[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 135 (Saturday, November 20, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2114-E2115]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       INTRODUCTION OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, November 19, 2004

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, to day I am introducing the ``Iran Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act,'' a bill to stop the transfer of nuclear 
equipment and technology to Iran.
  This week Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to intelligence 
that Iran is working to adapt missiles to deliver a nuclear weapon, 
which would provide further evidence Iran is determined to move forward 
to become a nuclear weapons state. His comments come on the heels of 
reports that Iran on the one hand has agreed with three European 
countries to freeze its uranium enrichment program, and, on the other 
hand, reports by an Iranian opposition group that Iran may still be 
pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program at an undeclared location.
  The credibility of the United States suffered when we missed the mark 
so badly in Iraq when the Administration concluded that Iraq had 
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In Iraq the IAEA had the 
advantage of 250 inspectors on the ground with anytime, anywhere 
inspection authority to go look wherever they suspected there might be 
evidence of nuclear weapons activity. The IAEA does not have that 
advantage in Iran. Instead, both the U.S. and the IAEA are trying to 
divine the plans of a regime through fragmentary pieces of information 
gleaned from a variety of sources, much of it subject to widely varying 
interpretation and credibility. We simply cannot afford to be wrong on 
a subject as serious as the spread of nuclear weapons.
  We know that a variety of foreign countries and companies may have 
provided assistance to Iran's nuclear program. Some of these countries 
may also be engaged in nuclear commerce with the United States, or may 
have received U.S.-origin nuclear technology in the past, or seek 
access to U.S. nuclear materials or technology in the future. Should we 
engage in nuclear commerce with countries that are supplying Iran with 
the wherewithal to move forward with a nuclear weapons program? I don't 
think so.
  Let's take just one example. China is known to have provided support 
to the Iranian nuclear program in the past. In recent months, there 
have been press reports that Vice President Cheney is championing 
efforts to export

[[Page E2115]]

nuclear reactors to China. It just does not make any sense to say that 
we are against nuclear proliferation in Iran, and then to turn around 
sell nuclear reactors to China.
  The bill I am introducing today will:
  Stop the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to any country 
that is supporting Iran's nuclear program;
  Require the President to report to Congress a complete list of 
countries who have provided missile and nuclear materials and 
technology to Iran;
  Require the President to report to Congress an estimate and 
assessment of Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear explosives and their 
delivery vehicles.
  Require the President to give to Congress an assessment of the 
European-Iran deal.
  Require the President to provide to Congress an evaluation of the 
basis and credibility of a possible secret nuclear facility in Iran.
  Require the President to provide to Congress information on whether 
the U.S. has provided the United Nations and International Agency, 
IAEA, weapons inspectors with full access to intelligence on Iran's 
nuclear program.
  Require the President to report to Congress on the steps the U.S. is 
taking to ensure that United Nations and IAEA inspectors have full 
access to all suspected Iranian nuclear sites and on what steps the 
U.S. it taking to work with the international community, including the 
IAEA, to ensure Iran is complying with the Nonproliferation Treaty.
  This bill will not:
  Apply to radiation monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, 
seals, cameras, tamper-indicating devices, nuclear detectors, 
monitoring systems, or equipment to safely store, transport or remove 
hazardous material.
  Apply, with a waiver by the President, if it is in the vital interest 
of national security.
  Apply, with a waiver by the President, if the transfer is essential 
to prevent or respond to a serious radiological hazard.
  Limit the full implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Programs, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program.
  While there is legislation in place that provides for sanctions 
against Iran--the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act or ILSA, this 
legislation has not proven to be effective. ILSA provides for sanctions 
against companies that invest $20 million or more in Iran's energy 
sector in a single year. Here is what the nonpartisan Congressional 
Research Service reports about the implementation of the Act:

       The Clinton Administration apparently sought to balance 
     implementation with the need to defuse a potential trade 
     dispute with the EU. In April 1997, the United States and the 
     EU formally agreed to try to avoid a trade confrontation over 
     ILSA and the ``Helms-Burton'' Cuba sanctions law (P.L. 104-
     114). The agreement contributed to a decision by the Clinton 
     Administration to waive ILSA sanctions on the first project 
     determined to be in violation: a $2 billion (1) contract 
     (signed in September 1997) for Total SA of France and its 
     minority partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia 
     to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25-phase South Pars gas 
     field. The Administration announced the waiver on May 18, 
     1998, citing national interest grounds (Section 9(c) of 
     ILSA), after the EU pledged to increase cooperation with the 
     United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The 
     announcement indicated that EU firms would likely receive 
     waivers for future projects that were similar.
       The Bush Administration has apparently adopted the same 
     policy on ILSA as did the Clinton Administration, attempting 
     to work cooperatively with the EU to curb Iran's nuclear 
     program and limit its support for terrorism. According to the 
     Bush Administration's mandated January 2004 assessment, ILSA 
     has not stopped energy sector investment in Iran. However, 
     some believe the law has slowed Iran's energy development, 
     and Iran's sustainable oil production has not increased 
     significantly since the early 1990s, despite the new 
     investment, although foreign investment has slowed or halted 
     deterioration in oil production. On the other hand, Iran's 
     gas sector, nonexistent prior to the late 1990s, is becoming 
     an increasingly important factor in Iran's energy future, 
     largely as a result of foreign investment.
       Since the South Pars case, many projects--all involving 
     Iran, not Libya--have been formally placed under review for 
     ILSA sanctions by the State Department. Recent State 
     Department reports on ILSA, required every six months, state 
     that U.S. diplomats raise with both companies and countries 
     the United States' ILSA and policy concerns about potential 
     petroleum-sector investments in Iran. However, no sanctions 
     determinations have been announced since the South Pars case 
     discussed above.

  Clearly, the ILSA sanctions are not working. We need to come up with 
a sanctions law that can work, and the Iran Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act is my attempt to forge such a proposal. I urge my 
colleagues to cosponsor this legislation, which I intend to reintroduce 
at the beginning of the next Congress.

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