[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 139 (Wednesday, December 8, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12044-S12045]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    PROTECTING AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, last Friday, December 3, 2004, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson, in his resignation speech, 
stated, ``For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists 
have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do so.'' 
These are strong words coming from the man charged with protecting the 
Nation's food supply. Yet this sort of warning is not news to those of 
us who follow this issue.
  The security of our Nation's food supply is of great concern to me. 
Over the past year, the United States has been reminded repeatedly of 
the vulnerable nature of the American agriculture system and the ease 
with which terrorists could manipulate that vulnerability. In 2003, mad 
cow disease surfaced for the first time in Washington State and various 
strains of the avian influenza began cropping up across Asia and in the 
United States. I have come to the floor repeatedly over the past few 
years to call attention to this growing problem. I also introduced 
legislation to strengthen prevention and response efforts as early as 
2002.
  At a November 2003 Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, 
``Agroterrorism: The Threat to America's Breadbasket,'' Dr. Peter 
Chalk, a RAND policy analyst, testified that an attack on American 
livestock could be extremely attractive to a terrorist for the 
following four reasons: one, a low level of technology is needed to do 
considerable damage; two, at least 15 pathogens have the capability of 
severely harming the agriculture industry; three, a terrorist would not 
need to be at great personal risk in order to carry out a successful 
attack; and four, a disease could spread quickly throughout a city, 
State, or even the country.
  Dr. Tom McGinn, formerly of the North Carolina Department of 
Agriculture, demonstrated a computer-simulated attack of foot-and-
mouth, or FMD, disease at our hearing where FMD was introduced in five 
States. According to Dr. McGinn's simulation, after five days 23 States 
would be infected; after 30 days 40 States would be infected. In this 
scenario, it would be likely that the disease would not be detected 
until the fifth day and a national order to stop the interstate 
movement of livestock would take place a few days later. Using Dr. 
McGinn's assumptions, over 23 million animals would die from illness or 
need to be destroyed. It is horrifying that such a massive blow could 
strike one of the United States' largest markets by simply coordinating 
the infection of five animals.
  As a senior member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, one of my 
greatest concerns is the lack of governmental organization--Federal, 
State, and local--to address this problem. Over 30 Federal agencies 
have jurisdiction over some part of the response process in the event 
of a breach of agricultural security.
  In a report on the country's preparedness for responding to animal-
bourne diseases issued in August 2003, Trust for America's Health, a 
nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded to raise the profile of 
public health issues, stated:

       The U.S. is left with a myriad of bureaucratic 
     jurisdictions that respond to various aspects of the 
     diseases, with little coordination and no clear plan for 
     communicating with the public about the health threats posed 
     by animal-borne diseases.

  Protecting America's agriculture and its citizens requires Federal 
agencies to have clear areas of responsibility that leave no ground 
uncovered and open lines of communication, both between agencies and 
with the public.
  State and local officials, and the communities they serve, are the 
front lines of defense for American agriculture. Without adequate 
resources, both in terms of funding and advice, these defenses will 
fail. Yet agriculture and food security have not been given the 
national attention necessary to prevent this failure.

  On December 7, 2001, I stood on the floor of the Senate and warned of 
the vulnerability of American agriculture. To address my concerns, I 
introduced S. 2767, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, on July 
22, 2002. My bill was not acted upon in the 107th Congress, so I 
continued my efforts in the 108th Congress with the introduction of S. 
427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the 
Agriculture Security Preparedness Act.
  The Agriculture Security Assistance Act would assist States and 
communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by 
authorizing funds for: animal health professionals to participate in 
community emergency planning activities to assist farmers in 
strengthening their defenses against a terrorist threat; a biosecurity 
grant program for farmers and ranchers to provide needed funding to 
better secure their properties; and the use of sophisticated remote 
sensing and computer modeling approaches to agricultural diseases.
  The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act would enable better 
interagency coordination within the Federal

[[Page S12045]]

Government by: establishing senior level liaisons in the Departments of 
Homeland Security, or DHS, and Health and Human Services to coordinate 
with the Department of Agriculture and all other relevant agencies on 
agricultural disease emergency management and response; requiring DHS 
and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to address the 
risks associated with transporting animals, plants, and people between 
and around farms; requiring the Attorney General to conduct a review of 
relevant Federal, State, and local laws to determine if they facilitate 
or impede agricultural security; and directing the State Department to 
enter into mutual assistance agreements with foreign governments to 
facilitate the sharing of resources and knowledge of foreign animal 
diseases.
  While some in the administration will say the situation is under 
control and there is no need for legislation from Congress, I would 
point to the failure of the Food and Drug Administration to comply with 
the basic food safety requirements in the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 in a 
timely manner. On Monday, the FDA published regulations requiring all 
companies involved in food production, processing, manufacturing, and 
transportation to keep detailed records identifying the source from 
which a food product was received and/or the recipient to whom a 
product was sent.
  The Bioterrorism Act required that these regulations be issued by 
December 2003--a full 12 months ago. The administration will continue 
to drag its feet on this issue if we in the Congress are not attentive.
  In the wake of Secretary Thompson's remarks, there has been much 
national attention given to the vulnerability of the American food 
supply. Some who had not focused on this issue in the past are publicly 
expressing concern about the safety of American food, and the national 
media is broadcasting special investigative reports on agroterrorism. 
President Bush was questioned about the issue during his press briefing 
with President Musharraf on Saturday.
  The spotlight is being focused on this glaring weakness in U.S. 
security. We must do more to protect the American public from what 
experts describe as an obvious and vulnerable target. The real, and 
perceived, security of the Nation's food supply is critical to the 
continued prosperity of the United States. I will reintroduce S. 427 
and S. 430 in the 109th Congress, and I urge my colleagues to cosponsor 
my bills. Together we can move this legislation forward and demonstrate 
that Congress is protecting our food supply.

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