[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 57 (Wednesday, May 4, 2005)]
[House]
[Pages H2937-H2939]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS LETTING OUR TROOPS DOWN
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday, May 1, marked the 2-year
anniversary of President Bush's aircraft carrier news event in which he
declared ``Mission Accomplished'' in Iraq. Two years later, our troops
are still facing a strong insurgence that shows no sign of slowing
down.
Our troops are doing valiant work, but that sadly is not always
enough. I will include for the Congressional Record a New York Times
investigative report from April 25 titled, ``Bloodied Marines Sound Off
About Want for Armor and Men.'' The article should be required reading
for every Member of this House, as well as the high-ranking military
and civilian personnel at the Department of Defense.
Times reporter Michael Moss interviewed Marines from Company E who
served a 6-month stint in Iraq last year. During that time, Company E
endured the highest casualty rate of any marine company in the war.
According to the Times, ``More than one-third of the unit's 185 troops
were killed or wounded during that time.''
Several months after the beginning of the war as Congress was
debating its first emergency supplemental, we were all alerted to the
fact that our troops did not have the equipment they needed to
adequately do their job and to protect themselves from extreme harm or
death. We heard they did not have the body armor they needed, nor did
the Humvees come with the necessary protective steel armor to protect
them from being easy targets of insurgents.
{time} 1615
The situation became so dire for our troops that one brave National
Guardsman last year asked Secretary Rumsfeld when the troops would have
the protective gear they had already been promised. Secretary Rumsfeld
could not give the Guardsman an adequate response at the time. As the
press began to question the Bush administration about this outrageous
neglect of our troops, President Bush came out and stated, ``The
concerns expressed are being addressed, and that is we expect our
troops to have the best possible equipment and I have told many
families I met with, `We're doing everything we possibly can to protect
your loved ones in a mission which is vital and important.' ''
The New York Times report clearly shows that the Bush administration
has not done enough to protect our troops. As the House prepares to
vote tomorrow on another $82 billion supplemental to fund the war,
bringing the total cost to $300 billion, it is hard to believe that the
Bush administration, particularly Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, has not
made protecting our troops in Iraq a main priority.
Mr. Speaker, we have now lost more than 1,600 troops in Iraq, but the
Defense Department has no idea how many of these troops have died
because they did not receive the proper supplies from the leaders that
sent them into harm's way. Would you believe that we do not have those
numbers because the Defense Department chooses only to list casualties
as ``killed in combat''?
However, the New York Times story gives a grim report on how the lack
of protection affected Company 13. According to the Times, ``The
biggest danger the men faced came in traveling to and from camp; 13 of
the 21 men who were killed had been riding in Humvees that failed to
deflect bullets or bombs.'' I repeat, 13 of 21, or almost two-thirds of
the men, were killed as a direct result of them not having access to
armed Humvees. Again, this is last year. This is not 2 years ago at the
beginning of the war.
Mr. Speaker, where is the Bush administration, particularly Secretary
Rumsfeld, spending the billions of dollars this Congress has given
them? The Pentagon says it will not have every Humvee suitably armed
until the end of this year. That is simply unacceptable. Our brave
troops should not have to wait another 8 months to have the proper
protection they need to do their job. Sergeant James King, a member of
Company E who lost one of his legs when he was blown out of a Humvee,
said it best to the New York Times: ``As Marines, we are always taught
that we do more with less and get the job done no matter what it
takes.''
You would expect nothing less from our troops. They have not let us
down. But, unfortunately, our troops have clearly been let down by the
Bush administration.
[From the New York Times, Apr. 25, 2005]
Bloodied Marines Sound Off About Want of Armor and Men
(By Michael Moss)
CORRECTION APPENDED
A chart on April 25 with an article about a company of
marines who fought in Iraq misstated the type of munition
that the armor installed on their Humvees is capable of
withstanding. It is a four-pound land mine, not a 155-
millimeter howitzer round.
CORRECTED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES Wed
May 04 2005
On May 29, 2004, a station wagon that Iraqi insurgents had
packed with C-4 explosives
[[Page H2938]]
blew up on a highway in Ramadi, killing four American marines
who died for lack of a few inches of steel.
The four were returning to camp in an unarmored Humvee that
their unit had rigged with scrap metal, but the makeshift
shields rose only as high as their shoulders, photographs of
the Humvee show, and the shrapnel from the bomb shot over the
top.
``The steel was not high enough,'' said Staff Sgt. Jose S.
Valerio, their motor transport chief, who along with the
unit's commanding officers said the men would have lived had
their vehicle been properly armored. ``Most of the shrapnel
wounds were to their heads.''
Among those killed were Rafael Reynosa, a 28-year-old lance
corporal from Santa Ana, Calif., whose wife was expecting
twins, and Cody S. Calavan, a 19-year-old private first class
from Lake Stevens, Wash., who had the Marine Corps motto,
Semper Fidelis, tattooed across his back.
They were not the only losses for Company E during its six-
month stint last year in Ramadi. In all, more than one-third
of the unit's 185 troops were killed or wounded, the highest
casualty rate of any company in the war, Marine Corps
officials say.
In returning home, the leaders and Marine infantrymen have
chosen to break an institutional code of silence and tell
their story, one they say was punctuated not only by a lack
of armor, but also by a shortage of men and planning that
further hampered their efforts in battle, destroyed morale
and ruined the careers of some of their fiercest warriors.
The saga of Company E, part of a lionized battalion
nicknamed the Magnificent Bastards, is also one of fortitude
and ingenuity. The marines, based at Camp Pendleton in
southern California, had been asked to rid the provincial
capital of one of the most persistent insurgencies, and in
enduring 26 firefights, 90 mortar attacks and more than 90
homemade bombs, they shipped their dead home and powered on.
Their tour has become legendary among other Marine units now
serving in Iraq and facing some of the same problems.
``As marines, we are always taught that we do more with
less,'' said Sgt. James S. King, a platoon sergeant who lost
his left leg when he was blown out of the Humvee that
Saturday afternoon last May. ``And get the job done no matter
what it takes.''
The experiences of Company E's marines, pieced together
through interviews at Camp Pendleton and by phone, company
records and dozens of photographs taken by the marines, show
they often did just that. The unit had less than half the
troops who are now doing its job in Ramadi, and resorted to
making dummy marines from cardboard cutouts and camouflage
shirts to place in observation posts on the highway when it
ran out of men. During one of its deadliest firefights, it
came up short on both vehicles and troops. Marines who were
stranded at their camp tried in vain to hot-wire a dump truck
to help rescue their falling brothers. That day, 10 men in
the unit died.
Sergeant Valerio and others had to scrounge for metal
scraps to strengthen the Humvees they inherited from the
National Guard, which occupied Ramadi before the marines
arrived. Among other problems, the armor the marines
slapped together included heavier doors that could not be
latched, so they ``chicken winged it'' by holding them
shut with their arms as they traveled.
``We were sitting out in the open, an easy target for
everybody,'' Cpl. Toby G. Winn of Centerville, Tex., said of
the shortages. ``We complained about it every day, to anybody
we could. They told us they were listening, but we didn't see
it.''
The company leaders say it is impossible to know how many
lives may have been saved through better protection, since
the insurgents became adept at overcoming improved defenses
with more powerful weapons. Likewise, Pentagon officials say
they do not know how many of the more than 1,500 American
troops who have died in the war had insufficient protective
gear.
But while most of Company E's work in fighting insurgents
was on foot, the biggest danger the men faced came in
traveling to and from camp: 13 of the 21 men who were killed
had been riding in Humvees that failed to deflect bullets or
bombs.
Toward the end of their tour when half of their fleet had
become factory-armored, the armor's worth became starkly
clear. A car bomb that the unit's commander, Capt. Kelly D.
Royer, said was at least as powerful as the one on May 29
showered a fully armored Humvee with shrapnel, photographs
show. The marines inside were left nearly unscathed.
Captain Royer, from Orangevale, Calif., would not accompany
his troops home. He was removed from his post six days before
they began leaving Ramadi, accused by his superiors of being
dictatorial, records show. His defenders counter that his
commanding style was a necessary response to the extreme
circumstances of his unit's deployment.
Company E's experiences still resonate today both in Iraq,
where two more marines were killed last week in Ramadi by the
continuing insurgency, and in Washington, where Congress is
still struggling to solve the Humvee problem. Just on
Thursday, the Senate voted to spend an extra $213 million to
buy more fully armored Humvees. The Army's procurement
system, which also supplies the Marines, has come under
fierce criticism for underperforming in the war, and to this
day it has only one small contractor in Ohio armoring new
Humvees.
Marine Corps officials disclosed last month in
Congressional hearings that they were now going their own way
and had undertaken a crash program to equip all of their more
than 2,800 Humvees in Iraq with stronger armor. The effort
went into production in November and is to be completed at
the end of this year.
Defense Department officials acknowledged that Company E
lacked enough equipment and men, but said that those were
problems experienced by many troops when the insurgency
intensified last year, and that vigorous efforts had been
made to improve their circumstances.
Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis of Richland, Wash., who commanded
the First Marine Division to which Company E belongs, said he
had taken every possible step to support Company E. He added
that they had received more factory-armored Humvees than any
other unit in Iraq.
``We could not encase men in sufficiently strong armor to
deny any enemy success,'' General Mattis said. ``The tragic
loss of our men does not necessarily indicate failure--it is
war.''
Trouble From the Start
Company E's troubles began at Camp Pendleton when, just
seven days before the unit left for Iraq, it lost its first
commander. The captain who led them through training was
relieved for reasons his supervisor declined to discuss.
``That was like losing your quarterback on game day,'' said
First Sgt. Curtis E. Winfree.
In Kuwait, where the unit stopped over, an 18-year-old
private committed suicide in a chapel. Then en route to
Ramadi, they lost the few armored plates they had earmarked
for their vehicles when the steel was borrowed by another
unit that failed to return it. Company E tracked the steel
down and took it back.
Even at that, the armor was mostly just scrap and thin, and
they needed more for the unarmored Humvees they inherited
from the Florida National Guard.
``It was pitiful,'' said Capt. Chae J. Han, a member of a
Pentagon team that surveyed the Marine camps in Iraq last
year to document their condition. ``Everything was just
slapped on armor, just homemade, not armor that was given to
us through the normal logistical system.''
The report they produced was classified, but Captain Royer,
who took over command of the unit, and other Company E
marines say they had to build barriers at the camp--a former
junkyard--to block suicide drivers, improve the fencing and
move the toilets under a thick roof to avoid the insurgent
shelling.
Even some maps they were given to plan raids were several
years old, showing farmland where in fact there were homes,
said a company intelligence expert, Cpl. Charles V.
Lauersdorf, who later went to work for the Defense
Intelligence Agency. There, he discovered up-to-date imagery
that had not found its way to the front lines.
Ramadi had been quiet under the National Guard, but the
Marines had orders to root out an insurgency that was using
the provincial capital as a way station to Falluja and
Baghdad, said Lt. Col. Paul J. Kennedy, who oversaw Company E
as the commander of its Second Battalion, Fourth Marine
Regiment.
Before the company's first month was up, Lance Cpl. William
J. Wiscowiche of Victorville, Calif., lay dead on the main
highway as its first casualty. The Marine Corps issued a
statement saying only that he had died in action. But for
Company E, it was the first reality check on the constraints
that would mark their tour.
Sweeping for Bombs
A British officer had taught them to sweep the roads for
bombs by boxing off sections and fanning out troops into
adjoining neighborhoods in hopes of scaring away insurgents
poised to set off the bombs. ``We didn't have the time to do
that,'' said Sgt. Charles R. Sheldon of Solana Beach, Calif.
``We had to clear this long section of highway, and it
usually took us all day.''
Now and then a Humvee would speed through equipped with an
electronic device intended to block detonation of makeshift
bombs. The battalion, which had five companies in its fold,
had only a handful of the devices, Colonel Kennedy said.
Company E had none, even though sweeping roads for bombs
was one of its main duties. So many of the marines, like
Corporal Wiscowiche, had to rely on their eyes. On duty on
March 30, 2004, the 20-year-old lance corporal did not spot
the telltale three-inch wires sticking out of the dust until
he was a few feet away, the company's leaders say. He died
when the bomb was set off.
``We had just left the base,'' Corporal Winn said. ``He was
walking in the middle of the road, and all I remember is
hearing a big explosion and seeing a big cloud of smoke.''
The endless task of walking the highways for newly hidden
I.E.D.'s, or improvised explosive devices, ``was nerve
wracking,'' Corporal Winn said, and the company began using
binoculars and the scopes on their rifles to spot the bombs
after Corporal Wiscowiche was killed.
``Halfway through the deployment marines began getting good
at spotting little things,'' Sergeant Sheldon added. ``We had
marines riding down the road at 60 miles an hour, and they
would spot a copper filament sticking out of a block of
cement.''
General Mattis said troops in the area now have hundreds of
the electronic devices to foil the I.E.D.'s.
[[Page H2939]]
In parceling out Ramadi, the Marine Corps leadership gave
Company E more than 10 square miles to control, far more than
the battalion's other companies. Captain Royer said he had
informally asked for an extra platoon, or 44 marines, and had
been told the battalion was seeking an extra company. The
battalion's operations officer, Maj. John D. Harrill, said
the battalion had received sporadic assistance from the Army
and had given Company E extra help. General Mattis says he
could not pull marines from another part of Iraq because
``there were tough fights going on everywhere.''
Colonel Kennedy said Company E's area was less dense, but
the pressure it put on the marines came to a boil on April 6,
2004, when the company had to empty its camp--leaving the
cooks to guard the gates--to deal with three firefights.
Ten of its troops were killed that day, including eight who
died when the Humvee they were riding in was ambushed en
route to assist other marines under fire. That Humvee lacked
even the improvised steel on the back where most of the
marines sat, Company E leaders say.
``All I saw was sandbags, blood and dead bodies,'' Sergeant
Valerio said. ``There was no protection in the back.''
Captain Royer said more armor would not have even helped.
The insurgents had a .50-caliber machine gun that punched
huge holes through its windshield. Only a heavier combat
vehicle could have withstood the barrage, he said, but the
unit had none. Defense Department officials have said they
favored Humvees over tanks in Iraq because they were less
imposing to civilians.
The Humvee that trailed behind that day, which did have
improvised armor, was hit with less powerful munitions, and
the marines riding in it survived by hunkering down. ``The
rounds were pinging,'' Sergeant Sheldon said. ``Then in a
lull they returned fire and got out.''
Captain Royer said that he photographed the Humvees in
which his men died to show to any official who asked about
the condition of their armor, but that no one ever did.
Sergeant Valerio redoubled his effort to fortify the
Humvees by begging other branches of the military for scraps.
``How am I going to leave those kids out there in those
Humvees,'' he recalled asking himself.
The company of 185 marines had only two Humvees and three
trucks when it arrived, so just getting them into his shop
was a logistical chore, Sergeant Valerio said. He also
worried that the steel could come loose in a blast and become
deadly shrapnel.
For the gunners who rode atop, Sergeant Valerio stitched
together bulletproof shoulder pads into chaps to protect
their legs.
``That guy was amazing,'' First Sgt. Bernard Coleman said.
``He was under a vehicle when a mortar landed, and he caught
some in the leg. When the mortar fire stopped, he went right
back to work.''
A Captain's Fate
Lt. Sean J. Schickel remembers Captain Royer asking a high-
ranking Marine Corps visitor whether the company would be
getting more factory-armored Humvees. The official said they
had not been requested and that there were production
constraints, Lieutenant Schickel said.
Recalls Captain Royer: ``I'm thinking we have our most
precious resource engaged in combat, and certainly the wealth
of our nation can provide young, selfless men with what they
need to accomplish their mission. That's an erudite way of
putting it. I have a much more guttural response that I won't
give you.''
Captain Royer was later relieved of command. General Mattis
and Colonel Kennedy declined to discuss the matter. His first
fitness report, issued on May 31, 2004, after the company's
deadliest firefights, concluded, ``He has single-handedly
reshaped a company in sore need of a leader; succeeded in
forming a cohesive fighting force that is battle-tested and
worthy.''
The second, on Sept. 1, 2004, gave him opposite marks for
leadership. ``He has been described on numerous occasions as
`dictatorial,''' it said. ``There is no morale or motivation
in his marines.'' His defenders say he drove his troops as
hard as he drove himself, but was wrongly blamed for problems
like armor. ``Captain Royer was a decent man that was used
for a dirty job and thrown away by his chain of command,''
Sergeant Sheldon said.
Today, Captain Royer is at Camp Pendleton contesting his
fitness report, which could force him to retire. Company E is
awaiting deployment to Okinawa, Japan. Some members have
moved to other units, or are leaving the Marines altogether.
``I'm checking out,'' Corporal Winn said. ``When I started,
I wanted to make it my career. I've had enough.''
____________________