[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 131 (Tuesday, November 16, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11338-S11351]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


      NOMINATION OF FRANCIS J. HARVEY TO BE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to executive session for consideration of Executive Calendar 
No. 915, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Francis J. 
Harvey, of California, to be Secretary of the Army.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the President's 
nomination of Dr. Francis J. Harvey to be Secretary of the U.S. Army. 
Dr. Harvey was nominated by the President to be Secretary of the Army 
on September 15, this year. The Armed Services Committee conducted a 
hearing on Dr. Harvey's nomination on October 6. The committee voted 
favorably on the nomination on October 7. At that meeting there was 
some expression in opposition by members of the committee, but the 
majority of the committee voted in favor.
  At the hearing, there was a fair exchange of viewpoints, recognizing 
that Dr. Harvey is coming to this position from outside of the 
Department of Defense and has, during the course of his distinguished 
career, not a specific opportunity to form opinions about some of the 
key issues that confront the U.S. Army today.
  No one should underestimate the challenges that have been faced by 
the Army and in large measure have been met by the Army under the 
distinguished leadership of the Acting Secretary of the Army and the 
current Chief of Staff of the Army. I commend both of them, who are 
daily meeting the new challenges as they arise.
  There will be today in the course of this debate, and I shall await 
other Members coming to the floor, expressions of opinion different 
from what I am providing the Senate today so I will wait until such 
time as they may appear and then seek under my time the opportunity to 
rebut their views.
  At the hearing of the committee on October 6, I indicated that Dr. 
Harvey has had an extraordinary career--and I underline very 
extraordinary career--as a business executive with extensive experience 
leading and managing very large corporate enterprises, particularly 
program-based organizations involved in the development and deployment 
of technology and systems.

  As the Army goes through its transformation, he will have the 
opportunity to provide unique decisionmaking ability given his 
experience in those areas.
  Dr. Harvey has a solid record of achievement in the private sector in 
areas related to transformation, financial management, and contracting 
which, as I said, will serve him very well if confirmed by the Senate 
as Secretary of the Army.
  At the nomination hearing, as those in attendance will recall, I went 
to some length to emphasize that there is another side to the Army and 
that is the human side. I was privileged at one time in my lifetime to 
be in the Department of Defense and to be Secretary of the Navy. It is 
not all contracts and negotiations and things of that nature; there is 
a very strong family side to each of the military departments. I 
referred to it in that hearing as the human side. That reflects the 
hopes and aspirations and patriotism of soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
marines, and their families.
  The family today has an ever increasing role in the life of the 
uniformed member of that family, be he male or female. Families now are 
instrumental in the decision process by which members of the military 
at the time they are up for consideration elect continuing service, to 
retire, or otherwise step aside and join the private sector. It is 
often the decision of the family that controls that sailor, airman, 
marine, as he or she makes that decision.

[[Page S11339]]

  I urged Dr. Harvey to travel as soon as possible to Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the Republic of Korea, in order to gain firsthand 
appreciation for the sacrifice being made by the soldiers and the 
stress being placed upon them and their families. Soldiers must be 
confident that the civilian leader of the department he represents is 
truly aware of their specific meanings and the emphasis on the family 
role.
  The Army is facing a great challenge today for which there are few 
precedents in a long, distinguished history. Dr. Harvey assured the 
committee on October 6 he would undertake this mission of familiarizing 
himself with the people who make up the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, 
and the National Guard. It is extraordinary, with over 400,000 who have 
been in this particular cycle of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq from 
the Guard and Reserve.
  At the hearing, Dr. Harvey committed that he would put people first. 
He emphasized that even as the Army carries out its responsibilities in 
the near term, it must also develop a future force that is better able 
to meet the challenges of this dangerous security environment by 
implementing the key element of defense strategy. He is committed to 
this transformation that has been laid down in the years previous by 
the Secretary of Defense, whom I commend for his undertaking and 
transforming the Army, and the Chief of Staff who currently serves and, 
indeed, the accomplishments to date by the distinguished Acting 
Secretary, Secretary Brownlee.
  Before I yield, I will say a few words about Secretary Brownlee. I 
was privileged to have the services of Secretary Brownlee on my 
personal staff and as a member of the committee staff. I note that he 
served as the senior member of the Armed Services Committee staff, 
chief of that staff, at the time our distinguished late colleague Strom 
Thurmond was chairman. He was a superb combat soldier. He brought to 
his work on behalf of the Senate an extraordinary record of a highly 
decorated officer. He had a tremendous inner confidence in his ability 
to understand the men and women in the Armed Forces and to understand 
particularly those who are experiencing the stress of combat, wherever 
that may be in the world--an extraordinary man: Two Silver Stars, three 
Bronze Stars, and the Purple Heart. He was a marvelous staff director 
not only for Senator Thurmond but to me. He is highly revered and 
respected and always will be by the Senate as a whole.

  Many colleagues came up to me during the course of the vacancy at the 
Secretary of the Army position in expressing hopes that he would be 
considered. Indeed, I talked to the Secretary of Defense on several 
occasions about it. On behalf of myself, most particularly, and other 
colleagues, I advocated consideration be given to him, but the 
Secretary and the President made a decision. I am urging the Senate to 
go forward with that decision today and to confirm the nomination of 
Dr. Harvey.
  I will yield the floor as I see the presence of my distinguished 
ranking member and the Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me first suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Army's current situation is approaching 
crisis proportions. The Army is bearing the largest burden of the war 
in Iraq and of the larger war on terror worldwide as well as 
maintaining forward-deployed forces to deter a possible conflict in 
Korea. The intense operations and personnel tempo are having a severe 
impact on both people and equipment, and relief is currently not in 
sight.
  There are nearly 270,000 soldiers deployed overseas in 120 countries. 
Soldiers make up 90,000 of the 135,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and 15,000 
of the 20,000 in Afghanistan. The 495,000 active-duty soldiers have 
been stretched to the limit. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve 
soldiers have been called upon to shoulder the ever-increasing burden.
  For instance, the first rotation in Iraq consisted of 75-percent 
active and 25-percent reserve component soldiers. In the current 
rotation, the Active Force has dropped to 61 percent and the Reserve 
Force has risen to 39 percent and the next rotation is projected to 
continue that trend, with about 57,000 percent active and 43 percent 
reserve.
  This trend is simply not sustainable. Many reserve component soldiers 
are approaching their 24-month limit on active duty and many more will 
reach that limit as the war in Iraq drags on. The stress on reserve 
component soldiers, family members, and civilian employees will only 
grow worse, as Senator Reed has pointed out to this body on many 
occasions and in the Armed Services Committee, has already had an 
adverse effect on reserve component recruitment, and greater problems 
are predicted for the future.
  Further, as reserve component units have been mobilized, personnel 
and equipment shortages have been addressed by tasking other units to 
fill those shortfalls. This is a snowballing effect as those units that 
were tasked to provide personnel and equipment are then alerted and 
deployed to subsequent rotations and have to fill ever-increasing 
personnel and equipment shortfalls.
  Ultimately, units lose cohesion and effectiveness as they are cobbled 
together from disparate pieces with people who do not know each other, 
have not trained together, and are short of required equipment, or 
unfamiliar with the equipment provided.
  This could have disastrous consequences, as evidenced by the 
leadership and performance failures witnessed in the 800th MP Brigade, 
a brigade formed in that manner during the Abu Ghraib incidents.
  The Active component is and will be under increasing stress as the 
Reserve component commitments become unsustainable. The Army's 33 
active combat brigades have all been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 
since those two operations began. Some units, including the 3rd 
Infantry, which led the initial attack into Iraq, have been alerted or 
deployed for a second 12-month combat tour. Two of these combat 
brigades had Iraq combat tours extended to 15 months last April during 
the Shiite uprising instigated by Moqtada Sadr. I understand that 
contingency plans exist to extend the combat tours of other Army 
brigades currently in Iraq to similarly build up troop levels prior to 
the Iraqi elections.
  Army policy is that soldiers should have at least 12 months between 
combat rotations or 1 month for each month deployed. However, there are 
already soldiers who are returning to Iraq or Afghanistan, having left 
there only 9 to 10 months ago. And during those 9 to 10 months, the 
soldiers are working long hours to repair equipment and spending 
several months away from their families as they train in preparation 
for their unit's return to combat.
  The Army is creating 10 additional combat brigades in an attempt to 
address the problems created by the high rotation rate. However, as the 
Army creates those additional brigades, it is reorganizing all of its 
brigades into brigade combat teams which are somewhat smaller than 
current brigades with respect to direct combat maneuver forces. 
Although the Army asserts that these brigade combat teams are more 
lethal because they have added artillery and reconnaissance assets that 
were previously located at the division level, it is not at all certain 
that the increased effectiveness that the Army expects from these 
redesigned brigades will make up for fewer combat troops on the ground. 
If more brigades than are currently deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan 
are then required to make up for the fewer number of combat troops in 
the new brigade structure, the operation and personnel tempo of the 
Active Force will not be much improved.
  The Army is also addressing the personnel problem by imposing a stop-
loss policy on soldiers in units alerted to deploy on combat rotations, 
forcing many to remain in the service well beyond their contracted time 
in the service. Additionally, the Army has had to recall over 5,600 
members of the individual Ready Reserve, soldiers who have already 
served their contracted

[[Page S11340]]

Active-Duty time, for involuntary tours of duty. Clearly, many of the 
soldiers in the ``All-Volunteer Army'' are no longer volunteers. As 
several critics have pointed out, this can be considered tantamount to 
a ``backdoor'' draft.
  The Army has also been suffering from the failure of the Department 
of Defense requirements generation and planning processes. The 
Department of Defense and the Army greatly underestimated the 
requirements for up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled 
vehicles--Humvees--and individual body armor for the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and have continually lagged behind in meeting those 
requirements, as well as requirements for armor for the entire truck 
fleet.
  Similarly, the Army has had to implement a crash program to equip its 
helicopters with aviation survivability equipment. For instance, the 
requirement for individual body armor was originally limited to combat 
arms soldiers only, even though for years the Army has been predicting 
a battlefield where there would be no distinct front and rear areas and 
where support soldiers would also find themselves in combat situations.

  The Army similarly failed to anticipate the need for armor for its 
trucks, again even though it had been predicting such a fluid 
battlefield. The Central Command requirement for up-armored Humvees was 
originally set at only 253. That requirement has been continually 
increased throughout the last year from 253 to 1,233 to 1,407 to 2,957 
to 4,149 to 4,388 to 4,454, and now to 8,105. The Army and Congress 
have poured over a billion dollars in the last year into armor for 
trucks, but as of last month, the Army was still reporting a shortfall 
of $380 million to meet its requirement for armored trucks, and that is 
simply unconscionable. There is no one in this Congress who would deny 
the Army the funding needed to meet its requirements for force 
protection.
  However, force protection items are not the only funding shortfalls. 
The Army has had $1.6 billion in equipment combat losses, $1.4 billion 
of which are aviation losses. Much of that loss occurred in fiscal year 
2003, and much of it has not been addressed in any of the supplemental 
appropriations bills to date because the Department of Defense did not 
choose to include all of those combat losses in its requests. This does 
not bode well for the Army as it continues its heavy engagement in 
Iraq.
  Similarly, Army equipment repair and replacement is not keeping up 
with the increased wear and tear induced by such a high operations 
tempo. The Army's requirement for fiscal year 2003 was $4.4 billion, of 
which none was funded. The cumulative requirement in fiscal year 2004 
was $11.1 billion, of which only $3.4 billion was funded. If this trend 
continues at those emerging requirements and anticipated funding rates, 
by fiscal year 2007 the Army cumulative equipment repair and 
replacement requirement will be $28.8 billion, of which only $12.1 
billion will have been funded. At that point, the Army will face a 
$16.7 billion maintenance backlog. This may have a severe impact on the 
Army's ability to sustain combat operations in the future.
  Several months ago, the Army estimated that it would cost over $20 
billion to create the additional 10 combat brigades and reorganize the 
existing 33 in the Active Force into the new modular design. No 
estimate was provided Congress for the cost of similarly reorganizing 
the Reserve component. The Army expects the new and reorganized 
brigades for the Active Force to be completed by the end of fiscal 
years 2006 and 2007 respectively, and paid for through supplemental 
funding. It is my understanding that the Army, having received $15 
billion from the initial $25 billion fiscal year 2005 supplemental 
appropriation provided by Congress, will send the Department of Defense 
a request for an additional $45 billion, a fiscal year 2005 
supplemental total of $60 billion. Of this amount, only $10 billion is 
expected to be for equipment. How far that will go toward meeting the 
Army's requirement is not clear at this time. Nor is it clear the 
Department of Defense will actually request that larger supplemental 
for the Army alone. Past history does not bode well for the Army in 
that regard either.

  The challenges for the Army are huge, and the civilian leadership in 
the Department of Defense has certainly not been supportive of the 
Army's uniform leadership. In fact, it has often been hostile and 
vindictive. When General Shinseki, the former Chief of Staff, in 
answering my prewar hearing question concerning the troop level 
required for postwar stability and support, opined that it would take 
several hundred thousand troops, he was publicly ridiculed by the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and effectively sidelined. 
When Army Secretary White defended the Chief of Staff, he was fired.
  Dr. Harvey, the nominee for Secretary of the Army, appears to have a 
wealth of industry experience but appears to have virtually no 
experience with regard to Army issues. In responding to questions for 
the record on his nomination before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Dr. Harvey answered one question concerning whether the Army 
had enough authorized Active-Duty end strength to sustain its 
commitments by saying he would use his ``independent judgment and past 
experience'' to determine the viability of Army initiatives to increase 
combat power and to ``reach conclusions and make recommendations 
accordingly.''
  I have no reason to question his ability to make an independent 
judgment. I am concerned as to whether his past experience qualifies 
him to reach appropriate conclusions, under the circumstances which I 
have just outlined, with an Army which is under so much stress and 
strain. I also question whether he would be willing to make 
recommendations contrary to the known positions of the Department of 
Defense leadership given the treatment received by his predecessors 
when they did so.
  In answering a question concerning the problems in the Army's 
requirements generation and planning processes that resulted in such a 
large shortfall in individual body armor, armor for trucks, and 
aviation survivability equipment, Dr. Harvey said that his ``current 
understanding is that the underestimation of the total requirement for 
armor protection for our Nation's service members was not the result of 
problems with the requirements generation process. The primary cause of 
the initial underestimation was a change in the hostile conditions 
under which military forces are now operating in Iraq.''
  Dr. Harvey apparently did not realize that is exactly the kind of 
hostile conditions which the Army for several years has been predicting 
for the future operational environment. It is an example of why I am 
concerned about Dr. Harvey's lack of experience as to whether he would 
be in a position to ask the hard questions and arrive at the 
appropriate recommendations under the very extraordinary and difficult 
circumstances in which the Army finds itself.
  There are numerous challenges that the Army faces, and it would be 
preferable that the Secretary of the Army be one more knowledgeable of 
the service that he will lead.
  Finally, I wish to comment on the comments of my good friend, Senator 
Warner, about Les Brownlee. I thoroughly and totally concur with 
Senator Warner's thoughts and feelings about Les Brownlee. He has 
served this Nation extremely well. He served our committee well before 
he went over to be the Under Secretary and then the Acting Secretary of 
the Army. I add my support for his service and for him personally on 
the Record today, as his former boss and employer has already done so 
eloquently and thoughtfully. I want to let Les Brownlee know, if he is 
listening, but more importantly let my friend, Senator Warner, know 
that he was right on the mark when he expressed the thoughts he did 
about Les Brownlee.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will yield the floor momentarily, but I 
do thank my colleague for his comments with regard to Les Brownlee.
  I remember the privilege I had introducing him at the confirmation 
hearing before our committee as Under Secretary of the Army. I went 
back and reread that introduction. I said he represented a tower of 
strength, dedication, and expertise that few could match. And, indeed, 
he has shown that in his exemplary manner in handling

[[Page S11341]]

the very difficult challenges that have been presented by the conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. I thank my colleague for those remarks.
  Mr. President, the distinguished ranking member and I are trying to 
advise our leadership with regard to a procedural matter. So at this 
time, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask that it be charged to 
both sides equally.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Warner for his 
consideration in arranging this opportunity to discuss the nomination 
of Dr. Harvey to be the Secretary of the Army. First, let me say it is 
obvious Dr. Harvey is an admirable person with experience and skill. In 
my view, this debate is less about Dr. Harvey and more about the United 
States Army; whether he is prepared to take the necessary steps to 
respond to severe crises that affect the Army today. The Army is 
extended across the globe. The Army is engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  I just returned from a trip to both Iraq and Afghanistan. I have seen 
these magnificent soldiers serve us with distinction and courage, but 
it is a very stressful and demanding responsibility that each day they 
discharge, and, indeed, for the Army the stresses are beginning to 
build.
  I think we have to recognize affirmatively that the Army must be 
bigger, not on a temporary basis but on a permanent basis. I think we 
also need to recognize the Army needs additional resources. Senator 
Levin, in his comments, pointed out the shortfall between the money the 
Army has estimated is necessary to recoup and repair their equipment 
and the actual funds they have available. If we do not address these 
issues, I believe we will begin to expose the Army to irreversible 
damage which certainly no one here in this body wants to see happen.
  One inescapable conclusion of my trip to Afghanistan and Iraq is that 
we will be in these countries for years; not months but for years. The 
cost, the human cost and the financial cost to the country and to the 
Army particularly, will be substantial.
  I have no doubt Dr. Harvey is a consummate professional. He is very 
skilled in managing organizations. I know he is committed to doing his 
best as Secretary of the Army, but I believe the Army needs a leader, 
not necessarily a manager. Also, I think we need an aggressive advocate 
for the Army. I hope that perhaps the result of this debate, if Dr. 
Harvey is confirmed, is that he will become that aggressive advocate 
for the Army. I know advocacy has to be appropriate. He has to be loyal 
to his civilian superiors. But he has to be someone who will take the 
case of the Army to the Secretary and, if necessary, beyond. Also, I 
believe any Secretary of the Army has to be cooperative with this 
Congress. He has to respond candidly and directly to our questions and 
our comments.
  One of the issues we all have as leaders is the necessity to speak 
truth to power on occasion. One of the observations I would make is 
that we have seen, in the experiences of General Shinseki and Secretary 
Tommy White, occasions where they gave us their best opinion and they 
effectively were punished for those views.
  I think that is wrong. I think that attitude has to be corrected. 
That is another responsibility of the Secretary of the Army, to ensure 
that uniformed officers have the opportunity to express themselves 
appropriately and not fear retribution. All of us will benefit from the 
advice the uniformed officers of this country can so wisely give to us.
  Secretary White was discharged many months ago as Secretary of the 
Army. It took a very long time for the Secretary of Defense and the 
President to nominate Dr. Harvey. In the interim we were extremely well 
served by Acting Secretary Les Brownlee. I don't have to add more than 
what the chairman and the ranking member have said about the qualities 
of that individual. I just had the privilege about 10 days ago to be 
with Secretary Brownlee up in West Point where he represented the Army 
at the Board of Visitors meeting. He is a consummate professional, 
someone who has rendered extraordinary service to the Army and to the 
Nation. But one of the issues I find somewhat disturbing is that even 
though we were well represented by Secretary Brownlee, it took so long 
for the Secretary of Defense to nominate a permanent Secretary. I think 
that I can put it this way: I find that doesn't suggest the importance 
the job must bear. That is another reason I found it somewhat unusual, 
at the very end of our session, before the election, there was a sudden 
rush to confirm Dr. Harvey.

  I had the occasion to speak with Dr. Harvey.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the interest of accuracy, I wonder if 
the Senator will yield?
  Mr. REED. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I know you want to be accurate. You are known on the 
committee as being a very accurate person, but you know the Secretary 
of Defense did forward the name of Secretary Roche, Secretary of the 
Air Force, to the Senate. Therein we discovered other situations that 
dictated in good, common sense that nomination should be withdrawn. But 
it did show action by the Secretary, and I wanted that part of the 
record.
  Mr. REED. I thank the chairman. I reclaim my time, and I thank him 
for that important and accurate input. I think, though, we have been so 
many months without a Secretary, and even when the nomination of 
Secretary Roche seemed to be in doubt, there was not the kind of 
response I thought necessary to show we had a permanent Secretary in 
place.
  Then, of course, Dr. Harvey was nominated in July. The chairman is 
absolutely right. After it became apparent that Secretary Roche would 
not lead the Air Force--but, July until, again, September or October, 
there was no movement to get someone confirmed in an office that is 
vital. The chairman is correct. He is entirely accurate and I accept 
that gratefully.
  One of the real issues that we have to deal with is the situation in 
the Army, and I think there are three areas that are of critical 
importance. First is end strength. Senator Levin has spoken to that. 
Second is the recapitalization issue, how do we repair this equipment 
and how do we buy new equipment. Again, Senator Levin has talked to 
that. Finally, there is this issue of leadership, of making sure that 
the Army is accountable to its peers in the legislative branch, 
accountable to Congress, and accountable to the values that we have all 
seen as the hallmark of the military.
  These are critical issues that the next Secretary will have to 
address.
  On the issue of end strength, during the last several months it has 
become increasingly clear to me, at least, that the Army needs to 
increase defense. It needs more Active-Duty soldiers in its ranks.
  Since 1989, the Army military end strength has been cut by more than 
34 percent, and civilian end strength by more than 45 percent, while 
undergoing a 300-percent increase in mission rate. That is not 
illogical.
  At the end of the Cold War--1989-1990--with the vanishing of the 
Soviet threat, the notion that we needed a heavy-armored corps in 
Europe to stop the potential thrust into Central Europe was no longer 
operative. So the Army was reduced. That logic was apparent.
  Then mission rate began to increase not just a few years ago but 
through Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkan threat. Just as there was logic 
in the early 1990s to reduce the size of our Army, I believe there is a 
compelling logic today to increase the size of our Army.
  For the past several years, the Army end strength has been virtually 
constant at 418,400. In December 2001, for example, with the 482,400 
end strength, there were about 100,000 Army personnel stationed abroad. 
Today, there are about 330,000 Army personnel stationed abroad.
  You can see the tremendous increase in demand for these troops to be 
taken from home stations and deployed overseas.
  Similarly, in 2004, 26 of the Army's 33 active combat brigades were 
deployed overseas at least once, and in 2003 and 2004 all 33 of the 
active Army combat brigades will have been deployed.

[[Page S11342]]

  We all recognize that our operations in Iraq were conducted by 
extraordinarily brave troops, and extraordinarily effectively in the 
opening phases. In a matter of days, the Iraqi military was destroyed. 
Saddam was toppled from power. Then we began what in retrospect was the 
most critical part of the campaign--the occupation and reestablishment 
of civil society in Iraq.
  One of the aspects of this phase is the growing recognition that it 
was not well planned. And we are indeed paying for that in terms of 
American military on the ground. Mistakes were made in the planning 
process.
  According to a recent article in the Philadelphia Inquirer, when a 
lieutenant colonel briefed war planners and intelligence officers about 
phase 4-C--not the combat but the occupation operations, both civilian 
and military operations after the battle is won--he was briefing them 
in March 2003. But he was a little bit reticent because the slide he 
had simply said this: ``To be provided.''
  We did not have good plans to occupy the country of Iraq. Today, we 
are paying for that lack of planning.
  The same Philadelphia Inquirer article pointed out that it is not 
because we didn't recognize there were potential problems in Iraq, but 
in the words of the article, there was a ``foot high stack of 
material'' discussing the probability of stiff resistance in Iraq. A 
former senior intelligence official stated, ``It was disseminated. And 
ignored.''
  But we see at least some indication of the difficult path ahead when 
the office referred to the comments General Shinseki made in February 
2003. Senator Levin asked him how many troops it would take. He said, 
``Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.'' He was 
immediately castigated by Secretary Rumsfeld, saying this estimate was 
``far from the mark.'' Secretary Wolfowitz called it ``outlandish.''

  And, once again, it raises another challenge for the next Secretary 
of the Army to deal with.
  How do we ensure that military officers will give their best advice 
and not suffer adverse consequences when they are asked by the 
Congress? We have a role to play. In fact, I think when many of us 
looked back, we hoped we had played a more significant role, 
particularly about the postwar occupation of Iraq.
  I think it is important for this next Secretary to develop a 
situation where these officers feel confident of being candid with 
their superiors in uniform and with Members of Congress.
  I know it has been pointed out that General Shinseki already had 
announced his plans to retire, or the Secretary had announced his plans 
for him. But, nevertheless, I think the treatment he received after his 
candid response to the committee was shabby and not comparable with the 
service this gentleman rendered the U.S. Army and the Nation.
  We understand, given the occupation unanticipated in many respects, 
we are going to require a significant number of soldiers in Iraq. This, 
again, should not come as a surprise to many people.
  This chart is illustrative. It basically compares the ratio of 
soldiers in Iraq with historical records. The first line--the blue 
line--is the occupation of Germany. Again, we had huge numbers of 
soldiers on the ground in Germany. The red line shows the troop level 
for Japan. The next is the Somalia level, then Haiti, and noticeably 
the successful operations in the Balkans. This horizontal line 
represents our troop levels in Iraq today, 142,000.
  History should have shown us that we would need a much larger Army to 
carry off this occupation in Iraq.
  You might say, Well, we succeeded in Japan. But we succeeded by 
essentially preempting the entire Japanese Government. Once the Emperor 
made his fateful visit to General MacArthur and bowed to him, our 
problems with insurgency and rehabilitation of the Japanese were all 
but over. It took years but not militarily successful; again, in 
Somalia and Haiti. In Somalia, we left abruptly without a great deal of 
grace despite the courage of soldiers who performed magnificently 
there. Haiti might be a special case. But it should be clear that we 
need more troops on the ground.
  If you need more troops on the ground, then you just simply need a 
larger Army.
  That is something that we have to confront. That is just one.
  Last summer, Secretary Rumsfeld asked the Defense Science Board, an 
independent group of experts, to study the transition from hostilities. 
Do we need more troops or less? Can we rely on technology or troops? 
They took a comprehensive look at missions and initiatives to reduce 
strain on the Army. Again, these are very sophisticated individuals 
selected by Secretary Rumsfeld. Their conclusion:

       A smaller force may be needed to defeat opponents than that 
     needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
     Technology has not had the same leverage in stabilization 
     sales and reconstruction that it has in conflict. Warfighting 
     transformation is not likely to save manpower needed for 
     stabilization and reconstruction.

  Consistent with history, consistent with what military officers tell 
us and presumably telling the Department of Defense, we need more 
troops for operations such as stabilization operations.
  We also understand that there are roughly 138,000 troops stationed in 
the country today. And in anticipation of the election, in January the 
Pentagon announced they were going to try to increase that size.
  Again, I think the inescapable conclusion from history and from 
uniformed military leaders candidly telling us their best judgment and 
from the result of the Defense Science Board is that we need more 
troops. We need a larger Army for these missions.
  But there are other issues that should suggest to us that we could 
use more troops effectively. We recently heard about a huge ammo dump 
that was discovered. It was apparently looted, and apparently unguarded 
for many months.
  When I was in Iraq traveling with the chairman and ranking member in 
July, we were in Kirkuk. I was amazed to hear a general of the 4th 
Infantry Division talk about the hundreds and hundreds of unsecured 
American ammo dumps. I don't believe they were unsecured because we 
believed there was no danger. It is simply because they did not have 
sufficient forces then to guard every ammo dump. They didn't have loyal 
Iraqi forces to support their efforts.
  Again, we have seen a situation in the last few days where we have 
conducted very successful and very difficult operations in Fallujah. 
Once again, the courage of the marines and the soldiers has been 
extraordinary--house-to-house fighting, difficult fighting. They have 
endeavored and succeeded in many respects not only in taking valuable 
terrain but also sparing innocent civilians with extraordinary 
demonstration of courage and skill.
  But as they reduce Fallujah, the insurgents again move operations 
into Mosul and Bogoba. They span out and spread out and hit us. 
Frankly, one of the reasons they were successful in Mosul was because 
there was no significant American forces there. And the local police--
some fought valiantly and a few others disappeared. Over a period of 
time, the whole town was under the control of the insurgents.
  When we went into Mosul and started injecting American forces and 
more reliable Iraqi forces, they now hit Bogoba and other parts of the 
Sunni triangle. That is another strong suggestion that more American 
forces might be useful in country.
  Finally, the borders of Iraq remain very porous. Smuggling is a 
venerable tradition in that part of the world, and the smuggling trade 
continues to operate.
  Could we use more troops? Yes. The administration and the Department 
of Defense have said that our future and our salvation is with the 
Iraqi security forces. I believe they are right, but that is the long 
term. That is years from now. We are training an Iraqi national army 
force. And, frankly, the training is at the level of squads and 
platoons. They haven't reached the level of companies or battalions 
that can effectively replace American units. They do not have the kind 
of equipment we have. The prospect of reliable, well-trained and well-
disciplined Iraqi forces is many months if not years away.
  We have a large number in Iraq already. Some might say: Goodness 
gracious, you have a bigger army than the

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130,000 troops that are there right now--140,000 troops. But I don't 
think people recognize that the troops that are deployed are just, if 
you will, the tip of the spear. They are behind in administration, 
behind in troops that are training there, and there are troops that are 
recovering from being there.
  It is important to recognize that even though there are roughly 
140,000 troops in Iraq, it is clearly tasking our Army.
  An observer of the scene, former Army officer Phillip Carter, tried 
to put this in perspective. Even the simplest military task, such as 
moving a unit from point A to point B, requires a Herculean logistical 
effort. Planes have to be scheduled; trains have to be contracted and 
loaded; ships must be diverted and filled with equipment. Just consider 
what it takes to move a single tank company from Fort Stewart to 
Fallujah. Soldiers have to spend days inspecting and packing their 
vehicles before loading them onto trains to take them to port. The 
trains will be met by more soldiers at dockside, who will work with 
longshoremen and contractors to put the tanks on a ship. Then the ship 
has to sail across to Kuwait where it will be met by more troops and 
contractors. Only then can they roll them north to Iraq. Moving one 
tank company costs a fortune and requires hundreds of people.
  Now imagine you want to move an entire unit such as the 3rd Infantry 
Division with hundreds of tanks and thousands of other vehicles. The 
size and complexity of the task is staggering. It may cost as much as 
$1 billion to send a division to Iraq. And it can't be done quickly.
  Major bases in the United States have a finite ``throughput'' 
capacity, meaning that they can only squeeze so many pieces of 
equipment out the door any given day.
  The tip of this spear is in Iraq. But whatever we have there, we need 
many more back here, again raising, I think, the obvious need for 
additional end strength for our Army.
  In January 2004, LTG John Riggs, in charge of the Army of the future, 
stated:

       I have been in the Army 39 years, and I've never seen the 
     Army as stretched in that 39 years as I have today.

  In July, LTG Jay Garner, who was the Bush administration's first 
generation in postwar Iraq, stated:

       I think people are worn out, equipment is run down, and 
     we've overstressed the reserves. We're drastically short [of] 
     infantry and MPs because the Army is too small.

  But all of this seems to have not made an impression on the 
Department of Defense with respect to the need to increase the size of 
the Army.
  I think it is not just a question of numbers. It is a question of the 
stress being borne by soldiers and their families.
  Approximately 16,000 Active-Duty soldiers have had two tours in Iraq, 
and if they stay in the service longer, they will have another.
  That is a very significant statement.
  In June of 2004, DOD projected that over the next 3 to 5 years it 
will continuously have 100,000 to 150,000 Reserve component members 
mobilized.
  It has been estimated that if we do not increase the Army size, 
forces that have already been deployed to Iraq will have to return two 
more times. Mr. President, 3,600 troops normally stationed in Korea to 
protect us against North Korea, a country that arguably is a dangerous 
threat to us with their nuclear weapons and their mentality, have been 
redeployed to Iraq.
  On July 6, the Defense Department stated it was calling up 5,674 
members of the Individual Ready Reserve soldiers who have completed 
active duty, were in an 8-year period to be recalled, and they are 
being recalled, but they do not drill on a regular basis and some have 
not put on a uniform in 3, 4, 5, 6 years.
  The DOD also implemented a series of stop-loss policies, what some 
might call a backdoor draft. Since September 11, DOD has announced six 
stop-loss policies for the Army, two for the Navy, five for the Air 
Force, and two for the Marine Corps. Only the Army still has a stop-
loss policy, which means, effectively, once the unit is alerted, until 
90 days after they return, that individual soldier cannot leave the 
Army even if his enlistment is up. These tours are increasingly longer. 
It is not just 12 months in-country; it is also the training beforehand 
and the demobilization after.
  As many have pointed out, a great burden is falling on our Reserve 
and National Guard units. Men and women who have full-time jobs, men 
and women who have families far away from their mobilization point. 
Today, frankly, we cannot meet our requirements in the Army without the 
Guard and Reserve. These are extraordinarily talented, consummate 
professionals. The citizen soldiers have done a remarkable job for us, 
but the strain is immense on the Reserve and National Guard, once again 
suggesting we need a larger regular force. We have adopted all sorts of 
measures, stop-loss, relying heavily on the Reserves, but the 
underlying point which has to be confronted by the next Secretary is 
how do we increase permanently, with regular budget authority, the 
Regular Forces of the United States. The average mobilization for 
members of the Reserves and National Guard has increased to 342 days 
this year from 156 during the Persian Gulf, again corresponding to the 
increased reliance we are placing on the Reserve soldiers.
  As we pointed out previously, the DOD mobilization authority states 
that the members of the Reserve component can be mobilized for no more 
than 24 months. Currently, 30,000 Reserve component members are up 
against this 24-month cap. But in 2005, indeed, a large portion next 
year will bump up against this cap. So we are using the Reserves and 
National Guard, and they are performing well, but this underscores the 
need for a large regular force. A larger regular force is included in 
the budget, but not funded by emergency provisions through supplemental 
appropriations.
  We are beginning to see, as a result of the stress on the Guard 
particularly, an erosion in terms of recruitment and retention. The 
Army National Guard ended fiscal year 2003 approximately 7,800 soldiers 
below the recruiting goal. Last month, the Army National Guard 
announced it expected to fall 5,000 short of the goal of 56,000 
soldiers. A survey by the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and 
Social Sciences reported to us that more than one in three Army 
reservists plan to leave or transfer to the inactive reserve when the 
current enlistment ended; only a quarter will reenlist.

  The Active Army made the reporting goal, but they did this by pulling 
forward one-half of the delayed entry program. Each year, they sign up 
young men and women who do not expect to report until the next year. In 
order to make the goal, they counted those soldiers in this year's 
accounting. So they start off essentially in a hole for this year 
because they cannot double-count those soldiers.
  The other factor I see potentially damaging in the longer run, for 
the first time in a very long time, a small fraction of soldiers is 
being led into the Army who are normally rejected because of lower 
qualifications. It is roughly 2,000 out of 100,000, but that is a trend 
that certainly we do not want do see grow or continue, and it is 
illustrative of the need to make the totals because of the stress our 
military is under.
  The other aspect is we are committed to making sure that the Army is 
there and we are trying to do that through incentives and bonuses, 
which puts additional financial stress on the budget of the Army. 
Again, this is something we can't avoid. That is the way we have to 
fund and maintain a volunteer force, but it is an issue in terms of 
long-term ability of the Army to find the resources so that they can 
pay these bonuses, they can pay the benefits, they can enlist the 
force.
  One other final aspect of this issue of reliance upon a force which I 
believe is too small. We have seen, for the first time in a notable way 
in Iraq, reliance and overreliance on contractors--not contractors who 
do the mess halls. By the way, they are doing a magnificent job over 
there. The quality of life of soldiers is first-rate. But I am taken 
aback when I see private contractors providing security. We all recall 
that even Ambassador Bremer's security was provided not by military 
people but by private civilian contractors. That is another indication 
to me that we have to increase the Regular Army.
  Part of this was a result of a plan that did not anticipate a long-
term, intensive involvement in Iraq. As mentioned before, this has been 
pointed out

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by others. In December of 2003, Jeffrey Record, of the Army's own 
Strategic Studies Institute, published a report that stated the ground 
force requirements in Iraq have forced the U.S. Army to the breaking 
point. He says the Army appears incapable of sustaining a commitment of 
16 of its 33 active-duty combat brigades in Iraq absent a reduction 
elsewhere or expansion of its force structure.
  Again, the Defense Science Board stated that current and projected 
force structure will not sustain our current projected globalization. 
There are inadequate total numbers of troops and a lack of long-term 
endurance. The board recommended adding troops or cutting back 
missions. It is very difficult to cut back missions.
  I should point out that the board was aware of the attempts to reform 
the military, the modularity that is going on within the military. 
Again, this is a very positive development. I commend the Chief of 
Staff, General Schoomaker, and those who are trying to reforge the Army 
to be more efficient, but the Defense Science Board recognized these 
efficiencies and still stated that we need more troops.
  We have in the Senate, with the cooperation of the chairman and 
ranking member, tried to do this. Again, going back a year or so ago, 
together with Senator Hagel, we introduced legislation that would 
increase the Army by 10,000. It passed this Senate, but the Department 
of Defense objected to it, and it fell out of the conference report. We 
were successful in the last authorization to include an increase of 
20,000 end strength, but once again the Department of Defense insisted 
that these troops be paid through emergency procedure.

  We have to have a situation where the end strength is increased but 
it is also paid for through the regular budget process. My fear is that 
eventually it will get more difficult to pass supplementals. Senator 
Levin pointed out how the Army will rethink the demand of a significant 
amount of money next year in the supplemental for 2005. Yet even with 
that money they might not be able to sustain all their needs, 
equipment, or otherwise.
  Unless we have an authorized end strength that is paid for through 
the regular budget process, we may end up leaving the Army in the lurch 
in the years ahead. When the budget comes down, the supplementals are 
not as robust, and they still have the missions and the troops they 
need to conduct those missions. That is a critical issue that the 
Secretary must address. I raised these issues with Dr. Harvey. He 
certainly listened attentively, but I received no commitment that he 
was going to move aggressively to do this.
  The other issue of equipment, which has been addressed by the ranking 
member, is the Army has sustained 1.6 billion in equipment battle 
losses in Afghanistan and Iraq. Presently it has an unfunded 
requirement of 1.3 billion for ammunition. The Army estimates a third 
of the equipment is either already in Southwest Asia or en route. In 
fiscal year 2005, approximately 1.6 million pieces of Army equipment 
will be sent back to the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan for 
repairs, upgrade, or replacement. The Army expects to need $7 billion 
for this effort.
  We have an extraordinary demand to keep Army equipment going, and the 
requests, so far, the supplemental requests have not met those demands. 
I personally believe we have to have a robust, dedicated fund from 
sources outside the Army so we can fund the simple recapitalization of 
the equipment needs of the military.
  There is another aspect of the equipment demand. We have taken a 
great deal of equipment from the National Guard and forces in the 
United States, moved it overseas, leaving our National Guard back here 
with a fraction of their critical equipment. As my colleagues 
recognize, the National Guard plays a critical role in homeland 
security, a critical role in aiding States and localities with disaster 
assistance, and they are not only deployed overseas but many of the 
guardsmen left behind do not have the full complement of equipment--
another issue we have to deal with.
  I could go on at great length talking about recurring equipment 
needs. There are other examples that are critically important. Nearly 
all the equipment, for example, in our stockpiles in Southwest Asia has 
already been deployed forward. We do not have those robust stockpiles 
of equipment necessary if there is another contingency in the area. The 
only area where stocks appear to be untouched is Korea, which I think 
is a very prudent decision. This is another example of the issues we 
are facing in terms of equipment.

  As we go forward, we have endeavored to provide the resources to our 
military to conduct the important operations overseas. In the past 17 
months, President Bush has requested and Congress has appropriated $187 
billion for Afghanistan and Iraq. We also anticipate an additional 
request of $70 billion in the next few weeks or months. We are spending 
a great deal of money, but still the needs of the Army are unmet. We 
have to provide for the needs. We have to provide for the necessary 
equipment.
  We have a crisis in end strength. We have a crisis in 
recapitalization of equipment, and we also have an issue of leadership. 
I have stressed this before so I will be brief.
  We have had two individuals serving the Army in this administration. 
General Shinseki and Secretary White were called upon to give their 
best views to the Congress. They did, and essentially they were 
punished for those views. That, to me, is not an effective way to use 
the offices of the Army or to get the kind of cooperation within the 
executive branch and the kind of cooperation between the Congress and 
the military service that is so necessary. Again, I feel the 
inhibitions that resulted from that very dramatic public behavior might 
have prevented individuals from appropriately sharing with us 
information about the planning problems for postwar Iraq, about the 
need for additional forces, about the need for recapitalization of 
equipment. In the long run, it is a very destructive and corrosive 
force. The next Secretary has to deal with that on an individual basis 
and on a collective basis in the Army and within the Department of 
Defense.
  Also, too, an issue that has concerned many, and one that we were 
shocked by, was the scenes of the Abu Ghraib prison, where individual 
soldiers have been held accountable, enlisted people, E-5s, E-6s, E-4s, 
but anyone who has read the reports and anyone who has been in the area 
in which the chairman has conducted it in a very professional and very 
courageous fashion has to understand that accountability does not stop 
here.
  We have had numerous reports by the IG, by General Taguba, by General 
Kern, and by others which suggests at least people at ranks beyond 
noncommissioned officer have to be held accountable. Yet to date there 
has been no accountability, in my mind.
  I was curious as to just simply who had the responsibility to press 
court-martial charges against some of the individuals notified in the 
report by General Karpinski. Now, that is, I am told no general officer 
can go before a court-martial without an IG report. The IG has 
conducted a report. I found out that the IG, General Mikolashek, is 
scheduled to retire in a few days. I don't know what the status of his 
report is, whether he forwarded it to the convening authority and 
whether the convening authority is taking steps. The convening 
authority is General Helmsley, who is the Reserve component commander. 
Colonel Pappas, who is out of the 5th Military Intelligence Brigade, 
and General Sanchez was originally the convening authority--he decided 
because of appearances, and I think appropriately, that he shouldn't be 
involved. It was then sent to General Bell, the USAREUR commander, and 
now it has been delegated to General Benny Williams. It seems to me in 
the course of trying to establish responsibility beyond the company 
grade level that we have not made much progress.
  I believe the next Secretary of the Army has to deal with this issue 
directly because it would be unfortunate--more than unfortunate--if 
individual soldiers were punished and it appeared that seniors who 
might be culpable--not directly involved in brutality but for 
dereliction of duty or for failure to follow the law of warfare--simply 
walked away or were lost in the shuffle of paperwork and reports. That 
is the challenge this Secretary has to deal with because the essence, 
in my

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mind, of a military officer is accountability and responsibility, and 
you do not get that by pushing reports and pushing paper and suddenly 
trying to make it go away.
  Maybe I am just premature in my demands for some type of finality to 
this situation. I don't think so. Again, I believe the next Secretary 
of the Army has to establish a very simple rule: Soldiers are 
responsible for what they do and commanders are responsible for their 
commands. I hope that is done because, if not, all the issues I have 
talked about--the lack of troops, the need for new equipment and 
refurbishment of equipment--will pale in comparison if people can draw 
the lesson that only soldiers are punished and superiors are somehow 
able to escape, at least the opportunity to be held accountable.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield? He brings up a subject of great 
importance to the committee. Indeed, I commend the committee as a whole 
for the manner in which it pursued its look into this situation. We are 
awaiting what is described as maybe the final report--the Senator is 
aware of that--which is to be a compendium analysis of previous reports 
and such other factors deemed relevant.
  There is also an outstanding request that I put to General Kern and 
his group in the course of the hearing that we would like to have them, 
once again, assess the full meaning of accountability as they use that.
  I thank the Senator for raising the question. I assure him it is 
something I will continue as chairman in the coming Congress. This is a 
matter which the committee will once again address.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I reclaim my time. Let me, once again, 
commend the chairman because he took a position that was very 
difficult.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished Senator. The ranking member was 
a full working partner, together with all Members of the committee.
  Mr. REED. Let me add, honestly, without his sensitivity to the 
importance of this issue, to the long run values of the military, it 
would not have received any attention. I commend the chairman for 
continuing his efforts.
  I just point out, all this might be coincidental. General Kern 
retired on Saturday, I believe. I hope the report and response is ready 
and en route to the chairman. I hope he, too, agrees with me that this 
is not an issue that we can ignore.
  I must say also this is not just an Army issue. I think there was a 
tendency initially to portray this as the aberrant behavior of young 
soldiers. As we now know, there was much more complicated and high-
level involvement. What involvement is still unclear, but we cannot 
walk away from this issue. And because the next Secretary of the Army 
will have so much authority with respect to reports, with respect to 
reviewing at least court-martial proceedings or involved in these 
decisions, this issue has to be addressed. And that is one of the major 
challenges I think Dr. Harvey will address, I hope, if he is confirmed.
  Let me again conclude by thanking the chairman not only for his 
leadership but for the gracious way he has helped today to illustrate 
these issues and to assist me in my presentation. I thank him. I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before recognizing the distinguished 
Senator from Colorado, I would like to respond to two issues raised by 
our colleague from Rhode Island in the course of what I think has been 
a very constructive debate today.
  The first is on the issue of end strength.
  Senator Reed has argued that the Regular Army--the active duty 
force--needs to be larger, and I would agree with him.
  In the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2005, signed by the President on October 28, Congress required 
that the Army increase its active-duty strength by 20,000 soldiers over 
fiscal year 2004 levels.
  The conference report, while noting that in a time of national 
emergency the President may direct even higher levels, specifically 
authorized an increase of 30,000 soldiers between 2005 and 2009.
  These increased numbers reflect the recommendations of General Peter 
Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army, who is a great soldier. He 
has proven to be a superb Chief of Staff of the Army.
  In the committee hearing on General Schoomaker's nomination last 
year, I recall very well the questions asked of him as to whether he 
thought that the Army needed to have more soldiers. General Schoomaker 
responded candidly that his intuition told him that he thought the Army 
needed to be larger.
  He was right. Following his confirmation and appointment in August 
2003, he has testified on several occasions about the end strength 
issues and communicated his views about what needs to be done to ensure 
the Army is prepared and ready in all respects for its current 
missions.
  The Army laid out a plan to temporarily increase end strength by 
30,000 over the next 5 years as it was transforming to ``modular units 
of action.''
  General Schoomaker, for example, testified on November 19, 2003, in a 
full committee hearing on ``Current Army Issues.'' I questioned him 
about the force level of the Army, asking General Schoomaker about 
whether we need additional troops.
  His response was that as a result of stop-loss and stop-movement, 
which currently serves to ensure unit manning and cohesion, the Army 
was operating with 20,000 more soldiers in the regular Army than in 
2002. He went on to emphasize that

     the greatest move we can make is to get the proper 
     utilization of the soldiers within the Army that we have 
     authorized and we are paying for right now. This is going to 
     require significant active-Guard and Reserve rebalancing and 
     significant restructuring of policies that will give us 
     access to more of the force that we are paying for and 
     have on hand right now.

  General Schoomaker reiterated this point in February 2004 when he 
testified with the Secretary of Defense on the President's fiscal year 
2005 budget. General Schoomaker shared his ``rain barrel'' and 
``spigot'' analogy with us in which he noted that because of the Army's 
current organization and composition, the Army cannot make use of the 
bulk of its manpower.
  General Schoomaker has called for transformational changes in Army 
personnel planning, such as conversion of billets from military to 
civilian employees; he has advocated rebalancing of reserve and active 
skills to improve readiness; he has called for greater numbers of 
soldiers with essential occupational skills, and implementation of new 
technology. In doing so, he consistently has argued throughout the past 
year that precipitous increases in end strength were not the answer to 
the Army's readiness challenges.
  In a recent interview last month, General Schoomaker stated:

       We all agree the Army should grow. The issue is how to pay 
     for it. Right now we have supplemental funding to increase 
     numbers we're bringing in and retaining. . . . We are growing 
     through increased accessions and retention. We have grown to 
     495,000 on active duty, up from 480,000 last year. We are 
     making the Army as big as we can, as fast as we can. But 
     paying for it is another issue.

  In summary then, three points need to be made:
  First, the Army is increasing in size. The Army active-duty strength 
on September 30 of this year was 499,530. That was about 17,000 above 
the authorized end strength for fiscal year 2004. The Army is 
projecting that it will meet the requirement to expand by 20,000 
soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2005.
  Second, while all agree that the Army is stretched, the Department of 
Defense has been clear that if the combatant commander in U.S. Central 
Command calls for more troops, he will receive them.
  And, third, the cost of 10,000 additional active-duty soldiers has 
been estimated to be $1.2 billion. It is essential that budgeting 
realities be taken into account and that the Army not be required to 
absorb additional soldiers ``out of hide.'' To do otherwise would 
undermine General Schoomaker's critically important transformational 
vision.
  I draw to my colleagues' attention that General Schoomaker, the 
current Chief of Staff of the Army, has addressed this issue. I 
questioned him in the course of the hearing on November 19 about the 
force level of the Army. I asked him how he felt about the need for 
additional troops. His response was that as a result of the stop-loss 
and

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stop-movement which currently serves to ensure unit manning and 
cohesion, the Army was operating with 20,000 more soldiers in the 
Regular Army than in 2002.
  In a subsequent interview last month, he stated:

       We all agree that the Army should grow. The issue is how to 
     pay for it.

  The Senator from Rhode Island raised that point.
  General Schoomaker went on to say:

       Right now we have supplemental funding to increase numbers 
     we're brining in and retaining. . . .

  I think he has looked at this in a very responsible way, recognizing 
that the supplemental, hopefully, has cared for the immediate needs of 
the Army and will provide funds to implement the legislation the 
committee incorporated in the Ronald Reagan Defense Act of 2004 that we 
put through.
  Also, the Senator raised a question about General Shinseki, and that 
is one in which I have been increasingly interested through the years. 
And actually, on this floor, I stated to the Senate that so much has 
been said about this distinguished officer's career and how he 
concluded, which I always thought was the regular way, that the Chief 
of Staff would step down at the conclusion of his term. But others have 
views about that, and I am not going to get into that.
  I would like to put in the Record the colloquy between Senator Levin 
and General Shinseki on February 25, 2003, when he addressed this 
question of the forces that could be used or required. It is 
interesting to go back and read it because I think people have seized 
on this so often to refer to it as a basis for their observations. But 
here is what he said. Senator Levin asked the question:

       General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the 
     Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following 
     the successful completion of the war?

  Bear in mind, the operation had not even started at that time, and 
this question was put to General Shinseki after all the chiefs had made 
opening statements. General Shinseki had put into the record his full 
statement and then testified in open session to most of that statement.
  General Shinseki said: ``In specific number, I would have to rely on 
combatant commanders' exact requirements,'' which is much what the 
President and the Secretary of Defense have said each time this issue 
is up. If the combatant commanders made requests, indeed he, the 
President, would consider it and, in all probability, meet those 
requests.
  Then he went on. It is very interesting. He is a most distinguished 
officer, and I share the Senator's views about him. There are moments 
in our Senate career that we never forget, but I remember in the course 
of the confirmation of General Shinseki, our distinguished colleague 
from Hawaii, Senator Inouye, rose and gave one of the most magnificent 
speeches on the floor of the Senate I have ever heard about any 
individual in the 26 years I have been privileged to serve here. I 
share in the full respect for this officer.
  Here is what he said again to Senator Levin:

       I would say that what has been mobilized to this point, 
     something in the order of several hundred thousand 
     soldiers, is probably a figure that would be required.

  In other words, it was not a finite statement. It was more or less a 
generalized statement. He continued:

       We are talking about post-hostilities control over a piece 
     of geography that is fairly significant with the ethnic 
     tensions that could lead to other problems.

  That is showing a lot of foresight.

       It takes a significant ground presence to maintain a safe 
     and secure environment to make sure that people are fed, that 
     water is distributed, all with the responsibilities that go 
     along with administering a situation like this.

  But he makes no reference at that point that he ever anticipated the 
level of insurgency, the infiltration of these terrorists from other 
nations to come in and fuel this fight.
  In fairness to him, I think the exact text that he responded to that 
question, which, again, was referred to by my distinguished colleague, 
the ranking member, and myself today should be made a part of this 
Record.
  I inquire of the Presiding Officer as to the time remaining under the 
control of the Senator from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 40 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. And the distinguished ranking member, I believe, has 
roughly an hour.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ranking member has 56 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. I notice the presence on the floor momentarily of our 
distinguished colleague from South Carolina and, indeed, the current 
junior Senator from South Carolina. I know the Senate is anxious to 
hear from both our colleagues with regard to the forthcoming retirement 
of our distinguished colleague, Senator Hollings.
  I also see my colleague from Colorado who desires to speak to the 
matter before the Senate. I say to the Senate that I think this debate 
and discussion among the members of the committee as relating to the 
nomination is about to come to a close, and subject to the ranking 
member's views, which I ask he provide the Senate at this time, I would 
like to give--how much time would the Senator from Colorado desire?
  Mr. ALLARD. I request from the chairman 10 minutes. I probably will 
not use that amount, but if there is a minute or two, I will yield that 
back.
  Mr. WARNER. I think the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe, wants 
about 5 minutes. Perhaps 15 minutes on this side, I say to my 
colleagues, is the remainder of the time we would seek on this 
nomination.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a unanimous 
consent request first. I am glad the Senator put in the Record the 
remarks of General Shinseki. I think they fully support what Senator 
Reed was saying and what I was saying. I also ask unanimous consent at 
this point in the Record that the reaction of Secretary Wolfowitz to 
those remarks be printed. We will provide those for the Record, to the 
effect General Shinseki was widely off the mark and that it is hard to 
believe it would take more troops to occupy a country than it would be 
to win the war. I ask those remarks be made part of the Record. We will 
supply those remarks to the clerk, if that meets with the agreement of 
the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. I certainly would not impose any objection to a colleague 
wishing to expand the remarks.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

The Statement of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Before 
            the House Budget Committee on February 27, 2003

       If I might digress for a moment, Mr. Chairman, from my 
     prepared testimony, because there's been a good deal of 
     comment, some of it quite outlandish, about what our post-war 
     requirements might be in Iraq. . . .
       But some of the higher-end predictions that we have been 
     hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take 
     several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in 
     post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark.
       First, it is hard to conceive that it would take more 
     forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would 
     take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of 
     Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I call to the attention of my colleague 
that this issue of General Shinseki's remarks has been and perhaps will 
continue to be debated and discussed.
  But actually, on the floor of the Senate--and my recollection is it 
was last fall from this fall in connection with the conference report--
I said to the Senate that I had asked repeatedly of the Army, of 
members of the Army: Was there any staff work done on this issue of the 
troop levels required in a post-conflict situation, either in the 
Department of the Army or in the joint staff? I urged that that be 
forthcoming and that information be given to the committee.
  To the best of my knowledge, no one has come forward to show any 
staff workup that provided the basis for the General's reply. As I 
point out, the General did not, in the course of these opening remarks, 
in a prepared statement, make any reference to that. As a matter of 
fact, he was supportive of the figure that was in the budget.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, though, again, for a comment on 
that.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. If there was no staff workup on that issue, it would be 
shocking. There surely should have been staff work on the question of 
how many troops it would take to secure a country after its occupation. 
There

[[Page S11347]]

have been a number of press reports to the effect that there in fact 
were some assessments as to how many troops, but I have never seen that 
assessment. If it did not exist, it would be pretty serious 
mismanagement, it seems to me, and if it does exist, we ought to get a 
copy of it.
  Either way, I think General Shinseki was mistreated. He was the 
subject of calumny, almost, inside the civilian part of the Defense 
Department, for expressing an opinion.
  I know my friend, the chairman, would agree with me that when a 
military officer is asked a question, he is required by a commitment 
that he makes to us when he is before us for confirmation to give us 
his honest professional judgment, and he was pressed by me to give us 
that judgment. He said he couldn't be specific, and then I pressed him 
to give us a range and he said: Several hundred thousand. The reaction 
to that amongst the civilians is that is widely off the mark. He paid a 
price he never should have paid for giving an honest opinion to a 
congressional committee.
  Mr. WARNER. You address this thing in a very broad context, which you 
are free to do. I was very specific. When he said several hundred 
thousand, I inquired as to whether there is any document, either in the 
Department of the Army or the joint staff, which supported that several 
hundred thousand individuals would be needed in a post-conflict 
situation.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is there a document that supports 130,000 would be needed? 
I would like to see a document that supports any analysis of what would 
be needed. That is the problem with the failure to plan for the 
aftermath. It is that there was no plan for the aftermath. If there is 
a document that says 130,000--and maybe my good friend from Rhode 
Island has the document we are referring to?
  Mr. REED. I don't have the document, but an article in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer of October 17, 2004 made several references. 
First:

       Franks' Central Command did have an extensive plan to 
     restore order and begin rebuilding the country, called 
     Operation Desert Crossing, said retired Marine Gen. Anthony 
     Zinni, who drew up the plan and updated it continuously when 
     he led Centcom until 2000. It was never used.

  Further in the story:

       Central Command originally proposed a force of 380,000 to 
     attack and occupy Iraq. Rumsfeld's opening bid was about 
     40,000, ``a division-plus,'' said three senior military 
     officials who participated in the discussions. Bush and his 
     top advisers finally approved the 250,000 troops the 
     commanders requested to launch the invasion. But the 
     additional troops that the military wanted to secure Iraq 
     after Hussein's regime fell were either delayed or never 
     sent.

  I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 17, 2004]

                The Iraq War: Miscalculation and Misstep

       Washington.--In March 2003, days before the start of the 
     U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American war planners and 
     intelligence officials met at Shaw Air Force Base in South 
     Carolina to review the Bush administration's plans to oust 
     Saddam Hussein and implant democracy in Iraq.
       Near the end of his presentation, an Army lieutenant 
     colonel who was giving a briefing showed a slide describing 
     the Pentagon's plans for rebuilding Iraq after the war, known 
     in the planners' parlance as Phase
     4-C. He was uncomfortable with his material--and for good 
     reason. The slide said: ``To Be Provided.''
       An Inquirer Washington Bureau review of the Iraq policy and 
     decisions of the administration has found that it invaded 
     Iraq without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and 
     rebuild the country. The administration also failed to 
     provide about 100,000 additional U.S. troops that American 
     military commanders originally wanted to help restore order 
     and reconstruct a country shattered by war, a brutal 
     dictatorship, and economic sanctions.
       In fact, some senior Pentagon officials had thought they 
     could bring most American soldiers home from Iraq by 
     September 2003. Instead, more than a year later, 138,000 U.S. 
     troops are still fighting insurgents who slip easily across 
     Iraq's long borders, diehards from the old regime, and Iraqis 
     angered by their country's widespread crime and unemployment 
     and the United States' sometimes heavy boots.
       ``We didn't go in with a plan. We went in with a theory,'' 
     said a veteran State Department officer who was directly 
     involved in Iraq policy.
       The military's plan to defeat Hussein's army worked 
     brilliantly and U.S. troops have distinguished themselves on 
     the battlefield.
       However, the review found that the President and many of 
     his advisers ignored repeated warnings that rebuilding Iraq 
     would be harder than ousting Saddam Hussein, and they tossed 
     out years of planning about how to rebuild Iraq, in part 
     because they thought pro-American Iraqi exiles and Iraqi 
     ``patriots'' would quickly pick up the pieces.
       The CIA predicted up until the war's opening days that the 
     Iraqi army would turn against Hussein, which never happened.
       This report is based on official documents and on 
     interviews with more than three dozen current and former 
     civilian and military officials who participated directly in 
     planning for the war and its aftermath. Most still support 
     the decision to go to war but say many of the subsequent 
     problems could have been avoided.
       Every effort was made to get those who were interviewed to 
     speak for the record, but many officials requested anonymity 
     because they didn't want to criticize the administration 
     publicly or because they feared retaliation.
       President Bush and top officials in Secretary of Defense 
     Donald H. Rumsfeld's office did not respond to repeated 
     requests for interviews. They have publicly defended their 
     plans for the invasion and its aftermath, and now some top 
     officials are blaming the CIA for failing to predict the 
     messy aftermath of Hussein's fall.
       The United States and interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad 
     Allawi are now taking steps to defeat the Iraqi insurgency 
     and will have national elections in January. They have 
     negotiated an agreement to disarm some of the militia led by 
     radical Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and are pressing 
     an offensive against Sunni rebels. After more than a year of 
     internal squabbling, U.S. military commanders, intelligence 
     officers, and diplomats in Baghdad are acting as a team.
       But the hole created by the absence of an adequate plan to 
     rebuild Iraq, the failure to provide enough troops to secure 
     the country, the misplaced faith in Iraqi exiles, and other 
     mistakes made after Baghdad fell is a deep one.
       ``We've finally got our act together, but we're all afraid 
     it may be too late,'' said one senior official who is engaged 
     daily in Iraq policy.
       The Bush administration's failure to plan to win the peace 
     in Iraq was the product of many of the same problems that 
     plagued the administration's case for war, including wishful 
     thinking, bad information from Iraqi exiles who said Iraqis 
     would welcome U.S. troops as liberators, and contempt for 
     dissenting opinions.
       However, the administration's planning for postwar Iraq 
     differed in one crucial respect from its erroneous prewar 
     claims about Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
     programs and links to al-Qaeda.
       The U.S. intelligence community had been divided about the 
     state of Hussein's weapons programs, but there was little 
     disagreement among experts throughout the government that 
     winning the peace in Iraq could be much harder than 
     winning a war.
       ``The possibility of the United States winning the war and 
     losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious,'' warned an 
     Army War College report that was completed in February 2003, 
     a month before the invasion.
       Without an ``overwhelming'' effort to prepare for the U.S. 
     occupation of Iraq, the report warned, ``The United States 
     may find itself in a radically different world over the next 
     few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein 
     seems like a pale shadow of new problems of America's own 
     making.''
       A half-dozen intelligence reports also warned that U.S. 
     troops could face significant postwar resistance. This foot-
     high stack of material was distributed at White House 
     meetings of Bush's top foreign policy advisers, but there's 
     no evidence that anyone ever acted on it.
       ``It was disseminated. And ignored,'' said a former senior 
     intelligence official.
       The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency was particularly 
     aggressive in its forecasts, officials said. One briefing 
     occurred in January 2003. Another, in April 2003, weeks after 
     the war began, discussed Hussein's plans for attacking U.S. 
     forces after his troops had been defeated on the battlefield.
       Similar warnings came from the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the 
     State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and 
     the CIA's National Intelligence Council. The council produced 
     reports in January 2003 titled ``Principal Challenges in 
     Post-Saddam Iraq'' and ``Regional Consequences of Regime 
     Change in Iraq.''
       Unlike the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which Iraqi troops 
     were trying to maintain their grip on Kuwait, ``they are now 
     defending their country,'' said a senior defense official, 
     summarizing the Joint Staff's warnings. ``You are going to 
     get serious resistance. This idea that everyone will join you 
     is baloney. But it was dismissed.''
       Retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner wasn't named to lead 
     Iraq's reconstruction until January 2003 and didn't oversee 
     the first major interagency conference on postwar Iraq until 
     Feb. 21, less than a month before the invasion.
       At the Pentagon, the director of the Joint Staff, Army Gen. 
     George Casey, repeatedly pressed Gen. Tommy Franks, the head 
     of the Central Command, for a ``Phase 4,'' or postwar, plan, 
     the senior defense official said.

[[Page S11348]]

       ``Casey was screaming. `Where is our Phase 4 plan?' '' the 
     official said. It never arrived. Casey is now the commander 
     of U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq.
       Franks' Central Command did have an extensive plan to 
     restore order and begin rebuilding the country, called 
     Operation Desert Crossing, said retired Marine Gen. Anthony 
     Zinni, who drew up the plan and updated it continuously when 
     he led Centcom until 2000. It was never used.
       The same officials who saw no need for a plan to secure and 
     rebuild a defeated Iraq also saw no need to position 
     thousands of U.S. soldiers, including military police, 
     engineers, ordnance disposal teams, and civil affairs 
     specialists, to begin taking control in Iraq even before the 
     war against Hussein was over.
       Long-standing Army doctrine calls for beginning 
     reconstruction in freed areas of a country while fighting 
     rages elsewhere. It also calls for a shift in military forces 
     from combat troops to civil affairs, military police and the 
     like.
       ``Unfortunately, this did not occur despite clear guidance 
     to the contrary,'' Army Col. Paul F. Dicker wrote in an 
     assessment.
       Bush, Rumsfeld, and other top officials insist that their 
     military commanders were given everything they requested, and 
     Franks wrote in his book, American Soldier, that Rumsfeld 
     supported his war plan.
       Technically, that's accurate. However, three top officials 
     who served with Franks at the time said the plan was the 
     product of a lengthy and sometimes heated negotiation between 
     the Central Command and the Pentagon, in which Rumsfeld 
     constantly pressed Franks and other senior officers to commit 
     fewer troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
       At one point, Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former 
     chairman of the joint chiefs, weighed in on Franks' side and 
     helped persuade Rumsfeld to commit more troops, a senior 
     administration official said.
       Rumsfeld and his aides wisely wanted to keep the U.S. 
     footprint in Iraq as small as possible, realizing that more 
     troops would likely breed more Iraqi resentment, and they 
     wanted a smaller, faster force that could overwhelm the Iraqi 
     military before it could torch the country's oil fields, 
     retreat into the cities and create a humanitarian disaster.
       ``There were different motivations by different people in 
     this administration for going after Iraq, but they all came 
     together . . . in a way that blotted out prudence and 
     caution,'' said a senior intelligence official.
       Central Command originally proposed a force of 380,000 to 
     attack and occupy Iraq. Rumsfeld's opening bid was about 
     40,000, ``a division-plus,'' said three senior military 
     officials who participated in the discussions. Bush and his 
     top advisers finally approved the 250,000 troops the 
     commanders requested to launch the invasion. But the 
     additional troops that the military wanted to secure Iraq 
     after Hussein's regime fell were either delayed or never 
     sent.
       As a result, the two Army divisions that Centcom wanted to 
     help secure the country weren't on hand when Baghdad fell and 
     the country lapsed into anarchy, and a third, the First 
     Cavalry from Fort Hood, Texas, fell so far behind schedule 
     that on April 21 Franks and Rumsfeld dropped it from the 
     plan.
       Moreover, one senior military official said, there was a 
     realization that fresh troops would eventually be needed to 
     replace worn-out units in Iraq.
       ``We could not burn the candle on the Cav prematurely,'' he 
     said.
       Others said that civilian officials in the Pentagon were so 
     convinced that these ``follow-on forces'' wouldn't be needed 
     in Iraq that they thought they could withdraw 50,000 troops 
     from Iraq in June 2003; 50,000 more in July; and a final 
     50,000 in August. By September 2003, Rumsfeld and his aides 
     thought, there would be very few American troops left in 
     Iraq.
       Instead of providing a plan and enough troops to take 
     control of Iraq, officials, advisers and consultants in and 
     around the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney's office 
     bet on Iraqi exiles such as Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi 
     National Congress, who assured them that Iraqis would welcome 
     U.S. troops as liberators.
       Gen. John Keane, the vice chief of the Army staff during 
     the war, said some defense officials believed the exiles' 
     promises.
       ``We did not see it [the insurgency] coming. And we were 
     not properly prepared and organized to deal with it. . . . 
     Many of us got seduced by the Iraqi exiles in terms of what 
     the outcome would be,'' Keane told a House committee in July.
       Rumsfeld's office ``was utterly, arrogantly, ignorantly and 
     negligently unprepared'' for the aftermath of the war, 
     said Larry Diamond, who was a political adviser in Baghdad 
     from January to March of this year.
       Douglas Feith, the Defense Department's number-three 
     official, and former Pentagon consultant Richard Perle both 
     acknowledged that their vision for post-Hussein Iraq included 
     putting pro-Western exiles in power.
       ``We had a theme in our minds, a strategic idea, of 
     liberation rather than occupation, giving them [Iraqis] more 
     authority even at the expense of having things done with 
     greater efficiency'' by coalition military forces, Feith told 
     The Philadelphia Inquirer last month.
       Perle, in an interview, said he and others had for years 
     advocated ``helping the Iraqis liberate themselves--which was 
     a completely different approach than we settled on.''
       ``We'll never now how it would have come out if we did it 
     the way we wanted to do it,'' he said.
       The CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State 
     Department all warned that Chalabi was a charlatan, and the 
     uniformed military dragged its heels in training exiles to 
     join the fight against Hussein.
       The battle over Chalabi was one of numerous bitter 
     interagency fights about Iraq that Bush and his national 
     security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, never resolved.
       ``I'm not going to put my thumb on the scale,'' Bush said 
     at a White House meeting in which Chalabi's bona fides were 
     hotly debated, according to an official who was present.
       That left Pentagon officials to plow ahead with their 
     attempt to position Chalabi and his militia, the Free Iraqi 
     Fighting Forces, to take power after Saddam's fall.
       Within 48 hours of their arrival in Baghdad in April, some 
     of Chalabi's men, including members of his personal bodyguard 
     force, began taking cars, bank accounts and real estate, said 
     a senior military officer who received reports of the events. 
     It became evident almost as quickly that Chalabi and other 
     exiles had a larger political following in the Pentagon than 
     they did in Iraq.
       Intelligence officials now charge that Chalabi or some of 
     his senior aides were paid agents of Iran's intelligence 
     service, and that Chalabi or his security chief provided 
     classified U.S. military information to Iran. Chalabi has 
     denied the allegation.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this point I further ask unanimous 
consent to have printed in the Record testimony by General Franks in 
response to questioning by Senator Levin on this issue.

  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Senator Levin. Could you give us just a range of troops? I 
     mean, would it be from 100-150,000 for many years? I'm not 
     asking for any kind of precise figure, but what's your 
     current best estimate?
       General Franks. Senator Levin, that actually is not as hard 
     to answer as it might seem. We have about 145,000 troops in 
     there right now. As I have talked to commanders at every 
     level inside Iraq, one finds that that footprint appears to 
     us on the operational side to be about what that footprint 
     needs to look like. There has been suggestion that perhaps 
     there should be more troops, and, in fact, I can tell you in 
     the presence of this Secretary that if more troops are 
     necessary, this Secretary is going to say yes. We have talked 
     about this on a number of occasions, and when the tactical 
     commanders on the ground determine that they need to raise 
     force levels, then those forces in fact will be provided. The 
     Secretary may want to comment on that, but what we----

  Mr. WARNER. That concludes the debate at this point. I wonder if 
Senator Allard and Senator Inhofe--I see Senator Sessions--we are 
trying, if I might, to acquaint my colleagues who have arrived on the 
floor--the distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina desires to 
speak to his forthcoming retirement. The senior Senator wishes to speak 
to that. Yet this issue has been fully debated by those who have been 
on the floor. I judge my colleagues here wish to take some time.
  If my colleague could indicate that to me, I would like to allocate 
the time you would like to have.
  First, Senator Allard.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, if I might have 10 minutes. I am not sure I 
would use that time, but I appreciate that.
  Mr. WARNER. Other Senators?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased--2 minutes will be 
sufficient to me.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's say 5. He is the chairman on the subcommittee for 
the Army and I think that is important.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I also have a 4 o'clock commitment I will need to be 
in.
  Mr. WARNER. I say to the Senator from Oklahoma----
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, if there is 10 minutes, I would like to 
have that. If not, I will downgrade that.
  Mr. WARNER. I will leave that to the Senator's judgment. For the 
moment I will say 7 minutes. Is that agreeable?
  Mr. INHOFE. That is agreeable.
  Mr. WARNER. Does the Senator from Colorado wish to allow our 
distinguished colleague from Alabama to proceed?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask if the Senator from Colorado will 
give me 2 to 3 minutes. I want to say a couple of things.
  Mr. WARNER. For that purpose, I ask unanimous consent for the Senator 
from Alabama, to be followed by the Senator from Colorado, followed by 
the Senator from Oklahoma, to address the Senate in the confines of the 
time allocated.
  Mr. ALLARD. That is all right with me. I yield 3 minutes.

[[Page S11349]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I was present when Dr. Harvey came 
before the Armed Services Committee for the nomination hearing on his 
appointment as Secretary of the Army. As the hearing went along, I 
became more and more impressed with this extraordinary man. This is not 
the time to debate somebody's differing opinions about how General 
Franks and others should have handled the war in Iraq. They did a 
dadgum good job of it, as far as I am concerned, in achieving the 
victory over there and in Afghanistan also. There will always be people 
to second-guess it.
  But Dr. Harvey has extraordinary experience of remarkable breadth. He 
has his B.S. from Notre Dame and Ph.D. from the University of 
Pennsylvania in metallurgy and materials science. He has been CEO of 
some of the country's largest corporations. He has been a COO of two 
high-tech startup companies in recent years. He is high-tech oriented. 
He is management oriented. He will bring those skills to the Department 
of Defense.
  As he goes through it, he will be able to help us decide how big the 
Army should be and how the transformation should go forward to help us 
transform our great Army, which is doing magnificent work this very 
moment in a hostile environment in Iraq. He will help us make it 
better. I am convinced of that.
  He is not a uniform man himself, nor should he be. He will bring his 
talents to bear to that subject. I am excited by his nomination. I 
believe he will do an outstanding job.
  I thank Senator Warner for his leadership and I yield the remainder 
of my time to Senator Allard and Senator Inhofe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I have the utmost confidence in Dr. 
Francis Harvey and I do believe he will act on behalf of our men and 
women in the field. I think he has a sincere concern about what happens 
to them and that they have the adequate equipment and manpower and 
whatnot to do their job. Frankly, it boils down to the fact that we can 
always anticipate what the force size has to be. That has to be 
determined basically by the men in the field, the commanders in the 
field. To try to run a war out of the Pentagon is a mistake. I happen 
to be rising in support of the nomination of Dr. Francis Harvey for the 
post of Secretary of the Army because I think he understands that.
  I will say a few things here to comment on Dr. Harvey's 
qualifications.
  In addition to the time Dr. Harvey spent with us in committee 
hearings, I spoke with him individually on a variety of Army issues, 
critical not only to our overall national security but also the 
citizens of Colorado. I believe Dr. Harvey to be fully qualified for 
this post. My distinguished colleague from Alabama, I think, went over 
some of his qualifications. I thank our distinguished chairman from 
Virginia for this timely debate and confirmation.
  Let me first acknowledge the outstanding performance of the current 
Acting Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee. Secretary Brownlee, 
together with General Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, has 
successfully directed the Army through this time of challenge and 
change. The Army is leading our Nation in the global war against 
extremist terrorists, and is making giant strides in transforming 
warfighting, logistics, and business management capabilities.
  Additionally, I know the Nation greatly appreciates the significant 
improvements in the quality of life of our Active Duty, Reserve, and 
National Guard soldiers. This includes our retirees, veterans, and 
dedicated spouses and families. I applaud Secretary Brownlee for these 
achievements and am thankful for his continued service to our country.
  The challenges and pace of change in the Army remain steady and are 
top national priorities. Based on my conversation with Dr. Harvey, I am 
confident he has the right skills and experience to lead this next 
period of transformation. Dr. Harvey demonstrated a record of 
management success in both public and private enterprise that will 
enable him to develop prudent choices and solutions for several 
strategic Army outcomes. Among the key strategic evaluations are force 
structure and force sizing reviews in pursuit of Army transformation 
objectives; global posture and ``mission needs'' evaluations to improve 
Army mobility and responsiveness regarding future demands at home and 
abroad; and, finally, manpower studies to assess and balance both the 
military, civilian, and the Active-Reserve distribution of skills to 
ensure we are optimally employing our military personnel and resources. 
These critical activities will define the composition and capability of 
the U.S. Army for the foreseeable future, and will improve the 
recruitment, retention, and motivation of our men and women and 
families throughout the Army family.
  Another high priority I covered with Dr. Harvey is the Army's 
commitment to, and funding for, our obligations to eliminate our 
chemical weapons stockpiles. The Army is the executive agent to carry 
out the chemical demilitarization and disposal program at various sites 
across the country. Unfortunately, the program is falling behind 
schedule and costing more money than originally planned.

  Dr. Harvey's qualifications and experience are well suited to address 
the problems associated with the chemical demilitarization program. In 
my personal conversations with the nominee, and again in public 
testimony, I received Dr. Harvey's assurances and commitment for Army 
leadership to pay close attention to and fix the problems within the 
technology and demilitarization programs at all of our chemical weapons 
facilities. I am convinced Dr. Harvey is as dedicated as I am to seeing 
the United States fulfill our chemical weapons treaty obligations.
  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak in support of 
Dr. Harvey's nomination. I believe Dr. Harvey is well qualified for the 
significant challenges facing him and I look forward to working with 
him to keep our Army the greatest the world has ever known.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 23 minutes, of which 10 
minutes has been allocated to the Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President.
  First of all, let me address some of the things that have been talked 
about today. We have had a drawdown in the military, starting with the 
Cold War. When it was over, all of us heard so many people say the Cold 
War is over, we have no need to have the strength we had before. Then 
after the 1991 gulf war, the drawdown continued. The Army is on the 
right track right now to regain the manpower they lost during that 
drawdown. I agree with the Senator from Rhode Island, who has been 
concerned about the end strength. I have joined him in that, and feel 
the same way.
  But I agree the drawdown in force that took place at the end of the 
Cold War went too far. We cut 365,000 troops, too many for the force we 
had. We should have stayed with the original number provided by General 
Powell during the first Bush administration.
  During the Clinton administration, we took a procurement holiday that 
cost us dearly. Budgets were woefully inadequate to sustain our force. 
Readiness suffered. The euphoria was around the fact that ``the Cold 
War is over,'' we no longer need this much military. We found out we 
were wrong. From fiscal year 1994 to 2001, we did not keep up with 
inflation. Defense spending lost $430.2 billion in constant 2002 
dollars. This was an average of $53.8 billion a year. We are talking 
about a loss of that amount. The deterioration would have been $53.2 
billion greater if not for the Congress plus-up of the Clinton budget 
from fiscal year 1996 onward.
  The Republicans gained control of both the House and the Senate in 
1994. To turn this positive from fiscal year 1996 onward, it would have 
been $58.1 billion or $9.7 billion a year average.
  The Democratic Congress had even reduced the Clinton request from 
1994 to 1996 by $4.8 billion, or $2.4 billion a year average, and 
reduced the last fiscal 1993 year Bush budget request by a whopping 
$8.1 billion.

[[Page S11350]]

  The Republican Congress was able to flatten this trend by fiscal year 
1997 and turn the trend upward from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 
2004 but never recovered the shortfall.
  When George W. Bush took office, the military readiness was in 
decline. We had not made the proper investment in modernization, 
readiness, and standard of living for our soldiers.
  I know it is true. I chaired the readiness subcommittee of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee during that timeframe. We desperately needed 
to reorganize the military to cope with this post-world war era.
  Just short of 9 months after taking office, George W. Bush was faced 
with 9/11. He was faced with mobilizing the military to protect the 
United States in a new kind of war, a new kind of war we never 
experienced before, one not properly dealt with by previous 
administrations, and one the military had not been funded to cope with.
  We are now paying for that mistake. We have been playing catchup. We 
need to put the Army back on the right track. And General Shoomaker and 
Acting Secretary Brownlee have done just that. We are reorganizing the 
Army to retrain soldiers from skills needed in today's threatened 
environment to skills more appropriate to those threats.
  We are adding 30,000 soldiers to the force and turning many noncombat 
jobs being performed by soldiers today into civilian positions.
  We are stabilizing families and rotating units rather than individual 
soldiers through Iraq and Afghanistan.
  We are accelerating equipment fielding to incorporate the latest 
innovations to defend against EIDs, the threat that we really didn't 
know about in years past.
  We are committed to providing the Army with anything and everything 
they need, but we can't waste resources by throwing money at the 
problem. We have to respond to the requests of our leaders in the 
field. I think we have done that, and I am committed to making sure we 
continue to do that.
  I am confident that Secretary Harvey, as has been said by so many 
people, will also continue to do that. I am confident he will be 
successful because he understands industry. Today, we need industry to 
give their best and as fast and as affordable as possible. It is 
important to have someone of Dr. Harvey's character and ability to 
provide the guiding hand and make this partnership between Government 
and industry work for the maximum benefit of our soldiers.
  You have to keep in mind that is one of the serious problems we face 
right now. The number of defense contractors is about one-fifth of what 
it was 20 years ago. It is important that we have someone who 
understands industry, and certainly Dr. Harvey will be such a person.
  We are playing catchup in the world. It is changing daily before our 
eyes. The Army must reorganize and modernize.
  How many people in America know we are sending our troops out many 
times with equipment that is not as good as that of our potential 
adversaries? In the area of artillery, five countries make a better 
artillery piece than we have, including South Africa. We found out from 
a very courageous general back in 1998 that in fact our best strike 
vehicles--F-15 and F-16--are not as good as some of the SU series being 
sold by Russia to many of our potential adversaries in the future. We 
must mobilize our Guard and Reserve in ways we haven't seen since World 
War II to fight this world war.
  We have a great team to accomplish all of that. General Shoomaker and 
Dr. Harvey and Les Brownlee and the brave men and women of our Army, 
both uniformed and civilian. What a task they have and what a team we 
have.
  Senator Akaka and I are both veterans of the Army. We started the 
Army Caucus. Up to that time they had not been given the proper 
attention as to how we are reliant on our Army for our ability to 
sustain this war against terrorism.
  I look forward to the confirmation of Dr. Harvey as the next 
Secretary of the Army, and support the Army's advice to end this war.
  We want to give, I believe, 10 minutes for the Senator from South 
Carolina. Is there more than 10 minutes remaining at this time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this time, the majority has 15 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, does the Senator from Oklahoma desire 
additional time?
  Mr. INHOFE. I will take only maybe 3 or 4 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator 3 more minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, a lot of things have been said about the 
condition of the soldiers in Iraq and about their attitudes. I can tell 
you that I don't think there is any Member of this body who has spent 
more time in Iraq and Afghanistan than I have. I hear statements of 
individuals. They are proud of the mission. They are proud of what they 
are doing. They have a spirit I have never seen before.
  I would like to quote Secretary Brownlee. He said:

       Some in this country have charged that the situation in 
     Iraq is getting progressively worse. You who have been there 
     know the truth, and so do the people of Iraq. Things are 
     getting better, not worse. Though the insurgents have caused 
     immense pain and suffering and delayed reconstruction efforts 
     in some parts of Iraq, most Iraqis are looking at the future 
     with hope, hope they lacked under the former regime.

  These successes constitute significant milestones of which the people 
of our Nation should be proud and hopeful. But the fight is by no means 
over to ensure that Afghanistan and Iraq attain stability and success 
and the transition into the democracies is very key.
  I think we have seen this with the election in Afghanistan. I 
personally was there when officials turned over to the Iraqis the 
training of the Iraqi National Army. I see the successes over there. 
The media has not done a good job and I feel they need to spend more 
time congratulating and talking about the great job we are doing.
  As Mr. Brownlee said, the Army is decisively engaged in fighting 
terrorism. But our soldiers are also building alliances, training other 
militaries with tenets of democracy and civilian control, executing 
counter drug operations and providing disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance. These missions are equally important to our national 
security. They help to increase mobile stability to prevent the 
development of serious crises and to demonstrate the goodwill of the 
American people.
  In light of the potential for terrorism to spread, the Army remains 
committed to participate. That is exactly what they are doing.
  I just got back from eight countries in Africa. There is a concern 
there. There is terrorism. As the squeeze comes in, terrorism is now 
infiltrating into the continent of Africa, and we are in the process of 
doing something with four brigades or five African brigades. So we will 
have them trained to face this when that time comes.
  I see other Senators waiting.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the 
President's nomination of Dr. Fran Harvey to the post of Secretary of 
the Army.
  Our forces are deployed around the world as they have never been 
before. They are fighting hard and they are fighting well to defend 
Americans in the war on terror, and the Army is at the front line of 
that fight.
  Gone are the days when massive and overwhelming force was all this 
country needed to ensure victory. The threats we face and the stresses 
they cause on our force require visionary solutions. Fran Harvey is the 
visionary we need at the head of our largest force.
  Fran Harvey knows how to look at a large organization where the 
bureaucracy is an overwhelming force in its own right, and mold it to 
meet future threats. Dr. Harvey is a successful executive who has 
extensive experience in leading and managing large organizations, 
particularly program based organizations involved in the development 
and deployment of technology and systems.
  He will bring a results oriented management approach to an 
organization where results matter more than anywhere else. As part of 
this approach, Dr. Harvey places major emphasis on business 
transformation through process improvement in combination with the 
application of information technology.
  Fran Harvey's broad base of experience has been multi-dimensional in

[[Page S11351]]

terms of industries, functions, and markets. His industrial experience 
is very diverse and includes aerospace and defense, environmental and 
infrastructure, energy, government facilities management, 
communications and information systems and electronics.
  Fran Harvey has the requisite experience to be Secretary of the Army, 
but what is more important, he is a visionary where long-term vision is 
badly needed. It is my great pleasure to support what I am sure will be 
a successful tenure leading our Army.
 Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, due to a prior commitment, I will 
not be able to vote in the Senate today on President Bush's nomination 
of Dr. Francis J. Harvey of California to be the next Secretary of the 
Army.
  I wish to state for the record that, had I been able to cast my vote 
today in the Senate, I would have voted in favor of Dr. Harvey. As he 
noted in his appearance before the Senate's Committee on Armed 
Services, Dr. Harvey has experience in leading, managing and fostering 
change in large organizations. In addition, I also appreciate that Dr. 
Harvey has experience in the defense industry, experience that should 
help him as he oversees the Army's important process of transforming to 
meet 21st century threats.
  On this last point, I hope that Dr. Harvey will devote considerable 
time and effort to the Army's transformation initiative. If the Army is 
to be a relevant force in future combat operations, it must have the 
resources and the commitment from senior leadership necessary to 
transform. This means that Dr. Harvey and others will need to fight for 
critical science and technology funds to enable key transformational 
programs, such as the Future Combat System, to succeed. While the Army 
does have current needs that require critical funds, it cannot 
sacrifice its future if it hopes to successfully transform.
  In addition, transformation encompasses more than just equipment and 
weapons platforms. I am hopeful that Dr. Harvey will continue to make 
sure that we achieve the proper balance of skills located in the Active 
Duty with those located in the Reserve component. Too many Low Density/
High Demand capabilities, such as military police and civil affairs, 
are found in Army's Reserve component. I am hopeful that the Army, 
under Dr. Harvey's leadership, will be able to strike the right balance 
so that Operational Tempo problems--highlighted by the war on 
terrorism--are not exacerbated.
  Again, had I been present in the Senate today, I would have voted in 
favor of confirming Dr. Francis J. Harvey as the next Secretary of the 
Army. I wish Dr. Harvey good luck on his new responsibilities and 
duties as Secretary of the Army.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Dr. Fran 
Harvey to be the next Secretary of the Army. I have met with Mr. Harvey 
and discussed the responsibilities of this position with him, and I 
believe he is well qualified to lead the Army during this critical 
time.
  As I stand here today, the U.S. Army is succeeding in the global war 
on terrorism despite continued stress on and transformation of the 
force. It is remarkable that the Army is succeeding to the extent that 
they are while--at the same time--undergoing a significant reshaping of 
the force. Many of my colleagues have suggested that a simple increase 
in the number of troops in the Army will solve the Army's challenges. 
While I believe that the Army does, at least in the near-term, need 
additional troops, I believe the Army's largest and most promising 
challenge is to continue transforming itself into a 21st century 
fighting force with 21st century tools and a 21st century management 
structure. I believe that Francis Harvey will help lead the Army in 
this direction.
  As I see it, to relieve the stress on the force, we have to create a 
more flexible force, and I commend Secretary Rumsfeld on the steps he 
has taken to achieve this. To implement these reforms, the Army needs a 
leader who has experience with leading, managing, and reforming large 
organizations. Mr. Francis Harvey has that experience, and the 
necessary business acumen and results oriented approach to get the job 
done.
  I have confidence in Mr. Harvey's ability to lead the men and women 
of the U.S. Army as they meet the challenges of the next decade. He 
will be an effective, forward-thinking leader who will take the Army 
where it needs to go in the coming years.
  In closing, I would also like to recognize the outstanding leadership 
and contribution of the Acting Secretary of the Army over the last 18 
months, my good friend Les Brownlee. Les has led the Army during an 
extraordinary time in the Army's history and deserves to be commended 
for his professionalism and his selfless service to our country and to 
the men and women of the U.S. Army.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to conclude this debate on the 
nominee. The nomination will be voted on, I am told, at 5:15, subject 
to modifications at that time.
  I say in conclusion that I think we have had a very good debate on 
this nomination and also the serious issues affecting the Department of 
the Army. I think it has been helpful in many respects.
  I am prepared to yield back all the remaining time which I have in 
the debate. I understand the distinguished ranking member is prepared 
to do likewise.
  Mr. LEVIN. We yield back the remainder of our time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in that case, I yield the floor with the 
understanding that the distinguished colleague from South Carolina can 
now proceed as he desires with regard to a very important set of 
remarks the Senate is anxious to receive. I say that in all sincerity.
  I thank colleagues for their participation in this debate. I strongly 
urge Members of the Senate to vote for confirmation of the nominee. 
This particular individual who is nominated to be Assistant Secretary 
of Defense came before the Armed Services Committee. He was reported 
out favorably to the floor and had been waiting for some period of time 
for confirmation to that position. The Secretary of Defense made the 
decision to resubmit his name in connection with the Secretary of the 
Army.
  I strongly urge colleagues to support this nominee. This is the 
nomination of the President of the United States.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and 
Senator Levin for allowing us to use the time, and I appreciate it very 
much.