[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 12 (Tuesday, February 8, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E186-E187]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES

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                           HON. HENRY J. HYDE

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 8, 2005

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, now that Congress has passed landmark 
legislation that will help reform our intelligence community, I believe 
we must now take a closer look at streamlining congressional oversight 
of that community. Therefore, I am pleased to share with my colleagues 
a recent opinion piece, which explores some of the reform options 
available to us.
  The op-ed, entitled ``Joint Intelligence Committee Overdue'' was 
published on Dec. 3, 2004, in the News-Leader--Florida's oldest weekly 
newspaper. It was authored by Mr. Thomas Smeeton, who is the former 
U.S. House Minority Staff Director of the Iran/Contra Committee and 
Minority Counsel of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee. Mr. Smeeton 
also served as a CIA officer. I hope my colleagues will find the op-ed 
interesting and beneficial:

                  Joint Intelligence Committee Overdue

       The collapse of Congressional efforts to reform the 
     intelligence community dominated the news just before 
     Thanksgiving. The proposed legislation embodied many of the 
     major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission for fixing the 
     executive branch's intelligence problems. Largely overlooked 
     in this reform debate is Congress' failure, so far, to do 
     enough to address its own problems. Yet the 9/11 panel noted 
     that ``of all of our recommendations, strengthening 
     Congressional oversight may be the most difficult and 
     important.'' The commission also pointed out that, 
     ``Congressional oversight for intelligence and 
     counterterrorism is now dysfunctional.''
       The main reason this critically important congressional 
     responsibility is malfunctioning is because it is spread 
     amongst too many committees. That is why the 9/11 Commission 
     urged Congress to replace the current fragmented oversight 
     arrangement with either a House-Senate joint committee or 
     single panels in each congressional body with exclusive 
     oversight and legislative power.
       Consolidation along these lines would drastically reduce 
     the time high level intelligence community officials spend on 
     Capitol Hill repeating over and over again the same briefings 
     and testimonies to the various committees now exercising 
     jurisdiction over intelligence activities. Redundant 
     congressional demands are becoming so time consuming that it 
     is increasingly difficult for these senior officials to 
     discharge their primary duties of attending to the many 
     security issues confronting this nation.
       The need to reform Congress' oversight of the intelligence 
     community has been recognized by some members of Congress for

[[Page E187]]

     years. Henry Hyde, currently chairman of the International 
     Relations Committee in the House of Representatives, proposed 
     legislation to create a Joint Intelligence Committee in 1984. 
     He spelled out what he had in mind in numerous forums, 
     including op-ed pieces that appeared in major newspapers. 
     Nearly 17 years ago, Hyde's idea was the top recommendation 
     of the Republican members of the Iran/Contra Committee. Among 
     those endorsing the Hyde initiative were Dick Cheney, Mike 
     DeWine and Orrin Hatch, who served with Hyde on the Iran-
     Contra Joint Committee. All of these political figures remain 
     major players in Washington.
       The reluctance of Congress to get its own house in order is 
     politically understandable. A Joint Intelligence Committee 
     would require a number of committees and their powerful 
     chairmen to sacrifice their jurisdictions over intelligence 
     matters. But given what is at stake, it is time to 
     subordinate such parochial concerns to the national interest.
       To really be effective, a Joint Intelligence Committee must 
     have both oversight and legislative authority. Otherwise, 
     those committees with an interest in intelligence issues will 
     try to recapture their lost purviews. Historically, those 
     committees have been Armed Services, Judiciary, 
     Appropriations and Foreign/International Relations. To 
     mollify these traditional bailiwicks, membership on the joint 
     committee should include representatives from each of these 
     committees. The panel must be small to ensure secrecy and 
     promote individual responsibility and accountability. To 
     encourage bipartisanship, neither political party should have 
     more than a one-vote edge. The committee staff should be 
     composed of apolitical professionals.
       In summary, the time has come to think outside of the box 
     and adopt radical congressional reforms to meet national 
     security challenges in the post 9/11 world. The 9/11 
     Commission put it best when it warned that ``the other 
     reforms we have suggested--for a national counter-terrorism 
     center and national intelligence director--will not work if 
     congressional oversight does not change too. Unity of effort 
     in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by 
     congressional oversight.''

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