[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 120 (Wednesday, September 29, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9987-S9988]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Governmental Affairs Committee be discharged from further consideration 
of H.R. 4259, and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 4259) to amend title 31, United States Code, 
     to improve the financial accountability requirements 
     applicable to the Department of Homeland Security, to 
     establish requirements for the Future Years Homeland Security 
     Program of the Department, and for other purposes.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.


                       homeland security strategy

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to call attention to a critical 
piece of this legislation--the requirement in section 5 of H.R. 4259, 
the Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act, for 
an annual homeland security strategy.
  Before 9/11, we did not truly perceive the threat of terrorism on our 
own soil, and what homeland security efforts we did have underway were 
badly divided. Dozens of agencies responsible for pieces of our 
homeland security were scattered across the Federal Government, and 
were largely unconnected to State and local officials and first 
responders on the front lines in our nation's cities and towns. There 
were overlaps and, more critically, treacherous gaps. And because 
everyone was responsible for parts of the effort, no one was ultimately 
in charge.
  We took one large step to remedy these weaknesses by creating the 
Department of Homeland Security, DHS. The Department brings more than 
two dozen of the Federal Government's critical homeland security 
agencies and programs under one roof, allowing for unprecedented 
coordination and cooperation. It also created a Cabinet Secretary 
charged with managing the budget and personnel of these agencies, and 
capable of providing a focal point for homeland programs and issues in 
the Cabinet and beyond.
  But we knew that in addition to creating a better organization we 
would need to lay out a clear roadmap to galvanize our homeland 
defenses--at all levels of Government and the private sector. That is 
what many of us called for and, regretfully, it is something this 
Nation still sorely lacks.
  The administration did produce a ``National Strategy for Homeland 
Security'' in July 2002 that correctly identified many of the 
challenges we face in preparing to meet the threat of terrorism. But 
that document predates the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and is already badly out of date.
  More significantly, as the highly regarded Gilmore Commission on 
terrorism noted in its final report last December:

       Much is still required in order to achieve an effective, 
     comprehensive, unified national strategy and to translate 
     vision into action. Notably, absent is a clear prioritization 
     for the use of scarce resources against a diffuse, unclear 
     threat as part of the spectrum of threats--some significantly 
     more common than terrorism. The panel has serious concerns 
     about the current state of homeland security efforts along 
     the full spectrum from awareness to recovery and is worried 
     that efforts by the government may provide the perception of 
     enhanced security that causes the nation to become complacent 
     about the many critical actions still required.

  It is true that the Department of Homeland Security is proceeding 
with some more targeted strategic regarding specific areas of concern, 
but these cannot replace a comprehensive strategy that sets the 
ultimate policies and priorities for our homeland effort.
  That is why I am pleased that the legislation before us calls upon 
the administration to develop and update its homeland security strategy 
in connection with its budgeting process for the Department of Homeland 
Security. More specifically, the legislation requires that the 
Secretary for Homeland Security:

     . . . set forth the homeland security strategy of the 
     department, which shall be developed and updated as 
     appropriate annually . . .

and explain how that strategy relates to the Department's planned 
budgeting.
  As it does so, the administration should adhere to the guiding 
principles laid out in the February 3, 2004 report by the General 
Accounting Office, GAO, now referred to as the Government 
Accountability Office, regarding the Nation's various strategies 
related to terrorism and homeland security. In that report, the GAO 
surveyed 7 existing Federal strategies related to terrorism--including 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security--and laid out guiding 
principles to improve these strategies. These principles stress 
accountability and prioritization as requirements for a sound strategy. 
The new strategy must employ risk assessment and analysis to help 
prioritize strategic goals, then indicate the specific activities 
needed to achieve those goals, as well as the likely costs and how such 
funds should be generated. In other words, the strategy must make real 
choices about priorities and resources. The current strategy identifies 
many goals, but rarely provides real deadlines for action, standards or 
performance measures to assess progress, or details on the resources 
required for stated initiatives.

  The strategy should clearly spell out organizational roles and 
responsibilities, including the proper roles of State, local, private 
and international actors and the coordinating mechanisms to bring these 
actors together. Almost 3 years after 9/11, we still too often must ask 
``who is in charge?'' of key pieces of our homeland security agenda. 
And, critically, the homeland security strategy must address how it 
relates to other Federal strategies regarding terrorist threats, and 
how the strategies will be integrated.
  Such a strategy must also provide more leadership on critical 
components of our homeland effort, such as a thoroughgoing strategy to 
maximize information sharing related to homeland security throughout 
the Federal Government and with state and local officials

[[Page S9988]]

and, where appropriate, the private sector. The strategy must look at 
preparing the public health sector to detect and respond to terrorist 
attacks, at integrating military capabilities into our homeland 
security planning, at building emergency preparedness throughout all 
levels of Government and the private sector, and securing our critical 
infrastructure, much of which is in private hands.
  While the Department of Homeland Security is central to our effort to 
protect the homeland, many critical components of the homeland security 
effort nonetheless lie outside the Department. An effective strategy 
must address all key homeland security programs, and should involve the 
cooperation of the Homeland Security Council and the President's 
Special Assistant for Homeland Security to assist the Secretary in 
gathering appropriate input from throughout the Federal government.
  The Department of Homeland Security has made important strides in 
improving our homeland defenses. But in the face of ongoing threats of 
terrorist attacks on our homeland, we cannot afford anything less than 
our best effort. Today, we still lack strong direction on critical 
aspects of our homeland security effort. A new and more forceful 
national strategy will energize and organize our resources--at all 
levels of Government and within the private sector--to better meet the 
threats ahead.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for his comments on 
this important issue, and rise to add my own remarks on the critical 
importance of building a strong homeland security strategy. As members 
of the Governmental Affairs Committee labored over legislation to 
create the Department of Homeland Security, we became well acquainted 
with the daunting array of programs and policies that are part of our 
homeland security effort. In creating the Department, and through 
efforts we have undertaken since that time, the committee has worked to 
help supply the Department of Homeland Security with the tools it will 
need to be successful. Our oversight work has demonstrated the need to 
have a strong national strategy to guide our homeland efforts. I agree 
with my colleague that GAO and others have identified ways in which our 
homeland security strategy could be strengthened and updated. This 
legislation will facilitate improvements by requiring that the 
administration lay out its homeland security strategy anew, and 
coordinate this strategy with its annual budget requests. This should 
bring out strategic vision into sharper view, and ensure that adequate 
resources are sought and secured to carry out homeland priorities.


                        financial accountability

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I would like to express my support for 
passage of H.R. 4259, the Department of Homeland Security Financial 
Accountability Act. This Act will apply the Chief Financial Officers 
Act of 1990 to the Department of Homeland Security, and will codify the 
existence of an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation within the 
Department. This latter provision, which was not part of the Senate-
passed companion bill, S. 1567, is an important one, and I would like 
to engage in a colloquy with the chair and ranking member of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs to clarify what is and is not 
intended by this provision.
  The Department of Homeland Security is charged with carrying out a 
wide range of activities related to our domestic security. In my view, 
it is probably the executive department with the broadest range of 
activities that need to be coordinated and reconciled from a 
programmatic standpoint. It is crucial that the Department have a 
robust programmatic coordination function at the highest level, and 
that this function have, at its base, a strong analytical capability 
for purposes of setting priorities among the disparate parts of the 
Department for purposes of budget formulation and execution. For this 
reason, the statutory creation of an Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation, and the mandate that it report no lower in the organization 
than directly to the new chief financial officer, is very sound.
  There is another related function in the Department of Homeland 
Security that has been given a different placement by statute. That is 
the function of test and evaluation for developing homeland security 
priorities and for assessing specific technologies. Under section 302 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Under Secretary for Science 
and Technology within the Department of Homeland Security was given 
statutory missions for, among other things, ``assessing and testing 
homeland security vulnerabilities and possible threats,'' ``testing and 
evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all elements of the 
Department'' and ``coordinating and integrating all research, 
development, testing, and evaluation activities of the Department.'' It 
is crucial that these testing and evaluation functions remain under the 
management of the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, because 
they need strong scientific management and focus. We cannot afford to 
spend constrained Federal funds for homeland security on approaches or 
technologies that are not technically sound, or that are not cost-
effective compared to other technologies.
  I do not believe that there is an inherent conflict between the new 
statutory office created by this bill and the existing statutory 
assignments in the Homeland Security Act. Offices like the proposed 
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation exist in several executive 
departments, and are generally more focused on assessing programmatic 
directions, outcomes, resources, and priorities. The test and 
evaluation function, in contrast, focuses more specifically on 
technical issues and relative technical merits. In the Department of 
Defense, for example, both functions are in distinct organizations that 
work together where appropriate to complement the different strengths 
and missions that each brings to the table. It would be my assumption 
that this is the outcome that Congress wants to see in the case of the 
Department of Homeland Security.
  With this as background, I would like to ascertain from my 
colleagues, the chair and ranking member of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, if they agree with my understanding that the 
statutory creation of the new Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
is not meant to supersede or alter the testing and evaluation function 
that Congress has previously assigned to the Under Secretary of 
Homeland Security for Science and Technology.
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank my colleagues.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time 
and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that 
any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (H.R. 4259) was read the third time and passed.

                          ____________________