[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 121 (Thursday, September 30, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1759-E1760]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




IN SUPPORT OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE IMPROVEMENT AND SECURITY ACT OF 2004

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JAMES P. MORAN

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                     Wednesday, September 29, 2004

  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, today we are pleased to introduce 
the Driver's License Improvement and Security Act of 2004, or DLISA, 
which will create a six state pilot project to standardize and 
modernize state-issued driver's licenses and identification cards. Two 
years ago I joined my colleague, Tom Davis, in sponsoring legislation 
to create nationwide standards for driver's licenses and identification 
cards.
  Our previous attempt to address fundamental flaws in the driver's 
license system may have been rather ambitious, but existing 
vulnerabilities in our identification system present a clear threat to 
our Nation's security and allow criminals to subvert our laws. A pilot 
project will allow the Secretary of Transportation and participants in 
the program to work out interoperability and logistical concerns on a 
smaller and more manageable scale.
  Today's legislation is the product of several years of hard work, 
input and research by state motor vehicle authorities, policy, 
technology, and identification security experts. As my colleagues 
prepare to consider comprehensive legislation to overhaul our national 
intelligence institutions, I strongly urge them to consider the 
following question: Why has it taken so long for us to repair a gaping 
hole in our identification system that leaves us vulnerable to 
criminals and terrorists? Reform should begin with the obvious--basic 
vulnerability issues.
  I agree with the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that institutional 
national intelligence reform is necessary, but I am dismayed by the 
lack of attention being paid to chronic and correctable shortcomings in 
our driver's license and ID card system. The legislative solution we 
are proposing today retains traditional state authority over non-
commercial driver's licenses, but recognizes that disparate standards, 
outmoded technologies and inadequate security features create risks 
that are national in scope and therefore justify Federal resources and 
technical assistance.
  A driver's license is a dangerous tool in the hands of a criminal. It 
allows them to easily travel on our roads, open bank accounts, rent 
vehicles, and take domestic flights. The driver's license has come to 
represent more than authorization to operate a motor vehicle; it 
imparts a stamp of legitimacy and is often taken as unquestionable 
proof of identity. Possession of a driver's license allows criminals to 
easily travel and blend into the population.
  Problems in our identification system were evident before 9/11. A 
thriving criminal enterprise learned to exploit the lack of 
standardization, the hodgepodge of loosely enforced rules, and 
antiquated security features, to serve a growing demand for fake 
licenses. The black market in fake licenses was, and remains, quite 
lucrative, commonly yielding $2,000 for a single fake license.

  Many of the 9/11 hijackers used black market ``brokers'' to illegally 
obtain driver's licenses. 13 of the 19 hijackers were able to obtain 
driver's licenses or non-driver ID cards. Like illegal gun dealers, 
those who profit from this illicit racket ask few questions and care 
little about the consequences of their actions.
  Since we first introduced legislation to remedy this problem, two 
reputable commissions have called for Federal government action. The 
Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information 
Age and the 9/11 Commission recommended that the Federal government 
should take action to standardize and improve the integrity of our 
driver's license and ID card system. Since the 9/11 commission's report 
was released, other legislative proposals have been unveiled, but none 
of them would fully implement the biometric and smart card technologies 
recommended by the Markle Task force and 9/11 Commission. Our bill 
takes full advantage of available technologies and addresses specific 
logistical, interoperability and policy concerns revealed by countless 
studies and reports on the subject over a number of years. DLISA draws 
upon these findings and balances some outstanding concerns about 
privacy, states' rights and the need for greater uniformity.
  The technology embraced in our bill is far from nascent. Private 
companies and government agencies currently utilize smart card and 
biometric technologies in their ID cards. Smart cards have been in use 
for years in the military with the Common Access Card, or CAC. Congress 
sanctioned the use of smart card biometric technology in the USVISIT 
visa program.
  DLISA will not create a national ID card. Instead, it preserves state 
authority and takes advantage of the existing state motor vehicle 
infrastructure and system of linked networks. In fact, DLISA is a step 
back from earlier congressional legislation. Congress created uniform 
standards for commercial licenses when it passed the Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, paving the way for the Commercial Driver's 
License Information System, or CDLIS. Congress has also recognized the 
need to assist state licensing authorities in a non-commercial context 
when it created the National Driver Register; which, like this bill,

[[Page E1760]]

was implemented first as a pilot program. DLISA is entirely voluntary, 
only states that wish to participate in the pilot project must adhere 
to the guidelines. In setting the authorization amount, we relied on 
the states own cost projections. States will not incur any expense 
under DLISA.
  Of course there are many out there who fear change. Civil 
libertarians, conspiracy theorists and absolutists will attempt to 
characterize DLISA as a threat to individual privacy. In fact the 
opposite is true. By reducing identity theft (clearly a privacy 
concern), controlling access to personal data through encryption and 
proper regulations, and making it easier to create a digital paper 
trail on government employees who access your data, smart cards will 
actually reduce privacy violations.
  Nor will my bill adversely harm immigrants. Congress has long been 
trying to improve the system to verify worker eligibility, and smart 
driver's licenses will make a quantum leap in the efficiency of that 
system, which will in turn make it harder for illegal aliens to get 
jobs with honest employers. Many people consider this an undesirable 
side effect of improving the driver's licensing system; after all, the 
vast majority of immigrants are hard-working people trying to make 
better lives for their families. The solution, however, is to change 
the rules governing immigration, not to preserve the fraud in the ID 
system.
  Finally, DLISA does not allow the government to track people's 
movements. Smart cards do not work with satellites to track your 
movements. The best government could do in tracking your movements is 
maintain records of where and when you are asked to show your license, 
something it already does by writing down your driver's license number. 
For example, when you enter a government building for a meeting, the 
security guard may record your information in a log.
  It is difficult to completely allay the concerns of civil 
libertarians and privacy advocates, lest we do away with all forms of 
identification. But this legislation will not create invasion of 
privacy risks that do not already exist today. It will, however, 
significantly reduce the risk of identity theft, and correct current 
widespread abuses in the system. As an added benefit, the technology 
will make it easier for law enforcement officials to do their job by 
eliminating wasted time filling out tickets and paperwork, but it will 
not magically transform every law enforcement officer or civil servant 
into a voyeur or jackbooted thug bent on harassing you at every turn.
  Taken as a whole, the potential benefits of smart licenses far 
outweigh the potential risks. The vast majority of Americans understand 
that privacy is a tradeoff rather than an absolute, and will accept the 
risks in exchange for the benefit--added security.
  I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this bill, and give this issue the 
urgent attention required to correct serious flaws in our driver's 
licensing and ID card system.