[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 49 (Thursday, April 21, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E715-E716]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF 
        THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. MARK GREEN

                              of wisconsin

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 20, 2005

  Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, over the past 
several years I have had the privilege and challenge of serving on both 
the House International Relations Subcommittee on International 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, and the House Judiciary 
Committee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security.
  As a member of these panels, I have closely watched the work of the 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. That is why I was very pleased 
to see the commission, chaired by former Senator Robb and Judge 
Silberman, recently present its final report. As someone who works 
daily to try and formulate the best policies to augment American 
security both at home and abroad, I have found a number of the 
conclusions and recommendations contained in this sweeping report to be 
of great interest.
  Those who have seen the news coverage of this report are aware that 
it serves as a broad analysis of the intelligence leading up to the war 
in Iraq. But those who have fully read the report know that it puts 
forth a helpful and needed blueprint for the continued reshaping of our 
intelligence community to meet the requirements of the 21st Century.

[[Page E716]]

  In particular, I'd like today to briefly discuss one of the most 
crucial areas of the commission's report, and one that has a 
substantial relationship to the work I've done on both of the 
committees I mentioned earlier--counterintelligence.
  The commission report lays out, quite frankly, a rather bleak picture 
of U.S. counterintelligence over the past decade. To quote the report, 
``. . . since the Cold War . . . while our enemies are executing what 
amounts to a global intelligence war against the United States, we have 
failed to meet the challenge. U.S. counterintelligence efforts have 
remained fractured, myopic, and only marginally effective.'' The report 
states that these circumstances have produced ``a cycle of defeat that 
cannot be indefinitely sustained.''
  Thankfully, the report suggests a number of what I believe are good, 
solid recommendations for working our way out of this 
counterintelligence ``wilderness.'' Like the other changes that are 
already slated to take place throughout the intelligence community, 
these reforms will not be easy. But I agree with the commission members 
in their conclusion that systemic changes are required to prevent the 
kind of counterintelligence failures we've seen in the past--failures 
that I fear in the future could have even more devastating 
consequences.
  The commission recommends that:
  ``The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)--the statutory 
head of the U.S. counterintelligence community--become the DNI's 
Mission Manager for counterintelligence, providing strategic direction 
for the full breadth of counterintelligence activities across the 
government. In this role, the NCIX should also focus on increasing 
technical counterintelligence efforts across the Intelligence 
Community;''

  ``The CIA create a new capability dedicated to conducting a full 
range of counterintelligence activities outside the United States;''
  ``The Department of Defense's Counterintelligence Field Activity 
assume operational and investigative authority to coordinate and 
conduct counterintelligence activities throughout the Defense 
Department;'' and
  ``The FBI create a National Security Service that includes the 
Bureau's Counterintelligence Division, Counterterrorism Division, and 
the Directorate of Intelligence. A single Executive Assistant Director 
would lead the service subject to the coordination and budget 
authorities of the DNI.''
  Each of these changes can play an important role in repairing and 
enhancing our current counterintelligence structure and capabilities. 
But I feel the first recommendation--related to empowered, centralized, 
strategic leadership in the counterintelligence community--is 
particularly important, and worthy of additional comment.
  As the rest of the intelligence community as a whole begins to adjust 
to the new structure we've all read and heard so much about, it's 
important to note that some considerable progress has already been made 
in working to centralize leadership and stimulate change within the 
microcosm of the counterintelligence community.
  Last month, President Bush approved the first National 
Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States--a document that sets 
forth a clear and unified direction for our nation's 
counterintelligence activities. This document further advances the 
importance of undertaking counterintelligence as a strategic venture--a 
venture that ought to be incorporated into our overall national 
security policy just as is any other substantial instrument of national 
power.
  In the context of this discussion of strategic counterintelligence, I 
am especially encouraged to see a new commitment by senior U.S. 
policymakers to shift our counterintelligence efforts away from the 
``defensive'' activities of the past to a more robust, ``offensive'' 
endeavor as we look toward the future. From our many successes in the 
War on Terrorism, we have learned that an offensive approach--taking 
the battle to our enemies before they can bring it to us--is essential 
to success. Each of the commission's recommendations serve the 
achievement of that goal.
  Mr. Speaker, it's my hope that the report of the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction will not only assist in reshaping our future overall 
intelligence structure, but will also further enable the realization of 
many reforms that are already underway in our counterintelligence 
community. I look forward to working with President Bush and my 
colleagues in this body to fully consider these changes and help make 
them a reality.

                          ____________________