
get this guy removed--Mr. Bolton traveled to the CIA headquarters to 
meet with Mr. Stuart Cohen, the Acting Chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, where he asked that the National Intelligence 
Officer be removed from his position.
  Mr. Cohen, the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 
said he did not remember many details about the meeting with Mr. Bolton 
other than Mr. Bolton's intent was clear: He wanted the National 
Intelligence Officer for Latin America removed.
  Later that month--again, remember, Mr. Bolton said: I did not try to 
get this guy. I let it alone--a senior aide to Mr. Bolton told a senior 
aide to Mr. Reich that Bolton wanted to meet Reich to ``discuss the 
draft letter to CIA on our favorite subject'' and said that ``John 
doesn't want this to slip any further.''
  The next day, the same aide to Mr. Bolton e-mailed Secretary Reich 
and his aide and had a new draft to the letter. He said that the draft 
``relies on John's tough talk with [Mr.] Cohen ``about the national 
intelligence officers.
  So much for not trying to get him removed.
  Two months later, in September, another draft letter urging the 
removal of the National Intelligence Officer was exchanged between Mr. 
Bolton's office and Mr. Reich's office.
  Now, does that sound like he ``let it go,'' as he said he did? 
Remember, his staff said Mr. Bolton said he doesn't want to let this 
matter ``slip any further.'' If you ask me, this was more than ``one 
part of one conversation . . . one time,'' as Mr. Bolton said. It was a 
campaign, a vendetta, against a person Mr. Bolton had never met and 
whose work Mr. Bolton acknowledges he cannot recall ever reading, all 
because he questioned Mr. Bolton.
  If this is how Mr. Bolton reacts to someone he has never met, how 
will he control himself in New York? Secretary Rice, the Secretary of 
State, told the Senator from Ohio that Mr. Bolton will be ``closely 
supervised.''

[[Page S5883]]

How much energy at the State Department will be diverted to supervising 
Mr. Bolton?
  Thankfully, senior management at CIA had the good sense to rebuff Mr. 
Bolton's attempts to remove the National Intelligence Officer. The 
former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John McLaughlin, 
remembers that when the issue was raised with him, he adamantly 
rejected it. Here is what the Deputy Director of the CIA said:

       Well, we're not going to do that, absolutely not. No way. 
     End of story.

  Mr. McLaughlin, at the CIA, explained why he so strongly opposed Mr. 
Bolton's proposal to get rid of this national intelligence officer. And 
I quote from Mr. McLaughlin, formerly at the CIA:

       It's perfectly all right for a policymaker to express 
     disagreement with an . . . analyst, and it's perfectly all 
     right for them to . . . challenge their work vigorously. But 
     I think it's different to then request, because of the 
     disagreement, that the person be transferred. And . . . 
     unless there is malfeasance involved here--and, in this case, 
     I had high regard for the individual's work; therefore, I had 
     a strong negative reaction to the suggestion about moving 
     him.

  He is speaking of the National Intelligence Officer.
  That, all by itself, is reason to vote against Mr. Bolton--thoroughly 
outrageous conduct as it related to two intelligence officers who 
disagreed with him.
  A second reason to oppose Mr. Bolton is that he frequently sought to 
stretch the intelligence--the available intelligence--to say things in 
speeches and in testimony that the intelligence community would not 
support. The committee report lays out this allegation in extensive 
detail, and it is there for every Senator to see. There is ample 
evidence that Mr. Bolton sought to cherry-pick, as one analyst said, 
cherry-pick intelligence; sought to game the system, to get the 
clearances he wanted, or simply sought to intimidate intelligence 
analysts to get them to say what he wanted.
  Again, don't take my word for it. Take the word of an administration 
appointee, Mr. Robert Hutchings, the Chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council from 2003 to 2004. Chairman Hutchings said, in the 
summer of 2003, that Mr. Bolton prepared a speech on Syria and weapons 
of mass destruction that ``struck me as going well beyond . . . where 
the evidence would legitimately take us. And that was the judgment of 
the experts on my staff, as well.''
  Now, remember, this is 2003. We had 160,000 troops in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan. There was all kinds of talk on the floor of the Senate and 
in the Nation about whether we would invade Syria next. There was all 
kinds of discussion and supposition that the weapons of mass 
destruction that were never found in Iraq--and we later learned had not 
existed after 1991 or 1995--had been smuggled, for hiding, into Syria. 
It was a very delicate moment, in which if, in fact, a senior 
administration official came forward and said there was evidence that 
there was a nuclear weapons program in Syria, we might have had a war.
  Mr. Bolton wanted to make a speech about that, and here is the guy 
who headed up the National Intelligence Council, the chairman. He said 
that what Bolton wanted to say ``struck me as going well beyond . . . 
where the evidence would legitimately take us. And that was the 
judgment of the experts on my staff, as well.''
  This is not minor stuff. I remind the American people and my 
colleagues that an awful lot of Senators voted to go to war in Iraq on 
the assertion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, which now the 
administration itself acknowledges they did not have. Mr. Bolton, 
according to the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, wanted 
to say things about Syria and weapons of mass destruction that struck 
him and his experts as going beyond what could legitimately be stated.
  Chairman Hutchings said that Bolton took ``isolated facts and made 
much more of them to build a case than I thought the intelligence 
warranted.''
  Does that sound familiar to you? Remember aluminum tubes, offered by 
the Vice President as evidence that Iraq had a gas centrifuge system, 
had reconstituted their nuclear capability, when, in fact, the most 
informed elements of the intelligence community said those tubes--
because they were anodized--couldn't be used for a gas centrifuge 
system? Facts taken out of context to make a case that didn't exist got 
us into war prematurely.
  Here we now have Mr. Bolton, when people are talking about going to 
war with Syria, and the head of the National Intelligence Council says 
Mr. Bolton took ``isolated facts and made much more of them to build a 
case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort of 
cherry-picking of little factoids and little isolated bits that were 
drawn out to present the starkest-possible case.''
  Let me take you back to aluminum tubes, out of context, an isolated 
fact, drawn out to present the starkest possible case that Iraq had 
``reconstituted its nuclear capability.''
  There used to be an expression my dad used to say in World War II: 
Loose lips sink ships. Cherry-picking little factoids and little 
isolated bits drawn out to present the starkest-possible case can cause 
wars.
  Listen to Larry Wilkinson, who served as Secretary of State Colin 
Powell's Chief of Staff, a military man himself. He told us that 
because of the problems that the State Department was having with Mr. 
Bolton's speeches not always being properly cleared by the State 
Department offices and officials--think of this now, the Chief of 
Staff, a military man himself, I think a colonel, working for the 
former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then Secretary of State, 
said that because Mr. Bolton didn't properly clear his speeches with 
the appropriate authorities and experts within the State Department--
the Deputy Secretary of State, the No. 2 man, Secretary Armitage ``made 
a decision that John Bolton would not give any testimony, nor would he 
give any speech that wasn't cleared first by Rich [Armitage].''
  Think of that. Here is the guy, head of the arms control and 
nonproliferation piece of the President's operation at the State 
Department who needs, as much as anyone, classified information and 
accurate intelligence, and he has to be told by the No. 2 man at the 
State Department that he is no longer authorized to make any speech 
without it first being cleared by the No. 2 man at the State 
Department. I don't do that with my senior staff. I don't have to. It 
is truly remarkable.
  This may have occurred with one of the six other Presidents with whom 
I have served since I have been here, but if it has, I am unaware of 
it, and I would like to know.
  Powell's Chief of Staff later told the New York Times, referring to 
what I just talked about--restrictions that Mr. Bolton could not make a 
speech without it being cleared by the No. 2 man at the State 
Department--that ``if anything, the [restrictions] got more stringent'' 
as time went on. ``No one else''--I assume he means in the entire State 
Department--``was subjected to these tight restrictions.''
  Consider this: we have the chairman of the National Intelligence 
Organization, the Chief of Staff for the President, Secretary of State, 
the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the former head of 
an office within the CIA named Mr. Cohen, and the former head of the 
intelligence apparatus at the State Department--all of them, nary a 
Democratic appointee in the crowd, pointing out how Mr. Bolton 
overreached, cherry-picked, had to be disciplined, had to be overruled, 
had to be supervised. And here Mr. Bolton was, an Assistant Secretary 
of State, and we want to send him now to the No. 2 job in diplomacy 
after the Secretary of State?
  Listen to Mr. Bolton's own loyal staff. After being told that the 
intelligence community could not support a statement Mr. Bolton wanted 
to make on Cuba, a member of Mr. Bolton's staff wrote to a CIA official 
and said that ``several heavy hitters are involved in this one, and 
they may choose to push ahead over the objections of the CIA and INR . 
. . unless there is a serious source and methods concern.''
  We have all been around here. Let's translate that. This is Mr. 
Bolton's staff writing to a CIA official, when CIA is telling Mr. 
Bolton that he cannot say what he wants to say. Mr. Bolton's staff 
writes to the CIA official who said Mr. Bolton could not do that:

[[Page S5884]]

``Several heavy hitters are involved in this one.''
  I am sure no staff on the floor of the Senate could possibly be 
intimidated to maybe reconsider a recommendation they made if, in fact, 
the Chief of Staff of the majority leader or the minority leader, or 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, or the ranking member sent 
out an e-mail or a letter to them saying: Look, Jack, I know what you 
said, but let me tell you something, there are several heavy hitters 
here who may go beyond you. Translated: Are you sure you want to say he 
cannot do this? You would have had to have your head in a rain barrel 
for the past 20 years not to understand what the message was that was 
being communicated.
  Mr. Bolton's staff was saying that Mr. Bolton might make statements 
in the name of the Government, or at least with the claim that they 
were supported by U.S. intelligence, despite the analysts' views that 
these statements were not justifiably based on the evidence. That is 
more than mere arrogance. It suggests a willingness to defraud the 
American people, and it suggests that there is a price that will be 
paid by you, you not-so-senior person, if you raise a ruckus about 
this.
  That e-mail I described was not a one-time event. Mr. Bolton's staff 
later informed the intelligence community that they wanted to change 
the rules for reviewing proposed speeches to limit their objections to 
only those objections related to sources and method.
  Let me translate that. I see my friend from Maryland on the floor. If 
he were an intelligence officer in the United States government who 
found out that another country was supporting an al-Qaida undertaking 
and my friend from Maryland was a CIA operative in that other country, 
if I were to expose the fact that that country was cooperating with the 
CIA, I might inadvertently disclose who the source of that intelligence 
is and, by doing so, maybe get my friend killed. Or if that information 
is picked up by a bugging device placed in a meeting room, if I were to 
say on the floor that we have a recording saying that Official A of 
Country A met with al-Qaida, clearly, they might be able to figure out 
how we knew that, what the method of picking up the information was.
  So we are very fastidious in this Senate--those of us who deal with 
intelligence matters--not to ever reveal a source or a method, and even 
though the information revealed may not be so classified that we are 
told by the Agency you cannot say this for fear of revealing a source 
or a method of picking up this information, we do not disclose it.
  There is a second type of intelligence, and that is the intelligence 
analysis that says: Syria does not have nuclear weapons. That is an 
analysis by experts in our intelligence community who reached the 
conclusion, from all kinds of sources and methods, that Syria doesn't 
have nuclear weapons, if that were the conclusion.
  Now, Mr. Bolton had been stopped repeatedly by various intelligence 
agencies from saying things that the intelligence did not support. I am 
making this up. Let's assume Mr. Bolton wanted to say that Syria has 
nuclear weapons and the CIA analysis says it doesn't. Under the present 
rules, CIA can say to Mr. Bolton that he cannot say that. So what does 
Mr. Bolton do? He goes back and says to the intelligence community, 
through his staff, we want to change the rule. You cannot tell me, I 
say to my friend from Maryland, what I can say about whether or not 
they have nuclear weapons. I can say they do, even though you say they 
don't.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BIDEN. First, let me finish this point. But, his staff says, you 
can tell Mr. Bolton he cannot say it only if it will reveal a source or 
a method. In other words, his staff was seeking carte blanche to allow 
Mr. Bolton to cherry-pick, as the former chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council said, factoids in isolation to make a case that 
didn't exist.
  I will yield to my friend for a question.
  Mr. SARBANES. It is my understanding that if a policymaker wants to 
make a statement reflecting an intelligence judgment, representing the 
position of the Government--not his own personal position, but the 
position of the Government--the standard practice is for the statement 
to be submitted to the intelligence community for clearance, to be 
certain that the statement accurately reflects the judgment of the 
intelligence community; is that correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. That is absolutely correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. So you don't have policymakers making assertions about 
intelligence matters that are not supported by the intelligence 
community. If you stop and think about that, it seems to me that is a 
very wise rule. Otherwise, policymakers can run around making all kinds 
of assertions about intelligence matters, portraying them as 
representing the considered judgment of the Government and, therefore, 
the considered judgment of the intelligence community. That is the kind 
of review that the intelligence community--in addition to the sources 
and methods review--was undertaking to do.
  As I understand it, it is standard operating procedure for any 
policymaker----
  Mr. BIDEN. If I may interrupt the Senator, any administration 
official who wishes to purport that he speaks for the administration, 
which includes the intelligence community, has to have his or her 
statement cleared on that specific point, yes. That is standard 
operating procedure.
  Mr. SARBANES. And that was the very thing that Bolton not only 
complained about, but for which he sought to have certain intelligence 
analysts punished; is that right?
  Mr. BIDEN. That is absolutely right. When an intelligence analyst 
said to him, on two occasions--Mr. Westermann being one--no, Mr. 
Secretary, you cannot say that because the intelligence community 
doesn't believe that, the intelligence community doesn't think what you 
are about to say is accurate, you cannot say it, what did Mr. Bolton 
do? He tried to get that intelligence analyst fired for doing nothing 
but his job and telling him, no, boss, you cannot say that; that is not 
what the intelligence community believes.
  That is different than if Mr. Bolton had said: I am going to go out 
and say, You know, the intelligence community doesn't agree with me, 
but I, John Bolton, I believe these are the facts. He probably would 
get fired by the President for doing that, but that is not a violation 
of any procedure. He is not purporting to speak for the intelligence 
community when he does that.
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield for a further question, I 
understand that the analyst with whom Bolton had this confrontation 
said that what Bolton was seeking to say didn't represent the judgment 
of the intelligence community. In other words, the analyst was stating 
correctly the position of the intelligence community which Mr. Bolton 
was, in effect, seeking to ignore or go against. So it is not as though 
the analyst was seeking to impose his own personal opinion. His 
judgment corresponded with the vetted judgment of the broader 
intelligence community; is that correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, not only the community he 
worked for, but the entire community. This National Intelligence 
Officer, who remains nameless because he is undercover, did not give 
his own opinion. He gave the opinion of what was the consensus of the 
intelligence community.
  The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McLaughlin, said: 
No, my guy, my CIA officer is right; Mr. Bolton is wrong, and it is 
wrong to try to get him fired.
  In addition to both of these intelligence analysts being backed up by 
their bosses at the highest level--one at INR, the intelligence 
operation within the State Department, and one in CIA--in addition to 
being backed up by them, they got backed up by the policymakers who are 
their bosses--the Secretary of State of the United States of America 
and the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States of America--both 
of whom were superior in terms of authority to Mr. Bolton.
  So it is Mr. Bolton who was chastised by the Deputy Secretary of 
State as a consequence of these encounters, because the Deputy 
Secretary of State said: Hey, look, John, in addition to the analysts 
being correct, you are no longer authorized to make any speech that is 
not cleared by me; you are no

[[Page S5885]]

longer authorized to give any testimony before the Congress that is not 
cleared by me.
  So not only were these analysts backed up by their superiors in the 
intelligence hierarchy, they were backed up by the policymakers.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a further question?
  Mr. BIDEN. Surely.
  Mr. SARBANES. I apologize if I am anticipating his statement. As I 
understand it, when a policymaker requests the transcripts of 
intelligence intercepts, let's say the intercept of a conversation, the 
documents that are provided identify the foreign source but they do not 
usually identify the American; is that how it usually works?
  Mr. BIDEN. Let me restate in my own words, so the Senator from 
Maryland understands. Let's assume there is the country of Xanadu and 
an American is meeting with the President of Xanadu. In all 
probability, an American official is meeting with the President of 
Xanadu. The National Security Agency--with the ability to intercept 
conversations by multiple methods--picks up a conversation, or 
somebody's report of a conversation, between an American and the 
President of Xanadu. That gets reported back, based on subject matter, 
to the appropriate officer within the State Department or the Defense 
Department who they feel should know about this conversation because 
maybe the President said to the American: You know, we have right here 
in our country 47 al-Qaida operatives. That should go to the person who 
has that responsibility.
  So a lot of stuff went to Mr. Bolton because he is the guy in charge 
of dealing with nonproliferation and other matters. He would get these 
NSA, National Security Agency, intercept reports. But in order to 
protect the identity of the American, for privacy reasons, he would get 
a statement and it would say: On such and such a date at such and such 
a time, the President of Xanadu met with an American. They discussed 
the following things. Here is what they said, here is the conversation.

  That is what I understand to be--I know to be--the way in which NSA 
intercept reports treat a case involving an American.
  Mr. SARBANES. It is my understanding that what Mr. Bolton had 
requested to know, although it was not revealed when they initially 
provided him the intercepts, was who were the Americans in each of 
these instances; is that correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. At least in 10 instances. On 10 different occasions, when 
he got access to an NSA intercept that mentioned ``an American,'' Mr. 
Bolton went back to NSA, and, as I understand it--and I ask to be 
corrected by my staff--but as I understand it, Mr. Bolton has to say to 
the head of NSA: I want to know more about this intercept, and I want 
to know the name of the American in order to better understand the 
intercept. He did that 10 times.
  Mr. SARBANES. And he got the name, presumably.
  Mr. BIDEN. To the best of our knowledge, he got the name of the 
American.
  Mr. SARBANES. I understand in trying to do due diligence on the 
Bolton nomination on the part of the committee, the very able Senator 
from Delaware, who has had extensive experience on investigatory 
matters, requested that we be provided with the names of the Americans 
that Bolton had received from the intelligence agency; is that correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, that is correct. Not only did I 
ask that, but the chairman of the committee asked that, and it was 
resolved that we were not asking it to be made public, we were not 
asking those names to necessarily be made available to the whole 
Foreign Relations Committee, although that was the chairman's 
preference, and ultimately the chairman concluded it should not even be 
provided directly to me or the chairman, but it should be made 
available to the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the 
ranking member or vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
and they should decide how our committee would review the information.
  I think the information should be provided to me and to Senator 
Lugar, as well, but the way this was parsed out, it was going to be 
that the National Security Agency was going to come and brief the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am no longer a member, and--I 
thought--tell them the names of these Americans. I might add further, 
the reason for that is, there are unsubstantiated--I emphasize 
``unsubstantiated''--allegations that Mr. Bolton may have been seeking 
the names of these Americans to seek retribution; that it may have been 
intelligence analysts with whom he disagreed or policymakers against 
whom he was trying to make a case in terms of the direction of American 
foreign policy. I do not know that to be the case. The question is why 
did he need the names.
  Mr. SARBANES. It seems to me a further question is that if Mr. Bolton 
went back to get those names for some reason--he must have had a reason 
for doing so--why the committee, in deciding whether to confirm him, 
should not have access to that same information so that we are in a 
position to ascertain what, if anything, may have been in play by these 
requests.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, to the best of my knowledge, 
there is absolutely no substantive reason why information that was 
provided to an Under Secretary of State down the food chain, and the 
Under Secretary of State's staff, to the best of my knowledge, why the 
information provided to them could not be provided to a Senator who has 
served 28 years, as the Senator has, in the Senate.
  Mr. SARBANES. And Senators who are charged with making this very 
important decision about whether this nominee should be confirmed for 
this very important position. It seems to me clearly relevant in 
reaching some judgment about the nominee to have this information 
provided to those who have to render the judgment.
  Mr. BIDEN. If my friend from Maryland will further yield, Senator 
Lugar, the Republican chairman of the committee, and I received a 
letter today dated May 25, addressed to both him and me, from the vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, saying: It is important to 
note, however, that our committee did not interview Mr. Bolton, so I am 
unable to answer directly the question of why he--Mr. Bolton--felt it 
necessary for him--Mr. Bolton--to have the identity information--that 
is, the name of the Americans--in order to better understand the 
foreign intelligence contained in the report. Furthermore, based on the 
information available to me--the vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee--I do not have a complete understanding of Mr. Bolton's 
handling of the identity information after he received it.
  Continuing quoting: The committee--the Intelligence Committee--has 
learned during its interview of Mr. Frederick Fleitz, Mr. Bolton's 
acting chief of staff, that on at least one occasion Mr. Bolton is 
alleged to have shared the un-minimized identity information he 
received from the NSA with another individual in the State Department. 
In this instance, the NSA memorandum forwarding the requested 
identity--meaning the memorandum forwarding the names of the Americans 
to Mr. Bolton--to State/INR--that is the State Department's 
intelligence agency--included the following restriction: ``Request no 
further action be taken on this information without prior approval of 
NSA.''
  Continuing to quote the vice chairman of Intelligence:

       I have confirmed with the NSA that the phrase ``no further 
     action'' includes sharing the requested identity of U.S. 
     persons with any individual not authorized by the NSA to 
     receive the identity.

  Continuing from the Intelligence Committee vice chairman:

       In addition to being troubled that Mr. Bolton may have 
     shared U.S. person identity information without required NSA 
     approval, I am concerned that the reason for sharing the 
     information was not in keeping with Mr. Bolton's requested 
     justification for the identity in the first place. The 
     identity information was provided to Mr. Bolton based on the 
     stated reason that he needed to know the identity in order to 
     better understand the foreign intelligence contained in the 
     NSA report.
       According to Mr. Fleitz--

Mr. Bolton's acting chief of staff--

     Mr. Bolton used the information he was provided in one 
     instance in order to seek out the State Department official 
     mentioned in the report . . .

  It goes on. But my point is, on the one case that Senator Rockefeller

[[Page S5886]]

knows of, Mr. Bolton apparently violated the restriction which was 
imposed upon him when he requested the information, and used that 
information for a purpose different than he requested.

  Having said all of that, even the Intelligence Committee was not 
provided the names of the Americans, which is a critical issue.
  Mr. SARBANES. Would the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes, I will.
  Mr. SARBANES. These are the very names that were provided to Mr. 
Bolton; is that right?
  Mr. BIDEN. And his staff, yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. And his staff?
  Mr. BIDEN. And his staff.
  Mr. SARBANES. But there is a refusal to provide them to the committee 
which now has to make a judgment as to whether Mr. Bolton should be 
confirmed to be the American ambassador to the United Nations?
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator would yield, not only a refusal to provide 
them to our committee that has that responsibility, refusal to provide 
them even to the Intelligence Committee that is once removed from this 
process--the same information that was made available to one of several 
Under Secretaries in the State Department and his staff.
  Mr. SARBANES. Well, what rationale is advanced, if any, for this 
backhanded treatment of the institutions of the Senate, these two 
important committees, the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign 
Relations Committee, both of which are trying to conduct due diligence 
on this nominee?
  I might say to my colleague, I remember when we held the nomination 
hearings for John Negroponte and Richard Holbrooke. That investigation 
went over an extended period of time and probed very deeply. The end 
result, of course, was that questions that had been raised were 
answered satisfactorily, and the body was able to come to a consensus 
about those nominees.
  I cannot think of a rationale that can be offered that would warrant 
a withholding of this information.
  Mr. BIDEN. There is no institutional, constitutional, or previously 
asserted rationale that has been offered in denying access of the 
Intelligence Committee or, for that matter, the Foreign Relations 
Committee chairman and ranking member to this information. I do not 
remember the exact quote. It may apply to the information we are 
seeking on Syria--I am not sure--saying that they did not think it was 
relevant, but I do not recall.
  I say to my friend from Maryland, there was no assertion on the part 
of the NSA, that I am aware of, that asserted that it was executive 
privilege or even that it was extremely sensitive. We have access to 
incredibly sensitive information. That is the reason we have an 
Intelligence Committee. That is the reason we on the Foreign Relations 
Committee have cross-pollination on that committee. So there is no 
reason--the Senator asked why they would deny it. The Senator's 
speculation is as good as mine. It seems to me they can end this thing 
very quickly. The only request being made is that Senator Lugar, 
Senator Roberts, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator 
Rockefeller, and I sit down in a room on the fourth floor of this 
building that is totally secure, have someone from the National 
Security Agency come in and say: Here are the 10 intercept reports and 
the U.S. person names.
  I know more about--I will date myself--I know more about the PSI of 
an SS-18 Soviet silo, which is highly classified information. Why am I 
not able to get information in the execution of my responsibilities 
under the Constitution that is available to a staff member of an Under 
Secretary of State? Members can guess for themselves. I do not know 
why. I know it is just not appropriate.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Senator for yielding. I just underscore 
this raises, I think, very fundamental and difficult questions about 
how we are supposed to carry out our responsibilities, in terms of 
advice and consent, if we are not allowed to get what appears to be 
relevant information or what might well be relevant information.
  The request is fairly limited, as I understand it, in terms of what 
is being sought. It seems to me that information ought to be provided 
to the Senate, or the appropriate agents or organs of the Senate, in 
order to put us into a position to at least address that aspect of this 
situation.
  There are many other aspects of the Bolton situation that I want to 
speak to later. But this one, it seems to me, is clearly an instance in 
which we are simply being blocked or frustrated from having information 
which is important to us carrying out our task, and is in such contrast 
with the inquiries that were made about other nominees to be U.S. 
Ambassadors to the United Nations. Of course, I mentioned two of those. 
The inquiries there went over quite a sustained period of time.
  We heard these complaints that Bolton is being held up. His 
nomination only came to us in March, I believe, of this year--March. 
Ambassador Holbrooke was nominated in June of 1998. He was finally 
confirmed in August of 1999. In the interim, these extensive 
investigations were run. I do not have the exact dates on Ambassador 
Negroponte, but I know that period of time extended well beyond what is 
already involved with respect to John Bolton.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I think Negroponte was 
nominated in May and confirmed in September.
  Mr. SARBANES. Well, there you are. That underscores the point I am 
trying to make.
  I thank the Senator for yielding.
  Mr. BIDEN. Let me continue.
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, if I may ask the Senator from Delaware how 
much longer he expects to be?
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be about another 12 to 15 minutes.
  Mr. ALLEN. OK.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, while my friend from Maryland is here, I 
want to point out, first of all, the request is very limited. We are 
looking for the names in 10 reports. It is totally circumscribed, the 
request as relates to this issue which you so painstakingly went 
through, explaining what it was that worried everybody--and worries 
everybody--about Mr. Bolton and the use of intelligence information, 
even after he has been proscribed, prevented, from being able to speak 
without clearance, which is--you and I have been here a long time--
fairly remarkable. That may have happened to other people in the State 
Department. I can't recall it happening.
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, this is an Under Secretary 
of State. This is like the No. 4 person in the Department.
  Mr. BIDEN. That's right. Now, after that occurs, or in the process of 
this occurring, Mr. Bolton's Chief of Staff contacts the CIA on a 
disputed issue about what can be said, and says--I don't know if you 
were here when I said this. To tell you the truth, I thought I knew all 
this, but I was surprised when my staff pointed this out. Mr. Bolton's 
acting Chief of Staff said Mr. Bolton wanted to make a statement on 
Cuba, and they didn't want to let him make that statement.
  Mr. Bolton's staff gets back to the CIA and says: Several heavy 
hitters are involved in this one, and they may choose to push ahead 
over your objections and the objections of INR, unless there is serious 
source and method concerned.
  Remember, going back to our discussions?
  Mr. SARBANES. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Then he, this staff member, goes and contacts the CIA and 
says: You know, we would like to change the ground rules. We can say 
the intelligence community thinks the following, even if you disagree. 
We don't have to clear it with you. The only thing we have to clear 
with you is whether or not we are exposing a source or a method. Let's 
have that new deal.
  Mr. SARBANES. Of course, that represented a sharp departure from 
previous practice.
  Mr. BIDEN. A complete departure. But the point I am trying to make is 
he keeps pushing the envelope, he keeps pushing the envelope.
  Mr. SARBANES. I take it, if the Senator will yield--I take it this is 
of such importance now because we are dealing with this problem as to 
whether intelligence is being misused.
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Decisions are being made by policymakers that reflect 
their policy attitude--

[[Page S5887]]

  Mr. BIDEN. Right.
  Mr. SARBANES. Not substantiated or backed up by the findings of the 
intelligence community. We have been through this issue. It seems to me 
a critically important issue.
  Mr. BIDEN. Right. I would argue it is being pushed by a person whom 
everyone would acknowledge is an ideologue, or at least confirmed in 
what his views are and who seeks facts to sustain his opinion.
  Look, the big difference, I say to my friend from Maryland, is that 
every time he tried to do that, repeatedly tried to do that in his job, 
his present job--every time he tried to push the envelope, every time 
he tried to intimidate, fire, cajole an intelligence officer to change 
his reading to comport with his prejudice, there was somebody there to 
intervene to stop him beyond the intelligence officer. There was the 
intelligence officer's boss, the deputy head of the CIA; the head of 
INR; the Deputy Secretary of State, the No. 2 man; the Secretary of 
State. That was bad enough.
  But now where is Bolton going? Bolton is going to be the equivalent 
of the Secretary of State at the U.N. Bolton has, I don't know how 
large the embassy is, but a very large contingent of Americans working 
for him in New York City--I am told there are about 150 people there. 
No one, in that operation, can control the day-to-day, moment-to-moment 
assertions he is making. No one can say: You cannot do that, John. He's 
his own boss.
  Now there is only one person who can do that. Well, the President can 
always do that. There is only one other person who can do that, and 
that is the Secretary of State.
  Go back to the comment our friend from Ohio made, our Republican 
friend, in the committee. He said, when he spoke to the Secretary of 
State, she said, and I am paraphrasing: Don't worry. We will control 
him. Acknowledging that even though you are sending this guy up to what 
has been a Cabinet-level position, another Cabinet-level officer is 
going to have to control him. I would respectfully suggest our 
Secretary of State has her hands full as it is, without having to 
babysit Mr. Bolton so he doesn't get America in trouble--America; I 
don't care about John Bolton; I don't even care about the U.N. in this 
regard; I care about America.
  This isn't complicated. Anybody can figure this out. Everybody 
acknowledges this guy is a loose cannon. Everybody acknowledges this 
guy has done things that, if he were able to do them unfettered, not 
overruled, would have at least raised the ante in the tension and the 
possibility of conflict with at least Syria and Cuba, among other 
places. And everybody acknowledges that he so far stepped out of line 
in the State Department that the Republican head of the State 
Department, Colin Powell, had to go down to analysts and say, 
basically: Don't pay attention to him. You did the right thing.
  And then the No. 2 man at the State Department, a former military man 
himself, says: By the way Mr. Bolton, no more speeches by you unless I 
sign off on them.
  Now we are going to take this guy, we are going to send him to the 
single most important ambassadorial spot in all of America's interests, 
and to make us feel confident, the Secretary of State says: Don't 
worry, we will supervise him.
  Come on.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on one other point I would like 
to make?
  Mr. BIDEN. Please.
  Mr. SARBANES. First of all, I want to pay tribute to the intelligence 
analysts and their superiors who stood up to this pressure to which the 
Senator has referred. They were put in an extremely difficult 
situation, and they performed admirably.
  It is asserted by some that no harm resulted from the pressure Mr. 
Bolton and his staff were placing on these people because they did not 
do what Mr. Bolton wanted them to do.
  That seems to me to be an upside down argument. The fact that they 
had the strength to resist this is a tribute to them, but it is 
certainly no excuse for Mr. Bolton and his staff engaging in this 
behavior. And the fact they resisted--which is a credit to them--is 
still a detriment to Mr. Bolton and his staff for engaging in this 
practice.
  So the argument that Mr. Bolton and his staff did not succeed in 
their efforts does not absolve them of responsibility for having tried.
  Mr. BIDEN. It is as though I try to rob a bank and it turns out they 
shipped all the money out and there was no money there. I walk out and 
I get arrested. I say: Wait a minute, no harm, no foul, I didn't get 
any money. I went in to rob the bank, that is true, but I didn't get 
any money. So what is the problem? What is the problem?
  Look, I told you about Mr. Bolton's staff, I assume with Mr. Bolton's 
authority, trying to get the intelligence community to change the 
groundrules. I gave the one example.
  There is a second example. He did not just do this once. The e-mail I 
just described was not a one-time event. Later, Mr. Bolton's staff 
informed the intelligence community they wanted to change the rules for 
the review of Mr. Bolton's proposed speeches and to have the CIA and 
the intelligence community limit their objections only to matters 
related to the source and methods. They go on, in one meeting with 
intelligence analysts--a meeting Mr. Bolton called but he was unable to 
attend at the last minute--his staff informed the assembled analysts 
that Mr. Bolton wanted to hear only concerns relating to sources and 
methods from them or ideas that would strengthen his argument. But if 
his arguments were merely wrong, he did not want to hear about it.
  Got that? I am not making this up. He, Bolton, calls the meeting of 
the CIA types, the INR types, to come into his office--he calls them 
into his office, and I guess he got called away and could not attend. 
But his staff says: The boss wants to make it clear there are only two 
things he wants to hear from you. If he wants to say the Moon is made 
of green cheese, the only thing he wants to hear from you is: You 
cannot say that because you will give away the fact that we have eyes. 
We have a source and a method that we do not want to release. Or he 
wants to hear from you how we can bolster the argument that the Moon is 
made of green cheese. But he does not want to hear from you if he is 
wrong. He does not want to hear from you if you do not believe the Moon 
is made of green cheese. That is none of your business. He does not 
want to hear that.
  Look, I don't know how you define an ``ideologue.''
  Mr. SARBANES. That is a pretty good definition.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think it is pretty close. It is like that famous 
expression in a different context of Justice Holmes. He said prejudice 
is like the pupil of the eye. The more light you shine upon it, the 
tighter it closes.
  It seems the more information you gave Mr. Bolton that conflicted 
with his predetermined ideological notion, the less he wanted to hear 
it. If you persisted in giving it to him, which was your job, he would 
try to get you fired.
  This is not a minor deal. At the very moment when whoever we have as 
our ambassador to the United Nations is going to be the man, 
unfortunately, or woman, who will have to stand up before the whole 
world and say, We have evidence that North Korea is about to do the 
following; or, We have evidence that Iran has pursued their nuclear 
option to a point they are violating the NPT--let me ask the Senator, 
are we going to send John Bolton to a place where we have already 
squandered our credibility by saying something that we did not know, or 
saying things we thought we knew that were wrong, are we going to send 
John Bolton up to be the guy to make a case relating to our national 
security?

  I ask my friend a rhetorical question--if, in fact, we fail to 
convince the Security Council, if we fail to convince our allies and 
those with a common interest that a threat exists and they do not come 
along, what are our options? Our options are to do nothing about it or 
to act alone. That is what I mean when I say I am concerned about U.S. 
interests.
  There is a story I first heard from Zbigniew Brzezinski that I have 
used many times since. The Senator knows it as well. During the Cuban 
missile crisis, the very time when Adlai Stevenson stood up and said, 
don't tell me that, we know the President of the United States, John 
Kennedy, desperately needed--although we could have done it alone--
desperately needed the support of the rest of our allies in the world 
for what we were about to do,

[[Page S5888]]

confront the Soviet Union. And he sent former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson to Paris to meet with then-President Charles de Gaulle. I am 
told this is not an apocryphal story; it is historically accurate. 
Acheson walked in to the Presidential palace, the President's office, 
and made his case. Then, after making his case, allegedly, he leaned 
over to pick up the satellite photographs to show President de Gaulle 
that what he spoke of was absolutely true, and he had pictures to show 
it.
  At that moment, paraphrasing, to the best of my knowledge, de Gaulle 
put up his hands and said: You need not show me the evidence. I know 
President Kennedy. And I know he could never tell us anything that 
could take us to war that wasn't true.
  Do you think there is anyone, anyone, anyone--including our own 
delegation in the United Nations--who would accept an assertion from 
John Bolton on the same grounds?
  Now, my friend, the chairman and others, will argue: Well, Joe, if it 
is that critical, he will not be making the case. That is probably 
true. It may be the Secretary of State making the case, who has great 
credibility. It may be the President of the United States. But there 
are a thousand little pieces that lead up to building coalitions that 
relate to our self-interest, based upon an ambassador privately sitting 
with another ambassador and assuring him that what he speaks is true.
  This is absolutely the wrong man at the wrong time for the most 
important job in diplomacy that exists right now.
  Mr. President, I ask my colleagues, is John Bolton a man in the 
tradition of Adlai Stevenson or Jack Danforth or any number of people I 
can name?
  There is a third reason to oppose Mr. Bolton.
  This is one that has animated the interest and concern of my friend 
from Ohio even more than it has me; and that is, that Mr. Bolton 
engages in abusive treatment of colleagues in the State Department, and 
he exercises frequent lapses of judgment in dealing with them.
  Again, do not take my word for it. Carl Ford, the former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence, described Mr. Bolton--and I am 
using Carl Ford's colorful language, I guess it is an Arkansas 
expression; he is from Arkansas--he said Mr. Bolton is a 
``quintessential kiss-up, kick down kind of guy.''
  He also objected, Mr. Ford did, in strong terms, to the treatment of 
one of his subordinates, Mr. Westermann. He said:

       Secretary Bolton chose to reach five or six levels below 
     him in the bureaucracy, bring an analyst into his office, and 
     give him a tongue lashing. . . . he was so far over the line 
     that [it's] one of the sort of memorable moments in my 30-
     plus year career.

  Listen to Larry Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff, who 
referred to Mr. Bolton--I am not making up these phrases--he referred 
to Bolton as a ``lousy leader.'' And he told the committee that he--
Wilkerson had an open-door policy. Some Senators and others have that 
policy. They literally keep their door open so anyone in the 
organization can feel free to walk in and say what is on their mind. He 
said his open-door policy--this is the chief of staff for the Secretary 
of State--he said his open-door policy led to a steady stream of senior 
officials who came into his office to complain about Mr. Bolton's 
behavior.
  Listen to John Wolf, a career Foreign Service Officer for 35 years, 
who worked under Mr. Bolton as the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation. Mr. Wolf said that Mr. Bolton blocked an assignment 
of a man he--Mr. Wolf--described as a ``truly outstanding civil 
servant,'' some 9 months after that civil servant made an inadvertent 
mistake.
  And Mr. Wolf says that Mr. Bolton asked him to remove two other 
officials because of disagreements Mr. Bolton had over policy, and that 
Mr. Bolton ``tended not to be enthusiastic about alternative views.''
  If that is not a quintessentially State Department, career Foreign 
Service Officer phrase: he ``tended not to be enthusiastic about 
alternative views.''
  Listen to Will Taft, a man whose name became known here in the 
investigations relating to Abu Ghraib and the treaties that were 
discussed about the treatment of prisoners. Mr. Taft served in the 
State Department as legal adviser under Secretary Powell during the 
tenure of Mr. Bolton. And before that, he was general counsel in two 
other Government Departments, as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
and formerly an ambassador to NATO--significant positions.
  Mr. Taft told our committee he had to take the extraordinary step of 
going to his boss--Mr. Taft's boss--to rein in Mr. Bolton after Bolton 
refused to work with the State Department attorney on a lawsuit in 
which the State Department was a defendant.
  This resulted--I will skip a little bit here--this incident caused 
the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Armitage, to write to Mr. Bolton a 
memo reminding him that the rules applied to him, as well as others in 
the State Department, and that he was required--Mr. Bolton was 
required--to work with State Department lawyers.
  There is a fourth reason, beyond his treatment of individuals--and I 
could go on for another hour citing examples of his alleged 
mistreatment of subordinates and colleagues at the State Department and 
in other endeavors--there is a fourth reason that, all by itself, would 
justify Mr. Bolton not being confirmed; and that is, Mr. Bolton gave 
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee under oath that at best 
was misleading.
  Again, do not take my word for it. It is true that I think Mr. Bolton 
should not go to the United Nations, and I am of a different party. But 
do not take my word for it. Listen to Tom Hubbard, referred to by the 
chairman earlier today. Mr. Hubbard is a retired Foreign Service 
Officer whose last post was as Ambassador to South Korea. During our 
hearing on April 11, Senator Chafee asked Mr. Bolton about a speech 
that Mr. Bolton gave in Seoul, South Korea, in 2003.

  Let me give you some context. This was on the eve of the President's 
initiative to begin what is referred to as the Six-Party Talks: the two 
Koreas, Japan, Russia, the United States, and China--a very delicate 
moment. Mr. Bolton has made it clear, in many speeches he has made, 
what he thinks of Kim Jong Il, and that is not inappropriate. And he 
has made it pretty clear that he rejected the idea proffered by me, and 
I believe even by Senator Lugar, and by other Senators here, several 
years ago that we should talk to the North Koreans--not negotiate, talk 
with them--and find out what it would take to make a deal and let them 
know what our bottom line was.
  Mr. Bolton is not the architect of, but a disciple of, the policy of 
containing and putting the North Korean regime in a position where he 
thinks if enough pressure is put on them they would topple. And we are 
going back to when he was making a speech in Seoul, South Korea, in 
2003, on the eve of the first Six-Party Talks.
  The speech was filled with inflammatory rhetoric, even though it may 
be true, about the North Korean leadership. The result of him having 
given the speech was that the talks were almost scuttled.
  Mr. Bolton, in reply to Senator Chafee of our committee regarding 
that speech, said:

       I can tell you [Senator] what our Ambassador to South 
     Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech.

  Meaning his speech.

       He said [to me], ``Thanks a lot for that speech, John. 
     It'll help us a lot out here.''

  Got this, now: He makes what is termed an inflammatory speech. He is 
asked: Wasn't that inflammatory, and didn't that cause us real trouble 
in pursuing the foreign policy objectives of the President to get these 
talks underway? And Bolton, in effect, says: No. And then the Senator, 
in effect, says: Well, didn't our Ambassador to South Korea think it 
was damaging? And he says: No. He not only didn't think it was 
damaging, he said to me: ``Thanks a lot for that speech, John. It'll 
help us a lot out here.''
  Now, you would draw from that exchange that this speech was totally 
consistent with the administration's policy, that it was something that 
was helpful, and that Bolton was doing a good job.
  Now, we didn't call Ambassador Hubbard. I may be mistaken, but I 
think the Republican majority staff got a call from Mr. Hubbard, the 
former ambassador to South Korea, who I guess saw this on C-SPAN. I 
don't know what

[[Page S5889]]

exactly prompted it. Maybe he read it in the newspaper. And he says: I 
want to talk to you guys. And in an interview which was totally 
appropriate, without minority staff there, he paints a very different 
story, accurately reported by the majority staff.
  Ambassador Hubbard remembers that little exchange about the Bolton 
2003 speech on the eve of the Six-Party Talks quite differently. The 
day after the committee hearing, Hubbard voluntarily contacted the 
committee to make clear that he disagreed at the time with the tone of 
the speech and thought the speech was unhelpful to the negotiating 
process and--this is the important part--and that he, Bolton, surely 
knew that, that I, Hubbard, thought it was unhelpful and was damaging.
  Hubbard then told the Los Angeles Times that although he had talked 
to Mr. Bolton and thanked him for removing from his speech some of the 
attacks on South Korea. Remember this now, the speech was about North 
Korea. The only thing the ambassador was able to convince Bolton to do 
was take out some of the stuff that attacked our ally South Korea, 
whom, I might note parenthetically, if, God forbid, there is a war, we 
need on our side. We have 30,000 American troops there. Bolton is 
making a speech characterized as an inflammatory speech about North 
Korea and is going to attack our ally South Korea, as well.
  And our ambassador says: Please don't do that stuff about South 
Korea. And so Hubbard says: It is true. I thanked him for removing some 
of the attacks he was about to make on South Korea.
  Then he went on to say, but ``it's a gross exaggeration to elevate 
that [statement] to praise for the entire speech and approval of it.''
  I don't know how you can comport how those two statements work out. 
Bolton saying: Remember that the ambassador said, thanks a lot for that 
speech, John. It helps us a lot out here. And the ambassador is saying 
that Mr. Bolton knows better. That is a gross exaggeration.
  In other testimony, Mr. Bolton frequently tried to claim he had not 
sought to fire or discipline the INR intelligence analyst, Mr. 
Westermann.
  He said:

       I never sought to have [him] fired.

  He later said:

       I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on 
     Mr. Westermann.

  And finally, he said:

       I didn't try to have Mr. Westermann removed.

  This is incredibly disingenuous. It is just not true. The record is 
clear that Bolton sought on three occasions that I referenced earlier 
to have Mr. Westermann removed from his position and given another 
portfolio. And by the way, you don't get another portfolio. If the only 
job you do in a restaurant is cook and they say you can't cook anymore, 
there are not many jobs left for you. This guy's expertise was dealing 
with chemical and biological weapons. Mr. Bolton wanted him taken off 
the case.
  As a lawyer, Mr. Bolton surely knows that civil servants have job 
protections and can't be readily fired. By asking repeatedly that this 
man be moved from his established area of expertise, he was endangering 
the man's career and sending a message of intimidation that was heard 
loud and clear throughout the Intelligence and Research Bureau. Mr. 
Bolton did not have the honesty or the courage to admit that fact to 
the Foreign Relations Committee. Where is this straight talker we hear 
so much about?
  The President has said that in his second term, one of his priorities 
is ``to defend our security and spread freedom by building effective 
multinational and multilateral institutions and supporting effective 
multilateral action.'' If this is a serious objective, he sure is 
sending the wrong man to put together these kinds of coalitions.
  It is manifestly not in our interest to send John Bolton to the 
United Nations.
  It is not in our interest to have a person who is ``a lousy leader'' 
in charge of a mission of 150 professionals who need leadership.
  It is not in our national interest to have a conservative ideologue 
who doesn't listen to others trying to rebuild frayed alliances at the 
United Nations.
  It is not in our national interest to have a man with a reputation as 
a bully trying to construct coalitions necessary to achieve U.N. 
reform.
  It is not in our interest to have someone with a reputation for 
taking factoids out of context, exaggerating intelligence information, 
as our spokesman in New York during the crises to come with Iran and 
North Korea, when we will have to convince the world to take action to 
stop nuclear weapons programs.
  Is this the best the President of the United States can do? Is this 
the best among the many tough-minded, articulate, conservative 
Republican foreign policy experts?
  The record presented by the Foreign Relations Committee is clear. The 
documents we have uncovered; the interviews with those who had to pick 
up the pieces at INR and CIA, in the office of the Secretary of State, 
and in South Korea; the testimony of former Assistant Secretary of 
State Carl Ford, a conservative Republican; all of this record has 
given us clear warning that Mr. Bolton is the wrong man for this job.
  Mr. Bolton's nomination is not--I emphasize ``not''--in the interest 
of the United States of America. I don't know that I have ever said 
this before on the floor, but I believe that if this were a secret 
ballot, Mr. Bolton would not get 40 votes in the Senate. I believe the 
President knows that. I wish the President had taken another look at 
this and found us someone--I am not being facetious and I am not the 
first one to say this, I say to my friend from Virginia, the single 
best guy we could send to the United Nations right now at this critical 
moment is former President Bush. I cannot think of anybody better. He 
would get absolutely unanimous support on this side of the aisle.
  Mr. Bolton is no George Herbert Walker Bush. I guess not many people 
are. But this guy should not be going to the U.N.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Martinez). The Senator from Virginia is 
recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the years I have been privileged to 
serve in this Chamber, I have so thoroughly enjoyed working with my 
good friend from Delaware. We have done a lot of things together. I 
listened carefully to his framework and remarks. I respectfully 
disagree, and I will so state my reasons momentarily.
  But I wondered if we could discuss for a few minutes the following. 
Before we start, I think it would be advisable for both sides to have 
from the Presiding Officer the time remaining on both sides for the 
record, so Senators listening will have an idea.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 116 minutes remaining of 
time, and the minority has 64 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry: Is that for today?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. And there is additional time tomorrow, is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to my good friend from Delaware, one of 
the interesting aspects of what has occurred in the Senate over the 
last week or so is an impetus to go back and do a lot of historical 
research. I went back and looked at the Articles of Confederation and 
the Founding Fathers and what they had to say about this provision of 
advise and consent in the Constitution.
  It is interesting. I was very taken aback with how they went about 
modifying. If the Senator and others will indulge me, I would like to 
discuss that for a moment or two because I think it poses a question I 
would like to put to my good friend. That begins at this juncture.
  You may ask why it is particularly appropriate for the Senate to be 
in executive session today, because on this day in 1787, 218 years ago, 
our Founding Fathers of the United States Constitution first reached a 
quorum so that the Constitutional Convention could draft our 
Constitution and they could proceed. It took several years to get it 
done. George Washington had been calling for such a convention for 
years, but it was not until this day, 218 years ago, that the 
convention finally began.

[[Page S5890]]

  From May 25, 1787, straight through the summer, 55 individuals 
gathered in Philadelphia to write our Constitution. It was a hot 
summer, with long and arduous debate, and many drafts went back and 
forth. Careful consideration was given. Finally, in mid-September, it 
was over. It was a monumental achievement, one that would enable the 
United States today, 200-plus years later, to become the oldest, 
continuously surviving republic form of Government on Earth today.
  I mention all this because one of the key compromises our Founding 
Fathers made throughout the Constitutional Convention was with respect 
to the advise and consent clause. Our Framers labored extensively over 
this section of the Constitution, deferring final resolution of the 
clause for several months. Some of the Framers argued that the 
President should have total authority to appoint. Others thought both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate should be involved in the 
process. Ultimately, a plan that was put forth by James Madison--if I 
may say proudly--of Virginia, won the day, where the President would 
nominate judges and executive nominees, and the Senate would reject or 
confirm them.

  In Federalist Paper No. 76, in 1788, Alexander Hamilton explains in 
detail exactly why this compromise was so important. Let me read a 
portion of Hamilton's quote:

       It has been observed in a former paper that ``the true test 
     of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce 
     a good administration.'' If the justness of this observation 
     be admitted, the mode of appointing the offices of the United 
     States contained in the foregoing clauses must, when 
     examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular 
     commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better 
     calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for 
     filling the offices of the Union.

  I presume he wasn't looking into the future, so I will add ``women.''
  Today, this great compromise can be found, unmodified, in article II, 
section 2 of the Constitution. This section of the Constitution reads 
in part as follows:

       The President shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
     and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . public 
     Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all 
     other Officers of the United States. . . .

  Thus, the Constitution provides a role for both the President and the 
Senate in this process. The President has the responsibility to 
nominate, and the Senate has the responsibility to render advice and 
consent on the nomination.
  While article II, section 2 of the Constitution doesn't explicitly 
make a distinction between the Senate's role with respect to executive 
branch nominees and judicial nominees of the other branch of 
Government, the tradition of the Senate, in recognition of the 
Constitution, dictates otherwise.
  Traditionally, a President, especially after taking office following 
an election, is given greater latitude in selecting individuals to 
serve in the executive branch of Government. This is in recognition of 
the fact that the Constitution treats Senate-confirmed executive branch 
nominees far differently than Senate-confirmed judges.
  In contrast to Federal judicial nominees who, once confirmed under 
the Constitution, serve a lifetime appointment in the third branch of 
Government, independent of the President, executive branch nominees 
serve under the President solely at the pleasure of the President. That 
phrase, ``at the pleasure of the President,'' is paramount. This time-
honored phrase, ``at the pleasure of the President,'' has been used by 
Presidents throughout American history to show the American people that 
the President is the final arbiter of accountability for executive 
nominees.
  I say that because I have fought hard here recently to deal with this 
question of the judicial nominees, along with some others. I am not 
here to seek whether we did right or wrong; history will judge that. 
But it was a magnificent experience to go back and study the process 
and listen to many scholarly people and to read extensively. But it is 
clear to me there is a difference between the judicial nominee who goes 
for life on the third independent branch--independent of Congress and 
the executive branch--and the President's right to select those 
individuals who he, together with his fellow Cabinet officers and 
others in the administration, feels are best suited to do the job. 
Would you agree there is a difference in that? I yield for the purpose 
of answering the question.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will answer the question. Let me say to 
my friend that regarding Federalist No. 76, I suffer from teaching the 
subject. For the last 16 years, I have taught a course in the 
separation of powers. I wrote a treatise, an entire book, on this 
subject. There is another phrase in Federalist No. 76 the Senator 
didn't read that I think is appropriate to mention.
  Federalist No. 76 was about the issue--remember, the Federalist 
Papers were trying to convince a public that didn't have a television 
set or a radio that their legislative body should ratify the 
Constitution. It was sort of pamphleteering. That is what they were 
doing. They were taking arguments against the Constitution and framing 
them, setting them up, knocking them down, and making the case. The 
issue in Federalist No. 76 was whether the President would have undue 
influence on the Senate. Would he not be able to pressure the Senate 
because he was chief executive officer? Hamilton said: Don't worry 
about that. He went on to explain that there could be no better system 
than the one that was arrived at.
  The compromise he is talking about, by the way, is the Connecticut 
Compromise. It was not until shortly before that the Founders decided--
this is the only reason this got resolved--that the great State of 
Virginia with, I think, the first or second largest population at the 
time, could only have two Senators, and the small State of Delaware 
would have two Senators. That was the Connecticut Compromise. That is 
what it was about.
  The reason it came about was that is they wanted to make sure that 
the minority would be able to be protected. He used the phrase--and I 
compliment and associate myself with my friend from Virginia; I know 
that is not why he sought recognition and why he asked the question, 
but what he did yesterday with Senator Byrd is what Alexander Hamilton 
was talking about--Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 76 used the 
following phrase in rebutting the argument that the President would be 
able to pressure the Senate. He said there will always be a sufficient 
number of men of rectitude to prevent that from happening. The Senator 
from Virginia demonstrated yesterday that there always is a sufficient 
number of men of rectitude--he and Senator Byrd--in averting a showdown 
that may have literally, not figuratively----
  Mr. WARNER. Together with 14 in total.
  Mr. BIDEN. It is true.
  Mr. WARNER. Coequal.
  Mr. BIDEN. The Senator from Virginia, Mr. Warner, and Senator Byrd 
were the catalyst that came along and rescued something that had been 
attempted and written off, at least by the six Democrats with whom I 
had been talking, as failed until the two of them came along. This in 
no way is to denigrate the significant efforts of the others.
  Mr. WARNER. The leadership of Senators McCain, Ben Nelson, and 
everybody else.
  Mr. BIDEN. The reason I say this is that, in the debates in the 
Constitutional Convention on this nominating process, on three 
occasions I believe it was Governor Wilson of Pennsylvania--I am not 
positive of that--proposed a motion that the President of the United 
States should have the power alone to appoint his Cabinet and inferior 
officers in the court. It never got, to the best of my knowledge, more 
than seven votes. The only consideration that almost passed twice was 
that only the Senate, without the President even in on the deal, could 
make those appointments. If we look at the constitutional history, the 
President was an afterthought in the nominating process. That is what 
Madison's notes show. That is what the history of the debate in the 
State legislative bodies shows.
  So here we are, the Connecticut Compromise comes along guaranteeing 
that small States will be able to have an impact on these choices, but 
go back and look, and I think it is Federalist 77--do not hold me to 
that--but it is Hamilton's treatise on why there was a need

[[Page S5891]]

to have the Senate involved in choosing not only judges but 
appointments to the Federal Government. There was the fear that what 
happened in the British Parliament would be repeated; that, in fact, 
the King and the leaders of the majority would appoint incompetent 
people, such as their brothers-in-law, their friends, to be surrounding 
them in their Cabinets, in the lesser offices of the Federal 
Government.
  So it was a genuine concern and a clear understanding--I think the 
phrase in Federalist 76 is; this is off the top of my head--if by this 
we are limiting the President, so be it; that is our intention.
  To the specific question, yes, there is more deference given to the 
President of the United States in the appointment of his Cabinet than 
there is to his appointments to the Supreme Court, district court, any 
lower court, or any other appointed office in the Government. But the 
single exception that was intended by the Framers, if you read what 
they said, in terms of even appointing those around him, if the persons 
he would pick, notwithstanding that they would reflect the President's 
political views, if the appointment inures to the detriment of the 
United States, they should be opposed.
  There have not been many occasions when I have opposed nominees to 
the President's Cabinet or Cabinet-level positions, and I imagine there 
have not been many my friend from Virginia has opposed. But I opposed 
two in the Clinton administration. I opposed one in the Carter 
administration. I think I opposed two in the Reagan administration. In 
each case, my opposition--and this would be only the second one I have 
opposed in this administration--is because the appointment of that 
individual, notwithstanding the fact that he or she is the choice of 
the President, would have the effect of negatively affecting the 
standing, security, or well-being of the United States.
  So there are exceptions, and I would argue Mr. Bolton, as my friend 
from Ohio, I suspect, is going to make a compelling case, falls into 
the category of, yes, the President gets who he wants, unless the 
appointment of that person would inure to the detriment of the United 
States.
  That is the central point I am trying to make. I understand my friend 
does not agree with me, but I honestly believe Mr. Bolton going to the 
U.N. will inure to the detriment of the United States, notwithstanding 
the President's judgment that it would not do that.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for the colloquy. We 
did settle clearly that greater latitude is given to the President.
  Mr. BIDEN. That is right; I acknowledge that.
  Mr. WARNER. And the Senator from Virginia does not infer that 
latitude is a rubberstamp, that everyone goes through. Clearly--and I 
know my good friend from Delaware speaks as a matter of clear 
conscience--I speak as a matter of clear conscience.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I am confident that is true 
about the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. Correct, and we have a difference of views as it relates 
to our conscience.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I respect that difference.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my friend. I would also go back to Federalist 76 
and read the following provision dated Tuesday, April 1, 1788, author 
Alexander Hamilton:

       The President is ``to nominate, and, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other 
     public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, 
     and other officers of the United States whose appointments 
     are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the 
     Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior 
     offices as they think proper in the President alone, or in 
     the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The 
     President shall have the power to fill up all vacancies which 
     may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting 
     commissions. . . .

  This is the operative paragraph to which I wish to refer:

       It has been observed in a former paper that ``the true test 
     of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce 
     a good administration.''

  I said that.

       If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode 
     of appointing the officers of the United States contained in 
     the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be 
     entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to 
     conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a 
     judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union; 
     and it will not need proof, that on this point must 
     essentially depend the character of its administration.

  Mr. President, our distinguished President has served in office 4 
years. He was reelected with a clarity by the votes. He is now putting 
together his administration for these coming years. The nomination of 
John Bolton, with whom I have had considerable experience in work, in 
whom I have a strong sense of confidence--he has chosen this 
individual, I might say by and with the consent of his Secretary of 
State, a very able and most credible individual, in my experience, in 
working with the distinguished current Secretary of State.
  The President, together with his principal Cabinet officers, has put 
together an extraordinary national security team. John Bolton will be a 
valuable addition to this team.
  The President and his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, have been 
clear in their belief that John Bolton has the experience and skills to 
represent the United States at the United Nations and to carry out the 
President's priorities to strengthen and reform the United Nations. I 
agree with the confidence they place in this nominee.
  John Bolton has had a long and distinguished career in public service 
and in the private sector. Most recently, he has served for the past 4 
years as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security Affairs. In that capacity, Secretary Bolton 
worked to build a coalition of over 60 countries to help combat the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction through the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, PSI. He was a leader in creating the G-8 Global 
Partnership, which invited other nations to support the Nunn-Lugar 
nuclear threat reduction concept. As a result, many other nations are 
now participating with the United States in helping to eliminate and 
safeguard dangerous weapons and technologies which remain in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union.
  Previously, John Bolton has served as Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Organization Affairs, as an Assistant Attorney 
General in the Department of Justice, and many years ago he held 
several senior positions in the Agency for International Development. 
He has also had a distinguished legal career in the private sector.
  It is no secret that Mr. Bolton has at times advocated or represented 
positions which have sparked controversy. He has done so with a 
frankness and assertiveness that demonstrate his strongly held beliefs. 
As the Senate considers this nomination, we should keep in mind the 
words of Secretary Rice. She stated:

       The President and I have asked John Bolton to do this work 
     because he knows how to get things done. He is a tough-minded 
     diplomat, he has a strong record of success and he has a 
     proven track record of effective multilateralism. Secretary 
     Rice concluded her remarks by saying, and I quote again: 
     John, you have my confidence and that of the President.

  Given the enormity of problems facing the U.N. today, we have an 
obligation to send a strong-minded individual to help constructively to 
solve these problems and to build the confidence of the American people 
in the U.N.
  I share the President's and the Secretary's belief that John Bolton 
will enthusiastically advance the President's goal of making the United 
Nations a stronger, more effective international organization.
  I urge my colleagues to support this nomination and to send Mr. 
Bolton to the U.N. to represent our Nation and to advance the 
President's agenda of reform. Such reform is necessary to restore 
American confidence in the U.N. and to ensure that the U.N. will remain 
a vital and respected international organization in the years to come.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record two 
articles from the New York Times and the Washington Post with regard to 
the Bolton nomination.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, May 11, 2005]

                        The Best Man for the Job

              (By James A. Baker III and Edwin Meese III)

       The image that critics are painting of John Bolton, 
     President Bush's nominee to be our

[[Page S5892]]

     representative at the United Nations, does not bear the 
     slightest resemblance to the man we have known and worked 
     with for a quarter-century.
       While we cannot speak to the truthfulness of the specific 
     allegations by his former colleagues, we can speak to what we 
     know. And during our time with Mr. Bolton at the Justice and 
     State Departments, we never knew of any instance in which he 
     abused or berated anyone he worked with. Nor was his loyalty 
     to us or to the presidents we served ever questioned. And we 
     never knew of an instance in which he distorted factual 
     evidence to make it fit political ends.
       At the heart of the claims made by Mr. Bolton's critics is 
     the charge that he was imperious to those beneath him and 
     duplicitous to those above. The implication is that Mr. 
     Bolton saw himself as something of a free agent, guided by 
     nothing more than his own notions of what he thought good 
     policy might be. Woe be to those who might dare to disagree, 
     according to these critics, be they lower-level analysts or 
     cabinet members.
       In our experience, nothing could be further from the truth. 
     John Bolton was as loyal as he was talented. To put it 
     bluntly, he knew his place and he took direction. As cabinet 
     members, we took our direction from our presidents, and Mr. 
     Bolton was faithful to his obligations as a presidential 
     appointee on our respective teams. In his service as 
     assistant attorney general and assistant secretary of state, 
     we had complete confidence in him--and that confidence turned 
     out to have been well placed. In our view he would be no 
     different in fulfilling his duties as our United Nations 
     ambassador.
       In any administration there are going to be disagreements 
     over process and policy, both in formulation and execution. 
     It is not uncommon to have battle lines within any 
     administration drawn between idealists and pragmatists. But 
     what has made John Bolton so successful in the posts he has 
     held, and what makes him so well suited for the position at 
     the United Nations, is that he exhibits the best virtues of 
     both idealists and pragmatists.
       Mr. Bolton's political principles are not shaped by 
     circumstances or by appeals to the conventional wisdom. He 
     knows, as Abraham Lincoln once put it, that ``important 
     principles may and must be inflexible.'' He also knows that 
     those principles often have to be fought for with vigor.
       On the other hand, he understands from his long experience 
     at the highest levels of government that in order to succeed, 
     one has to work with those whose views may differ; he knows 
     the importance of principled compromise in order to make 
     things happen.
       A most fitting example was his contribution, when serving 
     as an assistant secretary of state, in getting the United 
     Nations General Assembly in 1991 to abandon its morally 
     noxious doctrine that Zionism was a form of racism. This took 
     extraordinary diplomatic skill, combining the clear 
     articulation of the philosophic position of the United States 
     and his own personal persuasiveness. That this effort 
     succeeded where earlier efforts had failed came as no 
     surprise to anyone who had worked with Mr. Bolton. The power 
     of his mind and the strength of his convictions make him a 
     most formidable advocate.
       These skills have been on display more recently in his 
     current position as undersecretary of state for arms control 
     and international security. Not even his detractors deny, for 
     example, that he was instrumental in building a coalition of 
     60 countries for President Bush's Proliferation Security 
     Initiative to combat the spread of nuclear weapons 
     technology.
       At a time when all sides acknowledge that fundamental 
     reform is needed at the United Nations lest it see its moral 
     stature diminished and its possibilities squandered, we need 
     our permanent representative to be a person of political 
     vision, intellectual power and personal integrity. John 
     Bolton is just that person.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, April 24, 2005]

                          Blunt but Effective

                      (By Lawrence S. Eagleburger)

       President Bush's nomination of John Bolton as U.S. 
     ambassador to the United Nations has generated a bad case of 
     dyspepsia among a number of senators, who keep putting off a 
     confirmation vote. That hesitation is now portrayed as a 
     consequence of Bolton's purported ``mistreatment'' of several 
     State Department intelligence analysts. But this is a smoke 
     screen. The real reasons Bolton's opponents want to derail 
     his nomination are his oft-repeated criticism of the United 
     Nations and other international organizations, his rejection 
     of the arguments of those who ignore or excuse the 
     inexcusable (i.e., the election of Sudan to the U.N. Human 
     Rights Commission) and his willingness to express himself 
     with the bark off.
       As to the charge that Bolton has been tough on 
     subordinates, I can say only that in more than a decade of 
     association with him in the State Department I never saw or 
     heard anything to support such a charge. Nor do I see 
     anything wrong with challenging intelligence analysts on 
     their findings. They can, as recent history demonstrates, 
     make mistakes. And they must be prepared to defend their 
     findings under intense questioning. If John pushed too hard 
     or dressed down subordinates, he deserves criticism, but it 
     hardly merits a vote against confirmation when balanced 
     against his many accomplishments.
       On Dec. 16, 1991, I spoke to the U.N. General Assembly on 
     behalf of the United States, calling on the member states to 
     repeal the odious Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with 
     racism. As I said then, the resolution ``labeled as racist 
     the national aspirations of the one people more victimized by 
     racism than any other.'' That we were successful in obtaining 
     repeal was largely due to John Bolton, who was then assistant 
     secretary of state for international organizations. His moral 
     outrage was clearly evident as he brilliantly led and managed 
     the successful U.S. campaign to obtain sufficient votes for 
     repeal. The final vote, 111 to 25, speaks volumes for the 
     success of his ``direct'' style.
       Bolton's impressive skills were also demonstrated at the 
     time of the Persian Gulf War, when he steered a critical 
     series of resolutions supporting our liberation of Kuwait 
     through the U.N. Security Council. During this period we 
     negotiated some 15 resolutions up to and through the removal 
     of Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. Adoption of the key 
     Security Council document, Resolution 678, was not a foregone 
     conclusion and faced the possibility of a Chinese veto until 
     the final vote. While our diplomacy to obtain this and other 
     council votes was conducted on a global scale, Bolton was 
     deeply engaged in managing this worldwide effort.
       These are but two examples of why I believe Bolton 
     possesses the substantial qualifications necessary to be our 
     ambassador to the United Nations. By now it should be obvious 
     to all that the halcyon days when our advice was sought and 
     our leadership welcomed because the security of others 
     depended on the protection we gave are no more. I recognize 
     that John's willingness to speak bluntly has raised 
     questions. Perhaps there was a time when those concerns had 
     merit--but not now. Given what we all know about the current 
     state of the United Nations, it's time we were represented by 
     someone with the guts to demand reform and to see that 
     whatever changes result are more than window dressing.
       It is clear that the future of the United Nations and the 
     U.S. role within that organization are uncertain. Who better 
     to demonstrate to the member states that the United States is 
     serious about reform? Who better to speak for all Americans 
     dedicated to a healthy United Nations that will fulfill the 
     dreams of its founders?

  Mr. WARNER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coburn). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I recently sent my colleagues a letter 
regarding the nomination of John Bolton. I realize that they are all 
busy and likely they have not had an opportunity to read the letter. I 
will begin my remarks today by reading the letter to my colleagues so 
that it will be a part of the Record.

       Dear colleague: Throughout my time in the Senate, I have 
     been hesitant to push my views on my colleagues. However, I 
     feel compelled to share my deep concerns with the nomination 
     of John Bolton to be Ambassador to the United Nations. I 
     strongly feel that the importance of this nomination to our 
     foreign policy requires us to set aside our partisan agenda 
     and let our consciences and our shared commitment to our 
     nation's best interests guide us. At a time when the United 
     States strives to fight terrorism globally, to build a stable 
     and free Iraq, to find a peaceful resolution to the nuclear 
     ambitions of Iran and North Korea, to spread democracy in the 
     place of oppressive regimes, and to enact needed reforms at 
     the United Nations, it is imperative that we have the support 
     of our friends and allies internationally. These strong 
     international relationships must be built upon robust and 
     effective public diplomacy.
       I applaud our President for understanding this and for his 
     leadership on U.S. public diplomacy. He and Secretary Rice 
     have taken important steps to reach out to the international 
     community and strengthen relationships.
       Additionally, I applaud the President's decision to appoint 
     Karen Hughes to enhance U.S. public diplomacy at the State 
     Department and recently to get even the First Lady involved 
     in these important efforts to promote public diplomacy [and 
     improve the world's opinion of the United States of America].
       However, it is my concern that John Bolton's nomination 
     sends a negative message to the world community and 
     contradicts the President's efforts. In these dangerous 
     times, we cannot afford to put at risk our nation's ability 
     to successfully wage and win the war on terror with a 
     controversial and ineffective Ambassador to the United 
     Nations. I worry that Mr. Bolton could make it more difficult 
     for us to achieve the important U.N. reforms needed to 
     restore the strength of the institution. I strongly believe 
     that we need to reform the U.N., make it a viable institution 
     for world security, and remove its anti-Israel bias. However, 
     I question John Bolton's ability to get this job done.

[[Page S5893]]

       I know that you are very busy, but I would appreciate it if 
     you would review my edited statement before the Foreign 
     Relations Committee as to why I think we can do much better 
     than John Bolton . . .

  In my closing words I stated this:

       Mr. Chairman, I am not so arrogant to think that I should 
     impose my judgment and perspective of the U.S. position in 
     the world community on the rest of my colleagues. We owe 
     it to the President to give Mr. Bolton an up or down vote 
     on the floor of the U.S. Senate. My hope is that, on a 
     bipartisan basis, we send Mr. Bolton's nomination to the 
     floor without recommendation and let the Senate work its 
     will.
       I plead with my colleagues in the Senate that if this 
     nomination gets to the floor--

  And we are here today--

     to consider this decision and its consequences carefully, to 
     read all the pertinent material, and to ask themselves 
     several pertinent questions: Is John Bolton the best possible 
     person to serve as the lead diplomat to the United Nations? 
     Will he be able to pursue the needed reforms at the U.N., 
     despite his damaged credibility? Will he share information 
     with the right individuals, and will he solicit information 
     from the right individuals, including his subordinates, so 
     that he can make the most informed decisions? Is he capable 
     of advancing the President's and the Secretary of State's 
     efforts to advance our public diplomacy? Does he have the 
     character, leadership, interpersonal skills, self discipline, 
     common decency, and understanding of the chain of command to 
     lead his team to victory? Will he recognize and seize 
     opportunities to repair and strengthen relationships, promote 
     peace and uphold democracy--as a team--with our fellow 
     nations?

  I mentioned in my letter the Senate faces today a very important 
decision, whether to send John Bolton to New York to be the next U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations. I believe we can do better, and we 
owe it to the United States of America, the U.S. State Department, our 
soldiers overseas, our children, and our grandchildren to do better 
than Mr. Bolton. This is not my opinion alone. The overwhelming opinion 
of the colleagues I have talked to about John Bolton is that he is not 
an ideal nominee; that they are less than enthusiastic about him and 
many were surprised at the decision. Many of my colleagues have said 
that the only reason they are going to vote for him is because he is 
the President's nominee. I agree with my colleague, Senator Biden. I 
think if we had a secret vote on John Bolton, he would not get 50 votes 
from the Senate.

  I want to explain to my colleagues here today why it is I think Mr. 
Bolton should not be confirmed. One of my deepest concerns about this 
nomination involves the big picture of U.S. public diplomacy and the 
President's acknowledged need to improve it. It was not too long ago 
when America's love of freedom was a force of inspiration to the rest 
of the world, and America was admired for its democracy, generosity, 
and willingness to help others in need of protection. Today, the United 
States is criticized for what the world calls arrogance, unilateralism, 
for failure to listen and seek support of its friends and allies. There 
has been a drastic change in the attitude of our friends and allies in 
such organizations such as NATO and the countries' leaders whom we need 
to rely upon for help.
  I discovered this personally during a trip I took to London, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Italy last year, where I met with several individuals 
from various international backgrounds and attended the NATO 
parliamentary meeting in Venice. In London I met with several 
individuals from the Atlantic Partnership, chaired by Lord Powell, who 
told me that the United States needed to do something to improve its 
public diplomacy with countries where leaders are under a great amount 
of pressure. They mentioned Tony Blair, who has put his neck on the 
line to support the United States and needed the United States to 
improve its public diplomacy to meet the concerns of his constituency.
  We all know that Tony Blair lost a significant number of 
parliamentary seats because of these concerns. The group emphasized 
that we needed to do more in public diplomacy to reach out to our 
friends and allies so that we could work together to accomplish the 
daunting tasks before us.
  In Venice I attended the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I could not 
believe some of the comments that were being made about the United 
States--from our allies. It was a stark contrast to the parliamentary 
meetings I attended in Budapest in 2000, when our allies voiced the 
concern: What about this Bush who is running for President? Is he an 
isolationist?
  In Venice I heard their concerns that the United States is very much 
involved in international affairs but acts unilaterally, without any 
concern by the United States of its allies and friends.
  I have traveled a great deal in my career, and I have met with 
leaders and academics in the international community during previous 
wars. There has never been as drastic a shift in the international 
community's perception as there has been during the last 2 or 3 years. 
The countries that previously admired the United States for its values 
and principles of democracy and freedom, encouraging other nations to 
develop their own democracies and speak out against injustices, now 
criticize the United States for its failure to respect their views and 
opinions.
  It troubles me deeply that the United States is perceived this way in 
the world community. I am troubled because the United States will face 
a deeper challenge in achieving its objectives without their support. 
We will face more difficulties in conducting the war on terrorism, 
promoting peace and stability worldwide, and building democracies, 
without help from our friends to share the responsibilities, 
leadership, and costs.
  Even as recently as last night, the former President of the Czech 
Republic and champion of democracy, Vaclav Havel, told me over dinner 
that the United States needs to improve its public diplomacy, that we 
have become isolated in too many instances.
  If the United States wants to win the war on terrorism, win the peace 
in Iraq, promote freedom globally, and prevent new conflicts, we need 
to have the help of our friends. In order to have the help of our 
friends we need to have robust public diplomacy. For if we cannot win 
over the hearts and minds of the world community, we are not going to 
be able to create the team that we need and our goals will be more 
difficult to achieve.
  Additionally, we will be unable to reduce the burdens on our own 
resources, the most important of which is the lives of the men and 
women in our Armed Forces who are leaving their families every day to 
serve this country overseas.
  Now, 1,700 U.S. men and women--over that--have given their lives in 
Iraq and Afghanistan; over 12,000 have been wounded.
  Nothing can compare to the cost of human lives, but the financial 
costs of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan are also placing a 
tremendous human resources burden on our country. Weeks ago we passed 
the $82 billion supplemental bill for our operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. I understand that we will need at least $50 billion next year. 
The costs of this war are not going down anytime soon.
  We need the help of other countries to share the financial burden 
that is adding to our national debt, and the human resource burden that 
our Armed Forces, National Guardsmen, contractors, and their families 
are bearing so heavily now. The key is public diplomacy.

  As I say, I applaud the President and the Secretary of State for 
understanding that public diplomacy is an important objective and 
beginning this new term with an emphasis on repairing relationships. I 
applaud the President and Secretary Rice for reaching out to our 
friends in the world community and articulating that the United States 
does respect international law and protocol.
  The President's recent visits to Latvia, the Netherlands, Moscow, and 
Georgia, underscore the priority he places on strengthening U.S. public 
diplomacy. The way that he embraced the Russian people will serve the 
country well as we negotiate with President Putin to improve nuclear 
security cooperation and support U.S. positions on Iran and North 
Korea.
  The President has also enlisted the added value of the First Lady in 
pursuing an agenda to improve U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, 
an important initiative. I also applaud the President's decision to 
appoint Karen Hughes to help lead the public diplomacy effort at the 
State Department.
  Let's send Karen Hughes to be the next ambassador to the United 
Nations. There is someone who would

[[Page S5894]]

really make a difference for us, and deal with the challenge that we 
have in public diplomacy.
  The President clearly understands the importance of renewing our 
relationships and making clear that we want to work with our friends to 
achieve our many foreign policy goals. It is important to send a 
message that, though the United States may have differences with our 
friends at times, and though we may need to be firm about our 
positions, we are willing to sit down, talk about them, discuss our 
reasoning, and work for a solution.
  It is my strong belief in the need to improve U.S. public diplomacy 
and in the efforts of the President that has caused me to pause and 
reflect so deeply on the nomination of Mr. Bolton because, I asked 
myself, what message are we sending to the world community? In the same 
breath we are considering a nominee for ambassador to the United 
Nations who has been accused of being arrogant, of not listening to his 
friends, of acting unilaterally, and of bullying those who do not have 
the ability to properly defend themselves. These are the very 
characteristics we are trying to dispel in the court of world opinion.
  We must understand, next to the President, Vice President, and 
Secretary of State, the most prominent public diplomat is our 
ambassador to the United Nations. It is my concern that the 
confirmation of John Bolton would send a contradictory and negative 
message to the world community about U.S. intentions. I am afraid that 
his confirmation will tell the world we are not dedicated to repairing 
our relationships or working as a team but that we believe only someone 
with sharp elbows can deal effectively with the international 
community.
  I want to make it clear that I do believe that the U.N. needs to be 
reformed if it is to be relevant in the 21st century. We need to pursue 
its transformation aggressively, sending the strong message that 
corruption will not be tolerated. The corruption that occurred under 
the Oil for Food Program made it possible for Saddam's Iraq to 
discredit the U.N. and undermine the goals of its members. This must 
never happen again, and severe reforms are needed to strengthen the 
organization. And, yes, I believe it will be necessary to take a firm 
position so that we can succeed. But it will take a special individual 
to succeed in this endeavor, and I have great concerns with the current 
nominee and his ability to get the job done.
  To those who say a vote against John Bolton is a vote against reform 
of the United Nations, I say nonsense. Frankly, I am concerned that Mr. 
Bolton would make it more difficult for us to achieve the badly needed 
reforms to this outdated institution. I believe there could be even 
more obstacles to reform if Mr. Bolton were sent to the U.N. than if it 
were another candidate. Those in the international community who do not 
want to see the U.N. reformed will act as a roadblock, and I fear Mr. 
Bolton's reputation will make it easier for them to succeed.
  I believe that some member nations in the U.N. will use Mr. Bolton as 
part of their agenda to further question the credibility and integrity 
of the United States of America and to reinforce their negative U.S. 
propaganda.
  If we send Mr. Bolton to the United Nations, the message will be lost 
because our enemies will do everything they can to use Mr. Bolton's 
baggage to drown his words. The issue will be the messenger--the 
messenger and not the message.

  Another reason I believe Mr. Bolton is not the best candidate for the 
job is his tendency to act without regard to the views of others and 
without respect to chains of command. We have heard Mr. Bolton has a 
reputation for straying off message. He is reported to have strayed off 
message more often than anyone else holding a responsible position at 
the State Department during Secretary Powell's years as Secretary of 
State.
  U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard testified that Bolton 
rejected his request to soften the tone of a July 2003 speech on North 
Korea policy and stated that the speech hurt, rather than helped, 
efforts to achieve the President's objectives.
  Here is the question from a committee staffer:

       And what was your impression of the speech when you first 
     read it, the day before it was going to be delivered? Did you 
     suggest changes in it?

  We are talking now of the question to Ambassador Hubbard.

       I think our most important comment was that we thought the 
     tone was way too strong, that he used derogatory terms about 
     Kim Jung Il . . . throughout the speech, in virtually every 
     sentence. And I and my staff argued that was 
     counterproductive to our interest in getting the North 
     Koreans back into the talks [on their reducing their nuclear 
     threat.]

  Committee staffer:

       And was Mr. Bolton aware of the South Korean request to 
     avoid inflammatory language that might complicate the Six-
     Party process?

  Ambassador Hubbard:

       Yes.

  Committee staffer:

       Did he make all the changes [in the July 2000 speech] that 
     had been suggested?

  Ambassador Hubbard:

       No, I don't believe so. You know, I think that--to be very 
     clear, we didn't go through the speech, scratching out the 
     word ``dictator'' every time we saw it--you know, that--we 
     made an overall comment . . . that we felt that was 
     counterproductive and overblown.

  Committee staffer:

       Did you believe the speech advanced the President's 
     objective of achieving a peaceful denuclearization of the 
     Korean Peninsula through negotiations? Or, if not, why not?

  Ambassador Hubbard:

       No, I don't think it advanced the process . . . In my view, 
     the invective . . . gave the North Koreans another excuse or 
     pretext not to come back to the committee.

  Committee staffer:

       Did Bolton advance President Bush's North Korea policy?

  Ambassador Hubbard:

       My belief is that his actions hurt.

  According to reliable sources at the State Department, it was after 
that speech that it was made clear to Mr. Bolton he would have to clear 
any future speeches through the Secretary or Deputy Secretary and that 
he would be put on a very short leash. This was just one of the many 
times he was called on the carpet.
  In fairness to Mr. Bolton, the sources have said to me, once 
reprimanded, Bolton got back on track but that he needed to be kept on 
a short leash.
  Who is to say that Bolton will not continue to stray off message as 
ambassador to the U.N.? Who is to say he will not hurt, rather than 
help, United States relations with the international community and our 
desire to reform the United Nations?
  When discussing all of these concerns with Secretary Rice--John 
Bolton's propensity to get off message, his lack of interpersonal 
skills, his tendency to abuse others who disagree with him--I was 
informed by the Secretary of State she understood all these things and 
in spite of them still feels John Bolton is the best choice. She 
assured me she would be in frequent communication with him and that he 
would be supervised very closely.
  My private thought, and I should have shared this with the Secretary 
of State, is why in the world would you want to send someone to the 
United Nations who requires such supervision?
  I am also concerned about Mr. Bolton's interpersonal skills. I 
understand there will be several vacant senior posts on the staff when 
Mr. Bolton arrives in his new position. As a matter of fact, I 
understand all the top people are leaving. I understand one of the most 
respected and qualified people at the U.N., Anne Patterson, will be 
leaving her post, and others will be departing, as I mentioned.
  As such, Mr. Bolton will face a challenge of inspiring, leading, and 
managing a new team, a staff of roughly 150 individuals, perhaps more, 
whom he is going to need to rely upon to get the job done. As we know, 
all of us are only as good as the team we have surrounding us. We are 
all aware of the testimony and observations related to Mr. Bolton's 
interpersonal and management skills.

  With that record in mind, I have concern about Mr. Bolton's ability 
to inspire and lead a team so he can be as effective as possible in 
completing the important tasks before him. And I am not the only one. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee received letters from 102 U.S. 
diplomats who served under administrations for both sides of the aisle 
saying Mr. Bolton is the wrong man for the job.

[[Page S5895]]

  Colin Powell's chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, testified 
before the committee that Mr. Bolton would make ``an abysmal 
ambassador,'' and that ``he is incapable of listening to people and 
taking into account their views.''
  I would like to read some of Mr. Wilkerson's testimony.
  Mr. Wilkerson:

       I would like to make just one statement. I don't have a 
     large problem with Under Secretary Bolton serving our 
     country. My objections to what we've been talking about 
     here--that is, him being our ambassador at the United 
     Nations--stem from two basic things. One, I think he's a 
     lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that 
     have to be led; they have to be led well, and they have to be 
     led properly. And I think, in that capacity, if he goes up 
     there, you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year.

  I would also like to highlight the words of another person I myself 
respect and who worked closely with Mr. Bolton. He told me if Bolton 
were confirmed, he would be ok for a short while, but within 6 months 
his poor interpersonal skills and lack of self-discipline would cause 
major problems. He told me Mr. Bolton is unable to control his temper.
  I would like to read some quotes from the testimony of Christian 
Westermann, the analyst from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
and Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research, about Mr. Bolton's patterns of losing his temper and getting 
angry.
  Mr. Westermann:

       He was quite upset that I had objected and he wanted to 
     know what right I had trying to change an Under Secretary's 
     language.

  This was in a speech and Mr. Westermann had to send that speech over 
to the CIA and then it came back from the CIA.

       And what he would say, or not say or something like that. 
     And I tried to explain a little bit of the same things about 
     the process of how we clear language. And I guess I wasn't 
     really in a mood to listen and he was quite angry and 
     basically told me I had no right to do that.

  By the way, Mr. Westermann did not work in Mr. Bolton's section of 
the State Department. He worked in INR, another department, another 
department, not under his direct supervision.

       And he [Mr. Bolton] got very red in the face, shaking his 
     finger at me and explaining to me I was acting way beyond my 
     position, and for someone who worked for him. I told him I 
     didn't work for him.

  Staffer:

       And when [Bolton] threw you out of the office, how did he 
     do that?

  Committee staffer:

       He just told me to get out and get Tom Fingar, he was 
     yelling and screaming and red in the face, and wagging his 
     finger. I'll never forget the wagging of the finger.

  Committee staffer:

       Could you characterize your meeting with Bolton? Was he 
     calm?

  Mr. Tom Fingar:

       No, he was angry.

  Additionally, I want to note my concern that former Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, the person to whom Mr. Bolton answered over the 
last 4 years, was conspicuously absent from a letter signed by former 
Secretaries of State recommending Mr. Bolton's confirmation. Of all the 
people who worked with Mr. Bolton, Powell is the most qualified person 
to judge the man and his ability to serve as the Secretary's ambassador 
to the U.N. and he did not sign the letter.
  In fact, I have learned that several well-respected leaders in our 
foreign policy community were shocked by Mr. Bolton's nomination 
because he is the last person thought to be appropriate for the job.
  There are several interesting theories on how Mr. Bolton got the 
nomination. I am not going to go into them in the Senate. If anyone 
would like to talk to me about that, I am happy to discuss it with 
them; otherwise, I urge you to get in touch with senior members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and ask them.
  We are facing an era of foreign relations in which the choice of our 
ambassador to the United Nations should be one of the most thoughtful 
decisions we make. The candidate needs to be both a diplomat and a 
manager. He must have the ability to persuade and inspire our friends, 
to communicate and convince, to listen, to absorb the ideas of others. 
Without such virtues, we will face more efforts in our war on 
terrorism, to spread democracy and to foster stability globally.
  The question is, is John Bolton the best person for the job? The 
administration says they believe he is the right man. They say despite 
his interpersonal shortcomings, he knows the U.N., he can reform the 
organization and make it more powerful and more relevant to the world.
  There is no doubt John Bolton should be commended and thanked for his 
service and his particular achievements.
  He has accomplished some important objectives against great odds. As 
the sponsor of legislation that established an office on global anti-
Semitism in the State Department, I am particularly impressed by his 
work to repeal the U.N. legislation equating Zionism with racism. I 
wholeheartedly agree with Bolton that we must work with the U.N. to 
change its anti-Israel bias, and I applaud his work on this issue.
  In 2003, I sent a letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan of the 
United Nations to express my profound concern about the appalling 
developments in the U.N. and the Palestinian Observer's equation of 
Zionism with Nazism and ask that the United Nations condemn the remarks 
and maintain a commitment to human rights.
  Further, I am impressed by Mr. Bolton's achievements in the area of 
arms control, specifically on the Moscow Treaty, the G8 ``10-Plus-10-
Over-10'' Global Partnership Fund, and the President's Proliferation 
Security Initiative.
  Now, it has been suggested that we should vote for Mr. Bolton because 
of his achievements and qualifications despite his reputation as a 
``bully'' and his poor interpersonal skills.
  I agree that Mr. Bolton has had some achievements, but I am dubious 
that Mr. Bolton's record of performance has been so overwhelmingly 
successful that we should ignore his negative pattern of behavior and 
credibility problems with the international community.
  For the last 4 years, Mr. Bolton served as the top arms control and 
nonproliferation official for the State Department. The most pressing 
nonproliferation issues affecting U.S. national security today involve 
the threat of Iran's nuclear ambitions, the threat of North Korea's 
nuclear ambitions, and the need to expand and accelerate our 
cooperation with the Russian Federation to secure and dismantle 
Russia's nuclear and WMD infrastructure to keep it out of the hands of 
would-be terrorists or proliferant nations.
  The United States has not had significant success on these issues in 
the last 4 years. In the case of North Korea, they have withdrawn from 
the Nonproliferation Treaty and the situation has become more critical 
during Bolton's watch. Our U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas 
Hubbard, stated that Mr. Bolton's approach on North Korea was damaging 
to U.S. interests. With regard to our cooperation with Russia to secure 
its WMD infrastructure and fissile material, I have read several 
reports that Mr. Bolton also hurt efforts to move beyond the legal 
holdup of ``liability'' that has stymied our programs.
  On May 16, a Newsweek article reported that for several years, the 
disposal of Russia's 134-ton hoard of plutonium has been stymied by an 
obscure legal issue in which Washington has sought to free U.S. 
contractors from any iability for nuclear contamination during cleanup. 
It says that: Bolton bore a very heavy responsibility for festering the 
plutonium issue. It reports that a former State Department official 
said: In 2004, Bolton quashed a compromise plan by his own 
nonproliferation bureau, even after other agencies had approved it.
  I must say I am unimpressed by Mr. Bolton's failure to secure a 
compromise during his 4 years that would enable us to move forward to 
secure this material from terrorists.
  The situation in Iran is also very concerning and has only worsened 
in the last 4 years.
  Among our accomplishments in nonproliferation, there is no doubt that 
Libya's decision to dismantle its WMD infrastructure was one of the 
largest successes of the last 4 years.
  We really rejoiced over that. However, there is credible reporting 
that Mr. Bolton was sidelined from the negotiations by the White House 
and that some believed he might hurt their chances of succeeding with 
Libya. Additional reports indicate that Mr.

[[Page S5896]]

Bolton was sidelined at the request of British officials working on the 
issue, because they felt he was a liability during the negotiations.
  Mr. Bolton has also been given a great deal of credit for his work on 
getting Article 98 agreements with several countries and important 
military partners. Article 98 agreements secure U.S. military officers 
from prosecution under the International Criminal Court while 
conducting operations or military exercises in a foreign country.
  I support the efforts to secure Article 98 agreements and protect 
U.S. Forces against what could be a politically driven trial in a 
foreign country. However, I understand that Mr. Bolton worked to secure 
these agreements by putting a hold on all U.S. military education and 
training assistance to these countries--understanding that the last 
seven countries we brought into the United Nations never signed that 
Article 98 treaty.

  This assistance that we provide to these countries provides education 
to military officials about U.S. and Western military doctrine, the 
importance of a civilian-run military, civil-military relations, and 
respect for human rights. It provides basic leadership training and 
other important training that enables foreign troops to interoperate 
with U.S. forces and international forces--such as English language 
training and general combat training. This is very important assistance 
at a time when we are fighting with a coalition in Afghanistan and a 
coalition in Iraq. But at the very same time that we were seeking 
additional supporters in Iraq, some military officials arriving at U.S. 
airports to receive the military education training were turned away 
because of Mr. Bolton's strong-arming tactics.
  As I understand it, several different State Department officials 
asked Mr. Bolton to remove the holds because of the negative impact 
they were having on our allies, and he refused to listen to their 
views.
  I ran into this when I was in Croatia a couple weeks ago. I talked to 
the new Prime Minister of Croatia, Ivo Sanader, and he was saying: I 
have to sign Article 98. If I don't get it, then we get no help 
whatsoever in terms of advice about how we civilianize our Army and so 
forth. And there are people in the Defense Department who think it is a 
good idea. And I think it is a good idea because we have to be 
concerned, in some of those countries that have gone democratic, that 
if things get bad, we do not want to see a coup d'etat come from the 
military part of their operation. So we should be doing everything we 
can to civilianize it. But, no, can't do it. Mr. Bolton doesn't want to 
do it.
  Mr. President, how are we supposed to persuade our friends and allies 
to join us in Iraq and Afghanistan when we are cutting off the English-
language training and other military training that would enable them to 
send troops to serve with us?
  In fact, the policy is contradictory to U.S. public diplomacy efforts 
as well as efforts to secure support in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Mr. 
Bolton did not listen to the views of his staff who told him that the 
policy was damaging our bigger picture interests.
  For this reason, I question the suggestion that Mr. Bolton's 
qualifications and his record of performance is so outstanding that we 
should vote for him, despite his negative pattern of behavior.
  But this is another issue that is deeply concerning to me. We cannot 
deny that Mr. Bolton's record shows a pattern of behavior that is 
contradictory to that of an effective Ambassador.
  I would like to read to you a quote by Mr. Carl Ford, who headed the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR, in the State Department from 
2001 to 2003. He testified that Mr. Bolton is a ``kiss up and kick 
down'' leader who does not tolerate those who disagree with him and 
goes out of his way to retaliate for their disagreement.
  Here is what Mr. Ford said:

       Unfortunately, my judgment, my opinion, he's a 
     quintessential ``kiss-up, kick-down'' sort of guy . . . I'm 
     sure you've met them. But the fact is that he stands out, 
     that he's got a bigger kick and it gets bigger and stronger 
     the further down the bureaucracy he's kicking.

  Others who have worked closely with Mr. Bolton have stated that he is 
an ideologue and that he fosters an atmosphere of intimidation and does 
not tolerate disagreement, does not tolerate dissent, and that he 
bullies those who disagree with him.
  I would like to read some excerpts from the testimony of the 
Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, and Mr. John Wolf, Assistant 
Secretary of the Nonproliferation Bureau, who worked directly under Mr. 
Bolton.

       Committee staffer. There have been press reports--one in 
     December of 2003, in USA Today, that--I'll just read you the 
     quote from that story. Quote, ``In private, Bolton's 
     colleagues can be scathing. One high-level coworker calls 
     Bolton `an anti-diplomat who tries to intimidate those who 
     disagree with his views.' Another diplomat says, `No one in 
     the Department dares to criticize Bolton on the record, 
     because he has support at the highest levels of the 
     Administration. Despite his often blunt public 
     pronouncements, he's never publicly chastised or 
     contradicted,' the diplomat says.'' Does that sound like the 
     John Bolton you know?
       Ambassador Hubbard. It sounds, in general, like what I 
     experienced.
       Committee staffer. Did that--did Mr. Bolton prevent those 
     views of debate [on policy issues from the Nonproliferation 
     Bureau] from getting up to the Deputy Secretary?
       Mr. Wolf, [Assistant Secretary of Nonproliferation]: There 
     were long and arduous discussions about issues before they 
     got to the Secretary.
       Committee staffer. And, in those discussions, how would you 
     characterize Mr. Bolton's demeanor and professionalism in 
     listening to alternative points of views or listening to 
     those who disagreed with his point of view? Did he have an 
     open mind?
       Mr. Wolf. He tended to hold on to his own views strongly, 
     and he tended not to be--he tended not to be enthusiastic 
     about alternative views.

       Mr. Wolf. He did not--he did not--he did not encourage 
     differing views. And he tended to have a fairly blunt manner 
     of expressing himself.
       Committee staffer. Would you go so far as to say that he 
     discouraged alternative views through his demeanor and 
     through his response when people presented alternative views 
     to him?
       Mr. Wolf. He did not encourage us to provide our views to 
     the Secretary . . . our alternative views.

  Colin Powell's chief of staff Lawrence Wilkerson testified that Mr. 
Bolton tended to focus on accomplishing his own goals as a matter of 
``bean-counting'' and refused to consider the repercussions of his 
methods on the greater policy objectives of the United States.
  I would like to quote from Colonel Wilkerson's testimony:

       Second, I differ from a lot of people in Washington, both 
     friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, 
     ``brilliance,'' unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who 
     counted beans, who said ``98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next 
     day,'' and had no willingness--in many cases, no capacity--to 
     understand the other things that were happening around those 
     beans. And that is just a recipe for problems at the United 
     Nations. And that's the only reason that I said anything.

  Mr. Wilkerson again:

       My prejudice and my bias will come out here, because I 
     think one of the number-one problems facing the country right 
     now--and, you know, I'm here because of my country--

  This is Wilkerson. He volunteered. We didn't go out and get him. He 
volunteered.

     --not because of anybody else--is North Korea . . . So when 
     people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing with that 
     problem in order to push their pet rocks in other areas, it 
     bothers me, as a diplomat, and as a citizen of this country.

  And I have citations on all of this in the testimony.
  Wilkerson again:

       It was the same thing with nonproliferation. The statistic 
     I mentioned before, which I think Under Secretary Bolton 
     mentioned in his speech in Tokyo on February the 7th, if I 
     remember right--I still keep up with this stuff, Northeast 
     Asia--and he said the Clinton Administration, in eight years, 
     had sanctioned China eight times, and the Bush 
     Administration, in four years, had sanctioned China 62 times. 
     As I used to say, what's the measurement of effectiveness 
     here? What's it done? Is the sanctioning of 62 times an 
     indication that China is proliferating more? Or is it an 
     indication that we're cracking down? I'd love to see the 
     statistic for the next four years, if Bolton were to remain 
     Under Secretary. It would be 120 or 140. And what is the 
     effectiveness of this? Are we actually stopping proliferation 
     that was dangerous to our interest? Or are we doing it, and 
     ignoring other problems that cry out for cures, diplomatic? 
     And no one sits and says, you know, ``Okay, that's correct, 
     that's correct, this is correct, this is what's effective, 
     this isn't effective.'' The one time I had a conversation 
     with John about this, I asked him, ``How do you go beyond 
     sanctions, John? War?'' [Bolton's implied answer was:] ``Not 
     my business.'' [In other words, that was not his problem.]

  Former Assistant Secretary of the Intelligence and Research Bureau 
Carl Ford testified he had never seen anyone behave as badly in all his 
days at

[[Page S5897]]

the State Department and that he would not have even testified before 
the Committee if John Bolton had simply followed protocol and simple 
rules of management.

       Mr. Ford. I can guarantee you . . . that if Secretary 
     Bolton had chosen to come to see me, or in my absence, my 
     Principal Deputy, Secretary Tom Fingar, I wouldn't be here 
     today. He could have approached me in the same tone, and in 
     the same attitude--shaking his finger, red in the face, high 
     tone in his voice--and I wouldn't be here today. If he had 
     gone to Secretary Powell, or Secretary Armitage, and 
     complained loudly about the poor service that he was 
     receiving from INR and the terrible treatment that he had 
     been stabbed in the back by one of INR's analysts, I wouldn't 
     be here today. The fact is, it is appropriate, if someone is 
     unhappy with the service they're getting from one of the 
     services or organizations in a bureaucracy, that they should 
     complain. They should yell as loud as they want to. But, 
     instead of doing any of those three things, Secretary Bolton 
     chose to reach five or six levels down below him in the 
     bureaucracy--

  By the way, a bureaucracy he was not in charge of

     --bring an analyst into his office, and give him a tongue 
     lashing, and I frankly don't care whether he sang scat for 
     five minutes, the attitude, the volume of his tone, and what 
     I understand to be the substance of the conversation--he was 
     so far over the line . . . That is, I've never seen anybody 
     quite like Secretary Bolton . . . I don't have a second and a 
     third or fourth, in terms of the way he abuses his power and 
     authority with little people . . . There are a lot of 
     screamers that work in government, but you don't pull 
     somebody so low down in the bureaucracy that they're 
     completely defenseless. It's an 800 pound gorilla devouring a 
     banana. The analyst was required simply to stand there and 
     take it, and Secretary Bolton knew when he had the tirade 
     that, in fact, that was the case.

  I want to note that in Mr. Bolton's testimony, he justifies his anger 
and retaliatory actions against Mr. Westermann by citing an apologetic 
e-mail from Mr. Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of the Intelligence 
Bureau. And when I met privately with Mr. Bolton, he said: Right after 
it happened, I received this apologetic e-mail from Mr. Fingar. So we 
asked Mr. Fingar and Mr. Ford about the e-mail.

       Committee staffer. You said . . . that what Mr. Westermann 
     did was entirely within the procedure, he was never 
     disciplined, it was perfectly normal, that the only failure 
     of his was lack of prudence. And then here [in the e-mail to 
     Bolton] you say it's ``entirely inappropriate,'' and ``we 
     screwed up, it won't happen again.'' That seems like a rather 
     different assessment.
       Mr. Fingar. Well, I knew I was dealing with somebody who 
     was very upset, I was trying to get the incident closed, 
     which I didn't regard as a big deal. I know John [Bolton] was 
     mad. I assumed, when people are mad, they get over it. So, 
     did I lean over in the direction of ``Sure, we'll take 
     responsibility?'' He thanked me for it, at least as far as 
     I'm concerned, in my dealings with Bolton, that closed it.

  So basically it was, somebody is mad. You send them back an e-mail 
and say our guy didn't do what he was supposed to do. You hope they 
will get off your butt and it will be over with. But it wasn't over. He 
kept going after him. We have to move this guy. We have to bring 
somebody else in here. I can't deal with him. That is the way he acts.
  Mr. Ford:

     . . . knowing him [Fingar] well, I'm assuming it simply was, 
     as you said, this guy [Bolton] was furious, he could 
     potentially do great damage to the bureau, and he [Fingar] 
     was just trying to put him back in the box and keep him from 
     doing any more harm. And I can't fault him for that.

  I also want to point out that Carl Ford, Lawrence Wilkerson, and 
almost all of the witnesses who came before our committee are 
appointees of the Bush administration. These are loyal Republicans who 
say: I am a conservative Republican. I am loyal to the President, that 
they could not abide Mr. Bolton's nomination because of their concern 
for his conduct and his erratic, often unprofessional, behavior.
  That is what this is about.
  I have to say that after pouring over the hundreds of pages of 
testimony and speaking with many individuals, I believe John Bolton 
would have been fired if he had worked for a major corporation. That is 
not the behavior of a true leader who upholds the kind of democracy 
President Bush is seeking to promote globally. This is not the behavior 
that should be endorsed as the face of the United States to the world 
community at the United Nations.
  It, rather, is my opinion that John Bolton is the poster child of 
what the diplomatic corps should not be. I worry about the signal we 
are sending to the thousands of individuals under the State Department 
who are serving their country in foreign service and civil service, 
living in posts across the world and in some cases risking their lives, 
all so they can represent our country, promote diplomacy, and 
contribute to the safety of Americans everywhere.
  What are we saying to these people? And I care about human capital. I 
have been working on it now for over 6 years. When we say to these 
people that we look to confirm an individual with this record to one of 
the highest positions in the State Department, what are we saying to 
these people? I was in Croatia. I was in Slovenia. They can't believe 
it.
  I want to emphasize that I have weighed Bolton's strengths carefully. 
I have weighed the fact that this is the President's nominee. All 
things being equal, it is my proclivity to support the President's 
nominee, as most of us. However, in this case, all things are not 
equal. It is a different world today than it was 4 years ago. Our 
enemies are Muslim extremists and religious fanatics who have hijacked 
the Koran and have convinced people that the way to get to Heaven is 
through Jihad and against the world, particularly the United States. We 
must recognize that to be successful in this war, one of our most 
important tools is public diplomacy, more than ever before--
intelligence and public diplomacy. After hours of deliberation, 
telephone calls, personal conversations, reading hundreds of pages of 
transcripts, and asking for guidance from above, I have come to the 
determination that the United States can do better than John Bolton. We 
need an ambassador who understands the wisdom of Teddy Roosevelt's 
policy to walk softly and carry a big stick. The U.S. needs an 
ambassador who is interested in encouraging other people's points of 
view and discouraging any atmosphere of intimidation. The world needs 
an American ambassador to the U.N. who will show that the United States 
has respect for other countries and intermediary organizations, that we 
are team players and consensus builders and promoters of symbiotic 
relationships.
  In moving forward with the international community, we should 
remember the words of the Scot poet Bobbie Burns who said:

       Oh, that some great power would give me the wisdom to see 
     myself as other people see me.
  And when thinking of John Bolton earlier today, I thought of one--I 
don't know whether it is a fairy tale, or whatever, called ``The 
Emperor Has No Clothes.'' We are going to vote tomorrow, and I am 
afraid that when we go to the well, too many of my colleagues are not 
going to understand that this appointment is very important to our 
country. At a strategic time when we need friends all over the world, 
we need somebody who is going to be able to get the job done. Some of 
my friends say: Let it go, George. It is going to work out.
  I don't want to take the risk. I came back here and ran for a second 
term because I am worried about my kids and my grandchildren. I just 
hope my colleagues will take the time before they get to this well and 
do some serious thinking about whether we should send John Bolton to 
the United Nations.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I wanted to take a second to say to my 
friend and colleague from Ohio, I have been through a lot of this 
debate over the last several weeks and months. A lot of things are 
going on today, but I hope my colleagues and others--if they have not 
had a chance to listen to my colleague from Ohio--will read his 
comments. They are heartfelt. I know the feeling. I remember several 
occasions, but there was a time when I was one of two Democrats to 
support John Tower many years ago, when he was being considered for the 
nomination as Secretary of Defense. I supported John Ashcroft to be 
Attorney General from the previous administration.
  I know when you are being different and standing up and going against 
the tide from people on your own side, it can be a lonely moment. I 
know what it feels like to be there. If you do it out of conviction and 
belief and because of how important these issues are, then I think all 
of us, regardless of where you

[[Page S5898]]

come out on the issue, appreciate the courage and the determination of 
a Member who does it.
  I am comfortable with my colleagues' remarks, with his position. As I 
told him the other day, I have been here a long time now--24 years in 
the Senate--and there are moments like this when I am deeply proud to 
serve with my colleagues. George Voinovich and I don't agree on a lot 
of issues. We are of different political persuasions and parties. But 
my respect for him as a Member of this body is tremendous. Whether you 
agree with George Voinovich or not, this is a Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I deeply respect my colleague from Ohio, 
and I deeply respect the passion that he brings to his concern about 
this nomination.
  I also bring passion and concern. I have been involved as chairman of 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and have been looking at 
the U.N. and the oil for food scandal--a scandal which allowed Saddam 
Hussein to rebuild his military capacity, to bribe individuals close to 
the leadership of member states of the Security Council, to fund 
terrorism. I have looked at the U.N. over recent years, at the scandals 
of sexual abuse and child prostitution in Africa, where U.N. officials 
were not responded to for months and months. I have looked at the world 
in which we live, and the challenges we face, and I realize the United 
States cannot be the world's sole policeman, the world's sole 
humanitarian provider. We cannot do it on our own. We need partners and 
we need a U.N. that is strong and credible.
  This President has made a decision that the person who can best do 
the heavy lifting that is required for U.N. reform is John Bolton. He 
does that by looking at the record of John Bolton. I respect the 
President for that commitment to reform the United Nations, and as I 
look at this dangerous world in which we live, I think it is essential 
that we seize this moment of opportunity now. I think it is essential 
that we confirm this nomination.
  The reality is that John Bolton is a man of strong conviction. 
Clearly, there are some differences of perspective even in the State 
Department. There was an editorial in the Washington Post on May 12 of 
this year in which the writer said:

       The committee interviews have provided some colorful 
     details without breaking new ground on what has long been a 
     well-understood split in the first Bush administration, a 
     split between those who saw themselves as the pragmatic 
     diplomats, (the Powell camp) and those, like Mr. Bolton, who 
     saw themselves as more willing to bruise feelings here and 
     abroad in standing up for U.S. interests.

  In the end, the Post concludes:

       The nominee is intelligent and qualified; we still see no 
     compelling reason to deny the president his choice.

  Former Secretary of State--perhaps the model of the Secretaries of 
State--Lawrence Eagleburger, a career foreign service officer, said in 
an April 22 Washington Post op-ed:

       The real reasons Bolton's opponents want to derail his 
     nomination are his oft-repeated criticism of the United 
     Nations and other international organizations, his rejection 
     of the arguments of those who ignore or excuse the 
     inexcusable (i.e., the election of Sudan to the Human Rights 
     Commission) . . .

  And a couple weeks ago the election of Zimbabwe.

       As to the charge that Bolton has been tough on 
     subordinates, I can say only that in more than a decade of 
     association with him at the State Department, I never saw or 
     heard anything to support such a charge. Nor do I see 
     anything wrong with his challenging intelligence analysts on 
     their findings.

  My colleague from Ohio and my colleagues across the aisle talked 
about an incident with an analyst--Westermann--in which Bolton had a 
speech that he was preparing on the issue of Cuba's capacity to develop 
biological weapons. That speech then was supposed to be sent to 
analysts in the process. That is the process--send it around to 
analysts and they come back and tell you whether you can say what you 
want to say. In the end, the speeches have to get cleared.
  What happened with Mr. Westermann is this. What you have heard so far 
is that John Bolton was angry at Mr. Westermann. My colleague from Ohio 
said he was quite upset as to why he would change language. That is 
what happened. What happened is not that Westermann sent something 
around and then got it back, and then Bolton had a concern with the 
conclusion. What happened is that when Bolton gave the document with 
the language to Westermann, he sent it on. What he told Bolton's chief 
of staff was: I sent your language to the CIA intact and only at its 
source citations.
  What really happened, and what the record shows and demonstrates, is 
that what Westermann did is that he had sent it around, but he inserted 
language that basically said what Bolton wanted to say would not fly. 
So Bolton doesn't know, when he gets it back, that that piece is out. 
Clearly, he wanted to say it, but they said he could not. His concern 
with Westermann--and the testimony reflects this also--was not about 
policy. He said: I disagree with you going behind my back. I disagree 
with you not being honest with me, not telling me up front that in fact 
this is what you did rather than saying I circulated it, but I find out 
that, in effect, you lied to me.
  John Bolton was angry and he said: I have lost confidence in someone 
who cannot be honest with me, who goes behind my back, and I have to 
find out about it from another source. That was the conversation he had 
with Westermann. What you hear and what is portrayed about Mr. Bolton 
is that somehow there is this pattern of abuse. What is cited is that 
he had this conversation with Westermann--by the way, after that 
conversation, Mr. Bolton did check with Westermann's superiors and got 
an e-mail. We heard about that e-mail. The e-mail said--and this is 
from Mr. Fingar, one of the superiors of Westermann:

       We screwed up but not for base reasons. It won't happen 
     again.

  So Bolton finds out that he has been tooled by somebody who did not 
tell him the truth about what happened. He checks with his superior and 
gets an e-mail that says, by the way, we made a mistake, this will not 
happen again.
  My colleague from Ohio says they were just doing that because they 
found out somebody was upset. But if you are looking at it from John 
Bolton's perspective, what you see is: I was angry because somebody did 
something which is confirmed by their source, the senior person there, 
that, in fact, what they did was wrong.
  It is interesting because Fingar basically said it was not a big 
deal. As far as I am concerned, that closed it.
  We get a representation somehow that did not close it, that John 
Bolton is going around pounding this issue and looking for retribution 
with Mr. Westermann. In fact, the report shows just the opposite.
  What happened here is Bolton was upset. He went to the guy who caused 
the problem. He also tried contacting his superior. He was not around. 
He eventually got to Fingar who came back with an e-mail--I use his 
language--``We screwed up,'' and that is it. That is it.
  Then we hear the testimony of Carl Ford, a long-term, good, loyal 
employee of the State Department, and we hear about Ford and his 
representations about Mr. Bolton. John Bolton's interaction with Carl 
Ford was a 2 or 3-minute conversation in front of a water fountain. So 
it was not a matter of somebody going around to get retribution and 
they are angry. That was it, literally Bolton ran into Ford at a water 
fountain. What Ford was upset about was that John Bolton went to his 
guy. It was his guy on his team. Ford was upset with that. I guess you 
have two guys with pretty strong feelings. But that was the 
conversation.
  John Bolton did not call the Secretary of State, did not call the 
Deputy Secretary of State, did not call others in the Department, did 
not pursue it. If I am angry about something, really angry about 
something, I want to take care of it and I take care of it, 
particularly a guy like John Bolton. He is not a soft guy, no question 
about that. But the interaction regarding Westermann was bumping into 
someone at a water fountain and having an exchange. Westermann's boss 
basically said: Don't mess with my guys. And that is Mr. Ford. His 
experience with John Bolton is essentially that 2-minute conversation--
that is it--I think until he leaves.
  Then the only other conversation on the record that Mr. Bolton had 
about Mr. Westermann is a number of months later, he was visiting with 
another official within the agency and asked how

[[Page S5899]]

are things going and is there anything that troubles you? Only when 
asked that question does he even bring up the incident again, and that 
is it.
  So this image being portrayed about somehow hounding down a lower 
level employee--by the way, Westermann was a 20-year Navy veteran; he 
was not a kid wet behind his ears. I have to tell you, if it was the 
private sector, Mr. Westermann may have been fired for not being honest 
with his superior, for going behind somebody's back. That is what 
happened.
  I want to go back to the Washington Post article, the Eagleburger 
comment. Here is what is really happening here. When John Bolton's name 
was put forward as the nomination by the President, my colleagues on 
the other side made it very clear they were going to oppose this 
nomination. The issue then was his comments he made about the United 
Nations. My colleagues on the other side of the aisle did not think 
John Bolton was respectful enough of the United Nations and he did not 
deserve to be confirmed. That was the issue. It was about policy 
differences between John Bolton and my colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle.
  What happened is because that argument did not sell, they then began 
an examination of some of these interpersonal exchanges and what became 
the Westermann issue, what became a series of contacts with John 
Bolton, with legitimate concerns, characterized as a series of a 
pattern abuser.
  There were concerns raised about North Korea and about John Bolton's 
comments regarding North Korea, somehow that he was straying off 
message, that he was saying things that should not have been said, that 
he gave a speech in July 2000 in which I think he called Kim Jong Il, 
the North Korean President, a tyrant, which, by the way, he is. The 
comment was he was straying off message, that he was saying things that 
should not have been said.
  I have a copy of a letter from former Secretary of State Colin 
Powell. It is dated August 26, 2003, when he was Secretary of State. He 
is sending a letter to Jon Kyl of the Senate. He says:

       Dear Jon, I am pleased to reply to your recent letter 
     concerning John Bolton's speech in Korea and our reaction.
       Undersecretary's Bolton speech was fully cleared within the 
     Department. It was consistent with Administration policy, did 
     not really break new ground with regard to our disdain for 
     the North Korean leadership and, as such, was official.

  `` . . . and, as such, was official.'' ``Fully cleared,'' ``was 
official.''
  If one sat here and listened to what was said before, one would think 
somehow this guy was off there on his own saying things that were 
disruptive to policy.
  That is not the way it works. For the public who may not understand, 
when we have a senior State Department official making speeches in 
North Korea, making speeches about Cuba and its policy regarding 
procurement of biological weapons, these speeches are cleared. There is 
a process. There is not a single instance in the record where John 
Bolton is somehow substantiated for having said things that were not 
policy, said things that were disruptive of policy.
  At times did he challenge analysts? Yes, he did, and that is probably 
a pretty good thing to do. Analysts do not speak from a holy mountain. 
They come in with a perspective. We have seen enough history now in the 
last couple of years where analysts had a perspective and they were 
wrong. John Bolton challenged analysts, but in the end, each and every 
time, what he did was he delivered the message he was supposed to be 
delivering.
  There was a question concerning Libya and the allegation, by the way, 
in Newsweek--an allegation in Newsweek. My colleagues quote Newsweek as 
if it is the Holy Bible. Newsweek--credible reporting that he was 
sidelined, and then there was a conversation, an anonymous source, that 
somehow the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was complaining to 
Powell about John Bolton. The anonymous source, according to a Bush 
official, told them that Secretary of State Powell's Under Secretary 
for Arms Control was making it impossible to reach allied agreement on 
Iran's nuclear program. Powell turned to an aide and said: Get a 
different view on the problem, Bolton is being too tough. Jack Straw 
flatly rejects this. Here is what Straw's press spokesman is saying:

       Conversations between the Foreign Secretary and our U.S. 
     counterpart are private and we do not normally comment on 
     their content. However, the Foreign Secretary has no 
     recollection whatsoever of telling the U.S. administration or 
     any other whom it should or should not put in charge of its 
     business. John Bolton held a senior position in 
     counterproliferation arms control in the last administration 
     and senior UK officials worked closely with him on a range of 
     issues.

  The bottom line is Mr. Powell never told Mr. Bolton he was being too 
tough in dealing with our European allies. Mr. Bolton has continued to 
represent the Bush administration's firm position that Iran has yet to 
make their strategic decision not to pursue nuclear weapons capability 
and, therefore, Iran's violation of its commitments under the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty should be referred to the United Nations 
Security Council.
  There was another concern about an article 98 issue. The allegation 
was that somehow Mr. Bolton blocked military aid for Eastern European 
NATO candidate countries, even though there are article 98 
restrictions, concerns for not agreeing to take U.S. servicemen to the 
International Criminal Court, have been waived. Bolton wanted to 
pressure them to sign the article 98 agreements.
  Rich Armitage, the No. 2 person at the State Department under Colin 
Powell, has refuted this claim. He said: I did not consider this 
unusual at all. Different fiefdoms at State often have different 
positions and Deputy Secretaries resolve them. It was part and parcel 
of daily life. Again, allegation made and claim simply not true.
  I could go on. I would just like to touch upon a few more. One of 
them had to do with an allegation that Mr. Bolton, before he worked for 
the State Department, was involved in a situation where he yelled at a 
colleague, a woman whom he worked with. I think this conversation was 
supposed to have taken place in Moscow at the time. This individual 
said that Bolton had yelled and screamed at her, chased her around.
  We had a full committee hearing. The allegation was raised. It was 
raised in front of the press, raised in front of the media that somehow 
John Bolton--there was a source that said this woman had complained. It 
ended up that this woman, a very political woman, one of the leaders of 
Mothers Against Bush, a liberal activist, had made the claim on liberal 
Air America. Under questioning, when asked about whether she had been 
chased or harassed by Mr. Bolton, her testimony was: Well, I may have 
overstated that.
  We then get letters from the president of the company that held the 
contract for which this woman worked. He said: I certainly did not hear 
contemporaneously from any other employee in Moscow that anything 
occurred between Mr. Bolton and Ms. Townsel in Moscow. Consequently, it 
is difficult to understand how she could make such accusations with any 
veracity. He then went on to talk about some of her conduct and was 
very concerned about that. He concluded that he found Bolton to be very 
intelligent, hard working, loyal, ethical, and there was nothing to 
this. Ultimately, my colleagues on the other side kind of dropped that 
but after it was made public, after they discussed it in public, though 
I believe they had in their hands the same letters, the same rebuttal. 
That is one of the problems. There are individuals who--John Bolton, by 
the way, has been before this Senate three and perhaps four times. He 
has been before this body, been scrutinized, been confirmed three to 
four times. Now we reach a point, and maybe it is the atmosphere around 
here, maybe the partisan divide has gotten so great, but what starts 
out with a concern over policy then slips into attacks on the personal. 
People's character is disparaged, even though there is no basis for it, 
disparaged publicly, disparaged in the media.
  Folks then rely upon credible reporting in Newsweek magazine, when 
the sources then who are close to the issue come back and say that 
credible reporting simply is not very credible. People go through a 
ringer. If I was listening to some of these allegations, I would come 
to some conclusions about character, but then when one looks, for 
instance, at the Westermann incident and hears about serial abuse, they 
find out it was one conversation because

[[Page S5900]]

Mr. Bolton believed he got stabbed in the back; that the other 
conversation took place over a water fountain and that was it, except 
when asked, about 6 months later, ``Is there anything that bothered 
you?'' and he said, ``He has not bothered me.'' But we get a 
characterization of temperament and loss of temper and somehow being 
impolitic. It is simply not credible.
  I was there for just about every portion of every hearing and heard 
all the evidence. For all of these claims that are made, if one looks, 
as they say, at the rest of the story, they find out that they are not 
credible.
  It really gets back perhaps to where we started, that in the end this 
is about policy. We should end where it began. There are those who 
simply disagree with Mr. Bolton's approach. When I say ``approach,'' 
Mr. Bolton has made it very clear that he believes in the institution; 
that he is committed. He made the commitment--and I am going to take 
him at his word--to work with the institution. That is what he is going 
to do.
  I think we have to take him at his word, and we have to accept the 
fact that the President believes that U.N. reform is important and Mr. 
Bolton has the capacity to do the job. He negotiated the Treaty of 
Moscow, negotiated the U.N. reversing its position on a resolution that 
had been in place a number of years which said Israel was a racist 
state. Everybody said that would be impossible to change, and John 
Bolton provided the leadership to get the U.N. to reverse itself on 
that issue. He clearly has the qualifications and the skills. He has 
the support of the President. He has the support of the Secretary of 
State. He has my support. I know how important this job is. I know we 
have this window of opportunity and we have to seize it.
  I was a former prosecutor, and I know how it works. In Minnesota, the 
prosecution gives a closing argument and the defense goes after. There 
is no prosecution rebuttal. So I would often go in front of the jury 
and I would say: What you have to watch out for is the ``rabbits in the 
hat'' approach, that what you are going to hear come out on the other 
side is they are going to unleash a number of rabbits that are going to 
come running out of that hat.

  In this case, the first rabbit is of positions on the U.N.; the 
second rabbit is of policy positions; the third rabbit is saying things 
that should not have been said; the fourth rabbit is personal behavior, 
et cetera, hoping that somebody on the jury chases one of those 
rabbits. Instead, what we need folks to do is keep their eye on the 
main thing. The main thing, as Steve Covey said: One thing is keep the 
main thing the main thing.
  The main thing is that this President has a belief that this U.N. 
needs reform. The main thing is that John Bolton has a long and 
distinguished record of service to this country and an ability to get 
things done. He has the toughness it is going to take to get 191 
nations to stop putting Zimbabwe and Sudan on the Human Rights 
Commission. He has that ability. He has the confidence of the 
President. In the end, elections matter. The President of the United 
States won the election. He has chosen someone to carry out that 
vision, and that person has the record and the ability to do that. 
There is nothing in this record that undermines that. There is nothing 
in this record that he ever said he changed intelligence. There is 
nothing in this record that he ever got anybody fired.
  What is in this record is a distinguished record that has been 
attacked, savaged, and abused. I hope that does not have the chilling 
effect on others who want to serve this country.
  John Bolton is willing to serve this country. He deserves the right 
to do that, and I hope that my colleagues agree and they support his 
confirmation.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I speak as vice chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, and I oppose the nomination of John 
Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I purposely 
highlight that position on the Intelligence Committee because it is Mr. 
Bolton's pattern of attempting to distort and to misuse intelligence 
that is primary as a reason for my opposing his nomination. I have many 
reasons to oppose his nomination, but I will restrict myself to my work 
on the Intelligence Committee.
  Senator Biden and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee 
have walked through some of these facts, although perhaps not all of 
them yet, related to Mr. Bolton. So I will not go into all of the 
details. I do intend to provide some background and expand on at least 
one critical issue. I want to explain why this issue should matter to 
my colleagues and why Mr. Bolton's actions should disqualify him from 
this position.
  As my colleagues know, beginning in June of 2003, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee undertook an exhaustive inquiry into the 
intelligence concerning Iraq prior to the war. After more than a year, 
the committee unanimously approved a scathing 511 page report 
describing the intelligence community's systematic failures, 
particularly on issues related to weapons of mass destruction. One of 
the central issues to the committee's review was the question of 
``whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their 
analysis to support policy objectives.''
  It was a question so important, in fact, and so fundamental to our 
committee's oversight role that answering it was one of the four 
specific tasks laid out by Chairman Roberts and me at the beginning of 
this inquiry.
  The issue of maintaining objectivity goes to the very heart of 
intelligence and intelligence oversight. Our intelligence agencies are 
charged with gathering information around the world and then 
objectively analyzing the information and providing it to the rest of 
the Government. Intelligence consumers, then, rely on that intelligence 
for a variety of activities. Often, that information forms the 
foundation of the very national security policies we depend upon to 
keep our country safe. It is absolutely essential that our intelligence 
is objective, independent, and accurate. If it is not, then the system 
does not work, we waste billions of dollars each year, and we end up 
making a critical national security decision or a series of them based 
upon flawed assumptions.

  In the extreme, intelligence that is manipulated or shaped to fit 
preconceived conditions could lead the country into a war that we 
should not be fighting. This, of course, was the concern that many of 
us had when we began our investigation of prewar intelligence. It was a 
central point of the committee's review--a central point. It was 
something we pursued aggressively. In that case, the committee did not 
find evidence that the administration officials as a whole attempted to 
coerce, influence, or pressure analysts to specifically change their 
judgments--specifically change their judgments--relating to Iraq's WMD. 
I supported that finding, although in my additional views I described 
what I thought was a more pervasive environment of pressure, created 
prior to the war, to reach conclusions that supported the 
administration's policies.
  I describe this effort now, however, not to revisit these issues that 
we investigated but to impress upon my colleagues and the public how 
serious it is when policymakers are accused of attempting to manipulate 
the intelligence process. This is behavior we cannot tolerate, and this 
is the pattern of behavior Mr. Bolton has exhibited during his tenure 
as Under Secretary of State. As I said, Senator Biden, Senator Dodd, 
and others have done a superb job in describing the specific incidents. 
Let me add a few points to provide context for these episodes.
  First, I want everyone to understand that the Intelligence Committee 
was aware of these allegations long before Mr. Bolton was nominated to 
this job. These are not incidents dredged up after he had been 
nominated.
  The committee's Iraq report briefly mentions the case of an INR 
analyst--that is, the State Department intelligence analyst--who had 
the courage to stand up in a committee hearing and acknowledge what he 
described as political pressure. When the committee staff interviewed 
this analyst, they discovered that the instance involved Cuba and not 
Iraq. That being the case, the committee did not pursue a review 
because we were doing Iraq, not Cuba.
  Unfortunately, the committee's final report described and commented 
on this incident without conducting a

[[Page S5901]]

complete investigation of the facts. It is now clear from the record 
developed by the Foreign Relations Committee in their excellent work 
that Under Secretary Bolton attempted to exact retribution against this 
intelligence analyst because his analysis did not support Mr. Bolton's 
views.
  As with the case of the INR analyst, the State Department analyst, 
the committee previously was aware of the allegations of politicization 
related to the former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. 
We knew about it. In the course of a briefing to the committee staff in 
November of 2004, this individual described an effort to have him 
removed because his analysis was at odds with the views of certain 
policymakers, including Secretary Bolton. Unfortunately, the committee 
did not follow up on these allegations until March, when the minority 
staff on the committee began scheduling interviews. I speak now of the 
Intelligence Committee, not the Foreign Relations Committee. It is 
clear from these interviews that the minority staff on the Intelligence 
Committee did and from the much more extensive work done by the Foreign 
Relations Committee that Under Secretary Bolton and others, 
particularly Otto Reich, who was Acting Assistant Secretary of State 
for Latin America, sought to have the National Intelligence Officer 
reassigned because his analysis did not support their policies.

  These two episodes, in my mind, are enough to disqualify Mr. Bolton 
from this position. But there is more to this pattern of abusing the 
intelligence process. During the course of the nomination process, we 
learned that on at least 10 occasions, Mr. Bolton had sought to learn 
the identity of 19 U.S. persons--this has been discussed on the Senate 
floor, but I am going to add something--19 U.S. persons mentioned in 
intelligence reports. There has been a great deal of speculation as to 
why he wanted these names, whether it was proper to seek this 
information.
  To answer these questions, Chairman Lugar asked Chairman Roberts and 
me to solicit information from the appropriate agencies. Eventually--
eventually--eventually, the new Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence, GEN Michael Hayden, briefed Senator Roberts and myself. 
He did not brief Senator Lugar and Senator Biden--Chairman Lugar and 
Ranking Member Biden. That is a mystery to me. I don't understand that. 
But he briefed us on the content of the intelligence in question.
  Let me be clear. We did not receive the names, the very names 
provided to Under Secretary Bolton--which is an extraordinary sense of 
control of one branch of Government over another. We did not receive 
those names. We read everything associated with those names but not the 
names themselves. They were not given to us.
  Based on my limited review, I noted from the rest of the context 
nothing improper about the request. That, however, was not the end of 
the story. As part of our effort to respond to Chairman Lugar's request 
for information, the committee staff interviewed several individuals 
with knowledge of Under Secretary Bolton's request for these names. 
During one of those interviews, a senior member of his staff described 
actions Under Secretary Bolton took after he received one of those 
names.
  According to this individual, upon receiving the name from the 
National Security Agency, the NSA, Under Secretary Bolton shared that 
information with another State Department official. The reasons for 
this action are not clear, but it seems inconsistent with the stated 
reasons for obtaining the name.
  Let me explain. I must take a moment to describe the information we 
are talking about and put Mr. Bolton's action in some context. When a 
U.S. intelligence agency--in this case, the National Security Agency--
receives a report that includes information concerning a U.S. person, 
that information is, so to speak, minimized--that is the technical 
term--for privacy reasons, meaning that the U.S. name is replaced with 
a generic designation such as ``named U.S. Government official,'' or 
``named U.S. citizen,'' but that is all. Remember, this is information 
that is already classified at the highest levels, or it would not 
receive this treatment--classified at the highest levels and shared 
with a very limited number of people in order to protect the source of 
that information. The U.S. name is even more closely guarded and not 
provided unless an appropriately cleared official reading that 
intelligence report makes a specific request for it in order to better 
understand the foreign intelligence, and it is only intelligence that 
that person can be concerned with.
  The rules for dealing with this kind of comprehensive information are 
very strict. It is only provided on a case-by-case basis at the request 
of a specific individual. The National Security Agency has a formal and 
very well established procedure for processing such requests and for 
providing the names to the requester.
  When a decision is made to release the name, it is transmitted with a 
cover sheet with the following admonition:

       Request no further action be taken on this information 
     without prior approval of the National Security Agency.

  Probably that would not have to be there because anybody at that 
level understands that already, but nevertheless it is there, front and 
center. This language is clear. This language is unambiguous. But Mr. 
Bolton apparently disregarded it. Neither the NSA, the National 
Security Agency, nor the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research has a record of him seeking the necessary approval to further 
disseminate the name. Now his defenders say he never saw that 
restriction. I don't know if that is accurate, but I do know that it is 
entirely irrelevant because he knew about that. Anybody who is 
experienced to receive intelligence at that level has to know that.

  He knew the classification of the intercepts. He knew the sensitivity 
of information referencing U.S. persons. He knew the special procedures 
he had to go through to get that name. He knew the requirement to 
closely guard this information, even if he had not seen the specific 
language on the transmittal letter. Any attempt to place blame for his 
action on others is thinly veiled, sad, and wrong.
  I still have questions about this episode, but it appears to me on 
its face that he violated the restrictions placed on this information 
by the National Security Agency. Even if we discover his actions were 
technically not a security violation, if by a 1 in 1,000 percent chance 
it turned out to be true, it emphasizes something even worse, and that 
is a cavalier attitude to be, therefore, projected into the future in 
dealing with extremely sensitive intelligence information.
  This is part of a pattern which shows a blatant disregard for the 
importance of the intelligence process which is the spear tip of this 
Nation's internal security and security around the world and the 
sensitivity of the information contained in intelligence products.
  When viewed collectively, these actions demonstrate Mr. Bolton's 
unfitness for this position. I thereby urge my colleagues to oppose his 
confirmation. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. DODD. Let me thank my colleague from West Virginia who holds the 
very difficult position, along with Senator Roberts, of being the 
ranking member and chairman, respectively, of the Intelligence 
Committee. It is a very difficult job.
  For those who have served some time, we appreciate immensely the 
tremendous difficulty of trying to manage and handle the information 
that comes their way. I am particularly grateful to my colleague for 
his comments here today regarding the issue of the intelligence 
analysts and the handling of very delicate information.
  As my colleague from West Virginia knows, and I state this in the 
form of a question, Senator Biden, obviously, and Senator Lugar, going 
back to April 11, have requested information regarding the intercepts 
that the Senator from West Virginia has just described, along with 
other information from the State Department regarding testimony that 
Mr. Bolton was to give before a House committee dealing with weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq. We have been unable the last number of weeks 
to get the necessary information from the administration regarding 
these allegations.

[[Page S5902]]

  As such, we are asking the administration today if they would not be 
forthcoming with that information, to give the chairman and the ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee unredacted versions of these 
intercepts, along with the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee--not all members of the committee, not all Members 
of the Senate. I believe this is the normal operating procedure when 
matters like this arise, that requests are made of the administration 
for information and they go to selected, designated members to review, 
to determine whether there is something that as Members of this body we 
ought to be aware of in the consideration--relevant information in the 
consideration of a nomination.
  My question is, Is this an inappropriate request from the Senator 
from Delaware and the Senator from Indiana, to get unredacted versions, 
to go to the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee 
for them to be able to review, to determine whether they would be 
relevant to this nomination?
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I say to the Senator from Connecticut it is not only 
appropriate, but it is necessary. The Senator from Connecticut 
described the very condition of its sensitivity and its importance and 
therefore the importance of its place in this nomination consideration.
  The fact that only Senator Roberts and myself were briefed for a long 
period of time is part of the way the administration either shares very 
sensitive information which they do not want other committee members to 
have--which, of course, makes other committee members furious, as it 
would me, but they cannot take chances--but what that emphasizes is the 
importance and the confidentiality and the high degree of sensitivity 
of the information. When you are putting somebody potentially into the 
United Nations to effect policy, to reflect the views of the President 
more directly than the President can do on a daily basis, to reflect 
the views of the rest of the world toward the United States, this kind 
of thing must be available to Senator Roberts and myself and, just as 
importantly, to Senator Lugar as chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, for Heavens' sake, and Senator Joe Biden, the ranking 
member.

  Mr. DODD. Let me further ask my colleague, if I may, as I understand 
it, when a policymaker requests of the National Security Administration 
the raw data on an intercept, there must be a written explanation for 
why the policy center or policymaker is seeking that information; is 
that not correct?
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. That is correct. And that is not available.
  Mr. DODD. That was my second question. Was that available to the 
ranking member and the chairman of the Intelligence Committee?
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. No, it was not available and it is part of this 
pattern.
  We have to decide if there are two branches of Government or one.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague and I appreciate again his comments.
  I will be very brief in my comments this afternoon. I notice there 
are other Members here. I saw my friend from Virginia, Senator Allen, 
in the Chamber. Senator Coleman of Minnesota has already spoken, but he 
may want to speak. I think Senator Levin of Michigan may be coming over 
shortly.
  I will reserve for tomorrow further discussion of the nominee himself 
and the reasons for my objection for this nomination going forward, 
but, rather, I will focus in these brief minutes, if I may, on where we 
are and the procedural situation in which we find ourselves.
  I say to my colleagues it is awkward. We have just come through a 
rather contentious period in the history of the Senate over the last 
number of days dealing with how we deal with executive branch nominees. 
It would not have been my choice to have this matter come up in the 
midst of all this or in the wake of all of this. I would have preferred 
we had dealt with judicial nominations, which I thought was the primary 
rationale for the crisis we ran into over the extended debate rule.
  However, it is clearly the choice and the right of the majority, in 
my view, to set the agenda. As such, they have set the agenda to bring 
Mr. Bolton's nomination up before the Senate rather than additional 
judicial nominations before the Memorial Day recess.
  I have been asked and objected to a unanimous consent request that 
would have allowed for an up-and-down vote on Mr. Bolton at some point 
tomorrow afternoon. I have said to the majority leader and the minority 
leader, it is not my intention at all to filibuster this nomination. 
That is not what I want to have occur at all.
  I have suggested we ask the administration, once again, would they be 
forthcoming and give us this information about the National Security 
Agency intercepts to go just to Senator Rockefeller, Senator Roberts, 
Senator Lugar, and Senator Biden for review to determine what, if any, 
information in those 10 intercepts involving 19 names of American 
citizens that might have some relevancy to the nomination of Mr. 
Bolton. That request has been rejected since April 11, basically, and 
there have been numerous requests.
  The second request involves a request that Senator Biden has 
expressed a strong interest in detailed information regarding testimony 
of the weapons of mass destruction in Syria that was to be the subject 
of congressional testimony by Mr. Bolton. That information is also 
being sought.
  I commend and thank the majority leader, by the way. Earlier today in 
my conversations with him, I expressed that I had no desire to 
filibuster this nomination but would he transmit the request--I am not 
suggesting he support the request--but would he transmit the request to 
the appropriate personnel at the State Department or the White House 
regarding this information. Graciously, the majority leader has said he 
would do so, and I presume he has.
  No cloture motion has yet been filed, but it is my understanding, 
because it is the way I framed the request, that I would not insist 
upon a normal period of time to expire before a cloture motion could be 
invoked, or could be raised, nor would I insist that there be an 
adequate amount of time after the cloture motion, if it were invoked, 
be required, the 30 hours of debate; but, rather, we would truncate all 
of that some time tomorrow afternoon to give everyone an exact time to 
express themselves on either the motion to invoke cloture or on the 
nomination itself.
  If we are unable to get this data, information, which has been 
requested now for 6 weeks, I will urge my colleagues not to invoke 
cloture. I would do so most reluctantly, and I urge my colleagues, 
regardless of feelings about the nominee.
  This is what I want to address. We all have had strong views on Mr. 
Bolton. I see my friend from Virginia. He has been eloquent in his 
defense of Mr. Bolton, as has my friend from Minnesota.
  I listened to the remarkable speech given by our colleagues: Senator 
Voinovich of Ohio, Senator Biden, Senator Sarbanes, Senator 
Rockefeller, and others. There are strong feelings about this 
nomination. But put aside your strong feelings about the nominee and 
think for a minute about what we are asking for as an institution; that 
is, data that pertains to this nomination.
  I noted with some interest earlier today that one of the newspapers 
that covers Capitol Hill reported that a House Appropriations 
Committee, obviously under the control of the Republicans--the 
majority--was expressing a similar problem in getting information out 
of the administration on matters they thought were important.
  I do not think this desire to deprive the committees of information 
on Mr. Bolton is unique. I believe it is a pattern that we, as Members 
of this coequal branch of Government, must defend ourselves on, that if 
the administration--this administration or any administration--believes 
they can successfully deprive legitimate requests for information 
pertaining to a matter that is before us, particularly one that invokes 
as much debate as this nomination has, then we all suffer. Whether you 
are for Mr. Bolton or against Mr. Bolton is not the point. The point 
is, we ought to have a right to have information given to us, under 
controlled circumstances--not to the availability

[[Page S5903]]

of every Member under every circumstance but we have set up mechanisms 
which allow us to have information to determine its relevancy to 
something such as this.
  Consider, if you will--I am speaking hypothetically now, obviously--
that the administration deprives us of this information, the Senate 
invokes cloture, and there is then a vote to confirm Mr. Bolton and in 
a matter of days or weeks we discover that the very information 
requested is so damming that every Member of this body would have been 
against the nomination had they known the information at the time of 
the vote. There is the possibility of that, I would suggest to my 
colleagues, or I would not have requested the information.
  How would we feel institutionally at that point if we did not stand 
up for ourselves as Senators in insisting that this administration--or 
any administration when there was a legitimate request for information 
pertaining to a nomination such as this--ought to be forthcoming, and 
we ought not to have to go through the parliamentary procedures and 
debates and invoking various tactics in order to put pressure, in order 
to get this information? It seems to me that ought to be forthcoming. 
For those reasons, I am grateful to the majority leader for 
transmitting the request.
  I have also said, just to complete this, that if, in fact, cloture is 
invoked, that then I am prepared to vote immediately thereafter on the 
Bolton nomination. To make my point, I am not anxious for an extended 
debate or filibuster beyond cloture. Obviously, if cloture is not 
invoked, then my assumption would be the matter would go over until 
after the Memorial Day recess, in which case we might have some 
additional time to solicit the information we are seeking.
  My preference would be we get the information. We still have time. It 
is only 5:30 in the evening tonight. If the administration would say: 
Listen, we can give you this information--even if we do not get it 
until tomorrow morning, there ought to be adequate enough time, from 
tomorrow morning to the afternoon, by the appropriate committees to go 
over the unredacted versions of this--by the way, not crossing out the 
names of the very people we want to know--who they are--in addition to 
the rationale for the request, so we can make a determination as to 
whether those intercepts, and the requests of them, have pertained to 
Mr. Bolton's determination to punish certain people in the intelligence 
branch of the State Department because of their analysis that Mr. 
Bolton had some difficulty with.
  Also, of course, there is the request that Senator Biden is calling 
upon; that is, whether there was some effort here to cook up the books 
regarding the weapons of mass destruction or the allegation of weapons 
of mass destruction in Syria.
  That is not going to be that hard. It could be done in a matter of 
hours, and we could then vote on Mr. Bolton's nomination by tomorrow 
afternoon, up or down, one way or the other. I would hope my colleagues 
would join in this effort. If we tell the administration as a body that 
we have a right to this information, I would wage anything to my 
colleagues that the administration would be forthcoming with it. It is 
because they believe there are more than 40 Senators here who will vote 
to invoke cloture that they will not provide the information. The 
minute they think we might insist upon seeing it, I think the 
information will be forthcoming.
  There are those who have told me, by the way, as a general matter 
that while this was an extraordinary request in some sense, in others 
it may not have been an extraordinary request. I am thinking about Mr. 
Bolton's request now. So there may very well be there is nothing in 
these requests that should cause any of us any concern. It may be true, 
as well, regarding the Syria allegations. If that is the case, then 
there is nothing to fear by any of this to bring it up. But in the 
meantime, institutionally, in my view, as Senators representing a 
coequal branch of Government, when there is a legitimate request for 
information and an appropriate and proper means by which we receive and 
handle that information, it ought to be forthcoming. When we fail to 
insist upon that, in any administration, we weaken the ability of this 
place to do its job. That is really what is at stake in the debate here 
more than anything else at this moment.

  Now, there will, obviously, be further debate about Mr. Bolton. We 
all know that. We have been through it. Those of us who serve on this 
committee have had hours of debate on this issue. I suspect my friends 
from Virginia and Minnesota could quote my remarks about Mr. Bolton, as 
I could theirs. We have listened to each other for countless hours 
about this issue. Our colleagues will soon get the benefit of these 
remarks as we repeat them again in the next 24 hours or so.
  That is not the issue tonight for this Senator. The issue for this 
Senator tonight is, does the Senate, as a body, when there is a 
nomination before it--when there is critical information that serious 
Members of this body believe is pertinent to the debate before us--
should we have the ability under controlled circumstances to access 
that information? If my colleagues believe the answer is no and the 
administration is not forthcoming, then you ought to invoke cloture. If 
you believe we ought to have a right to this information, even though 
you support the nominee, as a matter of principle, as U.S. Senators 
charged under the Constitution to be responsible for the confirmation 
of high-level Federal employees and nominees, then it seems to me our 
answer, despite our views about the nominee, ought to be yes and to say 
with one voice: We support the nominee--if we do--but, Mr. President, 
in your administration, it is appropriate that you be forthcoming on 
the request.
  There is the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the ranking 
member, and there is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
and the ranking Democrat--four Senators. For them to get the unredacted 
versions of these intercepts and the information regarding Syria is not 
some breach of intelligence. Remember, Mr. Bolton and his staff had 
access to this information. They could read those names. They know what 
is in it. Does some Under Secretary of State have more rights than the 
Senator from Virginia or the Senator from Minnesota or the Senator from 
Connecticut or the Senator from Kansas? I don't think so.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the minority has expired.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I will conclude just by saying I would hope 
my colleagues would consider this, and rather than get to the point 
tomorrow night of having to invoke cloture, would they not even quietly 
ask the administration to be forthcoming? We do not need to go through 
this. We could have a vote on Mr. Bolton up or down tomorrow afternoon, 
one way or the other, and avoid this precedent-setting circumstance 
where legitimate information is not forthcoming. That is the point I 
wanted to make this evening.
  I thank the Chair and thank my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I will speak very briefly and yield to my 
colleague from Virginia.
  Mr. President, I would note that the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee is here, and I suspect he will respond to some of these 
issues.
  There is just one point the distinguished Senator from West Virginia 
raised again and again, and I just want to make the Record very clear; 
that is, again, he stated that it is clear, in his words, that the 
Under Secretary criticized this employee ``because his analysis did not 
support Bolton's view.'' I want to make it clear, the record does not 
support that. In fact, it was very clear that John Bolton said to the 
intelligence analyst:

       You are welcome to disagree with me, but not behind my 
     back.

  That is what this was about. In fact, the analyst himself gave some 
conflicting reasons of why he did not tell Bolton that he had tubed his 
language before he sent it around. He never told him that. That is what 
this is about. In fact, when the analyst was asked whether he disagreed 
with the statement ``You are welcome to disagree with me''--it is 
Bolton speaking to the analyst--``but not behind my back,'' his comment 
was, ``That does ring a bell.'' So that is what this is about. It is 
about process, it is not about policy.

[[Page S5904]]

  The last thing I would note is that we have had 10 hours of hearings, 
35 separate staff interviews, 2 business meetings, 29 different people 
producing 1,000 pages of transcripts and 800 pages of documents from 
the State Department. This individual has gone through a very thorough 
review.
  I appreciate my colleague from Connecticut not holding us up.
  Clearly, if cloture is invoked, we could wait another 30 hours. I 
thank him for that. But the record is clear it is time to move forward.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I thank my wonderful colleague from 
Minnesota, Senator Coleman, for his rebuttals of what has been said. As 
Senator Coleman and I have listened to this in the Foreign Relations 
Committee for many weeks--and all of these different issues and 
allegations and charges that have been refuted--we understand that what 
we are now off on are the detours and tangents, avoiding the reality 
and what is important; that is, John Bolton being the right person to 
bring accountability, being a watchdog for the $2 billion the American 
taxpayers send to the United Nations every year. The United Nations 
ought not to be a front for terrorist organizations or anti-
Americanism.
  John Bolton has a record of performance that is exemplary, from the 
Proliferation Security Initiative to repealing the odious resolution 
that likened Zionism to racism. They don't want to talk about the 
United Nations and the reform that is needed.
  They talk about John Bolton being straightforward. He is 
straightforward. He is not going to get seduced by the flowery language 
and pontifications of bureaucrats internationally. He is going to 
advance freedom and the interests of the United States and get other 
countries to join us.
  Having been a quarterback, there is a key player you always want to 
put in when you want to refute allegations of the side in opposition. I 
note that all of these individuals who have been criticizing Mr. 
Bolton, before they heard any of these allegations about intercepts, 
anything about the sensibilities of different Government officials 
being offended by Mr. Bolton, all of them--Senators Biden, Boxer, 
Kerry, Dodd, Sarbanes, and Rockefeller--in 2001, voted against Mr. 
Bolton in his position as Under Secretary before they heard any of 
these allegations.
  Now to talk about and to present the facts on this latest fishing 
expedition that we are hearing from the opposition of Mr. Bolton 
insofar as the conversations, the perfect person to speak on this and 
to answer the issue is the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
Senator Roberts of Kansas. He will rebut the allegations so far as 
matters dealing with intelligence are concerned.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is now recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Chair. I certainly thank the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia. This is sort of a quandary for me in that 
sitting in my office listening to the debate, I was having a hard time 
putting two and two together with my understanding of what the 
Intelligence Committee determined--not the committee but the vice 
chairman and myself. And in listening to the statements, they just 
didn't jibe. It is not my intent to perjure the intent of the 
distinguished vice chairman, but I sure have a different take on this. 
I think it is supported by facts.
  I am rising in the hope of providing some clarification surrounding 
one of the issues related to the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. 
ambassador to the U.N.
  On April 28, the vice chairman and I, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, 
received a letter from the distinguished chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Lugar. In that letter, the chairman asked 
the Senate Intelligence Committee to look into all information 
surrounding the process by which Mr. Bolton, between the years 2001 and 
2004, requested the names of U.S. persons that had been redacted from 
various intelligence products. The Intelligence Committee was asked to 
solicit all information regarding the process by which Mr. Bolton's 
requests were handled, the contents of the responses, and the process 
by which they were communicated, as well as any conclusions reached by 
the appropriate intelligence agencies or elements thereto as to any 
violations of procedures or directives or regulations or law by those 
with knowledge of Mr. Bolton's requests. That was a pretty clear 
letter. That sets out some pretty clear questions.
  It is my understanding that the vice chairman of the committee, the 
distinguished vice chairman and a person whom I respect, Senator 
Rockefeller, sent his own letter to Senator Biden with a different 
interpretation of the issues than I have described. I also understand 
that Senator Biden read that letter on the floor this afternoon. I 
regret that a meeting in the Intelligence Committee did prevent me from 
responding at that particular time, but since the distinguished vice 
chairman has made his remarks and his interpretation, perhaps this 
timing is even better. But what I don't understand is why the 
distinguished Senator from Delaware read only one of the letters from 
the vice chairman when he had both in his possession.

  Nevertheless, in his letter of April 28, Senator Lugar asked the 
Intelligence Committee to assist the Foreign Relations Committee in 
ascertaining the facts. This is what I attempted to do, and I think my 
letter certainly speaks for itself. Unfortunately, I believe that the 
vice chairman's account did omit some important facts which I believe 
give a much clearer picture of what actually took place.
  This morning, I sent a letter back to Senator Lugar detailing my 
findings and conclusions. This letter, which was also provided to 
Senator Biden, provides the rest of the story. With your indulgence, I 
will read my letter into the Record, as addressed to the Honorable 
Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It 
reads:

       Dear Mr. Chairman:
       I write in response to your April 28, 2005 letter asking 
     this committee to examine a number of intelligence-related 
     issues that have been raised during the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations' consideration of the nomination of Under Secretary 
     John Bolton to be the United States Representative to the 
     United Nations. My hope was to respond jointly with Vice 
     Chairman Rockefeller.
       While we both agreed there was nothing within the contents 
     of the intelligence reports in question that caused us any 
     concern, we were unable to agree on a final text in response.

  This was not for lack of trying. One day, 2 days, 3 days, a week, I 
think it was 10 days, trying to work out a joint letter. It just didn't 
happen. So we have two versions. I don't quite understand why, but 
especially since we both met with General Hayden, who is the Director 
of National Intelligence and who was the head of the NSA and, as such, 
is the head of intercepts and signals intelligence.
  I might say right now that I really do not like this business of 
coming to the floor of the Senate and talking about signals 
intelligence and intercepts. That causes me great concern. It is of the 
highest classification.
  I continued to Senator Lugar:

       Nevertheless, I am going to convey to you my findings and 
     conclusions.
       After completing an examination of these issues I have 
     found no evidence that there was anything improper about any 
     aspect of Mr. Bolton's requests for minimized identities of 
     U.S. persons. I further found no violations of procedures, 
     directives, regulations or law by Mr. Bolton. Moreover, I am 
     not aware that anyone involved in handling these requests had 
     any concerns regarding these requests at any point in the 
     process.
       State Department records indicate that Under Secretary 
     Bolton's office did request the minimized identities of U.S. 
     persons that are contained in the National Security Agency 
     signals intelligence products on ten separate occasions. 
     Every request was processed by the State Department's Bureau 
     of Intelligence and Research.

  The acronym for that is INR.

       In each case, INR personnel followed standard procedure by 
     preparing a written request which included a justification 
     for the request.
       INR sought the identities on behalf of Secretary Bolton's 
     office in each instance to better understand or assess the 
     foreign intelligence value of the information that was 
     contained in these documents. Senior INR officials were then 
     responsible for determining whether the requests were 
     reasonably related to Under Secretary Bolton's area of 
     responsibility.

  Continuing my response to Senator Lugar:

       In every instance, they were so determined and 
     electronically transmitted to the NSA for approval. The NSA 
     approved all ten of

[[Page S5905]]

     Mr. Bolton's requests and transmitted its responses to [the 
     State Department and the] INR. INR officials then notified 
     Mr. Bolton's staff that they had received the responses and 
     made them available.
       Committee staff interviewed INR analysts and NSA officials 
     responsible for processing the requests for the identities of 
     U.S. persons contained in signals intelligence products. None 
     of the individuals interviewed indicated that there was 
     anything improper or inappropriate about Mr. Bolton's 
     request.
       We were also briefed by General Michael Hayden, former 
     Director of the NSA and current Principal Deputy Director of 
     National Intelligence--

  He is a man who I think gives the best briefing of anybody in the 
intelligence community, and who was approved in regard to his 
nomination to that position by unanimous consent by this body.

       He also stated that Under Secretary Bolton's requests were 
     not only appropriate, but routine. In fact, INR records 
     indicate that since May 2001, INR submitted 489 other 
     requests for minimized identities.

  John Bolton requested 10.

       Finally, the Vice Chairman and I reviewed all ten 
     documents--

  We reviewed the intercepts. That is what we are supposed to do. That 
is the job of the Intelligence Committee. It is limited to only us two, 
and for darn good reason, because of the classified nature of the 
subject at hand.

     --containing the references to U.S. persons that generated 
     Under Secretary Bolton's requests. The documents we received 
     did not contain the actual identities of the minimized U.S. 
     persons. After reviewing the content of each report, however, 
     it was apparent to us both--

  This is my recollection of the meeting, and I cannot conceive of any 
other recollection that is accurate.

     --that it was not necessary to know the actual names to 
     determine whether the requests were proper.
       Ultimately, I found no basis to question the justification 
     for, or the appropriateness of, Mr. Bolton's requests for the 
     identities of U.S. persons contained therein.

  I continue in my letter to Senator Lugar:

       Further, General Hayden informed us that it is not uncommon 
     for senior government officials above the rank of Assistant 
     Secretary to make such requests. It is worth noting that Mr. 
     Bolton did not request the identity of every U.S. person 
     referenced in the documents which would have been his 
     prerogative.

  I can remember the distinguished vice chairman's comments indicating 
they didn't even ask for all of them.

       While I found that Mr. Bolton's conduct was entirely 
     appropriate and consistent with the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods, I did find that there are 
     significant deficiencies in the process by which U.S. person 
     identities are provided to requesters of such information.

  We have had a lot of discussion about questioners.

       As your committee has now learned, a request for a U.S. 
     person identity is a routine occurrence in the intelligence 
     process. The incidental collection of U.S. person identities 
     is a fact of life in the signals intelligence business. 
     Because U.S. persons are not the targets of foreign 
     intelligence collection, their identities are, as a matter of 
     policy, redacted or minimized to protect their privacy. When 
     an intelligence analyst or policymaker determines that a U.S. 
     person identity is necessary to better understand and assess 
     the intelligence value of the information, they are permitted 
     to request that identity. The NSA evaluates that request and 
     either grants it or denies it. As already discussed, all of 
     Mr. Bolton's requests were reviewed by both the INR and NSA 
     and were granted.
       In the course of our review, we found that the Assistant 
     Secretary for INR requested the identities so that they could 
     be passed to Under Secretary Bolton. The NSA provided the 
     U.S. person identities to the INR in the form of Information 
     Memoranda addressed to the Assistant Secretary for INR. We 
     were provided a copy of one of the memoranda, dated 20 
     February, 2003. This document included a paragraph which 
     stated:
       ``You may disseminate the information as requested, 
     provided it retains the classification as stated in paragraph 
     two above. Request no further action be taken on this 
     information without prior approval of NSA.''

  Now, that is important--``request no further action be taken on this 
information without prior approval of NSA.''

       The NSA confirmed that it uses standard dissemination 
     guidance language in response to customer requests for 
     release of identities. We were also told that Mr. Bolton was 
     not provided the 20 February 2003 Information Memorandum 
     containing this language.
       Upon further inquiry, we learned INR does not provide the 
     NSA transmittal sheets containing the U.S. person 
     information, or the handling information contained therein, 
     to the requesters of the identities, nor does it specifically 
     instruct the requester on the handling of such information. 
     The INR passes U.S. person identities verbally, without any 
     further guidance. The NSA expects the INR to provide specific 
     handling instructions at the time INR provides the identity 
     to the requester.
       Not only did INR not provide such instructions to Mr. 
     Bolton, it does not provide them to anyone. Also, it has 
     never established any formal procedures to train or educate 
     requesters Department-wide on the appropriate handling of 
     U.S. person identities.

  This came as somewhat of a shock to me, and it is something we have 
to review in the Intelligence Committee.

       In fact, in the case of the 20 February 2003 memorandum, 
     the INR did not pass the identity directly to Under Secretary 
     Bolton, but rather passed it to an individual within his 
     office, an action which violated the express dissemination 
     guidance contained in the Information Memorandum. The 
     Assistant Secretary at the time of this violation was Carl 
     Ford.
       The NSA did not in this particular instance, and does not 
     as a matter of course, do anything to ensure that its 
     dissemination guidance is actually followed by the Assistant 
     Secretary for INR or any official in any other Department 
     government-wide.
       The NSA depends upon the recipient to provide specific 
     handling instructions to the requester and to handle the 
     information appropriately and in accordance with 
     instructions. It appears that Assistant Secretary Carl Ford 
     did neither in this case. The INR's failure to instruct the 
     recipients of U.S. person identities on their proper handling 
     has left the State Department officials essentially to fend 
     for themselves.
       During the course of this review, we learned that Mr. 
     Bolton, in the absence of any guidance from INR or the NSA, 
     discussed the U.S. person identity contained in the 20 
     February 2003 Information Memorandum with one other 
     individual.

  This has been pointed out as a big deal by the vice chairman and my 
good friends across the aisle.

       This particular individual was the person referenced in the 
     report.
       This person worked directly for Under Secretary Bolton, 
     possessed the necessary security clearances, received and 
     read the same intelligence report in the course of his 
     duties, and understood that he was the U.S. person referred 
     to therein.

  I don't see what the problem is in that regard. Is this the big 
problem here that somebody is alleging illegal activities? By the way, 
the first time I learned about that was reading about it in the New 
York Times, as opposed to reading the letter disseminated by Senator 
Rockefeller to the distinguished vice chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.

       The NSA request that recipients of information about 
     specific identities of U.S. persons take ``no further 
     action'' with regard to the information provided is driven by 
     concerns about the privacy rights of named individuals. These 
     privacy concerns do derive from Attorney General-approved 
     minimization procedures which regulate the collection, 
     processing, retention, and dissemination of information to, 
     from, or about any U.S. persons. The request is also prompted 
     by concerns about protecting intelligence sources and 
     methods.

  Not to mention the chilling effect it would have in regards to all 
intelligence analysts.

       Mr. Bolton's actions in this instance would not implicate 
     any of these concerns. He discussed the identity with the 
     actual named person who was not only fully cleared to receive 
     the information, but already possessed the same information. 
     It is also important to note that the NSA's guidance is 
     formulated as a ``request,'' not a mandate. When asked why 
     the NSA ``requests'' rather than requires, that ``no further 
     action'' be taken with a U.S. person identifies without prior 
     approval, the NSA responded by stating that the language is 
     now ``currently under review.''

  So it is a pretty nebulous standard we are referring to in terms of 
any alleged misconduct.

       I intend to work closely with the Director of National 
     Intelligence to ensure that our intelligence agencies and 
     elements are doing everything they can to assist and educate 
     the requesters of U.S. person identities in the proper 
     handling and protection of this information. We must do 
     everything we can to not only protect the privacy of our 
     citizens, but to protect and preserve intelligence sources 
     and methods.

  I do not think you will find any quarrel among anyone on the 
Intelligence Committee or the vice chairman or myself on that.

       It is for this reason that I was a bit surprised and 
     dismayed when a member of your committee--

  Again, this is the letter that I sent to Senator Lugar--

     broached this issue in the course of your public confirmation 
     hearings. Normally, intelligence sources and methods are 
     discussed in closed session to protect our continuing ability 
     to collect the intelligence we all agree is so vital to our 
     Nation's security.

[[Page S5906]]

       As is often the case, some individuals, who are not 
     familiar with intelligence issues, perceive that something is 
     unusual and concerning when, as in this instance, it is 
     actually very routine. That is why the U.S. Senate created 
     the Intelligence Committee to deal with these issues in an 
     informed, responsible, and secure manner. It is my hope, in 
     the future, intelligence issues will be discussed in 
     executive session so that we can protect what are vital 
     national security assets.
       I appreciate your recognition of our unique ability to 
     assist with intelligence-related issues as you consider this 
     very important nomination. We take very seriously our 
     oversight responsibilities and our obligation to protect 
     highly sensitive intelligence information. Your consideration 
     of our duty to protect intelligence sources and methods is 
     greatly appreciated.
       Sincerely Pat Roberts, Chairman.

  With a copy showing to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
  Mr. President, I said I beg your indulgence in the reading of that 
entire letter on the floor of the Senate. That is the text of the 
letter I did send back to Senator Lugar and obviously copied to Senator 
Biden as of this morning.
  Why my colleagues chose to give you only part of the story is a 
question only they can answer. I have my thinking about that, but I am 
not going to go into that on the floor of the Senate.
  I also would like to add a bit of texture to some of the statements 
that have been made here today in regards to Mr. Carl Ford of ``kiss up 
and kick down fame.'' That has been quoted a lot. Mr. Ford has made a 
number of other statements that I think are relevant to these issues 
raised by my friends in opposition to Bolton's nomination.
  For example, on page 276 of the Senate Intelligence Committee's Iraq 
WMD report, Mr. Ford addressed the issue of whether it was appropriate 
for policymakers to view intelligence assessments with skepticism.
  I will just tell you that every member of the Intelligence Committee 
now, after our WMD report, does not take anything at face value, and I 
think that has helped. We just had a hearing today in which we had a 
response that I think was certainly more candid: Tell me what you know; 
tell me what you don't know; tell me what you think. I think there has 
been a historic change in the intelligence community as a result of our 
report and the WMD Commission, appointed by the President and the 9/11 
Commission, in the interest of all Senators.
  Mr. Ford said if a policymaker ``believed everything that the 
intelligence community told him, including what INR tells him, he'd be 
a fool. You should know better than anybody that a lot of the stuff we 
turn out is''--well, I am going to change the name. I am not going to 
say what is here. I am going to say it is a lot of what we have in our 
Dodge City feedlots--``and that a policymaker who sticks to that 
intelligence, I don't even want to be in the same room with. They've 
got to know the stuff isn't that good. So the notion that they 
sometimes disagree with us I find fine.''

  That is a little slightly different take on what we have been hearing 
so far. I guess what Mr. Ford meant to say--and he has been before the 
committee many times; he is a fine man--is that it is fine to disagree 
with intelligence analysts as long as you are not John Bolton. I only 
highlight some of the things to emphasize that there seems to be a 
double standard for this particular nominee.
  With the indulgence of my colleagues, I would also like to address 
some additional misperceptions about the intelligence community that 
were published as minority views in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee report on Mr. Bolton's nomination. The minority claims that 
policymakers should be restricted from making public statements that 
``defame U.S. intelligence agencies.'' I find this to be a rather 
absurd concept.
  I do not know how one ``defames'' an entire Government agency, but I 
do know that criticism played a vital role in our collective effort to 
reform the intelligence community and demand change for failure. I am 
not aware of any special status that insulates members of the 
intelligence community from criticism, nor should there be. That should 
be a slam dunk.
  I am also unaware of any special status that prevents intelligence 
analysts from having their views or actions challenged by policymakers. 
Intelligence analysis is not an exact science. Intelligence analysts 
are not infallible and their assessments are not unassailable. While 
the intelligence community has had many successes in the past few years 
for which it should, and can, be proud--there are many good things they 
have done in protecting the homeland and providing real-time 
intelligence to the warfighters--astounding failures, such as 9/11 and 
Iraq, should make it clear that the intelligence community does make 
mistakes.
  I often lament that policymakers did not ask enough tough questions 
about Iraq's suspected WMD programs prior to the war. Let me just say 
that persistent questioning to an analyst is not viewed by the 
analysts, in the 250 analysts we interviewed, as being pressured. If 
anything, we should be asking more questions. If anything, several 
members of the Intelligence Committee, whom I admire and respect and am 
very proud to be their chairman, ask more repetitive questions of 
witnesses every time we have a hearing than people are complaining 
about in this particular case.
  Perhaps, if we all had been more diligent, the intelligence community 
would have been more attuned to the gaps in its information and more 
accurate in its judgment. I, for one, now make it a point to repeatedly 
and persistently question analysts who come before our committee to 
ensure that I understand their judgments, understand the information 
upon which they base those judgments, and form my own opinions about 
gaps in their logic.
  The vice chairman and I have agreed on that, to look at every 
capability we have in regard to national security threats. Do we have 
the intelligence capability? Do we have the collection? Do we have the 
analysis? Is there a consensus threat analysis that makes sense? Are 
there gaps?
  We do not want to repeat past mistakes. I am not going to go down the 
laundry list, starting with Khobar Towers and ending up with 9/11 or 
the Madrid bombing or whatever it is we are talking about, or the USS 
Cole. We have to put that one in.
  So basically I resent any suggestion that this performance of my duty 
is somehow improper. I do not think that is right. Intelligence is a 
serious business, dealing with life-and-death issues. In my experience, 
our intelligence analysts understand this. They know that defending 
their views is vital to the process and are fully capable of doing so. 
These are individuals who work every day to defeat terror and defend 
our national security. They are tough and they are good. They are not 
delicate, hothouse flowers unable to defend their views or take 
criticism. They are, however, humans involved in a fundamentally human 
process. Intelligence analysts can make mistakes and their judgments 
are not immune from their own biases.
  Intelligence assessments should inform policy, not dictate it. 
Ultimately, as policymakers we need to understand that intelligence is 
merely a tool that at times can have great value as well as serious 
limitations.
  If we are going to make an informed judgment of Mr. Bolton's fitness 
for this position, please, I implore my colleagues, let us do it based 
upon all the facts known to us, not just the facts we like or pick out.
  In conclusion, I have looked at the intercept issue and allegations 
surrounding Mr. Bolton's management style. I have found nothing which 
would give me pause in voting for his confirmation. I support the 
Bolton nomination. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield before he leaves the floor?
  Mr. ROBERTS. Sure. Why not.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague for doing so. Let me preface my 
question to him by telling him how much--as I said to Senator 
Rockefeller, I have great admiration and respect for the work the 
chairman and the ranking member do.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator for his comments.
  Mr. DODD. It is a very difficult committee and I respect immensely my 
colleagues' efforts there. I note in my friend's letter which he has 
provided and read in detail to us, there was a reference--and to be 
quite candid, I think I am the Senator the Senator is

[[Page S5907]]

referencing here because I am the Senator who raised the question 
during the Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing of Mr. 
Bolton. Here my colleague says, and I am quoting now from page 4, the 
last paragraph of the Senator's letter to Senator Lugar, and I am 
getting down near the end of it, maybe the last sentence of that 
paragraph: It is for this reason that I was a bit surprised and 
dismayed when a member of your committee--speaking of this Senator--
broached this issue in the course of your public confirmation hearings. 
Normally intelligence sources and methods are discussed only in closed 
session.
  I will ask unanimous consent that the transcript of the question I 
raised to Mr. Bolton at that particular time be printed in the Record.
  The question was basically a very simple one. The question was: I 
want to know whether you requested to see NSA information about other 
American officials? That is the question. There was no reference to 
sources and methods. A simple question: Did you request to see this 
information, yes or no?
  And he went on to answer the question.
  Now, I ask the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, is that an 
inappropriate question to ask of a nominee? It was a simple question: I 
want to know whether you requested to see NSA information about any 
other American officials? Mr. Bolton's answer is: Yes, on a number of 
occasions I can think of, and he goes on to talk about it.
  My point of your letter is, there is a discussion that this Senator 
was acting inappropriately because I was seeking methods and sources. 
The only question I asked of Mr. Bolton in that public hearing was: Did 
you make such a request? Does my colleague believe I was violating some 
procedures regarding the gathering of intelligence by asking that 
simple question?
  Mr. ROBERTS. I would never raise the question about my colleague and 
friend about acting inappropriately, especially in regard to intent. I 
am concerned about us talking about intercepts and all of this that I 
went through in the letter on the Senate floor. I am concerned about 
many things that have been talked about publicly, quite frankly, leaks 
that appeared in the press that I find out about later as chairman and 
have to address. I cannot speak to them because they are classified. It 
is the classic case of Catch-22, where something appears in the press 
or perhaps somebody says something on the floor inadvertently--if it is 
done on purpose, that is another matter. That can be referred to the 
Ethics Committee--and that certainly is not the case in terms of my 
distinguished colleague. Then comes sort of a feeding frenzy and we end 
up with things that should not be in the public discourse that are 
highly classified, highly compartmented. Signals intelligence is one of 
the highest compartmented topics we deal with.

  Mr. DODD. I agree with my colleague.
  Mr. ROBERTS. It was only Senator Rockefeller and myself who were 
briefed by General Hayden, and that was a very good meeting. We went 
over virtually every intercept, as it should be. That was my point. 
That is what the Intelligence Committee does. It is accepted practice 
for the full committee, which many members of the full committee have 
trouble understanding, that only the vice chairman and the chairman 
have access to this kind of highly compartmented material. So when this 
kind of thing is bandied about on the floor in a generic way, it causes 
me great concern.
  Mr. DODD. Well, I understand that. It is just that this Senator in 
this--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas controls the time.
  Mr. DODD. If he would yield, this sentence in this letter suggests 
that this Senator--because I am the one who asked the question--crossed 
the line. Let me read my whole question.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I am not referring to the Senator from Connecticut by 
name. OK?
  Mr. DODD. I am the only one who asked the question that day.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Pardon me?
  Mr. DODD. I am the only one who asked the question of Mr. Bolton. I 
asked the question in this way: I want to read the question because I 
want to make sure I do not overstep a line here, and then I asked the 
question: Did 
you . . .
  My concern is that there is a suggestion, as the one who asked the 
question, that I had somehow--and I do not disagree with my colleague, 
by the way.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Reclaiming my time, I think I addressed the Senator's 
personal concern. The Senator knows me well enough to know that when I 
say I am not accusing him personally of anything that would be 
inappropriate, I have stated I am talking about open discussion of 
intelligence information, quite frankly, not only in this nomination 
process but in the Intelligence Authorization Act in regard to a whole 
series of other subjects I will not go into, that many people have 
spoken to on the floor, many people have talked to the press about, and 
I do not think it is appropriate.
  I will say again, I am not accusing the Senator of anything 
inappropriate. I think from the whole standpoint of this body, subjects 
such as this should be done in executive session. I think that because 
of all the problems we have had in regard to leaks and in regard to 
information that is not helpful to our national security. That is about 
as far as I will go with it. I could go through quite a laundry list of 
concerns I have of things that have been made public and what has 
happened in regard to our adversaries, what has happened in regard to 
our intelligence capability, and I worry about it. So my concern was 
basically the continued open discussion of things of this nature, not 
the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Will my colleague from Kansas yield?
  Mr. ROBERTS. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. COLEMAN. I take it my colleague from Kansas was not at the 
business meeting when the Bolton nomination was discussed. My colleague 
from Kansas was not at the hearing where the Bolton nomination was 
discussed. I do not know if it would surprise my colleague to note that 
in the business meeting, other Senators, not the Senator from 
Connecticut--this issue of intercept was raised again by another 
Senator and a similar question was asked. So it is not just the Senator 
from Connecticut who raised the issue during the questioning of Mr. 
Bolton.
  But, in fact, during the business meeting this came up again and 
again. I presume my colleague from Kansas must have been informed of 
that, to raise the level of concern he has.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator for his clarification.
  Mr. DODD. If my colleague will yield for just one additional point. I 
agree with respect to General Hayden as well. I noted because I watched 
the hearing--our colleague from Michigan is here and participated in 
the hearing--when General Hayden, in his confirmation hearing, was 
before the Armed Services Committee, there was a rather extensive 
discussion with General Hayden about the whole issue of intercepts. 
General Hayden was very forthcoming in that discussion about it. I have 
great respect for him as well. About the Web site here, I ask unanimous 
consent to have printed in the Record the Web page for the National 
Security Agency, the page headed, ``Signals Intelligence.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                          Signals Intelligence

       The National Security Agency collects, processes and 
     disseminates foreign Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The old 
     adage that ``knowledge is power'' has perhaps never been 
     truer than when applied to today's threats against our nation 
     and the role SIGINT plays in overcoming them.
       NSA's SIGINT mission protects the nation by:
       Providing information in the form of SIGINT products and 
     services that enable our government to make critical 
     decisions and operate successfully.
       Protecting the rights of U.S. citizens by adhering to the 
     provisions of the 4th amendment to the Constitution.
       Using the nation's resources responsibly, according to the 
     best management processes available.
       SIGINT is derived from the signals environment that is 
     described by the graphic above. Other agencies within the 
     Intelligence Community are responsible for other types of 
     intelligence:
       Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is primarily the responsibility 
     of the CIA and DIA,
       Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) belongs to NGA,

[[Page S5908]]

       Military Intelligence and Measurement and Signature 
     Intelligence (MASINT) belongs to DIA.
       Together, these different yet complementary disciplines 
     give our nation's leaders a greater understanding of the 
     intentions of our enemies.
       NSA's SIGINT mission provides our military leaders and 
     policy makers with intelligence to ensure our national 
     defense and to advance U.S. global interests. This 
     information is specifically limited to that on foreign 
     powers, organizations or persons and international 
     terrorists. NSA responds to requirements levied by 
     intelligence customers, which includes all departments and 
     levels of the United States Executive Branch.
       The prosecution of the SIGINT mission has evolved from the 
     relatively static, industrial age, Cold War communications 
     environment to the ubiquitous, high speed, multi-functional 
     technologies of today's information age. The ever-increasing 
     volume, velocity and variety of today's communications make 
     the production of relevant and timely intelligence for 
     military commanders and national policy makers more 
     challenging than ever.
       NSA has a strong tradition of dedicated, highly qualified 
     people deeply committed to maintaining the nation's security. 
     While technology will obviously continue to be a key element 
     of our future, NSA recognizes that technology is only as good 
     as the people creating it and the people using it. NSA 
     remains committed to its core mission of exploiting the 
     Agency's deep analytical skill and technological capabilities 
     to ensure the nation maintains a significant strategic 
     advantage in the advancement of U.S. interests around the 
     world.
       As much as modem telecommunications technology poses 
     significant challenges to SIGINT, the many languages used in 
     the nations and regions of the world that are of interest to 
     our military and national leaders require NSA to maintain a 
     wide variety of language capabilities. Successful SIGINT 
     depends on the skills of not only language professionals but 
     those of mathematicians, analysts, and engineers, as well. 
     The nation is indebted to them for the successes they have 
     won.
       SIGINT plays a vital role in our national security by 
     employing the right people and using the latest technology to 
     provide America's leaders with the critical information they 
     need to save lives, defend democracy, and promote American 
     values.

                        Introduction to NSA/CSS

       The National Security Agency/Central Security Service is 
     America's cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, 
     and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. 
     information systems and produce foreign intelligence 
     information. A high technology organization, NSA is on the 
     frontiers of communications and data processing. It is also 
     one of the most important centers of foreign language 
     analysis and research within the government.
       Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a unique discipline with a 
     long and storied past. SIGINT's modern era dates to World War 
     II, when the U.S. broke the Japanese military code and 
     learned of plans to invade Midway Island. This intelligence 
     allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan's superior fleet. The use of 
     SIGINT is believed to have directly contributed to shortening 
     the war by at least one year. Today, SIGINT continues to play 
     an important role in keeping the United States a step ahead 
     of its enemies.
       As the world becomes more and more technology-oriented, the 
     Information Assurance (IA) mission becomes increasingly 
     challenging. This mission involves protecting all classified 
     and sensitive information that is stored or sent through U.S. 
     government equipment. IA professionals go to great lengths to 
     make certain that government systems remain impenetrable. 
     This support spans from the highest levels of U.S. government 
     to the individual warfighter in the field.
       NSA conducts one of the U.S. government's leading research 
     and development (R&D) programs. Some of the Agency's R&D 
     projects have significantly advanced the state of the art in 
     the scientific and business worlds.
       NSA's early interest in cryptanalytic research led to the 
     first large-scale computer and the first solid-state 
     computer, predecessors to the modern computer. NSA pioneered 
     efforts in flexible storage capabilities, which led to the 
     development of the tape cassette. NSA also made ground-
     breaking developments in semiconductor technology and remains 
     a world leader in many technological fields.
       NSA employs the country's premier cryptologists. It is said 
     to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the United 
     States and perhaps the world. Its mathematicians contribute 
     directly to the two missions of the Agency: designing cipher 
     systems that will protect the integrity of U.S. information 
     systems and searching for weaknesses in adversaries' systems 
     and codes.
       Technology and the world change rapidly, and great emphasis 
     is placed on staying ahead of these changes with employee 
     training programs. The National Cryptologic School is 
     indicative of the Agency's commitment to professional 
     development. The school not only provides unique training for 
     the NSA workforce, but it also serves as a training resource 
     for the entire Department of Defense. NSA sponsors employees 
     for bachelor and graduate studies at the Nation's top 
     universities and colleges, and selected Agency employees 
     attend the various war colleges of the U.S. Armed Forces.
       Most NSA/CSS employees, both civilian and military, are 
     headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, centrally located 
     between Baltimore and Washington, DC. Its workforce 
     represents an unusual combination of specialties: analysts, 
     engineers, physicists, mathematicians, linguists, computer 
     scientists, researchers, as well as customer relations 
     specialists, security officers, data flow experts, managers, 
     administrative officers and clerical assistants.
  Mr. DODD. It is on public document and goes on at some length. I am 
not sure, my colleague may want to look at this. Maybe the agencies 
might be more careful about what it says here as well.
  The point all along here is the simple question whether access to 
these records will be granted to the appropriate Members here in the 
Senate. I appreciate immensely what my colleague said here today. He's 
a remarkable Senator who does a terrific job, and I thank him for 
engaging with me a bit in this colloquy, but I was concerned when I saw 
that line as somehow being singled out about raising the question about 
whether or not Mr. Bolton made a request. That is all I asked that day. 
I knew it was an important matter, and it ought to be dealt with not in 
a public setting, that that ought to be done behind closed doors with 
the Intelligence Committee to go into further detail about what 
actually went on. That is why I tried to word it very cautiously and 
caution myself not to go over a line in asking the question.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I only wish all Senators would have the same caution. I 
thank the Senator for his personal comments in my regard.
  I think he has made his point. As the farmer said as he crawled 
through the barbed-wire fence: One more point and we will be through.
  I suspect that you are through, and since I yielded back my time 
about 10 minutes ago, I yield it back one more time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to 
proceed for 20 minutes. I am very sorry the Senator from Kansas left. 
Let me first ask unanimous consent I be allowed to proceed.
  Mr. COLEMAN. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that transcripts of two public 
hearings where I asked questions of General Hayden, relative to the 
process of seeking identification of people who are referred to or who 
participate in intercepted conversations--that those unclassified, 
public hearing transcripts, or portions thereof, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       LEVIN. Thank you.
       General, this morning's New York Times had an article, 
     which troubled me, about the number of times in which 
     communications that had been intercepted by the NSA were 
     released to John Bolton. I was troubled by the number of 
     times that this happened, frankly.
       But since you're here and you're in a position to give us 
     some facts on this subject, I want to ask you a number of 
     questions about it.
       I gather that, according to the article, access to names 
     may be authorized by NSA only in response to special 
     requests, and these are not common, particularly from policy-
     makers. That's the quote in there. Is that an accurate 
     statement?
       HAYDEN. I think that's a very accurate description. In 
     fact, I read Doug Jehl's article. And I think Doug laid it 
     out in a very clear way.
       The way it works, Senator, is that we are required to 
     determine what is minimized U.S. person identity. Now, there 
     is a whole body of law with regard to protecting U.S. 
     privacy. But in an agency like ourselves, it is not uncommon 
     for us to come across information to, from or about what we 
     would call a protected person--a U.S. person. And then the 
     rules kick in as to what you can do with that information.
       The rule of thumb in almost all cases is that you minimize 
     it, and you simply refer to named U.S. person or named U.S. 
     official in the report that goes out.
       LEVIN. How often did Mr. Bolton request the names?
       [Crosstalk.]
       HAYDEN. I don't know.
       HAYDEN. We would have a record of it. Interestingly enough, 
     I double-checked this, this morning, after reading the 
     article, just to make sure I had this right. Because I did 
     approve, from time to time, the release of U.S. person 
     identity.

[[Page S5909]]

       And it's not very often. I have to do it when the identity 
     is released to a U.S. law enforcement agency. Just done for 
     foreign intelligence purposes, it's about three layers below 
     me in the NSA rule chart.
       LEVIN. Was there an unusual number of accesses requested by 
     Mr. Bolton compared to requests from other senior officials?
       HAYDEN. I don't know that, Senator; I really don't. And the 
     requests from Secretary Bolton were not of such a number that 
     they came to my attention.
       LEVIN. In other words, he obviously made requests. You say 
     that someone other than you would have approved those.
       HAYDEN. On a normal basis; that's right.
       LEVIN. But you do have records as to how often...
       HAYDEN. Yes, sir; we would.
       LEVIN. Thank you.
       HAYDEN. I should add: And that's a formal process. That's 
     just not a phone call.
       LEVIN. OK, thank you.
       HAYDEN. It's documented.
       LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       ROBERTS. Senator Levin, I wanted to let you know that in 
     answer to the number three question that I asked, why the 
     general replied in terms of cooperating with the committee, 
     deal with me to to provide documents or any material 
     requested by the committee in order for it to carry out its 
     oversight and its legislative responsibilities. We didn't put 
     a time frame on it, but you have. And his answer was an 
     emphatic yes.
       LEVIN. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

            4/21/05 SASC Nomination Hearing (NSA Intercepts)

       LEVIN. The Bolton nomination has raised a question about 
     protected U.S. identities. These are U.S. people who are 
     either participants in a conversation, communication which is 
     intercepted and included in a SIGINT product, where the 
     identity of that person is blocked, or sometimes, as said, is 
     minimized, and is referred to generally as a U.S. person.
       There are also many cases where that person is not a 
     participant in the conversation but is referred in a 
     conversation, and the identity of that person is also 
     protected as well.
       At the Intelligence Committee hearing with you last week, 
     you said that there's a formal written and documented process 
     for U.S. government officials to request the identity of a 
     U.S. person referred to in a SIGINT process. Is that correct?
       HAYDEN. Yes, sir, that's correct.
       LEVIN. Now, I take it there are a significant number of 
     requests, a large number of requests which come in for the 
     identity of a U.S. person who's been minimized.
       Can you tell us whether the majority of those requests, 
     indeed the vast majority of those requests, are made where 
     the person identified is not the participant in the 
     conversation, but rather is someone who is referred to in the 
     conversation?
       HAYDEN. Thank you very much for that question, Senator, 
     because when this comes up--I mean, first of all, to frame 
     the issue for me as director of NSA, I mean, the issue here 
     is the protection of American privacy. And everything then 
     devolves out of that fundamental principle: How do we protect 
     U.S. privacy?
       And in the course of accomplishing our mission, it's almost 
     inevitable that we would learn information about Americans, 
     or to or from, in terms of communications.
       The same rules apply, though, in protecting privacy, 
     whether it's to, from or about an American. You're correct. 
     In the vast majority of the cases the information is about an 
     American being referred to in communications between 
     individuals that I think the committee would be most 
     enthusiastic that we were conducting our operations against.
       LEVIN. And that's a very, very helpful clarification.
       My time is up. Can I just perhaps end this line of 
     questioning?
       Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
       I think the press has already indicated that there were 
     apparently 10 requests from Mr. Bolton.
       HAYDEN. Yes, sir, I've seen that number.
       LEVIN. Ok. Do you know or not the majority of his requests 
     were for persons that were referred to in the conversation or 
     for a participant in the conversation?
       HAYDEN. Yes, sir. I would like to respond to that for the 
     record in a classified way.
       LEVIN. That's fine.
       And the other question that relates not just to him, but I 
     guess to anybody, the person who makes this written 
     application for the information states specifically what that 
     purpose is that they want that information for. Is that 
     correct?
       HAYDEN. Yes, sir, Senator. But in all cases the purpose 
     comes down to the fundamental principle: I need to know the 
     identity of that individual to understand or appreciate the 
     intelligence value of the report.
       LEVIN. And is that printed there as a purpose, or does that 
     have to be filled in by the applicant?
       HAYDEN. Senator, I'm not exactly sure what the form looks 
     like, but I can tell you that's the only criteria on which we 
     would release the U.S. person information.
       LEVIN. But you don't know how that purpose is stated in 
     these thousands of applications?
       HAYDEN. I'd have to check, Senator.
       LEVIN. Or in Mr. Bolton's application?
       HAYDEN. Correct.
       LEVIN. Ok. And then once the information is obtained, you 
     do not know the use to which that information is put, I 
     gather. Is that correct?
       HAYDEN. No, we would report the information to an 
     authorized consumer in every dimension, in terms of both 
     security clearance and need to know, just like we would 
     report any other information.
       LEVIN. But then you don't know what...
       HAYDEN. No, sir.
       LEVIN. . . . that person does with that information.
       HAYDEN. No. The presumption, obviously, is the individual 
     uses that then to appreciate the original report.
       LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  Mr. LEVIN. The journalist Carl Bernstein once said, ``We have a 
national memory in this country of about 7 minutes.'' Once more, he has 
been proven right.
  Here we are, 2 years after one of the worst intelligence disasters in 
our history, debating the nomination of a man to the U.N. 
ambassadorship, a man who has a track record of attempting to 
manipulate intelligence by seeking to punish intelligence analysts who 
do not support his view. We are so slow to learn from our history, and 
we are so quick to repeat it.
  The issue here--and I am sure my friend from Connecticut would 
agree--is not the issue of whether or not policymakers have a right to 
disagree with analysts; of course, they do. We all should challenge 
analysts and analysis. We do not do enough of it. I happen to agree 
with the Senator from Kansas on that. That is not the issue.
  The question is whether or not we manipulate intelligence or try to 
manipulate intelligence by trying to force analysts, who are supposed 
to be objective, to reach conclusions with which they don't agree in 
order to get support for our own policy positions. That is what is 
unacceptable. It is not unacceptable to disagree with analysts or not 
to follow their analysis. That is not at all unacceptable. That is what 
policymakers are here for, to make judgments, to pick between analyses. 
But what is unacceptable is what Mr. Bolton did repeatedly, which is to 
try to get analysts, who are supposed to be objective, fired or removed 
or transferred because they would not come to the conclusion to which 
he wanted them to come. That is the issue here with Mr. Bolton.
  This administration does not hold people who politicize intelligence 
to account. Following the major intelligence failures before 9/11 and 
Iraq, the administration has failed to hold anybody accountable for 
either failure. In fact, the President gave one of the people most 
responsible for the intelligence disaster before Iraq, the CIA 
Director, a gold medal. Now the President wants to give John Bolton a 
promotion, although John Bolton has, in unconscionable--and I believe 
even potentially dangerous--ways attempted to get intelligence analysts 
to shape their views to his views and, if they wouldn't bend, to break 
them.

       We know what happens when intelligence is politicized. 
     Before the Iraq war, ``a slam dunk'' was the CIA assessment, 
     although the underlying intelligence contained nuances, 
     qualifications, and caveats. Too often the CIA told the 
     administration what it thought the administration wanted to 
     hear.

  The July 2004 bipartisan report of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
concluded the following:

       Most of the major key judgments in the intelligence 
     community's October 2002 ``National Intelligence Estimate, 
     Iraq's Continuing Programs for Mass Destruction,'' either 
     overstated or were not supported by the underlying 
     intelligence reporting.

  Just this month, newspapers reported on leaked notes from a July 23, 
2002, meeting of the British Prime Minister and his senior national 
security staff. According to the note, the head of British foreign 
intelligence told Prime Minister Blair, 7 months before the war, that 
President Bush:

     . . . wanted to remove Saddam through military action 
     justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the 
     intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.

  Those are contemporaneous notes, prior to the war against Iraq. Such 
reports reinforce the view of much of the world that the administration 
shaped intelligence to serve policy purposes and that it strayed from 
the critical principle that intelligence must be objective, 
independent, and free from political influence.
  Twenty-five years ago, the Iran-Contra Committee reaffirmed the 
principle that, after heavy manipulation of intelligence by CIA 
Director Bill Casey:


[[Page S5910]]


     . . . the gathering, analysis and reporting of intelligence 
     should be done in a way that there could be no question that 
     the conclusions are driven by the actual facts rather than by 
     what a policy advocate hopes those facts will be.

  That was 25 years ago. That was Iran-Contra. That was a bipartisan 
criticism of the then-CIA Director Casey.
  Intelligence must be gathered and analyzed in a way that there can be 
no doubt but that the conclusions are driven by the actual facts, not 
by what a policy advocate hopes those facts will be.
  It is going to take years of hard work to regain credibility in our 
intelligence assessments after the massive failures in Iraq. The Senate 
began that work with the intelligence reform bill in 2004. In that 
bill, Congress explicitly stated that national intelligence should be 
``objective'' and ``independent of political considerations.'' That is 
the law of the land. We require the process to ensure alternative 
analyses within the intelligence community.
  The nomination of John Bolton shows a disdain for objective, 
independent intelligence and flies in the face of the Senate's effort 
to reform our intelligence system. Indeed, Mr. Bolton is the 
personification of what has been wrong with our system. Mr. Bolton has 
a deeply disturbing history of trying to punish intelligence analysts 
who do not agree with his views, of trying to squelch intelligence 
analysis and of distorting the intelligence community's view when they 
do not agree with his own.
  He is aggressive about pursuing the answer that he wants, regardless 
of what the objective intelligence analysts say, and his actions have 
had a noticeably chilling effect on the intelligence analysts that he 
tries to intimidate and a harmful effect on the intelligence process 
itself.
  Let's just look at his record. Mr. Bolton's view on intelligence on 
Cuba can be gained from an e-mail to him from his chief of staff that 
called the intelligence community's language on Cuba ``wimpy.'' As a 
policymaker, he is entitled, and was entitled, to his own view. I make 
it clear that what the Senator from Kansas said, I agree with. Mr. 
Bolton was entitled to his own view, but what he was not entitled to do 
was force intelligence analysts to change their views.
  In preparation for his speech to the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Bolton 
repeatedly sought clearance for stronger language on Cuba's biological 
warfare effort than the intelligence community would support. He was 
repeatedly rebuffed by intelligence analysts at the State Department 
and the CIA, and he repeatedly responded by seeking those analysts' 
dismissal or removal, thereby crossing a vital line, a clear line, a 
red line, the line between ignoring intelligence analyses which, wise 
or not, is his right to do as a policymaker, that is on one side of the 
line. But the other side of the line he must not cross, trying to 
intimidate analysts into shaping intelligence analyses to his liking, 
that is totally impermissible. It is potentially dangerous, and it is 
clearly on the wrong side, the unacceptable side, the intolerable side 
of the line.
  When he did not receive the analysis he wanted on Cuba, Mr. Bolton 
unleashed a tirade against the intelligence analyst.
  Soon afterwards, he went to see Tom Fingar, the Principal Deputy 
Assistant for INR, to try to have the analyst removed. Mr. Fingar 
testified that Secretary Bolton was still visibly upset during their 
meeting, and he said that ``he wasn't going to be told what he could 
say by a midlevel INR munchkin analyst.''
  Mr. Bolton had made clear to the analyst he was his boss, and in 
essence had asked his subordinate: How dare you disagree with your 
superior?
  Mr. Fingar then testified that Mr. Bolton said he wanted the analyst 
``taken off his accounts.'' Mr. Fingar protested and said ``he is our 
chemical and biological challenge weapons specialist, this is what he 
does''--making clear to Mr. Bolton that reassignment would really mean 
termination. Mr. Bolton persisted.
  The record then shows that Mr. Bolton sought the analyst's removal 
two more times over a 6-month period. In one of those attempts, Mr. 
Bolton met with then-Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, 
Carl Ford, who later said the following:

       I left that meeting with the perception that I had been 
     asked for the first time to fire an intelligence analyst for 
     what he had said and done. In my experience no one had ever 
     done what Secretary Bolton did.

  Months later, Mr. Bolton made yet another attempt when Neil Silver 
became the analyst's supervisor. In his testimony to the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Mr. Bolton even conceded he was still pursuing the 
analyst's transfer.
  In his attempt to manipulate intelligence on Cuba, Mr. Bolton also 
tried to have a national intelligence officer from the CIA transferred. 
Mr. Bolton went personally to the CIA at Langley to argue for the 
analyst's dismissal. This is an analyst Mr. Bolton had never met, an 
analyst to whom he had never spoken. He had never read the analyst's 
work. He only knew one thing: The analyst disagreed with his views and, 
therefore, he had to be brought to heel.
  This effort, too, lasted several months and involved repeated 
attempts by Mr. Bolton and his staff. Former Deputy Director of the CIA 
John McLaughlin said of the request to dismiss the intelligence officer 
that it is ``the only time I had ever heard such a request.''
  So we have the Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin as saying nobody 
has ever made a request to him, that he knew of, to dismiss an 
intelligence officer because of a disagreement with that officer's 
analysis--very similar to what Mr. Ford said at the office of the 
Assistant Secretary of State: ``in his experience, no one had ever done 
what Secretary Bolton did,'' which was to fire an intelligence analyst 
for what he had said and done.
  In the end, both analysts were supported by their supervisors and 
they rightfully kept their positions. The only person who should have 
been fired over those incidents was Mr. Bolton.
  Mr. Bolton's defenders like to claim no harm, no foul. That is, 
because none of his targets were fired despite his efforts; that 
everything is just fine. But the harm is in the attempt. Shooting at 
someone is still a crime even if you miss. As soon as a policymaker 
threatens an intelligence analyst with removal for disagreeing with 
that analyst's analysis, the harm is done.
  As Mr. McLaughlin testified--and this is something the Senator from 
Kansas either overlooked or ignores. Listen to Mr. McLaughlin's 
testimony: It is perfectly all right for a policymaker to express 
disagreement with an intelligence officer or an analyst. And it is 
perfectly all right for them to challenge their word vigorously. But I 
think it is different, McLaughlin said, to then request, because of 
this disagreement, that the person be transferred.
  That is the line. That is the line which Mr. Bolton crossed. That is 
the line that we ought to insist on. Every Member of this body should 
insist that line never be crossed. We ought to protect the right of 
policymakers to disagree, to question, and to ignore the analysis. We 
should never condone a policymaker who wants to see an analyst fired 
because the policymaker disagrees with that person's analysis. That is 
the line which is dangerous to cross because the pressure that puts on 
the analyst is to come up with the answer that the policymaker wants to 
hear. That is what is dangerous, when we hear an analyst, or you hear a 
CIA Administrator say it is a slam dunk, when it isn't, because he 
thinks that is what the policy maker wants to hear.
  We cannot tolerate people being fired, discharged, transferred 
because the policymaker disagrees with the analysis of that analyst.

  Mr. McLaughlin is right. It was different. It was dangerous. And 
according to Mr. Ford, Mr. Bolton's actions had an impact. Word of the 
incident, according to Mr. Ford, ``spread like wildfire among the other 
analysts.'' Mr. Ford testified:

       I can only give you my impressions, but I clearly believe 
     that the analysts in INR were very negatively affected by 
     this incident. They were scared.

  Mr. Bolton's actions were so damaging that Secretary of State Powell 
made a special personal visit to offer encouragement to the analysts. 
In his remarks, Secretary Powell specifically referred to the analysts 
that Mr. Bolton had targeted. He told them: Continue to call it like 
you see it. Continue to speak truth to power.

[[Page S5911]]

  Former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf 
confirmed what should be all too clear about Mr. Bolton, that these 
examples of his behavior are not isolated instances but a persistent 
pattern. Mr. Wolf testified that Mr. Bolton sought the removal of two 
officers from a nonproliferation bureau over policy differences, and 
that, in general, officers in the bureau--and now this is Assistant 
Secretary of State John Wolf--that officers in the bureau ``felt undue 
pressure to conform to the views of [Mr. Bolton] versus the views they 
thought they could support.''
  Events of the past few years involving the completely missed 
intelligence on Iraq, the distorted intelligence on Iraq, have shown 
that we need to be encouraging independent and alternative analysis, 
not squelching it.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee report on the intelligence 
community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq concluded that a 
lack of alternative analysis contributed to the failure of that 
intelligence.
  The committee wrote that:

     . . . the analysts' and collectors' chains of command, their 
     respective agencies, from immediate services to the National 
     Intelligence Council and the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, all share responsibilities for not 
     encouraging analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully 
     consider alternative arguments, or accurately characterize 
     the intelligence report.

  ``Most importantly,'' according to the committee, they failed ``to 
recognize when analysts had lost their objectivity and take corrective 
action.''
  Our Intelligence Committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, said 
corrective action should be taken when analysts lose their objectivity. 
Mr. Bolton tried to get analysts punished for insisting on their 
independence. Mr. Bolton did not value independent and objective 
analysis. He scorned it. He sought not to encourage alternative views 
but to impose his own. He did not challenge analysts. He bullied them. 
And he tried to fire those who disagreed with him.
  Now, this is not ``water cooler'' gossip about an obnoxious boss. 
Objective, factual analysis can make the difference between success and 
failure, between life and death. In the near future, we may face a 
crisis over North Korea's nuclear program or Iran's nuclear intentions. 
Congress and the public must be confident that intelligence assessments 
represent information that has been assessed objectively, not shaped to 
serve policy goals. And if we need to go to the United Nations to make 
a case against a country based on our intelligence about that country's 
dangerous activity, the world must have confidence in the U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations.
  When Bush decided to make the case against Iraq to the United 
Nations, he sent Secretary of State Colin Powell, one of America's most 
credible diplomats. Today, we are being asked to confirm one of 
America's least credible diplomats to serve in an important diplomatic 
post, where we need credibility, we need the confidence to bring other 
countries to our side. We should not allow a situation in which the 
world might question whether it is hearing a credible view or whether 
it is hearing a Bolton view of intelligence.
  Perhaps the biggest canard of the debate is that John Bolton is the 
best person to reform the United Nations. The U.N. needs reform, but so 
does the intelligence community. So does its systems. And, frankly, so 
does John Bolton. Any number of people would be a far more credible 
voice for reform at the United Nations.
  This is a momentous decision for this body. It is shocking and sad--
it is shocking and sad--to me that the Senate may vote on this 
nomination while Senators are being denied critical, relevant 
information that members of the Foreign Relations Committee have 
sought. Members of that committee have requested information about the 
number of requests by Mr. Bolton for the names of U.S. persons cited in 
intelligence intercepts. The administration has refused to provide 
relevant information to members of the Foreign Relations Committee and 
to this body.
  Now, those requests may be benign that Mr. Bolton made for the names 
of those persons and what they were saying in those intercepts. They 
could be part of an effort by this nominee to politicize and punish, 
since that was the pattern of his activity. We do not know that. But we 
have a right to know that. We have a right to ask why those requests 
were made. But this administration has refused to provide that 
information. We should insist on this information before we vote on 
this nomination. We should insist that at least the leaders of our 
committees, the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Relations 
Committee, be given access to the names of people that Mr. Bolton asked 
the intercepts relative to.
  Denying the Congress and the Members of this body--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed his time.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and I ask unanimous consent for 3 
additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Denying Members of this body information is part of a 
woeful pattern of this administration denying information to the 
Congress. Even the Republicans of the House Energy and Water 
Appropriations Subcommittees and the Homeland Security Appropriations 
Subcommittee over in the House included language in their bill which 
says that the Bush administration should be criticized ``for its lack 
of responsiveness to repeated Congressional requests for information.''
  Mr. President, this Senate, as a body, should insist on legitimate 
requests for information from its Members. Every Member--every Member--
should add his or her voice to the demand for the production of 
relevant documents which Senators need to decide on confirmation or for 
any other legitimate reason. This body will be a lesser place if we do 
not stand with each other when it comes to gaining access to documents, 
at least in the absence of a claim of executive privilege.
  Now, I happen to believe we should give deference to the President on 
the selection of his team, but deference does not mean abdication of 
our best judgment when a nominee crosses the line. If we do that, we 
will send the wrong message to anyone working in the intelligence 
community who sees Mr. Bolton's behavior rewarded rather than seeing 
him held accountable. If we do that, we will send the wrong message to 
the international community, to send a repeat abuser of intelligence 
and an abuser of intelligence analysts to be our representative at the 
United Nations.

  We have the opportunity to send a different message to the 
intelligence community and to the world. We can cast a vote for 
objectivity in intelligence, for intelligence that is free of political 
influence, and for accountability. But before we vote--before we vote--
legitimate requests for documents and information from Members of this 
body should be honored and should be supported by every Senator. That 
is a need which, at one time or another, each one of us has, and as an 
institution we should, in one voice, demand that need be met.
  This is a demand for relevant documents relevant to the 
qualifications of this nominee to be confirmed to this high office. It 
is a demand for documents which relate to an issue which is clearly 
involved in this nomination, and that has to do with a pattern, on the 
part of Mr. Bolton, of punishing people who analyze intelligence who do 
not give him an analysis that he likes and that supports his own 
policy.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and thank my good friend from 
Minnesota for yielding the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 3 minutes to 
engage my colleague from Michigan in a little colloquy. Will my friend 
from Minnesota object to that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. COLEMAN. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my friend.
  I want to compliment my friend from Michigan on a very fine 
statement. He has focused, in my view, exactly on the central question 
here and that is not that there was disagreement over intelligence but, 
rather, whether someone went beyond a good, healthy fight over whether 
or not intelligence was accurate and took additional steps to dismiss 
or to change the jobs of the individuals involved.

[[Page S5912]]

  I appreciate my colleague calling into question the access of 
information because this is central. That is why this Senator has taken 
the extraordinary step of asking my colleagues to potentially oppose a 
motion to invoke cloture on this nomination if the information is not 
forthcoming.
  The reason I want to raise this is because our good friend from 
Kansas, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, read into the 
Record a letter he sent to Senator Lugar regarding this request for the 
intercept information. And the pertinent paragraph, to this Senator, I 
want to read quickly. It says:

       Finally, the Vice Chairman and I reviewed all ten documents 
     containing the references to U.S. persons that generated 
     Under Secretary Bolton's requests. The documents we reviewed 
     did not contain the actual identities of the minimized U.S. 
     persons. After reviewing the content of each report, however, 
     it was apparent to us both that it was not necessary to know 
     the actual names to determine whether [or not] the requests 
     were proper.

  Now, the letter goes on, but that is the important paragraph because 
the very identity of the individual names was redacted. The chairman of 
the Committee on Intelligence and the ranking member on Intelligence 
were not allowed to see the names, the very names that Mr. Bolton was 
able to see and apparently his staff was able to see. That is the 
relevant information that we are seeking--the names of the individuals.
  Does my colleague have any comment on that particular point? Because 
that, to me, is the central admission in this letter.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the names of the people that he sought 
information on are incredibly relevant to the question of why he sought 
information on those people, what was his motive. There is a pattern 
here, a pattern of punishment of people if they did not provide 
analysis that he agreed with, if they disagreed with his views. And 
when he asks for those intercepts, he may have had a perfectly benign 
reason for doing it. On the other hand, it may have been part of this 
totally unacceptable pattern.
  But the Senate has the same right to know what he knew and he asked 
for, which was intercepts of particular people who were either involved 
in the conversation or referred to in the conversation.
  If the Senate doesn't insist on that right for every Member of this 
body, we are a lesser body. We should insist upon that for Members who 
agree with us or not. This is an institutional issue of great 
magnitude.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is up.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my friend for a good statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the concern over the 
institutional issue of having access. I join my colleague in getting 
that information. Where I disagree is that when we have the chairman of 
the Intelligence Committee stating to us in this letter--saying: After 
reviewing the content of each report, it was apparent to us both that 
it was not necessary to know the actual names to determine whether the 
requests were proper. Ultimately, he found no basis to question the 
justification nor appropriateness of Mr. Bolton's request for the U.S. 
persons contained therein. So we have an individual we all deeply 
respect, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, saying ``it was 
apparent to us,'' the chairman and the ranking member, and then the 
letter went on.
  I would say there is an institutional issue that we should resolve at 
some point. In the context of this nomination, where we have a very 
clear statement that this specific information that was requested--it 
was ``not necessary to know the actual names to determine whether the 
requests were proper.'' Then it is basically saying the requests were 
proper.
  Let us move forward with this nomination because we have a statement 
saying the information wasn't needed to make a determination. Let us 
pursue with great vigor the right of Members of this body to have 
access to that kind of information. I think we really have to separate 
the two, based on the statement of the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield for a question?
  Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. I appreciate the Senator's comments. I ask unanimous 
consent that entire paragraph I quoted from the chairman be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Finally, the Vice Chairman and I reviewed all ten documents 
     containing the references to U.S. persons that generated 
     Under Secretary Bolton's requests. The documents we reviewed 
     did not contain the actual identities of the minimized U.S. 
     persons. After reviewing the content of each report, however, 
     it was apparent to us both that it was not necessary to know 
     the actual names to determine whether the requests were 
     proper.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I raise this point. I appreciate his point. 
Obviously, there is a disagreement between the ranking member and 
chairman, unfortunately, which is not a healthy thing to see coming out 
of the Intelligence Committee. The point I am trying to make here is, 
with all due respect to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and 
the ranking member, it was, in fact, the very names involved which 
could be the very names we are talking about that have been redacted 
from the document that would be terribly revealing. If, for instance, 
there is the name--we have called him ``Mr. Smith'' to protect his 
identity at the CIA. If there is overwhelming evidence that Mr. Bolton 
tried to have ``Mr. Smith'' dismissed as an intelligence analyst, and 
if one of the names being sought by Mr. Bolton was Mr. Smith, it seems 
that ought to send red flags up to everybody. Why? It is Mr. Bolton 
requesting to know who Mr. Smith was and what he said, an individual he 
was trying to have dismissed from the CIA. We don't know whether Mr. 
Smith's name is on there because the name was redacted. The chairman 
and ranking member cannot read that name.
  Without knowing the name of the individual, you cannot get to the 
point. Obviously, the people at the State Department--it is the same 
thing. Without knowing the names, without the identities, I don't know 
how you can draw the conclusion that it wasn't relevant. That is my 
point.
  Mr. COLEMAN. As I recall the statement from the ranking member, he 
said these incidents were not new to them. Some of these had been 
raised before. One was regarding Cuba. They had knowledge of this. 
Again, I would defer to the good judgment of the chair of the 
Intelligence Committee, who said we looked at it and it wasn't 
relevant. And then on and on in the letter again, and again he comes to 
the same conclusion: nothing inappropriate, nothing unusual, no 
violation of procedures. It is very clear.
  I urge my colleagues to let us pursue this issue. I don't think there 
is a reasonable basis for holding up this confirmation based on the 
concern of getting this type of information.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, my good friend from Minnesota. 
If you agree that the Senate is entitled to this information, but not 
now--if not now, when? The reason for seeking this information relates 
to the nomination of Mr. Bolton. That is why this is so relevant and 
important. I think the members of the Foreign Relations Committee have 
been seeking this information for many weeks. So it is not as though 
this is a last-minute request which is holding up the vote on a 
nomination or would hold it up until we receive that information.
  By the way, I happen to believe--and I don't know if my good friend 
from Connecticut agrees with me--that if the chairman and vice chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee saw the names and concluded that none of 
those names had any relationship to this nomination because none of the 
names are people he tried to get fired, transfer, or punish, that would 
satisfy me. But the administration knows the names. John Bolton got the 
names. But the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the 
chairman won't be given those names and they are redacted. I believe 
the Senate cannot accept that standard and hold ourselves up as a body 
that is equal in power to the executive branch. We cannot. We cannot 
say to ourselves that this body will look at all relevant evidence that 
relates to confirmation before we give our consent to it and protect 
the Members' requests for information if we do not insist that at least 
the chairman

[[Page S5913]]

and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee have access to the 
names and see whether those names are relevant to this nomination in 
terms of the specific people John Bolton tried to punish or get 
transferred.
  I find this really intolerable, incredible, that we as a body will 
not stand with a legitimate request for relevant information that 
relates to a pending nomination that was promptly and timely made.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, again, I remind my colleagues that it is 
a nomination with 10 hours of hearings, 2 business meetings, 35 staff 
interviews with 29 different people, a thousand pages of transcripts 
and 800 pages of documents, the opportunity for the chairman and the 
ranking member of the Intelligence Committee to look at this 
information, and they came to the conclusions they came to. In the end, 
I think perhaps--I agree with my colleagues on crossing the line. I 
agree. You should not be harassing intelligence officials because of 
policy disagreements to the point where you drive them out of the job. 
But that just didn't happen here.
  In fact, Mr. President, if you look at the statement of Carl Ford, he 
himself in the minority report said this incident didn't turn into the 
politicization of intelligence. Carl Ford--and I was there and listened 
to the testimony--said this incident didn't turn into the 
politicization of intelligence.
  We can walk through this again and again. We had the discussion over 
Cuba and the issue of biological weapons capacity. Again, the 
allegation was made that somehow Mr. Bolton took views that were his 
own and disregarded the views of the administration in regard to Cuba. 
Carl Ford testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on March 19, 
2002. He stated that the United States believes that Cuba has at least 
limited developmental offensive biological warfare and research 
capability--on and on. What does John Bolton say when he gives his 
speech? He says the same thing.

  The point is, in each and every instance when colleagues raise a 
concern about Mr. Bolton giving his own opinion versus that which is 
approved, it is simply not the case. I think my colleague from Kansas 
said this is a case of ``the rest of the story.'' It is true on the 
Cuba issue. It is true on Mr. Bolton's testimony about Syria. Again, 
the same concern was raised. The record is saying something very 
different--that in each and every instance, there may have been 
discussion and challenges, but in the end Secretary Bolton delivered 
the approved language. North Korea, the same thing. Allegation was made 
that he was off on his own, and Secretary Powell came back and said, 
no, he delivered the opinion of the administration, of the Secretary of 
State.
  What we have here--and the record is clear--is an individual with 
strong views and strong opinions, who challenged personnel, but never, 
never took any action against a single individual. Phrases are thrown 
out that there were threats to be fired or transferred. The reality is 
when Mr. Westermann back-doored Mr. Bolton, he lost confidence in him 
and said: I want him transferred. That is all you have.
  In the end, Mr. President, what we have is an individual who has 
served this country well, who has a record of distinguished service, 
who has the support of a litany of Secretaries of State, of individuals 
who have worked with him for years and years, who negotiated the treaty 
of Moscow and got the U.N. to reverse itself on the odious resolution 
declaring Zionism as racism, who has the support of the Secretary of 
State, who has the confidence of the President of the United States to 
do what has to be done, and that is the heavy lifting in reforming the 
United Nations.

  From the very beginning, my colleagues on the other side simply have 
said he is not acceptable, he has the wrong political perspective on 
the United Nations, he has the wrong political perspective perhaps on 
the war in Iraq and other issues, which morphed into allegations which, 
in the end, when we look at the rest of the story, simply are 
unsubstantiated.
  John Bolton deserves our support. He deserves to be confirmed. I will 
proudly vote for his confirmation tomorrow. I urge my colleagues to do 
the same.
  I yield back the remainder of our time, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter to 
Chairman Lugar and to Ranking Member Biden from Senator Rockefeller 
dated May 25 be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                     Washington, DC, May 25, 2005.
     Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators Lugar and Biden: I write in response to the 
     Chairman's April 28, 2005 letter asking that the Senate 
     Select Committee on Intelligence examine a number of 
     intelligence-related issues that were raised during your 
     Committee's consideration of the nomination of Under 
     Secretary John Bolton to be the United States Representative 
     to the United Nations.
       As you may be aware, I wrote to then-Director of the 
     National Security Agency (NSA), Lieutenant General Michael V. 
     Hayden, on April 20, 2005, requesting any documentation 
     related to Mr. Bolton's requests for the identity of a U.S. 
     person included in classified intelligence reports produced 
     by the NSA.
       In response, General Hayden provided Chairman Pat Roberts 
     and me the opportunity to review all ten NSA documents 
     containing the references to U.S. persons that generated Mr. 
     Bolton's requests. We were not permitted to retain these 
     intelligence reports and other members of our Committee were 
     not permitted access to them. Additionally, the actual U.S. 
     identities provided by the NSA to Mr. Bolton were not shared 
     with us.
       State Department records indicate that Mr. Bolton requested 
     the minimized identities of nineteen U.S. persons contained 
     in ten NSA signals intelligence reports. These requests were 
     processed by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
     and Research (INR). In each instance, the INR request to the 
     NSA, on behalf of Mr. Bolton, included the justification that 
     the identity of the U.S. person(s) was needed in order to 
     better understand or assess the foreign intelligence value of 
     the information contained in the intelligence report. This is 
     the standard justification required by NSA in order for 
     officials to request the identity of a U.S. person contained 
     in a signals intelligence report.
       Based on my personal review of these reports and the 
     context in which U.S. persons are referenced in them, I found 
     no evidence that there was anything improper about Mr. 
     Bolton's ten requests for the identities of U.S. persons.
       It is important to note, however, that our Committee did 
     not interview Mr. Bolton, so I am unable to answer directly 
     the question of why he felt it was necessary for him to have 
     the identity information in order to better understand the 
     foreign intelligence contained in the report.
       Furthermore, based on the information available to me, I do 
     not have a complete understanding of Mr. Bolton's handling of 
     the identity information after he received it.
       The Committee has learned during its interview of Mr. 
     Frederick Fleitz, Mr. Bolton's acting Chief of Staff, that on 
     at least one occasion Mr. Bolton is alleged to have shared 
     the un-minimized identity information he received from the 
     NSA with another individual in the State Department. In this 
     instance, the NSA memorandum forwarding the requested 
     identity to State INR included the following restriction: 
     ``Request no further action be taken on this information 
     without prior approval of NSA.'' I have confirmed with the 
     NSA that the phrase ``no further action'' includes sharing 
     the requested identity of U.S. persons with any individual 
     not authorized by the NSA to receive the identity.
       In addition to being troubled that Mr. Bolton may have 
     shared U.S. person identity information without required NSA 
     approval, I am concerned that the reason for sharing the 
     information is was not in keeping with Mr. Bolton's requested 
     justification for the identity in the first place. The 
     identity information was provided to Mr. Bolton based on the 
     stated reason that he needed to know the identity in order to 
     better understand the foreign intelligence contained in the 
     NSA report. According to Mr. Fleitz, Mr. Bolton used the 
     information he was provided in one instance in order to seek 
     out the State Department official mentioned in the report to 
     congratulate him. This use of carefully minimized U.S. person 
     identity information seems to be not in keeping with the 
     rationale provided in Mr. Bolton's request.
       An interview of Mr. Bolton by your Committee may provide a 
     more complete understanding of the extent to which he may 
     have shared with others the nineteen U.S. person identities 
     he requested and received from the NSA. I believe it is a 
     matter that deserves more thorough attention.
       I hope this information is of assistance to you.
           Sincerely,
                                           John D. Rockefeller IV,
                                                    Vice Chairman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican whip is recognized.

[[Page S5914]]

                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Executive 
     Calendar No. 103.
         Bill Frist, Richard G. Lugar, Richard Burr, Pat Roberts, 
           Mitch McConnell, Jeff Sessions, Wayne Allard, Jon Kyl, 
           Jim DeMint, David Vitter, Richard C. Shelby, Lindsey 
           Graham, John Ensign, Pete Domenici, Bob Bennett, Mel 
           Martinez, George Allen.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, under the previous agreement, this vote 
will occur tomorrow at 6 p.m. If cloture is invoked--and we hope it 
will be, of course--the vote on the nomination will then occur 
immediately.

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