[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 137 (Monday, December 6, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2154-E2155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE HAS BROAD JURISDICTION OVER 
                      ``CONGRESSIONAL CONTINUITY''

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JOHN B. LARSON

                             of connecticut

                    in the house of representatives

                        Monday, December 6, 2004

  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, on May 4, 2004, I introduced 
House Resolution 623. This was a one-line resolution which stated: ``. 
. . That the House of Representatives should address issues relating to 
the potential incapacity of its Members.'' I did this to make an 
important jurisdictional point.
  The resolution, which was referred solely to the Committee on House 
Administration, served to highlight the committee's jurisdiction over 
how to deal with the status of incapacitated Members, and, by 
implication, more broadly with certain other matters relating to the 
continuity of Congress. The committee already has principal 
jurisdiction over the conduct of congressional and Presidential 
elections, the qualifications and credentials of House Members, and 
administrative control over the internal operations of the House, 
including Chamber security.
  I would hope that in the 109th Congress, our committee, where I serve 
as the ranking minority member, will more forcefully exercise the 
authority it has to address a range of issues which threaten the 
ability of Congress to function in the event of a national catastrophe. 
We need to develop specific, and constitutional, proposals to address 
the potential absence of incapacitated Members. If the only effective 
way is through a constitutional amendment, as I suspect it is, then 
that argument should be clearly made.
  Much attention in the 108th Congress has gone to other committees, 
such as Rules and Judiciary, which have specialized roles in 
considering certain types of continuity measures. If a proposal is 
introduced as a House rule, it will be referred to the Rules Committee; 
if it is a constitutional amendment, it will go to Judiciary. The Rules 
Committee held a useful hearing this year on incapacity, but its 
ability to deal with elements of the issue beyond changes to the rules 
of the House is limited.

  This Congress has been a huge disappointment because of its failure 
to effectively address many issues involving the stability of our 
structure of Government, deficiencies brought to the forefront by the 
September 11 attacks, as well as a disturbing tendency to paper over 
controversies with legislation which fails to substantively address the 
problem.
  For example, the House earlier this year rejected a constitutional 
amendment offered by Representative Baird of Washington which would 
have reconstituted the House quickly through temporary appointments, 
pending special elections, if a large number of Members

[[Page E2155]]

were killed. I had introduced an alternate version of the proposal, 
H.J. Res. 89. Members opposed to the concept--which is admittedly 
extremely controversial--refused to allow real hearings and debate, 
preferring instead to misrepresent the various proposals which were 
introduced and to mock the sponsors. Even though prospects for passage 
of such an amendment at the time were extremely slim, a substantial 
debate would have served to educate the Congress and the American 
people on the importance of these issues, and perhaps provided impetus 
in a search for alternatives.
  Instead, the House passed, but the Senate subsequently killed, H.R. 
2844, the ``Continuity of Representation Act'', which created an 
unrealistically fast, unfair, undemocratic and unworkable scheme to 
fill vacant House seats through a mandatory national 45-day special 
election period. This bill was referred principally to the House 
Administration Committee, where I was able to point out its many flaws.
  Neither House passed simple legislation which would have corrected an 
oversight in the legislation creating the Department of Homeland 
Security in 2002, which failed to place the supposedly critical new 
Cabinet officer somewhere--anywhere--in the statutory line of 
succession to the Presidency.
  Though hearings were held, neither House addressed significant issues 
of Presidential succession, such as the role of the Speaker and 
President pro tempore and lame duck Cabinet members in the succession 
lineup, and the ability of some officials to ``bump'' others serving as 
acting President under the current Federal statute.
  The House is apparently planning to paper over its failure to 
effectively address congressional continuity by passing a blatantly 
unconstitutional new House rule when the 109th Congress convenes. It 
would pretend that a rump group of Members, acting with a ``provisional 
quorum,'' could exercise the full powers of the House even though a 
majority of the membership might still be alive but unable to reach the 
place the House was meeting in a timely manner.
  The proposal pretends to address the problem of incapacitated Members 
by effectively ignoring it, and by allowing the Speaker to deprive them 
and other absent Members of their constitutional authority by adopting 
an unprecedented and radical procedure to declare a quorum present when 
it clearly isn't. The proposed rule would ignore the explicit 
constitutional prohibition against less than a majority of the Members 
of the House taking any action except to adjourn, or to compel the 
attendance of absent Members. It would also demolish the century-old 
precedent, based on the Constitution, that a quorum of the House 
consists of a majority of the membership chosen, sworn and living.
  It is likely that this unconstitutional proposal will be shoehorned 
into House Resolution 5, the traditional opening-day resolution through 
which the House adopts its rules, to be considered on January 4, 2005. 
Parliamentary practices in effect at that time would allow only one 
hour of debate on the resolution, no matter how numerous or how 
controversial the rules changes contained within it might be. At a 
minimum, the House should debate the provisional quorum issue 
separately, following hearings by the Rules Committee through which 
Members could better inform themselves, I would hope, of the truly 
dangerous ramifications of this idea.
  Mr. Speaker, I plan to urge further action on congressional 
continuity issues in the new year, to work with my colleagues on the 
Committee on House Administration to assert our own jurisdiction more 
effectively and to push the other relevant committees to do the same. 
We need both more effective action, and better internal cooperation, to 
accomplish these goals.

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