[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 129 (Sunday, October 10, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1848-E1850]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
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HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS
of new york
in the house of representatives
Thursday, October 7, 2004
Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to draw your attention to a
shift in U.S. military strategy towards Latin America that has largely
gone unnoticed. In the last few years the nation has been increasingly
preoccupied with fighting terrorism, and defense and budgetary
appropriations have overwhelmingly focused on the Middle East. Yet the
U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom), encompassing the Caribbean Sea, the
Gulf of Mexico, and parts of the Atlantic Ocean and monitoring 33
countries to our south, has quietly expanded its traditional counter-
narcotics mission to that of counter-terrorism operations. All of this
is occurring in a region more or less devoid of the fundamentalist
Islamic terrorists currently
[[Page E1849]]
threatening America. This change in approach has gone so far as to
redefine terrorism, with drug-runners being termed ``narco-
terrorists.'' As a result, the U.S. is subsequently increasing its
assistance to Latin American militaries. Since many nations in the
region are young and relatively fragile democracies, their strengthened
armies have raised fears about a possible reemergence of limits on free
speech, human rights violations or even a return to military
governments.
The following research memorandum about Washington's post-transition
political and economic strategy for the region was authored by Eleanor
Thomas and Lindsay Thomas, research associates at the Washington-based
Council on Hemispheric Affairs. The Washington-based Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit,
non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has
been described on the Senate floor as being ``one of the nation's most
respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.''
U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) Struggles to Justify Its Role in the
War on Terror
This analysis was prepared by Eleanor Thomas and Lindsay Thomas, COHA
Research Associates.
After decades of U.S. meddling in the Western hemisphere in
the course of its Cold War crusade and subsequent War on
Drugs, Washington has found a new justification for its
heavy-handed intervention in the region. While there is
little evidence that the rest of the hemisphere is a breeding
ground for anti-American terrorist networks, the U.S.
Southern Command (SouthCom) is attempting to promote such a
misinterpretation to further its own self-serving agenda and
above all, to guarantee its funding. Under its current
commander, General James Hill, SouthCom has linked drug
trafficking and armed leftist Latin American political
movements to terrorist threats against U.S. national
security. By extending the definition of terrorism to cover
every bellicose act, the White House has rendered the term
practically meaningless; it has become the definition du jour
to provide Washington with an opportunity to continue its
interventionist tactics based upon its antiterrorist crusade.
Terrorism Discovered
Two years ago, SouthCom received Congressional approval for
a ``mission expansion.'' Previously largely limited to
counter-narcotics activities and the promotion of ``regional
cooperation,'' its duties are now increasingly being framed
within the War on Terror. According to Lisa Haugaard,
Executive Director of the Latin American Working Group,
SouthCom is ``clearly using rhetoric to justify [its]
budgets.'' In November, General Hill will relinquish his
command to Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock, but not
before ensuring that SouthCom remains at the forefront of
Washington's War on Terror. Through the distortion of the
definition of terrorism, the term has become little more than
a rhetorical device. By invoking the word ``terrorism'' on
Capitol Hill, General Hill and his successor are pursuing
additional resources for future expanded military initiatives
that will likely strengthen Latin American military
establishments, which are too often infamous for their long
records of violent oppression during the 1970s and 1980s.
This maneuvering can be seen as a purely self-interested
tactic that will stress the importance of Latin American
armed forces throughout the region.
A New Twist to a Familiar Mission
Since September 11, 2001, national defense priorities and
budgetary appropriations have concentrated on U.S. concerns
in the Middle East. SouthCom's area of responsibility--
encompassing all of Central and South America and the
Caribbean--has remained of secondary importance as Washington
has increasingly defined its international strategy according
to the War on Terror. With al Qaeda seen as the gravest
threat to U.S. national security, and with Latin America
seemingly not a major claimant to such terrorist cells,
aside from the tri-border area, SouthCom's operations are
not a priority for the Pentagon. Perhaps because of this
reduced role, Congress in 2002 granted SouthCom approval
to expand its mission priorities. Military aid and
training in Latin America, which previously were focused
on counter-narcotics operations, have now been re-tasked
as counter-terrorism responsibilities. Preying on the
terrorist fears that are currently dominating Washington's
defense plan, SouthCom claims that it is now pursuing
narcoterrorists to justify its expanded congressionally-
approved budget.
redefining terrorism
SouthCom's new shift towards terrorism is more ominous than
it first appears. In March, General Hill gave his annual
report on SouthCom's activities before the House Armed
Services Committee. According to his testimony, the commander
reported that the U.S. must be alert to two ``growing
threats'' to national security: the ``traditional'' danger of
``narcoterrorists and their ilk,'' and the ``emerging''
menace of ``radical populism'' that taps into the ``deep-
seated frustrations of the failure of democratic reforms.''
Hill's somewhat skewed assessment of the Latin American
situation suggests that ultimately any political opposition,
arguably a necessary element in any healthy democracy, can be
seen as a threat to American national security. The Bush
administration over the past years has instructed its
ambassadors to Bolivia, Nicaragua and El Salvador to inform
local authorities that although Washington respects free
elections, it will not necessarily respect electoral results
if the ``wrong'' people are elected. Former SouthCom
commander General Charles Wilhelm told COHA that while ``I
don't think any Latin American countries pose a specific
threat... there is a threat to the U.S. if existing
democracies are being undermined.'' However, by
characterizing the region's struggles for social and economic
equality as threats to U.S. security, SouthCom not only could
be viewed as erroneously dismissing the importance of such
movements, but could also divert attention away from the
actual terrorist threats currently directed at the U.S.
southcom's history of counter operations
SouthCom's official priorities have historically ranged
from ``counter-drug operations'' and ``engineering and
medical exercises'' to ``security assistance'' and
``military-to-military contact.'' By aiming to strengthen
militaries in the region, SouthCom under Hill has left behind
a controversial legacy in Latin America. General Hill's
recommendations to Congress and Lieutenant General Craddock's
statements during his Senate confirmation hearing showed a
firm commitment to ``maintain and broaden our consistent
military-to-military contacts as a means of irrevocably
institutionalizing the professional nature of those
militaries with which we have worked so closely over the past
several decades.''
Because U.S. law prohibits the direct training of foreign
armed forces, the U.S. military's involvement in such matters
is often classified as ``security assistance.'' However,
there are no safeguards in place to ensure that the Pentagon
provides Congress with detailed information regarding its
participation in current military-to-military interaction.
Nor does Congress hold SouthCom closely accountable for its
commitment to instruct Latin American militaries in the
institutionalization of respect for human rights. It was
this existing accountability loophole throughout the 1970s
and 1980s that allowed the Pentagon, through the infamous
School of the Americas as well as bilateral SouthCom
missions, to both directly and covertly train the
commanders of the death squads associated with Argentina's
``dirty war'' and the brutal contra campaigns that
oppressed Nicaragua's civilian population during that
country's unforgiving conflict.
The strengthening of Latin American armed forces to more
effectively control drug trafficking, gang violence and so-
called political insurgents has recently been used to justify
SouthCom's new terrorism priorities. This could create a
dangerous precedent for the reemergence of the de facto
limits on free speech, human rights violations or even a
return to the grim days of military rule that so traumatized
the region in recent decades. Although violent crime plagues
much of Latin America, defining it as a U.S. national
security concern, and therefore justifiable as a valid
SouthCom mission, will only continue the questionable trend
of expanding U.S. military aid, cooperation and training
throughout the hemisphere. While many Latin American
militaries are still struggling to overcome the bitter
effects and damaged reputations resulting from decades of
human rights abuses and institutionalized corruption, it may
be dangerous to instruct them in anti-terror tactics that
could later be used to suppress their own citizens. Without a
well-established commitment to protecting civil rights and
proper limitations on the autonomy of military institutions,
any renewed U.S. effort to fund and train rogue militaries
could lead to an expansion of their power and an abuse of
their authority, which could hinder the democratic process.
Moreover, some Latin American nations have not yet reached a
level of political maturation nor have maintained a
commitment to democratic principles that are necessary to
ensure such abuse will not occur.
colombia--latin america's supposed terrorist hotbed
According to General Hill, the ``narcoterrorists in
Colombia remain the largest and most well known threat in our
region.'' However, Hill fails to support this claim that
narcoterrorists pose such a direct security threat to the
U.S. In fact, the term narcoterrorist, while full of
threatening implications, is rarely clearly defined by the
U.S. government and its military agencies. At his
confirmation hearing, Lieutenant General Craddock did attempt
to define the highly dubious concept: ``the terms insurgents
or guerrillas are less applicable today than in the past. I
believe the term narcoterrorists is more appropriate, given
the fact that the center of gravity for these groups is the
incredible financial support they get from illicit drug
trafficking.'' The lack of clarity in Craddock's explanation
inadvertently reveals how SouthCom arbitrarily reclassified
the country's leftist armed political opposition, denominated
as guerrillas during the Cold War and drug traffickers in the
1990s, as a blanket terrorist threat. In an attempt to link
the situation in Colombia to Washington's global mission,
Craddock explained, ``supporting the government of Colombia's
efforts to defeat illicit narco-trafficking also directly
supports the
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global War on Terror.'' This assertion is a convenient
attemot to validate this new allusion without any supporting
evidence. The government's arbitrary use of inflammatory
language and its efforts to rationalize Washington's
allocation of
$1.5 billion for Plan Colombia have failed to overcome its
disappointing achievements in the War on Terror as
Colombia had played no part in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
For the past four years, the U.S. government has funded
Plan Colombia as part of a patently ineffective War on Drugs.
Even the head of the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy John Walters, upon returning from a recent
South American visit, reported that Washington's anti-drug
strategy has failed.
Despite SouthCom's dubious reports of its strategy's
success, Plan Colombia's failures are numerous. Colombia's
supply and the U.S.' demand for drugs remain essentially
unchanged. While U.S. armed forces are already overextended,
SouthCom is now seeking to further involve U.S. military
personnel in Colombia's protracted civil war by requesting an
increase from 400 to 800 military officers and from 400 to
600 private contractors allowed to be present in the country.
Critics contend that the now militarized Plan Colombia has
failed to effectively address the country's armed forces'
proclivity for human rights violations. Additionally, in its
own annual human rights report, the State Department has
maintained that the U.S.-trained Colombian military continues
to associate with illegal rightwing paramilitary groups--
Colombia's prime human rights violators. This subject is
continually under-addressed in SouthCom's public statements.
Following in the footsteps of the U.S. Patriot Act, the
Colombian Congress has passed anti-terror legislation that
allows the military to arbitrarily conduct searches and tap
the telephones of citizens without a warrant. U.S. support,
along with high funding for Colombia, has contributed to a
flawed domestic policy in the South American country. The
latest attempts to recast the nation's perpetual unrest as a
terrorism problem that threatens U.S. national security not
only represents little regard for the facts and a twisting of
reality, but is simply the latest stage in the repeating of a
foreign policy project that has never worked.
guantanamo bay--southCom's contribution to the war on terror
SouthCom's insistence that it is engaged in responsible
security practices and upholds human rights values awaits
final judgment, especially considering its jurisdiction over
the terrorist detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since
its creation as a prison facility in 2002, Camp X-ray has
faced consistent criticism from groups such as Amnesty
International (AI) which claim U.S. officials have sanctioned
illegal practices at the facility. Prisoner testimony and
photographs have established that suspected al Qaeda
detainees have been held without trial or proper legal
representation and may have suffered some of the same torture
tactics that took place at the now infamous Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq. AI alleged in its report that ``despite public
commitments to the humane treatment of detainees, it
subsequently has been revealed that the U.S. administration's
decision not to apply provisions of the Geneva Conventions to
those being held in Guantanamo may have been motivated by a
desire to apply harsher interrogation techniques than it
perceived would be allowed under the Geneva Conventions.''
Though SouthCom officers may be just one link in the chain of
command, the detention facility is ultimately located within
its region of responsibility. While SouthCom continues to
lobby Congress for increased funding, Camp X-ray remains a
glaring black mark that contrasts with SouthCom's
professed support for legal procedures and human rights
practices.
finding the causes, not just the terrorists
In the tumultuous history of U.S.-Latin American relations,
Washington has developed a strategy wherein various political
and military means have been used to deal with a range of
challenges and security threats posed by its southern
neighbors. As the world leader in the war on Communism, the
United States carried out regime change in Latin America with
singular tenacity. This included the training of the
Nicaraguan contras, the support of brutal dictatorships in
Guatemala, the endorsement of General Augusto Pinochet's
repressive regime in Chile, and the backing of the
particularly savage Argentina military junta after it came to
power in 1976.
In an attempt to adapt to its post-9/11 anti-terrorism
focus, the U.S. has amalgamated drug trafficking and
``radical populism'' into its terrorist fighting tactics.
This has been particularly evident in its policy formulations
regarding Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela. While the previous
eras, inspired first by the Cold War and then by the War on
Drugs, turned out to be based on a very sketchy rationale,
they were more solidly rooted than the current War on Terror.
Domestic conflicts throughout Latin America do not arise out
of thin air. The urgent social conditions and volatile
political environs that went unacknowledged by the U.S. in
previous decades account for the instability that the region
is currently experiencing. The causative agents behind the
new threat of terrorism are no different. As the Latin
American Working Group argues in its report on terrorism,
``while law enforcement action against terrorists is
essential, the most sustainable way to combat broader support
for terrorist activities is to address the conditions that
foster it--poverty, lack of social and economic development,
and undemocratic and repressive regimes that leave their
citizens scant hope of bettering their lives, and hence open
space for those offering extreme alternatives.''
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