[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 42 (Tuesday, April 12, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3486-S3487]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. DORGAN (for himself and Mrs. Hutchison):
  S. 763. A bill to direct the Federal Railroad Administration to make 
welded rail and tank car improvements; to the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing bipartisan 
legislation to address improvements that need to be made to the 
Nation's rail tracks and tank cars. I am very pleased to be joined on 
this bill by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison.
  It is vital that we address this issue of track and tank car safety. 
Rail accidents occur in our Nation too frequently, and can cause 
devastating harm, ranging from economic loss, environmental or health 
hazards, or the worst tragedy, the loss of human life.
  In my own State of North Dakota a terrible derailment took place in 
Minot, ND in January of 2002. At approximately 1:37 a.m. on January 18, 
2002, an eastbound Canadian Pacific Railway freight train, derailed 31 
of its 112 cars about \1/2\ mile west of the city limits of Minot, ND.
  Five tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, a liquefied compressed 
gas, catastrophically ruptured, and a vapor plume covered the 
derailment site and surrounding area. About 146,700 gallons of 
anhydrous ammonia were released from the five cars, and a cloud of 
hydrolyzed ammonia formed almost immediately. This plume rose an 
estimated 300 feet and gradually expanded 5 miles downwind of the 
accident site and over a population of about 11,600 people. One 
resident was fatally injured, and 60 to 65 residents of the 
neighborhood nearest the derailment site had to be rescued. Over the 
next 5 days, another 74,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia were released 
from six other anhydrous ammonia tank cars.
  As a result of the accident, 11 people sustained serious injuries, 
and 322 people, including the 2 train crewmembers, sustained minor 
injuries. Damages exceeded $2 million, and more than $8 million was 
been spent for environmental remediation. Imagine the devastation that 
could have occurred if this accident had happened in a more populated 
area.
  The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated this 
terrible derailment, and in its report issued important safety 
recommendations on track inspections and tank car crashworthiness. The 
findings by the NTSB raised great concern. NTSB estimated that the pre-
1989 tank cars were insufficiently crashworthy. The cars were estimated 
to make up approximately 60 percent of the pressure tank cars in the 
rail system, and with a 50-year lifespan, could continue operating 
until 2039. The risks posed by these cars are significant, and the NTSB 
set forth recommendations on addressing these safety issues.
  Of further concern is the fact that statistics show that there were 
more than 1.23 million tank car shipments of hazardous materials in 
2000, the last year for which the study had data available, in the 
United States and Canada. Of the top 10 hazardous materials transported 
by tank car, 5 were class 2 liquefied compressed gases, LPG, anhydrous 
ammonia, chlorine, propane, and vinyl chloride, that together accounted 
for more than 246,600 tank car shipments, or about 20 percent of all 
hazardous materials shipments by tank car.
  Consequently, the NTSB specifically stated concerns about continued 
transportation of class 2 hazardous materials in pre-1989 tank cars. 
Because of the high volume of liquefied gases transported in these tank 
cars and the cars' lengthy service lives, the NTSB concluded that using 
these cars to transport DOT class 2 hazardous materials under current 
operating practices poses an unquantified but real risk to the public. 
The NTSB also concluded that research was needed on improving the 
crashworthiness of all tank cars.
  With regards to track safety, the NTSB also found that improved track 
inspection, such as visual inspections, and additional oversight by the 
FRA was necessary. The accident was caused in part because of 
undetected cracks in the rail tracks, and NTSB concluded that track 
inspections to identify and remove cracked rail components before the 
cracks grow to critical size are the primary preventive measure to 
ensure safety.
  The findings from the NTSB's report are extremely troubling, and 
require immediate action by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
to implement the safety recommendations. Our legislation incorporates 
these recommendations and others on track safety, and sets forth time 
frames for the FRA to act so that we ensure that these critical and 
potentially life-saving recommendations will move forward.
  It is important to note that the terrible tragedy that took place in 
Madrid last year demonstrates that tank and track safety are vital to 
prevent not only against rail accidents, but also against terrorist 
attacks against our rail system. We cannot delay on investigating 
improvements to tank cars that travel every day across this country, 
often carrying dangerous loads of hazardous material. This is a 
necessary step in improving rail security.
  We will now work with the Senate Commerce Committee and the Senate 
leadership to speed enactment of this important legislation. Last year 
similar provisions were included in a larger rail security bill that 
passed the Senate, and I am hopeful that we can proceed along the same 
route this year, as both measures are vital to protect our rail system. 
I invite my colleagues to join me in cosponsoring this bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 763

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Welded Rail and Tank Car 
     Safety Improvement Act''.

     SEC. 2. WELDED RAIL AND TANK CAR SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS.

       (a) Track Standards.--
       (1) In general.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment 
     of this Act, the Federal Railroad Administration shall--
       (A) require each track owner using continuous welded rail 
     track to include procedures (in its procedures filed with the 
     Administration pursuant to section 213.119 of title 49, Code 
     of Federal Regulations) to improve the identification of 
     cracks in rail joint bars;
       (B) instruct Administration track inspectors to obtain 
     copies of the most recent continuous welded rail programs of 
     each railroad within the inspectors' areas of responsibility 
     and require that inspectors use those programs when 
     conducting track inspections; and
       (C) establish a program to review continuous welded rail 
     joint bar inspection data from railroads and Administration 
     track inspectors periodically.

[[Page S3487]]

       (2) Whenever the Administration determines that it is 
     necessary or appropriate the Administration may require 
     railroads to increase the frequency of inspection, or improve 
     the methods of inspection, of joint bars in continuous welded 
     rail.
       (b) Tank Car Standards.--The Federal Railroad 
     Administration shall--
       (1) validate a predictive model to quantify the relevant 
     dynamic forces acting on railroad tank cars under accident 
     conditions within 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     Act; and
       (2) initiate a rulemaking to develop and implement 
     appropriate design standards for pressurized tank cars within 
     18 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
       (c) Older Tank Car Impact Resistance Analysis and Report.--
     Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act the 
     Federal Railroad Administration shall conduct a comprehensive 
     analysis to determine the impact resistance of the steels in 
     the shells of pressure tank cars constructed before 1989. 
     Within 6 months after completing that analysis the 
     Administration shall--
       (1) establish a program to rank those cars according to 
     their risk of catastrophic fracture and separation;
       (2) implement measures to eliminate or mitigate this risk; 
     and
       (3) transmit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives 
     Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure setting forth 
     the measures implemented.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Federal 
     Railroad Administration $1,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 to 
     carry out this section, such sums to remain available until 
     expended.
                                 ______