[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 13 (Wednesday, February 9, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1194-S1195]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION'S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Brunswick Naval Air Station, which is in 
my own home State of Maine, is a facility of great importance to our 
Nation's military. While I could reflect today upon the bravery and 
tenacity of the P-3 Orion pilots at Brunswick who have supported the 
global war on terrorism, today I share with my colleagues the 
significant benefits and strategic advantages that Brunswick Naval Air 
Station offers our efforts in the areas of homeland defense and 
maritime interdiction operations. As we look toward the future, and 
develop new tools to address future threats, we must ensure that these 
tools are located in facilities where their advanced capabilities can 
be fully utilized. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that a white 
paper, authored by Ralph Dean, one of Brunswick's great advocates, 
entitled Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations, be 
printed in the Congressional Record. The white paper provides 
significant insight on the great advantages that Brunswick Naval Air 
Station offers.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations

       In the business of homeland defense (as in real estate), 
     location is the key. Imagine a naval search for a single, 
     relatively small merchant ship, which intelligence sources 
     have revealed has a hold full of weaponized chemicals. Its 
     destination is a major coastal city. After tense hours of 
     searching, a maritime patrol aircraft locates two possible 
     suspect vessels out of hundreds in one of the world's busiest 
     maritime areas. The aircraft directs two fast naval frigates 
     to the vicinity of the targets. The frigates and their 
     onboard helicopters intercept and challenge the target 
     vessels. One vessel submits to search and is determined to be 
     harmless. The other however, resists interception and 
     boarding. Finally, helicopter-borne special operations 
     commandoes descend upon the vessel, board and secure the ship 
     and its potentially deadly cargo.
       This scenario actually occurred in the western 
     Mediterranean Sea last month. The weapons of mass destruction 
     seized were simulated; the entire sequence of events part of 
     a successful exercise of Maritime Interdiction Operations 
     conducted by forces of four NATO nations.
       Maritime interdiction capability is a hot item right now 
     for defense planners, a particularly important focus of a 
     larger effort known as the Proliferation Security Initiative 
     (PSI). PSI is being advanced by 15 core member nations, 
     brought together at the request of President Bush last year 
     to develop cooperative diplomatic, military, and intelligence 
     means to stop ships which may be carrying weapons of mass 
     destruction (WMD). Many of the maritime interdiction precepts 
     under PSI are evolving from a multinational ``game'' 
     conducted last September at the Naval War College in Newport, 
     Rhode Island, and refining these concepts and procedures is 
     clearly a high priority for the nations involved. Japan 
     recently hosted the latest multinational PSI exercise, the 
     twelfth in the short time since the Initiative began.
       As the Mediterranean exercise and others showed, Maritime 
     Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are a critical, almost always essential 
     part of successful maritime interdiction. Whether conducting 
     a broad-area search, refining a datum provided by other 
     (including national) sensors, or vectoring surface, rotary-
     wing or

[[Page S1195]]

     special-warfare assets to a target, MPA are a key link in the 
     chain from initial intelligence to intercept. MPA are of 
     particular value in crowded shipping lanes, in areas of poor 
     weather or visibility. No other platform is as versatile in 
     this mission area, one as old and enduring as naval aviation 
     itself. But land-based aircraft need bases to fly from--bases 
     which optimize their speed, range, and turnaround capability 
     on missions protecting the nation's most vital areas. The 
     seaborne WMD threat has become primary. Maritime interdiction 
     platforms and infrastructure must be top concerns for naval 
     strategists and planners.
       Fortunately help is on the way, again from patrol aviation. 
     The Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) promises a 
     substantial increase in capability for commanders responsible 
     for maritime interdiction. Based on the Boeing 737-800, the 
     MMA will bring increased speed, range, and reliability 
     compared to the current workhorse MPA, the P-3C Orion. MMA 
     sensors for interdiction missions will include a new electro-
     optical and infrared spectrum sensor, moving target 
     indicators, an enhanced inverse synthetic aperture / 
     synthetic aperture radar, and a new signals intelligence 
     suite. Perhaps best of all, MMA will control and exploit the 
     capabilities of the Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) 
     Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
       The aircraft themselves will certainly be fantastic, but 
     land-based planes are only as good as the base they operate 
     from, and the future homes for MMA/BAMS have not yet been 
     identified. Conventional wisdom has it that the transition 
     from the P-3 force to one of fewer than half as many MMA will 
     inevitably result in a reduction in the number of maritime 
     patrol aircraft bases in the U.S. This assumption may be 
     incorrect, since optimum basing for maritime interdiction 
     assets is as important as the assets themselves. Bases must 
     be located to provide rapid response to all coastal areas, 
     particularly those containing major population centers and 
     port facilities. They must be versatile, able to support not 
     just MPA, but rotary wing units and special warfare forces 
     with easy access, unencumbered space and facilities for 
     joint, coordinated training, and self-protection and security 
     from intrusion or attack. Maritime interdiction is a team 
     game, and collocation of the assets for training and 
     operations is essential.
       The current MPA force laydown includes P-3 bases at Kaneohe 
     Bay in Hawaii, Jacksonville, Florida, Brunswick, Maine, and 
     Whidbey Island in Washington State. A robust P-3 capability 
     is maintained for fleet support and other missions at the 
     North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego. These last four 
     bases, at the ``corners'' of the continental U.S. are 
     perfectly situated for maritime interdiction of WMD threats. 
     From these sites, MMA response time to any point on the coast 
     will be less than two hours, and all major sea lanes of 
     approach can be covered within the 1200--1500 nautical mile 
     operational range of the aircraft.
       All four sites have their advantages, and all are essential 
     to that coverage. For example, the Naval Air Station in 
     Brunswick, Maine has remarkable potential as a joint forces 
     maritime interdiction center under the PSI initiative: The 
     only remaining fully capable active-duty military airfield in 
     the northeastern U.S. and near its coastal cities--a region 
     of over 48 million people; immediately adjacent to all major 
     sea lanes in the North Atlantic; more than 63,000 square 
     miles of unencumbered airspace for training and exercise 
     missions; versatile and extensive modern facilities 
     (including a new hangar designed specifically for MMA and 
     BAMS) and land with no encroachment issues; an established 
     all-weather training area available for Special Forces and 
     other units; completely secured perimeter and outstanding 
     force protection layout and capability; and easy access by 
     all forms of transportation.
       The ports and shipping lanes to the northeastern region of 
     the United States deserve the protection which can only be 
     provided by maritime interdiction forces operating from a 
     base within that region. Obviously transatlantic shipping is 
     critical to our nation's economy, but as west coast ports 
     operate at capacity, more and more operators are redirecting 
     their shipments from Asia directly to the northeast. These 
     shippers prefer to have their cargo spend the additional 7 to 
     10 days at sea rather than accept delays at west coast ports 
     and during rail transport across the continent. Container 
     traffic to New York alone has risen 65% in the last five 
     years, the fastest rate of growth in over 50 years. All of 
     the enormous volume of shipping to the region must be 
     monitored, and if necessary interdicted whenever it may pose 
     a threat.
       The Defense Department's Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commission (BRAC) will in 2005 identify military 
     infrastructure for permanent elimination. The BRAC process 
     must carefully factor in future requirements for maritime 
     interdiction as they are just now being developed under the 
     PSI. Caution is indicated--the nation cannot afford to close 
     irreplaceable military facilities just as new concepts and 
     capabilities are being developed to address a burgeoning 
     threat. Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction 
     headed for our shores is zero-defect work, and the selection 
     of bases for that effort must be equally judicious and 
     effective. Location is an enduring essential--we must keep 
     open our bases ``at the corners.''

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