[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 53 (Wednesday, April 27, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E789-E796]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR IRAN

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. BOB FILNER

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 27, 2005

  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, today I enter into the Congressional Record 
a report by the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) entitled, ``U.S. Policy 
Options for Iran.'' The IPC found that Iran presents a growing 
challenge to U.S. interests and values in a number of areas. The report 
examines the U.S. policy options for addressing these concerns and 
calls for change in Iran based on internal Iranian opposition.
  We need to foster greater awareness and dialogue in Congress about 
this critical situation. To that end, I urge my colleagues to review 
this report and join me developing an effective U.S. policy on Iran.

                      U.S. Policy Options for Iran


                Prepared by: Iran Policy Committee (IPC)

                               co-chairs

       Ambassador James Akins, (ret.)
       Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), CEO, wvc3, inc.
       Paul Leventhal, Founder and President Emeritus, Nuclear 
     Control Institute
       Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc.
       Bruce McColm, President, Institute for Democratic 
     Strategies and Former President, International Republican 
     Institute
       Lt. General (ret.) Thomas McInerney Former Assistant Vice 
     Chief of Staff of the Air Force
       Captain Chuck Nash (ret.) President, Emerging Technologies 
     International
       Lt. General Edward Rowny (ret.) Former Ambassador Strategic 
     Arms Reduction Talks
       Professor Raymond Tanter Former Staff Member, National 
     Security Council
       Major General (ret.) Paul Vallely, Military Committee 
     Chairman, Center for Security Policy
       Executive Director: Clare Lopez Strategic Policy and 
     Intelligence Analyst

            U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Executive Summary

       Iran poses six threats to American interests and ideals:
       Drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
       Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist 
     networks.
       Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace 
     process.
       Disruptive role in Iraq.
       Expansionist radical ideology.
       Denial of basic human rights to its own population.
       With respect to these threats from Iran, Washington circles 
     largely divide between two alternatives--those who favor 
     engagement with and those who support military strikes 
     against the regime Few favor regime change as an end in 
     itself.
       While the Bush administration does not yet explicitly call 
     for changing the regime, it advocates working with the 
     Iranian people as opposed to the unelected theocracy in 
     Tehran, which is an implicit policy of regime change.
       By calling for change in Tehran based on the Iranian 
     opposition instead of the U.S. military, the Iran Policy 
     Committee (IPC) highlights a third alternative: Keep open 
     diplomatic and military options, while providing a central 
     role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.
       IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy 
     initiated by think tank reports on Iran--Council on Foreign 
     Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 
     and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In 
     contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that 
     Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in 
     U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.
       Comprised of former officials who have worked on the Middle 
     East in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, 
     intelligence agencies, Congress, and experts from think tanks 
     and universities, IPC welcomes the occasion to support the 
     Iranian people in pursuit of U.S. national interests. But 
     continued designation since 1997 of the main Iranian 
     opposition group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), as a foreign 
     terrorist organization by the State Department assures Tehran 
     that regime change is off the table. Removing the MEK's 
     terrorist designation would be a tangible signal to Tehran 
     and to the Iranian people that a new option is implicitly on 
     the table--regime change.

                      U.S. Policy Options for Iran


                              Introduction

      `` . . . liberty in our land depends on the success of 
     liberty in other lands . . . . So it is the policy of the 
     United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
     movements and institutions in every nation and culture.--
     President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005.
       ``As you stand for liberty, America stands with you.''--
     President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2 
     February 2005.
       Using the theme of liberty in general from his Inaugural 
     Address, President Bush refers directly to the Iranian people 
     in his State of the Union Address. In so doing, he tacitly 
     ``targets'' the regime in Tehran.
       The question is what means should the President use to 
     decrease threats posed by Iran:
       Continued negotiations, including positive and negative 
     incentives.
       Future military action.
       Support for the Iranian opposition.
       These options are neither mutually exclusive nor logically 
     exhaustive; but they do reflect courses of action being 
     considered in Washington.
       Because the Iranian regime's policies pose direct threats 
     to national security interests

[[Page E790]]

     and ideals of the United States Government (USG) and those of 
     its allies and friends, Iran is on the front burner of 
     American foreign policy.
       Consider these six Iranian threats to U.S. interests and 
     ideals:
       Drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
       Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist 
     networks.
       Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace 
     process.
       Disruptive role in Iraq.
       Expansionist radical ideology.
       Denial of basic human rights to its own population.
       The Iran Policy Committee (IPC) analyzes these dangers and 
     makes recommendations to meet them. It is not the intention 
     of the IPC to duplicate analysis already receiving 
     consideration in policymaking circles; rather, this policy 
     paper offers a distinct perspective and recommends a course 
     of action that is different in key aspects from what has been 
     proposed to date. IPC seeks to build upon the President's 
     disposition to work with the Iranian people by broadening 
     options for American policymakers regarding Iran.
       For too long, Washington has been divided between those who 
     favor engagement with and those who support military strikes 
     against the Iranian regime. The Committee stresses the 
     potential for a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and 
     military options, while providing a central role for the 
     Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.
       President Bush's 2005 State of the Union Address ignores 
     the leadership in Iran in order to converse directly with 
     Iranian people. And it is not his first time doing so; 
     indeed, the President's radio address of December 2002 began 
     the process of having a conversation with the people instead 
     of diplomatic discourse with the regime.
       The IPC urges the administration to acknowledge the threat 
     posed to American national security interests by the 
     totalitarian theocracy in Tehran and to adopt a policy that 
     proactively steps forward to defend those interests.
       Furthermore, the IPC believes that Washington should 
     support the Iranian people in their efforts to participate 
     meaningfully in a representative government that is 
     responsive to their concerns; implicit in such support is the 
     recognition that the Iranian people have the right to choose 
     and change their own government, as they see fit.
       IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy 
     initiated by think tank reports on Iran--Council on Foreign 
     Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 
     and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In 
     contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that 
     Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in 
     U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.
       Themes running through these think tank reports include the 
     following reasons for dissatisfaction with American policy 
     toward Iran. Critics hold that U.S. policy is not well 
     articulated because of bureaucratic differences; there are 
     too many or too few carrots in relation to sticks; and 
     American policy is not linked enough with Europe's approach 
     to Iran. The reports view the threat of sanctions and force 
     as well as the promise of diplomacy as complementary tools 
     in the Western arsenal. At issue is the mix between 
     negative and positive incentives, a formula for which 
     there is little accord among transatlantic partners.
       While some place the burden on Washington to resolve Iran's 
     nuclear proliferation activities and its state sponsored 
     international terrorism, few place that responsibility 
     directly on the Iranian people. With the possible exception 
     of the CPD, there is too little acknowledgment of a role for 
     Iranians in general and groups opposed to the regime in 
     particular.
       As a result, there is a niche for the Iran Policy Committee 
     to address Iranian threats from the perspective of 
     encouraging the people to be principal agents change. Without 
     the active participation of Iranians, moreover, regime change 
     from the outside is unlikely to succeed.
       En route to her first overseas mission to Europe on 
     February 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice held 
     that the Iranian people should have a chance to ``change 
     their own future,'' a statement IPC considers as a euphemism 
     for regime change.
       Summing up the U.S. government's principal concerns with 
     respect to Iran, Rice further stated that, ``The goal of the 
     administration is to have a regime in Iran that is responsive 
     to concerns that we have about Iran's policies, which are 
     about 180 degrees antithetical to our own interests at this 
     point.''
       While the debate in Washington concerns whether to make 
     explicit its tacit policy of regime change for Iran, the 
     debate in the region is the race between two clocks--a 
     diplomatic and a nuclear timepiece.
       On one hand, at issue is whether negotiations can slow down 
     Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons status before Iran 
     acquires such status. The Committee holds that the diplomacy 
     is moving too slowly in relation to nuclear weapons progress.
       On the other hand, unless working with the Iranian people 
     rapidly leads to regime change in Tehran, the pace of nuclear 
     weapons development might leave Washington with what he 
     Committee believes is the least desirable option of waging 
     military strikes against Iran.


                     Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

       Regarding impact in the region, the nature of the regime in 
     Tehran is of greater import than its nuclear weapons 
     capability: An Iran with representative institutions with a 
     nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as 
     nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist 
     theocracy. The best outcome is a freely-elected, 
     representative government without nuclear weapons; only with 
     such a government would such an outcome be possible.
       The nightmare scenario is that a nuclear weapons capability 
     in the hands of an aggressive and repressive regime in Tehran 
     raises the possibility that it could and would collaborate 
     with transnational networks to carry out nuclear terrorism. 
     In any event, of the six critical threats posed by Iran, its 
     drive to acquire nuclear weapons is the first and most 
     urgent.
       According to June 2004 testimony by Undersecretary of State 
     for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, 
     defense experts in the United States strongly believe that 
     Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons. 
     Speaking in January 2005, moreover, Bolton told reporters 
     that Iran's repeated support for terrorism makes it 
     particularly dangerous if Tehran were to acquire nuclear 
     weapons.
       There have been new revelations about the rapid pace of 
     Iran's nuclear weapons progress since 2002. It is known that 
     Iran is developing its indigenous uranium mines; has built a 
     uranium conversion facility at Isfahan in central Iran; is 
     building a massive uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, 
     which is designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges 
     plus numerous centrifuge production workshops, a heavy water 
     production plant at Arak, and a laser enrichment facility.
       Revelations by diplomatic sources on February 3, 2005 
     suggest that Iran is testing components of its centrifuge 
     rotors, despite a November 2004 pledge to freeze all such 
     activities related to enrichment. That pledge led to an 
     agreement among Iran's European interlocutors and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put a hold on 
     U.S. attempts to report Iran to the UN Security Council for 
     violations of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons (NPT). The new revelations deal a serious blow to any 
     hopes that Iran intends to forego uranium enrichment en route 
     to a nuclear weapons capability.
       In separate developments on February 3, a spokesman for the 
     main Iranian opposition group charged that Iran has obtained 
     materials and expertise to make neutron initiators 
     (``triggers'') for an atomic bomb. A senior official of the 
     National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), speaking in 
     Paris, cited secret sources inside Iran's nuclear development 
     programs. This person accused Tehran of conducting a secret 
     program to develop a nuclear triggering mechanism using 
     smuggled materials. He claimed that Iran has produced or 
     purchased from abroad quantities of polonium-210 and 
     beryllium, two elements required for building a ``neutron 
     initiator,'' which is an integral part of a nuclear bomb.
       The facility where this work allegedly is taking place is a 
     military installation on the outskirts of Tehran, known as 
     Lavizan II. Remarkably, the IAEA has not inspected Lavizan II 
     yet, nor does it appear to be pressing for inspections there, 
     despite the site first being identified by the NCRI in 
     November 2004.
       The NCRI has been instrumental in exposing Iran's secret 
     nuclear facilities in the past. By relying on its network 
     inside Iran of a member organization, the Mujahedeen e-Khalq 
     (MEK), the NCRI revealed a number of significant nuclear 
     sites including Natanz, Arak, Ab-Ali, and Lavizan.
       Despite the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT, 
     Tehran has repeatedly violated its provisions and continues 
     to play fast and loose with IAEA efforts to monitor 
     compliance. The regime appears to be counting on the 
     apparently inexhaustible patience of the IAEA and the 
     Europeans, who have agreed to compromise after compromise 
     with Iran, to avoid having the issue brought before the 
     United Nations (UN) Security Council, as pursued by the 
     United States. The longer this negotiation takes, the more 
     time Iran has to engage in covert activities, enabling it to 
     acquire fissile materials to build and test nuclear weapons.
       In other words, time is on Iran's side. The world cannot 
     wait for proof ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' of an Iranian 
     bomb. The risks of delay are too high. The international 
     community should be prepared to act on the recent discoveries 
     of evidence of weapons-related nuclear activities. 
     Discoveries over the past two years, along with the 
     revelations by Iranian opposition groups that Iran is 
     developing a nuclear trigger, constitute ``clear and present 
     evidence'' of illicit activities that, unless halted, may 
     lead to bomb-making.
       The general view among the experts is that, if left 
     undeterred, Iran is only one to three years away from 
     producing a nuclear bomb. Indeed, there are reports from a 
     secret meeting that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
     has ordered technicians to accelerate Iran's nuclear 
     program in order to achieve nuclear weapons status by the 
     end of 2005.
       There is a notion in certain policy circles that, if Iran 
     feels threatened, the hard-line clerics will be further 
     induced to go nuclear. They propose offering additional 
     security assurances to Iran as an incentive to convince it to 
     give up its nuclear weapons program.

[[Page E791]]

     Given the nature and behavior of the regime, the more 
     plausible argument is that unless they feel threatened, the 
     Iranian clerical rulers will continue their nuclear weapons 
     program on the assumption they can get away with it. Only the 
     prospect of severe consequences threatening the very 
     existence of the regime could induce them to forego nuclear 
     weapons out of fear of the consequences.


         nuclear delivery systems: the iranian missile program

       Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in 
     the Middle East. It has acquired complete missile systems and 
     developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. 
     During military exercises held in September 2004, the Iranian 
     Revolutionary Guards successfully test-fired a ``strategic 
     missile,'' likely the Shahab-3 rocket, which reportedly has a 
     range of up to 2,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 
     760-1,000 kilogram warhead. The Revolutionary Guards is 
     officially armed with the Shahab-3 missiles.
       Taken in combination with Iran's drive to achieve a nuclear 
     weapons capability, its continuing support for radical 
     Islamist terrorist groups and avowed opposition to the 
     existence of Israel, Iran's demonstrated capability to field 
     an intercontinental ballistic missile raises much concern 
     among defense officials of many countries.
       In December 2004, Iran's main opposition coalition, the 
     National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uncovered a 
     new missile program secretly pursued by Iran, as well as a 
     program to develop a nuclear warhead. The new secret missile, 
     produced at the Hemmat Missile Industries Complex in 
     northeast Tehran, is named Ghadar, NCRI reported. North 
     Korean experts are believed to be assisting the Iranian 
     program at this complex.
       The Ghadar missile may have a range of 2,500 to 3,000 
     kilometers (1,550 to 1,860 miles). NCRI also reported that 
     Iran has improved the guidance and control system of its 
     Shahab-4 missiles, based on a system acquired from China.
       In late January 2005, a Ukrainian legislator alleged that 
     Kiev sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China 
     during the period from 1999-2001. The Kh-55 cruise missile 
     has a range of 3,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 
     200-kiloton nuclear warhead.
       In addition to Iran's nuclear weapons program and its 
     advanced delivery system, a second threat posed by the regime 
     is its support for and involvement with international 
     terrorist networks.


               regime support for international terrorism

       The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's number one 
     state-sponsor of terror. It created Hizballah, supports al 
     Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Hamas, and Palestinian 
     Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Tehran operates at the heart of a 
     network of terrorist organizations engaged in murder, 
     kidnapping, bombing, and other atrocities calculated to sap 
     the will of the United States and the West to resist.
       Iran's logistical, financial and operational assistance 
     takes the form of providing terrorists safehaven, travel 
     documents such as passports, weapons, training and technical 
     expertise.
       Information reveals a pattern of operational contacts 
     between the Iranian government and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda 
     organization. These contacts include: joint planning of 
     terrorist operations, military training of bin Laden 
     operatives inside Iran and by Iranian IRGC and MOIS officers 
     in Syria and Lebanon, financial assistance to clandestine 
     terrorist and surveillance cells, false passports, and 
     communications.
       The 9/11 Commission report documented in great detail the 
     logistical, operational, and material support provided by 
     Iran and Hizballah to al Qaeda. This report, released in July 
     2004, echoes the earlier federal grand jury findings about 
     links between Iran and al Qaeda. The Commission's report 
     stated that Iran's support of al Qaeda dates back to 1991, 
     when operatives from both sides met in Sudan; by 1993, ``al 
     Qaeda received advice and training from Hezbollah'' in 
     intelligence, security, and explosives, especially in how to 
     use truck bombs. The training took place in the Beka'a 
     Valley, Hizballah's stronghold in Lebanon.
       According to the 9/11 commission report, there is strong 
     evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda 
     members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that 
     some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. Iran's support 
     for al Qaeda has continued.


           Iran's Opposition to the Arab-Israel Peace Process

       Tehran was instrumental in the creation of Lebanese 
     Hizballah, which formed in 1982 under the sponsorship of 
     Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who arrived in 
     Lebanon as the vanguard of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.
       Iran continues to provide Hizballah with money, equipment, 
     training locations, and refuge from extradition. Its overall 
     financial support to Hizballah and Hamas totals tens of 
     millions of dollars in direct subsidies each year.


                        Iranian Designs in Iraq

       Demography and geography facilitate the impact of Iran's 
     expansionist ideology. With a population three times Iraq's 
     and a contiguous territory four times Iraq's, Iran exerts a 
     naturally powerful influence on its western neighbor. Iraq's 
     longest border is with Iran (over 900 miles), and the vast 
     majority of the Iraqi population lives within a 100-mile 
     distance from the Iranian border, placing it well within the 
     sphere of Tehran's expansionist ideology.
       Shiite pilgrims began flowing once again after 2003 between 
     the holy places in Iran and those in Iraq, especially the 
     holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. Iranian intelligence 
     agents also flooded the country. They quietly and effectively 
     set up a network of agents across Iraq, recruiting and 
     training local village people, former Iraqi military 
     officers, politicians, and young men to collect intelligence 
     on Coalition forces and facilities.
       A long period of secular Ba'athist domination in Iraq 
     punctuated by a savage eight-year war between Iran and Iraq 
     countered Iranian political influence in the region. During 
     this time, westward expansion of Iran's theocratic ideology 
     declined. With the April 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein's 
     regime and ensuing breakup of existing security and border 
     patrol forces, Iran seized the chance to spread its influence 
     and launched a multifaceted military, intelligence, and 
     political campaign in Iraq.
       Along with intelligence agents, the Iranian Revolutionary 
     Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) 
     also sent suicide bombers, money, and weapons to support 
     insurgents fighting against Coalition forces in Iraq. 
     Testimony and documentary evidence show that officials at 
     the highest level of the Iranian regime have been involved 
     with planning and providing support for terrorists and 
     suicide bombers affiliated not only with the upstart 
     Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, but with the forces of 
     wanted Jordanian terrorist and al Qaeda associate, Abu 
     Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ba'athist loyalists as well.
       In late January 2004, an Iraqi terrorist leader captured in 
     Falluja and accused of carrying out beheadings and deadly 
     attacks, claimed that his group was linked to Tehran. In 
     footage aired January 8, 2005 on the U.S.-run television 
     channel, AI-Hurra, Ahmed Yassin, a leader of the Jaish 
     Muhammed (Muhammed's Army) and a former colonel in Saddam 
     Hussein's army, said two members of his group went to Iran in 
     April or May, where they met a number of Iranian intelligence 
     officials and Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iranian 
     officials provided money, weapons, and even ``car bombs.'' 
     During December 2004, the Najaf police chief said that the 
     commander of three terrorists arrested in connection with a 
     car bomb that exploded in the holy city on December 26, had 
     extensive connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence.
       Tehran also recruited over four thousand volunteers for 
     suicide operations in Iraq in public ceremonies in Iran 
     attended by prominent Revolutionary Guards commanders.
       Iranian intelligence services have pumped millions of 
     dollars and hundreds of operatives into Iraq. In a press 
     conference in October 2004, Iraq's national intelligence 
     chief, Mohammed Al Shahwani, accused Iran's Baghdad embassy 
     of recruiting elements for sabotage operations and 
     assassinations of his intelligence agents. He said that 
     documents showed Iran had a $45-million budget for sowing 
     chaos in Iraq. At least 27 people working in the Iranian 
     embassy in Baghdad were coordinating intelligence gathering 
     operations and assassinations, the spy chief added.
       Iranian meddling is aimed at frustrating the emergence of a 
     stable and representative government in Iraq and also at 
     keeping the United States so occupied in dealing with the 
     insurgency that it would have neither the will nor the 
     resources to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue. In the 
     months and weeks leading up to national elections in January 
     2005, both Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar and Jordan's King 
     Abdullah charged that Iran was heavily involved in attempting 
     to influence the outcome to produce a Shiite dominated 
     government similar to Iran's. In an interview with the 
     Kuwaiti daily, Al-Qabas on January 6, 2005, Iraqi Defense 
     Minister Hazem Shaalan accused the Iranian regime of 
     ``interfering [in Iraq] with money, guns, and 
     intelligence.''
       With the apparent success of the Iraqi elections, Iraq has 
     now entered a new phase. Only a day after the January 2005 
     elections, Iranian media and web sites claimed victory, 
     comparing the Shiites' gain in the elections with the Iranian 
     revolution that brought an Islamic system to power or with 
     the rise of Hizballah in the Lebanese political scene in the 
     Middle East.
       The first and most pressing post-election challenge is to 
     ensure the selection of a representative National Assembly 
     that would draft a modern, broadminded constitution for Iraq. 
     The aim would be to reflect Iraq's Islamic soul but avoid a 
     narrow formula for governance based solely on Sharia law. It 
     is to be expected that Iran will seek to influence the 
     members of the National Assembly and their drafting of this 
     constitution.
       The makeup of the future interim government is equally 
     important and might succeed to avoid Iranian dominance by 
     seeking as diverse participation as possible from all sectors 
     of Iraqi society. In the transitional period before the 
     constitution comes up for a vote and a permanent government 
     and military and security structure is in place, it will be 
     critical to monitor Iranian efforts to influence the process.


                     Expansionist Radical Ideology

       Iran's ``Velayat e-Faqih'' system poses both an immediate 
     and continuing threat to neighbors because of its aggressive 
     policy of expansion. This policy is evident in Iranian

[[Page E792]]

     actions in Lebanon and Iraq, where calculated cultivation of 
     terrorism is an inseparable characteristic of the theocratic 
     system.
       Export of terrorism and extremism is an intrinsic attribute 
     of Iran's theocratic system. Tehran's rulers believe their 
     power lies in awakening the Islamic world to their Islamist 
     ideology. Iran's leadership clearly believes the Islamic 
     Republic's survival depends on the support of such a global 
     force.


            Denial of Basic Human Rights to its own citizen

       The human rights situation in Iran has deteriorated 
     severely over the past year. Ironically, the European Union's 
     ``human rights dialogue'' has had the opposite effect from 
     that intended because the regime has continued its 
     suppression of the Iranian citizenry.
       In December 2004, the United Nations in a resolution 
     criticized Iran for public executions, arbitrary sentencing, 
     flogging, stoning, and systematic discrimination against 
     women. The measure also condemned ``the execution of minors 
     below eighteen years of age, and the use of torture and other 
     forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.'' It also 
     rebuked Iran for discrimination against minorities, including 
     Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and the Baha'is.
       Gender discrimination and violence against women in Iran 
     continue to give cause for grave concern. The parliament has 
     called for placing more restrictions on women's attire and on 
     their social freedoms. Deputies have also called for 
     segregating men and women at universities and for other 
     limits on women's activities. The number of publications 
     closed down and of people arrested, prosecuted and sentenced 
     for the peaceful expression of their opinion has increased.
       While the human rights situation deteriorated in Iran, the 
     public discontent has been on the rise.


                       Political Dissent in Iran

       Over the past year, hundreds of anti-government 
     demonstrations were held in Iran, further destabilizing the 
     regime. Originating with complaints over municipal issues, a 
     series of anti-regime demonstrations that erupted in 2004 in 
     many provincial cities, such as Feraydoun Kenar, Boukan, and 
     the earthquake-stricken city of Barn, reportedly targeted 
     government buildings, vehicles, and security forces.
       In December 2004, students at Tehran University gave 
     President Khatami an angry and humiliating reception when he 
     admitted to the role he played in preserving the regime. They 
     shouted, ``Shame, shame'' while calling him a liar and 
     demanding his resignation.
       The anti-regime movement, partly derailed by the false 
     expectations aroused as a result of the election of Khatami 
     as president in 1997, has now gained a new momentum. The 
     disillusionment of the population with Khatami took place in 
     July 1999, when he failed to support a student demonstration 
     that turned into a six -day popular uprising, spreading to 19 
     cities and shaking the foundations of the regime. In the 
     midst of a bloody crackdown on the students, Khatami opted to 
     stand by the establishment; many believe he may have 
     ordered some of the crackdown himself.
       The opposition movement meanwhile continued its expansion, 
     and since 1999, many student demonstrations and popular 
     protests have rocked Tehran and other cities.


            In Search of a New Approach toward Iran: Options

       Some American policy advisors urge the administration to 
     refrain from taking a hard line with Tehran because they 
     interpret recent developments inside Iran as pointing to an 
     impending collapse of the system, much like the Soviet 
     implosion that led to the end of the communist regime in the 
     USSR. Other policymakers advocate engagement with the ruling 
     clerics in Tehran in order to solve controversial issues 
     outstanding between the two countries.
       In a difficult atmosphere of diplomatic gridlock, internal 
     and international ideological divisions, and faced with an 
     unappealing slate of military options, the United States 
     needs a broad set of options. This paper outlines a full 
     spectrum of approaches toward Iran, beginning with diplomacy 
     and moving through increasingly more coercive measures, 
     culminating with an outright commitment to regime change.


                               Diplomacy

       Proponents of the diplomatic approach hold that the United 
     States has not offered enough carrots to Iran to address its 
     security concerns. In addition, it is necessary to convince 
     Tehran that it is in its own interests to abandon outlaw 
     behavior, they contend.
       There are several carrots that might be offered to the 
     Iranian regime in the hope that a good-faith demonstration by 
     the West to an approach of engagement would elicit desired 
     compliance with international norms of behavior. Most of 
     these incentives have already been placed on the table.
       This diplomatic approach requires that Washington cooperate 
     with Europeans to present a united front to the regime. With 
     the example of U.S. resolve in Afghanistan and Iraq before 
     them, the Iranian leadership might be persuaded to reach the 
     appropriate conclusions, if the principal European 
     interlocutors were to emphasize the limits of their ability 
     to influence, much less control, American foreign policy 
     decisions. In a version of ``good cop-- bad cop,'' the 
     message would be conveyed that there are consequences for 
     noncompliance that are beyond European ability to control.
       An effort to acknowledge the legitimacy of Iranian national 
     desires for a civilian nuclear power program might provide 
     Iran an opportunity to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, 
     according to diplomatic approach.
       To enhance the acknowledged benefit of exchange programs 
     that bring foreign students and business leaders to the 
     United States for study and travel opportunities, Washington 
     should look for ways to expand such exchange programs, 
     consistent with the requirements of homeland security.


                           Coercive Diplomacy

       A frank evaluation of the track record so far on attempts 
     at diplomatic engagement with the ruling regime in Tehran 
     must conclude that such an approach is not working and 
     probably will not ever succeed, if not stiffened with more 
     stringent measures. Such measures would begin exacting 
     penalties from Iran if it does not comply.
       At the top of the list of penalties are economic sanctions, 
     which will not succeed unless applied in concerted and 
     cooperative fashion by all of Iran's major Western trading 
     partners. Such sanctions would include oil; ban on airline 
     travel; prohibition of financial transaction, bilateral or 
     multilateral economic assistance, and general trade.
       Increased funding and strong congressional backing for 
     radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iran would 
     send the message that Washington wants to reach out to the 
     Iranian people. Public statements of support from American 
     officials in favor of imprisoned and exiled Iranian political 
     leaders would be an encouraging sign of support for the 
     people.
       The U.S. State Department can send a strong message of 
     disapproval to the regime in Tehran by refusing to issue 
     visas to its United Nations representatives that would permit 
     them to travel beyond the immediate radius surrounding New 
     York City (as occasionally has been done).
       In the same vein, the activities of Iran's diplomatic 
     representation at the regime's interest section in the 
     Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, as well as at the regime's 
     UN mission in New York, should continue to be closely 
     observed by the appropriate domestic intelligence and other 
     agencies for possible unlawful activities that may include 
     espionage, threat, intimidation, or unlawful lobbying with 
     Members of Congress.
       Also relevant is a threat of action by an international 
     tribunal for Iranian leadership crimes. It might charge the 
     leaders with support for transnational terrorism and human 
     rights abuses. This threat might be made tangible by bringing 
     a legal case against Supreme Leader Khamenei.
       Most important of all, the United States must stay the 
     course in Iraq to ensure that a moderate system takes hold, 
     which is representative, committed to fairness for all 
     Iraqis, and intolerant only of terrorism and violence. 
     Helping the voices of moderate Iraqi Muslims to be heard and 
     protecting them from intimidation by agents of Iranian terror 
     should go a long way to encourage emergence of like-minded 
     moderates within Iran.
       As efforts on the diplomatic front are under way, the 
     United States should accelerate its outreach to the Iranian 
     people, as part of the process to help them change their 
     future.


                            Destabilization

       Application of the diplomatic measures may not alter the 
     regime's behavior on those issues of paramount concern to the 
     international community, such as support for terror, pursuit 
     of WMD programs, meddling inside Iraq, and violation of its 
     citizens' human rights. If not, then Washington should be 
     prepared to embrace a new option, short of direct military 
     action, but which might have the best chance for success.
       The middle option would open a campaign of destabilization, 
     whose aim would be to weaken the grip of the ruling regime 
     over the Iranian people sufficiently that Iranian opposition 
     groups inside the country and abroad are empowered to change 
     the regime. To the extent that any or all of the foregoing 
     diplomatic measures, coercive or not, are deemed useful, 
     their application should be sustained during a 
     destabilization phase.
       However implausible or unlikely to be taken seriously, an 
     American call for Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and his 
     cohorts ``to return to the mosque'' might set the stage and 
     be used as a point of departure for further negotiations. 
     Such a call might give the international community a 
     foundation upon which to build a case against the regime.
       The next stage of an American-led campaign to compel 
     conformity to international norms of behavior would be to 
     encourage Iranian opposition groups. This is an option that 
     has never actually been on the table and has not been 
     explored sufficiently; this option relies on the Iranian 
     opposition to take the lead role in coordinating a campaign 
     for regime change and establishing representative 
     institutions.
       Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters on her 
     February 2005 European trip, ``The Iranian people should be 
     no different from the Palestinians or Iraqis or other peoples 
     around the world.'' That is, the people of Iran are not 
     immune to the wave of democracy in the Middle East.
       In January 2005, six prominent members of the U.S. 
     Congress, led by House International Relations subcommittee 
     chair for

[[Page E793]]

     Middle East and Central Asia, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), as 
     well as Tom Lantos (D-CA), Eric Cantor (R-VA), Howard Berman 
     (D-CA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), and Gary Ackerman (D-NY), 
     introduced the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 282), with more 
     than 50 co-sponsors. It would provide U.S. assistance to 
     independent broadcasts into Iran and to pro-democracy groups.
       The best-known of the Iranian opposition groups is the 
     Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK). Founded in the 1960s by college 
     students, the MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against 
     the Shah, but quickly fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
     executed thousands of its members and leaders. Following the 
     start of mass executions in June 1981, the group went 
     underground, and many of its leaders fled to France from 1981 
     to 1986, after which the MEK took refuge in Iraq.
       While in Iraq, the group formed an army equipped with 
     tanks, armored personnel carriers, and field guns, 
     implementing cross-border attacks against the Iranian regime. 
     The MEK network in Iran also carried out military operations 
     against the Revolutionary Guards and other government 
     targets. The MEK has represented a significant security 
     threat to the Iranian regime ever since the end of the Iran-
     Iraq War and could continue to do so, were it released from 
     its circumscribed status in Iraq.
       United States policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and 
     controversial over the years and reached a nadir in 1997, 
     when the Department of State placed the MEK on its Foreign 
     Terrorist Organizations list. This inclusion was primarily a 
     goodwill gesture to Mohammad Khatami, the newly-elected 
     Iranian president, whose administration was looked to with 
     much hope for its reformist promise. Despite the State 
     Department's accusations that the MEK murdered Americans in 
     mid 1970s and supported the U.S. embassy takeover in 
     Tehran in 1980--charges the organization denies--the MEK 
     has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979 
     Iranian revolution.
       Nevertheless, the State Department added the major 
     political wing of the Iranian opposition, NCRI, to the 
     Department's terrorist designation; previously, NCRI had 
     operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered 
     organization.
       Before surrendering hundreds of tanks and armored personnel 
     carriers to the U.S. military, the MEK had notable mechanized 
     and infantry capabilities. The fledgling Iraqi Army uses some 
     of this equipment, since 2004.
       The MEK seems to have an impressive network in Iran, where 
     it has been gathering intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons 
     program as well as its activities in Iraq. The MEK published 
     a book detailing the particulars and pictures of nearly 22 
     thousand people--mostly associated with the MEK--executed for 
     political charges by the Iranian government.
       There is sizable support among the exile Iranian community 
     for the MEK, which often draws large crowds to its rallies 
     and demonstrations in western capitals.


         the MEK's relationship with the u.s. military in iraq

       Months before the start of the 2003 War in Iraq, the United 
     States' major concern was Iraq's eastern neighbor, and its 
     perceived involvement in the conflict that might have 
     complicated the situation in the region. Washington, 
     therefore, offered to alleviate Iran's concerns by bombing 
     and destroying the MEK, hoping to reach an accommodation with 
     Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq.
       Days after the start of U.S. bombing of Saddam's forces in 
     late March and early April of 2003, Coalition planes heavily 
     bombed nearly a dozen bases belonging to the MEK, killing 
     dozens of fighters and wounding many more.
       U.S. Special Forces worked out a ceasefire agreement with 
     the MEK in April 15, 2003, once the MEK consolidated its 
     forces in a few camps north of Baghdad. The United States 
     decided in May 2003 to disarm the group, and confiscated 
     2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, 
     air defense artillery pieces, and miscellaneous vehicles 
     formerly in the MEK's possession.
       In August 2003, in what appeared to be a response to 
     Iranian demands, the State Department acted to close down the 
     offices of MEK associate groups in Washington.
       Tehran has been particularly sensitive to the MEK 
     activities inside Iran and abroad, signaling that it takes 
     the dissident group most seriously. European governments and 
     some U.S. administrations have used the MEK as bait to 
     improve relations with Tehran. In a similar vein, the 
     November 2004 European Union nuclear agreement with Iran 
     includes an EU promise to treat the MEK as a terrorist group, 
     which addressed Iran's security concerns.
       Although it is difficult if not impossible to gauge the 
     level of support MEK enjoys in Iran, this organization is 
     indisputably the largest and most organized Iranian 
     opposition group. There are nearly 3,800 of its members in 
     Camp Ashraf, 60 miles north of Baghdad. Females constitute 
     nearly a third of its rank and file.
       As of February 2005, the State Department still listed the 
     MEK as a foreign terrorist organization, despite calls for 
     its removal from the list by many members of the U.S. 
     Congress and others.


     The MEK and other Opposition Groups Support of U.S. Interests

       The lack of viable intelligence about Iran continues to 
     plague analysts and planners. As stated earlier, the MEK and 
     NCRI revealed much of the information that has been verified 
     about Tehran's nuclear weapons programs. In this respect, 
     Washington might consider using intelligence made available 
     from opposition groups as lead information, i.e., to be 
     verified using independent means.
       A 16-month investigation by the State Department and other 
     government agencies of the MEK members in Iraq culminated in 
     the 2004 judgment that they were ``protected persons under 
     the Fourth Geneva Convention,'' and that there was no basis 
     to charge any of them with terrorist actions.
       At this juncture in 2005, therefore, a review of U.S. 
     policy concerning the MEK and the overall Iranian opposition 
     is in order. The designation of the MEK as a foreign 
     terrorist organization by the State Department has served, 
     since 1997, as an assurance to the Iranian regime that the 
     United States has removed the regime change option from the 
     table. Removing the terrorist designation from the MEK could 
     serve as the most tangible signal to the Iranian regime, as 
     well as to the Iranian people, that a new option is now on 
     the table. Removal might also have the effect of supporting 
     President Bush's assertion that America stands with the 
     people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves.
       In the same way that the United States was receptive to 
     South African anti-apartheid leaders and the Soviet Union's 
     anti-communist activists, Washington should invite prominent 
     opposition figures both in Iran and in exile to the United 
     States. They might meet with U.S. officials, Members of 
     Congress, academics, think tanks, and the media. The European 
     Parliament offered such an example in December 2004, when it 
     invited Maryam Rajavi, the president of the NCRI to its 
     headquarters in Strasburg, where she offered an alternative 
     view to that of the Iranian regime. Tehran's angry reaction 
     to this invitation served to highlight the effectiveness of 
     such measures.
       As an additional step, the United States might encourage 
     the new Iraqi government to extend formal recognition to the 
     MEK, based in Ashraf, as a legitimate political organization. 
     Such recognition would send yet another signal from 
     neighboring Iraq that the noose is tightening around Iran's 
     unelected rulers.
       In light of the MEK's status as protected persons under the 
     Fourth Geneva Convention and the continued protection that 
     the U.S. military provides the group in Iraq, Washington has 
     an opportunity to decide whether to return to the MEK its 
     weapons, which would relieve responsibility from the American 
     military for the protection of its camps and personnel. Such 
     a move also would send an unambiguous signal to the Iranian 
     regime that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on 
     its borders.
       Iranian groups, whether domestic or internationally-based, 
     which seek to broadcast or publish pro-democracy messages 
     inside the country might be provided with equipment, 
     facilities, funding, and support. Relatively modest 
     expenditures on such purposes can spell the difference 
     between a capability for such groups to get their message out 
     to international publics and in Iran.
       The United States should make it official policy to protest 
     publicly cases of human rights violations, crackdown on 
     Iranian student demonstrators, and application of inhumane 
     and degrading punishments, such as stoning to death, 
     flogging, eye gouging, and amputation. Washington should be 
     particularly vigilante in providing political and moral 
     support to student demonstrators in Iran and hold Tehran 
     accountable for the arrest and killing of students during 
     anti-government demonstrations.
       Should the United States reach a decision to support an 
     explicit policy of regime change in Iran, a Presidential 
     Finding would be a necessary first step, enabling many 
     activities by U.S. entities that cannot take place without 
     such a finding.
       The United States should ensure that Iran understands that 
     neither it nor the Iranian opposition will take any option 
     off the table, if Iran remains unwilling to address 
     adequately international concerns about its nuclear programs 
     in particular. The goal is to ensure that democracy, 
     tolerance, and the rule of law are established in an Iran 
     that abjures use of WMD, terrorism, and threats against its 
     neighbors. Bringing Tehran's flagrant non-compliance with the 
     NPT before the U.N. Security Council would be an important 
     first step.


            In Search of a New Approach: The Military Option

       ``We do not want American armies marching on Tehran,'' 
     then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November 2004. 
     Despite the official position of the administration, there 
     are some who suggest that given the failure of the engagement 
     option over the past quarter century and the urgency to 
     counter the Iranian threat, Washington should adopt a 
     military option. Despite its risks and implications, they are 
     willing to absorb the costs and consequences. Proponents of 
     strikes believe that United States interests are better 
     served by taking preventive military action in the present 
     than facing the future nightmare of a nuclear Iran with 
     extensive regional dominance armed with the ideology of hate.
       Conventional force military options have a broad spectrum 
     upon which to draw, which

[[Page E794]]

     individually or collectively might evoke different results 
     and/or responses from the Iranian regime.
       Air options include low-end, minimal-risk overflights of 
     unmanned aerial vehicles into Iranian airspace for purposes 
     of reconnaissance, psychological impact, testing of Iranian 
     response and capabilities. In addition, maximum options 
     consist of airstrikes by manned aircraft and drones as well 
     as cruise missile attacks against targeted facilities, 
     installations, bases, and command or research centers.
       Naval options range from low end overt open waters 
     surveillance and harassment of Iranian shipping to maximum 
     options such as introduction of major forces into theater and 
     a full blockade of Iranian ports and waters.
       On one hand, ground forces options include a low-end 
     approach of pressuring Iran through the buildup of 
     conventional ground forces and supporting logistics 
     capability along borders and at strategic locations within 
     the region. On the other hand, there are high-end options, 
     such as a well-planned, fully-coordinated and -executed 
     ground assault into Iran.
       On one hand, Special Operations Forces options include low-
     end clandestine ground operations supported by air insertion/
     extraction to acquire target information, emplace sensors or 
     precision guidance beacons, or preposition arms/equipment for 
     local insurgents. On the other hand, high-end options consist 
     of direct action missions against pre-selected targets, link-
     up with indigenous forces to engage and attack government 
     facilities, bases, and personnel. In total context, 
     combinations of the various minimal to maximum options 
     provide a wide array of choices that can exert significant 
     impact on Tehran and influence the regime economically, 
     diplomatically, and politically.
       Given the above capabilities, potential military options 
     include:
       Limited Actions: Clandestine insertions of Special 
     Operations Forces to acquire precision target information, 
     emplace remote sensors, and preposition arms/equipment. Such 
     actions offer the ability to gather unobtrusively more 
     reliable information than currently available through other 
     military means; these actions also might establish 
     sustainability for future operations. But, such actions do 
     not cause the regime to react as long as such actions remain 
     clandestine and the regime unaware. There is the possibility 
     of extremely negative reaction from various entities 
     internationally and in Iran if such activity were compromised 
     or uncovered.
       Moderate Actions: Limited naval blockade that overtly 
     conducts surveillance and harasses Iranian flagged shipping; 
     overt overflights of Iranian airspace by U.S. surveillance 
     aircraft and unmanned platforms; limited buildup of U.S. 
     forces, supplies, and equipment in friendly countries 
     adjacent to Iran; stationing of U.S. Marine amphibious forces 
     off the coast; overt equipping of Iranian dissident groups; 
     limited precision strikes or special operations activities 
     against known WMD targets or munitions factories.
       As such measures become increasingly visible to the 
     international public, a negative reaction might occur from 
     many quarters, including, of course, Iran, which would seek 
     diplomatic support in world forums to oppose U.S. activities. 
     Assuming the effectiveness of any actual military strikes 
     that cause damage to Iran's WMD or other indigenous military 
     capabilities, such offensive measures would degrade Iran's 
     ability to employ/deploy its weapons against United States 
     or other friendly interests.
       Outrage from some corners of the globe is to be expected; 
     the possibility of loss or capture of some U.S. service 
     personnel might create a new dimension to the problem; 
     outright military action also might toughen the resolve of 
     the Iranian regime and even turn some of the Iranian people 
     against the attacking forces. Serious consideration must be 
     given to the likelihood that under the extreme stress of 
     being attacked, Iran might unleash Hizballah and other 
     terrorist organizations around the world to launch terrorist 
     attacks against United States and/or other friendly 
     interests. The ultimate potential for pulling Washington into 
     a full-scale military confrontation with Iran must be weighed 
     before any military action, however limited, is considered.
       Maximum actions: Full-scale naval blockade, the landing of 
     U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces at strategic locations, 
     introduction of airborne, Ranger, Green Beret, or SEAL forces 
     to seize key objectives, and crossborder invasion by land 
     forces. All these actions would be fully supported by 
     preparatory airstrikes intended to disable and destroy 
     command and control centers, anti-aircraft capabilities, as 
     well as key military and logistics centers.
       Full-scale military invasion on the scale of Iraq or 
     Afghanistan would be a very serious step, embarked upon with 
     only one ultimate objective in mind: the overthrow of the 
     regime in Tehran and the forcible occupation of the country. 
     In addition to the destruction of regular army, IRGC, and 
     MOIS military units together with their armaments, such an 
     invasion would also number among its objectives the 
     elimination of Iran's WMD programs, and thereby, the ending 
     of WMD threats from Iran.
       Full-scale military invasion of Iran, even if supported by 
     an international coalition, would be likely to elicit outrage 
     from many corners of the globe. An invasion would be likely 
     to incur higher casualties and a much longer period of 
     intense, widespread conflict than that experienced in Iraq. 
     Given the size and population of Iran, a full-scale invasion 
     would require a force several times the size of the force in 
     Iraq; continued strain on the overall U.S. military structure 
     and its available resources would affect long-term 
     sustainability of any such operation and the overall ability 
     of U.S. armed forces to respond to crises elsewhere.


                              Conclusion:

       Recall the nuclear time clock that is ticking down as Iran 
     drives to reach nuclear weapons capability. If the regime 
     continues to prove intransigent with respect to fulfilling 
     its obligations under the NPT, the international community 
     may not have the luxury of pursuing only a regime change 
     policy. The theocratic leadership in Tehran must know that 
     they will not be permitted to achieve a nuclear bomb status. 
     A military option, which could include limited strikes 
     against Iran's nuclear program infrastructure, clearly would 
     be a last option but must clearly be understood to remain on 
     the table.
       Given the realities in the region and the fact that the 
     United States continues to be engaged in Afghanistan and 
     Iraq, a full-scale military invasion is the least appealing 
     of all the options on the table for dealing with Iran. 
     Nevertheless, as the ultimate means of ensuring U.S. national 
     security interests, such military action must remain 
     unambiguously among the options at U.S. disposal.
       The moderate action option that includes limited military 
     strikes would at best buy time while leaving intact or even 
     enhancing the overall threat of the regime in areas like 
     terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process, and 
     involvement in Iraq. Nevertheless, limited, precision 
     military strikes, executed according to high quality 
     targeting information with minimal collateral damage and 
     casualties might not only set back Iran's nuclear program to 
     a significant degree but likely would also help destabilize 
     the regime.
       In addition, diplomacy pursued by the Europeans and several 
     U.S. administrations has produced little tangible result over 
     the past quarter century. And unless the potential for U.N. 
     Security Council sanctions is on the table, diplomacy is 
     likely to yield few results in the future.
       While keeping open diplomatic and military options, 
     Washington should consider a third alternative, one that 
     provides a central role for the Iranian opposition to 
     facilitate regime change.

                                Appendix


           Iran Policy Committee (IPC)--Co-Chair Biographies

       James Akins, Ambassador (ret.): James Akins was U.S. 
     ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration. 
     An internationally respected expert on Middle East and energy 
     issues, Akins has been an active and outspoken proponent for 
     a just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a 
     prescient analyst of the Middle East peace process and Arab 
     politics in general. Author Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber has 
     called Akins ``the westerner who knows the most about the 
     Middle East and has the closest relationship of trust with 
     its leaders.''
       Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), co-founder of wvc3, inc.: 
     Bill Cowan is an internationally acknowledged expert in areas 
     of terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and military 
     special operations. A retired Marine Corps officer, Cowan 
     spent three-and-a-half years on combat assignments in 
     Vietnam. From 1989 through 1994, Cowan was involved in 
     numerous operations in the Middle East in response to 
     terrorist incidents and the holding of Western hostages in 
     Beirut and Kuwait. He was directly involved in every facet of 
     the Beirut hostages drama, including international 
     negotiations leading to their release in 1991.
       In 1990, on behalf of a major New York law firm and working 
     with former CIA Director Bill Colby, he organized and 
     successfully conducted a series of operations resulting in 
     the repatriation of a number of Western hostages from Iraqi-
     occupied Kuwait. Cowan is a FOX News Channel contributor and 
     a co-founder of the WVC3 Group, a company providing homeland 
     security services, support and technologies to government and 
     commercial clients.
       Paul Leventhal, Founder and President, Nuclear Control 
     Institute: Paul Leventhal founded the Nuclear Control 
     Institute (NCI) in 1981 and served as its President for 22 
     years prior to becoming Senior Advisor and Founding President 
     in June 2002. He prepared four books for the Institute and 
     lectured in a number of countries on nuclear issues, 
     including as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Cambridge 
     University's Global Security Programme. Prior to establishing 
     NCI, Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United 
     States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues.
       Leventhal was Special Counsel to the Senate Government 
     Operations Committee and Staff Director of the Senate Nuclear 
     Regulation Subcommittee; Leventhal was responsible for the 
     investigations and legislation that resulted in enactment of 
     two landmark nuclear laws--the Energy Reorganization Act of 
     1974 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. He also 
     served as co-director of the Senate Special Investigation of 
     the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Assistant 
     Administrator for Policy and Planning at the U.S. National 
     Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Leventhal 
     holds a bachelor's degree from Franklin and Marshall College 
     and a master's degree from the Columbia University Graduate 
     School of Journalism.

[[Page E795]]

       Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc., an 
     international risk management and business solutions company, 
     headquartered in Washington. Livingstone is author of nine 
     books on terrorism and national security topics and more than 
     200 articles that have appeared in such publications as The 
     Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street 
     Journal. He serves on numerous corporate and other advisory 
     boards, and has appeared on more than 1100 television 
     programs. He holds an A.B. from the College of William and 
     Mary, three master's degrees, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher 
     School of Law and Diplomacy.
       R. Bruce McColm, President Institute for Democratic 
     Strategies and Former President, International Republican 
     Institute: McColm is the President of Democratic Strategies, 
     a non-profit organization committed to strengthening 
     democratic processes abroad. For the past 25 years, he has 
     been actively involved in the global movement toward 
     democracy and has written extensively on political 
     transitions in Latin America, Africa, and Central Europe. He 
     has served on numerous boards of directors and acts as a 
     trustee for various private foundations and advocacy groups. 
     McColm served as president of the International Republican 
     Institute, where he extended the organization's capacity to 
     provide technical assistance on economic and political reform 
     around the world, introducing the use of information 
     technologies to democracy programs. Previously, McColm worked 
     in a variety of capacities at Freedom House, a New York-based 
     human rights organization and also was elected a member of 
     the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights by the General 
     Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). McColm 
     was educated at William College, Harvard University, and the 
     University of Chicago.
       Lt. General Thomas McInerney USAF, (Ret.): General 
     McInerney established his own consulting firm, GRTT 
     (Government Reform Through Technology) in January 2000. 
     Working with high-tech companies that do business with 
     federal, state, city, and local governments, GRRT helps 
     them introduce advanced technology into the private 
     sector. From 1996-1999, Gen. McInerney was Chief Executive 
     Officer and President of Business Executives for National 
     Security (BENS), a national, nonpartisan organization of 
     business and professional leaders, with headquarters in 
     Washington. Prior to joining BENS, Gen. McInerney was Vice 
     President of Command and Control for Loral Defense 
     Systems-Eagan. He joined Loral (then Unisys Electronic 
     Systems Division) in 1994, following 35 years as a pilot, 
     commander, and Joint Force Commander in the United States 
     Air Force. Gen. McInerney retired from military service as 
     Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as 
     Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR), 
     reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, 
     he led the Pentagon's ``reinventing government'' effort, 
     visiting more than 100 leading edge commercial companies 
     to assimilate their ideas about business reengineering.
       Gen. McInerney earned a Bachelor of Science degree at the 
     U.S. Military Academy in 1959 and a master's degree in 
     international relations from George Washington University in 
     1972. He completed Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and the 
     National War College in 1973. Gen. McInerney is a member of 
     several Boards of Directors.
       Captain Charles T. ``Chuck'' Nash, USN (ret.) is the 
     founder and President of Emerging Technologies International, 
     Inc. (ETII). The company's focus is to understand military 
     requirements and then actively search out and identify high 
     leverage, emerging technologies that can be inserted quickly 
     and inexpensively into tools for the U.S. military. Clients 
     include government laboratories and commercial technology 
     companies. Previously, Capt. Nash served as Vice President, 
     Emerging Technologies Group, Santa Barbara Applied Research, 
     Inc. For 25 years before that, Capt. Nash served as an 
     officer in the U.S. Navy, accumulating over 4,300 hours of 
     flight time and 965 carrier landings on nine different 
     aircraft carriers as a Naval Aviator. He served in a variety 
     of command positions with Naval Operations at the Pentagon 
     and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and has filled billets with U.S. 
     and foreign special operations forces in Turkey, Northern 
     Iraq and elsewhere. Capt. Nash previously served on the 
     Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and on the Naval Air 
     Systems Command (NAVAIR) Expert Panel for the Supersonic 
     Cruise Missile Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. He 
     was a sponsor and co-chairman of the OPNAV High Speed Strike 
     Information Day, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory 
     (JHAPL). Currently, he serves on a number of Boards 
     of Directors and is an advisor to the Chairman of the 
     Board of Isothermal Systems Research, Inc. and to the 
     President and CEO of Vision Technologies International, 
     Inc. Capt. Nash earned his B.S. in Aeronautics from Parks 
     College of Aeronautical Technology, St. Louis University 
     and attended the National War College at Fort L. J. McNair 
     in Washington. Currently a Fox News Channel Military 
     Analyst, Capt. Nash frequently appears on the network to 
     discuss military, terrorism and aviation issues.
       Lt. General Edward Rowny, USA (ret.): General Rowny began 
     his military career following graduation from the Johns 
     Hopkins University and the U.S. Military Academy, two Masters 
     degrees from Yale University and a Ph.D. from American 
     University. He fought in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam, 
     commanding units from platoon to Corps size. Later, he served 
     in the 1970s and 1980s as an advisor to the SALT II talks and 
     as the chief negotiator of the START negotiations, with the 
     rank of ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was Special Advisor 
     for Arms Control to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
     Bush. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential 
     Citizens Medal. The citation reads that Gen. Rowny is ``one 
     of the principal architects of America's policy of peace 
     through strength. As an arms negotiator and as a presidential 
     advisor, he has served mightily, courageously, and nobly in 
     the cause of peace and freedom.'' In 1991, Ambassador Rowny 
     retired from government and currently consults on 
     international affairs.
       Professor Raymond Tanter, Former Senior Staff Member, 
     National Security Council: Raymond Tanter is Visiting 
     Professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses 
     on International Relations and Terrorism. Tanter is adjunct 
     scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and 
     was scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in 
     Washington. He researched U.S. policy options regarding Iran 
     at both think tanks. After receiving a Ph.D. from Indiana 
     University in 1964, Prof. Tanter taught at Northwestern, 
     Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tanter was 
     a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and the 
     Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and a 
     Fulbright scholar, University of Amsterdam. In 1975, Tanter 
     spent a month as scholar-in-residence at the American 
     Embassy, Tokyo, lecturing on petroleum interruption 
     scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. In 
     1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at 
     the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department 
     of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel, 
     Chief of Naval Operations, 1980-1981. He served at the White 
     House on the National Security Council staff, 1981-1982. In 
     1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of 
     Defense to arms control talks in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm, 
     and Vienna. He is a member of the Council on Foreign 
     Relations. Among Tanter's publications is Rogue Regimes: 
     Terrorism and Proliferation, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
     1997. Tanter is a member of the Council on Foreign 
     Relations, Committee on the Present Danger, American 
     Political Science Association, and the Iran Policy 
     Committee.
       Major General Paul E. Vallely, USA (Ret.): General Vallely 
     retired in 1991 from the U.S. Army as Deputy Commanding 
     General, U.S. Army Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Gen. Vallely 
     graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and 
     was commissioned in the Army in 1961, serving a distinguished 
     career of 32 years in the Army. He served in many overseas 
     theaters, including Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, as 
     well as two combat tours in Vietnam. He has served on U.S. 
     security assistance missions on civilian-military relations 
     in locales around the world. Gen. Vallely is a graduate of 
     the Infantry School, Ranger and Airborne Schools, Jumpmaster 
     School, the Command and General Staff School, The Industrial 
     College of the Armed Forces and the Army War College. His 
     combat service in Vietnam included positions as infantry 
     company commander, intelligence officer, operations officer, 
     military advisor and aide-de-camp. He has over 15 years 
     experience in Special Operations, Psychological and Civil-
     Military Operations. Gen. Vallely was one of the first 
     nominees for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
     Operations under President Reagan and commanded the 351st 
     Civil Affairs Command during the 1980s. He has served as a 
     consultant to the Commanding General of the Special 
     Operations Command as well as the Department of Defense Anti-
     Drug and Counter-Terrorist Task Forces. Gen. Vallely is a 
     military analyst for Fox News Channel and is a guest on many 
     nationally-syndicated radio talk shows. He also is a guest 
     lecturer on the War on Terror and has just co-authored a book 
     entitled The Endgame, Winning the War on Terror.
       Clare M. Lopez, Executive Director, IPC is a strategic 
     policy and intelligence analyst with a focus on Middle East, 
     homeland security, national defense, and counterterrorism 
     issues. Based for the last five years in the private sector 
     environment of the Washington metro area, Lopez began her 
     career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence 
     Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in 
     a variety of assignments. Lopez served as a Senior 
     Intelligence Analyst, Subject Matter Expert, and Program 
     Manager for the Alexandria, VA firm, HawkEye Systems, LLC. 
     Lopez previously produced Technical Threat Assessments for 
     U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of 
     Diplomatic Security, where she worked as a Senior 
     Intelligence Analyst for Chugach Systems Integration. During 
     Lopez's CIA career, she served under diplomatic cover in 
     various postings around the world, acquiring extensive 
     regional expertise with a career focus on the former 
     Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 
     She has served in or visited over two dozen nations 
     worldwide and speaks several languages, including Spanish, 
     Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian. Lopez began a 
     study of Arabic in 2003 at the Department of Agriculture 
     Graduate School before transferring to the Middle East 
     Institute (MEI) in downtown Washington.
       Lopez received a B.A. in Communications and French from 
     Notre Dame College of Ohio

[[Page E796]]

     and an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell 
     School of Syracuse University. She completed Marine Corps 
     Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia before 
     declining a commission in order to join the CIA. Lopez is a 
     Visiting Researcher and an occasional guest lecturer on 
     counterterrorism, national defense, and international 
     relations at Georgetown University. Lopez is a member of the 
     International Association of Counterterrorism and Security 
     Professionals (IACSP), Women in International Security (WIIS) 
     and the Middle East Institute (MEI).

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