[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 13 (Wednesday, February 9, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1194-S1195]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION'S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Brunswick Naval Air Station, which is in
my own home State of Maine, is a facility of great importance to our
Nation's military. While I could reflect today upon the bravery and
tenacity of the P-3 Orion pilots at Brunswick who have supported the
global war on terrorism, today I share with my colleagues the
significant benefits and strategic advantages that Brunswick Naval Air
Station offers our efforts in the areas of homeland defense and
maritime interdiction operations. As we look toward the future, and
develop new tools to address future threats, we must ensure that these
tools are located in facilities where their advanced capabilities can
be fully utilized. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that a white
paper, authored by Ralph Dean, one of Brunswick's great advocates,
entitled Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations, be
printed in the Congressional Record. The white paper provides
significant insight on the great advantages that Brunswick Naval Air
Station offers.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations
In the business of homeland defense (as in real estate),
location is the key. Imagine a naval search for a single,
relatively small merchant ship, which intelligence sources
have revealed has a hold full of weaponized chemicals. Its
destination is a major coastal city. After tense hours of
searching, a maritime patrol aircraft locates two possible
suspect vessels out of hundreds in one of the world's busiest
maritime areas. The aircraft directs two fast naval frigates
to the vicinity of the targets. The frigates and their
onboard helicopters intercept and challenge the target
vessels. One vessel submits to search and is determined to be
harmless. The other however, resists interception and
boarding. Finally, helicopter-borne special operations
commandoes descend upon the vessel, board and secure the ship
and its potentially deadly cargo.
This scenario actually occurred in the western
Mediterranean Sea last month. The weapons of mass destruction
seized were simulated; the entire sequence of events part of
a successful exercise of Maritime Interdiction Operations
conducted by forces of four NATO nations.
Maritime interdiction capability is a hot item right now
for defense planners, a particularly important focus of a
larger effort known as the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). PSI is being advanced by 15 core member nations,
brought together at the request of President Bush last year
to develop cooperative diplomatic, military, and intelligence
means to stop ships which may be carrying weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Many of the maritime interdiction precepts
under PSI are evolving from a multinational ``game''
conducted last September at the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island, and refining these concepts and procedures is
clearly a high priority for the nations involved. Japan
recently hosted the latest multinational PSI exercise, the
twelfth in the short time since the Initiative began.
As the Mediterranean exercise and others showed, Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are a critical, almost always essential
part of successful maritime interdiction. Whether conducting
a broad-area search, refining a datum provided by other
(including national) sensors, or vectoring surface, rotary-
wing or
[[Page S1195]]
special-warfare assets to a target, MPA are a key link in the
chain from initial intelligence to intercept. MPA are of
particular value in crowded shipping lanes, in areas of poor
weather or visibility. No other platform is as versatile in
this mission area, one as old and enduring as naval aviation
itself. But land-based aircraft need bases to fly from--bases
which optimize their speed, range, and turnaround capability
on missions protecting the nation's most vital areas. The
seaborne WMD threat has become primary. Maritime interdiction
platforms and infrastructure must be top concerns for naval
strategists and planners.
Fortunately help is on the way, again from patrol aviation.
The Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) promises a
substantial increase in capability for commanders responsible
for maritime interdiction. Based on the Boeing 737-800, the
MMA will bring increased speed, range, and reliability
compared to the current workhorse MPA, the P-3C Orion. MMA
sensors for interdiction missions will include a new electro-
optical and infrared spectrum sensor, moving target
indicators, an enhanced inverse synthetic aperture /
synthetic aperture radar, and a new signals intelligence
suite. Perhaps best of all, MMA will control and exploit the
capabilities of the Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
The aircraft themselves will certainly be fantastic, but
land-based planes are only as good as the base they operate
from, and the future homes for MMA/BAMS have not yet been
identified. Conventional wisdom has it that the transition
from the P-3 force to one of fewer than half as many MMA will
inevitably result in a reduction in the number of maritime
patrol aircraft bases in the U.S. This assumption may be
incorrect, since optimum basing for maritime interdiction
assets is as important as the assets themselves. Bases must
be located to provide rapid response to all coastal areas,
particularly those containing major population centers and
port facilities. They must be versatile, able to support not
just MPA, but rotary wing units and special warfare forces
with easy access, unencumbered space and facilities for
joint, coordinated training, and self-protection and security
from intrusion or attack. Maritime interdiction is a team
game, and collocation of the assets for training and
operations is essential.
The current MPA force laydown includes P-3 bases at Kaneohe
Bay in Hawaii, Jacksonville, Florida, Brunswick, Maine, and
Whidbey Island in Washington State. A robust P-3 capability
is maintained for fleet support and other missions at the
North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego. These last four
bases, at the ``corners'' of the continental U.S. are
perfectly situated for maritime interdiction of WMD threats.
From these sites, MMA response time to any point on the coast
will be less than two hours, and all major sea lanes of
approach can be covered within the 1200--1500 nautical mile
operational range of the aircraft.
All four sites have their advantages, and all are essential
to that coverage. For example, the Naval Air Station in
Brunswick, Maine has remarkable potential as a joint forces
maritime interdiction center under the PSI initiative: The
only remaining fully capable active-duty military airfield in
the northeastern U.S. and near its coastal cities--a region
of over 48 million people; immediately adjacent to all major
sea lanes in the North Atlantic; more than 63,000 square
miles of unencumbered airspace for training and exercise
missions; versatile and extensive modern facilities
(including a new hangar designed specifically for MMA and
BAMS) and land with no encroachment issues; an established
all-weather training area available for Special Forces and
other units; completely secured perimeter and outstanding
force protection layout and capability; and easy access by
all forms of transportation.
The ports and shipping lanes to the northeastern region of
the United States deserve the protection which can only be
provided by maritime interdiction forces operating from a
base within that region. Obviously transatlantic shipping is
critical to our nation's economy, but as west coast ports
operate at capacity, more and more operators are redirecting
their shipments from Asia directly to the northeast. These
shippers prefer to have their cargo spend the additional 7 to
10 days at sea rather than accept delays at west coast ports
and during rail transport across the continent. Container
traffic to New York alone has risen 65% in the last five
years, the fastest rate of growth in over 50 years. All of
the enormous volume of shipping to the region must be
monitored, and if necessary interdicted whenever it may pose
a threat.
The Defense Department's Base Closure and Realignment
Commission (BRAC) will in 2005 identify military
infrastructure for permanent elimination. The BRAC process
must carefully factor in future requirements for maritime
interdiction as they are just now being developed under the
PSI. Caution is indicated--the nation cannot afford to close
irreplaceable military facilities just as new concepts and
capabilities are being developed to address a burgeoning
threat. Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction
headed for our shores is zero-defect work, and the selection
of bases for that effort must be equally judicious and
effective. Location is an enduring essential--we must keep
open our bases ``at the corners.''
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