[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 120 (Wednesday, September 29, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9871-S9873]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am going to respond to my colleague from
Massachusetts. He has made a pretty vicious attack, I would say, on the
President of the United States, contending that he has not leveled with
the American people, that he has to begin telling the truth about what
is going on in Iraq. These are very serious charges, and I would like
to try to respond to them.
The Senator from Massachusetts began by a recitation of why, in his
view, ``the outlook is so bleak,'' to use his quotation, and why he
concluded that ``we're losing the war,'' another quotation from the
Senator.
I see in the Senator's remarks, and others that I have heard
recently, a steely determination to keep hopelessness alive. I do not
think that should be the policy of the United States. The President has
a much better vision about how to bring the war against militant Islam
to a conclusion.
There were no constructive alternatives, as my colleagues will
recall, from the comments of the Senator from Massachusetts. There were
no ideas about how we could do better. It was just an attack on the
President and an assertion that we are losing the war, the implications
of which were left hanging.
When he said the President has this attitude of shooting first and
asking questions later, then perhaps we need to recall that we have
already been attacked. We did not shoot first. We were attacked
viciously on 9/11 and it changed everything about our approach to the
war against militant Islam.
Secondly, when the Senator from Massachusetts accuses the President
of painting a rosy picture and then refers to the National Intelligence
Estimate that predicted some pretty dire consequences, he forgets two
things. First, President Bush has said repeatedly from the very
beginning that this would be a very long and difficult conflict. He has
never wavered from that. In fact, he has tried to inspire the American
people to continue to persevere in this war.
One does not inspire people by wringing their hands and talking about
how we are losing the war. Think about what kind of a message that
sends to the troops and to the families who are sacrificing, to a mom
who gets notice that her young son has been killed in Iraq: We are
losing the war. It is hopeless. The outlook is bleak.
Well, what are we fighting for? What kind of a message does it send
to our allies, who some people say they could convince to come into
this conflict, we are losing the war, now please come in? That is not
exactly going to persuade them to come into the conflict.
Finally, and most importantly, what kind of a message does it send to
the enemy to suggest that they are winning and we are losing? Major
political figures in this country argue that we are losing the war. It
gives confidence to the enemies. That is exactly what they want to
hear. Osama bin Laden has said we are the weak horse and he is the
strong horse. If we convey that message to him, we increase the
possibility that he will continue to think he can win and that he will
continue to engage in this fight.
We need to break his will. He is testing our will and comments such
as this are not helpful to challenging the American people to continue
to persevere in this contest.
The question is about the American will, and I do not think the
comments we heard from the Senator from Massachusetts are going to be
effective in helping to sustain that will. I rather think the approach
that Winston Churchill took in World War II accentuating the positive,
yes, but not ignoring the negative and challenging the British people
and the people of the Allies to persevere in that war is the right
approach, and that is what President Bush has tried to do.
The Senator from Massachusetts has confused a couple of issues.
First, he confuses violence in Iraq with less security at home. I do
not think we are less secure at home because there is violence in Iraq.
In fact, one of the reasons we have not been attacked at home for over
3 years is because we have taken the fight to the enemy and we have
largely been successful. We have not lost a battle in this war.
There are battles yet to be fought, and the enemy attacks us with
guerilla tactics, but we can persevere and win militarily. So I do not
think we should confuse the fact that there is violence in Iraq and
therefore conclude we are less secure at home. That is simply not true.
Secondly, the Senator from Massachusetts alleges that there was no
relationship, no connection, between the terrorists and the Saddam
Hussein regime. I want to try to debunk this myth right now, so let me
quote from the CIA, from the 9/11 Commission, and from George Tenet's
assessment since we are going to be quoting the National Intelligence
Estimate. This is what the head of the CIA, George Tenet, said:
Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-
Qaida is evolving and is based on sources of varying
reliability. Some of the information we have received comes
from detainees, including some of high rank.
We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between
Iraq and al-Qaida going back a decade.
[[Page S9872]]
No relationship? According to the CIA, not true.
Continuing to quote:
Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaida have
discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.
Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of
the presence in Iraq of al-Qaida members, including some that
have been in Baghdad.
We have credible reporting that al-Qaida leaders sought
contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD
capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has
provided training to al-Qaida members in the areas of poisons
and gases and making conventional bombs.
Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians,
coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al-
Qaida, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will
increase, even absent U.S. military action.
No relationship? No contacts? No connection? Read the intelligence
reports.
What did the 9/11 Commission say? Quoting from Thomas Kean, cochair
of the 9/11 Commission:
There was no question in our minds that there was a
relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
Let us get the facts straight. If we are going to come to the Senate
floor and charge the President of the United States with misinforming
the American people, we need not misinform them ourselves.
Quoting further from the 9/11 Commission report:
With the Sudanese regime acting as an intermediary, Bin
Ladin himself met with senior Iraqi intelligence officers in
Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to
have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as
assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence
that Iraq responded to this request . . . [but] the ensuing
years saw additional efforts to establish connections.
That is from page 61 of the report. From page 66:
In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the
United States, two Al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq
to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation
traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and
then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps
both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin
Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to
the Iraqis.
From page 66:
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or
his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some
reported strains with the Taliban. According to the
reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in
Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his
circumstance in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the
Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and
indicates some common themes in both sides' hatred of the
United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that
these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a
collaborative operational relationship. . . .
That is the critical distinction. We have to be careful of our
language, especially when we are accusing the President of the United
States of misleading the American people. Our language matters. The
President never alleged an operational link or that Saddam Hussein
helped to plan the 9/11 attack on the United States, but there is
plenty of evidence of connections between bin Laden, al-Qaida, other
terrorists and Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
The Intelligence Committee report in July of this year reported:
[F]rom 1996 to 2003, the Iraqi Intelligence Service
``focused its terrorist activities on Western interests,
particularly against the U.S. and Israel.
They go on to quote the letter from George Tenet that I quoted
before.
[A]ccording to a CIA report called Iraqi Support for
Terrorism, ``the general pattern that emerges is one of al
Qaeda's enduring interest in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) expertise from Iraq.''
This is exactly what Senator McCain talked about a few weeks ago,
what the President has talked about, what the Vice President has talked
about, our concern of this relationship that would some day, if we did
not act against Iraq, blossom into fullblooded support, full-blown
support from Iraq to al-Qaida.
Finally:
[T]he Iraqi regime ``certainly'' had knowledge that Abu
Musab al Zarqawi--described in Iraqi Support for Terrorism as
``a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner''--was operating in
Baghdad and northern Iraq.
I ask unanimous consent that a New York Times article of June 25,
2004, which further makes this point, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, June 25, 2004]
Iraqis, Seeking Foes of Saudis, Contacted bin Laden, File Says
(By Thom Shanker)
Contacts between Iraqi intelligence agents and Osama bin
Laden when he was in Sudan in the mid 1990's were part of a
broad effort by Baghdad to work with organizations opposing
the Saudi ruling family, according to a newly disclosed
document obtained by the Americans in Iraq.
American officials described the document as an internal
report by the Iraqi intelligence service detailing efforts to
seek cooperation with several Saudi opposition groups,
including Mr. bin Laden's organization, before Al Qaeda had
become a full-fledged terrorist organization. He was based in
Sudan from 1992 to 1996, when that country forced him to
leave and he took refuge in Afghanistan.
The document states that Iraq agreed to rebroadcast anti-
Saudi propaganda, and that a request from Mr. bin Laden to
begin joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia
went unanswered. There is no further indication of
collaboration.
Last week, the independent commission investigating the
Sept. 11 attacks addressed the known contacts between Iraq
and Al Qaeda, which have been cited by the White House as
evidence of a close relationship between the two.
The commission concluded that the contacts had not
demonstrated ``a collaborative relationship'' between Iraq
and Al Qaeda. The Bush administration responded that there
was considerable evidence of ties.
The new document, which appears to have circulated only
since April, was provided to The New York Times several weeks
ago, before the commission's report was released. Since
obtaining the document, The Times has interviewed several
military, intelligence and United States government officials
in Washington and Baghdad to determine that the government
considered it authentic.
The Americans confirmed that they had obtained the document
from the Iraqi National Congress, as part of a trove that the
group gathered after the fall of Saddam Hussein's
government last year. The Defense Intelligence Agency paid
the Iraqi National Congress for documents and other
information until recently, when the group and its leader,
Ahmad Chalabi, fell out of favor in Washington.
Some of the intelligence provided by the group is now
wholly discredited, although officials have called some of
the documents it helped to obtain useful.
A translation of the new Iraqi document was reviewed by a
Pentagon working group in the spring, officials said. It
included senior analysts from the military's Joint Staff, the
Defense Intelligence Agency and a joint intelligence task
force that specialized in counterterrorism issues, they said.
The task force concluded that the document ``appeared
authentic,'' and that it ``corroborates and expands on
previous reporting'' about contacts between Iraqi
intelligence and Mr. bin Laden in Sudan, according to the
task force's analysis.
It is not known whether some on the task force held
dissenting opinions about the document's veracity.
At the time of the contacts described in the Iraqi
document, Mr. bin Laden was little known beyond the world of
national security experts. It is now thought that his
associates bombed a hotel in Yemen used by American troops
bound for Somalia in 1992. Intelligence officials also
believe he played a role in training Somali fighters who
battled Army Rangers and Special Operations forces in
Mogadishu during the ``Black Hawk Down'' battle of 1993.
Iraq during that period was struggling with its defeat by
American-led forces in the Persian Gulf war of 1991, when
American troops used Saudi Arabia as the base for expelling
Iraqi invaders from Kuwait.
The document details a time before any of the spectacular
anti-American terrorist strikes attributed to Al Qaeda: the
two American Embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998, the
strike on the destroyer Cole in Yemeni waters in 2000, and
the Sept. 11 attacks.
The document, which asserts that Mr. bin Laden ``was
approached by our side,'' states that Mr. bin Laden
previously ``had some reservations about being labeled an
Iraqi operative,'' but was now willing to meet in Sudan, and
that ``presidential approval'' was granted to the Iraqi
security service to proceed.
At the meeting, Mr. bin Laden requested that sermons of an
anti-Saudi cleric be rebroadcast in Iraq. That request, the
document states, was approved by Baghdad.
Mr. bin Laden ``also requested joint operations against
foreign forces'' based in Saudi Arabia, where the American
presence has been a rallying cry for Islamic militants who
oppose American troops in the land of the Muslim pilgrimage
sites of Mecca and Medina.
But the document contains no statement of response by the
Iraqi leadership under Mr. Hussein to the request for joint
operations, and there is no indication of discussions about
attacks on the United States or the use of unconventional
weapons.
[[Page S9873]]
The document is of interest to American officials as a
detailed, if limited, snapshot of communications between
Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden, but this view ends with
Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan. At that point, Iraqi
intelligence officers began ``seeking other channels through
which to handle the relationship, in light of his current
location,'' the document states.
Members of the Pentagon task force that reviewed the
document said it described no formal alliance being reached
between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence. The Iraqi
document itself states that ``cooperation between the two
organizations should be allowed to develop freely through
discussion and agreement.''
The heated public debate over links between Mr. bin Laden
and the Hussein government fall basically into three
categories: the extent of communications and contacts between
the two, the level of actual cooperation, and any specific
collaboration in the Sept. 11 attacks.
The document provides evidence of communications between
Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence, similar to that
described in the Sept. 11 staff report released last week.
``Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq
during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's
secular regime,'' the Sept. 11 commission report stated.
The Sudanese government, the commission report added,
``arranged for contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda.''
``A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three
visits to Sudan,'' it said, ``finally meeting bin Laden in
1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish
training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons,
but Iraq apparently never responded.''
The Sept. 11 commission statement said there were reports
of further contacts with Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan
after Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan, ``but they do not
appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship,'' it
added.
After the Sept. 11 commission released its staff reports
last week, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney said
they remained convinced that Mr. Hussein's government had a
long history of ties to Al Qaeda.
``This administration never said that the 9/11 attacks were
orchestrated between Saddam and Al Qaeda,'' Mr. Bush said.
``We did say there were numerous contacts between Saddam
Hussein and Al Qaeda. For example, Iraqi intelligence
officers met with bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, in the
Sudan. There's numerous contacts between the two.''
It is not clear whether the commission knew of this
document. After its report was released, Mr. Cheney said he
might have been privy to more information than the commission
had; it is not known whether any further information has
changed hands.
A spokesman for the Sept. 11 commission declined to say
whether it had seen the Iraqi document, saying its policy was
not to discuss its sources.
The Iraqi document states that Mr. bin Laden's organization
in Sudan was called ``The Advice and Reform Commission.'' The
Iraqis were cued to make their approach to Mr. bin Laden in
1994 after a Sudanese official visited Uday Hussein, the
leader's son, as well as the director of Iraqi intelligence,
and indicated that Mr. bin Laden was willing to meet in
Sudan.
A former director of operations for Iraqi intelligence
Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin Laden on Feb. 19 1995, the
document states.
Mr. KYL. I note, concluding with this point, that Abdul Yasim and Abu
Nidal were harbored in Iraq. The Taliban did not directly involve
itself in 9/11 or have weapons of mass destruction either, but it
harbored people like this and that is one reason we went after the
Taliban and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
With regard to the connections between Iraq and al-Qaida, the case is
very clear that they were there and the President stands correct, and I
hope the Senator from Massachusetts would stand corrected.
Finally, as to the suggestion that Iraq was a diversion from
succeeding in Afghanistan, that we have not finished the job there, we
were very successful in defeating the Taliban and killing a lot of al-
Qaida and capturing a lot of al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and in
establishing a regime there which will be holding elections. Karzai
made it very clear when he came to this country and expressed his
appreciation, just as did Prime Minister Allawi of Iraq, to American
forces for helping to provide the Afghanis with enough freedom to
control their own future. I think there is confusion that the only al-
Qaida are on the border between Afghan and Pakistan, and since we have
not captured every single one of them, including Osama bin Laden,
therefore our activities in Iraq are responsible for this fact. There
has been no evidence of that. As a matter of fact, our military
commanders make the point it is not true, that Iraq was not a diversion
from anything we had to do in Afghanistan where we were very effective
and successful.
To those who convey this sense of panic, that all is going bad, the
opposite of that is not those of us who support the President's policy
saying everything is rosy. I do not know that anybody has ever used
that phrase. If they have, I would like to see it. The President has
said repeatedly that this is a long and difficult war and it is going
to require a great deal of perseverance and commitment by the American
people. But as contrasted by those who create the sense of panic, the
President has a vision and the President's commanders have a strategy.
When I saw General Abizaid on television last Sunday, he didn't paint a
rosy picture. He painted a very realistic assessment. But he also
portrayed a calm confidence that if we can persevere we can prevail.
That is what he asked of the American people, to allow the military
commanders as well as the Commander in Chief to carry out the vision to
defeat the militant Islamic terrorists wherever they are. As I said,
they are not only in Afghanistan; they are all over the world including
primarily in the Middle East. That is why this war has many fronts. It
is not just Afghanistan. We fought simultaneously to try to gain
support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Libyan regime, and from Syria.
We did what we did in Afghanistan. We have done what we have done in
Iraq. There are still some places to go, but we have also been in Yemen
and Sudan, and so on.
The bottom line here is you can't isolate one place in the world and
say we have to do that first and win every possible goal there before
we can do anything else anywhere else. The President has made it clear
that by going to one of the chief sources of terrorism, namely Iraq, we
can help to win this war.
The fact that there was such a connection between the terrorists--
between al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime--is I think validated by the fact
that they have been able to so successfully continue to attack
Americans and American forces in Iraq.
Let's consider that the military commanders just might know what they
are talking about, No. 1. No. 2, it does no good to wring our hands and
paint a picture of panic. Realistic assessments, absolutely; truth to
the American people, absolutely; but leadership that presents a vision
and a strategy for winning the wider war on terrorism, that is what the
President has provided. That is why I am very proud to support
President Bush's efforts in this regard. 3
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