[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 131 (Tuesday, November 16, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11380-S11381]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR:
  S. 2981. A bill to provide for the elimination and safeguarding of 
conventional arms; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to introduce two new bills to 
strengthen U.S. nonproliferation efforts. One of these is a new 
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Act. The other is the fourth 
installment of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, the nonproliferation program 
that Sam Nunn and I sponsored in 1991.
  In that year, Sam Nunn and I authored the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction or Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program. That program has provided U.S. funding and expertise 
to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle their enormous 
stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, means of 
delivery and related materials. In 1997, Senator Nunn and I were joined 
by Senator Domenici in introducing the Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act, which expanded Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former 
Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise to first responders in American 
cities. In 2003, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which 
authorized the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet 
Union to address proliferation threats. The bill that I am introducing 
today would strengthen the Nunn-Lugar program and other 
nonproliferation efforts and provide them with greater flexibility to 
address emerging threats.
  To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated or destroyed: 6,462 
nuclear warheads; 550 ICBMs; 469 ICBM silos; 13 ICBM mobile missile 
launchers; 135 bombers; 733 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 408 
submarine missile launchers; 530 submarine launched missiles; 27 
nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.
  The Nunn-Lugar program also facilitated the removal of all nuclear 
weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, these three nations emerged as the third, fourth, and 
eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, all three are 
nuclear-weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-
Lugar program. In addition, Nunn-Lugar is the primary tool through 
which the United States is working with Russian authorities to 
identify, safeguard, and destroy Russia's massive chemical and 
biological warfare capacity.
  These successes were never a foregone conclusion. Today, even after 
more than 12 years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to 
ensure that the Nunn-Lugar program is not encumbered by bureaucratic 
obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.
  I have devoted much time and effort to overseeing and accelerating 
the Nunn-Lugar program. Uncounted individuals of great dedication 
serving on the ground in the former Soviet Union and in our Government 
have made this program work. Nevertheless, from the beginning, we have 
encountered resistance to the Nunn-Lugar concept in both the United 
States and Russia. In our own country, opposition often has been 
motivated by false perceptions that Nunn-Lugar money is foreign 
assistance or by beliefs that Defense Department funds should only be 
spent on troops, weapons, or other war-fighting capabilities. Until 
recently, we also faced a general disinterest in nonproliferation that 
made gaining support for Nunn-Lugar funding and activities an annual 
struggle.
  The attacks of September 11 changed the political discourse on this 
subject. We have turned a corner--the public, the media, and political 
candidates are paying more attention now. In a remarkable moment in the 
first Presidential debate, both President Bush and Senator Kerry agree 
that the number one national security threat facing the United States 
was the prospect that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the 
hands of terrorists.
  The 9/11 Commission weighed in with another important endorsement of 
the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of 
[weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by 
strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program.'' the report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in 
need of expansion, improvement, and resources.''
  The first bill that I am introducing today is ``The Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2004.'' It would underscore 
the bipartisan consensus on Nunn-Lugar by streamlining and accelerating 
Nunn-Lugar implementation. It would grant more flexibility to the 
President and the Secretary of Defense to undertake non-proliferation 
projects outside the former Soviet Union. It also would eliminate 
Congressionally imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar assistance that in the 
past have force the suspension of time-sensitive nonproliferation 
projects. The purpose of the bill is to reduce bureaucratic red tape 
and friction within our Government that hinder effective responses to 
nonproliferation opportunities and emergencies.

  For example, recently Albania appealed for help in destroying 16 tons 
of chemical agent left over from the cold war. In August, I visited 
this remote storage facility, the location of which still remains 
classified. Nunn-Lugar officials are working closely with Albanian 
leaders to destroy this dangerous stockpile. But the experience also is 
illustrative of the need to reduce bureaucratic delays. The package of 
documents to be reviewed by the President took some 11 weeks to be 
finalized and readied for President Bush. From beginning to end, the 
bureaucratic process to authorize dismantlement of chemical weapons in 
Albania took more than 3 months. Fortunately, the situation in Albania 
was not a crisis, but we may not be able to afford these timelines in 
future nonproliferation emergencies.
  The second piece of legislation that I am introducing is the 
``Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Act of 2004'' or ``CATRA.'' This 
legislation is modeled on the original Nunn-Lugar Act. Its purpose is 
to provide the Department of State with a focused response to the 
threat posed by vulnerable stockpiles of conventional weapons around 
the world, including tactical missiles and man portable air defense 
systems, or MANPADS. Such missiles and other weapons systems could be 
used by terrorists to attack commercial and military targets, and U.S. 
facilities here at home and abroad. Reports suggest that Al Qaeda has 
attempted to acquire these kinds of weapons. In addition, unsecured 
conventional weapons stockpiles are a major obstacle to peace, 
reconstruction, and economic development in regions suffering from 
instability.
  My bill declares it to be the policy of the United States to seek out 
surplus and unguarded stocks of conventional armaments, including small 
arms, light weapons, MANPADS, and tactical missile systems for 
elimination. It authorizes the Department of State to carry out an 
accelerated global effort to destroy such weapons and to cooperate with 
allies and international organizations when possible. The Secretary of 
State is charged with devising a strategy for prioritizing, on a 
country-

[[Page S11381]]

by-country basis, the obligation of funds in a global program of 
conventional arms elimination. Lastly, the Secretary is required to 
unify program planning, coordination, and implementation of the 
strategy into one office at the State Department. The bill also 
authorizes a budget increase commensurate with the risk posed by these 
weapons.
  The Department of State has been working to address the threats posed 
by conventional weapons. But in my judgment, the current funding 
allocation and organizational structure are not up to the task. Only 
about $6 million was devoted to destroying small arms and light weapons 
during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We need more focus on this problem 
and additional funding to take advantage of opportunities to secure 
vulnerable stockpiles from proliferation, theft, or diversion.
  In August, I visited Albania, Ukraine, and Georgia. Each of these 
countries has large stockpiles of MANPADS and tactical missile systems 
and each has requested U.S. assistance to destroy them. On August 27, I 
stood in a remote Albanian military storage facility as the base 
commander unloaded a fully functioning MANPAD from its crate and 
readied it for use. This storage site contained 70 MANPADS that could 
have been used to attack an American commercial aircraft. Fortunately, 
the MANPADS that I saw that day were destroyed on September 2, but 
there are many more like them throughout the world. Too often, 
conventional weapons are inadequately stored and protected. This 
present grave risk to American military bases, embassy compounds, and 
even targets within the United States. We must develop a response that 
is commensurate with the threat.
  I am offering these two bills now, during the November session, so 
that the administration, Congress, and the public can begin an 
examination of their merits. I will reintroduce these bills when 
Congress reconvenes in January. I am hopeful for strong support that 
reflects the priority status of U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
                                 ______