[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 8 (Tuesday, February 1, 2005)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E131-E132]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               THE NEXT STEP IN IRAQ IS AN EXIT STRATEGY

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. MARTIN T. MEEHAN

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 1, 2005

  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, this Sunday, millions of average Iraqis 
defied the threats of violence and took a courageous first step toward 
democracy and self-governance. The images of Iraqis voting for the 
first time were truly uplifting. But before this Administration 
declares ``Mission Accomplished'' all over again, we cannot ignore the 
challenges that remain. We cannot simply hope that the elections will 
make the insurgency go away, or put an end to the violence. For too 
long, our entire strategy in Iraq has been based on waiting and hoping. 
Now more than ever, we need a real strategy to make Iraq stable and 
self-sufficient and bring our troops home.
  President Bush came into office with clear ideas about when we use 
our military power and put our forces in harm's way. Five years ago, 
when he was running for President, Governor George W. Bush criticized 
President Clinton for not having an exit strategy in Kosovo. This is 
what he said: ``Victory means exit strategy, and it's important for the 
President to explain to us what the exit strategy is.'' Two years ago, 
President Bush sent our armed forces into Iraq without a plan to win 
the peace. We had no exit strategy and therefore no victory strategy.
  Two years later, we still don't. The elections are a step forward in 
a long process of making Iraq politically independent. But the 
elections don't change the fact that Iraq is still not secure. The 
150,000 American troops in Iraq are no less at risk than they were last 
week, which sadly was one of the most tragic weeks of the war. Despite 
the election, the reality on the ground is unchanged--security in Iraq 
is not getting better--it's been getting steadily worse since the 
summer of 2003. The occupation is not making Iraq secure--it's only 
fueling the violence.
  The Bush Administration has no endgame in sight. Their only strategy 
is to hope that security will get better. But it didn't get better 
after we captured Saddam, after we transferred sovereignty, or after we 
went into Fallujah. We can hope, but we can't plan on security 
improving now that Iraq has had elections. We can't count on security 
in Iraq getting any better as long as the United States has 150,000 
troops in Iraq, and as long as we are viewed as an occupying power. 
That's why we need an exit strategy that includes a timetable for a 
U.S. withdrawal. It's the only way to change the dynamic on the ground.
  A new Zogby poll in Iraq that found that 65 percent of Iraqis want us 
to leave, including 68 percent of Shiites and 80 percent of Sunnis. We 
need to recognize that the presence of 150,000 U.S. forces on Iraqi 
soil is fueling the insurgency. Over the last year, we've sent more 
troops to Iraq, but the insurgency has only gotten stronger, more 
sophisticated, and more deadly. We're creating more insurgents than 
we're neutralizing. We've killed or captured more than 1,000-3,000 
insurgents every month for more than a year. But the insurgency has 
quadrupled in size, from at least 5,000 to at least 20,000. The Iraqi 
Intelligence Minister estimates that there are 200,000 Iraqis who are 
providing support for the insurgents.
  Iraqis who voted on Sunday rejected the anti-democratic, terrorist 
ideology of Zarqawi. But for the most part, the insurgency in Iraq is 
not comprised of foreign terrorists or high-ranking Baathists. More 
than 95 percent of the detainees we have in Iraq are Iraqis, and more 
than 95 percent of those captured in the strike on Fallujah. Only a 
handful of the Baathists on the most-wanted list are still at large.
  To have any chance of success in Iraq we need to understand whom 
we're fighting against. The insurgency is not comprised of any one 
group, and they don't subscribe to any one ideology. They are united 
only by their opposition to the occupation. And they are receiving 
support from pockets of the Iraqi civilian population that have become 
embittered with the occupation.
  The open-endedness of the occupation also threatens to undermine the 
credibility of the moderate Iraqi leaders who are seen working with us. 
Most of the main political slates ran on the platform that they would 
be best suited to remove U.S. forces from Iraq. It can't happen today. 
But as the President of Iraq, Ghazi al-Yawar, said today, the U.S. can 
remove some troops over the course of this year. It's

[[Page E132]]

critical that we send a signal that this occupation will not last 
forever.
  When President Bush says we're going to stay ``for as long as it 
takes,'' Iraqis take that to mean we're going to stay there 
indefinitely. Now that there is an elected Iraqi government, we need to 
have an endgame. We also need to make absolutely clear that we aren't 
seeking a permanent military foothold in Iraq. The President has not 
yet made that clear.
  Under the plan I've proposed, the United States will announce its 
intentions to withdraw most of our forces this year. By next summer, 
only a small contingent of troops will remain, staying in the 
background to assist in the training of Iraqi forces. A smaller, 
lighter presence would prevent the formation of ethnic militias and the 
outbreak of civil war. But by staying in the background, it won't 
provoke bitterness and anti-Americanism among the Iraqi people. A 
timetable for a drawdown of U.S. forces sends a message to Iraq's new 
government and Iraqi security forces that soon they'll be responsible 
for their own security.
  The two elements that are key to any exit strategy are training Iraqi 
forces and investing in reconstruction projects that will create jobs 
in Iraq. The training of Iraqi security forces didn't begin in earnest 
until Lt. Gen. Petraeus was put in charge this past June--more than a 
year after it should have. For too long, Iraqi forces were given only a 
couple weeks training and sent to fight experienced insurgents. With 
the United States providing an open-ended guarantee for security in 
Iraq, untrained Iraqis saw little reason to risk their lives. As a 
result, their initial performance was mixed at best.
  However, their performance on Sunday was encouraging. For the first 
time, Iraqi forces served in the foreground, with U.S. forces in the 
background. After a belated start, Gen. Petraeus has the training 
program on track. Iraqi forces are now given months of training, not 
weeks. If we continue to train Iraqi security forces, we can give them 
steadily more responsibility beginning in the coming weeks. That will 
allow us to bring home the vast majority of our forces over the next 
12-18 months.
  As we decrease our military presence, we must maintain our commitment 
to the Iraqi people just as we did in postwar Europe with the Marshall 
Plan. Our role must change from occupying Iraq to assisting Iraq in 
economic reconstruction. Iraq's unemployment rate continues to be 30-40 
percent, and millions of Iraqis have gone without basic services. It's 
an outrage that of $22 billion that Congress has committed to 
reconstruction, only $4.3 billion has actually been spent in Iraq. And 
up to 50-70 percent of that money has been spent on security for 
foreign contractors.
  Yesterday the Inspector General for Iraq reconstruction said that 
almost $9 billion that the CPA transferred to government agencies in 
Iraq is entirely unaccounted for. That needs to change. We need to 
invest in projects that will provide immediate jobs for Iraqis, not 
foreign contractors.
  Finally, there are the unresolved political issues in Iraq. The key 
political question in Iraq now is whether Sunnis will be at the table 
as Iraq's constitution is drafted. Announcing an American troop 
drawdown will put pressure on the new Iraqi government to include 
Sunnis in the process. At the same time, the less the new government is 
seen as depending on us, the more it gains in popularity and 
credibility among all factions within Iraq.
  Tomorrow night, in this chamber, the President has another 
opportunity to present something he should have presented two years 
ago--an exit strategy from Iraq. 150,000 troops remain in Iraq, 
including the 12,000 that were sent to enhance security for the 
elections. President Bush is asking Congress for an additional $80 
billion to fund this war. The President cannot continue to ask American 
troops to shoulder the sacrifice, and American taxpayers to foot the 
bill, without light at the end of the tunnel.
  Congress must demand of President Bush what he demanded of President 
Clinton five years ago--an exit strategy. Victory means exit strategy, 
and it's important for the President to explain to us what the exit 
strategy is.