[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 3, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E844-E845]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTRODUCTION OF AIR CARGO SECURITY ACT
______
HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY
of massachusetts
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, May 3, 2005
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, more than three and a half years after the
September 11th attacks, gaping loopholes in our country's homeland
security continue to put Americans at risk of another devastating
attack. The Department of Homeland Security's former Inspector General
Clark Kent Ervin testified recently before the Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight. Mr. Ervin told
the Subcommittee that: ``Even in the area where the most time,
attention, and resources have been invested--aviation security--serious
vulnerabilities remain.''
One of our most dangerous vulnerabilities is the failure to screen
100 percent of the cargo that is carried on passenger planes and all-
cargo aircraft. Every time we fly, we wait in security lines, empty our
pockets, remove our shoes, walk through metal detectors, and have our
baggage inspected. We do not complain much--after all, we are told that
this is required to keep our planes secure--and we accept that. But
what many people do not realize is that every time commercial cargo is
loaded onto the very same passenger planes or placed on aircraft that
transport only cargo, almost none of it is ever inspected at all.
The security risk created by unscreened cargo is not just
theoretical: Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in 1988 over Lockerbie,
Scotland by a bomb contained in unscreened baggage, and Air India
flight 182 was downed in 1985 off the coast of Ireland by a bomb placed
in unscreened luggage.
Uninspected freight on all-cargo carriers also poses a serious
danger. Last summer, the 9/11 Commission reported that Al Qaeda
operative Zacharias Moussaoui's terrorist plans included ``buying four
tons of ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on cargo planes.''
Ammonium nitrate is the same chemical compound that Timothy McVeigh
used to kill 168 innocent men, women and children at the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 10 years ago. Less than two
years ago, a young man shipped himself undetected aboard a cargo plane
from New York to Texas. We were lucky he was just a lonely twenty-
something, not a terrorist.
It is long past the time when we should have adopted a policy that
subjects cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft to the same level of
screening that is performed daily on passengers' checked and carry-on
luggage.
Today, Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) and I are introducing
the Air Cargo Security Act to require the Secretary of Homeland
Security to establish and begin implementing a system to inspect all
the cargo transported on passenger planes and all-cargo carriers, so
that this cargo is subject to the same level of scrutiny as passengers'
luggage. Our legislation also. includes additional measures to close
the cargo loophole, such as: a mandate that the Secretary of Homeland
Secretary establish systems to inspect cargo using equipment,
technology and personnel that meet, at a minimum, the same standards
established to inspect passenger baggage; a requirement that the
Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and evaluate the research and
development of effective cargo screening technologies; establishment of
a system of regular inspection of shipping facilities for shipments of
cargo to ensure that appropriate security controls and systems are
observed, both at facilities inside the U.S. and abroad; a directive
that the Secretary of Homeland Security report to Congress on the
number of cargo shipping facilities that have been inspected, the
number of facilities that have failed to comply with security controls,
and the number of agreements concluded with foreign aviation
authorities to ensure that regular inspections are conducted for cargo
transported to the United States; and creation of a training and
evaluation program for cargo handlers to improve the security ensure
that cargo is safeguarded from security breaches.
The House has voted overwhelmingly--by votes of 278 to 146 and 347 to
47--to require 100 percent screening of cargo carried on passenger
planes. The airline industry and the Bush Administration strenuously
objected to the 100 percent screening mandate, and the Senate
ultimately dropped it from the final version of the Department's FY04
appropriations bill. Last year, the House narrowly defeated our 100
percent screening amendment after strong opposition from the airline
industry.
The experts who are our aviation system's ``eyes and ears''--namely,
the pilots and flight attendants who work aboard aircraft everyday--
have endorsed the Air Cargo Security Act. The Coalition of Airline
Pilots Associations (CAPA), which represents 22,000 pilots at American
Airlines, Southwest, AirTran and other airlines, and the Association of
Flight Attendants, with its 46,000 members, have endorsed this
important legislation. Since introducing similar legislation last year,
I have addressed the concerns of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
by including all-cargo carriers under the 100 percent cargo screening
mandate and providing for federal appropriations to implement this
mandate. When I offered the Air Cargo Security Act as an amendment
during the committee mark-up of the Homeland
[[Page E845]]
Security Department's FY06 authorization bill, ALPA supported my
amendment.
While last year's appropriations bill for the Department and the 9/11
reform implementation act included funding for cargo screening R&D,
additional cargo inspectors, and related provisions, these measures do
not go far enough.
TSA currently handles the screening of cargo carried on passenger
planes by using a process it calls the ``Known Shipper Program.'' The
Known Shipper Program requires only paperwork to be filed, but no
screening to be done. Mail and packages weighing less than 16 ounces
are not even subject to the paperwork check--they are loaded straight
onto the plane without even a perfunctory paper check! When it comes to
freight on all-cargo carriers, inspection is the exception, not the
rule--only a tiny portion is physically inspected before loading
onboard. TSA now requires air carriers to conduct random inspections of
cargo that are randomly verified by TSA--but this still results in
almost none of the cargo on passenger planes being physically inspected
for explosives or other dangerous materials. TSA is unable to inform us
of how many cargo inspections are performed by the air carriers because
the air carriers do not have to report to TSA the number of cargo
inspections they conduct.
Some have argued that the technology to screen 100 percent of cargo
is not available. But there are numerous companies that are currently
selling technology that is being used to screen cargo, including
American Science and Engineering; L3 Security and Detection Systems;
and Raytheon CargoScreen. Some have argued that 100 percent screening
is not technically feasible. But countries including Israel, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands routinely screen cargo. Moreover, Logan
Airport in Massachusetts, which has been conducting a cargo screening
pilot program, reported in February that ``100 percent of all air cargo
on all types of aircraft is technically possible.'' According to
Massport, which is responsible for the operation of Logan Airport, a
federal mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo and a funding mechanism
to distribute cost among the major players involved are required. The
Air Cargo Security Act provides this mandate and authorizes the
appropriations needed to accomplish it.
Some have argued that the Known Shipper Program is enough to assure
the security of cargo. The Known Shipper Program is dangerously flawed
and easily exploited. TSA has admitted that it has not audited most of
the so-called known shippers in its database, and packages weighing
less than 16 ounces are not even subject to the Known Shipper Program,
even though the bomb that brought down Pan-Am Flight 103 contained less
than 16 ounces of explosive!
I urge my colleagues to support the Air Cargo Security Act and close
a dangerous loophole that puts our Nation at risk.
____________________