[Congressional Record Volume 151, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 26, 2005)]
[Senate]
[Pages S600-S604]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR:
  S. 192. A bill to provide for the improvement of foreign 
stabilization and reconstruction capabilities of the United States 
Government; to the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. LUGAR. The bill I am introducing today seeks to enhance United 
States effectiveness in dealing with countries that are either emerging 
from civil strife and conflict or threatened with instability. It calls 
for the creation of certain fundamental capabilities within the 
Government, and the Pentagon in particular, that are critical to 
success in what has come to be called stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. These capabilities include the training and equipping of 
sufficient numbers of civilian and military personnel for such 
activities, as well as the development of a new guiding principle--one 
that designates stabilization and reconstruction as a prime Defense 
Department mission with the same priority as combat operations.
  Often these missions will occur at the end of major combat 
operations. We have learned from recent experiences in Afghanistan and 
Iraq that the

[[Page S601]]

United States will encounter significant challenges in seeking to 
ensure stability, democracy, and a productive economy in nations 
affected by conflict.
  While United States Armed Forces are extremely capable of effectively 
projecting military force and prevailing on the battlefield, achieving 
United States objectives also requires successful stabilization and 
reconstruction operations after major fighting has ceased. Without 
success in the aftermath of large-scale hostilities, the United States 
hard-won military victories will be at risk. To achieve this success, 
the armed forces and civilian agencies of the United States Government 
must have the capabilities to support stabilization and reconstruction 
and to undertake effective planning and preparation well before the 
outbreak of hostilities.
  There are many cases, as well, when timely intervention to stabilize 
a threatening situation can head off the need for a major combat 
operation. This legislation envisions that the same capabilities 
created to stabilize a post-conflict situation may also be used to 
prevent conflict in the first place, thus achieving United States 
objectives more effectively with less loss of life and less potential 
risk to our relations with other countries.
  Much as the military component of a conflict requires extensive 
planning and training, we must also be well-prepared and trained for 
stabilization and reconstruction operations. To be fully effective in 
such operations, the United States needs to have Federal Government 
personnel deployed continuously abroad for years-long tours of duty so 
that they become familiar with the local scene and can earn the trust 
of indigenous people. The active component of the Armed Forces cannot 
meet all of these requirements. Personnel from other Federal agencies, 
reserve component forces, contractors, United States allies and 
coalition partners, and indigenous personnel must help.
  This bill complements legislation I introduced last year, S. 2127, 
which calls for creation of a stabilization and reconstruction 
capability within the State Department. I am pleased the State 
Department created a new office for such activities. This bill is the 
important next step. It calls upon the President to issue a directive 
to develop an intensive planning process for stabilization and 
reconstruction activities, as well as the establishment of joint 
interagency task forces composed of senior Government executives and 
military officers to ensure coordination and integration of the 
activities of military and civilian personnel in a particular country 
or area of interest.
  In addition, the bill calls upon the Secretary of Defense to take 
immediate action to strengthen the role and capabilities of the 
Department of Defense for carrying out stabilization and reconstruction 
activities as well as to support the development of core competencies 
in planning in other departments and agencies, principally the 
Department of State. It further calls for the Secretary of Defense to 
take certain actions to ensure that stabilization and reconstruction 
becomes a core competency of general purpose forces through training, 
leader development, doctrine development and the use of other force 
readiness tools.
  I recognize that the subject matter of this bill is extremely broad 
in scope, and that it properly falls within the purview of other 
committees in addition to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
However, I believe that the only way the United States will achieve 
long-term success in stabilization and reconstruction operations is if 
all resources of the United States Government are brought to bear on 
the country or area of concern. It is for that reason that I am 
introducing this bill, and I hope that my colleagues in this body, in 
particular Senators Warner and Levin, will agree to take a major role 
in examining the merits of those aspects of this bill that fall within 
their jurisdiction and expertise.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 192

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Armed Forces of the United States are extremely 
     capable of effectively projecting military force and 
     achieving conventional military victory. However, achieving 
     United States objectives not only requires military success 
     but also successful stabilization and reconstruction 
     operations in countries affected by conflict.
       (2) Without success in the aftermath of large-scale 
     hostilities, the United States will not achieve its 
     objectives. Success in the aftermath follows from success in 
     preparation before hostilities.
       (3) Providing safety, security, and stability is critical 
     to successful reconstruction efforts and for achieving United 
     States objectives. Making progress toward achieving those 
     conditions in a country is difficult when daily life in that 
     country is largely shaped by violence of a magnitude that 
     cannot be managed by indigenous police and security forces.
       (4) Reconstruction activities cannot and should not wait 
     until safety and security has been achieved. Many elements of 
     reconstruction, including restoration of essential public 
     services and creation of sufficient jobs to instill a sense 
     of well-being and self-worth in a population of a country, 
     are necessary precursors to achieving stabilization in a 
     country affected by conflict. Stabilization operations and 
     reconstruction operations are intrinsically intertwined.
       (5) Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
     begun new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 
     18 to 24 months. Because each such operation typically lasts 
     for five to eight years, cumulative requirements for human 
     resources can total three to five times the level needed for 
     a single operation.
       (6) History indicates that--
       (A) stabilization of societies that are relatively ordered, 
     without ambitious goals, may require five troops per 1,000 
     indigenous people; and
       (B) stabilization of disordered societies, with ambitious 
     goals involving lasting cultural change, may require 20 
     troops per 1,000 indigenous people.
       (7) That need, with the cumulative requirement to maintain 
     human resources for three to five overlapping stabilization 
     operations, presents a formidable challenge. It has become 
     increasingly clear that more people are needed in-theater for 
     stabilization and reconstruction operations than for combat 
     operations.
       (8) Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
     spent at least four times more on stabilization and 
     reconstruction activities than on large-scale combat 
     operations.
       (9) One overarching lesson from history is that the 
     quality, quantity, and kind of preparation in peacetime 
     determines success in a stabilization and reconstruction 
     operation before it even begins. If an operation starts 
     badly, it is difficult to recover.
       (10) It is clear from experience in Afghanistan and Iraq 
     that the United States must expect to encounter significant 
     challenges in its future stabilization and reconstruction 
     efforts, including efforts that seek to ensure stability, 
     democracy, human rights, and a productive economy in a nation 
     affected by conflict. Achieving these ends requires effective 
     planning and preparation in the years before the outbreak of 
     hostilities in order for the Armed Forces and civilian 
     agencies of the United States Government to have the 
     capabilities that are necessary to support stabilization and 
     reconstruction. Such capabilities are not traditionally found 
     within those entities.
       (11) The United States can be more effective in meeting the 
     challenges of the transition to and from hostilities, 
     challenges that require better planning, new capabilities, 
     and more personnel with a wider range of skills.
       (12) Orchestration of all instruments of United States 
     power in peacetime would obviate the need for many military 
     expeditions to achieve United States objectives, and better 
     prepare the United States to achieve its objectives during 
     stabilization and reconstruction operations.
       (13) Choosing the priority and sequence of United States 
     objectives, acknowledging that not everything is equally 
     important or urgent, and noting that in other cultures 
     certain social and attitudinal change may take decades, all 
     require explicit management-decisionmaking and planning in 
     the years before stabilization and reconstruction operations 
     might be undertaken in a region.
       (14) To be fully effective, the United States needs to have 
     Federal Government personnel deployed continuously abroad for 
     years-long tours of duty, far longer than the length of 
     traditional assignments, so that they become familiar with 
     the local scene and the indigenous people come to trust them 
     as individuals.
       (15) There is a significant need for skilled personnel to 
     be stationed abroad in support of stabilization and 
     reconstruction activities. The active components of the Armed 
     Forces cannot meet all of these requirements. Personnel from 
     other Federal agencies, reserve component forces, 
     contractors, United States allies and coalition partners, and 
     indigenous personnel must help.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) enhancing United States effectiveness in the transition 
     to and from hostilities will require--

[[Page S602]]

       (A) management discipline, that is--
       (i) the extension of the management focus of the Armed 
     Forces (covering the full gamut of personnel selection, 
     training, and promotion;
       (ii) planning, budgeting, and resource allocation;
       (iii) education, exercises, games, modeling, and rehearsal, 
     performance and readiness measurement; and
       (iv) development of doctrine (now focused on combat 
     operations) to include peacetime activities, stabilization 
     and reconstruction operations and intelligence activities 
     that involve multi-agency participation and coordination; and
       (B) building and maintaining certain fundamental 
     capabilities that are critical to success in stabilization 
     and reconstruction, including training and equipping 
     sufficient numbers of personnel for stabilization and 
     reconstruction activities, strategic communication, 
     knowledge, understanding, and intelligence, and 
     identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric 
     warfare;
       (2) these capabilities, without management discipline, 
     would lack orchestration and be employed ineffectively, and 
     management discipline without these capabilities would be 
     impotent; and
       (3) the study of transition to and from hostilities, which 
     the Defense Science Board carried out in the summer of 2004 
     at the request of the Secretary of Defense, provides an 
     appropriate framework within which the Department of Defense 
     and personnel of other departments and agencies of the 
     Federal Government should work to plan and prepare for pre-
     conflict and post-conflict stability operations.

     SEC. 2. DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that a new coordination and 
     integration mechanism is needed to bring management 
     discipline to the continuum of peacetime, combat, and 
     stabilization and reconstruction operations.
       (b) Presidential Action.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should issue a directive to develop an 
     intensive planning process for stabilization and 
     reconstruction activities, and that the directive should 
     provide for--
       (1) contingency planning and integration task forces, that 
     is, full-time activities that could continue for months or 
     years, to be staffed by individuals from all involved 
     agencies who have expertise in the countries of interest and 
     in needed functional areas to work under the general guidance 
     of the Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs;
       (2) joint interagency task forces composed of senior 
     Government executives and military officers who operate in a 
     particular country or area of interest and are created to 
     ensure coordination and integration of the activities of all 
     United States personnel in that country or area; and
       (3) a national center for contingency support, that is, a 
     federally funded research and development center with country 
     and functional expertise that would support the contingency 
     planning and integration task forces and joint interagency 
     task forces and would augment skills and expertise of the 
     Government task forces, provide a broad range of in-depth 
     capability, support the planning process, and provide the 
     necessary continuity.
       (c) Actions by Secretary of Defense.--While a directive 
     described in subsection (b) is being implemented, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall--
       (1) take immediate action to strengthen the role and 
     capabilities of the Department of Defense for carrying out 
     stabilization and reconstruction activities;
       (2) actively support the development of core competencies 
     in planning in other departments and agencies, principally 
     the Department of State;
       (3) instruct regional combatant commanders to maintain a 
     portfolio of operational contingency plans for stabilization 
     and reconstruction activities similar in scope to that 
     currently maintained for combat operations; and
       (4) instruct each regional combatant commander to create a 
     focal point within their command for stabilization and 
     reconstruction planning and execution.

     SEC. 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES.

       (a) Core Competency.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of State shall each--
       (1) make stabilization and reconstruction one of the core 
     competencies of the Department of Defense and the Department 
     of State, respectively;
       (2) achieve a stronger partnership and closer working 
     relationship between the two departments; and
       (3) augment their existing capabilities for stabilization 
     and reconstruction.
       (b) Department of Defense.--
       (1) Mission.--The Secretary of Defense shall designate the 
     planning for stabilization and reconstruction as a mission of 
     the Department of Defense that has the same priority as the 
     mission of the Department of Defense to carry out combat 
     operations.
       (2) Supporting actions.--In administering the planning, 
     training, execution, and evaluation necessary to carry out 
     the stabilization and reconstruction mission, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall--
       (A) designate the Army as executive agent for stabilization 
     and reconstruction;
       (B) ensure that stabilization and reconstruction 
     operational plans are fully integrated with combat 
     operational plans of the combatant commands;
       (C) require the Army and the Marine Corps to develop, below 
     the brigade level, modules of stabilization and 
     reconstruction capabilities to facilitate task organization 
     and exercise and experiment with them to determine where 
     combinations of these capabilities can enhance United States 
     effectiveness in stability operations;
       (D) require the Secretary of the Army to accelerate 
     restructuring of Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces 
     with an emphasis on providing the capability for carrying out 
     the stabilization mission; and
       (E) ensure that stabilization and reconstruction becomes a 
     core competency of general purpose forces through training, 
     leader development, doctrine development, and use of other 
     force readiness tools and, to do so, shall require that--
       (i) the Secretaries of the military departments and the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff integrate stabilization and 
     reconstruction operations into the professional military 
     education programs of each of the Armed Forces and the joint 
     professional military education programs, by including in the 
     curricula courses to increase understanding of cultural, 
     regional, ideological, and economic concerns, and to increase 
     the level of participation by students from other agencies 
     and departments in those programs;
       (ii) stabilization and reconstruction be integrated into 
     training events and exercises of the Armed Forces at every 
     level;
       (iii) the commander of the United States Joint Forces 
     Command further develop, publish, and refine joint doctrine 
     for stability and reconstruction operations;
       (iv) the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and 
     the senior acquisition executive of each of the military 
     departments develop and implement a process for achieving 
     more rapid and coherent exploitation of service and 
     departmental science and technology programs and increase the 
     investment in force-multiplying technologies, such as 
     language translation devices and rapid training;
       (v) the resources for support of stability operations be 
     increased; and
       (vi) a force with a modest stabilization capability of 
     sufficient size to achieve ambitious objectives in small 
     countries, regions, or areas, and of sufficient capability to 
     achieve modest objectives elsewhere be developed, and 
     consideration be given to the actual capability of that force 
     in making a decision to commit the force to a particular 
     stabilization and reconstruction operation or to expand the 
     force for that operation.
       (c) Department of State.--
       (1) Policy on reconstruction integration.--It is the policy 
     of the United States that the capabilities to promote 
     political and economic reform that exist in many civilian 
     agencies of the United States Government, in international 
     organizations, in nongovernmental and private voluntary 
     organizations, and in other governments be integrated based 
     upon a common vision and coordinated strategy.
       (2) Responsibilities of the secretary of state.--The 
     Secretary of State shall--
       (A) be the locus for carrying out the policy on 
     reconstruction integration set forth in paragraph (1); and
       (B) develop in the Department of State capabilities--
       (i) to develop, maintain, and execute a portfolio of 
     detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities for the 
     civilian roles in reconstruction operations;
       (ii) to prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of 
     reconstruction missions; and
       (iii) to incorporate international and nongovernmental 
     capabilities in planning and execution.
       (d) Collaboration and Cooperation Between Departments of 
     Defense and State.--The Secretary of Defense shall--
       (1) assist in bolstering the development of the Office of 
     Stabilization and Reconstruction of the Department of State 
     and otherwise support that objective through the sharing of 
     the extensive expertise of the Department of Defense in 
     crisis management planning and in the process of deliberate 
     planning;
       (2) work collaboratively with that office and assign to 
     that office at least 10 experts to provide the intellectual 
     capital and guidance on the relevant best practices that have 
     been developed within the Department of Defense; and
       (3) ensure that extensive joint and collaborative planning 
     for stabilization and reconstruction operations occurs before 
     commencement of a conflict that leads to such an operation.

     SEC. 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION.

       (a) Presidential Directive.--Recognizing an increase in 
     anti-American attitudes around the world, particularly in 
     Islamic and Middle-Eastern countries, the use of terrorism, 
     and the implications of terrorism for national security 
     issues, it is the sense of Congress that the President should 
     issue a directive to strengthen the United States 
     Government's ability--
       (1) to better understand global public opinion about the 
     United States, and to communicate with global audiences;
       (2) to coordinate all components of strategic 
     communication, including public diplomacy, public affairs, 
     and international broadcasting; and
       (3) to provide a foundation for new legislation on the 
     planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic 
     communication.

[[Page S603]]

       (b) NSC Organization.--It is, further, the sense of 
     Congress that the President should establish a permanent 
     organizational structure within the National Security Council 
     to oversee the efforts undertaken pursuant to a directive 
     described in subsection (a) and that such structure should 
     include--
       (1) a deputy national security advisor for strategic 
     communication to serve as the President's principal advisor 
     on all matters relating to strategic communication;
       (2) a strategic communication committee, chaired by the 
     deputy national security advisor for strategic communication 
     and with a membership drawn from officers serving at the 
     under secretary level of departments and agencies, to develop 
     an overarching framework for strategic communication 
     (including brand identity, themes, messages, and budget 
     priorities) and to direct and coordinate interagency programs 
     to maintain focus, consistency, and continuity; and
       (3) an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for 
     strategic communication to serve as a source of independent, 
     objective expertise to support the National Security Council 
     and the strategic communication committee, by (among other 
     actions) providing information and analysis, developing and 
     monitoring the effectiveness of themes, messages, products, 
     and programs, determining target audiences, contracting with 
     commercial sector sources for products and programs, and 
     fostering cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and 
     information.
       (c) Actions by Departments of State and Defense.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary 
     of Defense shall each allocate substantial funding to 
     strategic communication.
       (2) Department of state.--Within the Department of State, 
     the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
     Affairs shall be the principal policy advisor and manager for 
     strategic communication.
       (3) Department of defense.--Within the Department of 
     Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall 
     serve as that department's focal point for strategic 
     communication.

     SEC. 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The knowledge necessary to be effective in conducting 
     stabilization and reconstruction operations is different from 
     the military knowledge required to prevail during 
     hostilities, but is no less important.
       (2) To successfully achieve United States political and 
     military objectives, knowledge of culture and development of 
     language skills must be taken as seriously as development of 
     combat skills.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the collection, analysis, and integration of cultural 
     knowledge and intelligence should be ongoing to ensure its 
     availability far in advance of stabilization and 
     reconstruction operations for which such knowledge and 
     intelligence are needed; and
       (2) a new approach is needed to establish systematic ways 
     to access and coordinate the vast amount of knowledge 
     available within the United States Government.
       (c) Commanders of Combatant Commands.--
       (1) Intelligence plans.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     require the commanders of the combatant commands to develop 
     intelligence plans as a required element of their planning 
     process. Each such plan shall satisfy information needs for 
     peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction 
     (including support to other departments and agencies) and be 
     developed by use of the same kinds of tools that are useful 
     in traditional pre-conflict and conflict planning.
       (2) Resources.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide 
     resources to the regional combatant commands for the 
     establishment of offices for regional expertise outreach to 
     support country and regional planning and operations, and to 
     provide continuity, identify experts, and build relationships 
     with outside experts and organizations.
       (3) Area experts.--In order to increase the number of 
     competent area experts, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
     Personnel and Readiness shall lead a process to set 
     requirements and develop career paths for foreign area 
     officers and a new cadre of enlisted area specialists, a 
     process based on a more formal, structured definition of 
     requirements by the commanders of the combatant commands.
       (4) Military education.--The Secretaries of the military 
     departments shall improve the regional and cultural studies 
     curricula in the joint professional military education 
     system, as well as in online regional and cultural self-study 
     instruction, in order to broaden cultural knowledge and 
     awareness.
       (d) Intelligence Reform.--
       (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should shift the focus of intelligence 
     reform from reorganization to the solving of substantive 
     problems in intelligence.
       (2) Actions.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall--
       (A) establish a human resource coordination office charged 
     with the responsibility to develop a comprehensive human 
     resource strategy for planning, management, and deployment of 
     personnel that would serve as the basis for optimizing the 
     allocation of resources against critical problems;
       (B) adopt a new counterintelligence and security approach 
     that puts the analyst in the role of determining the balance 
     between need-to-share and need-to-know that will enable the 
     intelligence community to enlarge its circle of trust from 
     which to draw information and skills;
       (C) improve integration between networks and data 
     architectures across the intelligence community to facilitate 
     enterprise-wide collaboration;
       (D) harmonize special operations forces, covert action, and 
     intelligence, and ensure that sufficient capabilities in 
     these specialized areas are developed;
       (E) accelerate the reinvention of defense human 
     intelligence and ensure that there are enough such personnel 
     assigned and sustained for a sufficient number of years in 
     advance of the nation's need for their services; and
       (F) enhance the analysis of intelligence collected from all 
     sources, including by improving the selection, recruitment, 
     training, and continuing education of analysts, producing 
     regular and continuous assessment and post-operation 
     appraisal of intelligence products, and creating incentives 
     to promote the creativity and independence of analysts.
       (e) Foreign Language Proficiency.--
       (1) Finding.--Congress finds that the utilization of 
     individuals with foreign language skills is critical to 
     understanding a country or a region, yet the Department of 
     Defense lacks sufficient personnel with critical foreign 
     language skills.
       (2) Actions by secretary of defense.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall--
       (A) prescribe the specific foreign language and regional 
     specialist requirements that must be met in order to meet the 
     needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of 
     the commander of the United States Joint Forces Command and 
     the commanders of the other combatant commands and the needs 
     of the Armed Forces generally, and shall provide the 
     resources for meeting these requirements in the annual budget 
     submissions; and
       (B) develop a more comprehensive system for identifying, 
     testing, tracking, and accessing personnel with critical 
     foreign language skills.
       (f) Exploitation of Open Sources of Information.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress finds that open sources of 
     information--
       (A) can provide much of the information needed to support 
     peacetime needs and stabilization and reconstruction needs; 
     and
       (B) can be used to develop a broad range of products needed 
     for stabilization and reconstruction operations, including 
     such products as genealogical trees, electricity generation 
     and transmission grids, cultural materials in support of 
     strategic communication plans, and background information for 
     noncombatant evacuation operations.
       (2) Executive agent for department of defense.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall designate the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency to serve as executive agent of 
     the Department of Defense for the development and 
     administration of a robust and coherent program for the 
     exploitation of open sources of information.

     SEC. 6. IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN ASYMMETRIC 
                   WARFARE.

       The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director 
     of National Intelligence, shall immediately develop a program 
     administered by a new organization established by those 
     officers to provide--
       (1) an overall technical approach to--
       (A) the identification, location, and tracking of 
     asymmetric warfare operations carried out against the Armed 
     Forces of the United States or allied or coalition armed 
     forces; and
       (B) tracking targets in asymmetric warfare in which the 
     Armed Forces of the United States, or allied or coalition 
     armed forces may be engaged;
       (2) the systems and technology to implement the approach;
       (3) the analysis techniques for translating sensor data 
     into useful identification, location, and tracking 
     information;
       (4) the field operations to employ, utilize, and support 
     the hardware and software produced; and
       (5) feedback to the Secretary of Defense and the Director 
     of National Intelligence on the impact of related policy 
     decisions and directives on the creation of a robust 
     identification, location, and tracking capability.

     SEC. 7. MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION PLANS.

       (a) Requirement for Plans.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Secretary of State shall each submit to 
     Congress a management plan for carrying out the 
     responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense (and the duties 
     of other officials of the Department of Defense) and the 
     responsibilities of the Secretary of State (and the duties of 
     other officials of the Department of State), respectively, 
     under this Act.
       (b) Content.--Each plan submitted under this section shall 
     include objectives, schedules, and estimates of costs, 
     together with a discussion of the means for defraying the 
     costs.

     SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Department of Defense.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Department of Defense for the Office for 
     Stability Operations such sums as may be necessary to enable 
     that office to carry out the planning, oversight, and related 
     stabilization and reconstruction activities required of the 
     Department of Defense under this Act.

[[Page S604]]

       (b) Department of State.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Department of State such sums as may be 
     necessary for carrying out the planning, oversight, and 
     related stabilization and reconstruction activities required 
     of the Department of State under this Act.
                                 ______