[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 121 (Thursday, September 30, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9997-S10050]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        IRAQ--SHIFTING RATIONALE

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, with tonight's Presidential debate coming 
up, the whole Nation will be watching John Kerry and George Bush debate 
the all important issue of why America went to war in Iraq, when Iraq 
was not an imminent threat, had no nuclear weapons, no persuasive links 
to al-Qaida, no connection to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 
and no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
  It is now clear that from the very moment President Bush took office, 
Iraq was his highest priority as unfinished business from the first 
Bush administration.
  His agenda was clear: find a rationale to get rid of Saddam.
  Then came 9/11. In the months that followed, the war in Afghanistan 
and the hunt for Osama bin Laden had obvious priority, because al-Qaida 
was clearly the greatest threat to our national security.
  Despite all the clear and consistent warnings about al-Qaida, 
President Bush treated it as a distraction from his obsession with 
Saddam. By the summer of 2002, President Bush was restless for war with 
Iraq. The war in Afghanistan was no longer in the headlines or at the 
center of attention. Bin Laden was hard to find, the economy was in 
trouble, and so was the President's approval ratings in the polls.
  Karl Rove had tipped his hand earlier by stating that the war on 
terrorism could bring political benefits as well. The President's 
undeniable goal was to convince the American people that war was 
necessary with Iraq--and necessary right away--because Saddam was a 
bigger threat.
  That conclusion was not supported by the facts or the intelligence, 
but they could be retrofitted to support it. Senior administration 
officials kept suggesting the threat from Iraq was imminent.
  At a roundtable discussion with European journalists last month, 
Secretary Rumsfeld insisted: ``I never said imminent threat.''
  In fact, Secretary Rumsfeld had told the House Armed Services 
Committee on September 18, 2002, ``. . . Some have argued that the 
nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent--that Saddam is at least 5-7 
years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain.''
  In May 2003, White spokesman Ari Fleischer was asked whether he went 
to war ``because we said WMD were a direct and imminent threat to the 
United States.'' Fleischer responded, ``Absolutely.''
  What else could National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice have been 
suggesting, other than an imminent threat--an extremely imminent

[[Page S9998]]

threat--when she said on September 8, 2002, ``We don't want the smoking 
gun to be a mushroom cloud.''
  President Bush himself may not have used the word ``imminent'', but 
he carefully chose strong and loaded words about the nature of the 
threat--words that the intelligence community never used--to persuade 
and prepare the Nation to go to war against Iraq.
  In the Rose Garden on October 2, 2002, as Congress was preparing to 
vote on authorizing the war, the President said the Iraqi regime ``is a 
threat of unique urgency.''
  In a speech in Cincinnati on October 7 that year, President Bush 
echoed Condoleezza Rice's image of nuclear devastation: ``Facing clear 
evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking 
gun--that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.'' He says he did 
not use the word ``imminent.'' What could be more imminent than talk 
like that?
  At a political appearance in New Mexico on October 28, 2002, after 
Congress had voted to authorize war, and a week before the election, 
President Bush said Iraq was a ``real and dangerous threat.''
  At a NATO summit on November 20, 2002, President Bush said Iraq posed 
a ``unique and urgent threat.''
  In Fort Hood, TX, on January 3, 2003, President Bush called the Iraqi 
regime a ``grave threat.''
  Nuclear weapons. Mushroom cloud. Unique and urgent threat. Real and 
dangerous threat. Grave threat. This was the administration's rallying 
cry for war.
  When he was Secretary of Defense during the first Gulf War, Vice 
President Cheney said, ``We were not going to get bogged down in the 
problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.''
  As Senator Edwards has said, Secretary Cheney was against getting 
bogged down in Iraq before he was for it.
  Here is another quote from the New York Times in 1991, by Secretary 
Cheney:

       If you are going to go in and topple Saddam Hussein, you 
     have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got Baghdad, it's not 
     clear what you're going to do with it. It's not clear what 
     kind of government you would put in place. How much 
     credibility is that government going to have if it is set up 
     by the United States military when it is there? How long does 
     the United States military have to protect the people that 
     sign on for that government? What happens to it once we 
     leave?

  That was Secretary Cheney, his words. He was against the war, too, 
before he was for it.
  But, it was Vice President Cheney who first laid out the trumped up 
argument for war with Iraq to an unsuspecting public. In a speech on 
August 26, 2002, to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he asserted: ``. . . 
We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons . . . Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear 
weapons fairly soon.'' As we now know, the intelligence community was 
far from certain. Yet the Vice President had no doubt.
  On September 8, 2002, Cheney was even more emphatic about Saddam. He 
said, ``[We] do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his 
procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich 
uranium to build a nuclear weapon.'' The intelligence community was 
deeply divided about the aluminum tubes, but Cheney was absolutely 
certain.
  One month later, on the eve of the watershed vote by Congress to 
authorize the war, President Bush said it even more vividly. He said, 
``Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes . . . 
which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. If the Iraqi 
regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched 
uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear 
weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible 
line would be crossed . . . Saddam Hussein would be in a position to 
pass nuclear technology to terrorists.''
  In fact, as we now know, the intelligence community was far from 
united on Iraq's nuclear threat. The administration attempted to 
conceal the disagreement from the public by classifying the information 
and the dissents by the intelligence community until after the war, 
even while making dramatic and excessive public statements about the 
immediacy of the danger.
  The second major claim in the administration's case for war was the 
linkage between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida.
  The National Intelligence Estimate found no cooperative relationship 
between Saddam and al-Qaida. On the contrary, it stated only that such 
a relationship might happen if Saddam were ``sufficiently desperate''--
in other words, if America went to war. But the intelligence estimate 
placed ``low confidence'' that, even in desperation, Saddam would give 
weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaida.
  President Bush ignored all that. He was relentless in raising 
America's fears about Saddam after the devastating 9/11 tragedy. He 
drew a clear link--and drew it repeatedly--between al-Qaida and Saddam.
  In a September 25, 2002, statement at the White House, President Bush 
flatly declared: ``You can't distinguish between al-Qaida and Saddam 
when you talk about the war on terror.'' How could any President make a 
preposterous statement like that?
  He kept piling it on. In his State of the Union Address in January 
2003, President Bush said, ``Evidence from intelligence sources, secret 
communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that 
Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-
Qaida.'' He said Saddam could provide ``lethal viruses'' to a ``shadowy 
terrorist network.''
  Two weeks later, in his radio address to the Nation, a month before 
the war began, President Bush described the ties in detail, saying 
``Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to 
terrorist networks...''
  He said: ``Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaida have met 
at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb making 
and document-forgery experts to work with al-Qaida. Iraq has also 
provided al-Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training. An al-
Qaida operative was sent to Iraq several times in the late 1990s for 
help in acquiring poisons and gases. We also know that Iraq is 
harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior al-Qaida terrorist 
planner. This network runs a poison and explosive training camp in 
northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad.''
  In fact, there was no operational link and no clear and persuasive 
pattern of ties between the Iraq and al-Qaida. That fact should have 
been abundantly clear to President Bush, since Iraq and al-Qaida had 
diametrically opposite views of the world.
  Al-Qaida and its religious fanatics detested Saddam, because Saddam 
was a secular dictator. Yet, President Bush had more than half the 
country believing that Saddam and al-Qaida were in cahoots on 9/11.
  Secretary of State Colin Powell now agrees that there was no link 
between 9/11 and Saddam's regime. So does Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld.
  A bipartisan 9/11 Commission Staff Statement put it plainly: ``Two 
senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed 
between al-Qaida and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and 
al-Qaida cooperated on attacks against the United States.''
  The bipartisan 9/11 Commission report stated clearly that there was 
no evidence of a collaborative ``operational'' connection between 
Saddam and al-Qaida. The report said there was no evidence ``indicating 
that Iraq cooperated with al-Qaida in developing or carrying out any 
attacks against the United States.''
  This past July, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan 
report whose title was, ``Prewar Intelligence Regarding Iraq Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and Links to Terrorism.'' The report said there was 
not ``an established formal relationship'' between al-Qaida and Saddam 
Hussein.
  But in his march to war, President Bush exaggerated the threat 
anyway. It was not subtle. It was not nuanced. It was pure, 
unadulterated fear mongering, based on a devious strategy to convince 
the American people that Saddam had helped commit 9/11 and had the 
ability to provide nuclear weapons to al-Qaida, so that immediate war 
was necessary.
  America went to war in Iraq because President Bush insisted that 
nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein and his ties to al-Qaida 
were too

[[Page S9999]]

dangerous to ignore. None of that was true, so all that President Bush 
says now is that Saddam was a brutal dictator and that America and the 
world are better off without him. Talk about flip-flops.
  How dare President Bush accuse John Kerry of flip-flops on Iraq. My 
response is ``Physician, heal thyself.'' President Bush is the all-time 
world-record-holder for flip-flops. Nothing John Kerry has said 
remotely compares with President Bush's gigantic flip-flops on the 
reasons he went to war.
  The war in Iraq itself has not made America safer and has not made 
the world safer. None of the President's post war rationalizations are 
sufficient to justify war.
  Almost every week, President bush tries a new rationale for the war. 
He's said our goal was ``sovereignty'' for Iraq, ``dignity'' for Iraq's 
culture, and ``for every Iraqi citizen, the opportunity for a better 
life.''
  On April 30, 2004, he suggested the war was about human rights, 
saying ``there are no longer torture chambers or rape rooms or mass 
graves in Iraq.''
  He's suggested the war was for freedom and democracy.
  He's said, ``The rise of a free and self-governing Iraq will deny 
terrorists a base of operation, discredit their narrow ideology, and 
give momentum to reformers across the region.''
  He has said the war was ``a victory for the security of America and 
the civilized world.''
  None of this rationale is an adequate justification for war, and the 
President did not even try to make them a justification until long 
after the war began and all the other plausible justifications had 
proven false.
  Saddam was not an imminent threat. The war in Iraq was a perilous 
distraction from the real war on terrorism--the war against al-Qaida. 
President Bush got it exactly wrong. To him, the war in Afghanistan was 
a distraction from the war he wanted against Saddam.
  The war on in Iraq has clearly made America more hated in the world, 
especially in the Islamic world, and it has made Americans more 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks both here at home and overseas.
  We'll hear much more about this issue in tonight's Presidential 
debate, and the debate will go in Congress and in communities across 
the country between now and the election. The most important decision 
any President ever makes is the decision on war or peace. No President 
who misleads the country on the need for war deserves to be reelected. 
Any President who does so must be held accountable, and November 2 is 
the chance to do it.
  Mr. President, we know that some defenders of the President are 
desperate to support him. They say any dissent is only helping the 
terrorists. They even claim that al-Qaida wants John Kerry to win this 
election.
  It's despicable to make charges like that. It is not unpatriotic to 
tell the truth to the American people about the war in Iraq. In this 
grave moment of our country, to use the words of Thomas Jefferson, 
``Dissent is the highest form of patriotism.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski.) The Senator from Oregon is now 
recognized for 10 minutes.


                         Senator Kerry and Iraq

  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I have been privileged on a number of 
occasions to be in that chair when Senator Kennedy was speaking. I say 
this with affection and admiration. Senator Kennedy has been clear from 
the beginning of this conflict that he is against the war in Iraq, and 
I respect his clarity. But it is interesting that while the senior 
Senator from Massachusetts has been entirely clear and entirely 
consistent, the junior Senator from Massachusetts, the Democratic 
nominee, could not have been in more confusion, leaving the American 
people in a greater sense of chaos than words could make possible.
  It is amazing, interesting, that we have in Senator Kerry a decorated 
Vietnam veteran, and yet we have in Senator Kerry a man who now is 
falling in the polls who faces tonight an opportunity to clarify for 
the American people his position on Iraq. With plummeting poll numbers, 
it has to be asked, why has his fortunes as a war hero and veteran been 
so reversed?
  I find the answer in the Good Book in a verse where Paul says:

       For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall 
     prepare himself to the battle?

  I do not know that there is a more certain sound than Senator 
Kennedy. I cannot imagine a more uncertain sound than Senator Kerry.
  Let's review the record. Whether you are for or against the war, 
those are positions one can argue, as I have done on the side of the 
war on terrorism that includes Iraq, or as Senator Kennedy has against 
Iraq as a part of the war on terrorism, but let's review what Senator 
Kerry has said to the American people.
  Did going to war in Iraq make us more secure or less secure? 
Apparently, Senator Kerry is not sure. He is saying now that we traded 
a dictator for chaos in Iraq. That has made us less secure. But during 
the primary season, he ravaged Howard Dean by saying:

       Those who doubted whether Iraq or the world would be better 
     off without Saddam Hussein and those who believe we are not 
     safer with his capture don't have the judgment to be 
     President or the credibility to be elected President.

  Yet those are two diametrically opposed positions.
  Yesterday on ABC's ``Good Morning America,'' Diane Sawyer asked him 
this very question. He said: We won't know until we know whether this 
has been successful or not. Thank Heavens President Roosevelt did not 
have that position after Corregidor or President Lincoln after 
Antietam. I think John Kerry was right: People who cannot make up their 
minds should not be President of the United States.
  But which is it? If, indeed, as Senator Kerry has claimed, we are 
less secure, then it seems that he is lacking a serious component of 
judgment.
  Can Senator Kerry, by virtue of bringing a new face to the 
Presidency, convince some of our reluctant allies to participate more 
vigorously to bringing democracy in Iraq? He believes he can, despite 
the fact that both the French and German governments have said time and 
again, repeatedly, no matter the outcome of the American election, they 
will not do more to help in Iraq.
  So it seems to me that Senator Kerry is playing a rather false hand 
to the American people. It is an illusory promise. It just will not 
happen.

  I have heard the Senator complain that we do not have enough troops, 
and now he wants to pull the troops home. So the question is, Should we 
increase the number of American troops or should we bring them home and 
leave Iraq to the Iraqis? This is a question about which reasonable 
people can disagree, but Senator Kerry's statements indicate he 
disagrees again with himself.
  First he says we should do what the military leaders say, even if 
that means deploying more troops to Iraq. Then he said he intends to 
get all Americans troops home in his first term. Then last week he said 
he does not intend to increase troops at all. Specifically he said:

       I believe as a new President, with new credibility, with a 
     fresh start, that I have the ability to be able to change the 
     dynamics on the ground.

  I agree with him; he would certainly change the dynamics on the 
ground. The enemies of freedom in Iraq would feel emboldened to wait it 
out until the United States leaves, rather than recognize the 
democratic process is irreversible. That is not the kind of dynamic I 
want to see or the American people deserve to see.
  When the Senate voted to give President Bush the authority to go to 
war, did we mean he could actually start a war? This is a question that 
I, as a Senator, take very seriously. Senator Kerry voted for the 
authorization, just as I did, but is now saying:

       The authority was the authority to do the inspections. The 
     authority is the authority to build an alliance. The 
     authority was necessary because it was the only way to make 
     inspections happen so that you could hold Saddam Hussein 
     accountable.

  And that the Senate also gave the President the ``authority not to go 
to war.'' End of quote from John Kerry.
  Yet what did the resolution actually say, Madam President? It could 
not be clearer. You heard what John Kerry said, what he thought it 
said, but he should have read it. It says: ``Joint Resolution to 
authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces against

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Iraq.'' If my colleague read nothing else in the resolution but that 
first line, he would still have known what this resolution was designed 
to do.
  Later in the text, in case anyone missed the intent, it states:

       The Congress declares that this section--

  Which authorizes the use of the Armed Forces--

     is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
     within the meaning of 5(b) of the War Powers resolution.

  There is no room for disagreement about what we are doing with this 
resolution. He voted for it. I did. An overwhelming majority did. And 
it does not say what Senator Kerry now says it said.
  I take responsibility for voting on matters of war and peace very 
seriously, but we cannot have it both ways. We cannot expect to have 
credibility in the world, that Senator Kerry so consistently states he 
would bring, if we squander our words in meaning in such a way as he 
now does on matters as important as authorizing war and peace.
  What do we do going forward, Madam President? On September 20, 
Senator Kerry gave a speech outlining his latest plan for Iraq. He had 
four main points.

  The first: The President must get international support so American 
troops do not have to ``go it alone.''
  The fact is, 32 countries are contributing 25,000 soldiers to the 
coalition effort in Iraq.
  The second part of his plan: The President must get serious about 
training Iraqi forces.
  Yet there are currently almost 100,000 fully trained Iraqi soldiers, 
police officers, and other security personnel out of the 164,000 Iraqis 
out there on the front lines defending their freedom and protecting 
their country. An additional 75,000 Iraqis have received some form of 
security training to guard important facilities.
  The third point: The President must carry out a reconstruction plan 
that brings tangible benefits to the Iraqi people.
  Yet the United States has already spent more than a billion dollars 
on urgent reconstruction projects in areas threatened by the 
insurgency. In the next several months, over $9 billion will be spent 
on contracts that will help Iraqis rebuild schools, hospitals, bridges, 
as well as upgrade the electricity grid and modernize the 
communications system.
  This point is actually particularly laughable, given that Senator 
Kerry, who now says we have to do this, voted against the money to do 
this. He voted against the $87 billion before he says he voted for it 
that included nearly $20 billion in vital reconstruction for Iraq. 
Again, the uncertainty.
  His final point: The President must take immediate steps to guarantee 
elections in Iraq will be held next year.
  Yet an Iraqi electoral commission is now up and running and has 
already hired personnel and is making key decisions about electoral 
procedures. The commission launched a public education campaign to 
inform Iraqis about the process and encourage them to become voters, 
and United Nation's electoral advisers are on the ground in Iraq.
  What is particularly interesting about this is that on May 24, 2004, 
nearly 4 months before Senator Kerry's speech in New York, President 
Bush laid out a five-step plan for helping Iraq achieve democracy and 
freedom. Everything Senator Kerry proposed was part of the President's 
plan he announced in May, and the administration has been implementing 
it.
  In conclusion, at the present time, Senator Kerry issued a press 
release stating that the President's speech laid out general 
principles--and this is laughable--``most of which we've heard before'' 
because they are part and parcel of the President's plan.
  So if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, no one will prepare to 
battle, and that, I believe, is the reason for Senator Kerry's 
plummeting in the opinion polls of the United States.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, we are now going to resume 
consideration of S. 2845. Senator Lieberman and I, along with the two 
leaders, encourage Members to come forward with their amendments. The 
leaders are determined that we will finish this bill very early next 
week. In order to do so, we need the cooperation of all Senators who 
have filed amendments, and we encourage them to bring them forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.


                           Amendment No. 3797

  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Madam President, I rise today to speak on what 
I consider to be one of the most important areas of intelligence 
reform, and then I will offer an amendment to help advance that 
position.
  Over the last several weeks, I have been making a series of 
statements on various aspects of intelligence reform. In my recent 
statements, I have discussed the history of the U.S. intelligence 
community, the community's failure to adapt to changing conditions 
since the end of the Cold War, the unfortunate reluctance of both the 
Congress and the administration to tackle these much needed and long-
reported necessary reforms, the shape that I believe our reform should 
take, and the danger that excessive Government secrecy poses to our 
national security.
  I have also expressed my gratitude to the independent 9/11 Commission 
and its predecessors for the work they have done in analyzing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the American intelligence community and 
offering recommendations as to how these weaknesses can be remedied.
  Today, I also thank several of my colleagues for the work they have 
done in providing the groundwork for this legislation and moving it 
substantially toward fruition. Senators Collins and Lieberman have put 
a substantial amount of work into crafting meaningful bipartisan 
intelligence reform legislation that seeks to correct current failings. 
They and their staffs should be commended for that effort.
  In addition, Senators McCain and Roberts have stepped forward with 
very thoughtful proposals for reform, and as we work to fine-tune the 
Collins-Lieberman bill, their proposals will be an excellent source of 
ideas and alternatives.
  We all owe our gratitude to the other members of the Governmental 
Affairs and Intelligence Committees, especially Vice Chairman 
Rockefeller on the Intelligence Committee, and their respective staff 
members for all the contributions they have made to the debate over the 
direction of intelligence reform.
  I spoke last week about the direction in which I thought we should 
move with these reforms and the shape these reforms should take. I 
would now like to discuss in more detail how we might accomplish that 
within this legislation.
  I will offer an amendment which I hope will be a contribution to 
achieving these goals. First some background.
  Our national intelligence community currently resembles our military 
as it looked prior to 1947. It is made up of a number of agencies that 
originated at different times and with different structures, with 
shared common goals, but frequently found they had difficulty working 
with one another because of their different histories, different 
cultures, different bureaucratic structures, and different priorities. 
That would have also been a definition for the American military pre-
1947.
  In that year, at the urging of President Harry Truman, Congress 
passed the National Security Act, which brought together all of the 
components of the military. There had been a Secretary of the Navy, 
there had been a Secretary of War, sometimes referred to as the 
Secretary of the Army, and there certainly would have been a Secretary 
of the Air Force had the National Security Act not intervened. This new 
legislation created for the first time a civilian leader at the top and 
uniformed service chiefs reporting to that leader.

  This was an important reform, but it did not end all the rivalries 
and competition for actions and spending resources within the military. 
There were a series of events that occurred in the late 1970s and early 
1980s which dramatized these continuing weaknesses. We were unable to 
rescue hostages who had been taken in Tehran. We were unable to avoid 
the massacre of over 200 American marines in barracks in Beirut by 
Hezbollah, and there were a series of missteps on the small island of 
Grenada. Reviewing all of these issues, in 1986, it was becoming

[[Page S10001]]

apparent that though all the services reported to a single departmental 
head, they still had many problems communicating with one another and 
working effectively together.
  As it had in 1947, Congress again stepped forward with the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, which decentralized the military establishment. Control 
over military operations moved from the Pentagon to several joint 
commands, each responsible for a different geographic area of the 
world. As a result, the U.S. military has become more effective than 
ever before.
  Given that our international intelligence community is currently in a 
pre-1947 state, our challenge now is to enact both the equivalence of 
the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
at the same time. In other words, we must centralize authority and then 
immediately commence the process of decentralizing the bureaucracy.
  We waited 39 years between the National Security Act and Goldwater-
Nichols. We cannot afford to wait 39 years between the action we will 
hopefully take this year and the time we will begin to decentralize the 
intelligence bureaucracies. It is essential that this legislation 
create a strong director of national intelligence and also lay out the 
best possible structure for intelligence collection and analysis.
  In my view and in the view of many others, our intelligence community 
would be most effective if it were organized around the mission-based 
model that brings personnel from different agencies and specialties 
together to focus on whatever intelligence missions the national 
director deems to be most important.
  In a recent publication called ``Intelligence Matters,'' I state:

       This may seem counterintuitive, but for us to deal with 
     this decentralization, we must first centralize. Since their 
     inception, the agencies that make up our foreign intelligence 
     community have focused on assignments like the collection of 
     signals or visual images. While each agency focuses on its 
     own responsibilities, the larger realities--like the changed 
     nature of the enemy--go unattended. They are nobody's 
     business.

  The structure we have before us today gives us an opportunity to 
place those large issues of adaptation to new threats in an appropriate 
structure.
  The director will be responsible for giving the centers their 
missions and assigning them the personnel and resources they need to do 
their job.
  He or she can then be held accountable for the centers' performance 
and accomplishments.
  This model was previously suggested by the 9/11 Commission.
  In the conclusion of its report, it discusses the structural problems 
that currently plague our intelligence community, and suggest that 
significant changes must be made in order to achieve unity of effort 
among the community's various agencies.
  The Commission report recommends that a national center for 
counterterrorism be established, and I am pleased that President Bush 
has endorsed the creation of such a center, and it is contained in the 
legislation before us today.
  This center will bring together personnel from a variety of 
disciplines and specialties from across the intelligence community to 
focus on the problem of international terrorism.
  By bringing them all together and placing them on the same staff, we 
can overcome the bureaucratic and sociological barriers that have 
sometimes prevented them from being effective.
  This will also help us use our intelligence resources more 
efficiently by ensuring that different agencies are not doing redundant 
work on the same threat.
  In addition to a national counterterrorism center, the Commission 
also recommends that other centers be created to focus on different 
global challenges, such as nuclear proliferation, international drug 
trafficking, or particular rogue states such as North Korea, and Iran.
  These centers would be able to bring together personnel in the same 
manner as the Counterterrorism Center, allowing us to be more efficient 
and effective in intelligence gathering and analysis.
  The Commission recommended that management of these centers should be 
one of the director's primary responsibilities. Their recommendation 
states:

       The current position of Director of Central Intelligence 
     should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with 
     two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national 
     intelligence centers on specific subjects of interests across 
     the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national 
     intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute 
     to it.

  The national director must be given the flexibility to create, 
reorganize or even disband these centers as needed, just as the 
Secretary of Defense has the authority to shift the responsibility of 
the unified commands.
  For instance, Syria and Lebanon were once included in the European 
Command, but as the international situation changed, it became more 
appropriate to move them to Central Command, which already included 
their Middle Eastern neighbors.
  A second instance is the Caribbean region, which was previously 
included in the Atlantic Command and has since been moved to the 
Southern Command, which includes the rest of Latin America.
  Congress had empowered the Secretary of Defense to make these 
decisions while maintaining its constitutional responsibility for 
oversight and appropriations.
  This wise allocation of authority has enabled the Department of 
Defense to do what the intelligence community has been unable to do; 
that is to respond to changing conditions in a swift and decisive 
manner.
  The authors of Goldwater-Nichols gave the Secretary of Defense the 
necessary level of flexibility and adaptability by not writing into law 
which commands should be created and what countries they should 
include.
  Instead, we empowered the Secretary to establish or alter the unified 
commands as circumstances dictate.
  The current version of the Collions-Lieberman bill includes language 
to establish national intelligence centers, in accordance with the 9/11 
Commission's recommendations.
  This is obviously a significant step in the right direction.
  However, I believe that is necessary to make some modifications to 
the language in order to clarify the purpose of the centers and to 
ensure that the national intelligence director has the authority needed 
to manage them effectively.
  Some of the provisions that we need to be aware of and include in the 
final version of this legislation as it relates to national 
intelligence centers are these:
  First, we should include language making clear that the mission of 
the national intelligence centers is to focus on specific threats.
  In keeping with the Commission's recommendation, this would mean that 
some centers might focus on specific countries or regions, while others 
would focus on global problems such as nuclear proliferation.
  Second, we must make the national intelligence centers the focal 
point of intelligence gathering and analysis for their particular area 
of focus.
  The centers should develop a strategy for the collection and analysis 
of intelligence regarding their area of focus and draw upon the 
resources of the various intelligence agencies to implement this 
strategy.
  To give an example of how this might work, imagine that the national 
director believes that we need a focus on counterproliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and surely we do.
  In a very important recent book, ``Nuclear Terrorism,'' by Graham 
Allison, it is pointed out that there are two important truths as it 
relates to nuclear terrorism. The first is that it is inevitable that 
nuclear weapons will come into the hands of terrorists who will use 
them against us. The second truth is that inevitability is preventable.
  Professor Allison points out a number of steps that must be taken in 
order to avoid the inevitable. Many of those relate to the intelligence 
community's role. Professor Allison makes a number of suggestions as to 
what reforms are required in order to avoid a nuclear weapon in the 
hands of a terrorist who is destined to use it against the people of 
the United States.
  Just to summarize his points:
  First, American intelligence must move beyond its Cold War mindset. 
This legislation will help us achieve that goal.
  Second, the United States must cultivate long-term strategic 
relationships with foreign intelligence agencies. I believe having a 
strong director

[[Page S10002]]

of national intelligence will contribute to that objective.
  Third, the American intelligence community must enhance its data-
mining efforts to process, analyze, and disseminate open sources of 
intelligence. This legislation provides a heightened awareness of the 
value and the credibility of open source information, that is 
information that is available, other than through clandestine means.
  Finally and above all, intelligence assessments must be credible.
  I believe this provision for the establishment of national 
intelligence centers will make a dramatic contribution toward enhancing 
the credibility of U.S. intelligence.
  The fact that we are creating within this legislation one national 
intelligence center, that for counterterrorism, and leaving the 
creation of the other centers up to the discretion of the national 
intelligence director is essentially an accident of history. The 9/11 
attacks were the use of conventional weapons--fire and gasoline--in a 
nonconventional manner--large airplanes flying into large buildings.
  If the attacks of 9/11 had taken another form, such as a cargo 
container which was loaded at a distant point and arrived in the Port 
of New York and was unloaded, and a week later found itself in downtown 
Chicago, and because that container, in addition to its commercial 
cargo, also carried a dirty nuclear bomb, and that bomb, were it to be 
detonated, we would have had an event multiple times of what, in fact, 
happened on 9/11. And I can assure you that the center would have been 
written into this legislation and would have been the center on the 
avoidance of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  We are about to give that authority to the director of intelligence. 
I believe we should give it to him with as close as possible the same 
authority and the same capability as we are statutorily giving to the 
center on terrorism. That is what this amendment attempts to do.
  Finally, we must ensure that our national intelligence community is 
constantly adapting in response to changes in the world around us. 
Unfortunately, our intelligence community, since its inception in that 
same National Security Act of 1947, has had difficulty adapting to 
changed circumstances. It had that difficulty in the 1950s. It has had 
that difficulty since the last of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s 
through the early 1990s. Our intelligence agencies were slow in 
shifting their focus from the Soviet Union to the more diffuse threat 
such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, and rogue states.
  As former CIA Director James Woolsey put it:

       It was as if we had been struggling with a dragon for 45 
     years and finally defeated it . . . and then found ourselves 
     in the jungle with a lot of poisonous snakes. The snakes were 
     harder to keep track of than the dragon.

  The national director should be required to frequently review the 
mission and areas of responsibility of the intelligence centers, so 
that we do not waste time staring at the dragon which we have already 
slain.
  He must also have the ability to create new centers rapidly, so that 
they are not slow to react to the appearance of snakes.
  The amendment I am offering would modify the very instructive 
policies in the Collins-Lieberman bill to lay the groundwork for 
reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission, and ensure that the 
national director has sufficient authority to carry them out.
  Madam President and colleagues, I draw your attention to the fact 
that I have discussed this amendment with Governor Kean and with former 
Congressman Lee Hamilton, the distinguished Chair of the 9/11 
Commission. And I am pleased they have responded enthusiastically.
  I have received a letter from Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton 
which includes this statement:

       The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be 
     overstated. Without it, it is not possible to ``connect the 
     dots.'' No one competent today holds all of the relevant 
     information. Our view is it is imperative to have unity of 
     effort across the intelligence community.
       Therefore, we strongly endorse the creation of national 
     intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across 
     the U.S. Government. Clearly, with regard to the high 
     priority of counterterrorism, the centers should be the 
     intelligence entity inside the national counterterrorism 
     center . . . we have proposed. Other national intelligence 
     centers--for instance, on counter-proliferation, crime and 
     narcotics, the Middle East, Russia and China--could be 
     created based on the President and National Security 
     Council's determination of need.

  The letter concludes:

       A true sharing of all relevant information among analysts, 
     and the creation of national intelligence centers offering 
     the best advice and analysis to the President--together with 
     the continued independence of State, Treasury, Energy and 
     Defense Department analytical units--provides a better way to 
     foster competitive analysis than does the status quo.
       To keep the country secure, we believe the government must 
     build the intelligence capabilities it will need for the 
     broad range of national security challenges in the decades 
     ahead.

  We have the opportunity to take a step which will fundamentally 
enhance the security of the people of America not only against the 
threat that we know today, not only against the dragons with which we 
are currently grappling, but with those poisonous snakes that may not 
be so obvious, the poisonous snakes which may be hiding just beyond the 
horizon.
  The national intelligence centers will be a key to our ability to do 
for intelligence what Goldwater-Nichols did in 1986 for our military.
  I urge my colleagues to seriously consider and to adopt these 
amendments to the excellent legislation which is before us today.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Governor Kean and 
Congressman Hamilton be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                               September 27, 2004.
     Hon. Bob Graham.
       Dear Senator Graham: Thank you for your question about the 
     9/11 Commission's proposal to establish national intelligence 
     centers. The Commission made 41 recommendations that we 
     believe will significantly improve the security and safety of 
     all Americans. All of the recommendations are, in our 
     estimation, important.
       We see a particular need for creating national intelligence 
     centers. We have reviewed your suggest amendment on the topic 
     of national intelligence centers. The language seems 
     constructive, and consistent with our proposed approach. As 
     far as how to proceed, we leave the tactics of floor 
     consideration to you and the bill managers.
       In our investigation of the 9/11 attacks, we learned that 
     the national security institutions of the U.S. government are 
     still the institutions constructed to fight the Cold War. 
     National intelligence is still organized around the 
     collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint 
     mission.
       The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be 
     overstated. Without it, it is not possible to ``connect the 
     dots.'' No one component today holds all the relevant 
     information. Our view is that it is imperative to have unity 
     of effort across the intelligence community.
       Therefore, we strongly endorse the creation of national 
     intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across 
     the U.S. government. Clearly, with regard to the high 
     priority of counterterrorism, the center--should be the 
     intelligence entity (formerly the Terrorist Threat 
     Integration Center) inside the National Counterterrorism 
     Center we have proposed. Other national intelligence 
     centers--for instance, on counterproliferation, crime and 
     narcotics, the Middle East, Russia, and China--could be 
     created based on the President and National Security 
     Council's determination of need. These centers will draw from 
     the talent of the individual agencies and become truly 
     national intelligence centers on their respective issues.
       The National Intelligence Director that we have proposed 
     would oversee the national intelligence centers to provide 
     all-source analysis and plan intelligence operations for the 
     whole government on major problems. Under our proposals, the 
     National Intelligence Director would retain the present 
     Director of Central Intelligence's role as the principal 
     intelligence adviser to the president. We hope the president 
     will come to look directly to the directors of the national 
     intelligence centers to provide all-source analysis in their 
     areas of responsibility.
       A true sharing of all relevant information among analysts, 
     and the creation of national intelligence centers offering 
     their best advice and analysis to the president--together 
     with the continued independence of State, Treasury, Energy 
     and Defense Department analytical units--provides a better 
     way to foster competitive analysis than does the status quo.
       To keep the country secure, we believe the government must 
     build the intelligence capabilities it will need for the 
     broad range of national security challenges in the decades 
     ahead. National intelligence centers should be among those 
     capabilities.
       We deeply appreciate your interest in the Commission's 
     recommendations, and we look

[[Page S10003]]

     forward to working with you on the national intelligence 
     centers proposal, as well as on our other recommendations.
           Very respectfully,
     Tom Kean.
     Lee Hamilton.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I wonder if I could, through you, ask 
the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he is going to comment on 
Senator Graham's amendment.
  Mr. PRYOR. No. I was going to comment on an amendment that we 
adopted.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, after Senator Pryor comments, I will 
be glad to speak for Senator Graham.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. PRYOR. Madam President, I rise today with a note of 
encouragement; that is, one of the things I have noticed through the 
committee process, and certainly on the Senate floor, is how 
bipartisan--or maybe in a better sense of the word, nonpartisan--this 
debate has been. I think the Senate is very committed to following up 
on the 9/11 recommendations in the 9/11 report. I think we are 
approaching this in a way that is very constructive and very positive, 
and which we all hope and pray in the long term is very effective for 
our national security and for our intelligence.
  I know there are a number of amendments that we have still pending. I 
don't know exactly what is going to be offered or what will be agreed 
to, but my plan is to listen very carefully to all of those amendments. 
I think they all have value. I may vote against some of them; 
nonetheless, I think it is important that we have this discussion, have 
this debate, and show our leadership for this Nation on this very 
issue.
  There are two Members, two really great leaders, I wish to commend; 
that is, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. They have done a 
fantastic job and have demonstrated the patience of Job through this 
process in their determination and commitment. They are a prime example 
of how this Senate can work and should work and how great things can be 
accomplished by working together.
  I think it is incumbent for us as a Senate and as a Congress to 
provide the tools and the structure that we need in our intelligence 
community to connect the dots.
  I think the 9/11 Commission said this in a number of ways in a number 
of cases. But at one point, the 9/11 Commission report said:

       Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional 
     oversight may be among the most difficult and important.

  I know because I have talked to many of my colleagues on both sides 
of the aisle that this body is committed to reforming itself when it 
comes to intelligence issues.
  Let me read, if I may, from the report one short paragraph found on 
page 105 of the 9/11 Commission Report. It says:

        Fourth, the oversight function of Congress has diminished 
     over time. In recent years, traditional review of the 
     administration of programs and the implementation of laws has 
     been replaced by ``a focus on personal investigations, 
     possible scandals, and issues designed to generate media 
     attention.'' The unglamorous but essential work of oversight 
     has been neglected, and few members past or present believe 
     it is performed well. DCI Tenet told us: ``We ran from threat 
     to threat to threat. . . . [T]here was not a system in place 
     to say, `You got to go back and do this and this and this.' 
     '' Not just the DCI but the entire executive branch needed 
     help from Congress in addressing the questions of 
     counterterrorism strategy and policy, looking past day-to-day 
     concerns. Members of Congress, however, also found their time 
     spent on such everyday matters, or in looking back to 
     investigate mistakes, and often missed the big questions--as 
     did the executive branch. Staff tended as well to focus on 
     parochial considerations, seeking to add or cut funding for 
     individual (often small) programs, instead of emphasizing 
     comprehensive oversight projects.

  Madam President, my hope is when we finish this bill--it looks as 
though next week, realistically at this point--we will then turn to the 
work of reforming congressional oversight. Members on both sides of the 
aisle are very committed to doing that.
  Let me speak for a moment or two about an amendment I was able to 
tack on in committee. Again, I thank the leadership in the committee 
but also thank the entire committee because in the end, after we 
explained this and worked through this and walked through this, we 
decided this was an amendment that should be added to the bill, and it 
currently is in the proposed legislation.
  Basically, one thing the 9/11 Commission Report said is we need to 
have a way to evaluate our intelligence structures. It is important as 
we pass this reform legislation, the most significant reform of 
intelligence since 1947, to build into it some sort of look-back 
provision. That is what we have tried to do with my amendment. I am 
glad the committee has agreed with this and has been able to go along 
with this.
  Basically, it requires the GAO to give a report in 2 years, an 
independent objective look at what we have done--have we been 
successful? Have we failed? Do we need to take away a little bit here 
or add a little bit there? But an independent evaluation, nonpartisan 
look at exactly what we have done to make sure it is working. It is too 
important to not get it right the first time.
  For example, the 9/11 Commission found a need-to-know culture of 
information protection rather than a need-to-share culture of 
integration. The GAO review can indicate whether adequate mechanisms 
have been put in place to change this culture and be more productive 
and better, long term, for U.S. intelligence.
  I thank the committee for its hard work. I thank the two leaders for 
their hard work. I thank this entire body for approaching this 
challenge in a very nonpartisan way.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I commend the Senator from Arkansas for 
the diligence with which he approached the hearings throughout the 
August recess and the writing of this important legislation. I very 
much appreciate the comments of the Senator from Arkansas. He is always 
generous to me, as well as to the ranking member. We would be remiss if 
we did not thank him for his contributions to this bill. He was 
terrific about redoing his schedule throughout the August recess to 
participate in our numerous hearings. He was instrumental in drafting 
provisions of the bill including the requirement for the GAO report. I 
recognize his hard work and leadership and thank him for his kind 
comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.


                           Amendment No. 3797

  Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I send to the desk the amendment 
consistent with the statement I have just made and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is set aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3797.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To improve the authorities with respect to the national 
                         intelligence centers)

       On page 94, line 14, insert before the period the 
     following: ``, whether expressed in terms of geographic 
     region, in terms of function, or in other terms''.
       On page 95, line 3, insert after the period the following: 
     ``Each notice on a center shall set forth the mission of such 
     center, the area of intelligence responsibility of such 
     center, and the proposed structure of such center.''.
       On page 96, line 7, insert ``of the center and the 
     personnel of the center'' after ``control''.
       On page 96, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:
       (5) If the Director of a national intelligence center 
     determines at any time that the authority, direction, and 
     control of the Director over the center is insufficient to 
     accomplish the mission of the center, the Director shall 
     promptly notify the National Intelligence Director of that 
     determination.
       On page 97, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
       (5) develop and unify strategy for the collection and 
     analysis of all-source intelligence;
       (6) integrate intelligence collection and analysis, both 
     inside and outside the United States;
       (7) at the discretion of the NID develop interagency plans 
     for the collection of all-source intelligence, which plans 
     shall--
       (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the 
     President); and

[[Page S10004]]

       (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses 
     of action, parameters for such courses of action, 
     coordination of agencies intelligence collection activities, 
     recommendations for intelligence collection plans, and 
     assignment of departmental or agency responsibilities;
       (4) ensure that the collection of all-source intelligence 
     and the conduct of operations are informed by the analysis of 
     all-source intelligence; and
       On page 99, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:
       (g) Review and Modification of Centers.--(1) Not less often 
     than once each year, the National Intelligence Director shall 
     review the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to 
     each national intelligence center under this section in order 
     to determine whether or not such area of responsibility 
     continues to meet intelligence priorities established by the 
     National Security Council.
       (2) Not less often than once each year, the National 
     Intelligence Director shall review the staffing and 
     management of each national intelligence center under this 
     section in order to determine whether or not such staffing or 
     management remains appropriate for the accomplishment of the 
     mission of such center.
       (3) The National Intelligence Director may at any time 
     recommend to the President a modification of the area of 
     intelligence responsibility assigned to a national 
     intelligence center under this section. The National 
     Intelligence Director shall make any such recommendation 
     through, and with the approval of, the National Security 
     Council.
       (h) Separate Budget Account.--The National Intelligence 
     Director shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by 
     the Director in consultation with the congressional 
     intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence 
     Program budget a separate line item for each national 
     intelligence center under this section.
       On page 99, line 21, strike ``(g)'' and insert ``(i)''.

  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague 
from Florida, Senator Graham, for introducing this amendment that 
clarifies the role of the national intelligence centers that the NID is 
empowered to create under our bill.
  Senator Graham, as former chair of the Intelligence Committee, and 
having just published a book on intelligence, provides this body with a 
very important perspective in this debate. His amendment strengthens 
the role of the national intelligence centers by placing them on par 
with the National Counterterrorism Center. This amendment provides much 
needed flexibility to the national intelligence director in 
establishing the centers. It allows the director to establish criteria 
for the centers to focus on vital areas of expertise.
  The amendment also directs the national intelligence director to 
provide an annual report to Congress on the responsibilities of each of 
the centers that are created. This is an important aspect of this 
amendment. We can no longer afford to maintain the same percentage of 
Russian linguists today, for example, as we had during the Cold War. We 
have new wars, new challenges, new threats, and they demand new 
capabilities and responses as the 9/11 Commission Report indicated.
  This amendment is well within the intent of the 9/11 Commission 
Report and recommendations as is evident by the letter that the Senator 
has from the chairman and vice chairman of the committee. I endorse the 
amendment on my side. I am happy to accept it. I thank the Senator for 
working closely with us.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I rise to support the amendment, as 
well, and to thank Senator Graham for the characteristic thoughtfulness 
he brought to this matter and the very constructive additions this 
amendment makes to the bill and to clarify the authority and the 
importance of these centers.
  This is one of the central contributions of this legislation and 
derivatively of the 9/11 Commission Report. It grows out of the 
outrageous failure to share information prior to September 11 that the 
9/11 Commission Report documents in riveting detail.
  As the Chair knows, we would establish on the passage of this, a 
national counter terrorism center to focus all of our efforts from all 
agencies--unity of effort, joint command operations, et cetera--in the 
fight against terrorism. We also take this basic idea and say to the 
national intelligence director, you can set up other centers to deal 
with other particular problems--maybe a specific threat like weapons of 
mass destruction or nuclear proliferation specifically or a country or 
subgroup that may be threatening--the United States, set up a center on 
North Korea or Iran--and you would guarantee, thereby, in these other 
centers that all the arms of our Government would know what the others 
would be doing, would be sharing intelligence and analysis of 
intelligence through these centers, being able to plan joint operations 
for the collection of intelligence, very critically important to inform 
the President and the officers of our Government how to deal with these 
crisis. Senator Graham's amendment makes clear how important these 
centers are that the NID can create.
  I stress, also, the centers are not permanent. They are part of the 
vision that comes out of the 9/11 Commission Report. The Collins-
Lieberman bill before the Senate now is about modern management, 21st 
century management. If there is a problem, create a center with all 
your best people around the table planning how to collect and analyze 
intelligence about the problem, advise the President, Secretary of 
State, Secretary of Defense, whomever. Once that problem is resolved, 
that center can and should be terminated. That is the kind of 
flexibility involved.
  Senator Graham, as Senator Collins has said, is building on an 
extraordinary record of experience and very constructive leadership, 
outspoken, appropriately outspoken leadership in the area of 
intelligence, and has given us the benefit of that experience with this 
amendment. I thank him for it. I am happy to accept the amendment on 
our side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3797) was agreed to.
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I extend my deepest gratitude 
to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman and also my appreciation for 
the Senators' kind remarks.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. It is deserved.
  I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay that motion on the 
table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3801

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we lay aside the 
pending business so I may offer an amendment which is at the desk.
  Before I finish, I want to say this on behalf of Senator Chambliss 
and myself. My intention is to speak on it now, then come back to it--
pursuant to an agreement that will be worked out with the managers of 
the bill--sometime early tomorrow afternoon, and people who are opposed 
to it will have been able to come to the floor and debate it. So we 
will talk on it right now for a little while, but the purpose for 
proceeding now is to get it pending so we can later reach an agreement 
and set it for debate at a later time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], for himself, Mr. 
     Chambliss, and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 
     3801.

  The amendment is as follows:

     (Purpose: To modify the privacy and civil liberties oversight)

       On page 52, strike beginning with line 21 through page 56, 
     line 8.
       On page 154, strike beginning with line 8 through page 160, 
     line 11 and insert the following:
       (d) Functions.--
       (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and 
     implementation.--The Board shall--
       (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies 
     related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, 
     including the development and adoption of information sharing 
     guidelines under section 205(g);
       (B) review the implementation of new and existing 
     legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to 
     protect the Nation from

[[Page S10005]]

     terrorism, including the implementation of information 
     sharing guidelines under section 205(g); and
       (C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, and 
     elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and 
     civil liberties are appropriately considered in the 
     development and implementation of such legislation, 
     regulations, policies, and guidelines.
       (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
       (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the 
     implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, 
     of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive 
     branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are 
     protected;
       (B) the information sharing practices of the departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine 
     whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil 
     liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines 
     prescribed under section 205(g) and to other governing laws, 
     regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil 
     liberties; and
       (C) other actions by the executive branch related to 
     efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine 
     whether such actions--
       (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and
       (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and 
     policies regarding privacy and civil liberties.
       (3) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and 
     testify before Congress upon request.
       (e) Reports.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall periodically submit, not 
     less than semiannually, reports--
       (A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including 
     the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House 
     of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House 
     of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
       (ii) to the President; and
       (B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year 
     under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
       (A) a description of the major activities of the Board 
     during the preceding period; and
       (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and 
     oversight functions under subsection (d).
       (f) Access to Information.--
       (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be 
     necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this 
     section, the Board is authorized to--
       (A) have access from any department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, to 
     all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, 
     papers, recommendations, or other relevant material, 
     including classified information consistent with applicable 
     law;
       (B) interview, take statements from, or take public 
     testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or 
     element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or 
     employee; and
       (C) request information or assistance from any State, 
     tribal, or local government.
       (2) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or assistance 
     requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) is, 
     in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably refused or not 
     provided, the Board may submit a request directly to the head 
     of the department, agency, or element concerned.
       On page 164, strike beginning with line 21 through page 
     170, line 8.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, neither the 9/11 Commission nor the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, nor anyone else that I am aware of, has said 
the problem leading up to the attack of 9/11 was due to too much 
intelligence. The problem, obviously, arose because we didn't have 
enough intelligence. We could not gather enough information in a timely 
way to put together all of the possibilities--some say connect the 
dots--in order to predict that a particular kind of attack was going to 
occur on that day.
  We have had a lot of good, constructive suggestions from the 9/11 
Commission, from the Senate Intelligence Committee, from the 
administration, from the work of the Governmental Affairs Committee, 
and from other commissions in trying to understand why we didn't have 
enough intelligence and why we could not put all of this together. Many 
of the recommendations of the Commission and the legislative solutions 
in the proposed bill try to correct that problem of not having enough 
good intelligence.
  None of the problems identified suggested that we had too much 
intelligence and the problem was that people's civil liberties were 
somehow being jeopardized, or that their privacy rights were being 
jeopardized. Nobody has ever said that was a problem.
  Subsequent to 9/11, we passed the PATRIOT Act. It has been signed 
into law and most law enforcement officials, the administration, and 
others argue persuasively, I think, that it has done a lot to help them 
win the war on terror by collecting additional intelligence. Some have 
concerns about some of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act with respect 
to civil liberties or privacy rights. But those are issues that have 
come up subsequent to 9/11.
  My point is that the problem before 9/11 was not having too much 
intelligence and that jeopardized people's privacy or civil rights. 
Therefore, it comes as a great surprise to me that there is such a huge 
emphasis in the committee bill on privacy, civil rights, on having an 
ombudsman to protect people's rights, on having such an emphasis within 
the national intelligence directorate on these subjects, having a 
special board that would look into it, with subpoena powers, outside 
the intelligence community, and so on. It is my considered judgment, 
having served on the committee for 8 years, and having heard testimony 
from a great many people, including Richard Clark, by the way, who 
testified that risk aversion was one of the key problems leading up to 
9/11--it is my judgment that the overkill of all of these provisions in 
the bill is a fatal flaw in this legislation, which must be corrected, 
or else what we would have done is to rearrange the bureaucracy here, 
putting a person in charge as the national intelligence director and 
making some other changes but crippling his effort and the efforts of 
the intelligence collection gatherers, analysts, and others in their 
ability to protect us by gathering intelligence.
  Risk aversion, which is a big problem today, will be a huge problem 
in the future because, in addition to the people today who are looking 
over the shoulders of the intelligence community, we will have a whole 
array of new entities with great powers looking over their shoulder; 
and all of the effort that we are going through to try to begin saying 
that people should think outside the box, should be bold, innovative, 
and imaginative, that we need more human intelligence, and that those 
human intelligence agents are going to do things to gather more 
intelligence--we should have people who are willing to think outside 
the box. All of that is going to be significantly jeopardized because 
of the risk aversion that will be blanketed over all of the community 
with all of these different entities saying, wait a minute, we 
understand you are trying to collect intelligence, but we have people's 
civil rights and privacy rights and all the rest to be concerned about 
as well.

  Of course those are legitimate concerns. That is why we have entities 
today that help to ensure that privacy and civil rights are not 
jeopardized. It is enough. This bill creates so many new opportunities 
for people who object to intelligence gathering and analysis in the way 
we know it needs to be done that they are going to be able to ball up 
forever any ability to get meaningful intelligence if we are not 
careful about how we construct this bill.
  Let me tell you a little bit about what I am talking about. Here is a 
bit of background. Risk aversion--we understand what it means. It was 
testified to by people such as Richard Clark and others before the 
Intelligence Committee as the mindset which exists if you do anything 
out of the ordinary, if you go against the grain, if you collect by 
unorthodox measures, if you analyze intelligence in a way that might be 
contrary to the superiors above you in the organization, or to what 
somebody in Congress or somebody else wants to see, or if the actions 
that you take have some degree of risk associated with them--either 
political risk or legal risk, or certainly operational risk in terms of 
casualties and the like--therefore, because of all of these things 
there is an aversion to taking those risks.
  Government employees who have a career, who have their retirement in 
mind, and who want to continue to work with the agency want to be sure 
they are able to continue their careers, do their jobs, and not, 
because they perhaps work outside of the box, be penalized for doing 
that.
  Agent Rowling of the FBI talked about this in her inability to get 
the FBI to act on a warrant request she

[[Page S10006]]

sought to look into Zacarias Moussaoui's computers. One of the reasons 
they didn't act was out of a ``political correctness''--their term, not 
mine--that concerned them about the view that it would look like they 
were going after somebody on the basis of racial profiling, or some 
kind of profiling, rather than because they were under suspicion of 
committing a crime.
  This is the kind of risk aversion that everybody agreed was part of 
the problem with the intelligence gathering and analysis prior to 
September 11. How do you make that situation worse? You do it by adding 
new layers of people who are second-guessing these intelligence agents 
and analysts. There are enough people second-guessing them already, 
imposing the legal and political layer or filter of approval of the 
actions of the people in the field. But what the bill does is to create 
whole new layers.

  First, it follows a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to create 
some kind of outside board, but goes far beyond the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations in empowering this board with subpoena power, literally 
the authority of this outside board, that is not within the 
intelligence community at all, a citizen board, to haul in any agent 
anywhere in the world and grill him about what he did or did not do or 
what he concluded or did not conclude, with no guidance whatsoever. 
This is a recipe for disaster.
  In addition, as if that were not enough, of the six assistant 
directors of the national intelligence directorate, fully a third of 
them, two out of the six, have nothing to do with intelligence 
collection or analysis; they are the privacy and civil rights division.
  First, one wonders why those are not the same thing and, second, why 
you would have to have two out of the six directorates specifically 
charged with this responsibility. We already have an inspector general 
whose responsibilities include any situation in which an agent or 
agency went beyond legal authority or beyond other appropriate 
authority in the conduct of his or her business. But in addition to the 
inspector general, in addition to the officers who currently exist in 
each of the agencies of the intelligence community--virtually all of 
them--to deal with privacy and civil rights concerns--these already 
exist--we create two new directorates with this legislation: this 
outside civilian board and an ombudsman.
  In looking through the ombudsman's responsibilities, for example, 
pity the poor intelligence agent who raises a question that causes this 
ombudsman to have to question him.
  This is not even to get into the congressional oversight which we 
want to enhance. Our working group, which is developing the 
improvements to the Intelligence Committee operation, will be soon, I 
think, be making a recommendation to the body, either in conjunction 
with the underlying bill or as an amendment to it, that will also fold 
in enhanced congressional oversight.
  We want enhanced congressional oversight, but it is a double-edged 
sword because it has been abused in the past and can be abused in the 
future.
  When Members have not intelligence as their first priority but 
questioning somebody within the intelligence community, they can be 
pretty hard on the intelligence community. We can go all the way to the 
Church Commission in 1976 to see what kind of damage that can do. So we 
need to be careful about this congressional oversight, but it is going 
to be enhanced. We are going to improve our ability to oversee the 
intelligence community.
  In addition to the offices that exist today, and in addition to the 
inspector general, and in addition to the enhanced congressional 
oversight, we are creating two more directorates, an outside board, and 
an ombudsman, all of whom have essentially the same general 
responsibility of questioning whether the intelligence agents, 
agencies, analysts, and others are doing their job properly. Then we 
will ask ourselves why we could not get anybody to think outside the 
box, to be forward leaning, to try to be aggressive in collecting 
intelligence, why everybody was meekly following a very single straight 
line.
  The fact that we are creating a national intelligence director 
creates a bit of a problem in this regard in the first place because 
instead of having a wider array of entities involved, each with their 
own points of view, sort of the devil's advocate concept recommended by 
many, including the 9/11 Commission, to get out of a single-channel 
orientation group-think, we are making the problem worse, in my view, 
by creating this single national intelligence director.

  If you want a career in the agency, you better not run afoul of what 
the director wants and what his views are. That is the reality of 
bureaucracy, and it exists in every agency of the Government, not just 
the intelligence community. But in the intelligence community, it is 
particularly important because we want people who are willing to 
question, to go against the grain, to disagree with their boss, to take 
a risk.
  If we look back at President Clinton's directives to the intelligence 
community, he tried to be forward leaning, especially with regard to 
al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. To paraphrase, in effect what he said is 
we have to do everything we can to try to get these guys. Repeatedly, 
efforts were made to bring to his attention operations that would 
either improve our intelligence or operationally deal with al-Qaida and 
Osama bin Laden. They were shot down by the Pentagon, by the Secretary 
of State, by the National Security Adviser, by the lawyers, by the 
intelligence community itself, the Director of the CIA. Every time we 
tried to do something, almost, somebody said this is too risky; we 
cannot do it. That was why the 9/11 Commission, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, and many other observers have said we have to get out of 
this stultifying risk-aversion environment where people are afraid that 
somebody is looking over their shoulder and is going to jump on them if 
they do anything that is the least bit out of the ordinary or risky. We 
have to have the out of the ordinary and risky if we are ever going to 
defeat this very unconventional enemy.
  What does the bill do? It does not try to solve the problem; it makes 
it far worse. The purpose of our amendment is to say we will follow the 
9/11 Commission recommendation and set up this outside commission, but 
for Heaven's sake, let's not give it the kind of subpoena power--
Congress already has that, the inspector general already has the 
ability to look into all of these things. We do not need an outside 
board of five, or whatever, people accountable to nobody with the 
ability to totally disrupt what the intelligence community is doing.
  It is fine to report to Congress, to analyze what they think the 
situation is and let us know what their concerns are. But that is far 
different from operationally getting right down into the bowels of the 
organization with hands that can extract anything, classified or not, 
subpoena anybody, whether in Afghanistan or Langley or wherever, and 
publicly question what is being done.
  That is the first part of the amendment.
  The second part of the amendment is to say we do not need all these 
new entities given the fact we already have existing civil rights and 
privacy controls. I do not want to be misunderstood. It would be very 
easy to characterize or mischaracterize what we are trying to do by 
saying these are people who do not care anything about civil rights; 
these are people who want the agency to run roughshod over American 
civil rights, and people can get pretty revved up about that very 
quickly.
  Nothing could be further from the truth. The folks who are 
understandably going to put a high priority on protecting civil rights 
need to balance their legitimate concerns about civil rights with a 
concern about the lives of American citizens, to balance the 
legislation that is supposed to help fix the problem in such a way that 
we do not put so many constraints on our intelligence community that it 
can't do its job.
  One of the biggest problems identified, this problem of risk 
aversion, will be horribly exacerbated if we simply blindly follow the 
recommendation of those who brought this bill to the floor--and I 
understand there were a lot of compromises made in order to get 
unanimous approval out of the committee, but sometimes getting 
unanimous approval is the wrong goal.

[[Page S10007]]

Sometimes you need to make tough choices and you need to reject 
proposals that are offered by people who then agree to vote for the 
overall bill if they get their amendment in the bill. That is what 
happened with this bill, and there are too many little amendments that 
got in which, when added up, are going to create a huge problem with 
our intelligence community with respect to this issue of risk aversion.
  I cannot stress strongly enough, and this will be my final point, our 
goal ought to be to improve our intelligence collection, to improve 
human intelligence, to improve analysis, to foster a sense within this 
community that they do not have to just follow the narrow channel of 
group-think that was criticized so strongly by the 9/11 Commission, 
that they do not have to feel risk averse, that they can take a chance 
sometimes because we need people to be imaginative and innovative and 
think about possibilities that before 9/11 we could not have even 
dreamed of.
  I know now some people like to go back and ask: Why did you not think 
up the fact that people could fly planes into these buildings? Well, 
one reason was because as soon as one starts thinking about those kinds 
of things, somebody is going to come down on them like a ton of bricks 
and say: Get back to your job and stay within the channel here. We do 
not have time for that kind of fantasizing. You are living in a fantasy 
world.
  We have to have people who are willing to ask these tough questions 
and think in ways that they are not going to get slapped down when they 
do. The sure recipe, the prescription for that occurring is by piling 
on layer upon layer of outside groups, ombudsmen, civil rights, privacy 
divisions, all of these groups that are duplicative of what we already 
have, to call into question what our agents and analysts are doing.
  There is simply no need to have so many people performing the same 
task, which, in any event, does not add to intelligence, but, by its 
very nature, is designed to restrict intelligence activity. Surely, we 
can protect civil liberties and privacy without setting up a situation 
in which it is going to be incredibly difficult for the intelligence 
community to effectively perform its mission.
  After all, our chief objective is to make it easier to predict and 
prevent a terrorist attack, not more difficult.
  Excessive oversight will result in our intelligence officers being 
more cautious than they should be, and deter them from taking the risks 
that may be necessary to keep our country safe.
  Indeed, an aversion to taking risks, even when they should be taken, 
already plagues our intelligence community. Time and time again, this 
has contributed to intelligence failures, most recently, of course, 9/
11 and the intelligence community's claims about Saddam's weapons of 
mass destruction.
  There are numerous reasons for this culture of risk aversion--unclear 
authorities, legal restrictions, and excessive oversight are among 
them.
  The deterioration of our intelligence community's clandestine service 
offers a good example.
  According to the 9/11 Commission's report, James Pavitt, the head of 
the CIA's Directorate of Operations, recalled that covert action had 
gotten the clandestine service into trouble in the past, and he had no 
desire to see it happen again.
  The ``trouble'' he referred to was at least partly the result of the 
1973 Church Committee hearings in Congress. Added to that were the 
restrictive guidelines promulgated by then-CIA Director John Deutch in 
1995, which severely limited the ability of CIA case officers to meet 
with and recruit foreign nationals who may have been involved in 
dubious activities or have blood on their hands.
  The end result was out intelligence community's inability to 
penetrate al-Qaida's command structure. Before 9/11, we had not one 
source inside that command structure. Unclear authorities, excessive 
oversight, and burdensome restrictions prevented our people on the 
ground from being effective.
  I recognize that privacy and civil liberties are substantively 
entirely different matters. However, the end result of unnecessary 
bureaucracy, restrictions, and excessive oversight will be the same. We 
will cultivate a culture within the intelligence community that makes 
it less likely that people will be willing to do the jobs we are asking 
them to do, and more likely that they will want to ``play it safe.''
  My amendment would very simply delete sections 126 and 127, which 
require officers for privacy and civil liberties with the National 
Intelligence Authority; it would strike section 212, requiring privacy 
and civil liberties officers with a long list of Executive Branch 
departments and agencies; and it would modify the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board established by section 211.
  The National Intelligence Authority does not need three individuals 
assigned to the same task. The IG of the National Intelligence 
Authority will be in place to ensure privacy and civil liberties 
receive adequate attention and oversight.
  Similarly, it is redundant to require privacy and civil liberties 
officers within almost every national-security related department and 
agency.
  My amendment would retain the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, as the 9/11 Commission recommended. However, it would limit 
Board's ability to interfere in the activities of relevant departments 
and agencies.
  I hope that Members will support this amendment. It follows the 9/11 
Commission's recommendations with respect to privacy and civil 
liberties, and ensures adequate oversight and protections, but does so 
without hamstringing the community.
  I urge my colleagues when we debate this amendment further tomorrow 
to please read the bill, look at the relevant portions of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, look at the testimony of those who have 
raised this kind of question and ask whether the bill as presented is 
not a little bit out of balance--I contend a great deal out of balance.
  I do not cast any aspersions on the people who worked so hard to 
bring this bill to the Senate floor. There are not enough compliments 
for the Senator from Maine and the Senator from Connecticut for the 
hard work they have done and all of the others who have worked so hard 
on it. This is not in any way meant as personal criticism, but I fear 
if we do not very carefully analyze this and try to correct it--and 
remember, that was part of what this was all about: let's get the bill 
to the floor; we can always make corrections here. This is the time to 
do it. We have not written a bill on the floor for a long time, but 
this is too important not to take the time to do right.
  I urge my colleagues, let us not make the mistake of rushing forward 
with this, putting a rubberstamp on the committee's bill because we 
have to do something before we leave on October 8. We will spend years 
ruing the day we took this kind of action if we are not careful about 
what we do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment of Senator Kyl be laid aside for purposes of proposing 
additional amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3806

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, and Mr. 
     Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 3806.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       (Purpose: To improve the transition between Presidential 
                            administrations)

       At the end of the bill, add the following:

                   TITLE __--PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

     SEC. __01. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION.

       (a) Services Provided President-Elect.--Section 3 of the 
     Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) by adding after subsection (a)(8)(A)(iv) the following:
       ``(v) Activities under this paragraph shall include the 
     preparation of a detailed classified, compartmented summary 
     by the relevant outgoing executive branch officials of 
     specific operational threats to national security; major 
     military or covert operations;

[[Page S10008]]

     and pending decisions on possible uses of military force. 
     This summary shall be provided to the President-elect as soon 
     as possible after the date of the general elections held to 
     determine the electors of President and Vice President under 
     section 1 or 2 of title 3, United States Code.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
       (3) by adding after subsection (e) the following:
       ``(f)(1) The President-elect should submit to the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation or other appropriate agency and then, 
     upon taking effect and designation, to the agency designated 
     by the President under section 115(b) of the National 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the names of candidates for 
     high level national security positions through the level of 
     undersecretary of cabinet departments as soon as possible 
     after the date of the general elections held to determine the 
     electors of President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 
     of title 3, United States Code.
       ``(2) The responsible agency or agencies shall undertake 
     and complete as expeditiously as possible the background 
     investigations necessary to provide appropriate security 
     clearances to the individuals who are candidates described 
     under paragraph (1) before the date of the inauguration of 
     the President-elect as President and the inauguration of the 
     Vice-President-elect as Vice President.''.
       (b) Sense of the Senate Regarding Expedited Consideration 
     of National Security Nominees.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) the President-elect should submit the nominations of 
     candidates for high-level national security positions, 
     through the level of undersecretary of cabinet departments, 
     to the Senate by the date of the inauguration of the 
     President-elect as President; and
       (2) for all such national security nominees received by the 
     date of inauguration, the Senate committees to which these 
     nominations are referred should, to the fullest extent 
     possible, complete their consideration of these nominations, 
     and, if such nominations are reported by the committees, the 
     full Senate should vote to confirm or reject these 
     nominations, within 30 days of their submission.
       (c) Security Clearances for Transition Team Members.--
       (1) Definition.--In this section, the term ``major party'' 
     shall have the meaning given under section 9002(6) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
       (2) In general.--Each major party candidate for President 
     may submit, before the date of the general election, requests 
     for security clearances for prospective transition team 
     members who will have a need for access to classified 
     information to carry out their responsibilities as members of 
     the President-elect's transition team.
       (3) Completion date.--Necessary background investigations 
     and eligibility determinations to permit appropriate 
     prospective transition team members to have access to 
     classified information shall be completed, to the fullest 
     extent practicable, by the day after the date of the general 
     election.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341, this 
     section and the amendments made by this section shall take 
     effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as I believe most of my colleagues know, 
Senator Lieberman and I made a commitment to the families and the 9/11 
Commission that we would ensure that all of their 41 recommendations 
were considered one way or another in this legislation. Because of the 
lack of scope of the Governmental Affairs Committee, there were several 
recommendations which were not considered.
  Senator Lieberman and I have already proposed and had adopted several 
amendments addressing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. There 
are three remaining issues. One of them is noncontroversial, which I 
will be proposing at this time and would hope would be voice voted 
since it is noncontroversial. Then there are two additional amendments 
concerning two additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Both 
of those are controversial, so I would propose those amendments and 
then ask that they be set aside after they are placed for 
consideration. Then they would be disposed of after debate, discussion, 
or however the managers would like to dispose of those additional two 
amendments.
  I hope I made myself somewhat coherent in that explanation.
  The amendment that is at the desk addresses the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendation to improve the transitions between administrations. It 
is nearly identical to title IV of the 9/11 Commission Report 
Implementation Act, which we introduced on September 7, except that it 
does not include the security clearance-related provisions that were 
adopted by the Governmental Affairs Committee and are already in the 
underlying bill, S. 2845.
  The Commission report states:

       Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no 
     notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption 
     of national security policymaking during the change of 
     administrations by accelerating the process for national 
     security appointments. We think the process could be improved 
     significantly so transitions can work more effectively and 
     allow new officials to assume their new responsibilities as 
     quickly as possible.

  As recommended by the Commission, this amendment is designed to help 
ensure an incoming President-elect has his or her national security 
team in place during a transition between administrations. The 
amendment would direct the outgoing administration to provide the 
President-elect, as soon as possible after the general election, a 
detailed, highly classified summary of current threats to the national 
security, major military and covert operations, and pending decisions 
on possible uses of military force.
  It also provides that the President-elect should submit to the agency 
responsible for background checks the names of possible candidates for 
high-level national security positions as soon as possible after the 
date of the Presidential election. In turn, it requires that agency to 
undertake and complete, to the fullest extent possible, the background 
investigations necessary to provide appropriate security clearances to 
these individuals by the date of inauguration.
  Finally, it urges the Senate to consider the nominations of top 
national security appointees as soon as possible, preferably within 30 
days of the submission of a nominee.
  As the chairman of a committee which has responsibility for the 
confirmation of many Presidential nominees, I assure my colleagues that 
I consider the Senate's advise and consent responsibilities to be very 
important. This amendment is not proposing that we shirk our duties in 
any way but that we act in the most efficient manner possible to 
thoroughly review the nominees to national security-related positions 
and allow for their confirmation so they can carry out the very 
important duties to which they are charged.

  I recognize that some, including administration officials, would 
prefer that we go further. It has been suggested and I believe the 
House bill even proposes that if the Senate has not voted to confirm a 
nominee within 30 days after the nominee's name has been submitted, the 
President alone should have the power to make that appointment. I, for 
one, cannot support such a proposal, and I doubt that it would have the 
support of the majority of Members in this body.
  Let me also point out that this amendment does not include the 
Commission's recommendations that the Senate should not require 
confirmation of such national security executive appointees below 
executive level 3. One of the reasons our amendment does not address 
that particular proposal is that upon review of such positions, we 
learned that it would eliminate the Senate's advise and consent duties 
for many important security positions that we believe merit the 
Senate's action. Executive level 4 includes all of the Assistant 
Secretary positions, many of which one would argue are important 
national security-related positions. Examples of these positions 
include the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat 
Reduction, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force 
Management Policy, and others.
  We believe that instead of removing the Senate's advise and consent 
obligations, a better approach would be for the Senate to fulfill its 
obligation in as expeditious a manner as possible. We hope this body 
will make a greater effort to hold confirmation hearings and report 
those national security-related nominations to the full Senate for 
swift consideration. To help spur swift Senate consideration, this 
amendment includes a sense of the Senate urging the President-elect to 
submit the nominations for high-level national security positions to 
the Senate by the date of the inauguration. It also calls for Senate 
committees to hold nomination hearings and consider these nominations 
to the fullest extent within 30 days of their submission.
  The amendment before the Senate is but one proposal that we need to 
move

[[Page S10009]]

forward. The more critical proposal which we still need to act on is 
congressional reorganization and oversight over intelligence and 
homeland security. As the Commission very directly pointed out, not 
only are Government agency reforms needed, so too are institutional 
reforms within Congress. The Commission went so far as to call 
congressional oversight as ``dysfunctional.''
  I remain hopeful that the bipartisan working group tasked by the 
leadership to develop a proposal for congressional restructuring will 
be successful. We owe it to the American public to fulfill our 
collective responsibilities. These are not normal times. We are at war.
  I just want to say again, as a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, I have seen particularly the Defense Department, as well as 
other national-security-related positions, literally vacant for months 
and months and months. This is really not an acceptable situation, and 
it has grown worse and worse. Background security checks have 
lengthened in their time. The Senate doesn't get moving until a couple 
of months after we are in session. It is not fair. It is not fair to 
the nominees, it is not fair to the country, it certainly is not fair 
to the Departments that are deprived of the services of a new 
President's team. So I hope we will support this amendment.
  I do not believe there is any controversy, so I ask for a voice vote 
before I move to a second amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? The 
Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am proud to be a cosponsor of this 
amendment with Senator McCain. This, again, is part of our attempt to 
implement through legislation as many of the recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Report as we possibly can.
  This is a critical one. The Commission made a finding not usually 
focused on, as part of its work, that there is a danger because of the 
slowness of the transition from one administration to the next that 
America will be vulnerable. We have an enemy out there, a terrorist 
enemy, that follows this kind of information. I don't make a causal 
statement now, but the fact is that it was in 1993, the first year of 
the Clinton administration, when the World Trade Center was first 
attacked by terrorists with a truck bomb. And it was 2001, of course, 
when the Twin Towers and the Pentagon and other targets were attacked, 
in the first year of the Bush administration.
  These are very good recommendations. I do want to point out simply 
that the underlying bill incorporates a related recommendation by the 
Commission to consolidate security clearance investigations in one 
agency and encourage reciprocity among agencies with respect to those 
clearances, which should help streamline what is now a frustratingly 
Balkanized system for determining who can have access to sensitive 
information.
  This is very constructive. I do not believe it is controversial at 
all.
  To reiterate, this amendment will help ensure that our vital national 
security capabilities do not suffer undue disruption during a 
presidential transition.
  The 9/11 Commission recommended several measures to provide a swift 
hand-off between incoming and outgoing national security teams during a 
change in presidential administrations, and this amendment reflects 
those recommendations.
  First, it directs the outgoing administration to provide the 
President-elect with a detailed, classified summary of critical 
operational threats, including major military or covert operations and 
pending decisions on the use of military force. The most important 
member of the national security apparatus is the Commander in Chief. 
This provision will help the President-elect begin focusing on these 
issues, and considering any imminent high stakes decisions that might 
need to be made, well in advance of the day he or she takes office.
  The amendment also includes several measures to help assure that the 
President-elect will have a qualified team of national security 
advisors in place early in the new administration and who are able to 
hit the ground running.
  It calls on the President-Elect to submit the names of likely high 
level national security personnel for security clearances as soon as 
possible after the election, and directs the appropriate Federal agency 
or agencies to complete the necessary investigations for those 
clearances as quickly as possible, preferably before the inauguration.
  The amendment also urges the administration to submit nominees for 
the top national security positions by Inauguration Day and, if it does 
so, urges the Senate to act on those nominations within 30 days 
wherever possible. I think this language is a useful reminder to both 
the executive branch and the Senate that we should act to fill these 
positions with all deliberate speed--mindful that delay has costs, but 
dedicated as well to careful selection and review of nominees for these 
sensitive positions.
  Finally, the amendment would allow major party candidates to seek 
security clearances for prospective transaction team members prior to 
the election, with the goal of having those clearances available the 
day after the election.
  I should note that the underlying bill already incorporates a related 
recommendation by the Commission to consolidate security clearance 
investigations in one agency and encourage reciprocity among agencies 
with respect to clearances. This should help streamline what is now a 
frustratingly balkanized system for determining who can have access to 
sensitive information.
  We do not include the Commission's recommendation to eliminate Senate 
confirmation for national security nominees below the Executive 
Schedule III pay grade. This category would include many Assistant 
Secretaries with critical policymaking responsibilities. Given the need 
for strong Congressional oversight of the intelligence community and 
other national security operations, it does not seem wise to remove 
this important layer of Congressional review and accountability.
  I believe this amendment helps ensure that we do not loosen our 
footing in the war on terriorism at moments of presidential transition. 
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I join Senator Lieberman in commending 
Senator McCain for offering this amendment. It would make several 
changes to the Presidential transition process, changes that are 
consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  The Governmental Affairs Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Voinovich, 
held a hearing on this issue at which two of the Commissioners, Fred 
Fielding and Jamie Gorelick, discussed how the current transition 
process does not serve our country well in the handing over, the 
transitioning of important national security decisions from one 
administration to another. One reason is that it is such a slow process 
to get the new administration's team in place.
  I believe this amendment would greatly improve the process. I know of 
no opposition to it. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on amendment? If not, 
the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3806) was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.


                           Amendment No. 3807

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3807.

  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The amendment is printed in Today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment may be subject to more 
debate and discussion and may require a recorded vote. I intend to 
propose this amendment, discuss it, and recognize that there will be 
further discussion about this amendment.
  This amendment addresses the terrorist travel and screening sections 
of the 9/11 Commission report. Contained in this amendment are the 
recommendations found on pages 383-390

[[Page S10010]]

of the 9/11 Commission report. The text of this amendment is nearly 
identical to Title VI of S. 2774, which was introduced September 7.
  In addition to working with the Commission on this amendment, Senator 
Lieberman and I have sought the advice and counsel from as broad a 
range of interested parties as possible. Meetings have been held to 
address the concerns of many of the interested groups. While some may 
prefer that we do not address these provisions, that is simply not an 
option. We must act one way or the other on all of the recommendations 
in the Commission report.
  Despite the hard work by the people at the Department of Homeland 
Security, it is apparent that our Government has just begun to carry 
out some of the reforms necessary to prevent terrorists from entering 
our country. Much remains to be done to target terrorist travel, 
combine our multiple screening systems and ensure that identification 
documents used to enter this country or to be used as feeder documents 
are trustworthy.
  Additionally, more must be done to improve the training we provide to 
our immigration and consular officers. These people represent the first 
line of defense in the security of our borders. We must ensure that 
these officers have access to the best training, technology and 
information available.
  According to the Commission Report:

       Better technology and training to detect terrorist travel 
     documents are the most important immediate steps to reduce 
     America's vulnerability to clandestine entry.

  By restricting terrorist access to travel documents, we increase the 
difficulty to travel into the United States. Our legislation aims to 
address this pressing issue by requiring the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to work with multiple Government agencies to develop a unified 
strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence, operations and 
law enforcement into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find 
terrorist facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility domestically 
and internationally. All agencies responsible for guarding our Nation 
against terrorist attack must be on the same page in our approach to 
keeping terrorists out.
  In order to efficiently screen those entering the United States, the 
multiple terrorist screening systems already in place must be 
integrated. Our legislation would require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to develop a comprehensive screening system that brings 
together an integrated network of screening points that includes the 
Nation's border security systems, transportation system, and critical 
infrastructure and facilities. The Department of Homeland Security will 
begin to address this issue as they carry out the orders given in HSPD-
11; however, our amendment represents a more comprehensive approach to 
uniting our various screening systems.

  Fundamental to increasing the security of our borders is the quick 
and full implementation of US VISIT. I, like many of my colleagues, 
have been troubled by the pace in which this system has been rolled 
out. This legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to 
develop and implement a plan for the accelerated and full 
implementation of the US VISIT system. Additionally, the amendment 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a single, 
consolidated program designed to expedite the travel of previously 
screened travelers across the borders of the United States.
  Lastly, this amendment would implement 9/11 Commission's 
recommendation that the Federal Government set standards for the 
issuance of birth certificates, driver's licenses, and other sources of 
identification. It has been well documented that many of the hijackers 
and their associates used counterfeit social security numbers and other 
fraudulent documents to obtain legal driver's licenses or State-issued 
ID cards--or were able to simply but fake ID's--which they then used to 
open bank accounts, rent cars, board airplanes, and attend flight 
schools. The ease with which these basic documents of American life can 
be counterfeited or obtained fraudulently is clearly a gaping hole in 
homeland security.
  Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, at least half the 
States have passed legislation to tighten up their eligibility 
requirements and procedures for issuing driver's licenses and State ID 
cards. These initiatives are commendable and have improved security, 
but the report of the 9/11 Commission, and numerous reports by Federal 
agencies and other organizations have all concluded that additional 
measures must be taken to improve the security of driver's licenses and 
other forms of identification.
  One study deserves special note. Over a 10-month period in 2002 and 
2003, the Government Accountability Office--GAO--conducted an 
undercover investigation of State driver's license practices and 
procedures, visiting seven States--Arizona, New York, Michigan, South 
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, California and the District of Columbia. 
In every jurisdiction, GAO investigators were able to obtain a driver's 
license or State-issued ID using fraudulent documents, including fake 
birth certificates and fake licenses from other States.
  Our amendment would require birth certificates and driver's licenses 
to meet new minimum Federal standards in order to be accepted by a 
Federal agency for any official purpose. Minimum standards would be 
established for proof and verification of identity by the applicant, 
and to make the documents themselves more resistant to counterfeiting 
and tampering. The amendment also would require minimum standards for 
the processing of applications to address a widely recognized and 
growing problem of fraud within the offices that issue licenses and 
birth certificates, including the Arizona Department of 
Transportation's Motor Vehicle Division. The amendment would authorize 
grants to the States to assist them in meeting the new standards and to 
help States computerize and match their birth and death records.
  To improve the security of social security numbers, the amendment 
would restrict the number of replacement cards that can be issued to an 
individual; require verification of records used to obtain an original 
social security card; and add death, fraud, and work authorization 
indicators to the social security number verification system. DHS and 
the Social Security Administration would also be tasked to take other 
steps to safeguard social security cards from counterfeiting and 
tampering, and increase enforcement against the fraudulent use of 
social security cards.
  Today, incredibly, the Social Security Administration will issue any 
individual up to 52 replacement cards a year, a practice GAO has cited 
as increasing the potential for misuse and fraud. Roughly two-thirds of 
the 12.4 million social security cards issued by SSA in 2002 were 
replacement cards. I am also incredulous that the system SSA uses to 
verify social security numbers does not include notations for death, 
fraud, or work authorization. Employers often use the system to verify 
the social security number of new employees. Because there is no 
notation on the records for death, a social security number for a 
decreased individual used fraudulently by another person will be 
verified as valid.
  This amendment would not mandate a national ID card. It would not 
infringe upon the right of the States to determine who can get a 
driver's license. It would not establish a national database with 
information on all drivers. And it would prohibit the establishment of 
a single design for driver's licenses and birth certificates. We 
believe it fulfills the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission without 
trampling on States' rights, privacy, or civil liberties.
  We must face the fact, however, that rightly or wrongly, the driver's 
license is the basic form of ID in the United States. We use it to 
board airplanes, to purchase alcohol and cigarettes, to cash checks, 
and for a host of other purposes. We cannot ignore that the security of 
driver's licenses and State-issued ID cards affect homeland security. 
And we cannot ignore that driver's licenses can and indeed have been 
used as an enabler for terrorism. There is a legitimate Federal role in 
establishing minimum standards for these documents.
  As the 9/11 Commission noted in its report, ``At many entry points to 
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources 
of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are 
who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.'' 
Making these documents more

[[Page S10011]]

secure will help make our country more secure, and help prevent another 
terrorist attack on our country.
  In closing, this amendment was carefully crafted to translate the 
commission recommendations into legislative language. I applaud the 
work of the commission and fully believe that the reforms they suggest 
in this section of their report will go a long way towards increasing 
the security and safety of all Americans.
  The Commission released their report in late July. Their 
recommendations are taking on a life of their own. The Commission 
report is the No. 1 nonfiction bestseller on both the New York Times 
and the Washington Post bestsellers list. The public is taking their 
recommendations very seriously, and so too should we. The people will 
hold us accountable for our failure if we don't enact these 
recommendations.
  I would like to point out a couple of additional facts.
  Today, each State has a different set of requirements for driver's 
licenses. Some States allow more than 30 different documents to be used 
by applicants as proof of identity. How in the world can an employee at 
the department of motor vehicles be expected to verify the authenticity 
of the applicant?
  I am amazed what some States will accept as proof of identity in 
supporting documents. For example, one State allows a picture from a 
high school yearbook to be used as one form of identification. Another 
State allows the school report card to be used as long as it is less 
than 1 year old. A third allows a snowmobile permit to be used as a 
form of identification. Several States allow permits for concealed 
weapons to be used in getting a driver's license. One State still has 
licenses without a photograph of the license holder.
  I recognize that we are on very interesting ground on this issue. On 
the one hand, we are trying to balance people's civil liberties. We are 
trying to make sure everyone has a right to privacy. We are trying to 
make sure there is no national database which would be used to follow 
people around the country. At the same time, if someone can 
fraudulently obtain a driver's license and that driver's license is 
used in obtaining access to places where acts of terror can be 
committed, we have to try to see that does not happen.
  What we have done with this amendment is try to carefully balance the 
requirement for some better way of assuring identity and at the same 
time not infringe on Americans' civil liberties. That is why I believe 
this amendment probably will be the subject of some debate and 
discussion and will probably require a recorded vote.
  If somebody has a better idea, I would like very much to hear it, but 
I do not know that there is a better idea. We have done extensive 
research, have had extensive discussions and an extensive amount of 
investigation building on the 9/11 Commission's findings and 
recommendations.
  It seems to me that this is a reasonable approach. But to have the 
status quo in America where people can easily and fraudulently acquire 
identification which allows them then to be able to commit acts of 
sabotage, espionage, or terror and risk the lives of others is not a 
status quo by which I think we can abide.
  I thank my colleagues for their consideration. I look forward to the 
debate.
  If the distinguished manager would perhaps illuminate as to how she 
would like to handle this particular amendment, I would be agreeable to 
whatever the manager's procedure would be.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, once again, I thank the Senator from 
Arizona for bringing up another series of recommendations made by the 
9/11 Commission.
  This is a very broad amendment. There is much in it which I support, 
and I agree with the Senator that there is a significant problem with 
fraudulent documents, including driver's licenses. Nevertheless, 
several groups, including the National Governors Association, the 
National Council of State Legislatures, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, have expressed concerns regarding the degree to which 
some of the provisions in this amendment would infringe on the powers 
traditionally exercised by the States to set standards in the area of 
driver's licenses, for example. Therefore, I would like to suggest to 
the Senator that we continue working on these issues to see if we can 
resolve some of these concerns and that we set this amendment aside for 
the time being to allow for that.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the manager. At this time I will not be proposing 
a further amendment.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, if I could get the attention of the manager 
of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Maine yield the floor?
  Ms. COLLINS. I yield the floor temporarily.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have a number of Members in and out of 
the Chamber who want to know when they can offer amendments and/or 
speak. Senator Cornyn is here, Senator Feinstein, Senator Lautenberg is 
here. I wonder if at least for these three can we get a queue set up so 
they will know when they can be expected to speak.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest, based on the conversations I 
have had with all who are present in the Senate now, we first yield to 
the Senator from California, who is going to discuss her proposal while 
we are continuing to work at the staff level on the language of her 
amendment; that we then go to the Senator from Texas, who has two 
amendments he would like to discuss--again, we are still working with 
the Senator from Texas--and we then proceed to the amendment Senator 
Lautenberg has proposed.
  Mr. REID. If I could be recognized to further this dialog, I wonder 
if we could then have a consent agreement that the Senator from 
California be recognized for 10 minutes, the Senator from Texas be 
recognized on his two amendments for no more than 15 minutes, and the 
Senator from New Jersey would be recognized after that.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from California be 
recognized for 10 minutes; following that, the Senator from Texas be 
recognized for 15 minutes; and Senator Lautenberg be recognized for 15 
minutes to offer his amendment.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, that unanimous consent agreement would 
work well from my perspective.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. We will now then go to the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.


                           Amendment No. 3718

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking 
member of the committee. I have indicated I am withdrawing one 
amendment, No. 3719, which clarifies the tactical intelligence part of 
the bill. I don't believe that is necessary. It has been withdrawn. I 
am also withdrawing amendment No. 3715 to strike the prohibition on co-
location.
  At this time I call up and then set aside amendment No. 3718.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3718.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To improve the intelligence functions of the Federal Bureau 
                           of Investigation)

       On page 4, line 4, insert ``foreign intelligence'' after 
     ``means''.
       On page 4, strike lines 5 through 16 and insert the 
     following:
       (2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information 
     gathered, and activities conducted, relating to the 
     capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign 
     governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 
     foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.
       (3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means--
       (A) foreign intelligence gathered, and activities 
     conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence 
     activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 
     behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
     organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist 
     activities; and
       (B) information gathered, and activities conducted, to 
     prevent the interference by or disruption of foreign 
     intelligence activities of the United States by foreign 
     government or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 
     foreign persons, or international terrorists.
       On page 6, line 12, strike ``counterintelligence or''.

[[Page S10012]]

       On page 7, beginning on line 5, strike ``the Office of 
     Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and 
     insert ``the Directorate of Intelligence of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation''.
       On page 8, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
       (8) The term ``counterespionage'' means counterintelligence 
     designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent 
     espionage activities though identification, penetration, 
     deception, and prosecution (in accordance with the criminal 
     law) of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting, or 
     suspected of conducting, espionage activities.
       (9) The term ``intelligence operation'' means activities 
     conducted to facilitate the gathering of foreign intelligence 
     or the conduct of covert action (as that term is defined in 
     section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 413b(e)).
       (10) The term ``collection and analysis requirements'' 
     means any subject, whether general or specific, upon which 
     there is a need for the collection of intelligence 
     information or the production of intelligence.
       (11) The term ``collection and analysis tasking'' means the 
     assignment or direction of an individual or activity to 
     perform in a specified way to achieve an intelligence 
     objective or goal.
       (12) The term ``certified intelligence officer'' means a 
     professional employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community engaged in intelligence activities who meets 
     standards and qualifications set by the National Intelligence 
     Director.
       On page 120, beginning on line 17, strike ``, subject to 
     the direction and control of the President,''.
       On page 123, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
       (e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) The Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation shall carry out subsections 
     (b) through (d) through the Executive Assistant Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Intelligence or such 
     other official as the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation designates as the head of the Directorate of 
     Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint 
     direction, supervision, and control of the Attorney General 
     and the National Intelligence Director.
       (3) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall report to both the Attorney General and the National 
     Intelligence Director regarding the activities of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation under subsections (b) through (d).
       On page 123, line 7, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
       On page 123, line 17, strike ``(f)'' and insert ``(g)''.
       On page 126, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

     SEC. 206. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU 
                   OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Directorate of Intelligence of Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.--The element of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation known as of the date of the enactment of this 
     Act is hereby redesignated as the Directorate of Intelligence 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Head of Directorate.--The head of the Directorate of 
     Intelligence shall be the Executive Assistant Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation for Intelligence or such 
     other official within the Federal Bureau of Investigation as 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
     designate.
       (c) Responsibilities.--The Directorate of Intelligence 
     shall be responsible for the following:
       (1) The discharge by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of 
     all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities 
     of the Bureau.
       (2) The discharge by the Bureau of the requirements in 
     section 105B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-5b).
       (3) The oversight of Bureau field intelligence operations.
       (4) Human source development and management by the Bureau.
       (5) Collection by the Bureau against nationally-determined 
     intelligence requirements.
       (6) Language services.
       (7) Strategic analysis.
       (8) Intelligence program and budget management.
       (9) The intelligence workforce.
       (10) Any other responsibilities specified by the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or specified by law.
       (d) Staff.--The Directorate of Intelligence shall consist 
     of such staff as the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation considers appropriate for the activities of the 
     Directorate.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I reiterate my strong support for this bill and the 
balance that has been struck by the committee in the drafting of this 
bill. It strikes the right balance. I am pleased to be an original 
cosponsor.
  In my remarks on Monday, I mentioned I was going to be submitting an 
amendment concerning the relationship between the FBI foreign 
intelligence functions and the national intelligence director. I thank 
both the majority and the ranking member staff for working with my 
staff to work out this amendment. It will be worked out and it will be 
the chairman's intent to present this amendment for unanimous consent.
  However, I will clearly state the intent of the amendment. The FBI 
functions as part of the intelligence community in the gathering, 
analyzing, and disseminating of information about the plans, 
intentions, and capabilities of our foreign enemies, including, most 
importantly, counter-terrorists. That effort, in my view, should be 
under the overall supervision of the national intelligence director.
  Let me be clear, though, this amendment does not mean the national 
intelligence director should run or control operations inside the 
United States. When the FBI, under the operational control of the FBI 
director and the Attorney General, works as a foreign intelligence 
agency, it should do so as part of that community under the general 
guidance of the national intelligence director.
  An excellent example of this issue is now part of the extensive 
record of structural intelligence failure prior to the September 11 
attacks, the way the intelligence community handled, or I should say 
mishandled, the so-called Phoenix document information and the 
Moussaoui information. Here we had in two different places FBI agents 
acquiring factual information which is of clear foreign intelligence 
value: that foreign individuals, associated with foreign terrorist 
organizations, may have been learning to fly passenger planes. At the 
very same time, the rest of the intelligence community had information 
that al-Qaida was preparing to strike against the United States and 
also that there had been past consideration of the use of airplanes in 
an attack methodology.
  Putting together these two disparate pieces of information is the 
business of an effective intelligence community. But it did not happen, 
in part, I believe, because the FBI part of the communication was not 
linked up with the Central Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Agency parts of the community.
  The bill before the Senate goes far toward remedying this by placing 
the FBI foreign intelligence elements under the overall supervision of 
the national intelligence director. I am concerned the bill presently 
contains ambiguities that, if left in, will cause confusion in the 
future. That is because the bill incorporates, with no change, current 
law which defines the role of the FBI intelligence activities. However, 
that law is confusing, it is internally inconsistent, and I believe it 
is the source of many of the problems which beset the FBI as part of 
the intelligence community.
  This amendment does three basic things to fix this. I want the record 
to reflect that. It clarifies critical definitions in the law. It makes 
a small alteration in the current law to make clear that the term of 
art ``counterintelligence'' is a subset of foreign intelligence, not an 
alternative to foreign intelligence.
  Second, it makes clear that when the FBI is engaged in law 
enforcement, it is not part of the national intelligence program or 
under the NID supervision, but removes the word ``counterintelligence'' 
from this so-called carve-out language. This is critical because this 
language in existing law was the confusing foundation upon which much 
of the wall between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community 
was built.
  This amendment creates a directorate of intelligence in the FBI. As 
written presently, the bill places the activities of the Office of 
Intelligence of the FBI clearly within the national intelligence 
program. This is good, but because the Office of Intelligence has no 
statutory basis, it could be rendered useless in the future if that 
office is removed or changed by a future FBI director.
  This amendment renames the office the Directorate of Intelligence and 
gives it a clear basis in law.
  Finally, this amendment introduces some clarifying language to ensure 
that the section governing ``FBI improvements'' is read to ensure that 
these improvements come as part of a larger, coordinated effort, led by 
the national intelligence director to improve the standards and 
practices of the entire intelligence community.
  It does this by ensuring that the FBI Director's improvement program 
is

[[Page S10013]]

guided by the national intelligence director. And it defines a 
``certified intelligence officer''--that is a term introduced for the 
first time in the underlying bill--to make sure that ``certification'' 
means meeting intelligence community standards, developed by the 
national intelligence director.
  The bottom line is that the FBI's intelligence functions must be part 
of a larger effort, guided by a strong leader, and linked carefully 
with all the other agencies and Departments in the intelligence 
community.
  There are still two parts of this amendment that are being worked out 
by staff. I appreciate their hard work very much and thank them. I also 
would like to thank the chair and the ranking member for their 
cooperation. I am very hopeful this amendment can later be adopted by 
unanimous consent.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3718 be set 
aside for the present time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I thank both managers of the bill, the 
chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and the ranking member, 
Senator Lieberman, for the great work they are doing on this bill. I 
know it is not easy, but it is vital that we achieve the kinds of 
reforms the 9/11 Commission and the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and others, over the years, have said would help make our 
Nation stronger.
  Yesterday, I proposed an amendment to this bill which dealt with a 
relatively narrow area but one I think is certainly relevant to what 
the 9/11 Commission recommended and, indeed, to the ultimate purpose of 
making America a safer place. Unfortunately, it is one that tends to be 
overlooked. That does not have to do with our physical security, 
potential cause of death and injury to the American people on our own 
soil but, rather, a body blow to our economic security.
  Indeed, one of the consequences of 9/11 was not just the terrible 
loss of life and injury but also the disruption to our economy, which 
resulted in chaos and many people being laid off work because of the 
economic disruption.
  This amendment had to do with cyber-security. I know it is something 
we do not think about very much but, indeed, now that we are so 
dependent upon computers for our way of life, to enhance our 
productivity, to communicate with one another, to do business, we 
somehow perhaps take for granted that they will always be secure. And 
particularly when it comes to our water utilities, our communications 
systems, our transportation systems, and financial networks, there is a 
very real danger that cyber-terrorists, those who would try to attack 
and dismantle and disrupt our financial, transportation, 
communications, and utility networks could wreak a terrible blow to the 
American economy.

  Now, my interest in this subject dates back several years to when I 
convened a panel in Texas, the State Infrastructure Protection Advisory 
Committee, as attorney general. We met hundreds of hours with both 
private and public sector participants, as well as people in the 
academic community, to try to figure out what we could do, No. 1, to 
identify what the problem was, and what we could do to make it better.
  Well, what we found is that in many instances because of liability 
concerns, because of concerns about trying to achieve and maintain 
public confidence in one's business or product, that the private sector 
was much better prepared than the Government was for cyber-attacks.
  I am pleased to say that Congress has begun to work to address this 
critical need for security in our computer networks by passing the 
Federal Information Security Management Act, or FISMA. Its purpose is 
to improve the information security of our computer networks and 
support Federal agencies by requiring top-to-bottom agency planning for 
information security and compliance with mandatory standards and 
benchmarks developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.
  FISMA also requires Federal agencies to conduct an annual evaluation 
of their computer security programs and to submit an effectiveness 
report to the Office of Management and Budget, the OMB.
  For several years, the House Government Reform Subcommittee, chaired 
by Congressman Adam Putnam, the Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census Subcommittee, has been 
working with the General Accounting Office to produce a report card for 
24 Federal agencies to see how well they are complying with 
congressional intent as expressed in FISMA, the Federal Information 
Security Management Act.
  What I would like to show you, Mr. President and my colleagues, is 
the report card that has been generated because I think it is 
indicative of the problems we have had and, indeed, the problems we 
still have, and how modest our improvement has been.
  Indeed, you can see from this chart showing the Federal computer 
security report card, issued on December 9, 2003, that overall 
Governmentwide, Government agencies, when it came to security of their 
computer systems, got a D, not a grade any one of us would be proud to 
take home. But I must say, as bad as a D is, in 2003, it is better than 
the F that many agencies got in 2002, before Congress began to get 
involved in trying to upgrade the security of our computer networks.
  But you can see, some of these agencies have improved from an F to a 
D. Indeed, the Department of Defense in 2002 had an F. In 2003, it got 
a D. The Small Business Administration went from an F to a C-. But we 
have some--the Department of the Interior, the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 
Department of State--that in 2002 got an F and in 2003 got an F.
  So I am not sure Congress is as successful as we should be or as we 
would like to be in getting the attention of the people who work in 
those agencies and who should be committed to carrying out this 
information security provision and protecting our Government computer 
systems from the potential of cyber-attack and the potential disruption 
to our economy.

  But I want to say in conclusion on that matter how much I appreciate 
the willingness of the Senator from Maine, the distinguished chair of 
the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senator from Connecticut, 
the distinguished ranking member of that committee, to work with us and 
consider this amendment and, indeed, to agree that the amendment should 
go forward because I think this is an easily overlooked but, 
nevertheless, a very important part of our security.
  Mr. President, I have two other amendments that have not yet been 
filed that I will obviously not call up but I would like to just 
preview for my colleagues. I have talked, also, to the chairman of the 
bill and the ranking member. We are going to continue to work with them 
and their staffs to try to make sure these matters can be worked out, 
if that is at all possible, much in the same manner we worked out this 
cyber-security provision.
  These matters have to do with other recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. Here again, the job that is before us is vast, indeed, as 
reflected by the 41 different recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
and the need for intelligence reform reflected in the bill before us.
  But perhaps it is because of the perspective I have as a Senator from 
the State of Texas, which has the longest border of any State with the 
country of Mexico--and, of course, beyond Mexico on to Central America 
and South America--the source of many concerns relative to human 
smuggling and to enforcement of our immigration and other laws related 
to those issues.
  First, we intend to offer an amendment to increase the penalties that 
can be assessed upon a successful prosecution for the crime of human 
smuggling. As the 9/11 Commission said: There is evidence to suggest 
that, since 1999, human smugglers have facilitated the travel of 
terrorists associated with more than a dozen extremist groups and that 
human smugglers clearly have the credentials necessary to aid terrorist 
travel. They also noted that many countries, because of their lack of 
security, make human smuggling an attractive avenue for terrorists in 
need of travel facilitation.

[[Page S10014]]

  In terms of our southern border, Under Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security Asa Hutchinson has told me and others that there is 
no documented instance of a terrorist actually coming across our 
southern border, but the truth is, it is very porous. If the motivation 
is high enough and the price is right, the same person who can be 
smuggled across the border for economic reasons because they want to 
come to work in this country outside of our laws, someone from a 
country other than Mexico, perhaps an Islamic extremist, somebody who 
wanted to take advantage of that porous border would, indeed, hire a 
human smuggler to bring them across our southern border into the United 
States and do us harm.
  It is important that our Federal policy and our criminal laws reflect 
both the strongest possible concern about this issue and express the 
will of Congress that human smugglers will be punished in a way 
commensurate with the threat they pose to the American people.
  The truth is, we cannot ignore this issue and believe that it is just 
related to people who want to come here and work. Money talks. And 
where human smugglers exist, they will go to the highest bidder to 
deliver their services in a way that could indeed deliver terrorists on 
to our soil. That relates to one amendment on which we will continue to 
work with the distinguished chairman and ranking member and their 
staffs to see if we can work out an agreement.
  The next amendment relates to another provision in the 9/11 
Commission report. The Commission, under the subheading ``Immigration 
Law and Enforcement,'' said:

       There is a growing role for state and local law enforcement 
     agencies. They need more training and work with federal 
     agencies so they can cooperate more effectively with those 
     federal authorities in identifying terrorist suspects.

  Again, on page 383 of the 9/11 Commission report, the Commission 
said:

       The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism 
     is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming 
     risks from entering or remaining in the United States 
     undetected.

  This amendment, which we intend to file and call up later--and we 
will continue to work with the managers of the bill on it--has to do 
with the authority of State and local law enforcement authorities to 
detain a certain narrow class of persons who are illegally in the 
country. Those relate to what I would think are three noncontroversial 
categories: Those who are absconders--in other words, 80,000 felons who 
are in the country illegally and running from justice. We don't have 
the capacity to know exactly where they are now because we have, 
unfortunately, ignored the crisis in our immigration enforcement for 
many years.
  Indeed, more than that, there are approximately, according to some 
guesses, between 300,000 and 400,000 people under final orders of 
deportation in the United States, and we simply don't have the Federal 
authorities sufficient to locate them and enforce final orders of 
deportation.

  This bill would narrowly address those who are under final orders of 
removal, those who have signed voluntary departure agreements, and 
those who have revoked visas. It would not, as some previous 
legislation that has been filed both here and in the House, offer an 
opportunity for local and State law enforcement officials to enforce a 
whole broad range of our immigration laws. This relates to a narrow 
group who are absconders from justice, including convicted felons and 
others, and reaffirms the authority of State and local law enforcement 
both to enforce those violations in the normal course of carrying out 
their duties and will make sure that we get the army of additional law 
enforcement authorities to assist the current Federal authorities who 
are mainly located along our border region when it comes to our border 
security and homeland security interests.
  Finally, this bill would direct the Department of Homeland Security 
to take custody within 48 hours of these persons so detained by State 
or local officials or else pay the locality to detain these particular 
class of aliens. Currently, the process is that once someone has been 
identified and perhaps detained for a violation of one of a host of our 
immigration laws, the common practice is to tell them to come back for 
a future hearing for deportation. It is no surprise to any of us that 
about 90 percent of them melt into the landscape and are never heard 
from again.
  Simply put, we need to have law enforcement authorities at all 
levels--national, State, and local--join forces, as the 9/11 Commission 
recommended, to deal with this certain narrow class of people who are 
under final orders of deportation from our country, those who have 
signed voluntary departure agreements, and those who have had their 
visas revoked. These are people who have exercised any right they may 
have to due process and should have no further recourse.
  I look forward to working with the manager and the ranking member and 
their staffs to try to see if we can work this out.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for his 
comments. We look forward to working with him on his two additional 
amendments. We were pleased to be able to pass his first amendment to 
this bill last night. We appreciate his cooperation.
  In consultation with the Senator from Nevada, the Democratic whip, I 
ask unanimous consent that the consent request previously entered into 
be altered so that Senator Byrd would be recognized for up to 25 
minutes prior to Senator Lautenberg offering his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, Senator Byrd likely will not use that much 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from West Virginia.


                        People Deserve the Truth

  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. I also thank the distinguished Senator, 
Ms. Collins, and our distinguished whip, Mr. Reid, who is always to be 
found on the floor or near it, always ready to assist us, any of us on 
both sides of the aisle. I thank the distinguished manager of the bill 
on this side of the aisle for his diligence, for his hard work always 
in his committee and outside his committee. He is ever ready.
  Mr. President, I take the floor on a point of personal privilege on 
behalf of the people of West Virginia.
  Growing up, we all heard the legend--which was probably mythical--of 
young George Washington. As the story goes, his father, after seeing a 
tree chopped down on their land, approached young George and asked if 
he was responsible. The story continues that the boy responded: 
``Father, I cannot tell a lie. I cut down that cherry tree.''
  The boy who grew up to be President knew the value of truth. 
Unfortunately, however, when it comes to Presidential politics these 
days, telling the truth is seriously out of style.
  That point was brought home sharply to me last weekend when I 
traveled to West Virginia, where I learned of a scurrilous campaign 
being waged in West Virginia to scare voters--think of it--to scare 
West Virginia voters into registering and voting Republican. 
Incredibly, the weapon being brandished is the Holy Bible itself. If 
ever there were one book that should never be used for political gain, 
if ever there were one book that should never be the subject of lies 
and deception, it is the Bible, which I hold in my hand.
  Over my 52 years of serving in the Congress, there have been 
occasions--few in number--when I brought the Holy Bible on the floor of 
the body in which I have spoken. I don't claim to be a minister. I 
would not be worthy of that title. But this is the Holy Bible. It is 
the King James version, first published in 1611 under the reign of King 
James I. I will only read this Bible at my house; I don't read any 
other Bible. Again I say, if ever there were a book that should never, 
ever be used for political gain, that should not be the subject of 
deception on the part of politicians, or anybody else, it is the Bible. 
Yet that is exactly what is happening today. I found, last weekend, 
that it was happening in West Virginia. I read somewhere that it was 
also happening in Arkansas.
  Two weeks ago, the Republican National Committee sent a mass mailing

[[Page S10015]]

to West Virginia suggesting that liberals--in other words, everyone but 
Republicans, I suppose--are out to ban the Bible. Get that: Out to ban 
the Bible. Can you imagine? They are out to ban the Bible. What a 
ridiculous claim. It is foolish on its face; it is absolutely 
ridiculous on its face. It is a flatout, no-doubt-about-it, silly, 
juvenile, sophomoric charge. The Republican National Committee is 
spreading this tripe--it is putrid, this tripe--to smear Democrats. The 
President ought to demand that the Republican National Committee 
apologize to the people of West Virginia.
  The hypocrisy of the Republican National Committee's desperation 
tactic is an insult--an insult--to the intelligence of voters in my 
State. The ninth of the Ten Commandments, passed down from God to 
Moses, states:

       Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.

  What could be more false? What could be more false than an 
advertisement implying that so-called liberals want to ban the Bible? I 
never knew I was a liberal. When I came to this Senate, I was to the 
right of Barry Goldwater, and I always considered myself to be a 
conservative in most things--certainly most things, other than matters 
affecting the economy. The political hacks behind that blasphemous 
flyer should be required to reread the Book of Exodus. There is no free 
pass from the Commandments in an election year. They are still there. 
There is no waiving of the Commandments in an election year.

  All West Virginians, from the northern tip of the State to the 
southern tip, from the east to the west, should be insulted by such 
dirty tricks on the part of the Republican National Committee. Paid 
henchmen who talk about Democratic politicians who are eager to ban the 
Bible obviously must think that West Virginians are gullible, ignorant 
fools. They must think that West Virginians just bounced off the turnip 
truck. They must think that spreading nonsense about banning the Bible 
is a sure-fire way to get votes in an election year. But the people of 
West Virginia are smarter than that. We are not country bumpkins who 
will swallow whatever garbage some high-priced political consultant 
makes up. West Virginians are smarter than that, and they deserve an 
apology from the Republican National Committee for this insulting 
mailing.
  Here it is. Take a look at this. Those of you who are viewing this 
Senate floor through those electronic lenses, look at this: ``The 
Bible, banned. This will be West Virginia.''
  I suppose the same flyer was used in Arkansas, with a few words 
changed from West Virginia. Here it is again: ``if you don't vote--if 
you stay away from the polls--the Bible, banned.''
  Such tripe. That is what West Virginians think of that. As a Senator, 
I am appalled by the Republican National Committee's utter ignorance of 
the Constitution.
  I am appalled, let me say it again, by the Republican National 
Committee's utter ignorance of this Constitution, the Constitution of 
the United States, which I hold in my hand. Our Constitution--let me 
say to the people of West Virginia and the people of Arkansas--our 
Constitution protects this Bible. So never fear, never fear that the 
Bible will be banned.
  The first amendment begins:

       Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
     religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .

  And yet this flier, paid for by the Republican National Committee, 
features a picture of the Bible, just as I have shown Senators--let me 
show it again--with the word ``banned'' across its cover. The people of 
West Virginia should not have to put up with such trash. It is a crass 
insult to the people and to their faith.


                                  Iraq

  But false claims seem to be the modus operandi in politics these 
days. The truth gets tailored to fit the occasion. Nowhere is this more 
evident than on the subject of Iraq. Whether it be weapons of mass 
destruction or an imminent threat or mushroom clouds, the reason for 
the war changes faster than the weather. Talk about flip-flops. There 
you have it.
  The White House said that our troops would be welcomed with flowers, 
and yet our soldiers saw mortar attacks and suicide bombings. The White 
House said the world would be with us in the war and the reconstruction 
in Iraq, but the coalition of the willing was never that large and has 
become the coalition of the wilting. How can the American people trust 
a White House that cannot get its stories straight? The flipping and 
the flopping from this slippery fish crowd is a sight to behold.
  Even now, the White House is trying desperately to portray Iraq as a 
nation that is getting back on its feet. Listen to the September 29 
Washington Post. The headline: ``Growing Pessimism on Iraq. Doubts 
Increase Within U.S. Security Agencies.''
  Let me read just the first few paragraphs:

       A growing number of career professionals within national 
     security agencies believe that the situation in Iraq is much 
     worse, and the path to success much more tenuous, than is 
     being expressed in public by top Bush administration 
     officials, according to former and current government 
     officials and assessments over the past year by intelligence 
     officials at the CIA and the Departments of State and 
     Defense.
       While President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
     and others have delivered optimistic public appraisals, 
     officials who fight the Iraqi insurgency and study it at the 
     CIA and the State Department and within the Army officer 
     corps believe the rebellion is deeper and more widespread 
     than is being publicly acknowledged, officials say.
       People at the CIA ``are mad at the policy in Iraq because 
     it's a disaster, and they're digging the hole deeper and 
     deeper and deeper,'' said one former intelligence officer who 
     maintains contact with CIA officials. ``There's no obvious 
     way to fix it. The best we can hope for is a semi-failed 
     state hobbling along with terrorists and a succession of weak 
     governments.''

  Yesterday's New York Times reports--what I just read was from 
yesterday's Washington Post--yesterday's New York Times reports that 
there have been 2,300 attacks by insurgents. They have been directed 
against civilians and military targets in Iraq in a pattern that 
sprawls over nearly every major population center outside the Kurdish 
north.
  So there you have it--an average of 80 attacks against our forces 
each day. The situation in Iraq is far more dire and the future far 
more uncertain than White House officials are ever going to admit, and 
so the lives of America's sons and daughters are on the line in Iraq, 
and still we hear happy talk about success right over the horizon.
  Misleading scenarios about Iraq or ludicrous nonsense about banning 
the Bible insult the values and the intelligence of West Virginians and 
the millions of other Americans who share the beliefs of West 
Virginians. Such stuff must not be tolerated. The people of this 
country know about honesty, and they must start demanding it from their 
leaders.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
West Virginia for his remarks today. I have tremendous respect for his 
belief and his knowledge of the Constitution. I share that belief and I 
only hope my knowledge can at some time reach the level his is in terms 
of understanding and being able to expound on the Constitution that is 
such a treasure and a blessing for this country.
  More importantly, I share in his belief and his execution in the 
teachings of the Bible. Like the Senator from West Virginia, I try very 
hard each and every day to follow the Ten Commandments, which are a 
cornerstone in the faith that we both practice in our Christian 
religion. I try hard to witness my faith each and every day in my 
actions and in my words. Among the Commandments, ``thou shalt not bear 
false witness'' is one I work desperately on. In our modern language, 
we know it as ``do not tell lies,'' something we were taught by our 
parents and we were taught by our faith.
  Now, I have not been in public service nearly as long as the Senator 
from West Virginia, but I have been around long enough to know that 
people say things in campaigns that come awfully close to breaking that 
Commandment. I have learned to turn the other cheek and brush aside the 
little white lies of political commercials and direct mail pieces. I do 
not know if brushing aside and turning that cheek at this juncture is 
the most appropriate thing to do, because I think we find ourselves at 
a time when that has definitely been taken to the extreme.
  The mailing the Republican National Committee sent to the people 
living in my home State of Arkansas, as well as

[[Page S10016]]

those in the State of West Virginia, goes beyond any political smear I 
have witnessed. I hope my colleagues in this great body, as members of 
that committee, would denounce such abusive action because I think it 
is completely inappropriate. To insinuate that members of the 
Democratic Party, simply because they are Democrats, would ban the 
Bible is absolutely absurd. It is outrageous, and it is outrageous that 
we in this Nation would stand for that.
  I am a Democrat. I was raised in a Democratic family. But I also grew 
up with the opportunity and encouragement to find my own belief and to 
reach out and find out, Who am I? What do I stand for? What is it that 
I want to contribute to this great world?
  I realized, not only as a Democrat but at a very early age, that I 
was first and foremost a Christian. I take that very seriously. I take 
my witness and my commitment to my faith as a part of my everyday walk. 
I try hard to walk my talk each and every day. I fight hard, both 
personally and professionally, every day to fulfill my witness to my 
faith, to care for those who are less fortunate than I am, to reach out 
and be kind to those who need kindness, to be able to look beyond the 
cover of what I might see in someone and look for the best of what God 
created in that human being as well.
  I know that we are all a part of God's creation on this Earth. I know 
that my God is a loving God, one who believes in me and who wants 
everyone in this body to reach their potential. But I also know, 
through my faith, that reaching that potential means being able to have 
that same kind of unconditional Christian love for my fellow man.
  It is amazing to me that we would see such action, such assumption, 
and such disregard for the intelligence of the people of our States.
  My faith has always been an important part of my life because I was 
raised in a Christian family, with parents who had strong principles, 
who had tremendous love, and continue to, and an ability to share with 
me what that love could produce in my life if I, too, were willing to 
share it with others.
  I worked as a youth group director while I was in college. I taught 
Sunday school while I worked here on the Hill as a staffer--in 
Washington, DC. I contribute time to homeless shelters here in DC, and 
at home, working with the Red Cross through many kinds of devastating 
natural disasters in my home State--finding incredible opportunities 
where I could provide that love and that assistance to my fellow man.
  My husband Steve and I make sure our family is regularly at church, 
whether we are here in the Washington area or at home in Arkansas with 
our family. There is rarely a meal that goes by in my home where we 
don't all join hands and say a prayer of thanksgiving and gratefulness 
for all of the many blessings in our life. We end each day saying 
prayers with our boys when they are tucked into bed. We talk about the 
day's events and how, through those prayers, we can ask for the 
assistance for others and to improve ourselves and provide the 
unbelievable talents God has given us to be a great part of making this 
world a better place.
  I am not the only one, as a member of my political party, whose faith 
is important to them. There are other members of my political party who 
are of other faiths who take their faith very seriously. There are 
other Christians in my political party who take their faith very 
seriously and act it as a real part of their everyday life.
  It is unbelievable to me that the Republican Party would try to claim 
that members of my party would want to ban the Bible. What do they base 
that on? Where is their credibility to say that? What evidence is there 
that would lead them to say that and to use that in such an 
important part of what we stand for in this Nation, the political 
process of being able to elect our leaders? I don't know. I don't know 
where that comes from.

  The Senator from Massachusetts, who is running for President, has 
told the American people that his faith is important to him as well. He 
says he is a man of God, and I believe him. Unlike some other political 
candidates, he has not sought to gain political advantage by boasting 
of his faith or wearing it on his sleeve, but I do believe his actions 
in defending so many of his fellow men, children, low-income families, 
the elderly, are certainly clear examples of how important his 
responsibility to his faith is to him.
  Maybe he was raised in a region of the country where people are not 
so outspoken about their faith, just as they are more reserved in most 
other aspects of their lives. I was raised in the South where we love 
to talk about it, where it is an important part of who we are and we 
want to talk about it, where we like to hug and we like to be close. 
There is no doubt that there are differences in the regions of our 
country in how we express things. Sometimes my colleagues say I even 
need a translator because my accent is so thick. There is nothing wrong 
with the differences in the regions of this country. There is nothing 
wrong in the different ways we choose to show our faith. But there is 
something deeply wrong with people using the political process to 
accuse people of not being true to their faith.
  The man from Massachusetts, maybe he is quiet, but less visible 
expressions of faith do not warrant such judgmental political 
statements from the Republican Party. I hope, I hope deeply, that the 
Republican Party, which has produced this pamphlet that was so well 
described by my colleague from West Virginia--I hope there will be an 
apology for their claims that Democrats want to ban the Bible and the 
inferences that Democrats, for some reason, cannot have a faith as 
close or as deeply held as the other party. I find that to be the pit, 
the absolute bottom of what is wrong in the political process.
  I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to come to the Senate 
floor and, even as a southerner, express something that maybe I am not 
as well equipped to express as others, but I promise you, it is not 
less heartfelt than any other Christian Member of this body.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arkansas and tell her, I, No. 1, never have any trouble understanding 
her, and, No. 2, I always enjoy giving her a hug.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. I thank my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from New 
Jersey is recognized for 15 minutes.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I thank our esteemed friend and colleague, the Senator 
from West Virginia, for his words--always words of wisdom and words of 
rage when he sees such an affront to the basic tenets of our society.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, what is the pending question? Do we 
have an amendment pending?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is an amendment pending.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside 
the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3802

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3802 and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Lautenberg], for himself, 
     Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Corzine, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3802.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

        (Purpose: To stop corporations from financing terrorism)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. TERRORIST FINANCING.

       (a) Clarification of Certain Actions Under IEEPA.--In any 
     case in which the President takes action under the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.) to prohibit a United States person from engaging in 
     transactions with a foreign country, where a determination 
     has been made by the Secretary of State that the government 
     of that country has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
     international terrorism, such action shall apply

[[Page S10017]]

     to any foreign subsidiaries or affiliate, including any 
     permanent foreign establishment of that United States person, 
     that is controlled in fact by that United States person.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Controlled in fact.--The term ``is controlled in fact'' 
     includes--
       (A) in the case of a corporation, holds at least 50 percent 
     (by vote or value) of the capital structure of the 
     corporation; and
       (B) in the case of any other kind of legal entity, holds 
     interests representing at least 50 percent of the capital 
     structure of the entity.
       (2) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' includes any United States citizen, permanent 
     resident alien, entity organized under the law of the United 
     States (including foreign branches), wherever located, or any 
     other person in the United States.
       (c) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--In any case in which the President has 
     taken action under the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act and such action is in effect on the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the provisions of subsection (a) shall 
     not apply to a United States person (or other person) if such 
     person divests or terminates its business with the government 
     or person identified by such action within 90 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act.
       (2) Actions after date of enactment.--In any case in which 
     the President takes action under the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act on or after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to a 
     United States person (or other person) if such person divests 
     or terminates its business with the government or person 
     identified by such action within 90 days after the date of 
     such action.

      SEC. __. NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS OF TERMINATION OF 
                   INVESTIGATION BY OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS 
                   CONTROL.

       (a) Notification Requirement.--The Office of Federal 
     Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

``Sec. 42. Notification of Congress of termination of investigation by 
              Office of Foreign Assets Control.''.

       ``The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
     shall notify Congress upon the termination of any 
     investigation by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the 
     Department of the Treasury if any sanction is imposed by the 
     Director of such office as a result of the investigation.''.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to this 
intelligence reform bill because I think it is consistent with the 
mission of that bill. There has been a lot of work and a lot of debate 
about the bill, and I personally am supporting it, but I offer an 
amendment to do something we very much intend to have happen, and that 
is to shut down the source of revenue for terrorist organizations.
  The 9/11 Commission report talks about the critical issue of 
terrorist financing because as President Bush has said, money is the 
lifeblood of terrorist operations.
  Amazingly, some of our very own corporations help provide revenue 
indirectly to terrorists by doing business with state sponsors of 
terrorism. My amendment would close the loophole in the law that allows 
this to happen, thereby cutting off a major source of revenue for 
terrorists.
  As the 9/11 Commission stated:

       Vigorous efforts to track terrorists' financing must remain 
     front and center in the U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

  We took pains to check with the Parliamentarian about the 
germaneness, the relevance of our amendment, and it was confirmed that 
this would be relevant.
  We need to starve the terrorists at the source and that is why our 
sanctions program in law is so critical, but now we know a loophole in 
the law exists that enables companies to do business with Iran, which 
openly boasts about its support for Hamas and Islamic jihad.
  Iran also funded the 1983 terror attack in Beirut that killed 241 
U.S. Marines; 241 of our finest young people killed by Iranian terror, 
and yet we are permitting U.S. corporations to provide revenue flows to 
the Iranian Government. We have to put a stop to it as quickly as we 
can.
  How do companies get around terrorist sanction laws? It is a fairly 
simple process. They simply establish a foreign subsidiary and run 
their Iranian operations. It is demonstrated on this chart which says 
that U.S. corporations have subsidiaries all over the place and that is 
common in our economic and business structure. Once a foreign 
subsidiary is created, then people can do business with Iran or other 
rogue nations, people who are determined to kill our citizens, can do 
business with them and provide services--intentionally, I do not 
believe--but nevertheless to people like Hamas and Hezbollah. It is a 
terrible thing to recognize that American companies can be providing 
sustenance to countries that support terrorism actively.
  Our American sanctions law prohibits American companies from doing 
business with Iran, but the law does not mention an American company's 
foreign subsidiaries. As long as a loophole like this is in place, our 
terrorist sanction laws are considerably diminished in their force.
  After brutally murdering 241 of our young marines in their sleep in 
Beirut in 1983, an Iranian-backed terrorist killed two American women 
whom we show in these photos. Look at these young faces. They are 
people at the dawn of life. Sara Duker was a constituent of mine, a 22-
year-old from the town of Teaneck, NJ. She was a summa cum laude 
graduate of Barnard College. Sara was killed with her fiance when the 
bus she was riding in in Jerusalem in 1996 was blown up by Hamas. An 
American court confirmed that Iran was responsible and assets were 
seized to try and provide compensation to the families.
  Hamas receives its funding and support from the Iranian Government 
and that is why this attempt to sequester assets was done.
  Last year, Abigail Litle, a 14-year-old Christian missionary 
originally from New Hampshire, was riding home from school in Haifa, 
Israel, when her bus exploded as a result of a suicide bomb. That 
attack killed 15 people and was directly linked to terrorists funded by 
Syria and Iran.
  I was in Iran with several other Senators and we talked to the 
President of the country about supporting terrorism. He denied any 
suggestion that they might be operating out of his country, but the 
Israelis last week apparently took an action to eliminate the head of 
one of the terrorist organizations who was clearly functioning there.
  We have to worry about these countries and we cannot give them any 
latitude, any encouragement to continue with their killing ways. We 
also have to worry about providing revenue to Iran because of its well-
known desire to build a nuclear bomb and other weapons of mass 
destruction.
  The 9/11 Commission concluded:

       Preventing the proliferation of [WMD] warrants a maximum 
     effort.
  Certainly, ``maximum'' includes providing funding for some of these 
firms. So allowing U.S. companies to provide revenue to rogue WMD 
programs is clearly not a maximum effort.
  Some people think this is an isolated problem, but it is not. 
According to a report by the Center for Security Policy, there are 
large numbers of companies doing business with Iran and other sponsors 
of terror.
  Iran sponsors terrorism, period. The terror they help fund has killed 
hundreds of Americans. Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons and 
yet U.S. companies are using a loophole in the law in order to do 
business with the Iranian Government. It is wrong. It is not illegal 
yet, but this amendment would change it. I am sure when my colleagues 
examine what we are talking about, they will consider joining us, I 
hope, enthusiastically.
  It is inexcusable for American companies to engage in any business 
that provides revenue, any business practice that provides revenues to 
terrorism. We have to stop it. We have a chance to do that with this 
amendment. I remind our distinguished colleague, the chairperson of the 
committee, that she supported this amendment before and I hope she will 
once again support the amendment and let all of us close the terror 
funding loophole.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                                  Iraq

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, we are today, in this country, convulsed by 
the situation in Iraq. It is an extraordinary crisis. It is taxing our 
men and women in uniform, and it is certainly taxing our resolve.
  I think one of the problems is that the administration has not 
focused on the reality on the ground, what is really happening on the 
ground. They are

[[Page S10018]]

hoping, but hope is not a substitute for planning; hope is not a 
substitute for a very candid and hard look at the situation on the 
ground. The reality is that there is widespread violence and 
instability throughout Iraq.
  Yesterday, the New York Times reported that

     over the past 30 days more than 2,300 attacks by insurgents 
     have been directed against civilians and military targets in 
     Iraq in a pattern that sprawls over nearly every major 
     population center outside the Kurdish north, according to the 
     comprehensive data compiled by a private security company 
     with access to military intelligence reports and its own 
     network of Iraqi informants.

  You would think, given this information, that the administration 
would begin to reflect on the difficult circumstances on the ground, 
but that is not the case. They continue to pursue both policies and 
rhetoric which suggest that all is not well yet it is quickly getting 
there.
  But there is something else they have done which I think is 
startling, and that is in a related story in the Washington Post, 
information such as what I just quoted, that data from private security 
companies is not being recognized and evaluated. It is being 
suppressed.
  According to today's Washington Post, the

       USAID said this week that it would restrict distribution of 
     reports by Kroll Security International showing the number of 
     daily attacks by insurgents in Iraq has increased.
       On Monday, the Washington Post published a front-page story 
     saying that the Kroll report suggests a broad and 
     intensifying campaign of insurgent violence. A USAID official 
     sent an e-mail to congressional aides stating: This is the 
     last Kroll report to come in. After the Washington Post 
     story, they shut it down in order to regroup. I will let you 
     know when it restarts.

  If we don't have accurate information, if we are not able to tell 
difficult truth one to another, we will never be able to effectively 
design a policy for Iraq.
  It is concerning to me that the administration would try to respond 
to the facts by suppressing the facts, but that is just one example of 
what is going on.
  I know this. The country, with some exception, is wracked by 
violence. The Kurds in the north have had a semiautonomous region for 
many years. It is under our informal protection and formal protection. 
That is a part of the country where there is a certain stability, but 
there is political tension building there because the Kurdish sense of 
autonomy will invariably clash with the need to create a central 
government in Iraq.
  The focal point of that clash could be the oil around Kirkuk, which 
is the second biggest source of oil for the country of Iraq. Those oil 
fields could be in jeopardy as a pawn, if you will, in a struggle 
between the Kurds asserting their autonomy and the central government 
trying to maintain its authority.
  We also understand clearly that Sunni provinces have ``no-enter 
zones''--areas in which the United States cannot even send its troops 
today successfully. One of these areas is Ramadi.
  According, again, to a story in the Los Angeles Times on September 
28:

       The erosion of order in Ramadi illustrates the success of 
     the insurgents' methods and the serious problems facing the 
     interim government and its U.S. backers in maintaining 
     stability in Iraq. It also threatens to thwart plans for a 
     national election in January. . . . An election that omits 
     key population centers in the so-called Sunni Triangle 
     region would have greatly diminished credibility.

  In Fallujah, there are similar situations where there are areas we 
cannot enter. In the Shia South, there is the instability principally 
generated by Sadr, the young cleric who has defied the central 
government and also the U.S. repeatedly.
  We generally see the violence in Iraq as a function of attacks 
against our troops, but when we do that we miss a very important 
reality; that is, this violence is only a small portion of the violence 
that the Iraqi people feel each day--not from terrorists but from 
robbers, burglars, rapists, and murderers.
  In June, a poll was conducted. They asked the Iraqi people to list 
their top three priorities. Fighting crime represented one of the top 
three priorities of 92.8 percent of the people of Iraq. Stopping 
attacks on coalition forces represented a top priority of 17.5 percent 
of the people of Iraq. On a daily basis, we are seeing not just attacks 
against coalition forces and security forces of Iraq, we are seeing a 
situation in many places which is beyond chaotic to the point which the 
Iraqi people are quickly beginning to assume that we not only are 
occupying but we are inept occupiers. We cannot even provide the level 
of stability that they enjoyed previously. They have already decided we 
are occupiers. They have decided we must go.
  The struggle now politically, I think, is you have to recognize that 
in this type of conflict it is essentially a political struggle. We can 
win tactical victories one after another--and we will--but unless we 
create a political dynamic which will coalesce support around the new 
Iraqi Government and coalesce cooperation with us, our efforts 
tactically will be marginal.
  What is happening, though, politically in Iraq now is the fact that 
each of these groups and subgroups have one eye on the current 
situation, our presence there, but their other focus is on what happens 
when we go. Will they be in power? Will they survive? Will they 
succeed? That creates a dynamic that is very difficult for us and very 
difficult for stability in Iraq.
  How did we get there?
  It is in some respects a triumph, as I said before, of hope over 
history, of ideology, of political calculation, arrogance in some 
cases, ignorance that has led us to enter the country ill prepared.
  There is a litany of mistakes that are quite obvious: No real plans 
for stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq. We should have sensed 
that.
  I can recall in the fall of 2003 and in succeeding days and months 
leading up to the attack last year where we had a situation where we 
were trying to get information about stabilization. We didn't have 
that. We did not have that information.

  In addition, there were insufficient forces to stabilize Iraq and we 
were left unprotected for weeks and months, which today has led to a 
proliferation of weapons in Iraq, IEDs particularly, the improvised 
explosive devices that are bedeviling our forces. We cannot secure 
those. We could not secure the borders. We need more troops.
  There was a failure to secure multinational support, not only in the 
sense of getting the good will, good wishes, and support of the 
international community, but particular failures.
  We were not able to convince the Turkish Government to allow the use 
of Turkey as a point of entry into Iraq. The Fourth Infantry Division, 
poised to move through Turkey, to attack in the north, to roll up and 
envelop all of the Iraqi forces to the north, was rerouted to the south 
because of that lack of cooperation. The consequence on the ground was 
literally thousands of Iraqi soldiers were never effectively contested. 
They gave up, they disappeared, and apparently reformed as insurgents. 
That is another example of the lack of international cooperation that 
could have materially assisted us.
  We made a significant error in disbanding the Iraqi Army. Rather than 
disbanding the army, we should have marched them back to their barracks 
and tried at that point to see if we could, through some type of 
vetting of officers and senior enlisted people, or some procedure, get 
them to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. They 
are part of the problem today. Many of these insurgent leaders, I 
believe, have roots going back to the army and the military force 
structure, the security forces of Iraq.
  Then we conducted a de-Baathification program that applied across the 
board. We put that in the hands of Chalabi and others who had no real 
legitimacy in the country. As a result, for months and months and 
months we prevented teachers and professionals from working. It did not 
help in terms of getting schools going quickly. It certainly created 
this atmosphere among the Sunni community that they were going to 
effectively be marginalized as people and as citizens of Iraq. That 
process was a mistake.
  Part of that, as I mentioned, was putting misplaced reliance on 
Chalabi and his colleagues. I recall he sat as a guest of the First 
Lady at this year's State of the Union speech, yet today is accused of 
cooperating and perhaps spying for the Iranians. That has been a 
mistake.

[[Page S10019]]

  The CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority, turned out to be not up to 
the great task with which they were entrusted. The administration 
rejected the traditional agencies of the State Department and their 
divisions who have experience in stabilization operations in terms of 
political governments, reconstruction, economic development, and put 
together an ad hoc group of people who were the architects of what was 
a lost year of progress that we should have been making with respect to 
Iraq.
  And, of course, there was the failure to recognize this insurgency. 
We all recall Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks about a few dead-enders. It 
was much more than a few dead-enders. It has metastasized into a 
virulent and effective force attacking our troops on a daily basis and 
attacking the citizens of Iraq.
  There was a failure then simply to read the intelligence. We are 
debating this intelligence bill today because we have to create--
indeed, it is necessary to create--an intelligence system that is more 
effective. Let me point to an intelligence success. This was the 
national intelligence estimate. According to a report in the New York 
Times,

       The estimate came in two classified reports prepared for 
     President Bush in January 2003 by the National Intelligence 
     Council, an independent group that advises the Director of 
     Central Intelligence. The assessments predicted that an 
     American-led invasion of Iraq would increase support for 
     political Islam and would result in a deeply divided Iraqi 
     society prone to violent internal conflict.

  Very perceptive. It was disregarded by the administration, and I 
think disregarded for several reasons. They had a view, which was not 
substantiated by the facts, that we would be greeted with open arms. 
Principals in the administration said that.
  As we debate this intelligence reform, we also have to understand it 
is not just producing good intelligence; it is having leaders who 
understand and use that intelligence wisely.
  Then one of the most critical issues is that we have wasted a year to 
train Iraqi security forces. I can recall, as many of my colleagues 
recall, being briefed over the past many months. It seemed each 
briefing would contain another pie chart showing the growing, growing 
Iraqi security forces and the diminishing United States involvement. 
All of that was an illusion. These forces were untrained, ill equipped, 
unprepared. It took us a year to recognize that and we are only 
beginning now to recognize what we have to do to ensure that Iraqi 
security forces can, in fact, provide for the security of their 
country.
  Part of it was a result of the notion that we could do it ourselves, 
that this was just a few diehards, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, that we 
could root them out and we could deal with them with the coalition 
forces. Then it was reluctance to develop an Iraqi security force 
because of the fear that they would become another power player in the 
very complicated politics of Iraq where it seems the only institutions 
that have any type of strength and coherence are the mosques or the 
militias, and they sometimes overlap. So for all these reasons, despite 
the evidence of growing instability, despite the proliferation of 
crime, we have just gotten down to begin to train an effective Iraqi 
security force of police, army, national guard, and special operations. 
That is a year wasted, a year that should not have been wasted. The 
signs were quite clear.
  Indeed, even as we focus on this, there have been reports in the 
press that General Petraeus, who has been put in charge of this 
operation, has not yet received his full complement of American 
personnel to help, another example of a delayed reaction, a reaction 
based upon hopes that did not materialize. While those hopes were 
bandied about here in Washington, the situation got much worse.
  All of this leads to an Iraq today that is imposing extraordinary 
costs on this country. One of the most obvious and poignant costs is 
the loss from American fighting men and women in battle: 1,054 soldiers 
have been killed and 7,532 soldiers wounded, who have served this 
country with great fidelity and great courage. Their families deserve 
our profound respect. We owe them, and we owe their colleagues who 
still fight, more wisdom and more truth.
  That is why it is particularly frustrating to see this example of a 
reaction where, when the facts are uncomfortable, those facts are 
suppressed. That is not appropriate given the sacrifices we have seen.
  The costs to our Army, particularly, are significant. Personnel 
costs. We all understand there were misgivings about the full size of 
the force being deployed. When General Shinseki was asked, he did not 
volunteer, about the size of the force needed, he said, ``something on 
the order of several hundred thousand soldiers,'' and was immediately 
castigated by Secretary Rumsfeld, saying this estimate was ``far from 
the mark,'' and Secretary Wolfowitz, who called the estimate 
``outlandish.''
  Then in his few remaining days in the Army, General Shinseki was 
personally shunned by the leadership and made to feel entirely 
uncomfortable--and I am being very polite. He did not deserve that. 
This is a professional soldier who was asked his honest opinion and he 
gave it. I wish there were more folks like him in uniform. Certainly 
the comments of Secretary Wolfowitz and Secretary Rumsfeld were very 
far off the mark. We have over 100,000 troops in place. They probably 
will be there for years. There is a strong sign that we need more.

  This is a great stress on our military, 17 months after President 
Bush declared the end of major combat operations, with over 138,000 
troops still stationed in Iraq. They are there because of a patchwork 
of different policies the Department of Defense has had to undertake 
because they do not have sufficient soldiers. Approximately 16,000 
active-duty soldiers have already had two tours in Iraq and if they 
stay in the service longer, they will have another. In order to keep 
the strength up, they have resorted to stop-loss orders, essentially 
telling a soldier, once your unit has been alerted, you are there until 
the unit returns home, even if you can leave the service in that 
interim. In the words of some, it is a ``backdoor draft.''

  Since September 11, DOD has announced six stop-loss policies for the 
Army, two for the Navy, five for the Air Force, and two for the Marine 
Corps. Only the Army still has a stop-loss policy in place. That is 
another way in which to create soldiers by means other than a strictly 
voluntary approach.
  One of the greatest burdens falls on the Guard and Reserves. Today, 
we cannot continue our mission without the brave men and women of our 
Army and Air Force Guard and Reserve units. We are asking them to go 
way above and beyond the call of duty.
  Since September 11, 2001, 422,950 members of the Reserve component 
have been mobilized; 51 percent of the Army Guard and 31 percent of the 
Air Guard. The average duty days have climbed as a result. Guard and 
Reserve men and women are now serving, on average, about 120 days a 
year. In fact, back in 2002, it was only 80, and before that it was 
much less.
  We are looking at a situation which the GAO described as fraught with 
consequences. In their words:

       DOD policies were not developed within the context of an 
     overall strategic framework. . . . Consequently the policies 
     underwent numerous changes as DOD strove to meet current 
     requirements. These policy changes created uncertainties for 
     reserve component members concerning the likelihood of their 
     mobilization, the length of their overseas rotations and the 
     types of missions that they would be asked to perform. It 
     remains to be seen how these uncertainties will affect 
     recruiting, retention and the long term viability of the 
     reserve components.

  We have already seen the National Guard report that they have not 
been able to meet their recruiting objectives for the most current 
year. So the evidence is beginning to accumulate.
  This operation tempo will mean more and more pressure on the military 
forces, particularly land forces, and, as a result, you will see the 
stress even more, in recruiting and retention, challenging our military 
leaders. We need more troops, I believe, as an initial response to the 
situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. We should do that 
honestly and directly. We should not rely upon supplemental 
appropriations. We should not rely on emergency authorizations for 
additional troops. We should increase the end strength of the Army and 
provide for the payment of that end strength through the regular budget 
process, not by supplementals.

[[Page S10020]]

  Senator Hagel and I offered an amendment to do this last October. In 
March, again, Senator Hagel, joined by Senator McCain and I, introduced 
a bill that would increase the Army end strength by 30,000 troops. In 
May, we together offered an amendment to the fiscal year 2005 Defense 
authorization bill to increase the size of the Army by 20,000 
personnel, a figure the Army says it could absorb in an efficient way 
in 1 year. This was accepted by the Senate, and it is now in conference 
with the House.
  One point I should make, though, is that, once again, the 
administration insisted--even though they oppose the end strength--if 
it was to be put in the bill, it still had to be paid for by emergency 
funds. That is not the right way to do this. We have to make sure we 
have a suitably sized Army.
  This is not a spike. This is not a temporary situation. Every time 
the President speaks, he talks about staying the course, our long-term 
commitment to Iraq. That is not a temporary promise, I do not think. I 
think that requires a permanent fix to the size of our Army and to our 
Marine Corps.
  Now, one of the things that has happened since our debate on the 
floor is that the Defense Science Board, a panel of experts appointed 
by Secretary Rumsfeld himself, stated: ``Current and projected force 
structure will not sustain our current and projected global 
stabilization commitments.'' There are ``inadequate total numbers'' of 
troops and a ``lack of long term endurance.''

  That is the conclusion of experts who have studied this issue, who 
have looked at all the things the Army is doing through modularity, 
through technical improvements and technological innovations to 
minimize the need for additional troops, and they have concluded, as a 
result of the study requested by the Secretary of Defense, that we need 
more troops.
  It is not only troops. We also need equipment. The Army has sustained 
$2.439 billion in equipment battle losses in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Presently, the Army has an unfunded requirement for $1.322 billion for 
munitions.
  Last year, the Army spent $4 billion on equipment reconstitution--
resetting it, repairing it, and getting it ready to go again.
  The Marine Corps expects to need over $1 billion to reconstitute 
equipment next year.
  The GAO reports that since September 11, the Army Guard has 
transferred 22,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to units 
deployed in Iraq. What we have is a huge reshuffling going on, as units 
back in the United States take their equipment and give it out to units 
that are deploying forward. It leaves these units back in the United 
States without equipment. If they are called upon to perform a mission, 
another international mission, a homeland security mission, or a 
mission involving a natural disaster, where are they going to get the 
equipment they deployed overseas? How are they going to be affected?
  In addition to the National Guard and Reserves, the Active Army is 
resetting itself under new battle formations, modularity, which is a 
concept that I think is ingenious, a concept that should be supported. 
But as they are doing this, they too are shuffling equipment about. 
There are some units that are not yet up to speed with all their 
equipment. They will have it, I am sure, before they are deployed 
overseas, but it is another example of the turmoil in terms of 
equipment we are seeing within the military.
  In order to respond accurately, correctly, and directly to the 
situation in Iraq, we have to increase our Army, I believe, and make 
sure they have the resources to have the equipment they need to do the 
job.
  Now, the funding for our operations in Iraq has been primarily 
through supplementals. In the past 17 months, President Bush has 
requested and Congress has appropriated $187 billion for the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. For comparison, the budgets for the Department of 
Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of 
Education, and the Department of Interior total $163 billion. So we 
have been spending in Iraq more money than we allow for discretionary 
spending for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, 
Education, and Interior.
  The last supplemental, for $25 billion, was passed in May 2004. At 
that time, the administration said they would not need the funding 
until January or February of next year, 2005. Yet it has been reported 
this week that $2 billion of this fund has already been used, showing 
the huge, huge pressure, the huge cost of our operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
  Last week, President Bush announced he plans to divert nearly $3.5 
billion from Iraqi water, power, and other reconstruction projects to 
security, another indication, I think, that the security situation is 
in very difficult circumstances.
  We have been funding these operations with supplementals. But we 
cannot continue to do that because there will be a point, I believe, at 
which the American people will be very concerned, when each year we are 
forced to vote on $60, $70, $80 billion of supplemental funding for 
Iraq and Afghanistan. We know this effort is going to take many, many 
years. People talk about it as a generational struggle, and I think 
that is right. We have to prepare for that struggle, but we cannot do 
it in ad hoc supplemental budgeting.
  We also have seen, of course, the terrible incidents of abuse in Abu 
Ghraib, with too few troops in that prison to do the job, ill-trained 
troops in that prison to do the job, but it is not just those troops. I 
think it is wrong simply to single out people we know from photographs 
who have done despicable things. They will be punished. They are being 
punished. We have a responsibility to look not only at the young 
soldiers, but the leadership, the chain of command, the policies they 
adopted or did not adopt, the confusion they created and did not 
resolve. We have had several investigations so far. Each one goes a 
little bit down the road but then seems to stop.
  We waited, frankly, for months for the report of General Fay and 
General Jones, thinking this would be the final authoritative report 
that would look from the level of three star and four star all the way 
down. It turns out that for one of the most significant issues, the 
issue of ghost detainees--those individuals who were not properly 
recorded by the authorities when they came into our custody--General 
Jones and Fay had no real answers because they didn't get any 
cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency. Now we have another 
investigation presumably conducted by the IG and the Department of 
Defense. This is not the way to get to the core of what happened. It 
might be an effective way of postponing real review and investigation, 
but it is not the way to get the answers.
  These answers are important, not simply because of individual 
culpability of soldiers up and down the ranks, but because we have to 
have a military force that understands that they are subject to the 
laws, that it is not optional for leaders to ignore some or modify them 
at will. This is the very challenging situation, but it is an example, 
once again, of the lack of preparedness, the lack of sufficient 
personnel, and the lack of clear guidance that has plagued our 
operations in Iraq from the beginning.
  I have spent a great deal of time talking about Iraq. The interesting 
thing in some respects is what we are not talking about. We are not 
talking about North Korea. But just this week on Monday, at the United 
Nations, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon said North Korea had been 
left with ``no other option but to possess a nuclear deterrent'' 
because of U.S. policies that he said were designed to eliminate his 
country. He stated:

       We have already made clear that we have already reprocessed 
     8,000 wasted fuel rods and transformed them into arms.

  Reprocessing 8,000 rods would extract enough plutonium for as many as 
eight nuclear warheads. Here is a situation where, as we focused on 
Iraq, we have sat by as the North Koreans blatantly and boldly opened 
up the cans in which IAEA sealed the rods and, according to their 
comments, have reprocessed this material into nuclear weapons. One of 
the worst possible situations, a nuclear-armed North Korea, may have 
evolved. We are at this point taking troops out of South Korea to 
fulfill our requirements in Iraq. What signal does that send to the 
North Koreans?
  It is not a question of deterrence. We have the capability of 
deterring the

[[Page S10021]]

North Koreans from coming south. But it certainly is not aiding us in 
what ultimately must be our objective of disarming North Korea, 
hopefully through peaceful means and through negotiations, not just our 
efforts alone but the world community, because the great fear that we 
all have, that transcends the current struggle in Iraq, is that 
terrorists will obtain nuclear material and nuclear weapons.
  Here we have a situation where over the last several months the North 
Koreans have finally said: We have them. Part of our lack of response 
is an internal debate within the administration that has been going on 
for months, if not years: Do you negotiate, which means some type of 
arrangement between the world and North Korea, or do you once again 
embark on a regime change operation? The difference over the last 
several months is the growing realization that Iraq has put so much 
stress on our military forces, that in the event of a need to disarm 
North Korea, there would be far fewer forces to draw on. So that is 
another huge cost of our involvement in Iraq.
  Then add another development: The Iranians continue to insist they 
have every right to a full, complete nuclear fuel cycle. Of course, the 
concern--not just of the United States but the international 
community--is that if they achieve that cycle, they will be able to 
obtain material with which to construct a nuclear weapon.
  Despite their protestations that that is not their objective, there 
is a growing suggestion, if not conclusive evidence, that certainly 
that possibility might exist. And once again, what are we doing? Why 
have we not focused attention on Iran in a more meaningful and decisive 
way?
  One has to question a strategy that has led us into Iraq, to the 
instability, to the costs, to the lost opportunity, when there appear 
to be much more serious threats abroad.
  We have an opportunity to be much more candid, much more truthful 
about what is going on. That is an opportunity I would hope the 
administration would embrace because unless we operate with the facts 
and unless we operate with the reality of the situation, there will be 
no way we can effectively plan to deal with the threats we face.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). The Senator from Illinois is 
recognized.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, before initiating my remarks, let me 
express the admiration and respect I have for the chairman of this 
committee, Senator Collins of Maine, as well as the ranking Democrat, 
Senator Lieberman of Connecticut. What they have presented to the 
Senate is an extraordinary work product, if one considers the fact that 
we first received the 9/11 Commission report on July 22, and a mere 8 
or 9 weeks later we are on the floor of the Senate considering landmark 
legislation. The first reaction of anyone who listens to those dates 
would be that they must be acting in haste.
  The fact is that no sooner did Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman 
receive this report than they announced they would take it extremely 
seriously and they would do some things unprecedented around this 
institution to try to move the legislation on a timely basis. It meant 
asking Senators to return in the month of August, a month when we are 
usually either back in our States or vacationing with our families, to 
come back and to have a series of hearings, starting with Governor Kean 
and Congressman Hamilton, Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, and 
then a long series of many scores of witnesses who came and talked to 
us about aspects of this report.
  They followed those hearings in August and early September with a 
markup last week which I attended as a member of the committee, a 
markup which considered 33 different amendments. Those were serious 
amendments, complicated amendments. Each one of them tested us to think 
long and hard about the 9/11 Commission report as well as the bill that 
is before us.
  The interesting thing about the amendments that were considered is 
that when all was said and done--some had been adopted, some had been 
defeated--not a single amendment passed or was defeated on a partisan 
rollcall.
  It wasn't Republicans versus Democrats. That is a good sign. It shows 
we took to this task in a bipartisan fashion and made concessions to 
try to find solutions.
  I, frankly, do not disparage debate on the Senate floor. It is an 
important part of what we do. Even heated debate I find informative and 
sometimes entertaining. But this morning at the town meeting which I 
had with Senator Fitzgerald, a constituent from Illinois came up and 
said: Why do you argue so much? Why don't you just get together, the 
two political parties, and solve the problems?
  I understand that sentiment. And though our arguments and debate may 
sound adolescent or a waste of time, they are, in fact, the noise of 
democracy. The debate in our committee, the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, which led to the adoption of some amendments and rejection 
of some amendments, led to a good bipartisan work product which we 
bring to the Senate floor today. I am proud to support it and proud to 
be a cosponsor.
  There are two parts of it in which I take particular pride. One 
relates to the civil liberties board. The civil liberties board was an 
idea of the 9/11 Commission. They understood, as I think all of us do, 
that historically when the United States was concerned about security 
issues and safety issues, those were the moments when our Government 
asked for more power to protect America, usually at the expense of 
individual rights and liberties. It is a delicate balance and delicate 
negotiation between security and liberty.
  Again, after 9/11, the first invasion in the continental United 
States since the British stormed this building in the War of 1812, 
after that our Government came and asked for more authority to go after 
the terrorists and to protect our Nation. On a bipartisan basis we gave 
that authority to the Government.
  We understood that it was a risky decision. We were enacting the 
PATRIOT Act at a time of high emotion, when we were still very mindful 
of the tragedy of 9/11 and the thousands of innocent Americans killed, 
as well as their families who were grieving. We gave that authority to 
our Government and said we will put a time limit on some of these new 
powers and we will revisit them in the future to see if we have gone 
too far.
  At every step of the way, we want to balance the security of this 
country and the liberty of Americans, and not to go too far in giving 
powers to Government at the expense of the rights and freedoms that we 
enjoy and which make us America. This civil liberties board, proposed 
by the 9/11 Commission, was consistent with that value. On a bipartisan 
basis, the Commission came and said, create within the executive branch 
a civil liberties board; this civil liberties board will be a guardian, 
if you will, of the basic rights of Americans. It will measure the 
policies and activities of our intelligence community and report 
regularly, on a public basis, as to whether there has been a Government 
effort that has gone too far.
  I am not sure there is another board like this in any other part of 
our Government, but I applaud the 9/11 Commission for suggesting it. I 
certainly applaud Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for 
incorporating the original civil liberties board in this legislation 
and accepting several amendments that I offered, which I think make the 
board even more independent and worthy of the duties that are entrusted 
to it.
  Senator Kyl of Arizona came to the floor this morning and suggested 
amendment No. 3801. It is an amendment to the civil liberties board 
section. In my estimation, it would really undermine the effectiveness 
of this civil liberties board.
  The Senator from Arizona said Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman 
failed to make tough choices, in his words, because they were trying to 
win unanimous approval of the bill. It is true the bill was reported 
unanimously from the committee; despite reservations of some members, 
we all came together to report it out. I disagree with the Senator's 
premise that this unanimous vote was at the expense of making hard 
choices. Trust me, hard choices were made on almost every page of this 
lengthy legislation. There is nothing wrong with trying to work

[[Page S10022]]

together in a bipartisan fashion. I think Senator Collins and Senator 
Lieberman did just that. They made some of the toughest choices.
  This legislation would authorize the most significant reorganization 
of our intelligence community in 50 years. I believe this legislation 
will save lives.
  In his remarks on the amendment, Senator Kyl of Arizona suggested 
those who were concerned about our fundamental constitutional rights 
need to balance our concerns with concerns about the lives of American 
citizens. If that is the premise of his position, I don't quarrel with 
it. It is always a balance. If you give the Government too much 
authority to make us safe and take away from individuals the basic 
rights of our country, then what do we have left? When it is all over, 
those unique American values have not been protected. Rather, they have 
been taken by the Government. So we always want to make sure we have 
enough authority in the Government to protect us, but not too much. 
That is what this legislation does.
  One of the issues we weighed heavily was how to fight the war on 
terrorism, while protecting basic liberties. The American people expect 
no less.
  Let me quote from the 9/11 Commission when they addressed this issue:

       While protecting our homeland, Americans should be mindful 
     of threats to vital personal and civil liberties. This 
     balancing is no easy task, but we must constantly strive to 
     keep it right.

  The 9/11 Commission recommended this board and, following their 
recommendation, the legislation included it.

  In fact, the Commission has already endorsed the board created by 
this bill. Commissioner Slade Gorton, a former Republican Senator from 
the State of Washington, and a member of the 9/11 Commission, and 
Richard Ben-Veniste, a Democratic appointee to the Commission, told the 
House Government Reform Committee:

       A civil liberties board of the kind we recommend can be 
     found in the Collins-Lieberman bill in the Senate.

  Those were the words of two commissioners. If nothing else, it is a 
seal of approval of what we offer on the floor today.
  I am not surprised that there is some opposition to the board, as 
there is some opposition to other provisions in the bill. The board is 
a new entity, and many of us are trying to understand exactly what it 
would do. But I urge my colleagues to read carefully what we have 
achieved with this board. It is an integral part of intelligence 
reform. It is independent. Those who serve on the board will be 
nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and have fixed 
terms.
  In addition, there is a requirement for public reporting. So what the 
board discovers will not be kept deep in some file or on some computer 
in an intelligence agency, but will be reported to the public through 
Members of Congress and their committees.
  The board will help to ensure that a powerful consolidated 
intelligence community does not violate privacy and civil liberties. I 
am afraid the Kyl amendment will upset this delicate balance. I want to 
speak about three problems associated with that amendment.
  Number one, very wisely, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman 
included in their bill a standard of review for the civil liberties 
board. I think you need to give the board guidelines as they review 
government actions. The board is to determine, under current language, 
whether Government power actually materially enhances security, whether 
there is adequate supervision of the use of the power to ensure 
protection of civil liberties, and whether there are adequate 
guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.
  Where did we find this particular approach? We found it in the 9/11 
Commission report.
  Frankly, I cannot understand Senator Kyl's amendment on this issue. 
He wants to take out the 9/11 Commission's standard of review. Should 
Congress not give this guidance to the board? Shouldn't the members of 
the civil liberties board understand their charge and responsibility? 
Can it be stated more simply and clearly than in the language I just 
read from the 9/11 Commission report? Taking away the standard of 
review is to leave the board with no guidance from Congress. That is an 
abdication of responsibility.
  Secondly, the bill gives the board the authority to obtain the 
information they need to determine whether the Government is violating 
civil liberties. If somebody outside the Government refuses to provide 
information, the board would have the power to issue a subpoena to 
obtain it.
  That is common sense. An investigative body doesn't have much 
authority in this society if it cannot, in compelling circumstances, 
subpoena materials it needs.
  It is not unusual to give this subpoena authority to a federal 
commission or board. Let me name a few of the Federal agencies with 
similar authority: National Labor Relations Board, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission.
  The Senator from Arizona, in speaking to his amendment this morning, 
suggested this subpoena authority would give the power to the board to 
``haul in any agent anywhere in the world and drill him.'' I am afraid 
that statement is not accurate. The subpoena authority in this bill is 
a narrow one. It only applies to people outside the Government. So for 
the Senator from Arizona to argue that we are going to call in an 
intelligence agent before the board and drill him is to overlook the 
obvious: The subpoena authority in the bill only applies outside of the 
Government.

  The obvious question is, why do you need subpoena authority outside 
of the Government? Here are two specific examples: First, the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal. Implicated in that scandal were private 
contractors hired by our Government to interrogate prisoners. 
Information they generated might be the domain and property of these 
private companies. If the civil liberties board wanted to look into 
prisoner abuse and the companies refused to provide that information 
voluntarily, they would need a subpoena. That is why this subpoena 
power is in the bill.
  In addition, if our Government engages in a cooperative agreement to 
obtain data from a private company to protect America from a terrorist 
attack, materials possessed by that private company would not be 
reviewable, except on a voluntary basis, by the civil liberties board, 
unless they had subpoena power. Senator Kyl wants to take away that 
subpoena power. In doing that, he will tie the hands of this board when 
it comes to gathering the necessary information to meet its 
responsibility.
  The other thing the Kyl amendment addresses is the section of the 
bill entitled ``Informing the Public,'' which requires this civil 
liberties board to share information about its work with the public. 
This is a good thing, from my point of view. It is a healthy aspect of 
the bill. We make provisions so that if the Board is dealing with 
classified information, there is no requirement to disclose it. 
Otherwise, we say the civil liberties board should inform the public 
about their work.
  So if the Government has gone too far, there is a public report that 
could be reviewed to understand how the civil liberties board reached 
its conclusion.
  The Kyl amendment would delete this section from the bill so that the 
board would not be required to inform the public about its activities. 
This directly contradicts the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 
As Commissioners Gordon and Ben-Veniste told the House Government 
Reform Committee:

       Such a board should be transparent, making regular reports 
     to Congress and the American public.

  I think sunshine is a great disinfectant, and I think the fact that 
this information will be made public is a further incentive for those 
in our Government not to abuse their power. In the name of protecting 
America, they should not destroy America's values and America's 
freedoms in a way that jeopardizes what is truly the character of this 
Nation.
  I think the Kyl amendment, in those three instances, not only 
violates the spirit of the 9/11 Commission Report but directly violates 
language in the 9/11 Commission Report that has guided this committee 
in the creation of this bill.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.
  In addition, Mr. President, I wish to speak for a moment to another 
provision in this bill that is near and dear to

[[Page S10023]]

me. As I mentioned earlier, when we went through the lengthy hearings 
on this legislation, there were many things that motivated us--this 
great Commission report on a bipartisan basis, the need to protect 
America as effectively as possible and as quickly as possible--but 
there was another factor.
  At many of our hearings, in fact, even appearing as witnesses, were 
the survivors in the 9/11 families, the men and women who lost a loved 
one in the tragedy of 9/11. I want to take a moment and salute them. 
They gave of their time and their lives. They made a commitment to make 
certain that those they love did not die in vain. They came to this 
committee and asked us to do our part, and we did. I think this 
committee was faithful to its charge: to follow the 9/11 Commission and 
to come up with a reasonable change in reforming our intelligence 
community.
  Why is reform necessary? It almost goes without saying. We found in 
the 9/11 Commission Report ample evidence that our intelligence 
community failed us before September 11. In the Senate Intelligence 
Committee on which I serve, we took a review of the intelligence 
leading up to the invasion of Iraq. As hard as it is to believe, with 
the millions of dollars and thousands of conscientious people involved, 
the intelligence gathering before the invasion of Iraq was in many 
respects just plain wrong.
  The American people, and many Members of Congress, were convinced 
that we needed to invade Iraq because of charges that there were 
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons programs, linkage with al-
Qaida--things that turned out to be patently wrong. The intelligence 
failed us.
  In one celebrated book, an author wrote that the head of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, in response to the President's question, Are you 
sure there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? is reported to have 
said: It's a slam dunk. He said with some certainty the weapons of mass 
destruction were there. When we arrived, they could not be found.
  We understand the gravity of the threat of terrorism. Those of us who 
remember 9/11 and understand the seriousness of this threat want to get 
it right, and intelligence is truly our first line of defense. But I 
have to tell my colleagues that the 9/11 Commission Report kept 
returning to one basic and recurring theme when it came to improving 
intelligence and making America safe.
  Let me show my colleagues what they said because I think it 
demonstrates in a few words why this section of the bill is so 
important to me and why I am glad it is part of our work effort.
  The 9/11 Commission Report said:

       The biggest impediment to all-source analysis--to a greater 
     likelihood of connecting the dots--is the human or 
     systemic resistance to sharing information.

  And that turned out to be a major obstacle.
  We have a weak system for processing and using the information that 
we need to make America safe, and the Commission pointed that out. I 
have said this before on the Senate floor, and it bears repeating, that 
those who think our information technology was adequate to the task on 
9/11 should consider the following.
  The computer system at the FBI, the premier law enforcement agency in 
America on 9/11/2001, did not have e-mail within their system, had no 
access to the Internet, was unable to sort and trace by more than a 
one-word reference, and when they finally came up with the photographs 
of the 19 terrorists on September 11, the computer system of the FBI 
was incapable of sending a photograph over its computer system. They 
had to overnight the photographs to their regional offices.
  That, to me, is as solid a condemnation of the computer system at the 
FBI as anything I read. That is a fact. And if you wonder why we failed 
to gather information, to process it, analyze it, and use it 
effectively, that is what it comes down to.
  On July 10, 2001, an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office sent a 
memo to FBI headquarters and to two agents on the international 
terrorism squads in the New York field office advising of the 
``possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden'' to send 
students to the United States to attend civil aviation schools. The 
date of that memo is July 10, 2001. The agent based his theory on the 
``inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest'' 
attending such schools in Arizona.
  The agent made four recommendations to the FBI. The agent recommended 
that we compile a list of civil aviation schools, establish a liaison 
with those schools, discuss the theories about bin Laden with the 
intelligence community, and seek authority to obtain visa information 
on persons applying to flight schools. This was July 10, 2001. Those 
were the recommendations in the FBI memo.
  The flare went off. The notice was there. Something needed to be 
done. His memo was forwarded to one field office. Managers of the bin 
Laden unit and the radical fundamentalist unit at FBI headquarters were 
addressees but did not even see the memo until after September 11. No 
managers at headquarters saw the memo before September 11. The New York 
field office took no action. It was not shared outside the FBI.
  As its author told the 9/11 Commission, the Phoenix memo was not an 
alert about suicide pilots. His worry was more about a Pan Am 103 
scenario in which explosives were placed on aircraft. Because it was 
not shared, because it was not processed, we find ourselves in 
situations more vulnerable.
  Mr. President, let me give another illustration of why this 
information sharing is so important.
  The 9/11 Commission Report tells us that on August 15, 2001, the 
Minneapolis FBI field office initiated an intelligence investigation of 
Zacarias Moussaoui, a name well known to us now. This man entered the 
country on February 23, 2001, began flight lessons at a flight school 
in Oklahoma City, and began flight training at Pan American flight 
training school in Minneapolis on August 13. Mr. Moussaoui had none of 
the usual qualifications for flight training on Pan Am's Boeing 747 
flight simulators.
  Contrary to popular belief, he did not say he was not interested in 
learning how to take off or land. Instead, he stood out because, with 
little knowledge of flying, he wanted to learn how to take off and land 
a Boeing 747. The FBI agent who handled the case in conjunction with 
the INS representative on the Minneapolis Joint Terrorism Task Force 
suspected Moussaoui of wanting to hijack airplanes. This is August 15, 
2001.
  If these respective agencies had the benefit of the Phoenix memo, 
brought it together with this information about Mr. Moussaoui, wheels 
would have started to turn and dots would have been connected. But, 
sadly, that information was not shared.
  I can go through other illustrations about why we need to share 
information when it comes to ships coming into the United States using 
the Great Lakes, which are near and dear to me as a Senator 
representing the great State of Illinois, and the city of Chicago, and 
how we can use existing information technology to link up facts and 
draw good conclusions to protect America.
  Sadly, what we have found, despite the passage of 3 years since 9/11, 
is we still have not figured out how to make critical information in 
our Government computers and other systems of records compatible and 
combat terrorism with that new information.
  In a statement before the House Government Reform Committee last 
month, James Dempsey, executive director for the Center for Democracy 
and Technology, a nonprofit public interest group, validated my 
concern. He wrote:

       To date, however, the government still does not have a 
     dynamic, decentralized network for sharing and analysis of 
     information.

  He goes on with a much longer statement, but to think that 3 years 
after 9/11, after the omissions, errors, and shortcomings which I have 
pointed out, we still do not have a dynamic decentralized method for 
sharing and analyzing information, which is one of the key elements in 
the 9/11 Commission Report.
  A case in point I frequently cite is the chronic delays in 
integrating FBI and Border Patrol fingerprint databases. This problem 
goes back at least 6 years, where the agencies have been unable to work 
out the transfer of information. In March of this year, the

[[Page S10024]]

Justice Department's Inspector General reported it will take at least 4 
more years to combine fingerprint systems. In other words, fingerprints 
collected at the border cannot be checked against fingerprints at the 
FBI in an integrated fashion so that a suspect at the border can be 
found to have been someone with a criminal record or a history which 
gives us caution and pause. How can we be any safer if that basic 
technology cannot be in place? Six years we failed to come up with it. 
The estimate is another 4 years is needed before it might happen.
  The FBI fingerprint database contains about 43 million ten-finger 
sets of known criminals' prints; the Border Patrol's separate 
fingerprint system, about 6 million two-finger sets of prints. One has 
to ask, at some point in time, did anyone think that both agencies 
should collect the same number of fingerprints from each person? Today 
it is much different. They did not integrate their effort because they 
were not going to integrate their information. Not integrating that 
information does not make us any safer.
  For well over 2 years I have urged that we do something significant 
and historic to address this failure of our information-sharing system. 
I refer back to GEN Leslie Groves, who was authorized and empowered by 
President Franklin Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor to start what was then 
known as the Manhattan Project.
  General Groves understood the possibilities of an atom bomb. At that 
point, there had been a cursory and casual inquiry into how it might be 
weaponized. After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt said: We need to 
get serious. We need to develop these atom bombs. He said to General 
Groves: Turn to the private sector, turn to Government, turn to 
academia, bring them all together, and do it in a hurry. We may need 
this atom bomb to end this war.
  That is how the Manhattan Project was born. I have argued for quite 
some time now that if General Groves could accomplish that historic 
task in 1,000 days, we can in even less time see dramatic progress in 
developing the information technology we need as a Nation. I am sad to 
remind my colleagues in the Senate, it has been over 1,000 days since 
September 11, and reports from agencies across the board tell us we 
have not done that.
  The Commission offers two key recommendations for achieving this 
unity of effort in sharing information. First, information procedures 
should provide incentives for sharing to restore a better balance 
between security and shared knowledge. Second, the President should 
lead the Governmentwide effort to bring the major national security 
institutions into the information revolution.
  This is from the 9/11 Commission Report:

       He should coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy 
     and technical issues across the agencies to create a 
     ``trusted information network.''

  We understand that without this sharing of information we cannot be 
safer as a nation. No agency can do this alone. They have to cooperate 
with one another. Throughout the eight hearings of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee conducted over the past 9 weeks, I have urged that we 
make revolutionary change in information sharing an essential element.
  I will tell my colleagues what section 206 of this bill, which 
comprises a large portion of the bill, does. We set forth precise and 
prudent directives for implementing a trusted information-sharing 
network. The President is directed to establish this network. The 
network is to be an environment consisting of policies and technology 
designed to facilitate and promote sharing. It is modeled on the 
comprehensive proposal by the Markle Foundation Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age, which I would like to salute as 
another major factor in the development of this section of the bill, as 
well as the 9/11 Commission Report.
  The network must have certain attributes. This network of information 
must be a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment; 
built upon existing systems' capabilities currently in use across the 
Government; utilize the industry's best practices, including minimizing 
the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and 
capabilities whenever possible. I want to dwell on this for one moment.
  Some of the critics have the wrong notion that we are trying to 
create a massive Government database. That is not what this bill sets 
out to do. What it sets out to do is to share the information to solve 
problems, to alert America to threats to our security. It is not a 
massive Government database.
  Employ an information access management approach that controls access 
to data rather than just networks; facilitate sharing of information; 
provide directory services for locating information; and incorporate 
protections for privacy and civil liberties. This is another one that 
is absolutely essential. We want to have this information collected, 
processed, analyzed, and shared every step of the way.
  Through the civil liberties board and express language in this 
legislation, we are mindful that we do not want to compromise the 
liberties and freedoms of Americans unless there is an absolute need to 
protect our lives and our security.
  Guidelines must be issued. Requirements satisfying governing the 
collection, sharing, and use of information have to be made known so 
that this will be an item that is followed very closely.
  Let me say what the network is not. Describing what the network is is 
only half of the issue. First and foremost, the network called for in 
this bill is not a centralized, consolidated system or database. 
Furthermore, it is not a mere network; it is a capability. It does not 
move data from current systems. It does not require all new systems. It 
is a means to make information in existing legacy systems sharable to 
authorized users. It is not based on any one architecture or platform. 
It does not require one encryption standard. It does not contemplate or 
require broad distribution of personally identifiable information. It 
does not remove authorization and access control from existing 
processes. It is not limited to supporting just the IC. It does not 
require next-generation technology to implement.
  I see other Members have come to the floor of the Senate to address 
aspect of this bill, and I have spoken for a little over 30 minutes. I 
want to give them a chance to express their feelings. I will return to 
this issue next week.
  I hope colleagues on both sides of the aisle will understand that 
this historic bill includes in it what I consider to be some of the 
most important weapons and important tools for protecting America 
against another terrorist attack. We have to be creative, which the 9/
11 Commission Report admonishes us to do, but we also have to use 
information in sensible, thoughtful ways to make us safer.
  A large section of this bill is directed towards that information 
sharing. I tried to engage the Senate in this debate when we created 
the Department of Homeland Security, but the time was not right. 
Everybody nodded in agreement, but I could not get anything done on the 
bill. Thank goodness this bill on the future of the intelligence 
community is different, and thank goodness on a bipartisan basis we 
have come to understand and believe that if we follow the 9/11 
Commission Report, with trusted information sharing, America will be 
safer.
  I thank Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for providing this 
section in the bill. I look forward to working with them on the passage 
of this important legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record an 
additional illustration on information sharing.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 Illustration No. 3 Ship in U.S. Waters

       Of course, representing Chicago and Lake Michigan, I 
     understand the importance of port security. Take a ship 
     entering the U.S. waters that comes down the St. Lawrence 
     Seaway. It comes into the Great Lakes.
       What happens? Four agencies of the Federal Government 
     collect information on that ship. One agency determines 
     whether the ship is carrying contraband. Another Federal 
     agency checks whether the ship has paid its tariffs and fees. 
     Another agency determines whether the ship and its crew 
     comply with immigration law. And another agency checks for 
     adherence to health and safety regulations. One ship, four 
     different Federal agencies.
       Much of this information will end up in separate data 
     systems. One of those, a $1.3

[[Page S10025]]

     billion Customs Services project known as the automated 
     commercial environment, is an import processing system. 
     Another, the student exchange and visitor information system, 
     is being developed by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement within Homeland Security. Other border protection 
     is held on databases held by the Coast Guard and by the 
     Department of Agriculture.
       The Transportation Security Administration also will 
     collect and hold relevant information in its systems. 
     Consider how many different agencies are concerned about the 
     one ship that we might fear may be bringing the wrong people 
     with the wrong cargo to threaten the United States.
       None of these information systems are designed to 
     communicate with one another. How in the world can we assure 
     the American people of their safety when we are ignoring the 
     most basic requirement--that these agencies--both people and 
     technology--work together and share information? Don't we 
     want to make certain that the FBI and the CIA had access to 
     that information? In addition, the NSA, DoD, Department of 
     Defense, State Department, State and local officials, all of 
     them could benefit by having access to that information.
       Observation: The information sharing environment of the 
     Network would facilitate full and timely information access 
     and exchange of the disparate information housed in each of 
     the data systems. The Network would allow information to 
     remain where it is created, but using standards, guidelines, 
     and rules to be developed, make it share-able and accessible 
     to authorized Network participants.

  Mr. DURBIN. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for his 
terrific contributions to this bill. He was the individual who brought 
to the committee's attention the woefully deficient information systems 
that have hindered the war against terrorism.
  I remember how shocked I was at our first hearing, when the Senator 
from Illinois described the FBI being unable to transmit pictures of 
the 9/11 terrorists to its field offices. He also told us the FBI did 
not have the capacity to transmit fingerprints to the Border Patrol. 
Those underscored, in a way that few have been able to do, the lack of 
an adequate, integrated communications network within the Federal 
Government.
  We worked very closely with the Senator from Illinois on this section 
of the bill. It incorporates his thoughts, his language, and it is his 
leadership that is behind those important provisions. So I salute him 
for being out in front on this issue and helping us come up with 
provisions that I think are going to make a real difference.
  I salute and thank the Senator from Illinois.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, even I want to thank the Senator from 
Illinois, a dear friend, a great colleague. He has made a very 
substantial contribution to this bill.
  Senator Durbin has a quality of service in the Senate that I have 
noted in some of the best colleagues with whom I have had the honor to 
serve. He thinks about matters, focuses on a problem, comes up with a 
solution, and he doesn't let it go until he gets it done. He saw a real 
problem here which others have seen but, frankly, have not focused on 
or grabbed ahold of as much, which is the woeful, outrageous, 
infuriating inability, up until this time, of our Government to put the 
best information technology at the disposal of those who are working to 
protect us.
  The terrorists have figured this out. We all know about the 
opportunities for cyberterrorism. If you look at the number of hits 
that are made on even Defense Department sites, you can see the 
potential. We are beginning to have a very good capacity to launch our 
own offensives here, but this is about something else. This is just 
taking information, which is a key to protecting ourselves in the age 
of terrorism, and moving it quickly to the places it can do the most 
good. Talk about connecting the dots.
  Anyway, Senator Durbin is really singlehandedly responsible for this 
substantial title of the bill. I thank him very much for his 
contribution. It is part of why this bill is going to make a real 
difference in protecting the security of the American people.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.


                           Amendment No. 3823

  Ms. COLLINS. I know Senator Conrad is waiting to have a colloquy with 
the managers of the bill. I do have an amendment that I think I can 
dispose of very quickly. I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside. On behalf of Senator Voinovich, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine (Ms. Collins), for Mr. Voinovich, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3823.

  Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To improve the financial disclosure process under the Ethics 
                       in Government Act of 1978)

       At the appropriate place insert the following:

     SEC. __. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND RECORDS.

       (a) Study.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Office of Government Ethics shall 
     submit to Congress a report--
       (1) evaluating the financial disclosure process for 
     employees of the executive branch of Government; and
       (2) making recommendations for improving that process.
       (b) Transmittal of Record Relating to Presidentially 
     Appointed Positions to Presidential Candidates.--
       (1) Definition.--In this section, the term ``major party'' 
     has the meaning given that term under section 9002(6) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
       (2) Transmittal.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 15 days after the date on 
     which a major party nominates a candidate for President, the 
     Office of Personnel Management shall transmit an electronic 
     record to that candidate on Presidentially appointed 
     positions.
       (B) Other candidates.--After making transmittals under 
     subparagraph (A), the Office of Personnel Management may 
     transmit an electronic record on Presidentially appointed 
     positions to any other candidate for President.
       (3) Content.--The record transmitted under this subsection 
     shall provide--
       (A) all positions which are appointed by the President, 
     including the title and description of the duties of each 
     position;
       (B) the name of each person holding a position described 
     under subparagraph (A);
       (C) any vacancy in the positions described under 
     subparagraph (A), and the period of time any such position 
     has been vacant;
       (D) the date on which an appointment made after the 
     applicable Presidential election for any position described 
     under subparagraph (A) is necessary to ensure effective 
     operation of the Government; and
       (E) any other information that the Office of Personnel 
     Management determines is useful in making appointments.
       (c) Reduction of Positions Requiring Appointment With 
     Senate Confirmation.--
       (1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``agency'' 
     means an Executive agency as defined under section 105 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Reduction plan.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the head of each agency shall submit a 
     Presidential appointment reduction plan to--
       (i) the President;
       (ii) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; 
     and
       (iii) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (B) Content.--The plan under this paragraph shall provide 
     for the reduction of--
       (i) the number of positions within that agency that require 
     an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate; and
       (ii) the number of levels of such positions within that 
     agency.
       (d) Office of Government Ethics Review of Conflict of 
     Interest Law.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of 
     Government Ethics, in consultation with the Attorney General 
     of the United States, shall conduct a comprehensive review of 
     conflict of interest laws relating to Federal employment and 
     submit a report to--
       (A) the President;
       (B) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Content.--The report under this subsection shall--
       (A) examine all Federal criminal conflict of interest laws 
     relating to Federal employment, including the relevant 
     provisions of chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code; and
       (B) related civil conflict of interest laws, including 
     regulations promulgated under

[[Page S10026]]

     section 402 of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.).

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know the Presiding Officer has a great 
interest in the issue that we are about to briefly discuss. The 
amendment of Senator Voinovich would require the Office of Government 
Ethics to report to Congress on recommendations for streamlining the 
financial disclosure forms for the executive branch. In addition, the 
amendment would require each executive branch agency to examine the 
number of positions requiring Senate confirmation. It would ask the 
Office of Government Ethics to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
Government's conflict of interest laws, and it would require the Office 
of Personnel Management to provide Presidential candidates with a list 
of all appointed positions within 15 days of their party's nomination. 
This amendment is based on legislation that was favorably reported by 
the committee during the last Congress.
  The 9/11 Commission recommended that the Senate should not require 
confirmation of appointees within the national security team below 
level 3 of the executive schedule. The Voinovich amendment lays the 
groundwork for this recommendation by requiring the executive branch to 
identify which positions could be eliminated from the confirmation 
process.
  Review of that information by all Senate committees will help those 
of us in the Senate make a more informed and thoughtful decision on 
reducing specific positions that now require confirmation.
  The financial disclosure requirements have been in effect for almost 
25 years. Unfortunately, in some cases, they have deterred very good 
people from serving in the Federal Government. I hope this will lead to 
more effective, more efficient, and simpler requirements so it no 
longer will deter potential nominees from serving, or force them to go 
through great expense in order to comply with overly burdensome laws 
and regulations.
  Again, this proposal is very consistent with the recommendations made 
by the 9/11 Commission and I urge acceptance of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the chairman of 
our committee in urging acceptance of this amendment. I thank Senator 
Voinovich and the occupant of the chair, the distinguished Senator from 
Tennessee, for their work on this issue.
  This is a topic we have been talking about in the Congress for a long 
time. The occupant of the chair, having been vetted, considered, and 
confirmed for a Cabinet position in the past, knows the difficulties he 
and others have faced in fulfilling all those obligations, well beyond 
what most would deem to be reasonable.
  What motivates this now is an extra dimension of concern. The 
September 11 Commission made it very clear that a catastrophic attack 
might well be more likely to occur during the transition from one 
administration to the other. Therefore, the Commission recommended that 
we should do anything we could reasonably think of that would speed up 
the process of filling national security positions in our Government.
  Earlier today, I am pleased to say, the Senate adopted an amendment 
that Senator McCain and I and others introduced to accomplish some of 
those specific recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. This amendment 
builds on that, goes beyond it, and makes the bill stronger by helping 
an incoming administration fill a wide range of its appointive 
positions more promptly, in some cases, doing what is just plain 
logical: requiring the OPM, Office of Personnel Management, to send 
information to Presidential candidates 15 days after they are 
nominated; describing positions that must be filled in the new 
administration. This would not only allow time to prepare it, it would 
create a sense of optimism and fantasy in the minds of candidates 
nominated as to what they would do when they were elected. The 
amendment also calls for reports that will help us and the President to 
consider ways to further improve and streamline the process of getting 
officials appointed and put into place.
  It is a very good amendment. It builds on some substantial 
contributions Senator Voinovich made to the bill in committee. I am 
pleased to urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If there is no further debate, without objection the amendment is 
agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3823) was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I come to the floor to ask a number of 
questions of my colleagues who are managing the bill. I have very high 
regard for the chairperson, Senator Collins. I have worked with her on 
other matters and found that she is an extremely able and diligent 
Member. I admire the way she has handled this legislation. I have 
watched the process as it went through the committee. I am not on the 
committee but I watched as it was being televised. I thought it was a 
very professional process.
  I also have very high regard for the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. 
Lieberman. I am not on the relevant committees. I am not on the 
Intelligence Committee. I am not on the Defense Committee. I am on the 
Budget Committee and the Finance Committee and deal with these issues 
from a budget point of view and financing point of view.
  With that said, I come to the floor to ask a series of questions. I 
want to indicate that I have with me charts that were prepared by the 
office of Senator Lieberman to talk about what the structure currently 
is and what this legislation would do to change it and to raise a 
number of concerns that I have about that change.
  First, I think we should indicate the problem we are confronting with 
the American intelligence community, where there is a lack of 
coordination and communication, which has been clearly outlined in a 
series of hearings and a series of reports, including the report by the 
9/11 Commission, including the report by the Intelligence Committee, 
including the work of the very able chairman, the Senator from Maine, 
all that has been laid across the record very clearly.
  This chart from the office of Senator Lieberman shows the 
organization of the intelligence community as it is, with the President 
and the National Security Council overseeing the various agencies of 
Government, including the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
Secretary of Defense, but has within it the National Security Agency, 
the National Geospacial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
Military Services and Combatant Commands. The large majority of the 
funding of the intelligence community is in the Department of Defense.
  I think maybe that is too little understood by the general public. 
But that is fact. The large majority of the funding is not at the 
Central Intelligence Agency. I think people in the United States 
probably assume that is the case; it is not. The vast majority of the 
funding for intelligence operations is within the Department of 
Defense.
  Other agencies that have a significant role, of course, are the 
Attorney General's office, because he oversees the FBI, and the FBI has 
responsibility for intelligence operations within the United States.
  Then we have the Secretary of Homeland Security within which we have 
the Information, Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Director and 
the Coast Guard intelligence. The Secretary of State has the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, and the Secretary of Treasury has an 
intelligence branch, as does the Secretary of Energy.
  The problem with this structure, which has been pointed out 
repeatedly, is that these are a series of stovepipes, basically leading 
only to the White House. There is nobody that is in overall 
coordination and direction of these various intelligence agencies. And 
the idea has been to have a national intelligence director that would 
have responsibility to coordinate and communicate with respect to these 
various agencies.
  So the proposal before us is to create a national intelligence 
director with these other various agencies already

[[Page S10027]]

existing reporting to the national intelligence director, so there is 
someone in a position to coordinate and ultimately communicate what 
intelligence agencies are finding.

  Let me just say that I thought that what was going to happen with the 
national intelligence director is that funds were going to be brought 
together and we would not have the continuing existence of all of these 
other agencies.
  That is really what I want to ask the managers about. The concern 
that I have is if we have a failure of communication and coordination, 
especially between the FBI and the CIA, how does adding another entity, 
how does adding another player improve the chances for coordination and 
communication?
  Let me say that I was trained in business management. My career 
before I came here was to manage organizations. My experience has been 
the more layers, the less communication, the more inefficient the 
communication.
  When this was first outlined and I found out that the CIA is still 
going to exist, I must say I was taken aback. I was surprised by that. 
I thought the Central Intelligence Agency would become the new 
intelligence, with a new national intelligence director. Therefore, we 
wouldn't be adding another player to the mix, but we would be putting 
somebody in a position of authority so that we could hold them 
accountable.
  The concern I have is instead of that, we have maintained a Central 
Intelligence Agency and all of the other intelligence agencies we had 
before, and added a national intelligence director.
  The fundamental concern I have and the question I have is, Why has 
the committee concluded that this is the right way to proceed? Why 
wouldn't it be better by joining the function, reducing the number of 
players, reducing the number of boxes on the organizational chart, 
instead of adding a layer?
  I would be quick to say I think you need to have a national 
intelligence director, somebody who is in overall coordination and 
control because before we did not have that.
  That is really the question I came to the floor this afternoon to 
query the chairman and ranking member about.
  I would be happy to yield so they might respond.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from North Dakota 
for his questions. I want to assure him, first, there will be no rental 
charges for the charts that were a joint product of Senator Collins's 
and my office.
  To very briefly give the background, most immediately from the 9/11 
Commission Report, when we said here repeatedly, and Lee Hamilton said 
during the course of our hearings during the investigation about how 9/
11 happened, the Commissioners very often would say, Who is in charge? 
The answer more often than not was: No one. They concluded it was an 
organization without a head. That explained why the CIA would have 
information and not share it with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service about people they would want to keep out of the country, or the 
FBI would have information and not share it with the CIA.
  The result was we are athletes--a homelier analogy--that the American 
intelligence community is like a football team with a lot of very good 
players but no quarterback. So they are kind of doing their own thing; 
some of them sometimes seem to be in another stadium and we are not 
getting the benefit of the billions of dollars that we are investing.
  The Commission recommended that we put someone in charge as a 
national intelligence director.
  Right now, the President is at the top on the chart. The President 
can't exercise day-to-day control over the intelligence community.
  Incidentally, this was the report of the 9/11 Commission. Most 
immediately, it was essentially the recommendation of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee of the Congress, and in the recent past created 
a national intelligence director. The Scowcroft report--though we have 
not seen it--everybody knows that it says there has to be a national 
intelligence director. In fact, these recommendations go way back to 
1947 when the National Security Act was passed post-Second World War 
and the CIA was officially created. Here is part of the problem. This 
is part of what I want to answer about the question.
  Part of the problem that all of these groups found was that the 
Director of Central Intelligence--as that position exists today, which 
was the same person as the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency--effectively became only the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. That is part of why nobody was really directly 
overhead.
  As we can see in the first chart, the director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency is over the CIA. The major recommendation was we 
have to separate those two, have a separate CIA Director, and then the 
national intelligence director who will be over all those stovepipes.
  How will he or she break them up? Two things. First, and this goes on 
from Colin Powell and others, we said the existing DCI was supposed to 
oversee the whole intelligence operation. We gave them some power but 
did not get them budget power. As my friend from North Dakota said, 80 
percent of the budget for intelligence goes through the Department of 
Defense.
  In an episode that Senator Collins and I were struck by in the 9/11 
report, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, in 1998, after a 
series of al-Qaida attacks, sends out a directive--then classified, now 
public--to the agencies under him and says, war has been declared 
against us by these terrorists: They hit the World Trade Center in 1993 
with the bomb, they went after the embassies in Africa, et cetera. This 
is a declaration of war by us and the American intelligence community 
against al-Qaida, a war on terrorism. And no one responded. No one did 
anything because he is a general without authority.
  It is the old biblical line, at the sound of the trumpet, be 
uncertain who will follow into battle and, unfortunately, here, one of 
the elements of a certain trumpet in the Washington bureaucracy is 
money, budget authority. So no one did anything.
  When the Commission asked one of the heads of the boxes on the chart, 
Why didn't you respond to George Tenet, he said, We didn't think we had 
to; we thought that was a memo.
  Separate CIA from the Director so he is not responsible only for that 
agency but everyone in the community, with the budget authority to 
enforce decisions, with transfer authority for personnel within the 
intelligence community and, one of the most important, form the budget. 
Do not let other agencies do it. Actually do the budget.
  The Senator from North Dakota is one of the Senate's experts on 
budgeting, one who worries most about whether we are getting taxpayers 
their money's worth. Billions of dollars--it is a classified number, so 
I cannot state it--but billions go into intelligence every year.
  One of my hopes, because we do not talk about it much, we talk about 
connecting the dot, the national intelligence director will, one, be a 
tough budget official; two, make sure we get our money's worth; and 
third, more budget authority and oversight over the constituents. And, 
too, maybe decide this box under me is getting more money in terms of 
the current threat to America than it should, but this one is not 
getting enough; I have to move this money around.
  One more point. A critical element under the national intelligence 
director to help him or her connect the dots is the National 
Counterterrorist Center. The other centers he can create for separate 
problems such as nuclear proliferation or separate geographic public 
areas like Iran and North Korea. This is the place where he will bring 
together as never before all the constituent parts of the intelligence 
community. They will sit down. He can transfer people to those centers. 
He can give them assignments. Most of all, he can make sure they will 
pool their collection of intelligence, their analysis of intelligence 
and, very importantly, since they are around the table--they are 
talking with one another, they see the problem, they have an idea from 
the best intelligence, signal intelligence, imagery from the satellites 
we have, human intelligence from people on the ground--they will do 
some joint operational planning as to how to deal with the problem. How 
do we get bin Laden? Or if there is a terrorist cell in America, what 
is the best way to pool our resources to get them? We put somebody in 
charge and we give them real authority.

[[Page S10028]]

  Incidentally, there will be amendments introduced, or already have 
been, that will come to a vote in the next 2 or 3 days aimed at cutting 
away at that power. I say, with all respect, probably folks worried 
about the Department of Defense losing some authority--Senator Collins 
and I are both on the Armed Services Committee. We have a deep 
commitment to the warfighters. We are confident this structure will 
actually give better intelligence to the warfighters.
  That is my answer to your question.
  Mr. CONRAD. Might I ask a followup question, because the Senator 
referenced these earlier reports going all the way back from 50 years 
ago. I fully support the concept of a national intelligence director. 
My concern is how we are implementing it. Did the earlier reports, 
including the most recent from the Intelligence Committees, from the 9/
11 Commission, contemplate with the creation of a national intelligence 
director we would still have a Central Intelligence Agency?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. They did. Interesting question. As a matter of fact, 
this was a real priority for the 9/11 Commission, that we separate the 
CIA from the national intelligence director. The point is that the CIA 
is only one element of the remarkable assets we have in our 
intelligence community, including the so-called signal intelligence, 
the imagery from the satellites we have, the work coordinating domestic 
and foreign. Because the terrorists do not separate between domestic 
and foreign, now for the FBI it is made statutory under the bill 
creating a new directorate of intelligence, counterterrorism, working 
with the CIA under the national intelligence director. So the answer is 
yes.
  In fact, my understanding of the original proposal for the National 
Security Act post-World War II was there be a separate national 
intelligence director overlooking a whole community and a separate CIA. 
Folks in the military community were able to blend the two and 
diminish--here in Congress we were worried about this--and diminish and 
separate the power of the DCI. We look back now, and the 9/11 
Commission certainly did, and say that was part of the problem. They 
created the vulnerabilities and weaknesses and openings the terrorists 
took advantage of on September 11.
  Mr. CONRAD. One additional question, if I could, on the budget 
authority inherent in this plan. I indicated the vast majority of 
resources actually go to the Department of Defense and the various 
intelligence operations within the Department of Defense. The Senator 
from Connecticut indicated it was as much as 80 percent.
  In terms of management of an operation, are we going to be left with 
a circumstance in which 80 percent of the funding is at the Department 
of Defense? And if so, how do we avoid a circumstance in which the tail 
is wagging the dog? That is, typically one finds in organizations that 
initiative and power follows money. If there is at the top a relatively 
weak national intelligence director, with most of the functions and 
resources in a subordinate agency, that creates its own management 
challenges.

  I am interested to know what the concept is with respect to budget 
authority. Who will have that overall authority over resources?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from North Dakota. He is 
absolutely right in his statement.
  We heard from witness after witness in our committee's deliberations 
in August and into September that probably worse than the status quo--
which is bad, without leadership--would be to create a national 
intelligence director and not give him the power to direct. This may be 
an old quote my friend is familiar with, but former CIA Director Jim 
Woolsey said: In Washington, there is a different definition of the 
golden rule. He who has the gold makes the rules.
  We are making sure the national intelligence director has the gold, 
which is to say the budget authority, both to formulate the budget for 
this entire community of national intelligence--the so-called tactical 
military intelligence budget--that stays with the Department of 
Defense.
  But while I cannot say the specific percentage, I will tell you under 
our proposal--again this is classified, but well over 50 percent of the 
budget authority will now go from the Department of Defense to the 
national intelligence director. So that position will have that budget 
authority in two ways. The first is to formulate the budget. Again, 
this is a very important colloquy because we are going to see some 
amendments that are intended to reduce the authority of the national 
intelligence director over budget to say he basically has to accept the 
budget proposals of the constituent agencies. That is not so in our 
bill.
  The second very important point: Right now the budget for the 
intelligence agencies goes to the Department of Defense. Even for the 
CIA it goes to the Department of Defense, then to the CIA. In our 
proposal, the money goes to the national intelligence director and then 
that position parcels it out to the others.
  Mr. CONRAD. Might I just conclude on that point, and then I am 
finished. I know there are other Senators waiting. I waited to have 
this opportunity because I think this is very important. These are 
questions I am getting.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Sure.
  Mr. CONRAD. In my position on the Budget Committee, people are asking 
me, how is this money going to be controlled? People are given 
responsibility. Do they have authority?
  The final question I have with respect to the Department of Defense 
is, we heard the other day from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary 
Rumsfeld, who has a very strong management background. He expressed 
great concern, and I think it is a concern that absolutely deserves 
full consideration. His great concern, as I heard it the other day in 
our briefing, was that he is going to have a separation of 
responsibility from authority; that is, resources that are currently 
under his control and direction are going to move up the line to the 
national intelligence director. He and the warfighters have a 
fundamental responsibility and need for intelligence. He is concerned, 
with the separation of these resources--as the Senator describes, much 
of the budget moving from the Department of Defense level up to the 
national intelligence director--that he not be shortchanged and that 
his combatant commanders not be shortchanged of the resources they need 
to make tactical and strategic decisions.
  This is my final question: What is the response of the leadership of 
the committee to his concerns?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. President, I will begin, and if the Senator from Maine wants to 
get into this, I would welcome her doing so.
  First, I would say, again, Senator Collins and I are members of the 
Armed Services Committee of the Senate. If we felt there was the 
remotest possibility this proposal of ours would shortchange the 
warfighters, we would not make it. And believe me, it does not.
  A couple things to say: First, we make a distinction in this bill 
between the tactical military budget on one hand and the national 
intelligence budget on the other. The tactical military budget--
intelligence officials who are working for individual services; Army, 
Navy, combatant commanders working on joint programs within the 
military for more than one service--that money all stays with the 
Department of Defense. But the national intelligence assets, which are 
used, let's say, for satellites--which are clearly used by the military 
but also provide information that is critically important for the 
Department of Homeland Security or the State Department in advising the 
President on critical foreign policy decisions--that is under the 
national intelligence director, as it should be.

  The fact is, a lot of this is worked out in a consulting, consensus 
way. But we want to just raise that national interest here. The 
military will always be a priority customer of the intelligence 
community, but it is not the only customer. The President of the United 
States is the most important recipient of intelligence. The Secretary 
of State is very important; now the Secretary of Homeland Security.
  I believe we have struck exactly a balance here in making sure the 
warfighter is well supported. We had very interesting testimony, which 
I can share with my friend, from two generals who are heads of two of 
the

[[Page S10029]]

constituent national intelligence agencies. They said to us they 
believe this proposal establishing a national intelligence director 
would be an improvement and be an improvement from the point of view of 
their agencies because it ended the ambiguity that exists now which 
they think is not good for their agencies and ultimately not good for 
the military.
  I wonder if the Senator from Maine wants to get into this and answer 
some of the very good questions my friend from North Dakota has asked.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the Senator from 
North Dakota for the thought he has given to this issue. I know he has 
a great interest in management structures, in making sure we have the 
most efficient structure possible to serve the taxpayers. So I very 
much appreciate the spirit with which he has raised these questions.
  I want to make three concluding points to emphasize some of the 
points already made by my colleague from Connecticut.
  First, it was evident as we studied this issue and read the 9/11 
Commission Report that the current system does not foster the kind of 
communication and cooperation we desperately need. It is a series of 
stovepipes with no one having the ability to make the final decisions, 
to resolve conflicts, to move resources and people where they are most 
needed. You cannot go to the President of the United States on 
everything.
  I have seen that firsthand in the staffing of the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center where the Director feels he needs more resources, 
other decisions have been made by various agency heads, and there is no 
one to step in and set the priorities, move the people, and direct the 
resources. I think our bill really changes that.
  Like Senator Lieberman, I was struck by Director Tenet's 12/98 memo 
in which he does this call to be at war and that all resources should 
be marshaled, and virtually nothing happened. That will change under 
our structure. There will be accountability under our structure because 
people will know who is in charge and whose call it is, and that is the 
national intelligence director. Our organization 
enhances accountability, cooperation, coordination, communication, and, 
most of all, results.

  Second, the 9/11 Commission considered doing the kind of structure 
you have raised questions about. Essentially, that would be creating a 
department of intelligence. You would take all of these units out of 
the other agencies and do a brandnew department. And it felt--and I 
agree--that would be too disruptive, particularly at a time when we are 
at war; that it would be expensive, it would be complicated, it would 
take a long time to put into effect.
  We have seen that with the Department of Homeland Security. That has 
been a massive undertaking. I am very proud of the leadership of 
Secretary Ridge and Admiral Loy, but it has not been without its 
growing pains. We just could not afford that kind of disruption right 
now.
  Third would be the reaction of DOD if we took all of those entities 
out and put them in a new department. There was testimony of a former 
head of the Defense Intelligence Agency at a hearing on the House side 
in August. He said if you pulled those agencies, like the National 
Security Agency, the DIA, the NGA, the NRO--those that serve DOD and 
other consumers--if you pulled them out, you would see DOD re-creating 
within the Department new entities to replace those if you severed that 
link and transferred them. To quote William Odom, ``You're just going 
to end up with a big mess'' if you do that. That is why we came up with 
this structure.
  Mr. CONRAD. The last reference of winding up ``with a big mess,'' 
whose quote is that?
  Ms. COLLINS. William Odom, who is a former head of DIA. So we felt 
the case was very persuasive for the kind of organizational structure 
we came up with. That was recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
  Having said that, I am sure it is not perfect. I am sure we are going 
to learn from it. That is why we have reports required back to Congress 
after a year's time and by the General Accounting Office Accountability 
Office in 2 year's time, because we want to make sure we get this 
right.
  I think we have struck the right balance in the organizational 
structure we propose.
  Mr. CONRAD. Let me conclude on this note: The thing I am most 
concerned about is having an entirely separate Central Intelligence 
Agency and an office of national intelligence director. The thing that 
I have a difficult time understanding is how that is not going to 
create its own turf battles, its own communications problems. I hope I 
am proved wrong by this, but it is the one thing I looked at and I was 
surprised by and, I must say, I wondered about.
  I read the reports on the difficulties we had with the coordination 
between the CIA and the FBI and their turf battles and their 
unwillingness to share information. When we preserve the Central 
Intelligence Agency and create an office of national intelligence 
director and we still have, of course, the FBI's Office of 
Intelligence, I wonder whether we don't wind up with more turf battles. 
I know the intention is to avoid that and to appropriately create a 
place that will coordinate all the work of the intelligence community.
  My great management concern is that we will wind up with additional 
turf battles. I hope that is not the case. I am glad the reviews are 
built in because I think that is important. I wanted to express these 
concerns publicly. I wanted to raise these issues and have a chance for 
the managers to fully respond.
  I very much thank the chairman and the Senator from Connecticut.
  Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know Members are eager for us to vote 
on Senator Lautenberg's amendment, which I believe is the pending 
amendment. I hope to conclude the debate on that shortly and move to 
table his amendment. Senator Stevens is in the Chamber and would like 
to lay down a couple of amendments. I will delay the debate on the 
Lautenberg amendment until after Senator Stevens.
  I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so 
Senator Stevens may offer his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alaska.


                           Amendment No. 3839

       (Purpose: To strike section 201, relating to public 
     disclosure of intelligence funding)

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have filed a series of amendments. I 
would like to address the one on disclosure of intelligence funding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself, Mr. 
     Warner, and Mr. Inouye, proposes an amendment numbered 3839.
       On page 115, strike line 13 and all that follows through 
     page 116, line 23.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I direct the attention of the Senate to 
page 115. This is title II. It pertains to the amounts to be disclosed. 
It deals with amounts authorized and appropriated in each fiscal year.
  My amendment follows the recommendation of the administration and, I 
might add, the intelligence community to think twice before we do this. 
It may be that we will want to do this after the NID comes into being 
and we all have a better knowledge of how these funds are going to be 
handled.
  This amendment would require a further study of the disclosure of 
funds that are provided for intelligence programs. The basic need for 
this amendment rests on the testimony of the Acting Director of Central 
Intelligence John McLaughlin before the Governmental Affairs Committee. 
He said:

       I would not go so far as to declassify the numbers for the 
     individual agencies. I think that gives too much opportunity 
     for adversaries to understand how we are moving our money 
     from year to year from technical programs to human source 
     collection and to other objectives.

  In the administration's statement of policy, the administration is 
also concerned that the committee bill mandates disclosure of sensitive 
information about the intelligence budget. The

[[Page S10030]]

legislation should not compel disclosure, including to the Nation's 
enemies in war, of the amounts requested by the President and the 
amounts provided for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence 
activities.
  I understand that the committee intends to comply with the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with regard to this. But I think 
it is time we slow down a little bit and respond at least in part to 
some of the comments of those people who have spent their lifetimes now 
in our intelligence service.
  I can tell you that I have not spent my whole lifetime there, but I 
have spent some 30 years now in terms of watching over the Defense 
Appropriations Committee and being part of it at least. In terms of 
being chairman and ranking member, it has been now 23 years. This 
concerns me greatly because one of the problems of the appropriators is 
to find ways to have an honest budget but to put the money where the 
enemies of this country, those who want to do us harm, do not know what 
our emphasis is way out into the future.
  I remember when we started transitioning to electronic intelligence 
and how we traveled from place to place to look at these new satellites 
and the things they were going to do and got briefings on capacities. 
Those were developed over a series of years, and they got more 
complicated as they went along. But the money that was involved was 
substantial.
  To have a disclosure of ``we are engaging in an entirely new effort 
in intelligence'' would be highly unwise.
  I quote from the second page of the administration statement:

       The Administration is also concerned that the Committee 
     bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the 
     intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel 
     disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the 
     amounts requested by the President, and provided by the 
     Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence 
     activities.

  I am deeply concerned about some of the problems of how we find a way 
to maintain the secrets of this country with regard to what we are 
doing in terms of human intelligence. We are building up human 
intelligence at the same time as we are changing the utilization of the 
electronic concept of intelligence. And while I believe the time may 
come when we can find a way to disclose certain portions of the budget, 
I have a real resistance to this proposal that says:

       Congress shall disclose . . . for each fiscal year after 
     fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to 
     be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds 
     appropriated by Congress for such fiscal year for the 
     National Intelligence Program.

  Then it directs the study of disclosure of additional information. We 
are certainly not opposed to the study. It is the mandate beginning in 
2005. We are going to start, for the fiscal year 2006, disclosing these 
amounts at a time when there is great change in the intelligence 
community. The whole structure of the intelligence community will be 
changed by this bill. To start disclosing where money is going is to 
tell the enemies of this country where our emphasis for the future is. 
It is the future I am concerned about in terms of disclosure.
  In the future we set up reserve accounts, and I will be talking about 
some of those soon. But if we set up reserve accounts, the reserves are 
classified as reserves because that is where they get the money for 
innovation and new developments. We don't have to disclose it. We don't 
have to tell them: Yes, we are going to build new satellites or we are 
going to build other devices that can listen to transmissions in the 
air and on the land and under sea.
  We have a lot of secrets in this country. They are all related to 
intelligence. Let me repeat that. Every one of our secrets is related 
to intelligence. They are highly classified. Many of them are known 
only to the President and a close circle. Part of that circle includes 
Members of Congress who deal with the very high-level, classified 
programs of the intelligence services.
  I urge that the Senate listen to us and listen to the administration 
and to those who have been involved in these activities. Again, I call 
to the attention of the Senate that when we returned and found there 
were a whole series of people who had not been heard on their 
viewpoints--they wanted to express their concerns--we held a hearing 
and listened to the intelligence people, who had great, distinguished 
records in the past. We listened to Secretary Kissinger and a whole 
series of people who wore our uniform and have been the top officers of 
our military. To a person, they do not believe we should move this fast 
on this disclosure item.
  Let us have the study. We are entirely in favor of the study. But to 
mandate the disclosure in the bill we will prepare in 2005, I think, is 
much too early, in view of the changes taking place in the area of 
intelligence. This is where we are going to start to see if there is 
any reaction to those who have had experience in the area, to the 
President, and to those who have reviewed the whole thing. Is the 
Senate going to listen to these people with some experience and say, 
OK, let's study it, but not make the judgment first and then study it?
  This disclosure in the next fiscal year is wrong, until we know what 
the policies of the NID are and what are going to be the policies of 
Congress and how we are going to handle this appropriation. It appears 
to me that the result of this bill will be to fractionalize the 
intelligence appropriation, anyway. Part of it is going to go to the 
Department of Defense; part will be split up into several agencies 
within the NID.
  I think we ought to know first what we are doing before we decide 
what we are going to disclose so we can maintain the secrecy that is 
required in order to prepare for the future. This is not something to 
correct mistakes of the past; this is something to prevent making 
mistakes in the future.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have enormous respect for the Senator 
from Alaska. He is an extraordinary Senator, with many years of 
experience. I do want to assure the Senator from Alaska that, contrary 
to the implication in his statement, the committee did not adopt the 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to declassify the aggregate 
budget totals of all the agencies that make up the national 
intelligence program. We did not adopt that recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission because, based on our hearings and the testimony of our 
witnesses, we concluded that that goes too far and might well reveal 
information that would be helpful to those who would do us harm.
  The only declassification in the Collins-Lieberman bill is the top 
line aggregate amount for the entire national intelligence program. It 
does not declassify the specific appropriations amount distributed to 
agencies such as the National Security Agency, or the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, or the CIA, even though the 9/11 Commission 
recommended declassification at that level.

  Declassification, the top line, only that aggregate figure which has 
been estimated in the newspapers many, many times, I believe, will 
improve congressional and public oversight of the intelligence budget. 
It will help us with better decisionmaking on resource distribution, 
and it will make the structure and the management of the intelligence 
community more transparent.
  We asked our witnesses, including the Acting Director of the CIA, 
John McLaughlin, his views. And he, like most of our other expert 
witnesses, told us that as long as the specifics of the intelligence 
budget remain classified, there was no harm to national security to 
declassify just that top line aggregate amount.
  I think we struck the right balance in this regard. What we did is we 
included a study asking the national intelligence director to report 
back to us--to the Congress--on whether further declassification was 
appropriate. But the only step we took was that top line aggregate 
amount. If you don't declassify that in order to have a separate 
appropriation, then you end up, I fear, with the status quo--the money 
going through DOD accounts once again. That greatly weakens the budget 
authority of the national intelligence director.
  Again, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. I wanted 
to make clear what our bill does and what it doesn't do, because I 
think we have reached the right decision.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the chairman yield for a question?

[[Page S10031]]

  Ms. COLLINS. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. I am looking at the bill. The bill says the President 
shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 
2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized and appropriated for the 
national intelligence program. Then I go back to the page 6 for the 
definition of national intelligence programs. It says:

       Refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and 
     activities of the elements of the intelligence community;
       Includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or 
     not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National 
     Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
     Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the 
     Department of Homeland Security.

  That involves five different bills in the appropriations process. We 
currently put in any one of those five bills a portion of the 
clandestine activities we are financing with these moneys. So what you 
are going to tell us is, we no longer can use any portion of those 
because we are going to disclose the whole amount in every one of those 
bills.
  Listen to me. You have not lived with how we have financed the 
intelligence community. The money is not disclosed. It is put in parts 
of the budget and you don't know where it is. It rests with Senator 
Inouye and me, to be honest about it, and we make sure that is what it 
is. Maybe four people in the House and Senate know where this is. You 
are telling us to disclose it, without regard to where we put that 
money--disclose the money that is in each account and it goes into five 
separate bills. I say that is wrong. Wait until the NID comes into 
office and have him tell us how we can disclose what should be 
disclosed to the public. The public should not ask us to disclose this 
very classified, secret information to protect the future of the 
country through clandestine activities and acquisitions.

  I ask the question, does the Senator understand what her bill does? 
It will disclose the aggregate amount of funds--disclose them all, 
including the very, very top secret items, which probably three or four 
people in the White House, a few people in the CIA, or the DIA, and 
maybe eight people in the Congress would know.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I direct the attention of the Senator 
from Alaska to line 16 on page 115, which clearly says that:

       The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal 
     year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of 
     appropriations requested . . . for the National Intelligence 
     Program.

  It does not say that we are requiring disclosure of the 
appropriations for the elements that make up the national intelligence 
program.
  Mr. STEVENS. It says:

       The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be 
     appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, 
     by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the 
     intelligence community.

  Both authorized and appropriated. That is on page 116, line 9.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I say respectfully to the Senator from 
Alaska that that refers to the study on whether there should be further 
declassification. It does not refer to the disclosure. The disclosure 
is only--and it is very clearly stated--of the aggregate amount of the 
appropriations for the national intelligence program.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this is a very important discussion 
about another critical part of this bill. Obviously, the Senator from 
Alaska has had an extraordinary record of leadership in this and so 
many areas of the Senate. He knows the subject matter. He has lived 
with it a long time. I understand what we are proposing represents 
change. He is quite sincerely concerned about it from the point of view 
of our national security interests.
  I most of all want to assure him we spent a lot of time thinking 
about this. We did not just go for the 9/11 Commission recommendation. 
The 9/11 Commission recommended that we disclose not only the bottom 
line of the national intelligence budget but, in fact, the budget of 
every single agency.
  Their argument, as I am sure the Senator from Alaska knows, was that, 
one, the public has a right to know. Of course, we have to balance it--
what we disclose to our enemies--against national security, but if the 
budgets of those constituent agencies were out in the public, then 
maybe over the years the public and more Members of Congress might have 
decided we were not putting enough money into human intelligence, CIA, 
et cetera, and that we were putting too much into signal intelligence 
and that we would not have had the shortfall many people think we have 
now.
  In our committee, Senator Collins and I decided we were not ready to 
make that leap of disclosing the budgets of the 15 constituent agencies 
of the intelligence community because we thought there was some risk 
involved about signaling the movement of our resources to those who 
wish us ill.
  Incidentally, there were some members of the Commission who felt very 
strongly about the disclosure of the budgets of all the agencies, 
including some former Members of this Chamber who really feel this was 
at the heart of it. We did not think so, and that is why we called for 
the study.
  We think we have, however, achieved something for asking for the 
disclosure of the bottom line because at least that tells the taxpayers 
and all the Members of Congress how much money we are spending for 
intelligence.
  In the course of this investigation, I asked some specific questions, 
obviously in closed settings, about the amount of money we are spending 
overall and for each individual agency. I was surprised at the answers 
I got. I think maybe more Members of Congress should ask those 
questions.
  But this is what I think we do achieve by having the bottom line 
disclosed. We are fulfilling a responsibility to the taxpayers to let 
them know how much money we are spending on intelligence because it is 
just the bottom line, without giving any particular guidance to our 
enemies as to where we are putting that money.
  The second point is, one result of this might be when more Members of 
Congress and the public see what we are spending on intelligence, which 
is so critical in the war on terrorism--intelligence is always critical 
in warfare and even more critical today because of the nature of this 
enemy which strikes at undefended targets, innocent civilians, and is 
crazy enough to blow themselves up.
  So the more we can see and hear and know what they are planning, the 
more likely we are going to be able to stop them.
  One conclusion, I say to my friend from Alaska, might be that Members 
of Congress and the public might conclude we are not spending enough on 
intelligence if they see the bottom line.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. The problem is not that, from my point of view. My 
problem is we are going through a transition and saying for the very 
first year we are going to be asked to disclose the full amounts 
appropriated to the whole intelligence community.
  My amendment strikes all of section 201, in effect. I urge, at the 
very least, that we strike that provision that requires disclosure in 
2005. Let's have the study. I hope the NID will be able to make studies 
and get back to us sometime next year. But why put on us the 
requirement that we must collate and take all the moneys going to the 
intelligence community in 2006 when we are going to be working on that 
and, at the same time, he is making his adjustments in the whole 
community?
  My effort is to protect the clandestine amounts, protect the amounts 
that are necessary for security. Why can we not at least agree to make 
it just the study? We all agree on the study. Maybe the Commission is 
right, and the Senator from Connecticut is wrong and I am wrong. Why 
don't we have the study and find out what the NID people think is right 
and then let us act on 2006?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, it is 
impossible that he and I can both be wrong.
  Mr. STEVENS. We have been there before.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. We have been there before.
  Listen, because of who you are and what you stand for, Senator 
Collins

[[Page S10032]]

and I will certainly think about this. We think we have struck a good 
balance in just asking for disclosure of the bottom line, no details, 
beginning public consideration of what we are spending on intelligence, 
and this study we ask for in 180 days, 6 months, and then we can make 
some judgments beyond that.
  I yield the floor. I thank the Senator. This is an important 
discussion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe I am a cosponsor of the 
amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes, Mr. President, the Senator is, along with Senator 
Inouye.
  Mr. WARNER. This is a debate we had many years on the floor of the 
Senate. It has been a debate we have talked about so many times, and 
there has been a consistency in the voting in the Senate to recognize 
the wisdom not to release the budgets.
  As yet, with all due respect to our managers and others, I have not 
heard an absolutely convincing argument to turn back at least several 
decades that this has been an issue of debate on this floor. What is it 
in the public interest or, most importantly, our national security 
interests that requires us at this time to reverse positions that have 
been taken by this Chamber, together with the other body, over the 
period of several decades that I have been privileged to serve here?
  My concern is that this world today is so rapidly changing, and with 
the advancement of electronics and so many devices to determine what we 
in an open society are doing, why put the roadmap on the table for all 
to begin to search?
  It has been my experience that if you put out half a loaf, it will be 
followed by a request to get the other half of the loaf. Were this 
provision to prevail, we would be back here in a very short time, some 
colleagues with the best of intentions, saying: Why don't you put it 
all out? Why should we have any of it secret? That, coupled with the 
fact I have in my lifetime never seen a period where there is greater 
uncertainty about the security of this country--because of the 
progression of weapons of mass destruction, because of the progression 
of terrorism, and the proliferation of individuals who are willing to 
give up their lives to do harm in this country and other parts of the 
world--I just do not think at this point in time, without following, I 
think, the sage advice of our distinguished President pro tempore, we 
need to reverse what this Chamber has considered and decided upon year 
after year that I have been here.
  So I urge colleagues to support the amendment of the senior Senator 
from Alaska. I intend to strongly do so.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I heard the last part of the comments of 
the Senator from Connecticut. I suggest we put this aside and see if we 
can come to some conclusion.
  The Senator makes a good suggestion of putting a time limit on the 
study and getting us to the point where we might be able to follow this 
suggestion by the fiscal year 2006 bill. That bill will, in all 
probability, move through the Congress, I would say, by the May, June, 
and July timeframe. With the 180 days, I am afraid the Senator may be 
referring to the start of the fiscal year. That bill goes through the 
House and Senate. These are the first bills--Defense and Homeland 
Security, and Intelligence. Obviously; It is going to be in the first 
three without any question.
  So the 180 days is going to be June, and this bill will be moving 
through the House before that time.
  We probably could catch it before they finish in terms of if there is 
a recommendation we need, but I would urge my colleagues to consider 
repealing the requirement for disclosure and say that we urge the NID 
to give us the earliest possible date for that disclosure, when it 
could be done in the national interest.
  We are putting a lot of control and power in this person. Let's have 
him tell us when and if it should happen rather than direct it now. 
Make the study and leave it up to him to recommend to us, at least to 
what extent we should disclose, commencing in fiscal year 2006.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to read a few sentences from the 
9/11 Commission Report on page 416 which I think are relevant. It says:

     . . . Opponents of declassification argue that America's 
     enemies could learn about intelligence capabilities by 
     tracking the top-line appropriations figure. Yet the top-line 
     figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. 
     intelligence sources and methods. . . .

  Here is a point that one of the members of the Commission, again a 
former member of this body, made from the 9/11 Commission Report.

       The U.S. Government readily provides copious information 
     about spending on its military forces, including military 
     intelligence. The intelligence community should not be 
     subject to that much disclosure. But when even aggregate 
     categorical numbers remain hidden, it is hard to judge 
     priorities and foster accountability.

  That is in defense of disclosing the 15 individual agency budgets.
  I say to the Senator from Alaska, who knows this better than I--and I 
am honored to serve on the authorizing Armed Services Committee--we 
give a fair amount of detail of the budget in terms of military 
programs.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. Unfortunately, that is not a part of the report. That is 
a comment after the recommendation. It sort of demonstrates the extent 
of the knowledge they had about what they were dealing with in the 
recommendations, because that is not true. We do not disclose the 
amount we appropriate for defense intelligence. We disclose the amount 
in the budget that we support defense intelligence agencies with pay, 
facilities, and offices, but the amounts of their programs are not 
disclosed.

  What I am saying to the Senator is, as we approach this, I think 
there is a growing desire to know how much money we are spending. The 
Senator may be right. Maybe people want us to spend more. I have wanted 
to spend more for a long time.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I know that is true.
  Mr. STEVENS. The problem is people ought to know what they are 
talking about before they change the system. In these budgets are both 
moneys for acquisition and for salaries, and somewhere in there is some 
money that everybody knows, in the intelligence community, where it is 
and what it is for.
  In the Defense authorization bill there is a classified portion of 
that budget.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Sure.
  Mr. STEVENS. I am not even sure, other than the chairman and ranking 
member, if the Senator knows what is in there. I am saying so 
apologetically, but the system that requires secrecy in this country on 
some things is kept secret. This disclosure prematurely might trigger 
someone saying ``watch that'' in answering the question, and that would 
be bad because if they answer the question about what they knew was in 
there, that would disclose what they did not know was in there.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. A final response on this point. The Senator from 
Alaska says correctly if one looks at the overall budget of a given 
military agency, it does not tell what they are spending on different 
programs. So I want to assure the Senator from Alaska that under the 
committee's proposal, not only do we not talk about what is being spent 
on specific programs and specific intelligence agencies, we do not talk 
about what is being spent in those agencies. We talk about the one 
number, the conglomerate bottom line or top-line number, and I think 
that only gives a general idea of what we are investing in 
intelligence, far from any specific information about what we are 
investing in particular kinds of intelligence, signal, human, image, 
let alone specific programs.
  I would not do this if I thought it would jeopardize our national 
security. In fact, that is why we did not call, as the Commission 
requested, for disclosure of individual agency budgets because we 
worried it might, and that is why we are asking for a report from the 
national intelligence director.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will quote Acting CIA Director John 
McLaughlin from our September 8 hearing on this very issue. He said:


[[Page S10033]]


       If there is a separate appropriation for the foreign 
     intelligence program, the national intelligence program, as 
     distinct from the current arrangement where that 
     appropriation is buried in the larger Defense Department 
     bill, I think it would make some sense to declassify the 
     overall number for the foreign intelligence program.

  That was typical of our witnesses.
  I also note that the top line has been made public on occasion in the 
past. It was made public in 1997 and 1998 by the DCI.
  At this point there are numerous Senators who are asking what the 
plan is for today and who are trying to catch planes. I ask for the 
regular order with respect to Lautenberg amendment No. 3802, and I ask 
unanimous consent that there be 2 minutes on each side prior to a 
motion to table the amendment. I further ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, it is my understanding 
that that would set aside the pending amendment and take up that 
procedure. We would come back to this amendment. Or is there another 
amendment in the queue by regular order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no other amendment in the queue by 
regular order.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending 
amendment be set aside so I can call up my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3795

  Mr. HOLLINGS. I call up my amendment numbered 3795.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Hollings] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3795.

  Mr. HOLLINGS. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

                  (Purpose: To propose a substitute.)

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR.

       (a) National Intelligence Coordinator.--There is a National 
     Intelligence Coordinator who shall be appointed by the 
     President.
       (b) Responsibility.--Subject to the direction and control 
     of the President, the National Intelligence Coordinator shall 
     have the responsibility for coordinating the performance of 
     all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States Government, whether such activities are foreign 
     or domestic.
       (c) Availability of Funds.--Funds shall be available to the 
     National Intelligence Coordinator for the performance of the 
     responsibility of the Coordinator under subsection (b) in the 
     manner provided by law or as directed by the President.
       (d) Membership on National Security Council.--The National 
     Intelligence Coordinator shall be a member of the National 
     Security Council.
       (e) Support.--(1) Any official, office, program, project, 
     or activity of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date 
     of the enactment of this Act that supports the Director of 
     Central Intelligence in the performance of responsibilities 
     and authorities as the head of the intelligence community 
     shall, after that date, support the National Intelligence 
     Coordination in the performance of the responsibility of the 
     Coordinator under subsection (b).
       (2) Any powers and authorities of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence under statute, Executive order, regulation, or 
     otherwise as of the date of the enactment of this Act that 
     relate to the performance by the Director of responsibilities 
     and authorities as the head of the intelligence community 
     shall, after that date, have no further force and effect.
       (f) Accountability.--The National Intelligence Coordinator 
     shall report directly to the President regarding the 
     performance of the responsibility of the Coordinator under 
     subsection (b), and shall be accountable to the President 
     regarding the performance of such responsibility.

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I support the Hollings-Stevens 
amendment, numbered 3795. My amendment strikes and replaces the 
underlying bill with language creating a national intelligence 
coordinator, or NIC. Important work since September 11th of the 9/11 
Commission, numerous Senate committees and others has convinced all of 
us that we must enact intelligence reform. I am impressed by the 
efforts of my friends Senators Collins and Lieberman, and others, who 
have used their considerable skills to implement most of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. But I worry that the Senate is 
moving ahead with enormous restructuring, when we could address the 
main problem more immediately. 9/11 was clearly an intelligence 
failure, and we must act now to fix the most glaring problem--the lack 
of an intelligence coordinator.
  My amendment fixes this most obvious, most severe problem with our 
intelligence structure by creating a national intelligence coordinator, 
or NIC. It will be the NIC's responsibility to sift through the work of 
all of our intelligence entities, both foreign, domestic and military 
and keep the President abreast of the intelligence community's findings 
in a coordinated, complete way. As it exists, the intelligence 
community's communications with the President cannot help but be 
haphazard. The President needs to have the huge volumes of intelligence 
information coordinated by someone he trusts, so he can make informed 
policy judgments. Thus, my amendment allows the President to select an 
intelligence coordinator as a member of the National Security Council, 
not subject to Senate approval. Just as President Bush has Karl Rove, 
whom he trusts and who coordinates the political intelligence 
throughout this Administration, the President needs a Karl Rove for 
national security intelligence.
  This NIC will need sufficient staff and resources. So my amendment 
assigns to the NIC in his or her role as coordinator of intelligence 
activities, the staff and resources currently assigned to the Director 
of Central Intelligence, or DCI, that is now employed in the 
performance of his role as coordinator of the intelligence community, 
which he is not doing.
  Many of the dozens of provisions in Collins-Lieberman would likely 
improve our system of intelligence. The Senate should study each of 
these provisions carefully, and enact the best of these provisions 
after such consideration. My amendment fixes the main problem in the 
meantime--the lack of a coordinator.
  Collins-Lieberman creates a National Intelligence Director, or NID, 
and gives that person considerable power over budgets and personnel. 
The NID will control a new national counterterrorism center, and 
generally manage the intelligence community. The bill is problematic 
because the NID will wield unheard of influence over work of the 
intelligence entities, before that work even gets done. This is 
groupthink--personnel from 15 agencies work to get the Director the 
answers they know he wants. Personnel will neglect intelligence that 
takes them in directions they know the NID opposes. Reform should 
encourage more creativity, not less; more diversity within the 
intelligence community, not less. These agencies each do different 
things well--we need to take advantage of differentiation, not squelch 
it under the NID.
  The national intelligence coordinator created by my amendment is 
unlikely to lead to this problem of Groupthink. The NIC will not 
control personnel and budget decisions. He will not have the power to 
fire people in other agencies that he disagrees with, or promote only 
people who share his worldview. He will not be able to manipulate 
policy direction of intelligence agencies and centers we may create. 
The NIC will coordinate, not meddle in the work itself. The 9/11 
Commission decided that part of the reason the 9/11 plot was successful 
is the lack of creativity in our intelligence community. Stopping 
complicated terror plots before they happen requires flourishing 
intelligence diversity, and Collins-Lieberman will undermine diversity 
by concentrating intelligence output in one manager--the NID. We don't 
need a Director of Intelligence. We need a coordinator. We need to 
change the NID to NIC, the ``D'' to ``C''.

  I would like to address concerns I have with the underlying bill 
related to Defense. In deciding what to do with

[[Page S10034]]

the Department of Defense's control over most intelligence dollars, 
Collins-Lieberman splits the baby. The bill transfers control over the 
budgets and some personnel decisions of the National Security Agency, 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office, from the Secretary of Defense to the NID without 
transferring control of the agencies themselves to the NID. The NID 
will develop and present the President with an annual budget request 
for these and other intelligence programs. It is unclear whether the 
Secretary of Defense or the NID will control the actual payroll. Under 
Collins-Lieberman, ``tactical'' military intelligence and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency will remain under the DOD. But the bill does not 
define ``tactical.'' Obviously, DOD will seek to define that term 
broadly, and the NID will seek to define it narrowly. I understand 
Senator Feinstein may offer an amendment that would define ``tactical'' 
and provide some clarity, but even if that amendment is enacted, the 
battle will be waged over how to interpret the Feinstein definition of 
``tactical.'' My friends Senators Specter, Roberts, Shelby, DeWine, 
Bond, Wyden, Bayh and others already think the NID should have even 
more control over agencies currently within the DOD than the Collins-
Lieberman bill would allow, but their amendment failed.
  In short, there is confusion over what Collins-Lieberman transfers 
from the DOD to the NID and what it does not transfer. There is 
confusion over what ought to be placed underneath the NID, and what 
stays with the DOD. There is confusion over how budget, personnel and 
other types of authority can be bifurcated and trifurcated. This is a 
time for clarity, not confusion. The NID will also receive the 
appropriation for these and other intelligence programs, and in 
Collins-Lieberman the NID can transfer funds from one office to another 
as the Director sees fit. If the underlying bill is enacted as it is 
currently written, I forecast open warfare between the Secretary of 
Defense and the NID. Especially during a time of war, DOD will insist 
on funding defense/military-related intelligence work its way. This 
kind of turf war is bad for the country, and we should not enact 
intelligence that we can see is likely to pit the Secretary of Defense 
against the NID. If this painful transition needs to occur, we should 
at least consider waiting until after combat operations in Iraq have 
ended.
  I am also concerned about some potential problems with the underlying 
bill's blurring of domestic and foreign intelligence. While I support 
the concept of fusing foreign and domestic intelligence, because that 
is what modern investigating and technology requires, this is a very 
sensitive and tricky area. Our Nation's history of domestic covert 
governmental operations shows the need to be careful here. Collins-
Lieberman places the FBI's domestic counterterrorism activities and 
those of the CIA and DOD under the NID. But it does not address 
problems with locating domestic covert operations outside the FBI. The 
NID would have the power to ask the CIA or DOD to engage in such covert 
domestic operations. Our current governmental arrangements keep the CIA 
from participating in domestic intelligence activities, yet none of 
this would apply to the NID. Who is to say that the NID will not begin 
using the CIA to conduct extensive covert domestic activities? This new 
role for the CIA may actually be appropriate, but we have to be careful 
to draw rules for CIA domestic conduct that respect our Bill of Rights 
and other basic traditions. Using agencies other than the FBI for these 
domestic tasks also removes the Attorney General from its supervisory 
function. The Department of Justice is qualified to make difficult Bill 
of Rights judgments, but these other agencies may not be. These other 
agencies may not even be inclined to exercise restraint when they are 
investigating Americans. We could ruin cases against suspected domestic 
terrorists, because our intelligence operatives do not conduct their 
investigations according to constitutional requirements, and the cases 
get thrown out. And unless the stovepipes we hear so much about are 
eradicated immediately under this bill, which seems unrealistic, we may 
even have multiple agencies conducting duplicate investigations against 
American citizens, trampling all over each other and the law.

  Collins-Lieberman also enacts the largest ever surveillance 
intelligence network, which can be data-mined by personnel in various 
levels of government. Senator Stevens and others point out that we do 
not even have the technology to meld all this intelligence in one 
database. While coordinating information among agencies is laudable, it 
is unclear that Collins-Lieberman addresses dangerous side effects of a 
new network database. Collins-Lieberman directs the White House to 
violate privacy protections, but of the three branches, the executive 
branch has the least incentive to balance individual rights concerns. 
Congress never held any hearings to address the civil liberties 
problems with such a network, or with turning over to the White House 
power to write privacy guidelines. Administration guidelines and a 
civil liberties board, contained in the bill, are not as likely to 
strike the correct balance over privacy issues as Congressional 
oversight and public debate would. At the very least, we need committee 
hearings to consider the consequences to our civil liberties of 
enacting a national network database.
  At this time I would like to say a few words about this underlying 
bill's possible impact on a couple of our intelligence agencies. 
Because of the bill's considerable scope, I will only raise a few of 
the potential problems with the bill's agency reforms. The bill hampers 
the FBI Director's ability to manage the FBI. The bill creates 
conflicting reporting requirements for the FBI's Executive Assistant 
Director for Intelligence, making her responsible to the FBI Director 
and the NID. She will support not only the FBI's counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence programs, under the NID, but also the FBI's 
criminal and cyber missions, which are not under the NID. The bill 
provides no clear way to separate FBI criminal investigations from its 
intelligence work. I would not want to be the Executive Assistant 
Director of Intelligence under this structure--with dueling bosses and 
duplicative reporting requirements. Also, will the National Security 
Council's role be weakened by the creation of a separate board chaired 
by the NID? Will the NID be allowed to deny the Secretary of State and 
other cabinet-level Secretaries personnel decision-making over their 
own subordinates? I understand Collins-Lieberman will give the NID 
authority over analysis. Where does this leave CIA analysts? The bill 
does not address what the new role for CIA analysts will be. Have these 
matters been worked out, or even discussed in a public forum? I have 
focused on several agencies I am particularly acquainted with through 
my experience on the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations 
Subcommittee. I am sure my colleagues are raising similar problems with 
reforming the agencies under their Committees' jurisdictions, and I 
encourage them to come forward and help us understand these important 
issues.
  Mr. President, I'd like to say a few words about policy too. This 
administration is extremely reticent to spend money in Afghanistan, and 
it was trying to funnel to Iraq funds Congress allocated for 
Afghanistan long before the President started the Iraq war. Collins-
Lieberman empowers the NID to transfer funds and personnel directed by 
Congress from one agency to another. For example, this body may 
substantially increase U.S. assistance to Afghanistan--I understand 
Senators McCain and Lieberman have advocated just such an increase. If 
we add funds for Afghanistan onto this bill, the NID could scrap the 
funds for Afghanistan and transfer them to fund a new operation in 
Syria or Iran. The NID would have a responsibility to inform Congress 
that he had moved this money, but these funds would be moved 
nonetheless. It is Congress's duty to allocate such funds. Empowering 
the NID to override Congress's funding priorities is bound to lead the 
NID to undermine Congress's powers, and instead use shift funds 
allocated by Congress to advance the administration's agenda.
  As we consider this bill under great political pressure and with the 
election looming, we have considerable analogous precedent to 
reference. Recent hasty Congressional enactments of Homeland Security 
legislation and the Patriot Act show the need for more

[[Page S10035]]

measured action. Collins-Lieberman is thrown together in a matter of 
weeks. Surely most of us agree that at least some of its provisions are 
problematic. Much of the conversation I have heard on the floor this 
week sounds more like campaigning than legislating. The White House 
identifies problems throughout Collins-Lieberman--will the House 
version appeal more to the White House? A hastily thrown together 
conference resolving differences in the House and Senate versions will 
not be conducive to finding and fixing these inevitable problems. My 
friend Senator Stevens says, ``Do no harm''. Whatever comes back from 
conference will have a tremendous head of steam behind it. By acting 
too fast on Collins-Lieberman, the Senate may get stuck with House 
provisions in a conference report that are unpalatable. Once reform is 
enacted, fixing missteps is extremely difficult. Experiences of 
homeland security legislation, passed right before an election, and the 
Patriot Act, prove that hasty restructuring results in confusion, 
mistakes and paralysis.
  I conclude by asking my colleagues to support my amendment. Let's act 
now and enact my amendment, which fixes the main problem of the lack of 
a coordinator, and then let's continue to act as we learn. Let's sift 
through the litany of approaches being advanced by my colleagues in the 
underlying bill, and the rival approaches being advocated by others 
both within this body and outside it. My amendment starts us on the 
right track to improving our intelligence structure, and it avoids the 
potential to start us on the wrong track.
  I appreciate the outstanding work Senator Collins and Senator 
Lieberman have done and thank them for that. They met over the break in 
August and worked around the clock to produce a product so we could get 
something done before we leave in time for the elections in November.
  However, in those pressures of time, they have come out with a 
product that needs many more hearings, more deliberation, and more 
consideration. In essence, they have a national intelligence director 
who directs and manages. Immediately that raised the red flag for this 
particular Senator.
  When I say ``raised the red flag for this particular Senator,'' let 
me tell of an experience. It was 50 years ago we had the Hoover 
Commission Task Force investigating the intelligence activities of this 
Nation. We had the McCarthy days, McCarthy charging there were 
Communist spies and agents within the State Department, within the 
Defense Department, within the executive branch, and everywhere 
throughout the Government. President Eisenhower appointed the Doolittle 
Commission and they came out with what was considered generally in the 
Congress as a whitewash. The White House and Congress got together and 
agreed efforts should be conducted to reorganize the executive branch, 
thus, President Hoover's commission came to be.
  A task force was headed by General Mark Clark. I served as one of 
those members of the task force investigating the CIA, the FBI, the 
Army, Navy, air intelligence, Secret Service, Q clearance, atomic 
energy intelligence, and on down the list. We spent some 2 years. After 
hearings and consideration of the generally speaking minute 
intelligence information at that time--I say ``minute'' for the simple 
reason that the intelligence information now correlated by the various 
entities and departments and agencies is like drinking water out of a 
fire hydrant. You have much, much greater volume. But even then we 
found the need for a coordinator.
  I can see Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency. Director 
Dulles of the CIA said, I have my hands full trying to get the work 
done properly of the CIA, much less as the head of intelligence 
activities in the Government, namely the coordinator of all 
intelligence, the centralizer of all intelligence. That is why it was 
called the Central Intelligence Agency. He said, I have too much work 
to do. What we need is one single intelligence coordinator to 
coordinate all of it--my work, the FBI, Defense Department, military.
  In those days all we had was foreign intelligence and military to 
bother with. We did not have terrorism threats and counterterrorism 
within the continental limits. Now we have heaped upon the 
responsibilities of the intelligence community all kinds of duties that 
need further deliberation and estimation because, as I say, the 
director of the national intelligence, when they said ``direct,'' when 
they said ``manage,'' I said heavens above, here is a flaw of September 
11 intelligence. It was directed. It was managed. Everyone knows that 
now after the hearings.
  The Vice President had his own little cabal in that Department of 
Defense. They had met with the head of the Defense Advisory Council, 
Richard Perle, and Scooter Libby and that group. They had submitted to 
the country of Israel in 1996--Benjamin Netanyahu was coming in as 
Prime Minister, and they submitted at that time that Saddam ought to be 
replaced with the Hashemite rule and they wanted to democratize Iraq 
back in 1996.
  When Netanyahu refused doing that, they came back and organized 
themselves into the Project for the New American Century and they have 
been pressing forward ever since.
  So when you direct and when you manage intelligence, you have a 
flawed product. We need coordination. You need to take the best of the 
best from the CIA, from the FBI, from the National Security Agency, 
from the National Reconnaissance Organization, and all these other 
entities and coordinate into a product to give to the President.
  Suppose you were President in the next 10 minutes and you heard about 
a terrorist threat, not only foreign but domestic. What you would want 
in line, you would want a Karl Rove on intelligence. Now, the President 
has a Karl Rove on political intelligence. Karl Rove can tell you for 
any section of the country what is going on in any particular State. He 
has pollsters. He can give a consummate judgment or alternative to the 
President to make a judgment. That is fine business. We have that 
without legislation.
  We need just that in security intelligence--not only foreign, not 
only domestic, not only military, but all three--security intelligence 
coordinator.
  So when I say the national intelligence director directing and 
managing, I am saying, here is a flaw of September 11. You know the 
group-think policy of the President. If you are directing and managing 
intelligence, what you do is go immediately and give that intelligence 
to the folks making the Presidential policy and you develop a group-
think and a flawed product.
  We do not want, necessarily, a director, certainly with all the 
duties that this particular director is burdened with but, rather, we 
want a coordinator. He should be or she should be in the National 
Security Council, appointed by the President, without confirmation by 
the Senate. You have to have your own person in there. And you have to 
not have him or her running over to several committees in the Senate 
and several committees in the House testifying about this management, 
this direction, this decision, this or that policy. He will have his 
hands full just with what the President wants.

  Necessarily, we transfer those coordination responsibilities from the 
CIA over to this national intelligence coordinator. This is a short, 
two-page amendment by Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Cochran, 
and myself. This was worked out this afternoon. I was trying to listen 
to the debate, and the more I listened, the more it impressed me that 
we needed much more deliberate work and consideration, and not the 
crunch of a national election to get all of us out of town and do 
something. So we are trying to respond to that edict of ``don't just 
stand there, do something.'' I am afraid we are going to enact the 
``Alka Seltzer'' intelligence bill: I don't believe we passed the whole 
thing.
  Look what it does. It directs and manages, but what intelligence is 
under the Department of Defense and what intelligence is under the 
national intelligence director. I searched and I found conflicts 
throughout the particular Collins-Lieberman measure, especially during 
a time of war. I can tell you, you are going to find all kinds of 
conflicts there. There are conflicts going on right now with the war in 
Iraq and the Secretary of Defense saying he is not going to stand for 
it. The national intelligence director has the defense intelligence 
budget, but then the

[[Page S10036]]

secretary of intelligence has the defense intelligence function and 
responsibility. And the Secretary of Defense does not have budget 
control over what he has responsibility. And then there is the ``ying'' 
and the ``yang'' of defense intelligence versus tactical intelligence. 
And I have listened to some, the distinguished Senator from California 
and others, on what they consider tactical intelligence.
  On civil liberties, there are real grave concerns there because there 
is within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that investigates crimes 
and protects civil liberties, a culture, a paradigm, and a discipline. 
The Justice Department has developed that over the years of different 
FBI Directors. Now, with respect to the national intelligence director, 
he can direct covert activity to be taken on by the FBI with none of 
that discipline and none of those checks and balances.
  You have heard the distinguished Senator from Alaska with respect to 
the national intelligence director's transfer of funds, not only the 
reporting of funds. I can tell you now that will never happen where you 
can transfer funds because the Appropriations Committee has that 
responsibility.
  I can go down the different disclosure of funds and various other 
things. What I want to emphasize is that I am not trying to disparage 
any of the wonderful work being done by our Governmental Operations 
Committee. They have a product out here now that we can develop and 
work upon and iron out the differences. But it should not be under the 
pressure that we are in and having passed ipso facto the Collins-
Lieberman bill. You would not satisfy the problem of 9/11, and that is 
coordination.
  You need the President's man or woman in that National Security 
Council, auditing, gaining, and getting. And mind you me, don't worry 
about getting it, now that you have a coordinator sitting there with 
the President. For example, that Arizona flight school information that 
did not get through the FBI to the coordinator, because they did not 
have one, is excused. That Minnesota terrorist who did not want to land 
the plane, all he wanted to do was fly it into a building; that came to 
the CIA but did not get to the White House. Known terrorists came into 
the country, passed the Immigration department, and the Naturalization 
Service. That did not get to the Director.
  But mind you me, if you have a coordinator, and the information of 
that importance does not get through to that coordinator, the opposite 
is going to be true. Rather than the old days when you held within your 
particular department or agency your intelligence and your information, 
and you did not tell the FBI, and the FBI did not tell the CIA, here 
you are going to try to regurgitate and spit up and throw out and 
report to that coordinator. Because if he does not get it at the White 
House level, heads are going to roll.
  So we have changed the culture and discipline by having one 
coordinator. That is all you need. We can go home and know that the job 
is done. The FBI is working. The CIA is working. The National Security 
Agency now knows not to wait until tomorrow to translate their go 
signal. As they went into the World Trade Towers, they were a day late 
in translating documents.
  We can go home and know that the President is equipped with a 
coordinator. And immediately, if I am running the CIA or FBI, I am 
going to start getting my information out rather than hiding it. That 
is the real difficulty: The dots were there, but the dots were not 
joined. With the Collins-Lieberman bill what you are instituting and 
legislating into law is the flaw of 9/11. You have a director of 
intelligence. You have a manager of intelligence. And that is how they 
got into the World Trade towers and into the Pentagon. It was managed.
  I can see the President on October 7, 2002, in Cincinnati. ``Facing 
clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait until the smoking gun is a 
mushroom cloud,'' he said. Seven days later I voted for the authority 
to go to the war when the President asked--I did not sit on the 
Intelligence Committee. When my Commander in Chief says: ``Facing clear 
evidence of peril, we cannot wait until the smoking gun is a mushroom 
cloud,'' I voted aye. Then I found out there weren't no smoking guns, 
there were no mushroom clouds, there were no facilities, there were no 
weapons, there were no terrorist threats. But that is another argument.
  I am trying to get something done where we in good conscience can 
protect our national security, protect us against domestic terrorism. 
And we can fix this bill.
  Now, let me add one little thing. I don't know whether Senator 
Stevens, my dear colleague, or Senator Inouye or Senator Cochran wants 
to talk. But I would agree, I don't need, unless I am questioned, 
another 10 minutes. And I know they have amendments of their own. So I 
would agree to a time limit on either side if the distinguished 
managers of the bill are trying to get to a vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. How much more time does the Senator from South Carolina 
believe he would require?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Let me reserve 10 minutes. I don't know if I will use 
it.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator 
from South Carolina be accorded up to 10 minutes more for his debate, 
and then that Senator Lieberman and I have up to 10 minutes for us to 
use in opposition to the Hollings amendment. Then it is my intention to 
move to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I will use just 1 minute for the 
Hollings-Stevens-Inouye-Cochran amendment. It is my policy, and it is 
not to be treated casually. It is to be treated seriously because what 
we are going through is this exercise here. And if you had the Collins-
Lieberman bill up, I would vote to get it to the House and let them try 
to hammer it out. They don't have the coordinator.
  I was just about to say, the reason they didn't have that coordinator 
is that the 9/11 Commission is even Stephen, Republican-Democrat. And 
they wanted to have a unanimous report, and I agree with that. So they 
didn't hammer and zero in or bull's-eye the real need and the real 
fault of 9/11. They didn't join the dots. They didn't have a 
coordinator. And if they were going to come out on that unanimously, 
they would have found fault at the White House level. It is just as 
simple as that.
  I know another time in the history of this Government where we knew 
full well that President Reagan knew about the Contras, at least I was 
convinced so. But you couldn't report it. You couldn't say it. You 
couldn't do it for the simple reason that these so-called commissions 
that are now sanctified are really politically balanced, and they leave 
out the necessary one. In this particular instance, we need a 
coordinator. You can get all of the directors. You can get all of the 
budgets. You can get all hammered out about the Defense Department. 
Just leave it all alone or put it all through. And you haven't 
satisfied and gotten a coordinator at the National Security Council.
  We had that amendment early on last year, and the vote was 49 to 48. 
We put him on. I had that amendment up. It was a partisan vote.
  Now I have worked yesterday and today to explain it to colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle, and it is bipartisan by the most 
responsible of Senators other than myself. I hope we don't treat it 
casually as something to be tabled and walk away and say: Let's have 
another amendment. We don't want to vote on Friday. Let's get some 
votes.
  We are all thinking about procedure and not thinking about the 
country. We are all thinking about the campaign and not the country.
  I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from 
South Carolina eviscerates the underlying bill. I want to be very clear 
about that. His amendment takes a radically different approach to 
intelligence reform. The Hollings amendment creates a national 
intelligence coordinator and transfers to this individual the 
responsibility and authority that the Director of Central Intelligence 
now has as head of the intelligence community. The DCI would remain as 
head of the CIA and principal adviser to the President.
  This approach is completely contrary to the recommendations of the 9/
11

[[Page S10037]]

Commission. It is completely contrary to the report of the 
congressional joint inquiry. It is completely contrary to numerous 
government and private sector reports over the past five decades.
  The Hollings amendment gives the national intelligence coordinator 
the responsibility to manage the intelligence community but does not 
give that individual any additional authority to allow him to 
accomplish that task. The Hollings amendment also provides that except 
as otherwise provided by law, the national intelligence coordinator 
shall not be accountable to Congress regarding the performance of the 
responsibility of the coordinator. It is difficult to imagine why we 
would establish such a position with a list of legally defined 
responsibilities and authorities currently in the National Security Act 
of 1947, very important responsibilities and authorities which affected 
the security and the liberty of the American people, and then 
specifically provide that this individual is not accountable to 
Congress.
  I am strongly opposed to this amendment. It guts the entire Collins-
Lieberman bill. I urge my colleagues to defeat it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the Hollings 
amendment. The Senator from South Carolina raised a question: Who cares 
about the country? Who is putting the country's interests and security 
first?
  I assure him that Senator Collins and I, the members of our committee 
from both parties, care about the country, care about the security of 
the country, worry about the imminence of a terrorist attack, read the 
reports, came in in July and August and September, worked real hard to 
produce this proposal.
  Talk about treating something casually, the amendment of the Senator 
from South Carolina would casually eliminate all our work and that of 
the 9/11 Commission and a series of commissions going back to 1947, 
when the National Security Act was adopted, recommending a strong 
national intelligence director.
  What you are doing is creating a position that is cosmetic, that has 
no teeth to it, and will not be able to do what we need to do. It will 
bring us back to where we were before September 11, with no one in 
charge and, even worse, the appearance of someone in charge.
  Witness after witness--people no one would treat casually, 
Secretaries of State, heads of the intelligence community, the past 
three or four of those people said: The worst thing you can do is to 
create a position and not give that position the authority to direct 
the intelligence community.
  With all respect, that is what the amendment of the Senator from 
South Carolina is doing.
  Secretary Powell said to us on September 13 of this year at a 
hearing:

       A [Director of Central Intelligence] was there before, but 
     the DCI did not have that kind of authority. And in this 
     town, it's budget authority that counts. Can you move the 
     money? Can you set standards for people? The [national 
     intelligence director]--

  The one created in our bill--

       will have all of that, and so I think this is a far more 
     powerful player. And that will help the State Department.

  Stansfield Turner, CIA Director under President Carter, told us on 
August 16:

       I think it's empowering somebody to run a $40 billion a 
     year . . . operation. And we just don't have that. And we 
     need to have a CEO. So the real issue is just how much 
     authority to give that CEO and still protect the Department 
     of Defense. And I, as a military officer, would err on the 
     side of giving it to the national intelligence director.

  That is what we do.
  With all respect, not casually, we have built in a lot of time and 
effort that this committee put in over a period of time on a totally 
bipartisan basis. This amendment would take us back to where we were 
when we were struck on September 11, 2001. I don't want to go back 
there, and that is why I oppose this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Well, two points quickly: I don't go back to 1947, but 
I go back to 1953 and 1954 under the Hoover Commission. And I would 
refer you to that report. They ask for a national intelligence 
coordinator. Allen Dulles would say--he was directing Central 
Intelligence--you can run the National Security Agency, you over at the 
Department of Defense, and you can direct and manage military 
intelligence and these different departments. But take those cold 
turkey facts of intelligence and information and have them 
coordinated--not superduper $40 billion. It sounds pretty on paper, but 
I can tell you right now, that is what was wrong with 9/11. The 
intelligence was directed, was managed.
  Why do you think the head of the CIA hammered and slammed his fist on 
the desk of the President and said, Slam dunk, Mr. President, we got 
all the information you need on weapons of mass destruction, when he 
didn't even have an agent in downtown Baghdad. We were about to invade 
Iraq, and we had not an agent. That was the same director who was the 
staff director before Gulf Storm and Senator Bill Cohen and I came back 
to be briefed on Iraq and Baghdad, against Saddam. And George Tenet, 
the staff director at that time, said: Gentlemen, we don't have an 
agent in Baghdad. We don't have one in Iraq. We will have to call over 
to the Defense Department. Here, 11 years later, we still don't have 
somebody down there. Now we have operative agents and everything else 
trying to manage elections and what have you. So the idea is to 
coordinate impartial, objective intelligence facts, not manage 
intelligence.

  Secondly, the Congress stays out of it, Senator Collins, most 
respectfully. The Congress stays out of the affairs of Condoleezza 
Rice. She is the National Security Adviser. We don't call her up willy-
nilly before 15 different committees here on the Hill and say testify 
here and there. You don't want that. If you are the President, you want 
it coordinated subject to you. That is what you need. You don't call 
Karl Rove up here and ask him about political intelligence; you have 
him working around the clock. He has us Democrats on the run.
  I want the same kind of job done in domestic intelligence, foreign 
intelligence, and military intelligence. I want it coordinated for the 
President so the buck doesn't stop here because the dots were not 
joined. Now we are about to join the dots in this amendment. Of all 
people, they say let's don't join them, let's just manage; and we have 
$40 billion or $30 billion, whatever it is, and we are going to manage 
indirectly and we are going to screw up the Defense Department, the 
FBI, civil rights, and everything else, in the head-on rush we have 
here this afternoon.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to table the Hollings amendment 
and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. 
Domenici), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl), and the Senator from 
Arizona (Mr. McCain) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), the Senator from California (Mrs. 
Boxer), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), the Senator from 
Florida (Mr. Graham), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), the 
Senator from Georgia (Mr. Miller), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. 
Nelson), are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 82, nays 7, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 193 Leg.]

                                YEAS--82

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe

[[Page S10038]]


     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--7

     Burns
     Byrd
     Cochran
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Sessions
     Stevens

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Akaka
     Biden
     Boxer
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Graham (FL)
     Kerry
     Kyl
     McCain
     Miller
     Nelson (FL)
  The motion was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). The Senator from Maine.


                           Amendment No. 3802

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to table the Lautenberg amendment 
and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. 
Domenici), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl), the Senator from Arizona 
(Mr. McCain) and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) are 
necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from Kansas 
(Mr. Brownback) would vote ``yea.''
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), the Senator from California (Mrs. 
Boxer), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Durbin), the Senator from North 
Carolina (Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) and 
the Senator from Florida (Mr. Nelson) are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 47, nays 41, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 194 Leg.]

                                YEAS--47

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bennett
     Bond
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Dole
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--41

     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bingaman
     Breaux
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Akaka
     Biden
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Graham (FL)
     Kerry
     Kyl
     McCain
     Nelson (FL)
  The motion was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. SANTORUM. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.


                           Amendment No. 3819

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay the pending 
business aside and call up amendment No. 3819.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Ensign], for himself, Mr. Kyl, 
     Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Grassley, and Mr. Sessions, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3819.

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require the Secretary of State to increase the number of 
   consular officers, clarify the responsibilities and functions of 
 consular officers, and require the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
  increase the number of border patrol agents and customs enforcement 
                             investigators)

       At the end, add the following:

                        TITLE IV--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 401. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSULAR 
                   OFFICERS.

       (a) Increased Number of Consular Officers.--The Secretary 
     of State, in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009, may 
     increase by 150 the number of positions for consular officers 
     above the number of such positions for which funds were 
     allotted for the preceding fiscal year.
       (b) Limitation on Use of Foreign Nationals for Visa 
     Screening.--
       (1) Immigrant visas.--Subsection (b) of section 222 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following: ``All immigrant visa 
     applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular 
     officer.''.
       (2) Nonimmigrant visas.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
     amended by adding at the end the following: ``All 
     nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and 
     adjudicated by a consular officer.''.
       (c) Training for Consular Officers in Detection of 
     Fraudulent Documents.--Section 305(a) of the Enhanced Border 
     Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1734(a)) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following: ``As part of 
     the consular training provided to such officers by the 
     Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive training 
     in detecting fraudulent documents and general document 
     forensics and shall be required as part of such training to 
     work with immigration officers conducting inspections of 
     applicants for admission into the United States at ports of 
     entry.''.
       (d) Assignment of Anti-Fraud Specialists.--
       (1) Survey regarding document fraud.--The Secretary of 
     State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, shall conduct a survey of each diplomatic and 
     consular post at which visas are issued to assess the extent 
     to which fraudulent documents are presented by visa 
     applicants to consular officers at such posts.
       (2) Placement of specialist.--Not later than July 31, 2005, 
     the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, identify 100 of such posts 
     that experience the greatest frequency of presentation of 
     fraudulent documents by visa applicants. The Secretary of 
     State shall place in each such post at least one full-time 
     anti-fraud specialist employed by the Department of State to 
     assist the consular officers at each such post in the 
     detection of such fraud.

     SEC. 402. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME BORDER PATROL AGENTS.

       The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 
     2006 through 2010, shall increase by not less than 2,000 the 
     number of positions for full-time active duty border patrol 
     agents within the Department of Homeland Security above the 
     number of such positions for which funds were allotted for 
     the preceding fiscal year.

     SEC. 403. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
                   ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATORS.

       The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 
     2006 through 2010, shall increase by not less than 800 the 
     number of positions for full-time active duty investigators 
     within the Department of Homeland Security investigating 
     violations of immigration laws (as defined in section 
     101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1101(a)(17)) above the number of such positions for which 
     funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. At least 
     half of these additional investigators shall be designated to 
     investigate potential violations of section 274A of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C 25 1324a). Each 
     State shall be allotted at least 3 of these additional 
     investigators.

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.


                           Amendment No. 3815

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
pending amendment be laid aside and call up amendment No. 3815, which 
is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller], for 
     himself, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Roberts, and Ms. Mikulski, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3815.

  The amendment is as follows:

[[Page S10039]]

    (Purpose: To improve and provide for the review of intelligence 
                         estimate and products)

       On page 17, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
       (11) direct an element or elements of the intelligence 
     community to conduct competitive analysis of analytic 
     products, particularly products having national importance;
       (12) implement policies and procedures to encourage sound 
     analytic methods and tradecraft throughout the elements of 
     the intelligence community and to ensure that the elements of 
     the intelligence community regularly conduct competitive 
     analysis of analytic products, whether such products are 
     produced by or disseminated to such elements;
       On page 17, line 20, strike ``(11)'' and insert ``(13)''.
       On page 17, line 22, strike ``(12)'' and insert ``(14)''.
       On page 18, line 1, strike ``(13)'' and insert ``(15)''.
       On page 18, line 4, strike ``(14)'' and insert ``(16)''.
       On page 18, line 7, strike ``(15)'' and insert ``(17)''.
       On page 18, line 14, strike ``(16)'' and insert ``(18)''.
       On page 18, line 17, strike ``(17)'' and insert ``(19)''.
       On page 18, line 20, strike ``(18)'' and insert ``(20)''.
       On page 19, line 5, strike ``(19)'' and insert ``(21)''.
       On page 19, line 7, strike ``(20)'' and insert ``(22)''.
       On page 31, line 1, strike ``112(a)(16)'' and insert 
     ``112(a)(18)''.
       On page 49, line 13, insert ``, and each other National 
     Intelligence Council product'' after ``paragraph (1)''.
       On page 49, line 15, insert ``or product'' after 
     ``estimate''.
       On page 49, line 17, insert ``or product'' after 
     ``estimate''.
       On page 49, line 19, insert ``or product'' after 
     ``estimate''.
       On page 49, line 22, strike ``such estimate and such 
     estimate'' and insert ``such estimate or product and such 
     estimate or product, as the case may be''.
       On page 49, line 24, insert ``or product'' after 
     ``estimate''.
       On page 51, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following:
       (i) National Intelligence Council Product.--For purposes of 
     this section, the term ``National Intelligence Council 
     product'' includes a National Intelligence Estimate and any 
     other intelligence community assessment that sets forth the 
     judgment of the intelligence community as a whole on a matter 
     covered by such product.
       On page 56, line 20, strike ``(15) and (16)'' and insert 
     ``(17) and (18)''.
       On page 87, line 16, strike ``and'' at the end.
       On page 87, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
       (D) conduct, or recomend to the National Intelligence 
     Director to direct an element or elements of the intelligence 
     community to conduct, competitive analyses of intelligence 
     products relating to suspected terrorists, their 
     organizations, and their capabilities, plans, and intentions, 
     particularly products having national importance;
       (E) implement policies and procedures to encourage 
     coordination by all elements of the intelligence community 
     that conduct analysis of intelligence regarding terrorism of 
     all Directorate products of national importance and, as 
     appropriate, other products, before their final 
     dissemination; and
       On page 87, line 17, strike ``(D)'' and insert ``(F)''.
       On page 96, line 16, strike ``foreign''.
       On page 100, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:

     SEC. 145. OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS.

       (a) Office of Alternative Analysis.--There is within the 
     National Intelligence Authority an Office of Alternative 
     Analysis.
       (b) Head of Office.--The National Intelligence Director 
     shall appoint the head of the Office of Alternative Analysis.
       (c) Independence of Office.--The National Intelligence 
     Director shall take appropriate actions to ensure the 
     independence of the Office of Alternative Analysis in its 
     activities under this section.
       (d) Function of Office.--(1) The Office of Alternative 
     Analysis shall subject each National Intelligence Estimate 
     (NIE), before the completion of such estimate, to a thorough 
     examination of all facts, assumptions, analytic methods, and 
     judgments utilized in or underlying any analysis, estimation, 
     plan, evaluation, or recommendation contained in such 
     estimate.
       (2)(A) The Office may also subject any other intelligence 
     estimate, brief, survey, assessment, or report designated by 
     the National Intelligence Director to a thorough examination 
     as described in paragraph (1).
       (B) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the estimates, briefs, 
     surveys, assessments or reports, if any, designated by the 
     Director under subparagraph (A).
       (3)(A) The purpose of an evaluation of an estimate or 
     document under this subsection shall be to provide an 
     independent analysis of any underlying facts, assumptions, 
     and recommendations contained in such estimate or document 
     and to present alternative conclusions, if any, arising from 
     such facts or assumptions or with respect to such 
     recommendations.
       (B) In order to meet the purpose set forth in subparagraph 
     (A), the Office shall, unless otherwise directed by the 
     President, have access to all analytic products, field 
     reports, and raw intelligence of any element of the 
     intelligence community and such other reports and information 
     as the Director considers appropriate.
       (4) The evaluation of an estimate or document under this 
     subsection shall be known as a ``OAA analysis'' of such 
     estimate or document.
       (5) Each estimate or document covered by an evaluation 
     under this subsection shall include an appendix that contains 
     the findings and conclusions of the Office with respect to 
     the estimate or document, as the case may be, based upon the 
     evaluation of the estimate or document, as the case may be, 
     by the Office under this subsection.
       (6) The results of each evaluation of an estimate or 
     document under this subsection shall be submitted to the 
     congressional intelligence committees.
       On page 194, line 9, strike ``112(a)(11)'' and insert 
     ``112(a)(14)''.
       On page 195, line 16, strike ``112(a)(11)'' and insert 
     ``112(a)(14)''.
       On page 195, line 23, strike ``112(a)(11)'' and insert 
     ``112(a)(14)''.
       On page 196, line 7, strike ``112(a)(11)'' and insert 
     ``112(a)(14)''.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise to offer, along with Senator 
Hutchison, and also Senator Roberts and Senator Mikulski, this 
amendment. I will explain it in further detail. But the main objective 
of our amendment is to institutionalize much needed reform, based upon 
our recent experience, which is, namely, the practice of alternative 
analysis, or, as we say, ``red teaming,'' in the production of 
significant intelligence assessments.
  As to this Rockefeller-Hutchison amendment, I am very pleased to say 
I believe the distinguished chair and ranking member of the Committee 
on Governmental Affairs have indicated their support for this 
amendment--that is my hope--and that, therefore, the amendment will be 
accepted by them and supported, obviously, by our colleagues without 
the need for a vote.
  Section 123 of the Collins-Lieberman bill provides for placement of 
the National Intelligence Council within the office of the national 
intelligence director. The Council is currently under the Director of 
Central Intelligence.
  As the Senate Intelligence Committee report on prewar intelligence on 
Iraq explains, National Intelligence Estimates are the intelligence 
community's most authoritative written judgments--they are the golden 
standard--on national security issues.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill reforms the work of the National 
Intelligence Council, based in significant part on the findings of the 
Intelligence Committee's Iraq review.
  Importantly, it requires the National Intelligence Estimates to 
distinguish between the intelligence underlying estimates and the 
judgments of analysts about the intelligence itself. The bill also 
requires that the estimates describe the quality and reliability of the 
intelligence underlying the analytical judgments, present and explain 
alternative conclusions, and characterize any uncertainties. Our 
amendment builds upon this important reform in two ways.
  First, our amendment applies these reforms not only to National 
Intelligence Estimates, to which they are currently limited, but also 
to other analytical products of the National Intelligence Council, 
which is the senior group made up of intelligence people and people 
from public and private sectors--the senior group.
  Second, our amendment will institutionalize a method of ensuring that 
an alternative analysis is used in the preparation of National 
Intelligence Estimates and is available to policymakers reviewing the 
estimates so they get the full picture.
  It does this by providing for the establishment within the national 
intelligence authority of an office of alternative analysis, whose head 
will be appointed by the national intelligence director. The national 
intelligence director is required to ensure the independence of the 
office of alternative analysis. The unit is directed to review every 
National Intelligence Estimate, and any other intelligence report 
designated pursuant to guidelines established by the director.
  The important purpose of the Rockefeller-Hutchison bill is the 
following: To thoroughly examine all facts, all assumptions, analytical 
methods, and judgments used in the estimate--in other words, the 
ability to question, to

[[Page S10040]]

be a contrarian, to dig deeper, to ask questions that otherwise and 
heretofore have not been asked. To make sure that the alternative 
analysis is available to policymakers, our amendment also requires that 
each National Intelligence Estimate or other product that is subject to 
an alternative analysis include the alternative analysis in its 
appendix.
  While our Intelligence Committee's Iraq review did not include 
committee recommendations, I can assure our colleagues of the 
widespread support within our committee of the importance of 
alternative analysis or ``red teaming'' as it is called informally. It 
remains important for the body of the National Intelligence Estimate to 
state dissent from within the intelligence community. But beyond that, 
it is vital for a dedicated group of analysts to examine all aspects of 
an estimate--data, assumptions, analytic methods, and judgments.
  The ultimate objective is to enable the National Intelligence Council 
personnel, the national intelligence director, and the executive and 
legislative branch policymakers to appraise the intelligence 
community's analysis on matters central to our national security.
  I would like to express my special appreciation to Senator Hutchison 
who has been working on this for a long time and had a similar 
amendment. Our staffs worked flawlessly together. Senator Roberts, 
chairman of the full Intelligence Committee, also had a related 
amendment making it clear that the national intelligence director is 
responsible for ensuring competitive analysis throughout the 
intelligence community. I thank both Senators for their contribution.
  I also wish to express my appreciation to Congresswoman Jane Harman 
for developing in the House an alternative analysis proposal from which 
we have benefited preparing this amendment.
  I hope the Rockefeller-Hutchison amendment is acceptable.
  I yield to the distinguished Senator from the State of Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank Senator Rockefeller for 
working with me on this amendment. We had very similar amendments that 
both of us filed independently and our staffs got together with the 
distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator 
Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, and I think we have 
come up with a comprehensive approach to competitive analysis. It is 
something the majority of people who have served on the Intelligence 
Committee know is desperately needed. Particularly as we are 
consolidating agencies and trying to make our agencies mesh better 
together. It is very important that we keep the competition of ideas, 
challenge assumptions, and ensure a forum is provided for alternative 
ideas and recommendations. The end result is an office which will 
perform what many refer to as ``red teaming'' that is so important to 
an effective intelligence network.
  When Dr. Henry Kissinger testified before the Appropriations 
Committee, of which I am a member, he said, particularly with the 
consolidation of intelligence oversight, you have to make sure that you 
have some way of finding out if there were different conclusions 
reached with the same or even other extraneous material.
  We had the challenge of making sure that the competition of ideas was 
not lost. I believe the Rockefeller-Hutchison amendment does exactly 
that.
  I thank the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Rockefeller. I appreciate 
Senator Roberts also working with us on this, and Senator Mikulski. 
Senator Kyl was interested in this as well. Everyone came together, and 
I think the result will be an office which is able to quickly adapt to 
terrorist threats. It will be an office of alternative intelligence 
analysis that will be able to challenge the assumptions and make sure 
that our highest policymakers, including the President of the United 
States, have access to this alternative analysis so that he will be 
able to make the very best decisions.
  I thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the 
committee. I thank Senator Rockefeller. I think we have a wonderful 
approach, a wonderful amendment that will add greatly to the bill and 
the goal we are all trying to reach of a quality intelligence product 
with which our President and our Secretary of State, Secretary of 
Defense can make decisions.
  I yield the floor and urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend Senator Rockefeller and Senator 
Hutchison for their amendment to improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis by creating a red team. Both of them talked to me very early 
on about the need for this improvement in our bill. Senator Roberts and 
Senator Mikulski have also been very interested in this issue. I am 
very pleased they have been able to come together. They have produced 
an excellent amendment that will improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis.
  I also urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank our colleagues from West 
Virginia, Texas, and Kansas for this amendment. It has been a priority 
of our focus, Senator Collins and mine and the committee, to make sure 
that intelligence is not only coordinated by the national intelligence 
director and the dots are connected, but that intelligence be high 
quality and objective and subjected to the competition of ideas. This 
amendment makes that basic approach even stronger.
  I thank our friends for all they have done. Senator Rockefeller, 
again, if I haven't said it on the floor, has been a tremendous 
contributor to our effort. I thank him for all the support he has 
given.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on amendment No. 3815?
  If not, without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3815) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3942

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have an amendment which I send to the 
desk at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
set aside.
  Without objection, the amendment is in order, and the clerk will 
report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman], for himself, 
     Mr. McCain, and Mr. Bayh, proposes an amendment numbered 
     3942.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise with Senator McCain to offer 
this amendment that takes the fight against terrorism right to where 
they live--right to their front lines.
  This amendment says we will identify terrorist havens and--working 
with our allies--we will break them up and keep them on the run.
  They will have no peace, no rest, no time to settle in and plot 
destruction.
  This amendment also says we will attack and cut their most vital 
supply line--the disaffected young who serve as recruits.
  We will do this by showing the Muslim world--especially the young--
that we believe in and can help them achieve their dreams of living in 
a 21st century world that still respects the tenets of Islam.
  These goals are a challenge. But if we succeed--and we must--this 
generation will see the calls to jihad fade and the global chorus 
celebrating our shared humanity and peaceful futures grow.
  Let us start with the challenge of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries 
and their sense of safety.
  As the 9/11 Commission reported, terrorist cells stretch from 
Afghanistan right into the major cities of Europe. And as 9/11 proved, 
into the United States as well.
  To fight and win this war, we need to identify these pockets of 
terrorist sanctuaries and, working with other nations, develop 
strategies that in the words of the Commission:

       Keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run using all 
     instruments of national power.


[[Page S10041]]


  The Commission did identify specific countries where we should 
concentrate our immediate efforts and I would like to focus on two of 
them.
  One is Afghanistan. This almost goes without saying.
  This is where al-Qaida trained its killers. This is where the 9/11 
plot was hatched. This is where the tyrannical Taliban rulers enslaved 
an entire nation except for those who plotted global destruction.
  This amendment says that Congress needs to authorize the aid and 
support necessary for the entire Afghan nation to finally realize its 
freedom, which is so close but still so fragile.
  At this stage, half measures in Afghanistan are the same as throwing 
a five-foot rope to someone drowning 10 feet away. We can't let that 
happen.
  Another country identified by the Commission was Pakistan.
  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Pakistani government made the 
choice to stand with us in the fight against terrorism at great risk to 
the stability of the nation and the lives of its leaders.
  We have no choice but to stand by them.
  Pakistan may be an imperfect ally at times. But they have been a 
loyal ally--committing troops on their own frontiers to hunt down al-
Qaida fighters and denying them safe bases.
  This amendment says we not only need to maintain our current 
financial support of Pakistan, but let the Pakistanis know we are 
making a long-term commitment to the future of their nation.
  They need to know they have our support for as long as they remain 
true to their goals of defeating domestic extremists, promoting a civil 
society and preserving the hope of Pakistani democracy that can become 
another beacon for the Muslin world in the years to come.
  Just imagine if one of the outcomes of the global war against 
terrorism was stable democracies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
  This goal is within our grasp. It is within our means. Only our 
vision can fail us now.
  And vision--long-term vision--is what we will need to fulfill the 
second part of the strategy outlined in this amendment.
  We must win over the minds of the Muslim world, especially the young, 
by reaching out and talking to them in ways we never have before.
  Let me pose a question the 9/11 Commission asked.
  How can a man hiding in a cave be communicating more effectively with 
the Muslim world than the nation that invented mass media and the 
Internet?
  The 9/11 Commission report said:

       To Muslim parents, terrorists like bin Laden have nothing 
     to offer their children but visions of violence and death.
       America and its friends have a crucial advantage. We can 
     offer these parents a vision that gives their children a 
     better future.

  But it doesn't matter if we don't effectively communicate that 
vision.
  This amendment says we must improve our mass communications efforts 
with the Muslim world through sustained and well-funded broadcast 
efforts on satellite television and radio.
  That is a good start. But this can't just be an air war. Minds are 
won over more by actions than words.
  And this amendment looks to engage the minds of Muslim youth by 
rebuilding scholarship, student exchange and library programs.
  It also calls for establishing an International Youth Opportunity 
Fund--that other nations would be asked to contribute to--that would 
help build and operate primary and secondary schools in Muslim nations 
committed to public education.
  Why do this? Because most of these nations are too poor to pay for 
public education.
  Instead, students attend Madrassahs that far too often are classrooms 
where hatred is taught and bigotry affirmed.
  Consider this: In Karachi, Pakistan, 200,000 students attend 
Madrassahs; 200,000 in one city alone. Multiply that over the entire 
Muslim world. We can't possibly keep up with those numbers year after 
year.
  The challenges ahead of us are daunting. But with this amendment we 
say that we are ready and willing to go to the front lines of the 
terrorist world and take away the sanctuaries where they hide--and take 
back the minds that they steal.
  This is another in a series of amendments that Senator McCain and I 
have offered to carry out the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 
This one has to do with recommendations they have made with regard to 
foreign policy. It has been cleared on both sides. I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  If not, without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3942) was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.


                    Amendment No. 3781, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the Senate to turn to the 
consideration of amendment No. 3781 which is pending at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it will be the pending 
business.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the modification or has 
the modification been cleared by the leader?
  Mr. WARNER. My understanding is the modification is accepted by the 
managers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
       On page 119, strike lines 16 through 18 and insert: ``The 
     National Intelligence Director shall convene regular meetings 
     of the Joint Intelligence Community Council.''.
       ``(e) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--
     (1) A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council 
     (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice 
     or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion 
     in addition to, the advice presented by the National 
     Intelligence Director to the President or the National 
     Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of 
     the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits 
     such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice 
     or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman 
     presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the 
     National Security Council, as the case may be.
       ``(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure 
     that the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the 
     President or the National Security Council is not unduly 
     delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice 
     or opinion of another member of the Council.
       ``(f) Recommendations to Congress.--Any member of the Joint 
     Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations 
     to Congress relating to the intelligence community as such 
     member considers appropriate.''.

  Mr. WARNER. Let me explain the modification. The original text 
required that the national intelligence director, in his capacity as 
chairman of the to-be-created joint intelligence community council that 
was part of the President's message, originally I had it that he would 
have monthly meetings of the council or meetings upon the request of 
the members of the council. But I think it more appropriate that that 
be modified, which has now been done, such that the amendment will 
read: Strike that paragraph and in its place put the national 
intelligence director shall convene regular meetings of the joint 
intelligence community council. And then I will address the balance of 
the amendment.
  It has been my concern, and I think from a fair reading of the 9/11 
Commission report, that we have to keep the views of those individuals 
primarily responsible for the collection, dissemination, and analysis 
of intelligence, those individuals who are on, incidentally, the 
council, who are your principal Cabinet officers--and that is the 
Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, and 
the Attorney General--those individuals from time to time could develop 
positions regarding an intelligence issue which are at variance with 
the national intelligence director.
  That collection of Cabinet officers is a vast array of individuals 
who will be working on issues of intelligence, collaborating with other 
agencies. From time to time, I am of the opinion that one or more of 
the members of the council might well have opinions that are at 
variance with the national intelligence director, and that when the 
national intelligence director goes to brief the President, there 
should be an obligation in law--I feel that strongly

[[Page S10042]]

about it--that those opinions at variance with the national 
intelligence director must be given to the President and such others 
who may be in attendance at the time the national intelligence director 
presents his or, as the case may be, her viewpoint.
  The strength of our intelligence system has to be predicated on 
competition of thinking. I have always liked the word that the 9/11 
Commission seized upon, ``imagination.'' It seems to me that type of 
competition and imagination is likely to develop better if we have the 
certainty that the viewpoints the President receives from the national 
intelligence director are not held by one or more of the members of 
that council, but that the President will receive the benefit of the 
other viewpoints. I think that system has to be made and put into law. 
It is so vitally important because, for example, as a member of the 
Intelligence Committee, when we examined, in extensive hearings 
conducted by Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, the issue 
of weapons of mass destruction--and the conclusion that is being 
reached is that there was a substantial variance between the 
intelligence opinions and what is evolving as the actual, factual 
situation--it appears that the caveats were not given the proper 
emphasis by people, from the President on down, as they reviewed the 
work of the various intelligence-collecting agencies.
  For example, the CIA had its position. From time to time, the 
Department of Energy had opinions at variance with the CIA. At times, 
there were opinions of the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which 
were at variance with the opinions of other departments and agencies. I 
think it is essential. Those caveats, in the case of weapons of mass 
destruction--I will use the phrase that they were not given the 
emphasis that was needed. That is a whole chapter. It is all laid out 
in a very extensive report developed by the Intelligence Committee, 
which is now public record.
  This amendment, hopefully, will go a long way to ensure that diverse 
opinions will be given to our President. That is the thrust of it. It 
is patterned after the Goldwater-Nichols Act--a piece of legislation on 
which I was privileged to have a very active role, enacted by the 
Congress in the late 1980s--which organized some elements of the 
Department of Defense and, most specifically, the joint staff.
  Mr. President, the act said that when the Chairman of the Joint Staff 
meets with the President of the United States, if there were members of 
the Joint Chiefs--i.e., Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval 
Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine 
Corps--who held opinions at variance with the Chairman, the Chairman 
was obligated under law to share those opinions with the President and 
such others as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 
addressing. That has been a very effective piece of legislation.
  This amendment is patterned almost verbatim after, and consistent 
with, the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Frequently, the 9/11 Commission, quite 
properly, paid a great deal of respect to that piece of legislation.
  In concluding my remarks--and I have worked on this, but I have not 
found a solution yet--this Senator is concerned about the future of the 
Central Intelligence Agency as an organization and the role of the head 
of that agency--now our former distinguished former colleague, Porter 
Goss. Therein resides an enormous wealth of professional people in all 
the nations of the world, in one way or another, who have come up 
through the ranks, training and taking risks, often commensurate with 
the risks the men and women of the Armed Forces take, often with long 
separations from their families in some of the more difficult posts in 
the world. All of that infrastructure is going to remain under the 
Director of the CIA, who will now report no longer directly to the 
President but to the concept of the new national intelligence director. 
That has been decided.
  I may eventually come up with the solution. I am trying to figure out 
how, if the Director of the CIA has a view that is held strongly, and 
it is at variance with the viewpoint of the national intelligence 
director, how that view can be properly emphasized and given to the 
President and such other persons as the NID will be addressing.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator from Virginia yield for a question?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of this amendment. As I 
listen to the Senator from Virginia, I wonder, I don't see anything in 
this bill that allows the separate agencies to communicate with the 
Congress, as they have in the past, such as the CIA and the NRO. They 
have all come directly to us. Would your amendment preserve the right 
of the people who would disagree with the NID to communicate with the 
Congress, as well as the Executive?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. My last section, recommendations to Congress, says:

       Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may 
     make such recommendation to Congress relating to the 
     intelligence community as such member considers appropriate.

  So in this particular law is specific authority for those Cabinet 
officers and others to come directly to the Congress. I am glad my 
colleague brought that up.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield for another question?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator from Virginia and I both served for a while 
in the executive branch. We know Cabinet officers often put down in the 
law about who can contact Congress on what. I don't know if it happened 
on your watch. It happened on mine.
  Mr. WARNER. It happened on mine when I was in the Department of 
Defense.
  Mr. STEVENS. Some people don't believe this language is necessary. 
Would the Senator agree if there is going to be the right to 
communicate, to go up the line toward the President or to the Congress, 
it has to be in the law? People's rights have to be protected to 
contact us?
  (Mr. CORNYN assumed the Chair.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it does, and that is why I have 
put in this paragraph, which is very explicit. This paragraph relates 
to the members of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, which I 
enumerated before as the several Cabinet officers--Secretaries of 
State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, and the Attorney General.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield once more, I 
sort of feel we have to put some meat on the bones of this commission a 
little bit as we go along to allow the Secretaries of the whole 
community to participate in the process--budget, management, and 
oversight. Will not the amendment of the Senator from Virginia 
strengthen oversight by giving the people involved in oversight the 
chance to hear the dissenting opinions as well as the opinion of the 
NID?
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct, Mr. President.
  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  I yield the floor for a moment for the purpose of receiving the 
distinguished chairman's views on this matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me begin by saying that I very much 
appreciate the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, working with Senator Lieberman and me 
to modify his amendment so that it is consistent with the goals of our 
legislation.
  The JICC was suggested by the White House when we drafted our bill. I 
view it as an important component of the Collins-Lieberman bill because 
it provides a forum for the national intelligence director to solicit 
the views of and to receive advice from key Cabinet members on a wide 
variety of issues.
  It is important for the members of the JICC--the Secretaries of 
State, Defense, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, and other 
Departments, Treasury as well--to see the council as a way to 
communicate their views freely to the NID to help the NID reach the 
right decisions and to be a forum for a wide variety of issues.
  It is also important for the NID to remain firmly in control as 
chairman of the council, and I believe the modification makes clear 
that it is the NID who is the chairman and who will regularly convene 
this council.
  Senator Warner's amendment, as modified, meets both those goals. It

[[Page S10043]]

strengthens the bill. I can speak on behalf of the ranking member of 
the committee in urging its adoption. I thank the Senator again for 
working with us.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and 
colleague, the manager. Might I solicit her views on the concern I 
have--and I have not figured out how to do it. The views of the 
Secretaries of State and Defense are very important because they have 
their own internal intelligence functions and they are subjected to 
this, particularly those two Cabinet officers, on a daily basis.
  The Director of the CIA will report to the national intelligence 
director. The national intelligence director--I do not know quite what 
the infrastructure will be. It is conceived, as the Senator from Maine 
said earlier today and several times, that she is not creating a whole 
new department. But the CIA Director will remain in charge of what I 
say is the most magnificent reservoir of professionals to be found 
anywhere in the world. I cannot give, because of classification, the 
numbers, but it is in the tens of thousands of these individuals all 
over the world. The CIA Director has instantaneous contact with them 
and personal association as he travels--or she, as the case may be--
worldwide. It is a network of these intelligence people who have 
knowledge that comes back up to the Director. He is hands on. The NID 
will not have that hands-on experience, cannot possibly because he has 
so much to manage.

  One of the reasons for this legislation is to split off the functions 
of the former head of the CIA, the Director of the whole Central 
Intelligence, and to give those responsibilities, as it relates to the 
national collection of the intelligence program, portions of it to the 
NID to operate now, leaving the Director of the CIA to manage primarily 
that agency.
  Supposing the Director of the CIA has a strongly held opinion and 
viewpoint which is at variance with the national intelligence director, 
but when the national intelligence director goes in to brief the 
President and the Security Council, in all likelihood the Director of 
the CIA will be at Langley. I am not certain how that varying opinion 
is given to the President and the other structure at the White House 
and the other Cabinet officers who may be present--for instance, at the 
meetings of the council, how that opinion can be expressed. I have not 
thought of it. Maybe the chairman and I can work on this in the few 
days remaining on this bill. But I am concerned about it.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would be happy to consult further with 
the Senator about his concern in this area. I note that the 9/11 
Commission and numerous other commissions have determined that the CIA 
Director has too many roles right now; that he has three roles. He is 
the principal adviser to the President for intelligence, he is the head 
of the CIA, and he is the manager of the intelligence community. There 
is widespread consensus that is too much for the CIA Director to have, 
so our legislation alters those roles.
  The CIA Director would run the CIA. The national intelligence 
director would not run the day-to-day operations of the CIA, but the 
national intelligence director would become the principal adviser to 
the President on intelligence. The national intelligence director would 
also be the manager of the national intelligence programs. So we have 
defined those roles in that manner, but we have not altered the fact 
that the CIA Director would still be a Presidential appointee, he would 
still be confirmed by the Senate, and he would still have lots of 
access, in my view, just as Cabinet members are always going to be able 
to get their views to the President.
  I think the structure the Senator has improved, the joint 
intelligence community council, strengthens that flow of communication, 
but that structure is there. I do not believe that is going to be a 
problem.
  I also point out to the Senator that the Senator made an excellent 
point earlier when he was talking about the need for competitive 
analysis for a variety of viewpoints to be presented to the President 
and that we did not see that work as well as it should have in recent 
cases.
  We have put in extensive language in our bill due to amendments 
authored by Senator Levin, as well as the work Senator Lieberman and I 
and others have done, that makes very clear, for example, that when a 
National Intelligence Estimate is produced, that it has to highlight 
dissenting views. That does not happen now sufficiently. Often those 
dissenting views are hidden away in a footnote when they really should 
be up front for us to be aware that there are dissenting views and who 
has those dissenting views.
  Another example: We require these estimates to have a confidence 
level attached to the prevailing view so we will know how much support 
that prevailing view has.
  So throughout our bill there are requirements to make sure that 
dissenting views are heard. Indeed, the Rockefeller-Hutchinson 
amendment we just adopted also strengthens that by having the office of 
alternative analysis. So I think there are numerous safeguards to make 
sure that all voices are heard; that competitive analysis is 
strengthened; that dissenting views are highlighted.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, all along I have expressed complete 
concurrence in what the Senator has done in this bill to the extent the 
Senator and I have looked at various sections. I may have reservations 
about others and tomorrow I hope to engage with the Senator on a number 
of amendments.
  As to the basic charter that the Senator outlined in her opening 
remarks, I am not going to at this time in any way indicate an 
objection. I just wanted to focus on this one individual, the CIA 
Director, who, as the Senator knows, under previous Presidents, and 
certainly President Bush, was in his office one way or another almost 
every day of the week working with him.
  The CIA Director had this--I understand all of these responsibilities 
may be too much for one individual and I am not arguing about shifting 
that at the moment, but I am talking about this magnificent collection 
of individuals--and he is the boss--who take all of these risks 
together, collect and analyze and develop opinions and it comes up to 
him and he may form a view which is totally opposite to the NID, and 
the NID goes into the President. I have guaranteed here that the 
Cabinet officers have the right to have their views presented 
simultaneously, one view after another, to the President, but I am not 
satisfied yet that the views of the CIA Director, which could well be 
different than the analysis and conclusion of the NID, would be given 
to the President with the weight and sufficiency I think they merit.
  Ms. COLLINS. I am certainly open to working with the distinguished 
Senator to address his concerns. I believe it would work similarly to 
how the views of the head of the NSA, the NRO, the NGA, and DIA get to 
the President now through the Secretary of Defense.
  Under our bill, the CIA Director clearly reports to the NID, much as 
the head of the NSA reports to the Secretary of Defense. Nothing 
prevents the CIA Director or the NSA Director from going to the 
President, but we have changed the structure.
  We are making the NID the principal adviser to the President for 
intelligence, but I cannot conceive of a situation where the NID would 
not be relying very heavily on the CIA Director for the advice that he 
is giving to the President. It would be foolhardy for him not to.
  Mr. WARNER. I see the Senator's point. The Senator put out a very 
clear example of the NRO, the NSA, the old mapping agency, they report 
to the SECDEF--we have just given the SECDEF the right to have his 
views presented simultaneously if they are at variance with the NID at 
the time he meets with the President. That is not present in the 
Central Intelligence Agency. If those views vary, there is no 
obligation under the law to see that they are presented simultaneously.
  The Senator says she cannot envision how they would not be. Well, it 
depends on the human factor, that these two individuals would get along 
and have a mutual respect. I can remember in my first term on the 
Intelligence Committee, there was a very colorful Director of the CIA, 
Mr. Casey. He was an extraordinary man. I remember he used to come in 
and testify before the committee. All the members would lean up like 
this because they could not understand him, to be honest. He spoke in a 
rather unusual way. I think he did that

[[Page S10044]]

to get through his testimony pretty quickly and get out of that hearing 
room. I am trying to put a note of humor into some serious things, but 
let us hope the Senator is right that as this law goes forward those 
individuals entrusted, the NID and CIA Director, can have a mutual 
respect and a mutual professional bond that will enable the views of 
the CIA Director to be given to the President if they are at variance 
with the NID. That is left up to the human quotient. This amendment, if 
adopted, puts it in law, not for the CIA Director but for the other 
members.

  Ms. COLLINS. I say to the distinguished Senator that I think the 
analogy is very similar. The Secretary of Defense is not required to 
present the views of the NSA to the President. I think this works in a 
more collaborative way than we are giving the system credit for.
  We have to be careful, while we put in all of these safeguards--and I 
support the chairman's amendment--that we do not create a situation 
where it is unclear who is the principal adviser to the President. And 
that, under our bill, is the national intelligence director.
  Mr. WARNER. In no way do I wish to in any way diminish the 
significance of the NID that is now being created presumably by law in 
the future. I think we have had a healthy discussion. I appreciate the 
distinguished manager accepting this amendment, and I will continue to 
work on the Director of the CIA issue which I continue to be concerned 
about. Maybe as a consequence of this colloquy, those who might be 
following it could come up with an idea. I hope they would communicate 
it to me or to the distinguished chairman.
  If there is no further debate, I ask that the amendment be agreed to.
  I ask unanimous consent that the following Senators be added as 
cosponsors to the amendment: Senators Stevens, Inouye, Talent, Allard, 
Dole, Chambliss, Cornyn, Ensign, and Inhofe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3781, as 
modified.
  The amendment (No. 3781), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished 
manager. I look forward to rejoining her tomorrow. Let us hope that 
those amendments that I bring forward largely with my colleague Mr. 
Stevens will add to the strength of this bill.
  Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his contributions. 
It is always a pleasure to work with him, particularly on an issue that 
is so important to our Nation's security.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are still on the bill being managed by 
Senators Lieberman and Collins?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent to lay aside any pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. On behalf of Senator Schumer, I ask unanimous consent it be 
in order to call up eight amendments, and after their reporting, they 
be set aside. Senator Schumer understands these can be acted upon in 
different ways, but we offer those on his behalf. He indicated to me 
that a number of these he thinks will be accepted. This gives the staff 
a chance to look at them and the manager can tell Senator Schumer which 
of those will not be accepted and he can come and debate those.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I ask the 
Democratic whip that those amendments be interspersed with Republican 
amendments.
  Mr. REID. That is appropriate. I modify my request that that be the 
case.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


               Amendments Nos. 3887 through 3894, en bloc

  Mr. REID. I call up amendments numbered 3887 to 3894, en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Reid] for Mr. Schumer, 
     proposes amendments numbered 3887 through 3894, en bloc.

  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 3887

(Purpose: To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to 
  cover individuals, other than United States persons, who engage in 
   international terrorism without affiliation with an international 
                            terrorist group)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. AMENDMENTS TO FISA.

       (a) Treatment of Non-United States Persons who Engage in 
     International Terrorism Without Affiliation With 
     International Terrorist Groups.--
       (1) In general.--Section 101(b)(1) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(1)) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in 
     preparation therefor; or''.
       (2) Sunset.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall 
     expire on the date that is 5 years after the date of 
     enactment of this section.
       (b) Additional Annual Reporting Requirements Under the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--
       (1) Additional reporting requirements.--The Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating--
       (i) title VI as title VII; and
       (ii) section 601 as section 701; and
       (B) by inserting after title V the following new title VI:

                   ``TITLE VI--REPORTING REQUIREMENT


                ``annual report of the attorney general

       ``Sec. 601. (a) In addition to the reports required by 
     sections 107, 108, 306, 406, and 502 in April each year, the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress each year a report setting forth with respect to 
     the one-year period ending on the date of such report--
       ``(1) the aggregate number of non-United States persons 
     targeted for orders issued under this Act, including a break-
     down of those targeted for--
       ``(A) electronic surveillance under section 105;
       ``(B) physical searches under section 304;
       ``(C) pen registers under section 402; and
       ``(D) access to records under section 501;
       ``(2) the number of individuals covered by an order issued 
     under this Act who were determined pursuant to activities 
     authorized by this Act to have acted wholly alone in the 
     activities covered by such order;
       ``(3) the number of times that the Attorney General has 
     authorized that information obtained under this Act may be 
     used in a criminal proceeding or any information derived 
     therefrom may be used in a criminal proceeding; and
       ``(4) in a manner consistent with the protection of the 
     national security of the United States--
       ``(A) the portions of the documents and applications filed 
     with the courts established under section 103 that include 
     significant construction or interpretation of the provisions 
     of this Act, not including the facts of any particular 
     matter, which may be redacted;
       ``(B) the portions of the opinions and orders of the courts 
     established under section 103 that include significant 
     construction or interpretation of the provisions of this Act, 
     not including the facts of any particular matter, which may 
     be redacted.
       ``(b) The first report under this section shall be 
     submitted not later than six months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports under this section 
     shall be submitted annually thereafter.
       ``(c) In this section, the term `appropriate committees of 
     Congress' means--
       ``(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       ``(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for that Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to title VI and 
     inserting the following new items:

                   ``TITLE VI--REPORTING REQUIREMENT

``Sec. 601. Annual report of the Attorney General.

                      ``TITLE VII--EFFECTIVE DATE

``Sec. 701. Effective date.''.


                           amendment no. 3888

(Purpose: To establish the United States Homeland Security Signal Corps 
   to ensure proper communications between law enforcement agencies)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

[[Page S10045]]

     SEC. __. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY SIGNAL CORPS.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``U.S. 
     Homeland Security Signal Act of 2004''.
       (b) Homeland Security Signal Corps.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 510. HOMELAND SECURITY SIGNAL CORPS.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is established, within the 
     Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response, a 
     Homeland Security Signal Corps (referred to in this section 
     as the `Signal Corps').
       ``(b) Personnel.--The Signal Corps shall be comprised of 
     specially trained police officers, firefighters, emergency 
     medical technicians, and other emergency personnel.
       ``(c) Responsibilities.--The Signal Corps shall--
       ``(1) ensure that first responders can communicate with one 
     another, mobile command centers, headquarters, and the public 
     at disaster sites or in the event of a terrorist attack or a 
     national crisis;
       ``(2) provide sufficient training and equipment for fire, 
     police, and medical units to enable those units to deal with 
     all threats and contingencies in any environment; and
       ``(3) secure joint-use equipment, such as 
     telecommunications trucks, that can access surviving 
     telephone land lines to supplement communications access.
       ``(d) National Signal Corps Standards.--The Signal Corps 
     shall establish a set of standard operating procedures, to be 
     followed by signal corps throughout the United States, that 
     will ensure that first responders from each Federal, State, 
     and local agency have the methods and means to communicate 
     with, or substitute for, first responders from other agencies 
     in the event of a multi-state terrorist attack or a national 
     crisis.
       ``(e) Demonstration Signal Corps.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish 
     demonstration signal corps in New York City, and in the 
     District of Columbia, consisting of specially trained law 
     enforcement and other personnel. The New York City Signal 
     Demonstration Corps shall consist of personnel from the New 
     York Police Department, the Fire Department of New York, the 
     Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and other 
     appropriate Federal, State, regional, or local personnel. The 
     District of Columbia Signal Corps shall consist of specially 
     trained personnel from all appropriate Federal, State, 
     regional, and local law enforcement personnel in Washington, 
     D.C., including from the Metropolitan Police Department.
       ``(2) Responsibilities.--The demonstration signal corps 
     established under this subsection shall--
       ``(A) ensure that `best of breed' military communications 
     technology is identified and secured for first responders;
       ``(B) ensure communications connectivity between the New 
     York Police Department, the Fire Department of New York, and 
     other appropriate Federal, State, regional, and local law 
     enforcement personnel in the metropolitan New York City area;
       ``(C) identify the means of communication that work best in 
     New York's tunnels, skyscrapers, and subways to maintain 
     communications redundancy;
       ``(D) ensure communications connectivity between the 
     Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police Department, and other 
     appropriate Federal, State, regional, and local law 
     enforcement personnel in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. 
     area;
       ``(E) identify the means of communication that work best in 
     Washington, D.C.'s office buildings, tunnels, and subway 
     system to maintain communications redundancy; and
       ``(F) serve as models for other major metropolitan areas 
     across the Nation.
       ``(3) Team captains.--The mayor of New York City and the 
     District of Columbia shall appoint team captains to command 
     communications companies drawn from the personnel described 
     in paragraph (1).
       ``(4) Technical assistance.--The Signal Corps Headquarters, 
     located in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, shall provide technical 
     assistance to the New York City Demonstration Signal Corps.
       ``(f) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after 
     the date of enactment of this section, and annually 
     thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report, to the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives, which outlines the progress of the 
     Signal Corps in the preceding year and describes any 
     problems, issues, or other impediments to effective 
     communication between first responders in the event of a 
     terrorist attack or a national crisis.
       ``(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       ``(1) Demonstration signal corps.--There are authorized to 
     be appropriated $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 to carry out 
     subsection (e).
       ``(2) Fiscal years 2006 through 2009.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 
     2006 through 2008--
       ``(A) to create signal corps in high terrorism threat areas 
     throughout the United States; and
       ``(B) to carry out the mission of the Signal Corps to 
     assist Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to 
     effectively communicate with each other during a terrorism 
     event or a national crisis.''.
       (2) Technical amendment.--Section 1(b) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 509 the 
     following:

``Sec. 510. Homeland Security Signal Corps.''.


                           amendment no. 3889

(Purpose: To establish a National Commission on the United States-Saudi 
                          Arabia Relationship)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following new section:

     SEC. __. COMMISSION ON THE UNITED STATES-SAUDI ARABIA 
                   RELATIONSHIP.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Despite improvements in counterterrorism cooperation 
     between the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia 
     following the terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 
     May 12, 2003, the relationship between the United States and 
     Saudi Arabia continues to be problematic in regard to 
     combating Islamic extremism.
       (2) The Government of Saudi Arabia has not always responded 
     promptly and fully to United States requests for assistance 
     in the global war on Islamist terrorism. Examples of this 
     lack of cooperation have included an unwillingness to provide 
     the United States Government with access to individuals 
     wanted for questioning in relation to terrorist acts and to 
     assist in investigations of terrorist activities.
       (3) The state religion of Saudi Arabia, a militant and 
     exclusionary form of Islam known as Wahhabism, preaches 
     violence against nonbelievers or infidels and serves as the 
     religious basis for Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda. Through 
     support for madrassas, mosques, cultural centers, and other 
     entities Saudi Arabia has actively supported the spread of 
     this religious sect.
       (4) The Secretary of State designated Saudi Arabia a 
     country of particular concern under section 402(b)(1)(A) of 
     the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 
     6442(b)(1)(A)) because the Government of Saudi Arabia has 
     engaged in or tolerated systematic, ongoing, and egregious 
     violations of religious freedom.
       (5) The Department of State's International Religious 
     Freedom Report for 2004 concluded that religious freedom does 
     not exist in Saudi Arabia.
       (6) The Ambassador-at-large for International Religious 
     Freedom expressed concern about Saudi Arabia's export of 
     religious extremism and intolerance to other countries where 
     religious freedom for Muslims is respected.
       (7) Historically, the Government of Saudi Arabia has 
     allowed financiers of terrorism to operate within its 
     borders.
       (8) The Government of Saudi Arabia stated in February 2004 
     that it would establish a national commission to combat 
     terrorist financing within Saudi Arabia, however, it has not 
     fulfilled that promise.
       (9) There have been no reports of the Government of Saudi 
     Arabia pursuing the arrest, trial, or punishment of 
     individuals who have provided financial support for terrorist 
     activities. The laws of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorist 
     financing have not been fully implemented.
       (b) Commission on the United States-Saudi Arabia 
     Relationship.--
       (1) Establishment.--There is established, within the 
     legislative branch, the National Commission on the United 
     States-Saudi Arabia Relationship (in this section referred to 
     as the ``Commission'').
       (2) Purposes.--The purposes of the Commission are to 
     investigate, evaluate, and report on--
       (A) the current status and activities of diplomatic 
     relations between the Government of the United States and the 
     Government of Saudi Arabia;
       (B) the degree of cooperation exhibited by the Government 
     of Saudi Arabia toward the Government of the United States in 
     relation to intelligence, security cooperation, and the fight 
     against Islamist terrorism;
       (C) the status of the support provided by the Government of 
     Saudi Arabia to promote the dissemination of Wahabbism; and
       (D) the efforts of the Government of Saudi Arabia to enact 
     domestic measures to curtail terrorist financing.
       (3) Authority.--The Commission is authorized to carry out 
     purposes described in paragraph (2).
       (c) Composition of Commission.--The Commission shall be 
     composed of 10 members, as follows:
       (1) Two members appointed by the President, one of whom the 
     President shall designate as the chairman of the Commission.
       (2) Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (4) Two members appointed by the majority leader of the 
     Senate.
       (5) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the 
     Senate.
       (d) Report.--Not later that 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the 
     President and Congress a report on the relationship between 
     the United States and Saudi Arabia. The report shall include 
     the recommendations of the Commission to--
       (1) increase the transparency of diplomatic relations 
     between the Government of the United States and the 
     Government of Saudi Arabia;

[[Page S10046]]

       (2) improve cooperation between Government of the United 
     States and the Government of Saudi Arabia in efforts to share 
     intelligence information related to the war on terror;
       (3) curtail the support and dissemination of Wahabbism by 
     the Government of Saudi Arabia;
       (4) enhance the efforts of the Government of Saudi Arabia 
     to combat terrorist financing;
       (5) create a foreign policy strategy for the United States 
     to improve cooperation with the Government of Saudi Arabia in 
     the war on terror, including any recommendations regarding 
     the use of sanctions or other diplomatic measures;
       (6) curtail the support or toleration of violations of 
     religious freedom by the Government of Saudi Arabia; and
       (7) encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia to improve the 
     human rights conditions in Saudi Arabia that have been 
     identified as poor by the Department of State.
       (e) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any 
     other provision of this Act, this section shall take effect 
     on the date of the enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3890

(Purpose: To improve the security of hazardous materials transported by 
                                 truck)

       At the end, add the following new title:

     TITLE IV--SECURITY OF TRUCKS TRANSPORTING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

     SEC. 401. IMPROVEMENTS TO SECURITY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
                   TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK.

       (a) Plan for Improving Security of Hazardous Materials.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall develop a plan for improving the security of hazardous 
     materials transported by truck.
       (2) Content.--The plan under paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) a plan for tracking such hazardous materials;
       (B) a strategy for preventing hijackings of trucks carrying 
     such materials; and
       (C) a proposed mechanism for recovering lost or stolen 
     trucks carrying such materials.
       (b) Increased Inspection of Trucks.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     require that the number of trucks entering the United States 
     that are manually searched and screened in fiscal year 2005 
     is at least twice the number of trucks manually searched and 
     screened in fiscal year 2004.
       (2) Wait times at inspections.--In carrying out this 
     section, the Secretary shall ensure that the average wait 
     time for trucks entering the United States does not increase.
       (c) Background Checks.--Beginning not later than 3 years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall require background checks of all 
     truck drivers with certifications to transport hazardous 
     materials.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any 
     other provision of this Act, this section shall take effect 
     on the date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3891

                  (Purpose: To improve rail security)

       At the end, add the following new title:

                        TITLE IV--RAIL SECURITY

     SEC. 401. IMPROVEMENTS TO RAIL SECURITY.

       (a) Protection of Passenger Areas in Rail Stations.--The 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall require that, not later 
     than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     each of the 30 rail stations in the United States with the 
     highest daily rate of passenger traffic be equipped with a 
     sufficient number of wall-mounted and ceiling-mounted 
     radiological, biological, chemical, and explosive detectors 
     to provide coverage of the entire passenger area of such 
     station.
       (b) Use of Threat Detectors Required on Certain Trains.--
     The Secretary of Homeland Security shall require that, not 
     later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, each train traveling through any of the 10 rail stations 
     in the United States with the highest daily rate of passenger 
     traffic be equipped with a radiological, biological, 
     chemical, and explosive detector.
       (c) Report on Safety of Passenger Rail Tunnels.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation 
     shall--
       (A) review the safety and security of all passenger rail 
     tunnels, including in particular the access and egress points 
     of such tunnels; and
       (B) submit to Congress a report on needs for improving the 
     safety and security of passenger rail tunnels.
       (2) Content.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
     recommendations regarding the funding necessary to eliminate 
     security deficiencies at, and upgrade the safety of, 
     passenger rail tunnels.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any 
     other provision of this Act, this section shall take effect 
     on the date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3892

                (Purpose: To strengthen border security)

       At the end, add the following new title:

                TITLE IV--STRENGTHENING BORDER SECURITY

     SEC. 401. TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS TO CONFIRM IDENTITY.

       Section 403(c)(1) of the USA PATRIOT ACT (8 U.S.C. 1379(1)) 
     is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of 
     State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly, 
     through the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
     (NIST), and in consultation with the Secretary of the 
     Treasury and other Federal law enforcement and intelligence 
     agencies that the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security deem appropriate and in 
     consultation with Congress, shall prior to October 26, 2005, 
     develop and certify a technology standard, including 
     appropriate biometric identifier standards for multiple 
     immutable physical characteristics, such as fingerprints and 
     eye retinas, that can be used to verify the identity of 
     persons applying for a United States visa or such persons 
     seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a visa for the 
     purposes of conducting background checks, confirming 
     identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa 
     under a different name.''.

     SEC. 402. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY AND EXIT DOCUMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Paragraph (1) of section 303(b) of the 
     Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 
     U.S.C. 1732(b)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than October 25, 2005, the 
     Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security shall issue to aliens only machine-
     readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry 
     documents that use biometric identifiers for multiple 
     immutable characteristics, such as fingerprints and eye 
     retinas. The Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly establish 
     biometric and document identification standards for multiple 
     immutable physical characteristics, such as fingerprints and 
     eye retinas, to be employed on such visas and other travel 
     and entry documents.''.
       (b) Consultation Requirements.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``in consultation with 
     the Secretary of State'' and inserting ``in consultation with 
     the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)(B) in the matter preceding clause (i), 
     by striking ``in consultation with the Secretary of State'' 
     and inserting ``in consultation with the Secretary of State 
     and the Secretary of Homeland Security''.
       (c) Use of Readers and Scanners.--Paragraph (2)(B) of such 
     section, as amended by subsection (b), is further amended--
       (1) by redesignating clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) as (ii), 
     (iii), and (iv), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting before clause (ii), as redesignated by 
     paragraph (1), the following:
       ``(i) can authenticate biometric identifiers of multiple 
     immutable physical characteristics, as such fingerprints and 
     eye retinas;''.
       (d) Certification Requirements.--Subsection (c) of such 
     section is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than October 26, 2005, the 
     government of each country that is designated to participate 
     in the visa waiver program established under section 217 of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187) shall 
     certify, as a condition of designation or a continuation of 
     that designation, that it has a program to issue to its 
     nationals machine-readable passports that are tamper-
     resistant and incorporate biometric and authentication 
     identifiers of multiple immutable physical characteristics, 
     such as fingerprints and eye retina scans. This paragraph 
     shall not be construed to rescind the requirement of 
     subsections (a)(3) and (c)(2)(B)(i) of section 217 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act.''.


                           amendment no. 3893

(Purpose: To require inspection of cargo at ports in the United States)

       At the end, add the following new title:

                        TITLE IV--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 401. CARGO INSPECTION.

       (a) Manual Inspection.--Not later than 2 years after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall require that the number of containers manually 
     inspected at ports in the United States is not less than 10 
     percent of the total number of containers off-loaded at such 
     ports.
       (b) Inspection for Nuclear Materials.--Not later than 2 
     years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security shall require that the number of 
     containers screened for nuclear or radiological materials is 
     not less than 100 percent of the total number of containers 
     off-loaded at ports in the United States.
       (c) Inspection for Chemical, Biological, and Explosive 
     Materials.--Not later than 4 years after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall require that the 10 ports in the United States that 
     off-load the highest number of containers have the capability 
     to screen not less than 10 percent of the total number of 
     containers off-loaded at each such port for chemical, 
     biological, and explosive materials.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to Congress a report on port security 
     technology. Such report shall include--

[[Page S10047]]

       (1) a description of the progress made in the research and 
     development of port security technologies;
       (2) a comprehensive schedule detailing the amount of time 
     necessary to test and install appropriate port security 
     technologies; and
       (3) the total amount of funds necessary to develop, 
     produce, and install appropriate port security technologies.
       (e) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any 
     other provision of this Act, this section shall take effect 
     on the date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3894

    (Purpose: To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance 
                 cybersecurity, and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. ENHANCING CYBERSECURITY.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement 
     Act of 2004''.
       (b) Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity.--
       (1) In general.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 203. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CYBERSECURITY.

       ``(a) In General.--There shall be in the Directorate for 
     Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection a National 
     Cybersecurity Office headed by an Assistant Secretary for 
     Cybersecurity (in this section referred to as the `Assistant 
     Secretary'), who shall assist the Secretary in promoting 
     cybersecurity for the Nation.
       ``(b) General Authority.--The Assistant Secretary, subject 
     to the direction and control of the Secretary, shall have 
     primary authority within the Department for all 
     cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection 
     programs of the Department, including with respect to policy 
     formulation and program management.
       ``(c) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of the 
     Assistant Secretary shall include the following:
       ``(1) To establish and manage--
       ``(A) a national cybersecurity response system that 
     includes the ability to--
       ``(i) analyze the effect of cybersecurity threat 
     information on national critical infrastructure; and
       ``(ii) aid in the detection and warning of attacks on, and 
     in the restoration of, cybersecurity infrastructure in the 
     aftermath of such attacks;
       ``(B) a national cybersecurity threat and vulnerability 
     reduction program that identifies cybersecurity 
     vulnerabilities that would have a national effect on critical 
     infrastructure, performs vulnerability assessments on 
     information technologies, and coordinates the mitigation of 
     such vulnerabilities;
       ``(C) a national cybersecurity awareness and training 
     program that promotes cybersecurity awareness among the 
     public and the private sectors and promotes cybersecurity 
     training and education programs;
       ``(D) a government cybersecurity program to coordinate and 
     consult with Federal, State, and local governments to enhance 
     their cybersecurity programs; and
       ``(E) a national security and international cybersecurity 
     cooperation program to help foster Federal efforts to enhance 
     international cybersecurity awareness and cooperation.
       ``(2) To coordinate with the private sector on the program 
     under paragraph (1) as appropriate, and to promote 
     cybersecurity information sharing, vulnerability assessment, 
     and threat warning regarding critical infrastructure.
       ``(3) To coordinate with other directorates and offices 
     within the Department on the cybersecurity aspects of their 
     missions.
       ``(4) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for Emergency 
     Preparedness and Response to ensure that the National 
     Response Plan developed pursuant to section 502(6) of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 312(6)) includes 
     appropriate measures for the recovery of the cybersecurity 
     elements of critical infrastructure.
       ``(5) To develop processes for information sharing with the 
     private sector, consistent with section 214, that--
       ``(A) promote voluntary cybersecurity best practices, 
     standards, and benchmarks that are responsive to rapid 
     technology changes and to the security needs of critical 
     infrastructure; and
       ``(B) consider roles of Federal, State, local, and foreign 
     governments and the private sector, including the insurance 
     industry and auditors.
       ``(6) To coordinate with the Chief Information Officer of 
     the Department in establishing a secure information sharing 
     architecture and information sharing processes, including 
     with respect to the Department's operation centers.
       ``(7) To consult with the Electronic Crimes Task Force of 
     the United States Secret Service on private sector outreach 
     and information activities.
       ``(8) To consult with the Office for Domestic Preparedness 
     to ensure that realistic cybersecurity scenarios are 
     incorporated into tabletop and recovery exercises.
       ``(9) To consult and coordinate, as appropriate, with other 
     Federal agencies on cybersecurity-related programs, policies, 
     and operations.
       ``(10) To consult and coordinate within the Department and, 
     where appropriate, with other relevant Federal agencies, on 
     security of digital control systems, such as Supervisory 
     Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
       ``(d) Authority Over the National Communications System.--
     The Assistant Secretary shall have primary authority within 
     the Department over the National Communications System.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items 
     relating to subtitle A of title II the following:

``203. Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity.''.

       (c) Cybersecurity Defined.--Section 2 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(17)(A) The term `cybersecurity' means the prevention of 
     damage to, the protection of, and the restoration of 
     computers, electronic communications systems, electronic 
     communication services, wire communication, and electronic 
     communication, including information contained therein, to 
     ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, 
     confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.
       ``(B) In this paragraph--
       ``(i) each of the terms `damage' and `computer' has the 
     meaning that term has in section 1030 of title 18, United 
     States Code; and
       ``(ii) each of the terms `electronic communications 
     system', `electronic communication service', `wire 
     communication', and `electronic communication' has the 
     meaning that term has in section 2510 of title 18, United 
     States Code.''.
  Mr. REID. While I have the floor, we have a lot more amendments filed 
than I ever dreamed. Everyone should understand there will have to be 
significant movement on this bill in the next 24 hours in the way of 
offering amendments. I hope people offer amendments tomorrow. It will 
be terribly embarrassing to the leaders if Monday we have nothing to 
vote on. I think that will not be the case, but I think we are to the 
point where there may have to be something done to move this along more 
quickly than it has been. That may include filing cloture in the next 
24 hours.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I appreciate the assistance of the 
assistant Democratic leader. I echo his hope that Members will come to 
the Chamber tomorrow to offer and debate their amendments. We will 
delay the votes on those amendments until Monday, but we have an awful 
lot of work to be done. Senator Lieberman and I will be here tomorrow 
ready to engage on these amendments. I ask my colleagues to be here as 
well and help make progress on this very important bill. We are making 
some progress, but we are not making enough progress and we need to 
pick up the pace. We need to whittle down that amendment list. We need 
to have some of those amendments simply go away. I hope that will 
happen.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President. I rise today to address one of the most 
timely and sensitive recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the 
creation of a civil liberties board to provide checks and balances 
against the ``enormous authority'' granted the government by the 
people. Critically, the 9/11 Commission concluded: ``We must find ways 
of reconciling security with liberty, since the success of one helps 
protect the other.''
  There is no doubt that such a board is needed given the heightened 
civil liberty tensions created by the realities of terrorism and modern 
warfare. The tools of the information age include precise data-
gathering, networked databases, and tracking and sensing technologies 
impervious to the common eye. As Vice Chairman Hamilton noted, in a 
recent Judiciary Committee hearing, as he commented about the security 
steps and the technology that are quickly becoming ubiquitous in our 
post-9/11 world, these developments are ``an astounding intrusion in 
the lives of ordinary Americans that (are) routine today in 
government.'' With such powerful tools come heightened responsibility.
  We have an obligation to ensure that there are mechanisms in place 
that will see to it that this power is subject to appropriate checks 
and balances and Congressional oversight. An effective civil liberties 
board can provide those checks and contribute to preserving both 
liberty and security.
  We need a civil liberties board that can think critically and 
independently about the policies we implement as a nation and about how 
they affect our fundamental rights. The board must be able to 
participate in the policymaking

[[Page S10048]]

process, review technology choices and options, peer into various 
agencies and assess actions, review classified materials and 
investigate concerns. This board must have the versatility to work 
closely with government officials, but at the same time it must be 
sufficiently independent to assess those government policies without 
fear, favor or compromise. Given these significant responsibilities, it 
is equally important that the board be accountable to Congress and the 
American people.
  The civil liberties board outlined in the Collins-Lieberman bill 
makes great strides in meeting these goals. It represents a true 
bipartisan effort from conception to introduction. I was pleased to 
work with these Senators along with Senator Durbin to make this civil 
liberties board the kind of board that would honor the 9/11 
Commission's intent.
  It establishes a bipartisan board that would have access to the 
documents and information needed to assess our counterterrorism 
policies that affect the vital civil liberties of the American people. 
It provides a mechanism for them to work closely with administration 
officials, including working with a network of newly created 
department-level privacy and civil liberty officers, whose proximity to 
decision makers will ensure that these concerns are considered from the 
earliest stages of policy formation. It requires the board to report to 
Congress on a regular basis, and without compromising classified 
information, inform the public about policies that impact their vital 
liberties.
  Unfortunately, Senator Kyl's amendment No. 3801 attempts to gut the 
carefully crafted, bipartisan civil liberty and privacy provisions that 
are the hallmark of the Collins-Lieberman bill. It is inconsistent with 
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and would undermine the 
civil liberties that we cherish.
  First, Senator Kyl's amendment attempts to cut off the information 
flow that would ensure that the board could accurately, reliably and 
effectively advise on the impact of policies on privacy and civil 
liberties. It would also eliminate the board's ability to subpoena 
people outside of the government who may have important information, 
such as private sector data collectors working on behalf of the 
government. It would also eliminate the privacy officers, as well as 
public hearings and reports to the public.
  It is clear that the commission intended for the board to have access 
to the information that it needed in order to effectively assess 
policy. In a recent House Judiciary Committee hearing, Vice Chairman 
Hamilton said, ``The key requirement is that government agencies must 
be required to respond to the board.'' He went on to note that the 
commission itself had subpoena power, and ``if we had not had it, our 
job would have been much, much more difficult.'' I would note that the 
Collins-Lieberman bill does not go as far as to mandate subpoena power 
over government officials, but rather only over relevant non-government 
persons.
  Given the secrecy and civil liberty concerns that have been pervasive 
in this administration, we should be enhancing information flow and 
dialogue, not eliminating it. It is ironic that at the same time that 
the administration has been making it more difficult for the public to 
learn what government agencies are up to, the government and its 
private sector partners have been quietly building more and more 
databases to learn and store more information about the American 
people.
  Second, Senator Kyl's amendment would eliminate a provision that 
gives the board important guidance on how to review requests by the 
government for new and enhanced powers. This is a critical omission. In 
order to balance liberty and security, we need to ensure that the board 
will be looking at policies through a prism that would allow for 
heightened security protection, while also ensuring that intrusions are 
not disproportionate to benefits, or that they would unduly undermine 
privacy and civil liberties.
  Contrary to assertions that this would be a ``citizen board'' gone 
wild that would ``haul any agent in anywhere in the world and grill 
him,'' this board would consist of highly accomplished members who have 
the appropriate clearance to access classified information, who have 
extensive professional expertise on civil liberty and privacy issues, 
and who have the knowledge of how to view these concerns in the context 
of important anti-terrorism objectives.
  It simply cannot be that the government can create and implement 
policies that impinge on our liberties without having to account to 
anyone. While that may make things convenient or easy, it certainly 
does not preserve the ideals of the country we are fighting to protect.
  Senator Kyl's amendment is just the latest of recent attempts to 
undermine the 9/11 Commission's clear recommendations for an effective 
board. The administration recently issued an executive order that 
attempted to foist upon us an anemic civil liberties board. I and 
several of my colleagues noted in a letter to the President that the 
board was not a bipartisan or independent entity. It had no authority 
to access information and no accountability. It was housed in the 
Department of Justice, and comprised solely of administration officials 
from the law enforcement and intelligence communities, precisely the 
communities that the board would have an obligation to oversee. It was 
the proverbial case of the fox guarding the henhouse. This would not 
have resulted in a vigorous consideration of policy that the Commission 
intended.
  As the Commission noted, the ``burden of proof for retaining a 
particular governmental power should be on the Executive, to explain 
(a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that 
there is adequate supervision of the Executive's use of the powers to 
ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there 
must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its 
use.''
  We should be looking for ways to ensure that this burden of proof 
will be met, rather than weakening oversight and accountability.
  As the 9/11 Commission noted, when it comes to security and civil 
liberties, ``while protecting our homeland, Americans should be mindful 
of threats to vital personal and civil liberties. This balancing is no 
easy task, but we must constantly strive to keep it right.''
  Senator Kyl's amendment fails to ``keep it right,'' and I urge that 
the Senate honor the spirit of the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission, and reject it.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, in 1957, when America was caught off guard 
by the Soviet Union's launch of a satellite named Sputnik, Congress 
passed a massive education bill, the National Defense Education Act, 
which poured federal funds into the study of math, science and 
strategic languages like Russian. Thirty-two years later, the Soviet 
Union fell. Following the 9/11 attacks and the Commission's report, we 
need to rise to the challenge once again. We must intensify the study 
of strategic foreign languages, like Arabic, Pashto and Korean.
  According to the Department of Education, only 22 of the 1.8 million 
American students who graduated from college last year earned degrees 
in Arabic. This figure has remained about the same over the last 
decade. And as the 9/11 Commission reported, and the Washington Post 
and the New York Times reiterated on Tuesday, the lack of qualified 
personnel has left hundreds of thousands of pages of intercepted 
terrorist communication untranslated.
  On page 77 of the Commission's report, the Commission notes the FBI 
``lacked sufficient translators proficient in Arabic and other key 
languages, resulting in a significant backlog of untranslated 
intercepts.'' On page 92, the report adds, ``Very few American colleges 
and universities offered programs in Middle Eastern languages or 
Islamic studies.'' The 9/11 report also calls for both the CIA and the 
FBI to strengthen their language programs and for the FBI to improve 
ability to attract candidates with technological skills.
  At a hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Oversight of 
Government Management Subcommittee on September 14, 9/11 Commissioner 
Fred Fielding described the lack of language skills at intelligence 
agencies as: ``embarrassing.'' FBI Assistant Director for 
Administrative Services Mark Bullock testified that while the agency is 
receiving thousands of applicants, the agency has found it ``difficult 
hiring agents with language skills, skills in the right languages.''

[[Page S10049]]

  We can do better.
  The bill we are considering today does address education, but not 
completely. This bill calls for better coordination of joint training 
among the intelligence agencies and authorizes, but does not direct, 
the National Intelligence Director to collaborate with the intelligence 
agencies to establish a scholarship program, in which students agree to 
work for an agency in exchange for financial assistance with their 
education. I commend the managers of the bill for including this 
innovative education subsidy-for-service approach. This is an important 
mechanism to put in place, although we need to do more to expand 
instruction in critical foreign language, particularly in the area of 
science and technology. If no one is teaching the classes we need, we 
can't improve the pool of qualified applicants from which the 
intelligence community can recruit.
  The amendment my colleagues from Florida and Hawaii and I sponsored 
will expand targeted educational opportunities to promote integration 
of intelligence collection and analysis and to prepare intelligence 
personnel to work with other agencies.
  We ask the National Intelligence Director to assess the current needs 
of the intelligence community with respect to language skills; 
determine whether the community's needs for critical foreign language 
skills and understanding science and technology terms in those 
languages are being met; and report to Congress recommendations for 
programs to help meet those needs.
  In developing its report, the NID is directed to take into account 
existing education grant programs through the Departments of Education 
and Defense. The first report is due to Congress within one year of 
enactment, and then again each year after that.
  I thank the Senators from Florida and Hawaii for their willingness to 
work together in developing language to strengthen the critical 
language education component of the reorganized intelligence community. 
And I thank my colleagues from Maine and Connecticut for their 
leadership in crafting and managing this important piece of 
legislation, which now includes this additional focus on strengthening 
necessary language skills in this country.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as I noted on the floor yesterday, the 
Senate is now engaged in perhaps the most important debate of the 108th 
Congress. Increasing the security of our country against terrorist 
attack requires new strategies, new ways of thinking, and new ways of 
organizing our Government. That is what this legislative debate is all 
about.
  Earlier this month, I joined with Senator Lieberman and others in 
introducing comprehensive legislation to implement all the 9/11 
Commission recommendations. Along with Senator Lieberman, I pledged 
that the Commission's recommendations--including the ones not already 
addressed in the underlying bill--would be fully debated. Yesterday, we 
offered an amendment that was designed to address the Commission's 
transportation security-related recommendations. Now we will offer an 
amendment that encompasses the Commission's diplomacy, foreign aid, and 
military-related recommendations.
  I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator 
Lieberman, and Senator Bayh, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  This amendment is very similar to Title V of S. 2774, the 9/11 
Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004, which we introduced 
earlier this month. In drafting this amendment, we have worked with the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to develop consensus language 
concerning areas of their jurisdiction, and with the Senate Armed 
Services and Banking Committees to develop language for other 
provisions.
  As the Commission report observed, there were many deficiencies that 
led to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Not the least was the 
failure of the United States to adapt its foreign policy to address the 
changed realities of the post-cold war era. In hindsight, it is evident 
that we did not do enough to prevent the creation of terrorist 
sanctuaries, encourage the democratization of the Greater Middle East, 
and engage countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in 
their battles against fundamentalism.
  In light of this realization, the Commission found that no single set 
of strategies is sufficient to prevent future terrorist attacks. The 
United States must use all of the instruments at our disposal to 
counter the short-and long-term threats posed by international 
terrorism. For this reason, it is critical to pay due attention to the 
role of diplomacy, foreign aid, and the military.
  Consistent with the Commission's recommendations, this amendment 
requires the executive branch to develop a strategy to address and, 
where possible, eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. It renews the U.S. 
commitment to Pakistan's future, in light of the critical role that 
country plays in the war on terror, and authorizes assistance to 
Afghanistan--aid that many of us believe must be increased. The 
amendment addresses our relations with Saudi Arabia and suggests 
establishing an international contact group to develop a multilateral 
counterterrorism strategy.

  Our amendment also calls on the U.S. Government to work with our 
coalition partners to develop a common approach to the treatment of 
detainees, and reiterates standards for the humane treatment of enemy 
detainees--standards that our soldiers and officials should have been 
following all along. Most of this language was taken directly from the 
Senate-passed version of the Department of Defense Authorization bill, 
which is now pending in conference. The Senate has already spoken on 
this issue once; however, it has yet to be enacted. We must continue 
pressing to ensure that America treats individuals in its custody 
humanely, as the Commission rightly advocates. As the 9/11 Commission 
rightly pointed out, allowing torture of prisoners only makes it more 
difficult to build the alliances and support we need to defeat 
terrorism. Portrayals of inhumane treatment of captured terrorists 
hinder our ability to engage in the wider struggle against them.
  Other provisions in this amendment are designed to enhance America's 
ability to fight the war of ideas by promoting universal values of 
democracy, tolerance, and openness. It authorizes funding for U.S. 
broadcasts to Muslim countries, and authorizes an increase in our 
education and exchange programs. In addition, it establishes an 
International Youth Opportunity Fund that will provide financial 
assistance for the improvement of public education in the Middle East. 
Finally, the amendment notes that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is a grave and gathering threat to this country, and 
requires the executive branch to develop a strategy to expand and 
strengthen our nonproliferation programs.
  This amendment is the next step in fulfilling the mandate of the 
9/11 Commission recommendations and ensuring that we orient our 
diplomacy, foreign aid, and military programs toward combating 
terrorist threats, in both the short and long terms. The provisions in 
our amendment are not the only steps that are needed, and there are a 
number of other important actions that the executive branch should 
undertake in order to fully implement the Commission's recommendations. 
But I believe that passing this amendment is a vital and necessary 
step.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 3771

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, since the Manhattan project, national 
laboratory scientists have performed an inherently unique governmental 
function of not only designing and producing nuclear weapons, but 
analyzing intelligence on foreign nuclear weapons and nuclear 
technology.
  In performing this governmental function, the national laboratory 
scientists have staffed the Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee, which 
produces strategic assessments on foreign nuclear weapons programs, 
helped produce technical assessments of foreign nuclear weapons, and 
provided critical technical support in disabling improvised nuclear 
devices, which in today's post-9/11 environment is one of our greatest 
fears. In many cases these functions are performed through rotational 
assignments to the intelligence community staff.

[[Page S10050]]

  The amendment I have offered today, and cosponsored by my colleague 
Senator Domenici, preserves this rotational capability in the 
intelligence reforms proposed by Senators Collins and Lieberman.
  Typically, national laboratory personnel can be detailed to the 
intelligence community, or any Federal agency, through the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act. This act permits employees of 
federally funded research and development centers, FFRDCs, to act for 
set periods of time, as staff of a Government agency.
  This amendment does not alter the authorities under the act. What 
this amendment does is reinforce the congressional intent, that in 
addition to the authorities granted to the National Intelligence 
Authority to staff its centers with personnel from other branches of 
the Government, that it continue to be able to utilize the unique 
capabilities of Department of Energy staff and other FFRDCs.

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