[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 9 (Wednesday, February 2, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S904-S905]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR:
  S. 270. A bill to provide a framework for consideration by the 
legislative and executive branches of proposed unilateral economic 
sanctions in order to ensure coordination of United States policy with 
respect to trade, security, and human rights; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Sanctions Policy 
Reform Act.
  The fundamental purpose of my bill is to promote good governance 
through thoughtful deliberation on those proposals involving unilateral 
economic sanctions directed against other countries. My bill lays out a 
set of guidelines and requirements for a careful and deliberative 
process in both branches of government when considering new unilateral 
sanctions. It does not preclude the use of economic sanctions nor does 
it change those sanctions already in force. It is based on the 
principle that if we improve the quality of our policy process and 
public discourse, we can improve the quality of the policy itself.
  Numerous studies have shown that unilateral sanctions rarely succeed 
and often harm the United States more than the target country. 
Sanctions can jeopardize billions of dollars in U.S. export earnings 
and hundreds of thousands of American jobs. They frequently weaken our 
international competitiveness by yielding to other countries those 
markets and opportunities that we abandon. They also can undermine our 
ability to provide humanitarian assistance abroad.
  Unilateral sanctions often appear to be cost-free, but they have many 
unintended victims--the poor in the target countries, American 
companies, American labor, American consumers and, quite frankly, 
American foreign policy. Sanctions can weaken our international 
competitiveness, lower our global market share, abandon our established 
market to others and jeopardize billions in export earnings--the key to 
our economic growth. They may also impair our ability to provide 
humanitarian assistance. They sometimes anger our friends and call our 
international leadership into question. In many cases, unilateral 
sanctions are well-intentioned, but impotent, serving only to create 
the illusion of U.S. action. In the worst cases, unilateral sanctions 
are actually undermining our own interests in the world.
  Unilateral sanctions do have a place in our foreign policy. There 
will always be situations in which the actions of other countries are 
so egregious or so threatening to the United States that some response 
by the United States, short of the use of military force, is needed and 
justified. In these instances, sanctions can be helpful in getting the 
attention of another country, in showing U.S. determination to change 
behaviors we find objectionable, or in stimulating a search for 
creative solutions to difficult foreign policy problems.
  But decisions to impose them must be fully considered and debated. 
Too frequently, this does not happen. Unilateral sanctions are often 
the result of a knee-jerk impulse to take action, combined with a timid 
desire to avoid the risks and commitments involved in more potent 
foreign policy steps that have greater potential to protect American 
interests. We must avoid putting U.S. national security in a straight-
jacket, and we must have a clear idea of the consequences of sanctions 
on our own security and prosperity before we enact them.
  To this end, I am offering this bill to reform the U.S. sanctions 
decision-making process. The bill will establish procedural guidelines 
and informational requirements that must be met prior to the imposition 
of unilateral economic sanctions. For example, before imposing 
unilateral sanctions, Congress would be required to consider findings 
by executive branch officials that evaluate the impact of the proposed 
sanctions on American agriculture, energy requirements, and capital 
markets. The bill mandates that we be better informed about the 
prospects that our sanctions will succeed, about the economic costs to 
the United States, and about the sanctions' impact on other American 
objectives.
  In addition, this sanctions policy reform bill provides for more 
active consultation between the Congress and the President and for 
Presidential waiver authority if the President determines it is in our 
national security interests. It also establishes an executive branch 
Sanctions Review Committee, which will be tasked with evaluating the 
effect of any proposed sanctions and providing appropriate 
recommendations to the President prior to the imposition of such 
sanctions.
  The bill would have no effect on existing sanctions. It would apply 
only to new sanctions that are enacted after this bill became law. It 
also would apply only to sanctions that are unilateral and that are 
intended to achieve foreign policy goals. As such, it excludes trade 
remedies or trade sanctions imposed because of market access 
restrictions, unfair trade practices, or violations of U.S. commercial 
or trade laws.
  Let me suggest a number of fundamental principles that I believe 
should

[[Page S905]]

shape our approach to unilateral economic sanctions: unilateral 
economic sanctions should not be the policy of first resort (to the 
extent possible, other means of persuasion ought to be exhausted 
first); if harm is to be done or is intended, we must follow the 
cardinal principle that we plan to harm our adversary more than we harm 
ourselves; when possible, multilateral economic sanctions and 
international cooperation are preferable to unilateral sanctions and 
are more likely to succeed, even though they may be more difficult to 
obtain; we ought to avoid double standards and be as consistent as 
possible in the application of our sanctions policy; to the extent 
possible, we ought to avoid disproportionate harm to the civilian 
population (we should avoid the use of food as a weapon of foreign 
policy and we should permit humanitarian assistance programs to 
function); our foreign policy goals ought to be clear, specific and 
achievable within a reasonable period of time; we ought to keep to a 
minimum the adverse affects of our sanctions on our friends and allies; 
we should keep in mind that unilateral sanctions can cause adverse 
consequences that may be more problematic than the actions that 
prompted the sanctions--a regime collapse, a humanitarian disaster, a 
mass exodus of people, or more repression and isolation in the target 
country, for example; we should explore options for solving problems 
through dialogue, public diplomacy, and positive inducements or 
rewards; the President of the United States should always have options 
that include both sticks and carrots that can be adjusted according to 
circumstance and nuance (the Congress should be vigilant by ensuring 
that his options are consistent with Congressional intent and the law); 
and in those cases where we do impose sanctions unilaterally, our 
actions must be part of a coherent and coordinated foreign policy that 
is coupled with diplomacy and consistent with our international 
obligations and objectives.
  An unexamined reliance on unilateral sanctions may be appropriate for 
a third-rate power whose foreign policy interests lie primarily in 
satisfying domestic constituencies or cultivating a self-righteous 
posture. But the United States is the world's only superpower. Our own 
prosperity and security, as well as the future of the world, depend on 
a vigorous and effective assertion of our international interests.
  The United States should never abandon its leadership role in the 
world, nor forsake the basic values we cherish. We must ask, however, 
whether we are always able to change the actions of other countries 
whose behavior we find disagreeable or threatening. If we are able to 
influence those actions, we need to ponder how best to proceed. In my 
judgment, unilateral economic sanctions will not always be the best 
answer. But, if they are the answer, they should be structured so that 
they do as little harm as possible to our global interests. By 
improving upon our procedures and the quality and timeliness of our 
information when considering new sanctions, I believe U.S. foreign 
policy will be more effective.
                                 ______