[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 35 (Sunday, March 20, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3099-S3103]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the immediate consideration of S. 686 introduced earlier 
today.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the bill by 
title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 686) for the relief of the parents of Theresa 
     Marie Schiavo.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           Judicial Discretion Under the Schiavo Relief Bill

       Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to seek clarification from 
     the majority leader about one aspect of this bill, the issue 
     of whether Congress has mandated that a Federal court issue a 
     stay pending determination of the case.

[[Page S3100]]

       Mr. FRIST. I would be pleased to help clarify this issue.
       Mr. LEVIN. Section 5 of the original version of the 
     Martinez bill conferred jurisdiction on a Federal court to 
     hear a case like this, and then stated that the Federal court 
     ``shall'' issue a stay of State court proceedings pending 
     determination of the Federal case. I was opposed to that 
     provision because I believe Congress should not mandate that 
     a Federal judge issue a stay. Under longstanding law and 
     practice, the decision to issue a stay is a matter of 
     discretion for the Federal judge based on the facts of the 
     case. The majority leader and the other bill sponsors 
     accepted my suggestion that the word ``shall'' in section 5 
     be changed to ``may.''
       The version of the bill we are now considering strikes 
     section 5 altogether. Although nothing in the text of the new 
     bill mandates a stay, the omission of this section, which in 
     the earlier Senate-passed bill made a stay permissive, might 
     be read to mean that Congress intends to mandate a stay. I 
     believe that reading is incorrect. The absence of any state 
     provision in the new bill simply means that Congress relies 
     on current law. Under current law, a judge may decide whether 
     or not a stay is appropriate.
       Does the majority leader share my understanding of the 
     bill?
       Mr. FRIST. I share the understanding of the Senator from 
     Michigan, as does the junior Senator from Florida who is the 
     chief sponsor of this bill. Nothing in the current bill or 
     its legislative history mandates a stay. I would assume, 
     however, the Federal court would grant a stay based on the 
     facts of this case because Mrs. Schiavo would need to be 
     alive in order for the court to make its determination. 
     Nevertheless, this bill does not change current law under 
     which a stay is discretionary.
       Mr. LEVIN. In light of that assurance, I do not object to 
     the unanimous consent agreement under which the bill will be 
     considered by the Senate. I do not make the same assumption 
     as the majority leader makes about what a Federal court will 
     do. Because the discretion of the Federal court is left 
     unrestricted in this bill, I will not exercise my right to 
     block its consideration.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the tenth amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides:

       The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
     Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
     reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

  This is a principle of Federalism which, I believe, is not being 
followed by Congress in enacting this legislation.
  That the misfortunes of life vested upon Theresa Marie Schiavo are a 
human tragedy, no one can deny. I said my prayers, as did many 
Americans, as we attended religious services this Palm Sunday.
  I believe it unwise for the Congress to take from the State of 
Florida its constitutional responsibility to resolve the issues in this 
case.
  The Florida State court system has adjudicated the issues to date. 
This bill, in effect, challenges the integrity and capabilities of the 
State courts in Florida.
  That the Federal system of courts can move properly and fairly 
ajudicate the equities among the diverse parties in this particular 
case is a conclusion with which I cannot agree.
  Greater wisdom is not always reposed in the branches of the Federal 
Government.
  Apart from constitutional issues, I am concerned for the institution 
of the Senate, a body in which I have been privileged to serve for over 
a quarter of a century.

  I view service in the Senate as that of a trustee--preserve this 
venerable body, its traditions and time-tested precedents, for future 
generations. It is one of a kind in their troubled world.
  The drafters of this bill endeavored to write in provisions to 
prevent this unique law--a private relief bill is the term used in our 
procedures--from becoming a ``precedent for future legislation'' 
(section 7).
  I do not believe the legislation can, or will, block further 
petitions from our citizens. Who can say there are not other tragic 
situations across our land today; who can predict what the future may 
inflict by way of personal hardship upon our citizens?
  I fear the door has opened and Congress, which by constitutional 
mandate is entrusted to pass laws for the Nation, will again and again 
be petitioned to deal with personal situations which are the 
responsibility of the several States.
  I respect the views of those who drafted and moved this bill swiftly, 
with limited debate, through the Senate. I value the sanctity of life 
no less fervently than they, for I had the great fortune of being the 
son of a doctor who devoted his entire life to healing and caring for 
the sick and injured. My father's principles have been my compass for 
my life.
  It is not easy to be in opposition to this legislation, but I have a 
duty to state my views in keeping with my oath to support the 
Constitution as I interpret it.


                     in defense of senate tradition

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, opponents of free speech and debate claim 
that, during my tenure as majority leader in the United States Senate, 
I established precedents that now justify a proposal for a misguided 
attempt to end debate on a judicial nomination by a simple majority 
vote, rather than by a three-fifths vote of all Senators duly chosen 
and sworn as required by paragraph two of Senate rule XXII. Their 
claims are false.
  Proponents of the so-called nuclear option cite several instances in 
which they inaccurately allege that I ``blazed a procedural path'' 
toward an inappropriate change in Senate rules. They are dead wrong. 
Dead wrong. They draw analogies where none exist and create cock-eyed 
comparisons that fail to withstand even the slightest intellectual 
scrutiny.
  Simply put, no action of mine ever denied a minority of the Senate a 
right to full debate on the final disposition of a measure or matter 
pending before the Senate. Not in 1977, not in 1979, not in 1980, or in 
1987--the dates cited by critics as grounds for the nuclear option. The 
Congressional Research Service confirms that only six amendments have 
been adopted since the cloture rule was enacted in 1917, and ``each of 
these changes was made within the framework of the existing or 
`entrenched' rules of the Senate, including rule XXII.''
  In none of the instances cited by those who threaten to invoke the 
nuclear option did my participation in any action deny the minority in 
the Senate, regardless of party, its right to debate the real matter at 
hand.
  Let us examine each of these so-called precedents in greater detail.
  October 3, 1977--Enforcing Senate Rule XXII Against Improper Post-
Cloture Delay: In 1977, the Senate invoked cloture on S. 2104, 
described as ``a bill to establish a comprehensive natural gas 
policy.'' Shortly thereafter, two Senators began a postcloture 
``filibuster by amendment,'' after a supermajority of the Senate had 
already chosen to invoke cloture (under the Senate rules) and had made 
clear its desire to bring debate on the bill to close. Though the 
Senate had voted to invoke cloture by an overwhelming vote of 77 to 17, 
two Senators nonetheless continued to offer amendments, to request 
quorum calls, and to offer amendments to amendments to preserve and 
extend time on the bill post-cloture. Their efforts, as confirmed by 
the Chair, ran directly contrary to the purpose of rule XXII, which is 
to limit debate.
  The tactics employed were sufficiently egregious that the Senate 
spent 13 days and 1 night debating the bill, which included 121 
rollcalls and 34 live quorums. Cloture having been invoked by an 
overwhelming vote, I then made the point of order that:

     when the Senate is operating under cloture, the Chair is 
     required to take the initiative under rule XXII to rule out 
     of order all amendments which are dilatory or which on their 
     face are out of order.

  Critics have alleged that my actions in this instance ``cut off 
debate'' and somehow constitute a precedent for ending a filibuster of 
a judicial nominee by 51 votes before cloture has been invoked. But 
that argument is erroneous.
  The Senate was operating postcloture. The Senate had voted 77 to 17 
to end debate. I didn't do that; the Senate took that action.
  If anything, my actions clarified that rule XXII means what it says. 
The text of rule XXII provides explicitly that, once cloture is 
invoked, ``no dilatory motion, or dilatory amendment, or amendment not 
germane shall be in order.'' Therefore, once Members have voted to 
invoke cloture, dilatory amendments or actions are simply out of order. 
Senators still retain their hour of postcloture debate. Senators still 
have the right of appeal.
  Some have falsely alleged that I even acted to impede debate on that 
appeal,

[[Page S3101]]

but they are mistaken yet again: Under the provisions of rule XXII, 
appeals from rulings of the Chair were not and are not debatable 
postcloture.
  Nothing that was done in 1977 changed rule XXII or sent a shock wave 
through the Senate. Nothing that was done restricted the right of 
Senators to wage a filibuster against a nominee or legislation before 
cloture is invoked. No action taken affected the fundamental right of 
Senators to debate the natural gas deregulation bill; they had already 
debated the bill and, of their own volition, had decided to end their 
debate by an overwhelming vote. Instead, I sought to end dilatory 
tactics postcloture, when such tactics were, and remain today, 
prohibited by the plain text of paragraph two of rule XXII. I simply 
sought a ruling from the Chair to enforce Senate rule XXII.
  In fact, when, in 1977, my point of order was sustained, the Chair in 
so doing noted that the point of order was consistent with the purpose 
of rule XXII, which ``is to require action by the Senate on a pending 
measure following cloture within a period of reasonable dispatch.'' 
When the Chair's ruling in support of my point of order was thereafter 
appealed, that appeal was tabled in the Senate by another overwhelming 
vote of 79 to 14.
  No Member of the minority in the Senate lost his right to debate the 
natural gas deregulation bill. Their ability to debate the bill was not 
tampered with or impeded in any way. Each Senator retained the right to 
debate, under the Senate rules, the bill both precloture and in the 
hour that was provided to each Senator under rule XXII postcloture.
  Thus, contrary to current assertions, in 1977, a strong, bipartisan, 
supermajority of the Senate, supported by, among others, Minority 
Leader Howard Baker and myself, endorsed this necessary effort to halt 
postcloture dilatory tactics consistent with Rule XXII of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate. That is completely unlike the so-called nuclear 
option that is currently being discussed by some in the Senate. I 
sought to enforce rule XXII; not to destroy it.
  January 15, 1979--Enforcing Rule XXII Against Improper Post-Cloture 
Delay: At the beginning of the new Congress in 1979, I, as Senate 
majority leader, introduced a resolution to make various changes to 
Senate rule XXII, the bulk of which addressed circumstances 
postcloture. Recently, on March 10, 2005, a Senator spoke on the Senate 
floor and stated that this resolution serves as a precedent for the 
nuclear option. However, my resolution served to enforce rule XXII, not 
to destroy it. My introduction of S. Res. 9 was influenced by the 
postcloture dilatory tactics that were suffered by the Senate during 
its consideration of the natural gas deregulation bill during the 
preceding Congress.
  My efforts in that regard were supported, on a bipartisan basis, by 
Minority Leader Howard Baker who stated in response to my introduction 
of S. Res. 9:

       I point out, as I am sure most of our colleagues are aware 
     and will recall, that in the case of the most recent post-
     cloture filibuster, it was the majority leader and the 
     minority leader, with the distinguished occupant of the 
     chair, the Vice President, in the chair at the time, who 
     managed to establish a line and series of precedents that 
     created the possibility to at least accelerate the 
     disposition of the controversy and conflict.
       The point of the matter is that this is not, nor has it 
     been, a matter that is purely partisan in its character. . . 
     .

  He added:

       I share with the majority leader the belief that the post-
     cloture filibuster, a creature of fairly young age and recent 
     development, is one that the Senate has not focused on 
     adequately. I am prepared to do that and I want to do that.

  As the minority leader in the Senate recognized at the time, the text 
of rule XXII provides explicitly that, once cloture is invoked, ``no 
dilatory motion, or dilatory amendment, or amendment not germane shall 
be in order.'' Therefore, once Members vote to invoke cloture, dilatory 
amendments or actions are impermissible. No proposal of mine in 1979 
restricted the right of Senators to filibuster a nominee or a piece of 
legislation prior to the invocation of cloture, consistent with Rule 
XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate. And the position I took at 
the time enjoyed support on both sides of the aisle.
  November 9, 1979--Strengthening Rule XVI Against Legislation on 
Appropriations Bills: Opponents of free speech and debate in the Senate 
cite a third event as a supposed basis for their proposed ``nuclear 
option.'' In November 1979, during consideration of a Department of 
Defense Appropriations bill, Senator Stennis raised a point of order 
that an amendment to change the rate of pay for military personnel, 
which had been offered by Senator Armstrong, constituted legislation on 
an appropriations bill and was therefore out of order under the express 
terms of Senate rule XVI. Legislative amendments to appropriations 
bills violate Senate rule XVI. However, by precedent, the ``defense of 
germaneness'' arose. According to this practice, which evolved outside 
the text of rule XVI, if the House has acted first to ``open the door'' 
to legislate on an appropriations measure, a Senator could respond with 
a legislative amendment, provided that it is germane to some House 
legislative language. If a point of order were made that an amendment 
constituted legislation, a ruling by the Chair on that question would 
be preempted by a vote on the germaneness of the amendment to the House 
language. This practice was justified only if the House had included 
legislative language in its bill. But this practice made a mockery of 
the rule if the House had not included any legislative language.
  When Senator Stennis raised the point of order that the Armstrong 
amendment constituted legislation on an appropriations bill, Senator 
Armstrong asserted the defense of germaneness, meaning that his 
amendment was germane because it was relevant to the House bill. At 
that point, I made the following point of order:

       I make the point of order that this is a misuse of the 
     precedents of the Senate, since there is no House language to 
     which this amendment could be germane and that, therefore, 
     the Chair is required to rule on the point of order as to its 
     being legislation on an appropriation bill and cannot submit 
     this question of germaneness to the Senate.

  I was concerned that, as a threshold matter, the amendment should not 
be considered because there was no House language to which the proposed 
amendment could possibly be germane. The Chair noted that while this 
was a case of first impression, my point was ``well taken,'' and he 
sustained my point of order. Senator Armstrong then appealed the ruling 
of the Chair, and I moved to table that appeal. My motion was adopted 
by the Senate.
  Critics claim that my actions in this instance were contrary to the 
plain language of rule XVI, because rule XVI at paragraph four states, 
``all questions of relevancy of amendments under this rule, when 
raised, shall be submitted to the Senate and be decided without 
debate.'' But their assertion that I acted in a manner contrary to rule 
XVI is false.
  My point of order went not to the issue of legislating on an 
appropriations bill, but to a different issue: The concept of ``defense 
of germaneness.'' Nowhere in rule XVI is there a reference to the 
concept of ``defense of germaneness.'' The source and subsequent 
application of defense of germaneness and its threshold test is not 
rooted in any Senate rule. Instead, it dates back to a precedent, which 
is identified by Riddick's Senate Procedure as a ``theory,'' which was 
``enunciated'' by Vice President Marshall in 1916, that, 
``Notwithstanding the rule of the Senate . . . when the House of 
Representatives opens the door and proceeds to enter upon a field of 
general legislation . . . the Chair is going to rule, but of course the 
Senate can reverse the ruling of the Chair, that the House having 
opened the door the Senate of the United States can walk through the 
door and pursue the field.''
  Second, my efforts were to avoid the misuse of precedent and thereby 
enforce the express provisions of Senate rule XVI, which prohibits 
legislation on an appropriations bill. It is only by precedent that 
germaneness justified a legislative amendment on an appropriations 
bill, and only if the House opened the door. My goal was to preserve 
proper precedent and strengthen rule XVI; not to weaken it, as the 
nuclear option would do to rule XXII. My actions did not establish any 
precedent to destroy the right of extended debate in the Senate. In 
fact, the Senate's action affected only the ability to offer certain 
amendments to particular legislation, and, even then, the Senate 
minority's rights to appeal a ruling of the Chair were fully preserved.

[[Page S3102]]

  March 5, 1980--Enhancing the Right of Debate of Nominations on the 
Executive Calendar: Critics of extended debate also reference a motion 
I made in 1980 to proceed directly to a nomination on the Executive 
Calendar. They claim that this created a precedent making a motion to 
proceed to any nomination on the Executive Calendar nondebatable. It 
did no such thing.
  At the time, a nondebatable motion to go into executive session 
automatically put the Senate on the first treaty on the Executive 
Calendar. This meant that moving to the Executive Calendar required 
consideration of treaties before nominations, simply because the 
Senate's Executive Calendar prints both treaties and nominations in the 
order in which they are reported out of their respective committees of 
jurisdiction, and treaties are then printed in the first section of the 
Calendar.
  But the placement of treaties and nominations on the Senate Calendar 
was not and is not based on any great precedent or legal requirement 
that would elevate treaties to a position of prominence greater than 
nominations. Instead, the placement of treaties and nominations on the 
Senate Executive Calendar is simply the result of a clerical printing 
convention. There has never been a logical reason for the Senate to 
distinguish between a motion to proceed to a nomination and a motion to 
proceed to the first treaty. Because there is no substantive reason 
that the Senate should have to go to treaties before being able to 
consider a nomination, it seemed logical that the Senate should be able 
to proceed directly to a nomination on the Executive Calendar.
  My motion to proceed directly to the first nomination, rather than a 
treaty, did not inhibit or frustrate Senate debate in any way. The 
Chair explicitly confirmed that it did not contravene any precedent or 
Standing Rule of the Senate. Moreover, it also did not restrict the 
ability of the Senate to filibuster the nomination itself. In fact, 
disposition of the nomination remained, as it is today, fully debatable 
in several respects. A nomination remains fully debatable when it comes 
before the Senate, and motions to proceed from one nomination to 
another are also fully debatable when the Senate is in executive 
session.
  May 13, 1987--Enforcing Rule IV Against Improper Debate of a Motion 
To Approve the Journal: In 1987, a Republican minority led a filibuster 
seeking to prevent the Senate from considering a defense authorization 
bill. Prior to moving to the bill, I sought unanimous consent that the 
Journal of the preceding day ``be approved to date,'' a routine request 
in the course of Senate business. The Journal is the official record of 
the proceedings of the Senate, and under Senate rule IV, the Journal of 
the preceding day must be read following the prayer by the Chaplain 
unless, by nondebatable motion, the reading of the Journal is waived.

  In this instance, Senator Dole objected to my request that the 
Journal be approved by unanimous consent, and the question of whether 
the Journal should be approved was put to a vote. Under Senate rule 
XII, if a Senator declines to vote during a rollcall, he or she must, 
at the time his or her name is called, give a reason for not voting. In 
an unusual occurrence, Senator Warner advised the Chair that he 
``decline[d] to vote for the reason that I have not read the Journal.'' 
Rule XII requires that if a Senator declines to vote, the Presiding 
Officer must put a nondebatable question to the Senate on whether it is 
``permissible for the Senator to decline his right to vote on the 
issue.''
  The Chair called for the vote to determine whether Senator Warner 
should be excused from voting on the Journal. However, before that vote 
was completed, Senator Dan Quayle stated that he, too, declined to 
vote, because he said, ``I do not believe a Senator should be compelled 
to vote.'' The Chair asked the clerk to call the roll on whether to 
excuse Senator Quayle from voting, when Senator Symms stated that he, 
too, declined to vote for the same reason. At this point, there were 
four Senate votes pending. if additional Senators in the Chamber 
similarly chose to decline to vote, seriatim, the process could have 
continued forever.
  Recognizing that, just a bit over a year previously, the Senate had 
deliberately amended rule IV to make the motion to approve the Journal 
a nondebatable motion, I made a point of order that the requests of the 
Senators to decline to vote were not in order. I stated:

     that in amending rule IV, the Senate intended that a majority 
     of the Senate could resolve the question of the reading of 
     the Journal. I make my point of order that a request of a 
     Senator to be excused from voting on a motion to approve the 
     Journal is, therefore, out of order and that the Chair 
     proceed immediately, without further delay, to announce the 
     vote on the motion to approve the Journal.

  Through a series of subsequent motions and votes, I prevailed in 
rectifying what I observed at the time was an extraordinary situation 
illustrated by a series of, in essence, ``votes within a vote.''
  Contrary to erroneous allegations by some, my actions in this regard 
did not set a precedent that ``changed Senate procedure to run contrary 
to the plain text of a Standing Senate Rule.'' In fact, the action I 
took achieved exactly the opposite result: It ensured that Senate 
procedure would conform more closely to both the intent and the plain 
text of Senate rule IV.
  At the time, one Senator mistakenly stated that the Chair could not 
entertain a unanimous consent request to suspend the application of 
rule XII in this instance. But that is an incorrect understanding by a 
Senator who was referring to rule XII, paragraph 1--where Senators 
cannot seek to be added to a vote that they missed, and the Chair may 
not do it or entertain a request to do so, a rule that was not in 
question and has always been strictly enforced by the Chair--not rule 
XII, paragraph 2, which was in dispute at the time.
  Again, the actions I took were to enforce both rules IV and XII. 
Should I, instead, have endorsed a procedure whereby one Senator after 
another could simply decline to vote and put each Senator's reasons for 
declining to vote to another vote? Should Senators have been permitted, 
one after another, to decline to vote, then force a vote on each one's 
reason for not voting, on what is a nondebatable question in a 
nondebatable posture? Had I not raised a point of order against this 
abusive practice, it could have been used in innumerable future 
circumstances, and the Senate would not be able to complete a vote on 
any measure or matter, ever. It would, again, have made a mockery of 
the Senate's rules. Keep in mind that, if the tactic were ever 
legitimized, it could be employed to prevent a judicial nominee from 
ever receiving a vote.
  It should be further noted that the point of order I made applies 
only to proceedings on motions to approve the Journal. Both the 
Presiding Officer and I confirmed this specifically in response to a 
question from Senator Alan Simpson. As I then stated:

     where Senators decline to vote on other rollcall votes in 
     other situations--this point of order does not go to those. 
     This point of order only goes to the unusual situation, the 
     extraordinary circumstances, in which the Senate found itself 
     today, when it was trying to act on a motion to approve the 
     Journal to date, and when three Senators in succession stood 
     to say, ``Mr. President, I decline to vote on this rollcall 
     for the following reasons.''

  Elsewhere, I also expressly stated that, ``for the legislative 
history,'' the precedential value of my point of order was ``confined 
only to that situation in which the Senate is trying to complete a vote 
on a motion to approve the Journal to date . . . It is confined to that 
very narrow purpose.''
  The Senate's decision on that day was fully consistent with the text 
of rules IV and XII, which provides expressly that the question of 
whether a Senator could decline to vote, ``shall be decided without 
debate.'' The decision, once again, further enforced the existing rules 
of the Senate. This stands in stark contrast to the proposed nuclear 
option, which would contravene, by a simple majority vote, the express 
text of rule XXII, which applies to ``any measure, motion, or other 
matter pending before the Senate,'' and which requires an affirmative 
vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn.
  Let me state, once again, that no action of mine cited by the 
proponents of the nuclear options has ever denied a minority in the 
Senate its right to full debate on the final disposition of a measure 
or matter pending before the Senate.
  The steps discussed here have all gone toward strengthening or 
enforcing

[[Page S3103]]

Senate rules, or clarifying the application of Senate precedents--not 
undermining them. The Senate has been the last fortress of minority 
rights and freedom of speech in this Republic for more than two 
centuries. I pray that Senators will pause and reflect before ignoring 
that history and tradition in favor of the political priority of the 
movement.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be 
read a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the 
bill pass?
  The bill (S. 686) was passed, as follows:

                                 S. 686

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. RELIEF OF THE PARENTS OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO.

       The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
     Florida shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine, and 
     render judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa 
     Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of 
     Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the 
     United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of 
     food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her 
     life.

     SEC. 2. PROCEDURE.

       Any parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo shall have standing to 
     bring a suit under this Act. The suit may be brought against 
     any other person who was a party to State court proceedings 
     relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or 
     medical treatment necessary to sustain the life of Theresa 
     Marie Schiavo, or who may act pursuant to a State court order 
     authorizing or directing the withholding or withdrawal of 
     food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her 
     life. In such a suit, the District Court shall determine de 
     novo any claim of a violation of any right of Theresa Marie 
     Schiavo within the scope of this Act, notwithstanding any 
     prior State court determination and regardless of whether 
     such a claim has previously been raised, considered, or 
     decided in State court proceedings. The District Court shall 
     entertain and determine the suit without any delay or 
     abstention in favor of State court proceedings, and 
     regardless of whether remedies available in the State courts 
     have been exhausted.

     SEC. 3. RELIEF.

       After a determination of the merits of a suit brought under 
     this Act, the District Court shall issue such declaratory and 
     injunctive relief as may be necessary to protect the rights 
     of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution and laws of 
     the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal 
     of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain 
     her life.

     SEC. 4. TIME FOR FILING.

       Notwithstanding any other time limitation, any suit or 
     claim under this Act shall be timely if filed within 30 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 5. NO CHANGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create 
     substantive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution 
     and laws of the United States or of the several States.

     SEC. 6. NO EFFECT ON ASSISTING SUICIDE.

       Nothing in this act shall be construed to confer additional 
     jurisdiction on any court to consider any claim related--
       (1) to assisting suicide, or
       (2) a State law regarding assisting suicide.

     SEC. 7. NO PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION.

       Nothing in this Act shall constitute a precedent with 
     respect to future legislation, including the provision of 
     private relief bills.

     SEC. 8. NO EFFECT ON THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT OF 
                   1990.

       Nothing in this Act shall affect the rights of any person 
     under the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990.

     SEC. 9. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

       It is the Sense of the Congress that the 109th Congress 
     should consider policies regarding the status and legal 
     rights of incapacitated individuals who are incapable of 
     making decisions concerning the provision, withholding, or 
     withdrawal of foods, fluid, or medical care.

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the bill we 
just passed that will give Terri Schiavo another chance. The bill we 
passed this afternoon centers on the sanctity of human life. It is 
bipartisan; it is bicameral. The House of Representatives is 
considering the exact same bill today. After the Senate and House pass 
this legislation, the President will immediately sign it into law.
  There has been a lot of discussion about what this bill actually 
does. Let me point out several things.
  Simply put, it allows Terri's case to be held in Federal court. The 
legislation permits a Federal district judge to consider a claim on 
behalf of Terri for alleged violations of constitutional rights or 
Federal laws relating to the withholding of food, water, or medical 
treatment necessary to sustain life.
  The bill guarantees a process to help Terri but does not guarantee a 
particular outcome. Once a new case is filed, a Federal district judge 
can issue a stay at any time 24 hours a day. A stay would allow Terri 
to be fed once again. The judge has discretion on that particular 
decision. However, I would expect that a Federal judge would grant the 
stay under these circumstances because Terri would need to live in 
order for the court to consider the case. If a new suit goes forward, 
the Federal judge must conduct what is called de novo review of the 
case. De novo review means the judge must look at the case anew. The 
judge need not rely on or defer to the decision of previous judges.
  The judge also may make new findings of fact, and from a practical 
standpoint this means that in a new case the judge can reevaluate and 
reassess Terri's medical condition.
  I would like to make a few other points about the bill.
  First, it is a unique bill passed under unique circumstances that 
should not serve as a precedent for future legislation.
  Second, this bill would not impede any State's existing laws 
regarding assisted suicide.
  Finally, in this bill Congress acknowledges that we should take a 
closer look in the future at the legal rights of incapacitated 
individuals.
  While this bill will create a new Federal cause of action, I still 
encourage the Florida Legislature to act on Terri's behalf. This new 
Federal law will help Terri, but it should not be her only remaining 
option.
  Remember, Terri is alive. Terri is not in a coma. Although there is a 
range of opinions, neurologists who have examined her insist today that 
she is not in a persistent vegetative state. She breathes on her own 
just like you and me. She is not on a respirator. She is not on life 
support of any type. She does not have a terminal condition.
  Moreover, she has a mom and a dad and siblings, her closest blood 
relatives, who love her, who say she is responsive to them, who want 
her to live, and who will financially support her. These are the facts.
  We in the Senate recognize that it is extraordinary that we, as a 
body, act. But these are extraordinary circumstances that center on the 
most fundamental of human values and virtues--the sanctity of human 
life.
  The level of cooperation and thoughtful consideration surrounding 
this legislative effort on behalf of my colleagues has truly been 
remarkable. I thank Senate minority leader Harry Reid for his 
leadership on this issue. He and I have been in close contact 
throughout this process. I also thank my Democratic colleagues who 
expressed their concerns but have allowed us to move forward. In 
particular, I thank Senators Mel Martinez, Rick Santorum, Tom Harkin, 
and Kent Conrad for their dedication in shepherding this legislation. 
This is bipartisan, bicameral legislation.

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