[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 119 (Tuesday, September 28, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9784-S9805]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004--Continued

  Mr. THOMAS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3702

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally 
divided on the McCain amendment.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment is designed to address 
transportation security-related recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 
The amendment is almost identical to Title VII of S. 2774, the 9/11 
Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004, which Senator Lieberman 
and I introduced earlier this month.
  The amendment implements the Commission's recommendations on 
transportation security in the following three ways: One, establishing 
a national strategy for transportation security; two, assigning 
responsibility for the ``no-fly list'' to the Transportation Security 
Administration; and, three, enhancing passenger and cargo screening.
  This amendment is the next step in fulfilling the mandate of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations and ensuring we move forward in addressing 
the vulnerabilities in our transportation systems. These provisions 
should not be controversial, and I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment which I 
cosponsored with Senator McCain. This is the first of several he and I 
will be introducing, along with other Members, which would implement 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission not included in the underlying 
bill that Senator Collins and I have introduced which focuses on 
intelligence reform.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I am pleased to support my 
colleague's amendment to implement the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations on improving aviation security. Senator McCain and I 
have worked closely over the last several years to strengthen our 
aviation security network. Although I strongly agree with the 9/11 
Commission's recommendations for improving aviation security, I believe 
that Congress must go further than the Commission's recommendations if 
we are to continue to improve our aviation security system.
  It is for this reason that I have filed my bill, S. 2393, the 
Aviation Security Advancement Act, as an amendment to this legislation 
as well. I would note that Senator McCain is a cosponsor of my bill. In 
addition, to incorporating the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, 
my bill also includes specific requirements to improve air cargo and 
general aviation security, which I have long felt to be significant 
gaps in our security system and the 9/11 Commission specifically cited 
as a weakness. My bill also authorizes funding for these new security 
requirements.
  This legislation was passed unanimously out of the Commerce Committee 
last week. This legislation is also supported by the airline industry. 
I hope that the Senate will consider this legislation later this week. 
My amendment is cosponsored by Senators Hollings, Lautenberg, Snowe, 
and Schumer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3702.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), and the Senator from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 97, nays, 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 189 Leg.]

                                YEAS--97

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (FL)
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Akaka
     Edwards
     Kerry
  The amendment (No. 3702) was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator 
Stevens no longer needs to use his time at this time. I believe he will 
be speaking later. So I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the order that 
reserved time for Senator Stevens and instead have Senator Hutchison 
recognized to offer an amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Texas.


                           Amendment No. 3711

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3711, which is 
at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3711.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide for air cargo safety, and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

                     TITLE      --AIR CARGO SAFETY

     SEC. --01. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Air Cargo Security 
     Improvement Act''.

     SEC. --02. INSPECTION OF CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER 
                   AIRCRAFT.

       Section 44901(f) of title 49, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:

[[Page S9785]]

       ``(f) Cargo.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     establish systems to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the 
     security of all cargo that is to be transported in--
       ``(A) passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or 
     foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air 
     transportation; or
       ``(B) all-cargo aircraft in air transportation and 
     intrastate air transportation.
       ``(2) Strategic plan.--The Secretary shall develop a 
     strategic plan to carry out paragraph (1) within 6 months 
     after the date of enactment of the Air Cargo Security 
     Improvement Act.
       ``(3) Pilot program.--The Secretary shall conduct a pilot 
     program of screening of cargo to assess the effectiveness of 
     different screening measures, including the use of random 
     screening. The Secretary shall attempt to achieve a 
     distribution of airport participation in terms of geographic 
     location and size.''.

     SEC. --03. AIR CARGO SHIPPING.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 44925. Regular inspections of air cargo shipping 
       facilities

       ``The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a 
     system for the regular inspection of shipping facilities for 
     shipments of cargo transported in air transportation or 
     intrastate air transportation to ensure that appropriate 
     security controls, systems, and protocols are observed, and 
     shall enter into arrangements with the civil aviation 
     authorities, or other appropriate officials, of foreign 
     countries to ensure that inspections are conducted on a 
     regular basis at shipping facilities for cargo transported in 
     air transportation to the United States.''.
       (b) Additional Inspectors.--The Secretary may increase the 
     number of inspectors as necessary to implement the 
     requirements of title 49, United States Code, as amended by 
     this subtitle.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     449 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:

``44925. Regular inspections of air cargo shipping facilities''.

     SEC. --04. CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is further amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``Sec.  44926. Air cargo security

       ``(a) Database.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     establish an industry-wide pilot program database of known 
     shippers of cargo that is to be transported in passenger 
     aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in 
     air transportation or intrastate air transportation. The 
     Secretary shall use the results of the pilot program to 
     improve the known shipper program.
       ``(b) Indirect air carriers.--
       ``(1) Random inspections.--The Secretary shall conduct 
     random audits, investigations, and inspections of indirect 
     air carrier facilities to determine if the indirect air 
     carriers are meeting the security requirements of this title.
       ``(2) Ensuring compliance.--The Secretary may take such 
     actions as may be appropriate to promote and ensure 
     compliance with the security standards established under this 
     title.
       ``(3) Notice of failures.--The Secretary shall notify the 
     Secretary of Transportation of any indirect air carrier that 
     fails to meet security standards established under this 
     title.
       ``(4) Withdrawal of security program approval.--The 
     Secretary may issue an order amending, modifying, suspending, 
     or revoking approval of a security program of an indirect air 
     carrier that fails to meet security requirements imposed by 
     the Secretary if such failure threatens the security of air 
     transportation or commerce. The affected indirect air carrier 
     shall be given notice and the opportunity to correct its 
     noncompliance unless the Secretary determines that an 
     emergency exists. Any indirect air carrier that has the 
     approval of its security program amended, modified, 
     suspended, or revoked under this section may appeal the 
     action in accordance with procedures established by the 
     Secretary under this title.
       ``(5) Indirect air carrier.--In this subsection, the term 
     `indirect air carrier' has the meaning given that term in 
     part 1548 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.
       ``(c) Consideration of Community Needs.--In implementing 
     air cargo security requirements under this title, the 
     Secretary may take into consideration the extraordinary air 
     transportation needs of small or isolated communities and 
     unique operational characteristics of carriers that serve 
     those communities.''.
       (b) Assessment of Indirect Air Carrier Program.--The 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess the security 
     aspects of the indirect air carrier program under part 1548 
     of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, and report the 
     result of the assessment, together with any recommendations 
     for necessary modifications of the program to the Senate 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the 
     House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure within 60 days after the date of enactment of 
     this Act. The Secretary may submit the report and 
     recommendations in classified form.
       (c) Report to Congress on Random Audits.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall report to the Senate Committee on 
     Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of 
     Representatives Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure on random screening, audits, and 
     investigations of air cargo security programs based on threat 
     assessments and other relevant information. The report may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (d) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     449 of title 49, United States Code, as amended by section 3, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

``44926. Air cargo security''.

     SEC. --05. TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CARGO HANDLERS.

       The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a 
     training program for any persons that handle air cargo to 
     ensure that the cargo is properly handled and safe-guarded 
     from security breaches.

     SEC. --06. CARGO CARRIED ABOARD ALL-CARGO AIRCRAFT.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     establish a program requiring that air carriers operating 
     all-cargo aircraft have an approved plan for the security of 
     their air operations area, the cargo placed aboard such 
     aircraft, and persons having access to their aircraft on the 
     ground or in flight.
       (b) Plan Requirements.--The plan shall include provisions 
     for--
       (1) security of each carrier's air operations areas and 
     cargo acceptance areas at the airports served;
       (2) background security checks for all employees with 
     access to the air operations area;
       (3) appropriate training for all employees and contractors 
     with security responsibilities;
       (4) appropriate screening of all flight crews and persons 
     transported aboard all-cargo aircraft;
       (5) security procedures for cargo placed on all-cargo 
     aircraft as provided in section 44901(f)(1)(B) of title 49, 
     United States Code; and
       (6) additional measures deemed necessary and appropriate by 
     the Secretary.
       (c) Confidential Industry Review and Comment.--
       (1) Circulation of proposed program.--The Secretary shall--
       (A) propose a program under subsection (a) within 90 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (B) distribute the proposed program, on a confidential 
     basis, to those air carriers and other employers to which the 
     program will apply.
       (2) Comment period.--Any person to which the proposed 
     program is distributed under paragraph (1) may provide 
     comments on the proposed program to the Secretary not more 
     than 60 days after it was received.
       (3) Final program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall issue a final program under subsection (a) not later 
     than 90 days after the last date on which comments may be 
     provided under paragraph (2). The final program shall contain 
     time frames for the plans to be implemented by each air 
     carrier or employer to which it applies.
       (4) Suspension of procedural norms.--Neither chapter 5 of 
     title 5, United States Code, nor the Federal Advisory 
     Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the program 
     required by this section.

     SEC. --07. PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION VERIFICATION.

       (a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     may establish and carry out a program to require the 
     installation and use at airports in the United States of the 
     identification verification technologies the Secretary 
     considers appropriate to assist in the screening of 
     passengers boarding aircraft at such airports.
       (b) Technologies Employed.--The identification verification 
     technologies required as part of the program under subsection 
     (a) may include identification scanners, biometrics, retinal, 
     iris, or facial scanners, or any other technologies that the 
     Secretary considers appropriate for purposes of the program.
       (c) Commencement.--If the Secretary determines that the 
     implementation of such a program is appropriate, the 
     installation and use of identification verification 
     technologies under the program shall commence as soon as 
     practicable after the date of that determination.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Snowe be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise today to offer the Air Cargo 
Security Act as an amendment to the Intelligence Reform Act. This is a 
measure that we need to pass to answer some of the criticisms in the 9/
11 Commission Report regarding cargo security.
  I am going to talk further about this bill, but I would like to offer 
Senator McCain some of the time to also talk because he was one of the 
cosponsors. It went through the Commerce Committee with his 
chairmanship. We all agree this is a bill that is needed to add to the 
security that is in the bill in accordance with the 9/11 Commission 
Report.

[[Page S9786]]

  I yield to Senator McCain for his remarks, and then I will finish my 
presentation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas. She has 
been on this issue for at least 3 years that I know of. We passed this 
bill twice through the Senate. Under the chairmanship of Senator 
Hutchison, we had extensive hearings on this issue in the Commerce 
Committee.
  I believe this is a very important issue. Senator Hutchison has many 
important aviation assets in her State, including major airports that 
are not only for passengers but for ports of entry as well.
  I say to Senator Hutchison, thank you, because I think this is a very 
important bill. I tell my colleagues, it has been passed twice through 
the Senate. It is unfortunate that we have to go back and revisit it.
  Finally, we made a commitment that we would try to address all 41 of 
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, not always in a positive 
fashion but at least have them addressed. This is one of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  I thank Senator Hutchison, and I urge my colleagues to support this 
very important amendment. Air cargo, according to many experts, is a 
subject that certainly needs increased security and increased 
attention. I think this amendment does that. I thank my colleague from 
Texas, Senator Hutchison.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the Commerce Committee, Senator McCain, for adding his support to this 
bill. We would not have gotten it through the Commerce Committee 
without his support. I think it adds immeasurably to the bill that is 
before us today.
  Congressional action following 9/11 quickly created the 
Transportation Security Administration to address the appalling 
security gaps exposed by terrorists. We took drastic but appropriate 
steps to considerably increase security of our airports and planes, and 
3 years later we are light-years ahead of where we were on that 
horrific day.
  I am pleased that the 9/11 Commission raises issues that are similar 
to those I have discussed since we enacted the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act. The Commission report states:

       Concerns also remain regarding the screening and transport 
     of checked bags and cargo. More attention and resources 
     should be directed to reducing or mitigating the threat posed 
     by explosives in vessels' cargo holds.

  I have worked since 2001 to enact stringent air cargo security 
standards and, along with Senator Feinstein, introduced the Air Cargo 
Security Act to create a comprehensive system to secure shippers, 
freight forwarders, and carriers. The Senate has twice passed this bill 
unanimously, but it remains stalled in the House of Representatives.
  The bottom line is this: Are we safer than on September 11? 
Absolutely. But have we done enough? Not yet. So I think we can do 
more. I think this is an opportunity for us to address this issue.
  The Air Cargo Security Act will make a difference in our Nation's air 
security. One thing we have not provided since 9/11 is security in the 
belly of the aircraft equal to protections for passenger areas and 
airports. Cargo is shipped on passenger aircraft, in some cases, 
without being screened. That is why we need this amendment.
  The Air Cargo Security Act would establish a reliable known-shipper 
program, mandate inspections of cargo facilities, and direct the 
Transportation Security Agency to work with foreign countries to 
institute regular inspections at facilities that bring cargo into the 
United States.
  The legislation would develop a training program for air cargo 
handlers and give TSA the power to revoke the license of a shipper or 
freight forwarder whose practices are unsound. These provisions will go 
a long way toward further securing aircraft in our country. All of us 
want America to have the safest aviation system in the world. Closing 
the cargo loophole is an important step.
  There is no doubt in my mind that the traveling public is 
considerably safer. We have made changes to ensure our screeners 
undergo background checks, training, and testing. Checked bags are 
scrutinized, flight crew training is constantly being improved, and we 
are traveling in a more secure system. But we must address the cargo 
issue.
  Mr. President, 22 percent of all air cargo in the United States is 
carried on passenger flights, only a tiny fraction of which is 
inspected.
  Beyond transport on passenger planes, there are other issues in the 
cargo arena. Identification cards used by workers are generally not 
secured with fingerprints or other biometric identifiers. Background 
checks for cargo employees are still inadequate.
  Perhaps the weakest link in the cargo security chain is the freight 
forwarder. These are the middlemen who collect cargo from the shippers 
and deliver it to the air carrier. Regulations governing these 
companies are lax, and the TSA is finding security violations when it 
conducts inspections. Under current law, however, TSA lacks the 
authority to revoke the shipping privileges of freight forwarders that 
repeatedly violate security procedures. This air cargo security 
amendment would give TSA that power.
  Air cargo security is not a new problem. In 1988, Pan Am 103 went 
down over Lockerbie, Scotland, because of explosives planted inside a 
radio in the cargo hold of a passenger airplane. The 1996 Valujet crash 
in the Everglades was caused by high-pressure tanks that never should 
have been put on a passenger aircraft in the first place.
  My amendment will strengthen air cargo security on all commercial 
flights. It establishes a more reliable known shipper program by 
requiring inspections of facilities, creating an accessible shipper 
database, and providing for tamper-proof identification cards for 
airport personnel. It gives TSA the tools required to hold shippers 
accountable for the contents they ship by allowing the administration 
to revoke the license of a shipper or freight forwarder engaged in 
unsound or illegal practices. This is the most important part of the 
bill. The TSA has told me time and again they need to have this 
capability in order to revoke licenses when they find an unsafe 
situation.
  I have had the support of my colleagues, such as Senator McCain. 
Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, has worked 
with me on this bill. We have passed this bill twice in the Senate. It 
is a bill we have looked at, we have vetted. We have had hearings.
  I see my colleague Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation 
Subcommittee, is on the floor of the Senate. He knows this bill. He 
worked with me to perfect it. If we can put this amendment on this very 
important piece of legislation, it will add immeasurably to our 
aviation security. We will have the most secure aviation system in the 
world with this amendment on this particular legislation.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from Texas for 
her determination in this area. It is one of the places where there was 
a gap in our aviation security. It is one that she has been working on, 
thinking about, going back to the last Congress. I think one of the 
last things we did in the last Congress was the Senate let this issue 
go through, but we didn't get it completed. She has continued to work 
on it. There were some concerns. Those concerns have been worked on and 
developed and straightened out, and this is a good piece of 
legislation. It passed the full Commerce Committee overwhelmingly last 
week. It is supported by the industry. I want the record to show that 
it would not be happening if it were not for her determination and her 
leadership. It is good legislation.
  The title of this bill is National Intelligence Reform Act. I want us 
to concentrate on the intelligence area and the reforms that are 
necessary to give the national intelligence director the real strength 
he or she may need to make sure our intelligence community does its 
job. It talks about the national counterintelligence center. This was 
done at the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission for intelligence and 
security reforms. So while I don't want this to just become a debate 
about various

[[Page S9787]]

security areas, I would like us to focus on intelligence. This is an 
area where there clearly was a gap. This is an area where thoughtful 
legislation was available. I believe it is appropriate to be added.
  I hope we will support the chairman of the committee and the ranking 
member who have worked hard to get this legislation through in a 
reasonable time. We will have some good debates, and we will have some 
disagreements. We will have some votes. But at the end of the day, we 
need to get this done because the Commission has made it clear where 
there are gaps and where there are problems, both in the executive 
branch and in the legislative branch. We also have to have the follow-
on congressional reforms that will allow us to do a better job on 
oversight because we are part of the problem.

  For those who have questions or have concerns or have amendments, my 
argument is, come forth. Let's have the amendments. Let's debate them 
in the light of day. Let's have a full debate and let's vote. But let's 
get this done because this is about real issues. A lot of times we 
debate, we vote on things that won't affect our lives immediately or 
affect people's ability to do the job under national security. But this 
legislation is about lives. It is about what happened on 9/11. It is 
about what will happen again if we don't step up to this important 
issue and make sure that our executive branch is set up in such a way 
as to do the job, that they have the right chain of command and that 
somebody is in charge, somebody who reports only to the President, 
somebody who can make a decision about the placement of satellites, 
somebody who will give us the information we need to know, not only 
about how much money is spent but where it is spent.
  That has been one of our problems. The Congress has not been putting 
money in many instances where it should have gone so that our 
intelligence community would have had what they needed to do the job. 
Just this very day, we understand the FBI does not have the linguists 
they need to translate intercepts. Now it has become so voluminous it 
is uncontrollable. That is scary. But it is a real problem. We are not 
going to solve it just with this bill or just in this week. If we don't 
begin now, it will make the day even more inevitable or closer that we 
are going to have another disaster on our hands.
  I am here today to tell the committee members I support their effort. 
They have done a good job. We can make it stronger, I believe. But I am 
going to be supporting getting this work completed.
  I thank the chairman of the committee and I thank the sponsor of this 
amendment for the work she has done on this cargo security issue.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the Aviation Subcommittee, the Senator from Mississippi. In fact, one 
of the unanimous consents we had when we took this intelligence reform 
bill to the floor was that all the amendments would have to be relevant 
to the 9/11 Commission. The amendment before us is relevant. I think 
because the Senate has acted on this, it will be a valuable 
contribution to the bill.
  I appreciate the help and counsel of the Senator from Mississippi. I 
thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee for bringing this bill to the Senate floor. We will 
pass this bill, and it will be a good bill. We are all going to work 
together to make that happen, which the distinguished chairman and 
ranking member have already proven.
  I ask for the yeas and nays at the appropriate time for whenever it 
can be scheduled along the lines that the chairman and ranking member 
would schedule.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before the Senator from Mississippi has 
to leave the floor, I want to thank him for his advice and his support 
as we bring this very important legislation before the Senate for 
consideration. I very much value the advice and support of the Senator, 
and I appreciate all he is doing to help move this legislation forward. 
He has been a very early voice in identifying the flaws in our current 
intelligence system and has been stalwart in his support for 
significant reform. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.
  I also commend the Senator from Texas for her continued effort to 
examine the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to pursue 
legislative solutions, particularly in the area of improving the 
security of cargo and general aviation security in general. Senator 
Hutchison has been a longtime leader in this area. Her amendment 
encompasses a significant portion of S. 165 that the Senate passed by 
unanimous consent in May. I commend her for her foresight in 
recognizing areas of concern that have been singled out by the 9/11 
Commission.
  In the Commission's report, for example, the Commission noted that:

       Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general 
     aviation security.

  The Commission went on to say that:

       The TSA and Congress must give priority attention to 
     improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect 
     explosives.

  The Commission says:

       More attention and resources should be directed to reducing 
     or mitigating the threat posed by explosives in vessels' 
     cargo holds.

  These are all areas of weakness identified by the Commission that the 
Senator from Texas would address in her amendment. It will assist in 
implementing several of the Commission's recommendations and as a whole 
will help to make our Nation's air passengers, air carriers, and air 
cargo more secure. I would note that the Department of Homeland 
Security has no objections to the Senator's amendment. When the roll 
call does occur, I will be urging our colleagues to support her 
efforts.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment of 
Senator Hutchison. I thank her for proposing it. She was ahead of her 
time because she has been on this case, along with members of the 
Commerce Committee, at least since March of last year, when the bill 
came out of the Commerce Committee; in fact, the Senate passed this 
bill unanimously in May of 2003.
  Unfortunately, there has been no action that meets up with this bill 
in the House. So Senator Hutchison is quite right to introduce this as 
an amendment to our underlying reform of the intelligence community. 
This is directly relevant to the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that 
``major vulnerability still exists in cargo and general aviation 
security. These, together within adequate screening and access 
controls, continue to present aviation security challenges.'' That 
comes from the 9/11 Commission.
  The Commission concluded that we are safer than we were on September 
11, 2001, but we are not yet safe. This underlying bill is aimed at 
reforming our intelligence community so we will be safe, so we can see 
the threats coming at us, hear them, and stop them before the 
terrorists are able to strike, but also that we may adopt other 
provisions of the 9/11 Commission report.
  Senator McCain and I introduced an amendment that was the first to 
pass a short while ago. I hope this amendment will pass as well, 
because it tightens existing weaknesses, loopholes in the screening of 
cargo transported in passenger aircraft, opening up a vulnerability 
that we all fear terrorists may exploit to strike at us.
  I thank the Senator from Texas for not only being foresighted last 
year in seeing this weakness in our defenses to terrorism but for 
coming forth and introducing this amendment. It will strengthen the 
bill Senator Collins and I and other members of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee have brought out and, therefore, I urge its adoption.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we are making very good progress on this 
significant bill that does focus on the

[[Page S9788]]

safety and security of the American people. This morning the Democratic 
leader and I opened up stressing the importance of making very 
efficient use of our time on the floor.
  A lot has been accomplished even since this morning, but we have a 
lot to do. This morning the leadership on both sides of the aisle 
talked, and we have talked in our caucuses, of the importance of 
collecting today all of the amendments that might potentially be 
offered on this bill. People have been studying the issue since August. 
The bill was marked up in committee in a very thorough way. A lot of 
amendments were offered and debated, some of which will be debated 
again on the floor. Because we need to finish the bill this week, if at 
all possible, it means, given the fact that there are a lot of evening 
commitments which will preclude us from doing a lot of voting tonight, 
we have to get this universe of amendments today.
  Thus, I ask all of our colleagues to give us, through the managers, 
their potential amendments today, and if they plan on offering 
amendments, we absolutely must have them today.
  We are not looking for amendments, but if people have serious 
amendments they feel need to be debated, if we have that list, and 
shortly thereafter--and it would be in all likelihood some time 
tomorrow--we will ask to have the complete language of each of those 
amendments.
  The initial reaction by some is: you are moving too fast. Again, this 
is something we announced several weeks ago, that we would be going to 
the bill yesterday. We have made progress. The bill has been out, and 
people have had time to address it. We ask people over the next hour or 
couple of hours to let us know what amendments they may want to offer 
so we can have that list, and then shortly thereafter--not tonight, but 
shortly thereafter--we will have a deadline by which we need to have 
those amendments, to have the language. It is the only way we will have 
an orderly process to address the substance of this very important 
bill.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, will the Republican leader yield?
  Mr. FRIST. I will.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, Senator Daschle announced in our caucus that 
he was in agreement with the majority leader. In conjunction with the 
Republican cloakroom, we are going to hotline this and tentatively have 
9:30 or 10 o'clock in the morning--whenever the two cloakrooms agree 
they can get their work done, we will have a time for Members to let us 
know what amendments they might want to offer.
  Senator Daschle is always very cautious to make sure we have ample 
time to offer amendments, but this is an extraordinary piece of 
legislation, and Senator Daschle agrees with the Republican leader that 
we should set a time shortly thereafter, either tomorrow evening--or I 
assume tomorrow evening, when Members will actually have to file their 
amendments.
  The concept of the majority leader is certainly one with which 
Senator Daschle agrees. So we are ready to have our hotline go out, and 
theirs. We will look at amendments in the morning and find out what the 
universe of those amendments is, and then those people are going to 
have to step forward and offer amendments at a later time and enter 
into a consent agreement if at all possible later on tomorrow.
  Mr. FRIST. Good. Mr. President, as you can hear, this is a bipartisan 
effort, with full cooperation back and forth between the managers and 
the leadership. We felt it was important to restate the sense of 
efficiency with which we have to address this bill. That is what we 
would like to see happen.
  Again, please let us know your amendments in the next several hours.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur in 
relation to the pending amendment, that is, the Hutchison amendment No. 
3711, at 4:30 p.m. today, with no amendments in order to the amendment 
prior to the vote; further, that there be 2 minutes equally divided for 
closing remarks prior to the vote.
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, if the leader can withhold 
for a minute, unless there is something that would cause us to vote at 
4:30 p.m., we might be able to get that done a half hour earlier.
  Mr. FRIST. From our side, because of various commitments, 4:30 p.m. 
is the best time.
  Mr. REID. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, part of the scheduling is to do just that, 
so we can have another amendment fully considered and then yet even 
another amendment. For planning purposes, 4:30 p.m. seems to be the 
most appropriate time. We will continue to debate and vote on 
amendments. Then hopefully by 4:30 p.m., we will be able to schedule 
additional votes as well.
  Again, I encourage all Members to come forward now and notify us of 
their amendments and to work through the managers to offer appropriate 
amendments.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, if the distinguished majority leader is 
finished, Senator Nelson is here and wishes to be recognized for 5 
minutes to talk about the situation in Florida. Is that all right with 
the two managers?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if I might say a word before that and 
then I will be happy to yield the floor to Senator Nelson. Maybe I 
should yield to the chairman who will probably say the same thing I 
will be saying.
  I am very grateful to the Senate majority leader and to the Senate 
Democratic leader for this agreement and for the pace they are setting 
for consideration of this bill on a bipartisan basis. These are not 
ordinary times. This is not ordinary legislation. It goes to the heart 
of our security. We want to have thoughtful debate.
  The chairman of the committee, Senator Collins, and I found in the 
committee that when we let some time for debate occur, people came to 
very thoughtful conclusions, totally without regard to party. The votes 
on all the amendments went all around the lot. I think people 
ultimately felt good about the process.
  By setting these deadlines now for amendments to be noticed and then 
filed, we are going to expedite exactly that kind of thoughtful 
consideration so we can get this done with the same feeling of, well, 
confidence that we are doing the right thing. We are not only doing 
something we need to do quickly, but we are doing it the right way. So 
I thank the majority leader and Senator Daschle for their help on that 
matter and the help they have given to Senator Collins and me.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I, too, thank our leaders for their 
cooperation in moving this bill forward. The process they have outlined 
is a fair one. It will help us know how many amendments there are, and 
we will work with the sponsors of those amendments to ensure adequate 
debate.
  If the Senator from Florida could tell me how much time he 
anticipates needing.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, if I take 1 minute per 
hurricane in Florida, that would be a total of 4 minutes.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, we would be happy, in light of the 
devastation to his State, to give the Senator from Florida 10 minutes, 
if that would be helpful.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, to the distinguished Senator 
from Maine, it will not be necessary for 10 minutes, but the Chair of 
the committee is very gracious.
  It seems all I talk about on the floor of the Senate is the 
hurricanes that have ravaged Florida. I would like to say to the 
leadership of the committee, I support their legislation. I am looking 
forward to voting for it. They have done a magnificent job. It is very 
timely, and I hope the wisdom they have displayed will be displayed by 
the House of Representatives so we can get a quick agreement and a 
conference and go about the process of reforming our intelligence 
apparatus. My congratulations.


                           Florida Hurricanes

  It does seem that I have spoken over and over about hurricanes and 
about the need for disaster assistance. Indeed, I am making that plea 
again. When we passed the Department of Homeland Security funding bill 
2 weeks ago, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee had 
committed, in a colloquy on the Senate floor, that he would address it. 
I take him at his word, and I am sure his word is good.
  Now that the President has requested additional funds, the question 
for us

[[Page S9789]]

and Florida is speed in enacting this legislation quickly so that money 
can get to the people who desperately need it in direct, outright FEMA 
grants. They need assistance to rebuild their homes. They need Small 
Business Administration loans so that they can rebuild their lives and 
their businesses. Then there are a myriad of Federal disaster 
assistance programs to local governments so that we can rebuild our 
communities, so that we can pick up the debris.
  There is one part of Florida where debris is all over our communities 
from three hurricanes that have hit the same place. We need to rebuild 
our roads and bridges, our airports, our military facilities, and NASA 
at the Kennedy Space Center. So time is of the essence, and I implore 
our leadership to get that message through to the White House and to 
the leadership at the other end of this Capitol to get these funds.
  It is the intention of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, 
who just told me this a few minutes ago, to attach this money to the 
Homeland Security bill, but if that bill gets hung up for whatever 
reason, then this emergency funding needs to come out of here like a 
rocket taking off at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station so that it 
can get to our people.
  Needless to say, after two hits, one wonders just what is in store, 
and how they are going to pick up the pieces of their lives. But when 
three hit, and then four, one can imagine how distressed our people 
are. Help us. We need speed. We need action now.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
following cosponsors be added to Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman 
amendment No. 3705: Senators Voinovich, Leahy, Akaka, Rockefeller, 
Nelson of Nebraska, and Hagel.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Voinovich, along with Senator 
Levin, was very instrumental in helping to draft the compromise 
represented in this amendment. I talked earlier about the efforts of 
the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Connecticut, but I also 
wanted to acknowledge that Senator Voinovich and Senator Levin worked 
very hard to help us strike the right balance in allocating funding so 
that large States with high-threat areas would receive additional 
funding. Yet we wanted to make sure that we recognize that every State, 
regardless of size or population, has certain vulnerabilities.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3706

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3706 on behalf of 
Senator Shelby, Senator Roberts, Senator Bond, Senator Wyden, Senator 
Bayh, Senator Feinstein, and myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
laid aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter), for himself, 
     Mr. Shelby, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Bond, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Bayh, and 
     Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 3706.

  Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text 
of Amendments.'')
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this is one of two amendments which I 
intend to offer to strengthen the position of the national intelligence 
director. At the outset, I join many others in complimenting the 
chairwoman, Senator Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, 
for their leadership and their outstanding work in presenting the bill 
which is now on the floor.
  This measure is a long time in coming for decision by the Congress. 
In my view, had there been a strong national intelligence director in 
existence prior to September 11, 2001, the attack on 
9/11 might well have been prevented. There were many indicators 
present. Had they all been put together, I think there is a good chance 
we could have avoided the calamity of that day.
  There is a famous FBI report from Phoenix about this suspicious 
character who wanted to learn how to fly an airplane but who was not 
interested in takeoffs or landings. That information never got to the 
appropriate authority in headquarters at the FBI. There were two al-
Qaida suspects in Kuala Lumpur known to the Central Intelligence 
Agency, information not communicated to the INS, to Immigration, so 
that those two al-Qaida agents came into the United States and were 
among the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the atrocities of 9/11.
  There was an extensive investigation conducted by the Minneapolis 
office of the FBI, the famous 13-page, single-spaced memorandum by 
special agent Coleen Rowley about Zacarias Moussaoui. Had those leads 
been followed, had there been an application for a warrant under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act using the right standard--the FBI 
used the wrong standard--that would have produced a great deal of 
information which could have, in combination with other information, 
been pieced together to have warned us of the impending attack.
  There is the information from NSA, where there was the tip that 
something was going to happen on 9/11 which was either not translated 
or not communicated to the Intelligence Committee.
  There had been the information about Murad, an al-Qaida operative 
back in 1996, and his plans to fly an airplane into the CIA.
  Those are only some of the threats. In combination and along with 
others, had we had all the information together, had we known what 
could have been pieced together, I think the likelihood is present that 
9/11 could have been prevented.
  During my tenure as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
during the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committee reported a bill, 
S. 1718, which sought to lodge effective power in the Director of 
Central Intelligence. That position theoretically was in charge of all 
the intelligence community but, because of lack of authority, lack of 
budget control, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was 
never able to carry out the role of being the unifier, the real leader 
of the intelligence community.
  In section 707 of that bill, it provided for:

       Enhancement of authority of Director of Central 
     Intelligence to manage, budget, personnel, and activities of 
     the intelligence community.

  On a cross referral, by the time it got to the Armed Services 
Committee, the substance was taken out. There was a big turf battle and 
the effort to lodge authority in the Director of CIA to do effective 
direction and management of the Central Intelligence Agency went to 
naught.

  Thirty days after 9/11, Senator Lieberman and I introduced 
legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. That was on 
October 11 of 2001. When special agent Coleen Rowley testified before 
the Judiciary Committee in June of 2002, there was finally impetus to 
get support from the administration to move ahead with a Department of 
Homeland Security, and when the matter was debated on the floor of the 
Senate, the effort was made to vest authority in the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to direct other intelligence agencies. It seemed to 
us that when we were creating a new department, Homeland Security, this 
was an opportune time to pick up the strands of what had been attempted 
by S. 1718 back in 1996, and by many others.
  It wasn't my idea alone. The Scowcroft Commission had come up with 
similar recommendations. Others had called for real power and real 
authority in a national director. It seemed to us that that was the 
time, with the new Department of Homeland Security, to give this 
effective power to the newly created Secretary of Homeland Security.
  Our efforts, again, were unsuccessful because of the turf battles, 
because of the interests of the CIA and the Department of Intelligence, 
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense and the 
FBI, and the

[[Page S9790]]

other agencies to protect their own turf.
  In October of 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill and 
went home leaving the Senate with the alternative of either taking the 
bill or letting the matter go over until the next year. I was prepared 
at that time to offer the amendment to give the Secretary of Homeland 
Security authority to direct some real power. After talking to 
Secretary Ridge, talking with the Vice President, and talking with the 
President, rather than have no bill at all, it was decided to proceed 
and let the matter stand without having that kind of authority for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.
  There the matter languished until the families of the victims of 
September 11 became a powerful advocacy group, which led to the 
creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the 9/11 Commission report was 
filed in July of this year. There was very substantial momentum finally 
to create a national intelligence director with some real authority to 
really manage the entire community.
  Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and I have produced 
a bill as had been recommended by the 
9/11 Commission and then the Governmental Affairs Committee proceeded 
to have hearings, came back after the recess in late July, had hearings 
in August, marked up the bill, and passed it out of committee last 
week. So it is now on the floor in a context where there is 
considerable public pressure created by the 9/11 Commission report and 
what the families of the victims have done. And the momentum is 
present.
  There has been very substantial opposition to moving at this time. 
There are those who say this legislation is precipitous, that it ought 
not to be passed on the eve of an election, that we have more of an eye 
on 11/2, the election date, than we have on 9/11.
  I reject those contentions. This issue has been under study for 
decades, and personally on my behalf since I spent 8 years on the 
Intelligence Committee and chaired the committee during the 104th 
Congress.
  The 9/11 Commission unanimously and emphatically has called for the 
creation of a national intelligence director. It is my view that is a 
proposition whose time has come.
  When I offered the amendment in committee, which was rejected 
although we received five votes in the committee, there was very 
intense lobbying coming, as I understand it--you can never present 
competent evidence which would stand up in court but a lot of lobbying 
from the protectors of their turf.
  My amendment to create the strength of the national intelligence 
director was deferred until this day. It is my hope and expectation 
that from this bill we will have a national intelligence director if it 
is the one proposed by amendment or if it is the one which is in the 
bill which has been reported by the committee.
  It is my conclusion after very substantial study and after very 
substantial thought and after very substantial consideration that we 
need a very strong national intelligence director. We need an 
independent national intelligence director who will stand up to the 
executive branch, who will stand up to the Congress, who will tell the 
Congress exactly what is needed by way of resources, and who will have 
the stature and strength to get that job done.
  There is an enormous controversy about the resolution to authorize 
the use of force which Congress passed and the President acted on--a 
lot of concern about the adequacy of the intelligence which led to that 
judgment, the 77 votes in this body joined by a majority of Democrats 
as well as Republicans. But there is no doubt that however one views 
the resolution for use of force, it would have been highly desirable to 
have better intelligence.

  The amendment which is embodied in amendment No. 3706 would give 
substantial additional authority to the national intelligence director 
than is contained in the committee bill. It would put the CIA under the 
national intelligence director. The national intelligence director 
would have the authority to manage and oversee the intelligence 
community, including the CIA, the NSA, the National Security Agency, 
the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, the NGA, the National 
Geospacial Agency, and national collection from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency leaving tactical intelligence within the Department 
of Defense as it is now.
  Valid considerations have been raised that tactical intelligence 
ought to be left in the Department of Defense so the Department of 
Defense can carry out its functions. My amendment would leave that 
important facet with the Department of Defense.
  The national intelligence director under the committee bill has 
budget authority over the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a 
great deal of thought, this amendment No. 3706 does not include the FBI 
under the supervision, direction, and control of the national 
intelligence director as the other agencies enumerated would have the 
national intelligence director with the authority to supervise, direct, 
and control which, in my judgment, would give the national intelligence 
director the authority to manage and oversee the national intelligence 
community in an effective way.
  The essence of my bill was circulated to the Governmental Affairs 
Committee with a letter dated August 3 of this year. I put the bill 
into the Congressional Record on September 7. I introduced the bill on 
September 15 under the caption of S. 2081. The amendment embodied in 
No. 3706 is somewhat different, as I have described it.
  We are dealing here with agencies where there are inbred cultures of 
concealment. It is very difficult to get information, even as chairman 
of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  My experience has shown it was very difficult for the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency to know fully and adequately what has 
happened within his own agency. One of the matters which I referred to 
during the committee hearings was information which was disseminated by 
the CIA Chief of Reports and Requirements in the Soviet East European 
Division of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was a man who was in 
the CIA from 1950 until 1991. He had information which was tainted by 
the Soviet Union--information where the individual conceded that he 
knew the intelligence came from Soviet-controlled sources and that he 
disseminated that information at the highest levels of government 
without disclosing that fact to the individuals whom he transmitted the 
information that it came from controlled or tainted sources.
  That information was transmitted, including transmission on January 
13 of 1993. So it went to President George Herbert Walker Bush and it 
went to President-elect Bill Clinton.
  When I took his testimony and expressed shock at what he had done, 
the individual confidently responded that he had acted entirely 
properly because disclosure of the controlled source that the 
information was tainted would have made it even harder, as he put it, 
to sell the intelligence to policymakers; that there was no reason to 
believe the Soviets used deception was inaccurate, and no customer 
would use it unless he had concealed the fact it was tainted.
  This was an extraordinary approach, as I saw it, but I think 
revealing as to what happens within the Central Intelligence Agency, 
within the Bureau, where the individuals have their empires, where they 
know better than anybody else, and transmit information to the 
President of the United States and the President-elect, knowing it to 
be tainted and not telling the President or President-elect that it was 
tainted because they then would not use it, and saying that the 
information was given because the CIA agent, the CIA individual, knew 
that it was correct. That is just the height of audacity but I think 
indicative of the kinds of problems we face with the cultures of 
concealment that we have in the intelligence agencies.
  Another matter which I refer to, in the course of the committee 
hearings, is relevant for presentation; that is, the difficulty of 
having adequate oversight over the intelligence agencies and the duties 
that the intelligence agencies have to make disclosures to the 
oversight committee.
  In the spring of 2002, when I chaired a subcommittee of oversight on 
the Department of Justice and had a wide-ranging subpoena, a document 
was presented which I ask unanimous consent

[[Page S9791]]

be printed in the Record, Mr. President.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                 December 9, 1996.
     To: Mr. Esposito.
     From: Director.
     Subject: Democratic National Campaign Matter.

       As I related to you this morning, I met with the Attorney 
     General on Friday, 12/6/96, to discuss the above-captioned 
     matter.
       I stated that DOJ had not yet referred the matter to the 
     FBI to conduct a full, criminal investigation. It was my 
     recommendation that this referral take place as soon as 
     possible.
       I also told the Attorney General that since she had 
     declined to refer the matter to an Independent Counsel it was 
     my recommendation that she select a first rate DOJ legal team 
     from outside Main Justice to conduct that inquiry. In fact, I 
     said that these prosecutors should be ``junk-yard dogs'' and 
     that in my view, PIS was not capable of conducting the 
     thorough, aggressive kind of investigation which was 
     required.
       I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's comment 
     to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on him and PIS 
     regarding this case because the ``Attorney General's job 
     might hang in the balance'' (or words to that effect). I 
     stated that those comments would be enough for me to take him 
     and the Criminal Division off the case completely.
       I also stated that it didn't make sense for PIS to call the 
     FBI the ``lead agency'' in this matter while operating a 
     ``task force'' with DOC IGs who were conducting interviews of 
     key witnesses without the knowledge or participation of the 
     FBI.
       I strongly recommended that the FBI and hand-picked DOJ 
     attorneys from outside Main Justice run this case as we would 
     any matter of such importance and complexity.
       We left the conversation on Friday with arrangements to 
     discuss the matter again on Monday. The Attorney General and 
     I spoke today and she asked for a meeting to discuss the 
     ``investigative team'' and hear our recommendations. The 
     meeting is now scheduled for Wednesday, 12/11/96, which you 
     and Bob Litt will also attend.
       I intend to repeat my recommendations from Friday's 
     meeting. We should present all of our recommendations for 
     setting up the investigation--both AUSAs and other resources. 
     You and I should also discuss and consider whether on the 
     basis of all the facts and circumstances--including Huang's 
     recently released letters to the President as well as Radek's 
     comments--whether I should recommend that the Attorney 
     General reconsider referral to an Independent Counsel.
       It was unfortunate that DOJ declined to allow the FBI to 
     play any role in the Independent Counsel referral 
     deliberations. I agree with you that based on the DOJ's 
     experience with the Cisneros matter--which was only referred 
     to an Independent Counsel because the FBI and I intervened 
     directly with the Attorney General--it was decided to exclude 
     us from this decision-making process.
       Nevertheless, based on information recently reviewed from 
     PIS/DOC, we should determine whether or not an Independent 
     Counsel referral should be made at this time. If so, I will 
     make the recommendation to the Attorney General.

  Mr. SPECTER. The essence of the document disclosed that there had 
been an effort by ranking officials in the Department of Justice to try 
to influence the FBI not to pursue an investigation on campaign finance 
irregularities in December of 1996 because at that time Attorney 
General Reno was under consideration for reappointment. The relevant 
part of this document from Director Freeh to Mr. Esposito, who was his 
deputy handling this matter:

       I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's comment 
     to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on him and PIS 
     [Public Integrity Section] regarding this case because the 
     ``Attorney General's job might hang in the balance'' (or 
     words to that effect). I stated that those comments would be 
     enough for me to take him and the Criminal Division off the 
     case completely.

  This matter was not brought to the attention of the Judiciary 
Committee as a matter of oversight. In my judgment, this is the kind of 
a matter which the Director, on his own, without request, without 
knowledge by the oversight committee, without subpoena, as it was 
disclosed some 4 years later, should have turned over as a matter of 
oversight.
  Another amendment which I intend to offer would give the national 
intelligence director a 10-year term on the analogy to the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That would enable the director of 
national intelligence to have a substantial degree of independence 
since his term would outlast the term of the President--4 years or, 
with reelection, a total of 8 years.
  We have seen in today's press reports of very substantial problems in 
the FBI, where there are inadequate translators and a great deal of 
information from al-Qaida has gone untranslated. I have talked to FBI 
Director Mueller, who tells me the information is dated, but there is 
still a significant problem in having sufficient translators to handle 
that important matter so we have our intelligence in hand.
  The national intelligence director is going to have to be strong and 
independent, with enough stature, with a tenure of a 10-year term, to 
come to the Congress and be able to see to it that adequate funds are 
provided for the intelligence community.
  The media reports are full of information that show very substantial 
problems on what would happen in Iraq after a military victory with the 
insurgents. The national intelligence director is going to have to be 
strong and independent and bring those matters to the attention of the 
Congress as well as to the executive branch.
  It is my hope that in this legislation we will do a complete job and 
structure the responsibilities of the national intelligence director to 
give him the authority on budget and the authority on supervision, 
direction, and control to effectively manage and oversee the entire 
intelligence community.
  That is an abbreviated statement of a great many considerations. At 
this time, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Specter is offering the first of 
what I anticipate will be many amendments to alter the authority of the 
national intelligence director. He is arguing that the Collins-
Lieberman bill does not go far enough. Later on in this debate you will 
hear from those who believe our bill empowers the NID too far, with too 
much authority in the NID.
  Our approach gives the national intelligence director full budget 
authority, including the authority to execute, reprogram, and transfer 
funds over the entire budgets of the National Security Agency, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office, which are all now located within the Department 
of Defense.
  Our bill also gives the NID enhanced tasking authority, the power to 
transfer personnel and authority over the selections of the heads of 
these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense.
  What it does not do is sever the link between these agencies and the 
Secretary of Defense, nor does it give the NID exclusive control over 
these agencies. And that would be the impact of Senator Specter's 
amendment. He would sever the link between these agencies and the 
Secretary of Defense, and he would give the NID exclusive control over 
these agencies. I think that would be a mistake.
  I believe our legislation strikes the right balance in the 
relationship that it sets forth between the NID and these agencies. I 
note that our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission. It is consistent with the recommendations of the 
administration. The 9/11 Commission, indeed, opposes adoption of 
Senator Specter's amendment. The Commission believes it would be a 
mistake to sever that link between these agencies and the Secretary of 
Defense.
  In deciding to keep these agencies--the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO--
within the Department of Defense, we were cognizant of the fact that 
the NSA and the NGA are designated as combat support agencies. We did 
not want to in any way weaken or break the bonds between these agencies 
and the military forces that serve in that capacity. Indeed, many 
current and former defense officials warned that taking such a step 
would be counterproductive and would risk breaking something that is 
working well for the military today.
  For example, at our hearings, Secretary Powell said:

       We should not break the link between these intelligence 
     organizations and the organizations that they are supporting, 
     especially within the military context and the direct kind of 
     support that the NRO and similar organizations give to the 
     warfighter.

  I would note that by severing that link, the Specter amendment would 
create some real anomalies. For example, in his proposal, he requires 
that every 2 years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would 
submit to the national intelligence director a report on the combat 
readiness of these organizations. Why would a report on

[[Page S9792]]

combat readiness go to the national intelligence director rather than 
to the Secretary of Defense?
  There are some other unanticipated consequences of the Specter 
amendment that illustrate how wholesale changes to the status of NGA, 
NRO, and the NSA might have completely unintended consequences. For 
example, title X, section 442(b) now provides that the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating 
vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the 
authority of the Secretary of Defense, accurate and inexpensive 
nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals 
of instructions for the use of all vessels in the United States and of 
navigators generally. The Specter amendment, in changing the Secretary 
of Defense to the national intelligence director, would make the 
national intelligence director responsible for a navigation mapping 
responsibility that has nothing to do with intelligence. That is just 
an example of some of the unintended consequences.
  Again, the approach taken by Senator Specter--and I know he has given 
this matter a great deal of thought--does not have the support of the 
9/11 Commission. It does not have the support of the administration. It 
would sever the link between these combat support agencies and the 
Secretary of Defense.
  I will note that these three agencies within the Pentagon do serve 
customers other than the Secretary of Defense. There are other 
consumers, such as the CIA, for the intelligence information they 
produce. That is why our legislation does give the NID significant 
authority over these agencies, including budget authority, the ability 
to transfer personnel, and the ability, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of Defense, to name the heads of these agencies. That is the 
right balance. But to break that link between these agencies and the 
Secretary of Defense simply, in my judgment, does not make sense.
  I urge opposition to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, with great respect for Senator Specter, 
friend and colleague, I rise to oppose this amendment.
  I want to say that Senator Specter has been a very constructive 
member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, not just on this matter 
but on so many others that come before the committee. He has 
contributed substantially to the strength of the bill that is before 
the Senate that Senator Collins and I have offered. He and I talked 
quite seriously about this earlier in the year, and ultimately my 
conclusion was that it would construct a bridge too far.
  We have a crisis, which the 9/11 Commission documents, which is that 
we have an intelligence community, as we discussed yesterday and showed 
on the graphs, without a leader, without anyone in charge. It is so 
frustrating to the point of being infuriating to read the lengthy 
narrative at the beginning of the 9/11 Report to see documented the 
failure to connect the dots. The cases that Senator Specter mentioned--
one agency knowing something, not telling it to another agency, which 
might well have either kept out some of the terrorists who struck us on 
September 11--should have--or would have opened our eyes to the plot 
that was being hatched that FBI agents came face to face with, this is 
a system, the American intelligence community, without a leader.
  The most urgent recommendation, according to Governor Kean and 
Congressman Hamilton, that the Commission makes to us is to create a 
strong national intelligence director and then, right alongside that, a 
strong counterterrorism center--connect the dots. We have done this. 
Senator Collins documented the various powers we have given to the 
national intelligence director.
  First, this has been a recommendation of commission after commission. 
Going back to the late 1940s, when the National Security Act was 
adopted and the Central Intelligence Agency was created, post Second 
World War, there was the creation of the Director of Central 
Intelligence who was supposed to be not just the head of the CIA but 
the overseer of our entire intelligence community. The position was 
taken but hamstrung. It was not given the power. The DCI was the same 
person as the head of the CIA. That contributed to the community being 
without a leader.
  In this bill we separate these two positions. We create the 
overarching national intelligence director, separate from the head of 
the CIA, and we give that national intelligence director real budget 
authority, personnel authority and tasking, assignment coordinating 
authority, which we are convinced will make us a lot safer and stronger 
against the threat of terrorism here at home and against Americans and 
others throughout the world.
  The Specter amendment goes further than that and would provide that 
not only would the national intelligence director in the underlying 
bill direct, oversee, and execute the budgets of these agencies, but he 
or she would also supervise, direct, and control their day-to-day 
operations. That approach would create a department in everything but 
name and put the national intelligence director in charge of multiple 
agencies on a day-to-day basis.
  One of the witnesses before our committee was Philip Zelikow, 
Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. We asked Dr. Zelikow: Did 
the Commission consider creating a department of intelligence, giving 
the national intelligence director the powers that the Specter 
amendment would give?
  Dr. Zelikow said: Yes, the Commission considered creating such a 
department but decided against it on several bases.
  And they are the bases of my opposition to the Specter amendment. 
First, the current job that the Director of Central Intelligence had--
which was CIA Director, director of presumably the overall intelligence 
community and principle intelligence adviser to the President--was in 
itself more than one person could do. To give powers to the national 
intelligence director for day-to-day operations of the agencies under 
his or her control would again give more authority, more responsibility 
than the Commission decided was appropriate and manageable.
  The Commission also opted for what they considered to be a more 
modern management approach. They didn't want to create another big 
Federal bureaucracy; they wanted to create, really patterned after some 
very large and very successful private corporations in this country, a 
central management system, strong as our national intelligence director 
would be, with budget, personnel, tasking authority, but not top heavy, 
agile, and not in response or in charge of the day-to-day decisions of 
all of the agencies under that position. That is what we have in the 
approach we are taking in this bill.

  Senator Collins said some people will say--and you will hear of 
amendments on this floor, as the debate goes on, from Members and those 
outside the Chamber who feel the bill Senator Collins and I have put 
before the Senate gives the national intelligence director too much 
power. They will try to strip away that power or fuzz it up so that it 
is not clear and the status quo can remain. There will be plenty of 
opportunity to argue against that when those amendments are filed.
  But here we are in the middle of a war on terrorism, struck as we 
were on September 11, under a continuing threat of attack, alerts all 
over, particularly in Washington and New York--real concern--and to do 
what looks like protecting the status quo of the particular authority 
of existing agencies doesn't make sense. There will be those who feel 
our bill goes too far.
  I don't mean to put words into Senator Specter's mouth because he is 
very eloquent, but this amendment suggests we have not gone far enough. 
The Commission deliberately decided not to take the National Security 
Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and National 
Reconnaissance Organization out of the Department of Defense. The 
Commission was concerned, Dr. Zelikow said, about the balance between 
national and departmental guidance, and they didn't want to tilt the 
balance too far away from defense. The Commission's executive director 
portrayed the Commission's idea of a lean, creative command center this 
way:

       Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old 
     ways of executive management in our national security 
     bureaucracy,

[[Page S9793]]

     counterterrorism requires an innovative response.

  I believe the underlying bill does exactly that: real authority, 
decisionmaking authority, but lean and, may I add, mean, because the 
people who are threatening us are very mean.
  The other thing the kind of structure we have created does is make it 
harder for the problems that many in the Senate and Committee on 
Intelligence cited in its report on prewar intelligence are worried 
about, which is group-think. There is an increased danger that persons 
at the top of the daily operations of the organizations--there is a 
danger that you will begin to have not the competition of ideas we want 
to see in our intelligence community and that we feel strongly will be 
encouraged by the national intelligence director we are creating by the 
language in the bill, the focus on independence and objectivity of 
intelligence and by the national counterterrorism center, which is 
ultimately the place where everybody who knows anything about a 
particular problem--in this case terrorism--and maybe the director will 
create other centers on weapons of mass destruction for particularly 
problematic countries like Iran or North Korea. Everybody in the 
Government who knows anything about that will sit down together to 
share what they have collected in the way of intelligence, share their 
analysis of it, and then plan jointly on how to stop it, how to deal 
with the threat represented by those situations.
  So I believe Senator Specter's intentions are very good, and I admire 
him for them. But I think at this moment they are a bridge too far, 
both in the substance of where he would take us and also, frankly, in 
terms of the probability of any such measure passing Congress. There is 
an urgency to our deliberations, as we have said over and over again. I 
think if we reach too far, we may end up with nothing and nothing 
maintains the status quo, which failed us on September 11 and will fail 
us again unless we act.
  I oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, by way of a very brief reply at this 
time, others will say the committee bill goes too far, and the 
committee bill stands between others who would reject any 
reorganization of the national intelligence community. The amendment I 
have offered doesn't go to that point.
  The question is, what is the best way to reorganize the national 
intelligence community? When reference is made to the comments by Mr. 
Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, he made an 
analysis of S. 2811, which is a bill similar to the amendment now 
pending, but it is not the same. I think it is an overstatement to say 
that the 9/11 Commission rejects the amendment I have offered because 
it hasn't been considered by the Commission.
  Former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee during my tenure as chairman, called me, unsolicited, and 
said that he favored the elements which I had offered and thought it 
was preferable to have the national intelligence director with greater 
authority, which I was proposing.
  I believe it is a fair statement to say that the 9/11 Commission 
would be pleased to see us move to establish a national intelligence 
director, whether it was along the lines of the committee report or 
whether it was along the lines of my amendment. I say, too, that it is 
important to establish a national intelligence director with as many 
powers as we can reasonably give the national intelligence director. I 
think that is what the 9/11 Commission is looking for. I don't think it 
can be accurately said that the 9/11 Commission rejects the substance 
of my amendment. Certainly, former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a member 
of the 9/11 Commission, was not, as far as I can say from an 
unsolicited call. He said he liked the substance of what I was 
offering.
  I think other Senators are going to be interested in participating in 
the debate. It was unknown, generally, what sequence would occur as to 
the offering of the amendment. But I think others will want to come and 
be heard.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment 
offered by Senator Specter. I do so with regret but with conviction. 
Regarding the phrase ``direct and control their day-to-day 
operations,'' if somebody wants to make the national intelligence 
director strong, that will certainly do it. The question is, what does 
that mean? What are the implications? That goes into the law, and then 
people have to interpret what that law means. I think if there is 
anywhere we want to be quite clear, we want the American people, 
through public law, to understand how far the national intelligence 
director can go and, on the other hand, to what point can that 
particular person not go.
  We give that person all kinds of authority, and I think the 
appropriate authority, but when we get into managing and direct control 
of the day-to-day operations, that is a phrase which concerns me 
greatly, and I say so not as one Senator from West Virginia but as vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
  My understanding is that this was brought up in the Governmental 
Affairs Committee and was defeated by a vote of 12 to 5, which is not 
nip and tuck.
  I think the recommendations that were central to the 9/11 Commission 
were very forthright, and Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have 
reflected in their bill, which I am proud to cosponsor, very strong 
measures: a unified budget--oh, there are some people around town who 
are not very happy about that, which is all right--personnel, 
management authority over the national intelligence programs.
  But then we come back to the phrase ``direct and control their day-
to-day operations,'' and that makes me go to an argument which I am 
quite sure, since I was not on the floor, was used by both good 
Senators who are managing this bill. And that is, what I think they 
tried to do is they figured some people would want to have the national 
intelligence director stronger than what they proposed, and others 
would want to have the national intelligence director weaker than what 
they proposed. I heard cases on both sides.
  As I hear those cases, I am drawn more back to the possibility of the 
one I think is the more sensible approach as a person who has been in 
government for a long time but also, quite frankly, I am interested in 
passing a bill and passing a bill that we are pretty sure will be doing 
no harm as a result of the passing of that bill. I am not sure the 
Specter amendment meets that particular test.
  We have all these agencies, and we want to create some sense of 
order, but we do not want to get unnecessarily in the way in places 
where we should not of the combatant commanders, which Senator Collins 
mentioned in her excellent opening statement yesterday. There are some 
things which the military should be able to make decisions about 
outside of the national intelligence director, and they are allowed to 
so do on a modest basis, but on an important basis, by this bill.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill strikes exactly the correct balance on 
this matter, and I think balance, generally speaking, is what works in 
this country and balance is generally what gets bills passed in a 
closely divided Senate.
  Their bill explicitly acknowledges the connection and, at times, the 
tension with what I have just spoken about, and that is the needs of 
the military and the needs of the intelligence community.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill accommodates the uniformed military's 
legitimate need to control its operations. I think that is right 
without shortchanging the consumers of the intelligence, such as the 
President of the United States, Congress, and senior officials 
throughout the Government, such as the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.
  Their bill correctly recognizes the new national intelligence 
director will have to rely on the expertise of his newly created 
deputies which are left, to my way of thinking, in their bill very 
intelligently just floating a bit so that he can decide wisely how best 
to do that rather than decide everything in a period of a week or two.

  I think Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton have endorsed the 
approach contained in the Collins-Lieberman bill. That would be good

[[Page S9794]]

enough for me on most matters, and it certainly is on this matter. The 
notion that the national intelligence director established under this 
bill would not be sufficiently empowered to effectively manage the 
intelligence community is not borne out when one reads this 
legislation, and that is what they are doing. They are doing the 
managing of the national intelligence aspect.
  Without going on at great length, I like the balance. It is the 
nature of this body to seek out that kind of balance. We have to be 
realistic that we are faced in the days ahead with some fairly strong 
probable assaults upon this bill by those from the Armed Services 
Committee and perhaps some from other committees, and our strength in 
being able to get a bill passed, in knowing we passed a good bill, is 
by sticking to a moderate and centrist course which, in fact, is quite 
radical in terms of everything which has taken place since the National 
Security Act of 1947. This bill is an enormous update.
  I just wish to be understood as being strongly for the approach of 
Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia 
for his excellent comments. He states the case very well.
  There are two final points that I would like to make on Senator 
Specter's amendment, and that is, when we asked Philip Zelikow, the 
executive director of the 9/11 Commission, to comment on this, he gave 
us a history of why the Commission specifically rejected this approach, 
and we talked about many of the reasons.
  But one other that he mentioned is that one damaging consequence of 
stripping NSA, NGA, and NRO out of the Department of Defense is that 
then the Pentagon might well feel obligated to recreate the 
capabilities within the Department at great expense and creating many 
more opportunities for bureaucratic conflict. That was a point made by 
the executive director in expressing his opposition to Senator 
Specter's amendment and in giving us an insight into why the Commission 
specifically rejected the route taken in this amendment.
  I also note that Senator Specter's amendment, while it is intended to 
create clear lines of authority between the NID and the combat support 
agencies, in reality could well create much ambiguity and confusion. 
While the amendment gives the NID supervision, direction, and control 
over these combat support agencies, it keeps them housed in DOD 
buildings, on DOD land, and the amendment does not take away from the 
Secretary of Defense the direction and control he currently has over 
these agencies.
  For example, the law that created the National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency, which is now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
establishes that Agency under the authority, direction, and control of 
the Secretary of Defense. Yet under the Specter amendment, the NSA, the 
NGA, and the NRO would fall under the line authority of both Agencies. 
I think that would create tremendous confusion and ambiguity.

  Mr. President, I see the time for the vote has arrived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The next 2 minutes will be equally divided by 
the proponents and opponents prior to the vote occurring at 4:30.
  Mr. SPECTER. Parliamentary inquiry: I believe we have 2 more minutes 
until 4:30.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. And those 2 minutes will be equally divided.
  Mr. SPECTER. I seek recognition to make a comment about the pending 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, we can get more into the details on 
rebuttal as to what Senator Collins has said. I do not think it is 
accurate that we are taking away key authority from the Department of 
Defense, but I want to print in the Record a letter signed by 14 
Senators objecting to the committee bill saying that it ``does not give 
the NID additional authorities will be required to provide the unity of 
leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. 
In particular, we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day 
operational control of all elements of the Intelligence Community 
performing national missions.'' It is signed by Senators Roberts, 
Shelby, DeWine, Hatch, Lott, Snowe, Voinovich, Bayh, Graham, Wyden, 
Bond, Hagel, Chambliss, and myself. There is the current chairman, 
Senator Roberts, and three prior chairmen, Senator Shelby, Senator 
Graham, and myself.
  I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the Record together 
with a memorandum from me to the members of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee dated December 5, 1995.
  A December 9, 1996 memorandum has already been printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                               Washington, DC, September 20, 2004.
     Hon. Susan Collins, Chairman,
     Hon. Joseph Lieberman, Ranking Member,
     Committee on Governmental Affairs,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman: We would like 
     to congratulate both of you for your hard work to draft 
     legislation to reform and strengthen the Intelligence 
     Community. We have covered much ground over the last few 
     months, unraveling the complicated issue of intelligence 
     reform. As a result of your outstanding leadership, we are 
     close to enacting meaningful reform. We understand that your 
     bill includes many important provisions, particularly the 
     creation of a National Intelligence Director (NID) with 
     strong budget authority.
       We are writing to you, however, to express our serious 
     concern that the current draft of the bill, as described by 
     your summary and after review by Governmental Affairs 
     Committee members and staff, does not give the NID additional 
     authorities that will be required to provide the unity of 
     leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence 
     reform. In particular, we feel strongly that the NID must 
     have day-to-day operational control of all elements of the 
     Intelligence Community performing national missions. To 
     fulfill the historic intent of the National Security Act of 
     1947, we must provide the NID--as head of the Intelligence 
     Community--the additional authorities necessary to match the 
     position's responsibilities and to ensure accountability. To 
     address these concerns, we request the opportunity to meet 
     with you prior to any further committee action on the 
     legislation.
       In addition to day-to-day operational control of all 
     elements of the Intelligence Community performing national 
     missions, some members also believe that we must either 
     explicitly create a new agency, or at least provide the NID 
     with supervision, direction, and control similar to a 
     department or independent agency head.
       Clear lines of authority between the NID and our national 
     intelligence agencies, extending beyond budgetary control, 
     are critical to our success in countering 21st Century 
     national security threats. There must be no doubt in anyone's 
     mind that the NID is in charge and is accountable.
       Thank you for you leadership under very challenging 
     circumstances, and we look forward to meeting with you prior 
     to the committee mark-up of intelligence reform legislation. 
     Working together, we can achieve the real intelligence reform 
     that we all seek.
           Sincerely,
         Pat Roberts, Mike DeWine, Trent Lott, George V. 
           Voinovich, Bob Graham, Christopher S. Bond, Saxby 
           Chambliss, Richard Shelby, Orrin Hatch, Olympia Snowe, 
           Evan Bayh, Ron Wyden, Chuck Hagel, Arlen Specter.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 1995.
     To: Members, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
     From: Arlen Specter.
     Re Ames Damage Assessment Inquiry.

       On November 29, 1995, Charlie Battaglia, Fred Ward and I 
     and Gerry Prevost, from CIA's Office of Inspector General, 
     went to the home of L in Springfield, VA, to take his 
     testimony because L advised that his medical condition was 
     such that he could not come to the Committee. The deposition 
     lasted about one hour and 45 minutes., The transcript is 
     available for your review.
       L began working for the CIA in 1950 and during the period 
     from 1980 to 1991, L was Chief of Reports and Requirements in 
     CIA's Soviet East European Division. He was responsible for 
     determining the quality of Soviet sources, assessing the 
     authenticity of the intelligence, and disseminating those 
     reports to policymakers.
       L readily conceded that he knew intelligence data came from 
     Soviet controlled sources and that he disseminated such data 
     to the highest levels of our government without disclosing 
     the fact that it came from such controlled sources.
       When I expressed shock at this, L confidently responded 
     that he had acted entirely properly because disclosure of the 
     controlled source would have made it even harder to ``sell'' 
     the intelligence to policy makers, there was no reason to 
     believe the Soviets used deception, no customer could use it 
     unless his unit gave permission, and no customer would make 
     any decision based on one or two documents.

[[Page S9795]]

       L boasted that often U.S. general officers came to him 
     directly for assessments of Soviet information much to the 
     consternation of his division director.
       When L was told that his successor, Z, denied knowing that 
     such intelligence data came from a source known to be 
     controlled by the Soviets, L responded ``bullshit.'' Z 
     received only a letter of reprimand for passing on 
     intelligence data from Soviet controlled sources without 
     appropriate disclosures.
       It is had to comprehend: (1) how L failed to understand 
     that his conduct posed a grave threat to U.S. national 
     security and was an unconscionable arrogation of power unto 
     himself; (2) how his superiors (some of whom reportedly knew 
     what he was doing) could permit him to function in this 
     manner for so long; and (3) why the Agency has not turned 
     heaven and earth to root out this kind of attitude and 
     conduct. From the Ames case and other matters, L's conduct 
     and attitude appears to represent a deep-seated institutional 
     problem for the Agency.
       Detailed questioning must be undertaken of the supervisors 
     of L and Z, including the Directors, to determine how this 
     could have gone on so long. Extensive work remains to be done 
     to trace to whom the controlled data went, what decisions 
     such data influenced and what damage the U.S. sustained from 
     such decisions.


                           Amendment No. 3711

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, do I have 1 minute remaining before 
the vote begins?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will support this 
air cargo security amendment. This is an amendment that the Senate has 
voted on twice and passed. It will add significantly to the security of 
our aviation community. The airports and the top of the airplane are 
very safe. We have done a super job of creating those safe areas, but 
what we have not done is matched that with cargo security, what is in 
the belly of the airplane. We want a seamless aviation system, and with 
this amendment I think we will have the safest aviation system in the 
world.
  I am very proud to have the support of so many of my colleagues, and 
I hope we send a strong message that this amendment should be added to 
the final bill. I appreciate the support of the chairman, the ranking 
member, the chairman of the Commerce Committee, and the Aviation 
Subcommittee as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I urge support for Senator Hutchison's 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for not more than 1 
minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise to support Senator Hutchison's amendment. It 
really strengthens the basic bill that we brought before the Chamber. 
It would reorganize our intelligence community to better deal with the 
threat of terrorism. We want this core proposal to be a vehicle for 
responding to the other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to 
close as many of the points of vulnerability that we have in America to 
terrorists as we possibly can.
  The Commission said major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and 
general aviation security. This amendment would go a long way toward 
ending those vulnerabilities. I thank the Senator from Texas, and I 
urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the 
conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the 
Specter amendment for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question is on agreeing to Hutchison amendment No. 3711. The yeas 
and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Corzine), the Senator from North Carolina 
(Mr. Edwards), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 190 Leg.]

                                YEAS--96

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (FL)
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Akaka
     Corzine
     Edwards
     Kerry
  The amendment (No. 3711) was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized for 10 
minutes.


                           amendment no. 3706

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Specter 
amendment. I wish to compliment the managers of the bill, Senators 
Collins and Lieberman. I thought their arguments were overwhelmingly 
persuasive in support of the President's position and indeed the 9/11 
Commission that these agencies--the National Security Agency; the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the former Mapping Agency, as 
we knew it; and the National Reconnaissance Office--have important 
intelligence functions. They are collection agencies. They must remain 
under the managerial supervision of the Secretary of Defense. I feel 
ever so strongly about that.
  These three agencies are designated in law as combat support 
agencies, servicing our troops, the men and women of the Armed Forces 
wherever they are in the world facing harm's way, today, tomorrow, and 
in the future.
  The President announced, on September 8, that these three agencies 
would not--I repeat, would not--be moved from the Department of 
Defense. This decision was based on two very important principles: One, 
no reform measures that the President advocates should disrupt ongoing 
operations in the war on terrorism. I am certain all colleagues fully 
appreciate the sensitivity of that extremely important decision and 
principle not to move these three agencies. Secondly, no ambiguity 
should be introduced in the chain of command, from the President 
through the Secretary of Defense down to the combatant commanders. That 
is vital to the war on terrorism and indeed other military operations.
  These three agencies are designated combat support agencies providing 
direct intelligence support to the unified combatant commanders 
currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other theaters.
  The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President. Under law--
I shall turn to the law momentarily. To ensure that these agencies 
provide the proper intelligence to our military customers, the 
Secretary of Defense must be able to direct them in executing their 
operational missions.
  I would like to pause for a minute and draw to my colleagues' 
attention the law. It reads, for the Secretary of Defense:

       The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director 
     of Central Intelligence, shall--
       (1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the 
     intelligence community within the Department of Defense are 
     adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the 
     Department of Defense. . . .

  Further on down it reads:

       (4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community 
     within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely 
     with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military 
     forces. . . .


[[Page S9796]]


  I do not see how the amendment of my colleague from Pennsylvania 
modifies the existing law, and that is imperative if this amendment is 
to be effective.
  I draw my colleagues' attention further to the law, and that is title 
10 with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I read from 
section 193:

       (a) Combat Readiness.--(1) Periodically (and not less often 
     than every two years), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on 
     the combat support agencies. Each such report shall 
     include--
       (A) a determination with respect to the responsiveness and 
     readiness of each such agency to support operating forces in 
     the event of a war or threat to national security; and
       (B) any recommendations that the Chairman considers 
     appropriate.

  That law would have to be modified in some way were this amendment to 
be adopted.
  So, in conclusion, Mr. President and colleagues, I foresee a 
potential disruption to operations were this amendment to become law. 
Numbers are classified, but approximately one-half of the employees of 
these agencies are Active-Duty military personnel.
  In addition to national requirements, these agencies provide great 
volumes of tactical-level support to the warfighter.
  Also, in existing law, I draw to my colleagues' attention that the 
Under Secretary of the Air Force is dual-hatted as a Director for the 
NRO. So that, too, would have to be amended and changed. Furthermore, 
the Director of the NSA is dual-hatted. He is a Deputy Commander of 
Strategic Command for Information, warfighting responsibility.
  So in conclusion, I strongly support the position of the 
distinguished chairman and ranking member and urge colleagues to vote 
against this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have listened with a keen interest, as 
I always do, when the Senator from Virginia speaks. The concerns which 
I have seen in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and as chair--
and I served with the Senator from Virginia on the Intelligence 
Committee--is the dominance of the Department of Defense on the budget 
and the lack of coordination with the other intelligence agencies, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence branch of the 
FBI.
  The citations of authority which the Senator from Virginia raises can 
all be accommodated. In a very careful way, very carefully crafted, we 
have left the Department of Defense with the necessary intelligence 
gathering for them to perform their mission and their function.
  When the national intelligence director has overall supervision and 
management, it does not mean that the Secretary of Defense will not 
have access to information from the NRO or the NSA or the other 
branches. When we hear those citations of authority, they can all be 
molded consistent with the amendment I have offered, which, as the most 
recent enactment, governs and dominates.
  So I know the sincerity and I know the perspective of the chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee. When I had introduced S. 1718 back in 
April of 1996, and it was referred to the Armed Services Committee, it 
was emasculated, really, on a turf struggle. I think there is a very 
heavy overtone of the turf battle which is present here this afternoon 
at this moment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the one thing we want to avoid is 
patchwork legislation. I have drawn to the attention of my colleague--
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I yield the floor. I had the floor, but I 
do yield it.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. But, I say to the Senator, I would 
be happy to enter into a colloquy with you on this point.
  Mr. SPECTER. Then in that event I will stay standing.
  Mr. WARNER. I would hope you do so.
  I pointed out specific provisions of the law requiring certain 
accountability of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs. We do not want to do patchwork legislation.
  My understanding, after reading and studying your amendment, is you 
take these three entities out of the Department of Defense. I do not 
read into the amendment where there is a residual authority left in the 
Secretary to perform the functions as prescribed in title 10 and, to 
some extent, title 50.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, through the Chair, I would inquire of the 
Senator from Virginia, what does he see which would stop those various 
officers from complying with those requirements and still allow the 
national intelligence director to have overall management? That is my 
question to the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I will wait for the Senator from West Virginia to answer. 
You directed it to the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. SPECTER. I hadn't meant to promote Senator Warner.
  Mr. WARNER. I am trying to inject a little lightheartedness.
  Mr. SPECTER. If you are confused on the substance of the question, 
maybe the court reporter could repeat it.
  Mr. WARNER. I say to my good friend, a little humor now and then is 
well advised. But I understand precisely the question directed to me. 
Let us read your amendment. Would you read your amendment and show me 
where that residual authority under titles 10 and 50 are left in the 
Secretary of Defense?
  Mr. SPECTER. There is nothing in the amendment which takes the so-
called residual authority from the Secretary of Defense. The amendment 
gives to the national intelligence director management and supervision, 
but it does not undercut the directions of the statutes to which you 
have referred.
  Mr. WARNER. I would draw that argument to the attention of the 
distinguished manager of the bill. My understanding, in reading some of 
your comments, is that I do not find in this amendment where there is a 
clear delineation of authority and that managerial responsibility, as 
required under titles 10 and 50, remains in the Secretary of Defense.
  Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield on that point, I think this 
points out the confusion and ambiguity I pointed out earlier due to the 
way the Specter amendment is drafted. I agree that it creates confusion 
and also that the implications of substituting the national 
intelligence director for the Secretary of Defense throughout the laws 
creating these agencies creates a lot of unintended problems. That is 
one reason I believe this amendment should be defeated.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the concept of unintended consequences is 
not an unusual argument. It can be attenuated in many directions. My 
submission to this body is that the amendment is plain on its face, 
that it seeks to create a national intelligence director who has the 
authority to manage the intelligence community. When the Senator from 
Virginia cites responsibilities in existing law, there is nothing in my 
amendment which undercuts that law, nothing at all. Ambiguity, like 
beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and in this situation, on the 
face of the amendment, there is no ambiguity.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am reading from section 305, Defense 
Intelligence Agency. I believe that is clear on the DIA, but I do not 
see it with reference to the National Reconnaissance Office. ``The 
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the 
direction, supervision, and control of the NID.'' I just see no 
residual managerial authority left in the Secretary of Defense to 
fulfill his statutory requirements under titles 10 and 50.
  ``Line of authority: The Director of National Reconnaissance shall 
report directly to the national intelligence director regarding the 
activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.'' I mean, there is 
the clear English language.
  I say to my good friend, he may be well intentioned, but I am 
somewhat at a loss to find any reference in this amendment that 
preserves that residual responsibility which you have represented to 
the Senate.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I regret the Senator from Virginia is at 
a loss, but that doesn't affect the plain language of the amendment and 
the fact that it doesn't disturb the responsibilities under the section 
cited by the Senator from Virginia.

[[Page S9797]]

  Mr. WARNER. Might I just hand you the amendment and ask you to point 
to the language which you feel leaves the residual authority in the 
Secretary of Defense?
  Mr. SPECTER. I think the amendment speaks for itself, I say to 
Senator Warner.
  Mr. WARNER. I have given every opportunity to my colleague. I stand 
by my representations to my colleagues and I support the managers of 
the bill in having this amendment defeated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the bottom line of the Specter amendment 
is that it would sever the reporting relationship between the heads of 
these three combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I 
don't think that makes sense. I understand these three agencies serve 
consumers of intelligence other than the Pentagon, other than the war 
fighters, but the Pentagon, the war fighter, is a very important 
consumer of the intelligence produced by these agencies, and that is 
why in our legislation we gave a lot of thought to how to handle the 
organization of these agencies and the reporting requirements.
  We followed the advice of the 9/11 Commission. We kept a reporting 
relationship to the Secretary of Defense in acknowledgment of the 
combat support agency role played by these organizations. But in 
recognition of the fact that they also provide critical intelligence to 
the CIA and to a host of other agencies and to the President, we 
recognized that they are national as well.
  What we have is a dual reporting responsibility to both the Secretary 
of Defense and the new national intelligence director. We do strengthen 
the control of the national intelligence director in significant ways 
in acknowledgment that these are national assets. We give the director 
control over the budget of these agencies. We allow the director to 
appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary 
of Defense. The new national intelligence director can transfer 
personnel and funds. But we should not sever the link between those 
agencies and the Secretary of Defense. That would be a big mistake.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the Specter amendment.
  I appreciate the support of the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the distinguished manager would yield 
for a question, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in support 
of his amendment, submitted for the record a letter dated September 20, 
2004, signed by a number of colleagues. Here is a statement that I 
believe confirms the proposition I just enunciated, that the amendment 
would strip the Secretary of all of his responsibilities as existing in 
other statutes. I will read it:

       We are writing to you, however, to express our serious 
     concern that current draft of the bill, as described by your 
     summary and after review--

  It is addressed to the chairman.

       --by the Governmental Affairs Committee members and staff, 
     does not give the NID additional authorities that will be 
     required to provide the unity of leadership and 
     accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In 
     particular--

  This is the operative sentence.

       --we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day 
     operational control of all elements of the intelligence 
     community performing national missions.

  It goes on. So it is very clear.
  I would say that they do single out the term ``national missions,'' 
but these combat support agencies perform both national missions and 
tactical combat missions. They are not clearly separable. I mean the 
soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in the field today relies on 
satellite intelligence, which is a national mission of, say, the NRO, 
as well as the tactical support the NRO gives in various ways.
  So I feel that as I read the amendment, it is totally contradictory 
of the desire of the 9/11 Commission, totally contradictory of the 
advice and counsel that the President has given the Congress, am I not 
correct?
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct and his points are well taken. In 
reading to me the statement from that letter, the Senator has brought 
up another important point. Do we really believe that the national 
intelligence director should have line authority, day-to-day 
operational authority over all of those agencies? We know that the 9/11 
Commission found that one reason the CIA Director was not as effective 
as he should be was he had too many jobs. He is head of the 
intelligence community, he runs the CIA, and he is the principal 
adviser to the President.
  Under the formulation proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, we 
would be worsening that problem by giving the NID line authority, day-
to-day operational authority. That person cannot possibly run all of 
those agencies and still coordinate, oversee, and manage the 
intelligence community.
  So I believe this amendment goes too far. The Specter amendment 
essentially creates a de facto department of intelligence, as my 
colleague from Connecticut has pointed out, and that approach was 
specifically rejected by the 9/11 Commission. They specifically 
considered what should be the reporting relationships of these three 
combat support agencies. They rejected the approach taken by the 
Specter amendment. The administration also opposes that approach. Our 
committee rejected that approach. Our witnesses did not think that 
approach was wise.
  I urge my colleagues to join in opposition to the amendment offered 
by Senator Specter.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may I ask my distinguished colleague 
another question? This is a letter which is now submitted for the 
Record. It contains the names of about eight or nine other Senators. 
Have any of those Senators come to clarify this point? I would like to 
study what they have said.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, in committee, some of the Senators who 
signed that letter participated in the debate. They did not convince 
the majority of the committee members. So far in this debate today, I 
don't believe that other advocates of this approach have yet been 
heard, but they may well be heard tomorrow. I know Senator Bond wants 
to speak. I think there are both proponents and opponents who still 
wish to be heard.
  Mr. WARNER. I hope to be on the Senate floor when they do that. I 
wonder if the managers of the bill might acquaint them with the title 
10 and title 50 provisions and ask where in the amendment those 
provisions are modified; otherwise, we are going to end up with a 
patchwork. That is one thing I know this chairman and ranking member do 
not wish to have.
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator's point is well taken.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Warner, who chairs the 
Armed Services Committee, which the chairman of our committee and this 
ranking member are privileged to serve on, for his statement, his 
reference to sections of statute that could be compromised and indeed 
overridden if this amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania were 
adopted.
  I thought that the colloquy between Senator Warner and Senator 
Collins was very illuminating. I hope our colleagues had a chance to 
listen to it because it did, I believe, ultimately explain why this is 
a bridge too far, a motto from the Second World War, where the troops 
were sent to take one bridge too far--I have the feeling that Senator 
Warner is going to know the background of this ``bridge too far'' 
reference--too far to hold the bridge and, as a result, the overall 
effort collapsed.

  I am afraid this stretches too far and it weighs down the reforms we 
are trying to make. I believe the colloquy between Senator Warner and 
Senator Collins is a great argument for the balance we have struck. We 
leave the line authority over these national intelligence agencies with 
the Defense Department. Without going into details--because it is 
classified--thousands of men and women in uniform serve in these 
agencies. So we want to leave that line authority with the Secretary of 
Defense but create a reporting authority to the national intelligence 
director because the NID will oversee the entire intelligence 
community.
  This has been a wonderful learning experience for Senator Collins and 
me. We met with the head of the NSA, General Hayden, and the head of 
the NGA, General Clapper, and it was fascinating to hear the extent to 
which they are not only providing day-to-day technical military 
intelligence to help their personnel in the field at Central

[[Page S9798]]

Command today, and other commands, but the way in which they are also 
providing, because of their extraordinary capabilities, daily 
assistance and intelligence security to law enforcement agencies. That 
is the balance we tried to strike.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will pose a question to both managers, 
also members of the Armed Services Committee. As we proceed with this 
legislation, I am sure you are bearing in mind that we recall the 
aftermath of the 1991 war in which we participated in liberating 
Kuwait. You will recall as a member of the committee that General 
Schwarzkopf came before us at that time as sort of an after-action 
report. He talked in some detail about what he felt were shortcomings, 
particularly in the tactical intelligence, as to what he needed as a 
warfighter, as commander of the forces. That sounded alarms throughout 
the system. It startled many of us that that shortfall existed to that 
extent. Immediately the then Secretary of Defense and the successive 
Secretary of Defense--particularly Secretary Rumsfeld--have done 
everything possible to strengthen and remove the weaknesses that were 
in the system at that time.
  As we proceed on this bill, I hope we have been mindful of particular 
tactical strengths that have been built into the existing system. It 
would be my fervent hope that nothing in this bill would roll back that 
progress. I wonder if the managers might address that, since both are 
members of the Armed Services Committee and have experience with the 
gulf war and what has been done in the ensuing years.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator for his question, my chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee. It is an important question, one that 
Senator Collins and I weighed as we went through this process of 
accepting the assignment from the bipartisan leadership to consider and 
recommend to the Senate on the 9/11 Commission Report. We both take not 
only our responsibility to protect America's security under the 
Constitution seriously, we take our membership on the Armed Services 
Committee seriously. We have a purpose here. We want to put somebody in 
charge. The 9/11 Commission Report says the intelligence community 
doesn't have a leader. They are not coordinating their effort. As we do 
that, we said we want to make sure we don't compromise the quality and 
availability of intelligence to our warfighters. In fact, we believe 
our proposal not only doesn't compromise the quality of intelligence, 
but will ultimately improve it because there will be better 
coordination.
  Even from within some of these agencies, national assets under the 
Defense Department, high officials said to us that they don't benefit, 
they don't think the military benefits, the warfighters benefit from 
the current ambiguity. Make those lines clear, and all the customers, 
if I can use that term, of intelligence will benefit, including the 
military.
  Senator Warner knows that in specific regard to the so-called TIARA, 
or tactical intelligence budget of the military, that remains totally 
within the Defense Department, and so do most of the joint military 
intelligence programs. So the answer is a resounding yes. We understand 
the uncertainty, the anxiety because of our bill. The 9/11 Commission 
recommendations represent change. It does take the budget authority and 
put it under the national intelligence director for national 
intelligence programs, including these three within the Defense 
Department. So we understand the anxiety. But we think we put together 
a balanced system that will not only first provide the No. 1 customer 
of intelligence, the President of the United States, with the best 
intelligence, with the coordinated unity of effort that he requires, 
but do the same for the warfighters. That is our firm belief.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is reassuring. If I might further 
inquire of my distinguished colleague, I was given today, and I expect 
the managers maybe earlier received this, in any event, this is the 
September 28 communication from the Executive Office of the President 
to the Senate. It is entitled ``Statement of Administration Policy.'' 
Has that been printed in the Record as yet today?
  Ms. COLLINS. It has not.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, at this point in 
the debate or at the conclusion of our colloquy, to print this 
Statement of Administration Policy in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   Statement of Administration Policy

       The Administration supports Senate passage of S. 2845, 
     commends the Committee for its expeditious attention to these 
     important intelligence reform issues, appreciates the 
     Committee's efforts to include important provisions proposed 
     by the Administration, including specific and detailed budget 
     authorities for the National Intelligence Director (NID), and 
     looks forward to working with the Congress to address the 
     Administration's concerns outlined below. This measure will 
     build upon actions already taken by the Administration, 
     including in the President's recently issued Executive 
     Orders, as well as upon the recommendations of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 
     Commission).
       The Administration supports, in particular, the 
     establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful 
     budget authorities and other authorities to manage the 
     Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the 
     newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The 
     Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken 
     the full budget authority or any other authorities that the 
     President has requested for the NID. The Administration will 
     work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and 
     streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make 
     adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have 
     flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting 
     intelligence activities.
       The Administration is concerned about the excessive and 
     unnecessary detail in the structure of the Office of the NID. 
     In particular, provisions of S. 2845 would, in the aggregate, 
     construct a cumbersome new bureaucracy in the office of the 
     NID and in the Executive Office of the President with 
     overlapping authorities. Legislatively mandated bureaucracy 
     will hinder, not help, in the effort to strengthen U.S. 
     intelligence capabilities and to preserve our constitutional 
     rights. The Administration urges the Senate to delete or 
     significantly revise these problematic provisions.
       The Administration opposes the Committee's attempt to 
     define in statute the programs that should be included in the 
     National Intelligence Program; the Administration believes 
     that further review is required. The Administration also 
     believes that the Committee bill's provision relating to the 
     NID's role in acquisition in major systems needs further 
     study to ensure that the requirements of major consumers are 
     met.
       The Administration supports the strong information-sharing 
     authorities granted to the NID in the bill. The 
     Administration is concerned that the extensive authorities 
     and responsibilities granted to the Office of Management and 
     Budget (OMB) to implement an information sharing network are 
     both outside of OMB's usual responsibilities and are 
     inconsistent with the goal of ensuring a NID with effective 
     authority to manage the Intelligence Community. These 
     responsibilities should be granted to the NID in such a way 
     as to remain consistent with section 892 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002. The Administration also believes 
     that the detail in which the legislation prescribes the 
     network is excessive; the network would be more likely to 
     accomplish its beneficial goal if the bill simply provided 
     the authority necessary for its establishment while 
     leaving the details to be worked out and altered as 
     circumstances require.
       The Administration is also very concerned about the 
     provisions that would purport to reorganize the President's 
     internal policy staff by merging the National Security 
     Council and the Homeland Security Council. Based on the 
     constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the Congress 
     should not legislate and make permanent the internal 
     organization of the President's own Executive offices or 
     otherwise limit the flexibility needed to respond quickly to 
     threats or attacks.
       The Administration is also concerned that the Committee 
     bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the 
     intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel 
     disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, for the 
     amounts requested by the President, and provided by the 
     Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence 
     activities.
       The Administration opposes the provision in the Committee 
     bill purporting to require the President to select a single 
     department or agency to conduct all security clearance 
     investigations. Although the Administration supports 
     improvements to the security clearance process, this 
     provision would impermissibly interfere with the President's 
     need for flexibility in conducting security clearance 
     investigations and does not recognize the special needs of 
     individual intelligence agencies.
       The 9/11 Commission found that the creation of a NID and 
     National Counterterrorism Center, ``will not work if 
     congressional oversight does not change too.'' The 
     Administration notes that the bill does not address this 
     vital reform component or the parallel recommendation to 
     consolidate oversight for the Department of Homeland 
     Security. The Administration believes the legislation

[[Page S9799]]

     should also address the Commission's recommendation to ensure 
     rapid consideration by the Senate of national security 
     appointments.
       The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not 
     include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and 
     Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal; the 
     Administration supports inclusion of this provision in the 
     Senate bill. The legislation should also recognize that its 
     provisions would be executed to the extent consistent with 
     the constitutional authority of the President: to conduct the 
     foreign affairs of the United States; to withhold information 
     the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations, 
     the national security, deliberative processes of the 
     Executive, or the performance of the Executive's 
     constitutional duties; to recommend for congressional 
     consideration such measures as the President may judge 
     necessary or expedient; and to supervise the unitary 
     executive.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it is a document that will be of 
value to all Members of the Senate if they have not received it.
  I would like to draw the attention of the two managers to that 
operative paragraph 2:

       The Administration supports, in particular, the 
     establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful 
     budget authorities and other authorities to manage the 
     Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the 
     newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The 
     Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken 
     the full budget authority or any other authorities that the 
     President has requested for the NID. The Administration will 
     work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and 
     streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make 
     adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have 
     flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting 
     intelligence activities.

  It is the operative phrase that ``the Administration will oppose any 
amendments that would weaken the full budget authority,'' and the 
preceding sentence where they said ``a NID with full, effective, and 
meaningful budget authorities.''
  Mr. President, first, I would like to ask the two managers, is the 
purport of this paragraph consistent with all the several provisions in 
the bill that refer to budget authority, in their judgment?
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to answer the question of the Senator 
from Virginia, I believe it is consistent. I direct the Senator's 
attention to the very first sentence of this Statement of 
Administration Policy where it states: ``The Administration supports 
Senate passage of S. 2845.'' That is the bill before us. That is the 
bill that is also known as the Collins-Lieberman bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Without diminishing in any way that very encouraging 
sentence, if you go on to read the totality of this communication, 
there are expressly in here some reservations, but I will not get into 
that at this point in time.
  I want to go back to these words, ``full, effective, and meaningful 
budget authorities.'' We just had a debate on the Specter amendment, 
which I believe, with no disrespect to my good friend and colleague, is 
an extreme viewpoint on this, and I am hopeful the Senate will not 
adopt it, but we do come back to this pivotal question, and tomorrow I 
hope to bring forth some amendments. Now that I see the expressed 
language and the Senator assured me her bill tracks this, I have to 
have some clarification--at least I shall seek clarification--of what 
is the remaining role of the Secretary of Defense with regard to those 
portions; namely, these three combat agencies, together with DIA, what 
is the residual area of collaboration, jointness, in the preparation of 
the budget--preparation is part 1--and then the execution of the budget 
after it goes through the authorization and appropriations process and 
begins to come back to the several departments and agencies.
  So let's talk about what the Senator believes this language--which is 
consistent, as she says, with the language in the bill--I presume the 
Senator's language would not be modified or changed by this--what is 
left to the Secretary of Defense in regard to the budget authority?
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to respond to the question of the Senator 
from Virginia, our bill makes very clear that the budgets for the 
tactical intelligence programs remain under the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense. That is consistent with the position of the 
administration, and it is also consistent with the position of the 9/11 
Commission.

  What we are seeking to do is to put national intelligence assets--the 
budget for those programs--under the national intelligence director 
and, indeed, much of the budget for these agencies is currently within 
the National Intelligence Program, or what is now known as the NFIP, 
the National Foreign Intelligence Program, because as the Senator is 
well aware, these agencies are providing intelligence not just to the 
combatant commanders, the troops, DOD, but as one of the generals with 
whom we met told us, he talks far more often to the Director of the CIA 
than he does to the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I really think that is an important 
representation the Senator has made, but I do not read in this language 
of the communication from the White House the distinction that she 
draws between tactical and national. Can I refer the Senator again to 
this language?
  Ms. COLLINS. If we look at the administration's legislative language 
they have sent up, they, too, exclude the tactical intelligence assets. 
I think what this language is intended to convey is, as one of our 
witnesses said--as many of our witnesses said--the worst thing we could 
do is to create a national intelligence director who did not have 
budget authority. That power of the purse is arguably the most 
important authority given to the NID, but no one, to my knowledge, has 
advocated giving the NID authority over the tactical intelligence in 
the Department of Defense.
  Mr. WARNER. I draw the attention of the distinguished managers to the 
words ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken 
the full budget authority. . . .'' It is the word ``full.''
  Ms. COLLINS. Yes, that the President has requested for the NID.
  Mr. WARNER. To me ``full'' is the whole basket. It could be 
interpreted that way.
  Ms. COLLINS. What I am telling the Senator is that if he looks at the 
language sent up by the administration, he will see--and if he looks at 
the language in our bill, he will see there has never been discussion 
in putting tactical intelligence--
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I acknowledge that, the JMIP and the TIARA 
in the language sent up. But it seems to me the writer of this could 
have been somewhat more explicit in the communication because this is 
an important communication to guide Senators desiring to establish 
their voting pattern in connection with the Senator's bill.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I, obviously, am 
not the author--
  Mr. WARNER. I think I pressed the point far enough and I think the 
Senator from Maine has been very courteous in her responses. I just 
want to bring to the attention of colleagues, when this says ``full,'' 
it is your understanding it did not include the JMIP, the TIARA, and 
those programs; is that correct?
  Ms. COLLINS. That is correct, other than there may be some programs 
that are now part of the JMIP that are not principally for--and I see 
my colleague from Michigan joined us; we had a long debate in committee 
about this--that are not principally used for joint military purposes, 
but rather are national intelligence assets, and an example of that 
would be DIA.
  Mr. WARNER. I am privileged to be in this colloquy with my friends. I 
would like to have the assurance of the ranking member of the committee 
that he concurs in the statements just made by our distinguished Chair.
  Mr. LIEBERMANN. Mr. President, my reflex is to say I do, but I must 
say I was distracted for a while, so I do not know everything the 
Senator said.
  Mr. WARNER. The question is the language sent up by the 
administration did have a breakout of the budget authority as relates 
to certain parts of the overall programs performed by these combat 
agencies.
  I ask our distinguished manager of the bill whether this language in 
the communication today which said the administration opposed any 
amendments, because I proposed to have an amendment tomorrow--it may be 
opposed by the administration, but I want to make sure that the phrase 
``full budget authorities'' is not amending what they sent up by way of 
language.

[[Page S9800]]

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the sentence is subject to more than 
one interpretation. So I am not sure what the meaning of it is, but I 
can assure the Senator about what the intention of the underlying bill 
is and that is the way in which I look forward to continuing this 
discussion and debating any amendments the Senator might have.
  I found a quote that may be reassuring to the Senator. It is from 
General Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, when he 
testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on August 
18 of this year about the 9/11 Commission recommendations. He said an 
empowered national intelligence director, with direct authority over 
the national agencies, including his own, should not be viewed as 
diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill our responsibility as 
combat support agencies, which I found reassuring. That is certainly 
our intention and I hope the Senator from Virginia will find that 
reassuring as well. That, combined with the possibility that the 
administration might oppose one of the Senator's amendments, I hope 
will lead the Senator to reconsider.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, time will tell. I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed at this point in the Record a copy of the administration--I 
think the Senator referred to it as a bill although it was never 
introduced--language they sent up which made a clear reference and 
distinction to what budget authority was given to the NID and what 
residual remains in the Secretary of Defense. Am I correct on that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have no objection. I think that would 
be helpful.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, 
my understanding is, as the Senator said, this is not a complete bill. 
It was legislative language for parts of what ultimately have been 
covered in our bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I have no objection.
  Mr. WARNER. It was a communication from the administration----
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely.
  Mr. WARNER. I guess to the managers of the bill or the committee. 
Nevertheless, it is a document expressing the intentions, and the 
distinguished chairman has clearly indicated that her bill tracks that.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Ms. COLLINS. I do not want to give the impression that our 
legislation tracks the administration's legislation in all respects, 
because it does not. What I was saying to the Chair and to the Senator 
from Virginia is there has never been support for bringing the tactical 
intelligence assets, bringing the budget for those programs under the 
national intelligence director's control. Our legislation specifically 
carves them out and keeps them under the control of the Pentagon. So I 
am a bit perplexed by this debate because nobody is proposing what the 
Senator seems to be fearing.

  Mr. WARNER. I asked that if a construction of this language we 
received today is full budget authority, it could lead someone to the 
conclusion that everything was transferred.
  Ms. COLLINS. The full budget authority, in my view, applies to the 
national intelligence assets.
  Mr. WARNER. Good. And if they had inserted that in there, it would 
have been clearer, I hasten to add. We are not going to debate this 
further. In fairness, having raised this question, I think the Senator 
has brought considerable clarification. It may be the administration 
may be more forthcoming about what they precisely meant by the use of 
full budget authority in the use of this communication, but let me 
proceed in my questioning with regard to the residual authority of the 
Secretary of Defense over those budgets in the combat agencies, and I 
would like to add DIA, which is also a combat agency.
  As the Senator says in her bill, those sections which are tactical 
are in the discretion of the Secretary in the preparation of the 
budget, and he would collaborate with the NID in preparing those 
sections. Now, on the national intelligence collection, I think the 
chairman agrees with me that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 
utilize that in carrying out their tactical missions, although it 
classifies the NRO and the gathering in space as the national program. 
Am I correct? It does feed into the tactical portion?
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. So, therefore, should not the Secretary of Defense have a 
voice--and I would like to see how we can describe that voice--in the 
compilation of that budget for the national program which in part 
supports the efforts of the forces in the tactical missions?
  Ms. COLLINS. I would say to the Senator that the Secretary already 
does have a voice. There is a requirement that as the national 
intelligence director develops the budget to be recommended to the 
President, he must do it in consultation with the Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretary of Energy for the part of the intelligence community 
that is under the Secretary of Energy's control, et cetera.
  In addition, we create a new entity called the joint intelligence 
community council, which I think already has an acronym, on which the 
Secretary of Defense will serve, which serves as an advisory board to 
the national intelligence director.
  I also point out to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that 
ultimately it is the President's call on the budget. These are 
recommendations made by the national intelligence director. It is the 
President who ultimately decides.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is very helpful. I wonder if the 
Senator's staff would provide for the Record at this point an insertion 
of those references in the bill which supports the Senator's very 
important representation to the Senate just now, that the Senator feels 
he has the consultation role and such other roles as to assure the 
Secretary of Defense that he has a voice in the preparation of the 
budget.
  Ms. COLLINS. Those provisions are extremely clear in the bill. I do 
not see how they can be ambiguous.
  Mr. WARNER. I just wanted to have the pages annotated. I think my 
colleague witnessed several colleagues today saying it would be helpful 
if we could get a clearer understanding of some things, and I think the 
Record today could be of help to those who want to see in the Senator's 
bill precisely those sections which underpin the Senator's important 
representation. I ask if the Senator might consider putting that into 
the Record.
  Ms. COLLINS. I would be happy to put the provisions in the Record. I 
question why it is necessary when everybody has the bill available. It 
is on page 12, for example, lines 20 through 25, in describing what the 
national intelligence director shall do. It says:

       Developing and presenting to the President an annual budget 
     for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with 
     the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their 
     respective departments . . .

  I do not see how it could be clearer.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was not challenging the language. I was 
simply trying to get a reference. The Senator provided it, and I thank 
the chairman.
  If I could transition to the second part of this, the budget is 
prepared and approved by the President. It is then acted upon by the 
Congress by authorization and appropriation and it goes to the NID. Am 
I correct?
  Ms. COLLINS. After Congress acts.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Ms. COLLINS. And the law is signed by the President.
  Mr. WARNER. Right.
  Ms. COLLINS. The appropriation is received by the NID for the 
national intelligence program.
  Mr. WARNER. Right.
  Ms. COLLINS. Not for what is known as TIARA or JMIP.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the chairman. That portion of the budget then 
goes back to be administered by the Secretary of Defense; is that 
clear?
  Ms. COLLINS. Which portion?
  Mr. WARNER. That nonnational portion.
  Ms. COLLINS. Correct.
  Mr. WARNER. It goes back to the Secretary of Defense. I thank the 
distinguished chairman on that point.
  I see on the floor my distinguished colleague, the ranking member of 
the

[[Page S9801]]

Armed Services Committee. I wondered, since he followed this colloquy 
and I know he has worked very hard in this area with the Senator from 
Virginia, have some of his concerns which he has expressed to me been 
touched on in this colloquy?
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Virginia has the floor. Who 
has the floor?
  Mr. WARNER. I think I have the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). The Senator from Virginia has 
the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent I be able to respond to the 
Senator from Virginia without his losing the right to the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think I have the floor. I am quite happy 
to yield to my colleague to respond to my inquiry.
  Mr. LEVIN. On the first part of the inquiry, what is interesting to 
me, and ironic, is the Director of Central Intelligence has that same 
authority the chairman just read from page 12, line 20, that is 
provided to the NID, which is to develop and present to the President 
the annual budget for the national intelligence program. That is the 
same authority as exists in current law to the intelligence director. 
So there is no change in terms of presenting and developing the budget.
  Where the real changes take place are after the budget or after the 
appropriation is adopted, and then it depends--then the law will change 
who it is that executes that budget authority. That is where we get 
very complicated changes.
  I think the discussion and debate is very important, that we analyze 
which specific programs, projects, and activities, budget execution--
not presentation or preparation--but execution is transferred to the 
NID from where it currently is. That is where I think we all would 
benefit from a description of specific programs which are not 
transferred. There are some in the tactical area. But there are also 
some that are transferred--very few, perhaps 3 percent of the 80 
percent of the budget that is transferred, in terms of budget execution 
to the NID--that in my judgment should not be transferred. A very tiny, 
few programs, including the intelligence--the J-2 programs that are out 
in the combatant commanders, including the communications 
infrastructure between the JCS and the combatant commanders. Those 
specific programs--and I know my good friend from Virginia knows these 
programs--those specific programs clearly belong in the Defense 
Department's budget execution, in my judgment. However, they are 
transferred.
  To try to answer the Senator's question, I think it would be very 
illuminating, in addition to what he has asked for, if we could take 
some examples, and there are very few, of some programs where budget 
execution is transferred to the NID that should not be. I emphasize 
again, so this is not mischaracterized, I am talking here about less 
than 3 percent of the 80 percent of the budget which is transferred.

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I apologize for interrupting the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. No, I am done.
  Ms. COLLINS. The leaders have been waiting for Senator Lieberman and 
me since 5:30 for a meeting and they have summoned us again. I did not 
want to walk off the floor without explaining to my distinguished 
colleagues the fact that we have already kept our leaders waiting for 
more than 20 minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Will the distinguished Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, if I could make a preliminary statement, and then I 
will be glad to yield. As a matter of fact, I will yield the floor. If 
you seek the floor, I am going to yield it momentarily.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I was going to ask a question of the distinguished floor 
manager. I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his 
courtesy.
  It is my understanding we are not going to vote on the Specter 
amendment as of this evening; is that right?
  Ms. COLLINS. I am sorry, I couldn't hear the Senator.
  Mr. ROBERTS. It is my understanding we are not going to vote on the 
Specter amendment as of this evening; is that correct?
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct. The vote will occur tomorrow.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Do we have an idea approximately what time tomorrow 
morning?
  Ms. COLLINS. We do not. We have not been able to determine how many 
people still want to speak on the amendment. We are trying to 
accommodate those who do wish to speak.
  Mr. ROBERTS. One Senator who is asking you some questions now would 
like to speak, and I would like to have 20 to 25 minutes, if that would 
be all right, speaking as the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. 
If I could have an understanding? I know you will work very hard and I 
know there has been a lot spoken tonight; I understand that. But I 
would like to speak in favor of the Specter amendment, if in fact that 
could be arranged, or have that understanding with the Senator.
  Ms. COLLINS. I would certainly welcome that. Perhaps we can try with 
the help of the floor staff to order the series of speakers. We will 
make sure the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee is 
protected in that regard.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent also that I be given 5 minutes in 
opposition to the Specter amendment tomorrow morning, and if I am not 
here because of the full committee meeting we have at Armed Services, 
that my statement be made part of the record at that time.
  Ms. COLLINS. We hope the Senator will be here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first I thank the distinguished manager 
and ranking member for engaging in I think a very important colloquy. I 
wanted to make a record for some colleagues who have asked a number of 
questions, and I think we made an interesting record here that 
will help in their deliberations and thought processes.

  I will have amendments tomorrow, hopefully to clarify some things 
which I feel should be clarified. They are constructive amendments, I 
say to the distinguished chair and ranking member, because I want to be 
cooperative and supportive of the President and your efforts. But I do 
feel very strongly that there are some amendments.
  My colleague, Senator Levin, and I have worked together. It may well 
be we will jointly put in some amendments tomorrow on this subject. Not 
in a manner of a turf battle. I am really quite in temper that that 
word continues to be brought up, because I personally am striving to do 
what is best for this country and to make our intelligence system 
stronger as a consequence of this legislative process. I think it can 
be achievable. But I have to get clarifications. The language in this 
message that came up today about full budget authority seems to be 
somewhat contradictory of some other things. But we will work it out.
  I thank the distinguished managers and I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Briefly, I thank Senator Warner for his statement in 
opposition to the Specter amendment and for the questions which he 
raised which I think have been helpful and clarifying. No doubt this 
discussion will continue in the days ahead.
  I thank the Chair.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is not very often that things come up 
that require an immediate fix, but I think one has.
  First, I ask unanimous consent I be recognized to speak as in morning 
business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Inhofe pertaining to the introduction of S. 2855 
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. INHOFE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S9802]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to address the critical issue 
that is before the Senate--reform of our intelligence community and 
restructuring of the Federal Government to enhance our ability to wage 
the global war on terror and protect our Nation from other threats.
  I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman and their staffs for their 
hard work and leadership on this issue, and I am proud to be a 
cosponsor of this legislation.
  I also thank the Senate leadership for making this a priority. There 
is no issue more important for us to address. In fact, I believe this 
legislation is the most important I have worked on since coming to the 
Senate in 1999.
  The war on terror is unlike any conflict we have fought--covert holy 
warriors seeking to infiltrate our society and those of our allies to 
do us grievous harm. Against this radical enemy, intelligence is of the 
greatest importance. We must do everything we can to strengthen our 
intelligence capabilities. If you think of what we need to do about 
terrorism, we need to attack, we need to prevent, and we need to 
prepare. Intelligence is the greatest weapon we have in all three of 
those categories.
  Before I comment on this legislation before us, however, I would like 
to first offer some principles and thoughts that have guided my 
deliberations.
  First, we must do no harm. Great progress has been made since 
September 11, 2001, to improve the operations of our intelligence 
community and make our country more secure. There is no greater 
evidence of that than when I travel in Ohio to various large urban 
areas. I am so impressed with the cooperation that now exists as 
contrasted to what was there before 9/11. Because we are making 
progress, we must be sure that we do not inadvertently set back our 
current efforts. We must implement additional improvements.
  Second, we must not restructure the intelligence community to deal 
solely with the threat of terrorism caused by Islamic extremists, as 
pressing a concern as that is. There are many other threats that 
require close scrutiny by the intelligence community. Reform must 
address the threats that will confront America 10 and 20 years in the 
future in addition to those faced today.
  For example, the United States must continue to monitor regional 
conflicts which have the potential to undermine stability in various 
parts of the world such as India, Pakistan, China, and Taiwan. Regional 
conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, are motivated by 
political, social, and historical reasons unique to their own 
countries. In the event that regional conflicts should escalate to such 
proportions that chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons would be 
used, as would be possible in the event of a conflict between India and 
Pakistan, U.S. interests certainly would be threatened. The 
intelligence community must remain keenly aware of what is happening in 
other areas of the world so that the U.S. is not only prepared and able 
to respond but so that we can do everything in our power to prevent 
such a crisis from happening.
  The United States must also monitor threats presented by rogue 
nations such as North Korea, rogue states that have the ability to 
foster regional instability and harm U.S. interests. They, too, must be 
closely monitored as dictators such as Kim Chong-il look to enhance 
their power and position. If not, the U.S. risks strategic surprise 
which would be devastating to our national security interests.

  Additionally, the United States must address the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have the ability to cause 
grave harm to Americans and life as we know it if found in the wrong 
hands. They could be used by terrorists against cities in the United 
States, they could be used in regional conflict, or they could be used 
by a rogue state to enhance its power.
  Third, we should make it clear to the American people that the 
different perspectives presented on the Senate floor are legitimate. A 
review of the hearings held by various congressional committees during 
August and September demonstrated that many former Government officials 
who have had distinguished careers in senior national security posts 
hold contradictory opinions on the 9/11 Commission recommendations and 
related national security issues.
  Fourth, reforming the Federal Government to address the challenges of 
global terrorism is going to take several years to accomplish. It is 
not going to happen that fast. It is my hope that during the next 
Congress we will address the critical challenges confronting the 
Federal law enforcement community, for example. For example, 
rationalizing responsibility and missions and personnel systems is 
vital to ensure that Federal law enforcement is best equipped to 
confront foreign terrorists operating in the United States.
  I am pleased that we have addressed some of the needs of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in the legislation we are considering today. 
But much more remains to be done, and it is important for our national 
security to finish this job.
  As my colleagues may know, I sponsored legislation that became law 
that requires the Office of Personnel Management to study Federal law 
enforcement personnel systems and recommend improvements. I was 
concerned that we were going forward with personnel changes and getting 
some coordination between those law enforcement agencies and the 
homeland security, but we were failing to do the same thing with law 
enforcement agencies that were outside of the Department of Homeland 
Security. The Office of Personnel Management has implemented that 
legislation. They have made some significant recommendations on how we 
can improve the relationships, classifications, and so forth, with 
those outside of Homeland Security. It would be my hope that we 
implement those recommendations.
  Regarding the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, I strongly 
support creating a robust national intelligence director, but I have 
been wrestling with exactly how much authority we should give the new 
national intelligence director. I appreciate the balance that Senators 
Collins and Lieberman were trying to achieve in their legislation. It 
is clear to me that these authorities should not be diminished.
  In fact, in committee I offered an amendment that would give the 
national intelligence director reorganization authority over the 
national intelligence program so that the director could identify 
efficiencies and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort. It is 
unfortunate that my amendment was weakened in committee, and I am still 
considering amendments to strengthen the management authority of the 
national intelligence director.
  The intelligence community budget process is extremely complex. 
Indeed, the manner in which these agencies interact with each other is 
probably the most complicated interagency process in the Federal 
Government. The budgets of the 15 intelligence community agencies, 
including all those of the Armed Forces, are intertwined in the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence 
Program, the tactical intelligence and related activities.
  The Collins-Lieberman legislation seeks to bring clarity to the 
situation by defining a national intelligence program. However, we may 
be able to improve this budget definition, and I will weigh all 
amendments to do so carefully.
  At the same time, we must be careful not to erode the budget 
authority of the national intelligence director. I understand that some 
of my colleagues may offer amendments to give the national intelligence 
director a fixed term in an attempt to immunize this individual from 
political pressure. I would note that a host of other provisions, 
including a strong inspector general for the intelligence community and 
an ombudsman to specifically guard against political concerns, have 
been created to do exactly that.
  Quite the contrary, a fixed term is unnecessary and could diminish 
the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. A close and 
trusting working relationship with the President is going to be key to 
the success of the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. 
We should not weaken this relationship by mandating a fixed-term 
appointment.

[[Page S9803]]

  The Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from three former 
Directors of Central Intelligence, and all agreed that the national 
intelligence director should serve at the pleasure of the President. An 
incoming President should not be stuck with a national intelligence 
director from a previous administration.
  I know that the Presiding Officer, in his former capacity as Governor 
of the State of Tennessee and as a member of the Bush Cabinet, 
understands that if this individual doesn't have the confidence of the 
President of the United States, his or her effectiveness is going to be 
diminished a great deal. So much of what this person can accomplish 
will have a lot to do with that relationship with the President because 
there are going to be situations where there are going to be 
differences of opinion. Finally, the boss has to decide them. If you 
have somebody there that has the job and doesn't have the confidence of 
the boss, we are in trouble.

  Mr. President, although this legislation deals primarily with 
improving structured roles and missions, the human capital challenges 
confronting our intelligence community must not be overlooked.
  In March of 2001--it seems like a long time ago--my Government 
Management Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``The National Security 
Implications of the Human Capital Crisis.'' The panel of distinguished 
witnesses that day included former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, 
a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st 
Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded his testimony with these 
remarks:

       As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds 
     itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence 
     in Government. The maintenance of American power in the world 
     depends on the quality of U.S. Government personnel, civil 
     and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in 
     the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet 
     future challenges. That fixing of the personnel problem is a 
     precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs 
     repair in the institutional edifice of U.S. national security 
     policy.

  He was so right. Secretary Schlesinger's insightful comments were 
reinforced by the 9/11 Commission on page 399 of the report. The 
Commission said ``significant changes in the organization of the 
Government.'' The Commission went on to say:

       We know that the quality of people is more important than 
     the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some of the saddest 
     aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so 
     many individuals straining, often without success, against 
     the boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad 
     structures, but they should not have to.

  I will never forget that after 9/11 the first thing that came to my 
mind was we didn't have the right people with the right knowledge and 
skills at the right place at the right time. If you go back and look at 
all of the report, it gets back to that situation and also the fact 
that they weren't communicating with each other.
  I am pleased that the Collins-Lieberman legislation includes some 
important human capital provisions. I offered an amendment in 
committee, which was unanimously accepted, that provides enhanced 
classification and pay flexibilities for intelligence analysts at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
  Specifically, my amendment enables the FBI to work with the OPM to 
develop new classification standards and pay rates for intelligence 
analysts. The amendment also allows the bureau to improve their 
performance management system for their intelligence analysts and 
establishes two congressional reporting requirements. The amendment was 
completely within the spirit of the 9/11 recommendations, which noted 
that the FBI should create a specialized and integrated national 
security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and 
surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and 
retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture with 
strong experience in intelligence and national security throughout the 
organization.

  I thought the other incredible thing after 9/11 was the cry that went 
out: Can anybody speak Farsi? Can anybody speak Arabic? You would have 
thought that after the Persian Gulf war there would have been a very 
aggressive effort, because of the instability of the area, for us to 
bring in people who could speak Farsi and Arabic. If you looked at the 
State Department a couple years ago, you would have found we had all 
kinds of linguists who could speak fluent Russian. But the threat had 
changed. We didn't have the capacity to change with that threat. 
Hopefully, with this new national intelligence director, we are going 
to be able to have that flexibility.
  It is my hope that this amendment will provide the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation with essential human capital flexibilities specifically 
targeted to building an elite cadre of intelligence analysts. In 
addition, Senator Lugar and I will offer another amendment to the bill 
to improve the Presidential appointment process, which has been broken 
for decades. Over the coming days, I want to work with Senators Collins 
and Lieberman on this amendment.
  This amendment addresses a critical recommendation in the 9/11 
Commission Report. It is a problem I have been examining for years. 
During my time in the Senate, I have found political appointees to be 
dedicated and diligent professionals who want to make a difference for 
our country. They often leave high-paying corporate jobs only to find 
their commitment to our Nation requires an increase in workload and a 
decrease in salary.
  I talked to one individual who filled out the financial disclosure 
form and all that was required. He said that it cost him $200,000 to 
pay the professional people to do all the things that were required in 
this disclosure form that is now currently in effect with the Federal 
Government. I suspect that the President, when he appointed the 
Secretary of Education, had to go through all these forms, and so 
forth, and wondered to himself whether he ought to do it. Before they 
even begin to work for the Government, however, as I mentioned, they 
must first navigate the complex, turbulent, and outdated Presidential 
appointment process--an area where reviews and recommendations for 
improvement have gone unheeded far too long.
  In 1937, a committee issued the first report on improving the 
Presidential appointment process. During the 67 years since this 
inaugural report, the appointment process has been formally examined 14 
additional times. After such extensive reviews, it is disconcerting for 
this Senator that we have not been able to enact meaningful reform in 
this area.
  To capture the essence of the problem, understand first that the 
number of politically appointed positions has grown from 286 to 3,361 
over the past 4 decades. This increase is straining an already 
overburdened system. And the time it takes to complete an appointment 
has increased through the years from just over 2 months during the 
Kennedy administration to 8 months in the current administration. I 
think Secretary Rumsfeld said his team didn't go into place until 6 
months after he had been appointed as Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. President, 8 months is simply too long to fill an appointed 
position. I am afraid that if we do not update the current system for 
processing Presidential appointees, we run the risk of driving good 
people away from appointed Government service. Progress has been made 
on this issue during the last several years.

  First, on February 15, the Hart-Rudman commission issued their report 
entitled ``The Roadmap for National Security Imperative for Change,'' 
which in part examined the Presidential appointment process. The 
Commission's final report observes: The ordeals to which outside 
nominees are subjected are so great, above and beyond whatever 
financial or career sacrifice is involved, so as to make it prohibitive 
for many individuals of talent and experience to accept public service.
  Then on April 4 and 5, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
held 2 days of hearings on the state of the Presidential appointment 
process. During those hearings Paul Light from the Brookings 
Institution said:

       Past and potential Presidential appointees alike view the 
     process of entering office with disdain, describing it as 
     embarrassing, confusing, and unfair. They see the process as 
     far more cumbersome and lengthy than it needs to be.

  By the way, I held a hearing a couple weeks ago, and Paul Light was 
there,

[[Page S9804]]

and he reiterated that same statement he made in 2001.
  On May 16, 2001, the Governmental Affairs Committee passed Senator 
Fred Thompson's bipartisan bill to streamline the Presidential 
appointments process that I cosponsored with Senators Akaka, Durbin, 
Lieberman, and Lugar. Although it passed the Governmental Affairs 
Committee in the 107th Congress, it did not pass the full Senate. When 
Senator Fred Thompson left the Senate, I promised him I would continue 
to push for appointments reform. Therefore, in April of last year, I 
reintroduced the Presidential Appointments Improvement Act, and today I 
urge my colleagues to pass this important proposal.
  What happens is that after the President comes in and he goes through 
this line of getting people appointed, they get off on other things, 
and they forget about the problems they went through to get all their 
appointees. So it kind of goes to the bottom of the stack in terms of 
priorities. This 9/11 Commission implementation by the Senate gives us 
a wonderful opportunity to do something about this problem that has 
lingered for so many years.
  I am certain all my colleagues have read the recommendations in the 
9/11 Commission report. As you recall, one of the recommendations 
underscored the importance of improving the Presidential appointment 
process. Specifically on page 422, the report states:

       Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no 
     notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption 
     of national security policymaking during the change of 
     administration by accelerating the process for national 
     security appointments. We think the process could be improved 
     significantly so transitions can work more effectively and 
     allow more new officials to assume their responsibilities as 
     quickly as possible.

  The 9/11 Commission report also noted that in 2001, the new 
administration, like others before it, did not have its team on the job 
until at least 6 months after it took office. In fact, I commented to 
people that after the length it took for the President to finally know 
he was President, we lost that period of time once the President was 
elected and started building his team; they were just concentrating on 
who was going to be the President. Once that was done, then they 
started to concentrate on who the people were going to be in the 
administration.
  They did a great job of taking care of the initial people, but, as 
you know, it took a long time for them to start filling in that 
organization.
  My amendment offers realistic governmentwide solutions to the 
problems identified by the 9/11 Commission and the 14 other Commission 
studies and reports that have detailed the importance of streamlining 
the Presidential appointment process.
  The four main provisions of the amendment include streamlining the 
financial disclosure forms for executive branch employees. Two, 
requiring agencies to examine the number of Presidential-appointed 
positions and recommending to Congress which positions could be 
eliminated. We are asking them to do it. Three, allowing Presidential 
candidates to obtain a list of appointee positions 15 days after they 
receive their party's nomination so they will have an idea of the kind 
of people they have to look for if they are elected President of the 
United States. And four, requiring the Office of Government Ethics to 
review the conflict-of-interest laws.
  The principles behind this amendment are simple, and given the 
bipartisan nature in which the original bill passed the Governmental 
Affairs Committee last Congress, I ask my colleagues to adopt this 
amendment. Although it will not solve all the problems with the 
appointments process outlined in the 9/11 Commission report, the 
amendment is an important first step for updating an outdated system.
  I urge the Senate to support its adoption. Senator Lugar and I will 
be working with Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman to try to obtain 
their support for this amendment and to also work out any of the 
problems they may have with it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Kansas is 
waiting. I need to make a couple of very brief announcements, with the 
Senator's indulgence.


                Amendment No. 3731 to Amendment No. 3705

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have two amendments that have been 
cleared on both sides. Both of these amendments are second-degree 
amendments to my underlying amendment No. 3705 regarding Homeland 
Security grants. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Inhofe-
Jeffords second-degree amendment No. 3731, which is at the desk, be 
considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the 
table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 3731) was agreed to, as follows:

   (Purpose: To ensure the participation of the Under Secretary for 
   Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Threat-Based Homeland 
  Security Grant Program grant-making process for nonlaw enforcement 
                            related grants)

       In section 406 of the amendment, redesignate subsections 
     (i) and (j) as subsections (j) and (k), respectively.
       In section 406 of the amendment, insert after subsection 
     (h) the following:
       (i) Participation of Under Secretary for Emergency 
     Preparedness and Response.--
       (1) Participation.--The Under Secretary for Emergency 
     Preparedness and Response shall participate in the 
     grantmaking process for the Threat-Based Homeland Security 
     Grant Program for nonlaw enforcement-related grants in order 
     to ensure that preparedness grants where appropriate, are 
     consistent, and are not in conflict, with the Robert T. 
     Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
     U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
       (2) Reports.--The Under Secretary for Emergency 
     Preparedness and Response shall submit to the Committee on 
     Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the Committee 
     on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives an annual report that describes--
       (A) the status of the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant 
     Program; and
       (B) the impact of that program on programs authorized under 
     the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).


                Amendment No. 3732 to Amendment No. 3705

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the 
Levin second-degree amendment No. 3732, which is at the desk, now be 
considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the 
table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 3732) was agreed to, as follows:

     (Purpose: To give the Secretary of Homeland Security greater 
   flexibility in allocating funds for discretionary grants to local 
                              governments)

       On page 36, strike lines 3 through 21, and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 409. CERTIFICATION RELATIVE TO THE SCREENING OF 
                   MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TRANSPORTED INTO THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``municipal 
     solid waste'' includes sludge (as defined in section 1004 of 
     the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903)).
       (b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Customs and 
     Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security 
     shall submit a report to Congress that--
       (1) indicates whether the methodologies and technologies 
     used by the Bureau to screen for and detect the presence of 
     chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological weapons in 
     municipal solid waste are as effective as the methodologies 
     and technologies used by the Bureau to screen for such 
     materials in other items of commerce entering into the United 
     States by commercial motor vehicle transport; and
       (2) if the methodologies and technologies used to screen 
     solid waste are less effective than those used to screen 
     other commercial items, identifies the actions that the 
     Bureau will take to achieve the same level of effectiveness 
     in the screening of solid waste, including the need for 
     additional screening technologies.
       (c) Impact on Commercial Motor Vehicles.--If the Bureau of 
     Customs and Border Protection fails to fully implement the 
     actions described in subsection (b)(2) before the earlier of 
     6 months after the date on which the report is due under 
     subsection (b) or 6 months after the date on which such 
     report is submitted, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     deny entry into the United States of any commercial motor 
     vehicle (as defined in section 31101(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code) carrying municipal solid waste until the 
     Secretary certifies to Congress that the methodologies and 
     technologies used by the Bureau to screen for and detect the 
     presence of chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological 
     weapons in such waste are as effective as the methodologies 
     and technologies used by the Bureau to screen for such 
     materials in other items of commerce entering into the United 
     States by commercial motor vehicle transport.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341, this 
     section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this 
     Act.


[[Page S9805]]


  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I hope we can continue to work on the 
underlying amendment with the goal of having a vote on it shortly. I 
also want to announce to all of my colleagues that we do intend to vote 
on Senator Specter's amendment tomorrow. I recognize there are a few 
Senators who have not been heard on it who desire to be heard, but we 
do intend to conclude the debate and vote on Senator Specter's 
amendment tomorrow.
  I thank the Chair.


                           amendment no. 3731

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I will never forget my visit to Ground 
Zero. I hope that September 11 is an event that will never be repeated, 
on any scale, in our country or anywhere in the world.
  I share the goal of all my colleagues that our Nation be as prepared 
as possible, should such an event occur. However, in seeking to improve 
our capability to respond to terrorism, it is critical that we do not 
lose our capability to respond to natural disasters, which happen much 
more frequently than terrorist events.
  The Inhofe-Jeffords second degree amendment to the Collins' amendment 
will ensure that as we seek to enhance our ability to respond to 
terrorist events, we do not lose our ability to respond to natural 
disasters.
  I thank my colleagues, the chair and ranking member of the Government 
Affairs Committee and Senator Carper, a cosponsor of the Collins 
amendment for agreeing to accept this amendment.
  The role of a first responder, whether responding to a terrorist 
event or a natural disaster is, for the most part, the same. For 
decades, the Federal, State, and local governments in this Nation have 
partnered together to plan, prepare, respond, and recover from both 
minor and major natural disasters.
  We have a robust system for responding to these events, authorized 
through the Stafford Act and executed through FEMA. My home State of 
Vermont has a long history with emergency management.
  My colleague and friend, Senator Bob Stafford of Vermont, served as 
chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee for many years 
and ushered the Stafford Act through Congress in 1974. The Stafford Act 
is the authorizing statute for emergency response activities at the 
Federal level, and it forms the basis for the emergency management 
system in this Nation. The Stafford Act gave structure to an emergency 
response process where virtually none existed in the past.
  FEMA, which was formed in 1979 and incorporated into the Department 
of Homeland Security in the Homeland Security Act, is a robust agency, 
with extensive experience in all-hazards planning, preparing, response, 
and recovery. It has a tradition of providing quick response to people 
in immediate need.
  As Chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee during the 
107th Congress, I recognized the need to provide assistance to our 
first responders. I was struck during my visits to the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Center in particular at the inability of first responders 
to communicate with each other. To combat this and the other 
shortcomings we observed, I introduced S. 2664, the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2003 with my colleague Senator Bob 
Smith. The EPW Committee reported that bill on June 27, 2002.

  During this Congress, Senator Inhofe and I worked together to 
introduce S. 930, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Act of 2003. 
The EPW Committee reported that bill favorably on July 30, 2003, by 
voice vote.
  Before the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, I 
expressed grave concerns about the proposal to incorporate FEMA into 
the Department of Homeland Security. I was concerned at that time that 
the robust agency we saw jumping every hurdle after September 11, 2001 
to provide assistance to World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and to 
hundreds of natural disasters each year, would give way under the 
pressure of the enormous bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland 
Security and lose its ability to respond quickly and effectively to 
disasters.
  I remain concerned today. However, the administration prevailed and 
incorporated FEMA in DHS with the enactment of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002.
  Since the formation of DHS, FEMA has administered aid for 169 major 
disasters, 29 emergency declarations, and 172 fire management 
assistance declarations--all natural disasters. That is 370 communities 
that have received emergency assistance from the Federal Government and 
our Nation's first responders for natural disasters.
  Over the last several weeks, we have seen record-breaking hurricanes 
rip through the southeast bringing high winds, flooding, tornadoes, and 
beach erosion. In my home State of Vermont, we recently had a disaster 
declared for extensive flooding throughout the State.
  The Inhofe-Jeffords second degree amendment ensures that FEMA, the 
agency responsible for administering our Nation's disaster response 
programs, is involved in the distribution of funds to first responders 
and that grants made are consistent with the Stafford Act. This ensures 
that we will not lose the level of preparedness and response that we 
have seen at work in States like Florida over the last few weeks.
  We obviously need to be prepared for the small percentage of the time 
when a terrorist event may occur, but we cannot ignore the day-to-day 
operations, which affect so many lives.
  I thank my colleagues, the distinguished chair and ranking member of 
the subcommittee as well as Senator Carper, a cosponsor of the Collins 
amendment, for working with us to incorporate our second degree into 
the underlying amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

                          ____________________